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TESIS DOCTORAL

Institutional reform through innovative diasporas in the knowledge economy

Reforma institucional a través de diásporas innovadoras en la economía del conocimiento

MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR

PRESENTADA POR

Juan Enrique Gutiérrez Chávez

Directores

María Esther del Campo García

Yevgeny N. Kuznetsov

Lev M. Freinkman

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INSTITUTIONAL REFORM THROUGH INNOVATIVE DIASPORAS IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY



*Doctoral dissertation by
Juan Enrique Gutiérrez Chávez*

*Under the supervision of
María Esther del Campo García
Yevgeny N. Kuznetsov
Lev M. Freinkman*

REFORMA INSTITUCIONAL A TRAVÉS DE DIÁSPORAS INNOVADORAS EN LA ECONOMÍA DEL CONOCIMIENTO

Tesis doctoral presentada por

Juan Enrique Gutiérrez Chávez

Bajo la tutela de los doctores

María Esther del Campo García – Universidad Complutense

Yevgeny N. Kuznetsov – Migration Policy Institute

Lev M. Freinkman – Banco Mundial

Para obtener el grado de Doctor en Gobierno y Administración Pública



Instituto Universitario de Investigación
José Ortega y Gasset



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Dedicada a mi madre y a mi padre, sin cuyo amor, ejemplo, esfuerzo y apoyo hubiera sido imposible llegar hasta aquí.

Посвящено Маше, непоколебимая любовь, терпение и поддержка которой стали основой этого достижения.

Dedicated to my PhD supervisors, family & friends who suffered by my side the long and oftentimes tortuous process of the dissertation.

Dedicada al talento mexicano en Europa, ese gigante dormido que aún no toma plena conciencia de su gran potencial.



Resumen

La migración del talento comporta efectos tanto negativos como positivos a los países emisores; el balance final dependerá de si dichos países tienen capacidad institucional de absorber las potenciales contribuciones intangibles de sus migrantes calificados en el exterior. Por tanto, ¿cómo desarrollar las capacidades institucionales de los países de origen para (re)vincularse con sus diásporas talentosas a fin de aprovechar al máximo las aportaciones intangibles de éstas?

Para entender mejor el reto planteado y poder dar una respuesta adecuada, nuestra tesis sigue el proceso tradicional: abordando primero una revisión a la literatura relevante, seleccionando un marco analítico adecuado para el tema de estudio, y finalmente aplicando empíricamente el marco analítico a un estudio de caso.

Así, la primera parte de nuestra tesis explora diferentes disciplinas y tradiciones teóricas que estudian tres temas centrales: conocimiento e innovación para el desarrollo, migración del capital humano, y cambio de políticas públicas y reforma institucional.

De dicha exploración, en la segunda parte extraemos una serie de fundamentos teóricos para abordar el reto desde una perspectiva integral. Atendiendo a estos fundamentos, hemos ensamblando un marco analítico interdisciplinario, multinivel y anidado (bautizado como Matryoshka, como las muñecas rusas anidadas), que se integra, de nivel micro a macro, por adaptaciones de herramientas metodológicas bien establecidas:

- 1) el marco de las narrativas de políticas de Jones y McBeth,*
- 2) la teoría del poder en red de Castells,*
- 3) el marco de movilización de diásporas de Kuznetsov,*
- 4) el marco de coaliciones promotoras de Sabatier, y*
- 5) los protocolos de investigación para estudios de caso orientados al cambio de políticas públicas de Barzelay et al.*

En la tercera parte, aplicamos el marco analítico unificado Matryoshka al caso de estudio de la relación entre el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior y la diáspora calificada de México en Europa, para descubrir si existen las condiciones institucionales y de política pública para generar y mantener el fenómeno de la circulación de cerebros, y en su caso, ofrecer recomendaciones de mejora.

Abstract

The migration of talent entails both negative and positive effects for the countries of origin; the outcome will depend on whether these countries have the institutional capacities to absorb the potential intangible contributions from their qualified migrants abroad. So, how can the countries of origin develop those institutional capacities to (re)engage with its talented diasporas in order to maximize the benefits of their intangible contributions?

To understand the challenge better and to be able to answer adequately, our dissertation follows the traditional process: first, by undergoing an in-depth review of the relevant literature, then selecting an appropriate analytical framework for our object, and finally, by empirically applying the analytical framework to a case study.

Therefore, part one of our dissertation explores different theoretical disciplines and traditions that focus on three central topics: knowledge, innovation and its embodiments for development, the migration of human capital, and policy change and institutional reform.

From this exploration, in part two, we extract a set of fundamental criteria to approach the challenge from an integrated perspective. Following these criteria, we have assembled an interdisciplinary, multilevel, and nested analytical framework (named Matryoshka, after the nested Russian dolls), composed from micro to macro levels by well-established methodological tools slightly adapted for integration:

- 1) the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) by Jones and McBeth,*
- 2) the Network Theories of Power (NTP) by Castells,*
- 3) the Diaspora Mobilization Framework (DMF) by Kuznetsov,*
- 4) the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) by Sabatier, and*
- 5) the Case-study Oriented Research for Policy Change (CORPC) by Barzelay et al.*

In part three, we empirically apply the unified Matryoshka framework to the case study of the engagement relationship between the Institute of Mexicans Abroad and the Mexican qualified diaspora in Europe, to discover whether the institutional and public policy conditions exist to generate and sustain brain circulation, and if needed, to offer improvement suggestions.

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
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

{D}	Development and growth as dissertation pillar concepts
{I}	Institutional reform and policy change as dissertation pillar concepts
{I→D}	How institutional reform and policy change affect development and growth
{I↔K}	Relation between institutional reform, and knowledge and its embodiments
{K}	Knowledge and its embodiments as dissertation pillar concepts
{K→D}	How knowledge and its embodiments affect development and growth
{K↔M}	Relation between knowledge and its embodiments, and the migration of talent
{M}	Migration of talent as a dissertation pillar concept
{M→D}	How the migration of talent affects development and growth
{M↔I}	Relation between the migration of talent, and institutional reform and policy change
ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AMD	Advanced Micro Devices
BRICs	Brazil, Russia, India and China

CCIME	<i>Consejo Consultivo del Instituto de los Mexicanos en Exterior</i> (Consultative Council for the Institute of Mexicans Abroad)
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIREA	<i>Conferencia Internacional sobre las Relaciones Estado-Diáspora</i> (International Conference on State-Diaspora Relations)
CNCME	<i>Consejo Nacional para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior</i> (National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad)
COLEF	<i>Colegio de la Frontera Norte</i> (College of the Northern Border)
COMPAS	Centre on Migration, Policy and Society
CONACYT	<i>Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología</i> (Mexican Council of Science and Technology)
CORPC	Case-Study Oriented Research in Policy Change
DMF	Diaspora Mobilization Framework
ExATec	<i>Asociación de Ex-Alumnos del Tecnológico de Monterrey</i> (ITESM Alumni Association)
FUMEC	<i>Fundación México Estados Unidos para la Ciencia</i> (United States-Mexico Science Foundation)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLOPP	Globalization and Livelihood Options of People living in Poverty
HTAs	Home Town Associations
IAD	Institutional Analysis and Development
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IMD	International Institute for Management Development IMD Business School
IME	<i>Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior</i> (Institute of Mexicans Abroad)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INADEM	<i>Instituto Nacional del Emprendedor</i> (National Institute for Entrepreneurs)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
ITESM	<i>Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey Tecnológico de Monterrey</i> (Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education)
KE	Knowledge Exchanges
LEED	OECD's Local Economic and Employment Development Program
MPI	Migration Policy Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIE	New Institutional Economics
NPF	Narrative Policy Framework
NTP (+)	Network Theories of Power (+) as adapted to be integrated to the Matryoshka framework

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIE	Original Institutional Economics
OPME	<i>Oficina Presidencial para la Atención de los Mexicanos en el Exterior</i> (Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad)
PAN	<i>Partido Acción Nacional</i> (National Action Political Party)
PCME	<i>Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior</i> (Program for Mexican Communities Abroad)
PDLM	<i>Programme Développement Local-Migration</i> (Local Development and Migration Program)
PNCS	<i>Puntos Nacionales de Contacto Sectoriales</i> (National Topical Contact Points)
PRD	<i>Partido de la Revolución Democrática</i> (Democratic Revolution Political Party)
PRI	<i>Partido Revolucionario Institucional</i> (Institutional Revolution Political Party)
R&D	Research and Development
RedGlobal.Mx	<i>Red Global de Mexicanos en el Exterior</i> (Global Network of Mexicans Abroad)
RTM	<i>Red de Talentos Mexicanos en el Exterior</i> (Mexican Talent Network)
SE	<i>Secretaría de Economía</i> (Mexican Ministry of the Economy)
SEDESOL	<i>Secretaría de Desarrollo Social</i> (Mexican Ministry for Social Development)
SENER	<i>Secretaría de Energía</i> (Mexican Ministry of Energy)
SOPEMI	<i>Système d'Observation Permanent des Migrations</i> (OECD's Continuous Reporting System on Migration)
SRE	<i>Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores</i> (Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Networks
UN	United Nations Organization
UNAM	<i>Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México</i> (National Autonomous University of Mexico)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
US	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
WEF	World Economic Forum



INTRODUCTION

Migration implies the physical relocation of a person from their original place of residence to a new one; a process that may cut some—or even all—ties linking migrants and homelands. For this reason, brain drain is a widely used metaphor: countries losing their most talented citizens as these emigrate in search of better opportunities abroad.

Sadly, the equally important phenomenon of brain circulation does not receive enough attention and remains rather obscurely in the domain of migration experts. Essentially, the brain circulation notion suggests that not only the emigration of talent should not imply a loss to the countries of origin, but that it might in fact represent an opportunity for development. However, for this notion to work, there is a *sine qua non* condition: to keep migrants engaged with their homelands.

To keep compatriots abroad engaged, in broad terms, means to keep those ties with the homeland alive and constant for the benefit of both the migrant and the communities whence they originate. Most often migrants do so themselves through their personal linkages (family, friends, colleagues, etc.). These ties are usually *ad hoc* and tend to have a limited development impact.

However, ties could also be institutionally managed through diaspora engagement policies, which for the purposes of this dissertation we define as decisions made and actions taken—or the absence thereof—by governments and institutions on interactions with their citizens abroad.

Our overall aim of this doctoral dissertation is to find and to help improve the mechanisms through which networks of highly skilled migrants enter into brain-circulation dynamics with their homelands, as an alternative to the quaint albeit ubiquitous metaphor of brain drain. We contend that talented diasporans are an untapped resource for modernization and development, particularly through the promotion of institutional reform, especially for countries that are in transition to become knowledge-based economies.

About the Structure of this Dissertation

To achieve our overall aim, we decided to invest the better part of the doctoral process in becoming as knowledgeable as possible in the three greater subjects and in their interlinkages at its core: knowledge, migration and institutions. Moreover, we decided to follow the traditional and straightforward dissertation structure, in which the first part covers a theoretical review of the relevant literature, the second part attempts to design an analytical framework for our overall aim, and the third part deals with the implementation of said analytical framework.

We soon discovered, however, that the process would not be as straight forward as we had anticipated. Shortly after our initial attempt to scour the scientific literature on knowledge, migration and institutions, it became clear that the three core subjects had been covered from such a variety of academic disciplines and traditions, that deciding the best approach to build our analytic framework would be the greatest challenge we would face.

Our literature review took us not only through the broadest of fields, such as sociology, economics, or political science, but also through their subfields, including—but not limited to—psycho-sociology, demography, economic sociology, behavioral economy, geographical economy, institutional economic, political economy, public policy, or public management, just to name a few. Often complementary and sometimes outright incompatible, the approaches these fields offer also gave us different semantic and conceptual understandings on the core subjects.

For this reason, in part one, we offer just the most relevant fraction of our theoretical exploration to find a common language across different academic disciplines and traditions, and to find compatible and complementary perspectives that would aid us in the construction of our analytic

framework. In a way, part one is a sort of accessible textbook compiled (1) to extract the most relevant notions from our three subjects, narrowed down to knowledge and its embodiments, the migration of talent, and the change of policies and institutions; (2) to build our own conceptual background; and (3) to level the playing field of the different reader profiles.

In part two, we attempt to integrate a conceptually robust interdisciplinary, multilevel, nested analytical framework that works much in the way a prism disaggregates a beam of light into its different components. Through this proposed framework, our one object of study—the mechanisms through which brain circulation can be achieved and used as a lever for institutional modernization towards development—will be disaggregated into five distinct interrelated levels ranging from the macro-most environmental variables to the micro-most individual concerns for increased explanatory power.

Then, in part three we deal with the empirical application of our analytical framework through the case study of the talented Mexican diaspora in Europe. Three main reasons inform our choice. First, because it fitted our target precisely: Mexico is a country in transition to become a knowledge-based economy often diagnosed as suffering from brain drain. Second, because timing seemed adequate, since an important effort has been taking place over the past couple of decades from the public arena to hone the Mexican institutions to reconnect with the country's talent abroad for development. Third, because while most studies on Mexican emigration focus on the diaspora in the United States, we have found that Mexicans who migrate to Europe are a more skilled group as a proportion of the average Mexican migrant.

Finally, we close this dissertation with our general assessment of the framework. In this last section, we discuss our experience applying the methodology to the case study, its performance, and we offer some final remarks on the challenges and further areas of development and application.

Summing up, our dissertation is about the international movement of human capital and how these flows could impact the development of the homelands left behind. More specifically, about how these skilled and talented migrants can contribute to the modernization—thus to the development—of their homelands by acting as knowledge-bridges between the developed countries where they reside and their places of origin.

Before we start with part one, it is important to provide some of the context in which our work unfolds. After all, to use the words from Bourdieu as paraphrased by Jenkins (2008):

Although as social scientists we must aim for the greatest possible clarity, our concepts must also be grounded in the observable realities of the human world. If we try to impose concepts

that are too straight-edged on this messy reality we risk divorcing ourselves from it, substituting the 'reality of the model' for a 'model of reality'.

Set in the stage of contemporary globalization, where concepts such as national identity, talent migration, international competitiveness, human capital, social capital, and innovation have a heightened role in an increasingly important knowledge economy, this dissertation has a developmental goal at heart.

Development in the Age of Globalization

At the dawn of the new millennium, common wisdom deemed globalization as the irreversible condition that best characterized our deeply-interconnected fast-moving times. Nevertheless, economic historians often tell a different story, providing us with ample evidence to support the view of globalization as a historical trend.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the world was highly integrated economically, through mobility of capital, information, goods, and people. [...] Trade was largely unhindered, even in apparently protectionist states such as the German empire. Above all, people moved. [...] Economists who have tried to find a statistical basis for a comparison of this first era of globalization with our own era are usually struck by the degree of similarity. (James, 2002:10-12)

As a result of the historical evidence¹, authors like Keohane and Nye prefer a definition of globalization as an ongoing process with ebbs and flows, and differentiate it from globalism which would be the outcome condition (McGrew, 2005:209).

Other common misconceptions of this process reduce globalization to a cliché of homogenizing forces that erase all geographical and organizational differences of regional economies. This may well be due to the proliferation of mainstream best-selling books and other publications that use and abuse certain common places by deeming globalization as “the end of geography” (O’Brian, 1992), a “borderless world” (Ohmae, 2005), or a “flat world” (Friedman, 2005).

Nevertheless, while some of the forces behind this phenomenon do indeed push towards the convergence of regional economies, such a view of economic globalization is incomplete. Homogenizing tendencies coexist with several other forces which may act in direct opposition,

¹ For more on the epochal shifts in globalization from an economic perspective, see Lindert & Williamson (2001)

pushing towards an increased differentiation, polarization and specialization of the various regional economies.

Evidence of these other forces is clearly present in the works of scholars who claim that globalization increases the role of geographical location as a competitive advantage (Porter, 1998), and that it brings about greater disparity among regions generating sets of geographical winners and losers (Stiglitz, 2002; Dicken, 2003; Florida, 2005)².

Furthermore, since not every place is affected evenly by the same forces at the same time, the outcome is countless different regional subsystems, which in turn, become interconnected amongst themselves by the continuous trade of goods and services, and the mobility of capital, technology, information and labor.

The result is akin to those kinetic sculptures that play with the principles of balance and equilibrium (usually called Calder mobiles after Alexander Calder who originally popularized them): a plethora of regional interconnected economies integrated by a myriad of public and private actors, interacting through numerous layers up to a dynamic and fluid globalized economic system capable of multiple equilibriums.

Such is the complexity of the context that all private and public actors face in a race to reap the benefits (or, in the worst case, to mitigate their losses) of globalization, making it a process driven fundamentally by microeconomic considerations (Houghton & Sheehan, 2000:12) in a constant quest for *growth* and *development*. These two concepts, albeit their important differences –growth refers to “an increase in the *income and material wealth of a country* [...while development...] also considers other aspects of economic and social change” (Acocella, 2006:73)³–, exhibit close ties especially in economic terms.

[Economic development is defined as the] qualitative change and restructuring in a country's economy in connection with technological and social progress. The main indicator of economic development is [...] an increase in the economic productivity and average material wellbeing of a country's population [...therefore, it...] is closely linked with economic growth. (Soubbotina, 2004:133)

² For more on how the globalized world is not flat, see Florida (2005) and Christopherson et al. (2008)

³ Here and henceforth, italics and other emphasis will always appear as in the original unless otherwise noted

Consequently, understanding the underpinnings of economic growth is essential to understand economic development, which in turn is an essential component of a more integral notion of development more closely associated with the idea of prosperity.

The considerations of the United Nations [...for a definition of development...] are based on the Aristotelian idea that societies should be judged according to the extent that they promote 'human good'. This leads to a definition of human development as a 'process of enlarging people's choice', which amounts to expanding human '**capabilities**'. (Brakman, 2006:73-4)

If economic development in this broader prosperity context implies an expansion of a person's material capabilities, an expansion of non-material capabilities essentially implies an expansion of a person's relevant knowledge and its application to other areas of the person's life. In that sense, development in the age of globalization cannot be understood without the incorporation of knowledge and its embedment into individuals and societies, even as these societies seem to become more homogeneous, or as these individuals move across borders in higher quantities.

Migration in a Historical Context

We have also said that this dissertation is about migration. However, this migration does not take place in a historical void.

People move. Short, and long, and in-between distances. Within a region, within a country, and across borders. In times of war, in times of tension, and in times of peace. In economic boom, or in times of crisis. For personal, social, ethnic, economic, religious, or even a combination of these reasons. Voluntarily or forced. Individually, with their families, or in sizeable groups. A single time, or several. Temporarily with a defined seasonality, temporarily with an open-end, or permanently. Without any distinction of class, religion, education, ethnicity, gender, or preference. Across the world, people move, and have always moved.

Philosophers as early as Aristotle and Aquinas were already concerned with the migratory debate as they "recognized that some products needed to be traded over long distances, but believed that local production was more moral, because foreigners would disrupt civic life" (James 2002:208)⁴. However, there is no need to go that far back if we wanted to draw some parallels with historical examples to our contemporary context.

⁴ James paraphrases Irwin, D. (1996) *Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 19.

The last decade of the nineteenth century saw the beginning of the end of an important wave of globalization. At the time, the international mobility of people was very much commonplace partly because it was largely unregulated, and partly because of an increase in speed and a reduction in price for passenger transportation pushed by the industrial revolution. Passports were not required to cross borders in search of freedom, security and prosperity, and the debate on citizenship was almost inexistent. (James, 2002; McGrew, 2005)

In the 1890s the German chancellor Leo von Caprivi had defended his attempts to liberalize trade policy by saying that the alternative would be pauperization and increased emigration. “We must export. Either we export goods or we export people.”⁵ [...] Between 1871 and 1915, 36 million people left Europe. In the countries of immigration, the inflows brought substantial economic growth. At the same time, the countries left behind experienced large productivity gains as surplus (low-productivity) populations were eliminated. Such flows eased the desperate poverty of, among others, Ireland and Norway. (James, 2002:10-5)

Economic historians have demonstrated that “migration contributed more to the convergence of the income across the globe than trade did in the nineteenth century”. (Weizsäcker, 2006:2) However, this openness towards migration would be reversed on the wake of the Great War, with the advent of the modern idea of the nation-state as the new dominant paradigm and its consolidation as a defense mechanism against external threats in the developed nations of Europe and the United States (Ohmae, 2005). As a direct consequence, questions of nationality, citizenship and restrictions to the free movement of people gained notoriety.

By the 1920s and 1930s, the powerful idea of the external threat to consolidate a sense of nationhood, amid episodes of economic and financial crises, and the incessant arrival of migrants running away from hunger, destitution and war, became fertile ground that begat protectionist and anti-immigrant sentiments, quickly picked up and institutionalized by the politicians of evermore democratic states.

Immigration is the area most vulnerable to the protectionist impulse. This was where a decisive backlash against internationalism occurred in the 1920s, and was accompanied by the hardening of unpleasant and also short-sighted nationalistic arguments. (James, 2002:206)

The effects of migration on local labor markets brought about a tide of critics from several different fields of knowledge. The main argument from the economic field was the erosion of the living

⁵ James quotes Stürmer, M. (1983) *Das ruhelose Reich: Deutschland 1866–1918*. Berlin: Severin und Siedler, p. 49.

standards and wages that local communities suffered as they engaged with immigrants in a race to the bottom for job opportunities.

From the field of sociology, Max Weber also proposed an argument in which immigration posed a threat to the cultural identity of developed nations: “There is a certain situation of capitalistically disorganized economies, in which the higher culture is not victorious but rather loses in the existential fight with lower cultures.” (Weber as quoted by James, 2002:16)

Not surprisingly, these popular views resulted in the passing of legislation limiting the flow of migrants in most parts of the world which radically change the global situation by the interwar period. Governments of destination countries such as the United States and Britain did all they could to restrain immigration to protect their low-skilled workforce, while countries which had traditionally been the origin of emigrants, also tried to limit the outflow of their citizens.

Hitler’s unpublished foreign policy statement, subsequently known as Hitler’s Secret Book, argued that Germany had lost the most courageous and resistant Germans through emigration. Also the Soviet Union and its satellites tried to prevent emigration completely under the ideological argument that “the socialist state considers people as its most valuable asset” (quoted in James, 2002:182).⁶

A century later, the parallels with the contemporary situation seem uncanny. The second half of the twentieth century (and especially since 1970) saw a new wave of increased expansion and globalization. While most migration policies worldwide remained relatively unchanged⁷, technological progress further reduced the distances and costs associated to international travel, and this caused migrant shares to rise again worldwide, albeit at lower rates than those experienced 100 years earlier. (Lindert & Williamson, 2001)

According to the United Nations Population Fund, the amount of people who live outside their countries of origin would have gone from 75 million in 1965 to 120 million in 1990 and to 150 million in 2000. [...] 90% of those 150 million would have emigrated for economic reasons, and the remaining 10% for political motives, usually because of armed conflict (Noin, 2003:54)⁸

⁶ James quotes a Soviet representative from Kotkin S. (1995) *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.34

⁷ Perhaps the two most important exceptions are the relaxation of migration policies in post-Soviet countries, and the liberalization of people movement in the European Communities as established by the Schengen Agreements.

⁸ Freely translated from the Spanish original: “Según el Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas, la cantidad de personas que viven fuera de sus países natales habría pasado de 75 millones en 1965 a 120 millones en 1990 y a 150

Some argue that the point break for this wave of globalization came with the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. In the immediate aftermath, some experts in international affairs like Moisés Naím even went on to suggest that the era of globalization was over (McGrew, 2005). One decade later, while globalization did not come to a sudden halt proving to be more resilient than some expected, this idea is still highly contested and its ultimate outcome will be for future economic historians to judge.

Other authors find evidence to suggest that globalization's latest wave "may have already peaked and be declining" (Roskin & Berry, 2005:17) in the increasing trade and migration protectionism, and in the general economic globalization slowdown. Meanwhile, other authors dismiss such claims as they find an overcompensation of such decline in the acceleration of military, technological cultural and social globalization (McGrew, 2005b).

If the cyclical view of history –"origin is destiny"– is any indicator of what may come, we would be approaching the type of junctions which led to major wars in the previous cycles. However, despite all similarities, there are important differences at the core economic, cultural and institutional framework that will hopefully shape the events to come rather differently.

While extreme nationalism and ideology fueled violent conflicts in the past centuries, it was an economic spark what often triggered expansionist military campaigns and colonial imperialism of less developed territories. It is no surprise that Karl Polanyi suggested, referring to the hundred year peace, that "the paucity of wars, civil and foreign, had much to do with the cumulative rise of capital and productivity in that period" (Phelps, 2013:53 fn.15).

Nowadays, under a model that derives more value from technology and knowledge, those resource-seeking reasons tend diminish in relevance as a motivation for armed conflict⁹, especially since highly liberalized international trade and investment markets suffices to satisfy most of the world's needs. While on the cultural institutions side, the deep transformations at the social level allows us to agree with Collier when he asserts that "[w]hat underpins European peace is not a currency or Brussels bureaucracy, but a profound change in sensibilities. A century on from 1914, no European crowd is going to cheer for violence." (2013:241)

millones en 2000. [...] El 90% de esos 150 millones habría emigrado por razones económicas, y el 10% restante por motivos políticos, en general a causa de un conflicto armado."

⁹ Although a counter-argument could be made for some recent controversial military campaigns.

For some observers, however, this shift of importance in the factors of production has substituted national expansionist conflict with a non-military yet equally heated rivalry over the control of technologies, ideas, and the attraction of talent embodied in people, given that the international flow of labor is not nearly as liberalized as the other factors of productivity. To borrow the expression of David Petraeus, the United States General in charge of the operations in Iraq in 2007 and 2008, “the terrain that matters the most is the human terrain” (quoted in Held, 2010:12).¹⁰

On the one hand, the United Nations’ Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, anticipates an age of mobility,


when people will cross borders in ever greater numbers in pursuit of opportunity and a better life. They have the potential to chip away at the vast inequalities that characterise our time, and accelerate progress throughout the developing world. (quoted in Keeley, 2009:12)¹¹

On the other hand, the latest world crises (and the various local crises it generated) have had a profound effect rising anti-immigrant sentiments in many developed economies allowing some politicians to adopt a more restrictive stand on immigration policies. While several of such sentiments may be misguided by fear, we acknowledge there are genuine economic, socio-demographic, cultural-identity, national-security, political, linguistic, and even religious concerns at the heart of the debate.

Such is the paradox of our current migration policies: a constant tension between policy tools to attract the best talent and skills to boost the economy and policy tools to restrict the migration of those whose presence may spark conflict with the locals. This is the stage where our research takes place.

¹⁰ Held quotes Petraeus, D. (2010) Counterinsurgency Concepts: What We Learned in Iraq, *Global Policy*, 1(1), p.116

¹¹ Keeley quotes Ban, K.M. (2007) We Should Welcome the Dawn of the Migration Age, *The Guardian*, 10 July, Manchester: Guardian News and Media Ltd.



PART ONE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The overall aim of this doctoral dissertation is to propose a methodology that helps highly-skilled diaspora of countries in transition to knowledge-based economies and the governments of these homelands to reconnect and to establish brain-circulation dynamics, in order to generate new—or draw on previously untapped—opportunities for modernization and development, particularly through the promotion of institutional reform. Consequently, we dedicate this first part to the theoretical roots of our dissertation.

For want of a better metaphor, these roots stem from the seed of the notions of development and growth {D} as explored in the introduction. They consist of three key subjects, which we will explore in separate chapters: the role of knowledge and its embodiments on the economy {K}, the impact of the migration of skills especially for the countries of origin {M}, and the way in which institutions and policies are shaped and reformed {I}.

The first chapter is dedicated to explore knowledge and its embodiments. It provides an introductory study on the knowledge-based economy as it reviews the theories of endogenous

economic growth and the learning dynamics required for generating innovation, human capital, and social capital. Furthermore, it uses the empirical evidence from four different studies, to highlight the impact knowledge and its embodiments on the development of nations.

The second chapter is dedicated to explore the migration of skills. It reviews the main theories of international labor migration and explores the flows of human capital to understand how brain drain takes place. It also explores how despite the negative connotations of the migration of skills, this phenomenon can be harnessed for the development of sending countries, especially when it allows for brain-circulation dynamics. Finally it characterizes how migrants organize in diasporas as transnational communities.

The third chapter is devoted to the topic of institutions and policies. On the one hand, it explores the variety of institutionalisms and different policy theories in search of the best fitting for our analytical methodology. On the other hand, it explores the interplay between—and roles adopted by—the main actors in control of the institution and policy change processes, in order to better understand diaspora-led development, especially through the diasporas' influence on their homelands' social and institutional landscape.




Figure 1: Conceptual Map of the Theoretical Background¹²

¹² While we acknowledge that the causal relationships between K, M and I, and D may be better represented by a bidirectional arrow, we view the outflows from D as reinforcing feedback that can generate either positive or negative inertia. Consequently, we prefer to focus on unidirectional linkages towards D, in order to emphasize the influence of K, M, and I as our points of entry in an attempt to positively influence D.

Although treated separately for the literature review, we understand that the elements explored in those three chapters are clearly interrelated. Moreover, that these interrelations are central to the construction of our analytic methodology. So, we emphasize their linkages throughout part one in two ways: (1) by highlighting them directly in the text through the use of six tags— $\{K \rightarrow D\}$, $\{M \rightarrow D\}$, $\{I \rightarrow D\}$, $\{I \leftrightarrow K\}$, $\{K \leftrightarrow M\}$, $\{M \leftrightarrow I\}$ —one for each of the relations graphically represented in our conceptual map in Figure 1, and (2) by making them explicit in the conclusions of each chapter.

In addition, aware that the multi-disciplinary nature of this dissertation may imply different conceptual understandings for similar terms across the boundaries of academic fields of learning—such as economics, sociology and politics—we use this part to establish a common language to define, ground, and contextualize the elements and concepts henceforth used to build further sections.

Finally, while it is our intention to be exhaustive in the research of the theoretical roots, we also intend to make this modest attempt to level the playing-field of the readers as concise as possible. Consequently, whenever the concepts and theories under review extend the proposed scope of the dissertation, we will point towards further references.

Chapter 1: On Knowledge and its Embodiments

He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.

Tomas Jefferson, 3rd President of the United States of America (1813)

Knowledge is a central concept to this dissertation. Aside it being amongst the main drivers behind economic growth and development {K→D}, our overall aim is focused, on the one hand, on migrants who are deeply imbued with it, and on the other hand, on economies verging on becoming knowledge-based.

“The dominant definition of a knowledge society is economic; it states that knowledge has become a productive force that increasingly replaces capital, labor, and natural resources as central value- and wealth-creating factors (e.g., Bell, 1973; Drucker, 1993: 45). Analysts may also emphasize the presence and role of information infrastructures and the changes in economic and social organization that result from them (e.g., Lash and Urry, 1994; Castells, 1996; DiMaggio, 2001).

“But a knowledge society is not simply a society of more knowledge and technology and of the economic and social consequences of these factors. It is also a society permeated with knowledge settings, the whole sets of arrangements, processes, and principles that serve knowledge and unfold with its articulation. Epistemic cultures are the cultures of knowledge settings. If the argument about the expanding presence of knowledge settings is right, what we call society will to a significant degree be constituted by such cultures.” (Knorr Cetina, 2005:65-6)

Moreover, knowledge is an essential concept to understand important issues related to the other two elements of these theoretical roots, such as the logic behind the migratory patterns of highly-skilled people {K↔M}, and how certain types of it are crucial building blocks of institutions and how it can be the main driver behind policy change {I↔K}.

But let us start from the beginning.

Knowledge Is at the Heart of Economic Growth

As mentioned in the introduction to our dissertation, understanding the underpinnings of economic growth is essential to understand economic development. Since the 1950s, Robert Solow proposed that economic growth is a direct result of an increase in production output, which in itself may only be explained by an increase in the production factors (capital stock and labor, both characterized by diminishing returns), and by an increase in productivity related to technological progress (Brakman et al. 2006:307-10).

The most basic proposition of growth theory is that in order to sustain a positive growth rate of output per capita in the long run, there must be continual advances in technological knowledge in the form of new goods, new markets or new processes. This proposition can be demonstrated using the neoclassical growth model developed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), which shows that if there were no technological progress, then the effects of diminishing returns would eventually cause economic growth to cease. (Aghion & Howitt, 1998:11)

However, Solow's and other post-Keynesian and neoclassical models considered technological progress to be "a continuous, ever-expanding set of knowledge that simply became evident over time—not something that was specifically created by economic forces" (Cortright, 2001:3). As Phelps comments, they "regarded all material advances in a country as driven by the force of science: the discoveries of 'scientists and navigators' external to the national economies." (2013:9)

This paradigm was set by Schumpeter as early as 1911, when he asserted that

[w]hat is knowable at present in the economy is already known. So no originality is possible within the economy. It is discoveries outside the economy that make possible the development of any new method or good. Though the opening of such a possibility is soon "in the air," its realization, or implementation, requires an entrepreneur willing and capable enough to undertake the demanding project: to raise the capital, organize the needed start-up company, and develop the newly possible product—"to get the job done." Though the project is onerous, the likelihood of the new product's commercial success—the likelihood of an "innovation"—is as knowable as the prospects faced by established products. There is no chance of misjudgment, provided there is due diligence. An expert entrepreneur's decision to accept a project and a veteran banker's decision to back it are correct *ex ante*, even uncanny, though *ex post* bad luck may bring a loss and good luck an abnormal profit. (quoted in Phelps, 2013:10)

Schumpeter's dogma of technology as an exogenous factor remained in the dominant economic paradigm until the late 1980s, when several authors (such as Paul Romer, Robert Lucas, Edmund Phelps, Philippe Aghion, and Peter Howitt among others) developed complementary contributions,

known as “new growth” or “endogenous growth” theories¹³, by which technology, R&D activity, education, and other knowledge-based growth determinants were reincorporated to the explanatory models of growth and took center stage (Acocella, 2005; Lucas, 2009; Mankiw et al., 1995) {K→D}.

This reincorporation of knowledge and innovation into the economic models has allowed economists to better understand what gives a modern economy its distinctive experience. For Phelps (2013), a modern economy experience is derived from “the activity of creating, developing, marketing, and testing new ideas. In many occupations, though not all, the experience of work is transformed from the sameness, or *stasis*, typical in the traditional economies to the change, challenge, and originality found in the modern economy.” (57)

Phelps also goes on to identify some of its main qualities:

- It provides workers with an endless succession of problems to be solved, keeping them engaged and challenged to foster an expansion of their talents, which in turn leads to their feeling of self-realization or self-actualization; after all, “[t]here is direct clinical evidence of the craving for mental stimulation and problem solving [...]” (61).
- It provides workers with the experience of interchange with other colleagues from work, or even with people from outside their workplace. “A company with better access to the industry’s rumor mill would have a better idea what not to produce.” (58)
- It gives workers a chance to “interject [...]their] own creativity and judgment unto decisions—for *self-expression* or *self-affirmation*” (58) aiming to give them a better sense of accomplishment.
- It democratizes the privilege that only very few epic navigators and discoverers of yore had, by giving every worker the chance to embark in their own voyage of exploration or discovery entailing a “leap into the void.” (59)
- It allows workers to obtain additional non-material rewards for achievements. These tend to be very visible, providing gratification incentives and encouraging further success.

¹³ For a chronological account on the evolution of endogenous growth theories, see Aghion & Howitt (1998:11-39); for a historical evolution of the innovation-led economy, see Phelps (2013).

- It respects the workers' individual "*freedoms to act* (or not to act) on their unique knowledge, judgment, and intuition [as these] may be indispensable to people's sense of self-sufficiency and thus self-worth." (59)

Different Types of Knowledge, Learning and Innovation

The physical world is characterized by diminishing returns. Diminishing returns are the result of the scarcity of physical objects. One of the most important differences between objects and ideas... is that ideas are not scarce and the process of discovery in the realm of ideas does not suffer from diminishing returns. (Romer quoted in Cortright, 2001:4)

So, on the one hand, knowledge and ideas are a special kind of asset that is neither entirely public, nor entirely private, and this duality is at the heart of knowledge's increasing returns (Nelson & Romer, 1996). Like public goods, they are non-rival which means that more than one person can make use of them at any given time without having to deprive others of its use. However, they may still be—at least partially—excludable, through patents, trademarks, copyrights, and other forms of intellectual property protection like private goods. On the other hand, ideas and knowledge still suffer from other issues affecting traditional assets, like being subject to obsolescence without perennial investment in research, development and innovation (Aghion & Howitt, 1998).

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1996) bases its typology of four categories of knowledge relevant to economic growth on Lundvall and Johnson (1994): facts or the "know-what", science and other principles and laws of nature or the "know-why", skills, talents and other capabilities to do something or the "know-how", and information about specialists and other people with the knowledge we seek or the "know-who". Friso Den Hertog and Edward Huizenga (2000) elaborate on this typology and add two more types of contextual knowledge based on social and cultural cues: the "know-when" and the "know-where"¹⁴.

Knowledge is a much broader concept than information, which is generally the "*know-what*" and "*know-why*" components of knowledge. These are also the types of knowledge which come closest to being market commodities or economic resources to be fitted into economic production functions. Other types of knowledge—particularly know-how and know-who—are more "*tacit knowledge*" and are more difficult to codify and measure. (OECD, 1996:12)

¹⁴ Know-where and know-when of Den Hertog & Huizenga (2000) are also present in Lundvall & Johnson (1994), but they are considered subdivisions of the "know-who" category.

As Iskander, Lowe, and Riordan (2009) remind us, tacit knowledge cannot be fully made explicit and its dissemination is tightly linked to the social interactions and everyday practices in which it is embedded:

Although they are often presented as opposites, tacit and explicit knowledge are deeply interconnected: indeed, as Polanyi pointed out, it is the tacit, embodied, dimension of knowledge that allows us to fully interpret and understand explicit knowledge (Polanyi 1966; Hidreth and Kimble 2002). [...] But tacit knowledge too depends on explicit knowledge to be functional: explicit articulations act as symbols of tacit knowledge. (Iskander, Lowe, & Riordan, 2009:6)



Figure 2: Components of a Social Theory of Learning - An Initial Inventory (Wenger, 2001:23)

This process is what Lundvall and Johnson (1994) call learning by interacting, which is just one of the many facets of learning as a multidimensional issue. A wide variety of theories exist on the subject, each considering different aspects, and each useful for different objectives. For the purposes of this chapter, we focus on the social approaches¹⁵, specifically on Wenger's theory, which explores learning from a psycho-social perspective suggesting four different types: (1) learning as experience, (2) learning as doing, (3) learning as belonging, and (4) learning as becoming, each depending on an element (see Figure 2) closely related to the spatial dimensions where the learning takes place, and all related to the learning by interacting.

Another concept close to knowledge and to learning is that of innovation, which we understand not only in terms of information technologies (IT), but also as other non-IT “practices that are new to a given society [...and aim to find] new solutions to existing problems” (World Bank, 2010:4), or as

¹⁵ These may include neurologic (neurophysiologic), psychological (conductist, cognitive, constructivist, and social learning), and mixed (pedagogic, sociologic, and organizational) approaches. For a brief introductory description of each, see Wenger (2001:20-1).

Edmund Phelps would phrase it “a new method or new product that becomes a *new practice* somewhere in the world.” (Phelps, 2013:20)

Innovation is, on the one hand, dependent on the person’s individual observations, knowledge, “imaginativeness and insight to envision a new objective [...as well as] boldness to venture into unknown territory”(32). On the other hand, innovation is system dependent, as it involves processes for both, “the *origination* of the new thing[, ...] and the *pioneering adoption*”(20).

Another characteristic of innovation is its unpredictability and, consequently, its disruptive quality on the economy. This in contrast to adaptations, which although also make use of knowledge, judgment and other elements common to innovation, “do not involve an intuitive leap” (31) and are reactive to events, in any case bringing closure to the unforeseen disruptions caused by innovations. In other words, “[i]nnovations are the happenings to which ‘adaptations’ adapt.” (32)

Some innovations are accidental. Thomas Edison absent-mindedly created a filament out of some tarred lampback in his hand, and Alexander Fleming made penicillin by mistake by leaving a Petri dish uncovered. [...V]irtually all innovations have an accidental or random element. [...] Innovators travel on a voyage to the unknown, one with some known unknowns and some unknown unknowns; so they have no way of knowing whether—even with every lucky break—their creativity and intuition will deliver the innovation they hoped for. (33-4)

As with knowledge and learning, innovation thrives on diversity within society: pluralism of situations, backgrounds and conceivers of ideas is essential, but so is having the same variety in financiers who evaluate, appreciate and fund those ideas. “The success of this system depends also on the degree of interactivity within it [...as i]nteractions also enhance individual powers.”(38-9)

A team—a well-functioning one, at any rate—achieves not just the productivity from combining their complementary talents, as a classical economist would say, but also, in management theorists’ terminology, the “superproductivity” that comes as every member of the group acquires a heightening of his or her talent, thanks to their mutual questioning and resulting gains in insight, and their urging one another on, a point emphasized by the management philosopher Esa Saarinen. [...] There is also interactivity over distance and time. The ideas of a society combine and multiply. A person’s fertility in producing new ideas is hugely increased by exposure to recent ideas generated by the economy in which the person functions and, these days, the global economy. (39)

This systemic need for diversity and interaction implies that, like knowledge and learning, innovation also requires a certain spatial agglomeration of people, which we will now proceed to examine.

Innovation Is Facilitated by Geographical Proximity

This spatial relevance to learning finds an echo in what economic geographers see as the distinctions between first and second nature geography: first nature geography refers to the natural and infrastructural endowments of places, while second nature geography refers to the “the interactions between economic agents, and in particular increasing returns that can be created by dense agglomerations and interactions” (Kanbur & Venables, 2005:3).

These second nature characteristics tend to generate self-reinforcing development and have marked a trend among manufacturing and service industries—particularly in high- and middle-income countries—for concentrating in specific locations to gain advantageous access to a pool of specialized workers, supplies of inputs and to knowledge relevant for the firm (UNIDO, 2009), in what is referred to as agglomeration economies, conceptually mapped in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Knowledge Spillovers in the Systematic of Agglomeration Effects (Lang, 2005:6)

The deep connections and the human and social interactions required to learn, create, embody, use and disseminate knowledge further motivate an increased spatial concentration of knowledge-intensive or knowledge-based economic activities into clusters or learning regions (see Figure 4), where the synergies provided by their geographical agglomeration can be achieved (UNCTAD, 2008). Logically, this spatial concentration is extremely important in the attraction of highly-skilled migrants $\{K \leftrightarrow M\}$, as we will further explore in the next chapter (page 77).




Figure 4: The Geography of Innovation (adapted from Florida, 2005:50-1)

Innovation tends to develop in microclimates with an accumulation of talent, entrepreneurs, and knowledge. Like certain biological processes, this concentration favors a natural dynamism. The phenomenon is illustrated by famous locations such as Silicon Valley, Italy's industrial districts in traditional sectors, or Bangalore in IT services, as well as many lesser-known sites throughout the world. Cities and regions with strong knowledge assets or large creative classes become innovative sites naturally and have a definite advantage in global competition. Well aware of the importance of these concentration effects, governments attempt to recreate such sites artificially by establishing technopoles, science parks, special economic zones, and the like. (World Bank, 2010:63)

Pinch, Henry, Jenkins and Tallman (2003) have reworked Matusik and Hill's distinction between component knowledge—defined as specific knowledge resources skills and technologies tied to identifiable parts of an organizational system, relatively codifiable and transferable—and architectural knowledge—related to the organization's entire system structures and routines and it is mostly comprised by the relationships between individual components—to understand the dynamics behind the geographical agglomeration effects on knowledge-intensive industrial clusters.

Pinch and his colleagues suggest that, over time, knowledge clusters compile their particular architectural knowledge stocks involving “many tacit assumptions [...] that evolve organically through localized practices [...] socially embedded [...] and closely tied to location” (385). These stocks are defined as “*a shared system for organizing component knowledge that is common to a set of proximate firms*” (382) and to further clarify their concepts, the authors use the metaphor of component knowledge being the cargo transported on cluster-level architectural knowledge rails to convey the dynamics of knowledge dissemination in an agglomeration setting.

Other Important Proximities beyond Geography

Nevertheless, while geographical proximity is a necessary condition for agglomeration economies to arise, Wiebke Lang (2005) suggests it can only generate knowledge spillovers¹⁶ when three additional dimensions of proximity—conveniently facilitated by spatial concentration—are present: (i) cognitive proximity at an individual level, (ii) technological proximity at an industrial level, and (iii) behavioral proximity at a social level.

[M]uch valuable knowledge involves information that is ambiguous or confidential. And such knowledge seems more easily transferred between people who are members of the same group or community and thus share many ties in common (cf. Uzzi, 1997; Hansen, 1999). (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:936)

So, while geographical proximity places different actors within interacting physical distance, cognitive proximity allows for the possibility of their mutual understanding as individuals, technological proximity allows for the possibility of their economic interaction as firms, and behavioral proximity—defined by Lang as the set of explicit and implicit rules and routines—allows actors to coordinate their interactions.

¹⁶ “Spillovers occur when knowledge, for example, of technology, is accessible by individuals and companies other than those who have invested in its original production.” (Wade, 2005:311)

If the proximity gaps (cognitive or technological or behavioral) between actors are too wide, spatial concentration will not be sufficient to generate knowledge spillovers for the overall system until such gaps have been breached. Yet, at the opposite end, too much proximity may generate redundancies in which overlaps will diminish the cumulative properties provided by knowledge diversity, and these in turn might prevent the interdisciplinary cross-pollination required for innovation to take place.

[W]hile it may be easier to absorb new knowledge when one focuses either in the same domain of knowledge or on exchanges with others who share one's knowledge, it is questionable whether the most valuable new knowledge is discovered in this manner. Rather, it is widely recognized that significant advances in knowledge often come when knowledge from one domain is applied to other domains to create new combinations and recombinations. (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:936)

This tension was expressed by March (cited in Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008) as the tradeoff between exploration—"the search for new alternatives to existing activities"—and exploitation—"the refinement of existing activities" (936). While these two are essential components in all knowledge systems, limited resources tend to prevent a simultaneous intensive concentration of economic activities in both perspectives.

This tension also draws further attention to the importance of the right mix of knowledge assets—between architectural and component, between specialist and generalist, and across all relevant fields of the economy—to make innovation happen, especially considering Cohen and Levinthal's notion (also cited in Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008) that "an actor's 'absorptive capacity' [...] is greater insofar as she has already accumulated related knowledge—that 'related knowledge' is 'needed to absorb new knowledge'" (935).

Even if it "is difficult to distinguish skills that drive innovation from those required as a result of changes brought about by innovation [...] it is possible to say something about the nature of skills required for innovation and the implications for policy" (World Bank, 2010:167), which also include the ability to understand the nature of problems and the creativity and aptitudes to address them.

Moreover, some skills such as those "for acquiring, using, and operating technologies at rising levels of complexity, productivity, and quality; and the design, engineering, and associated managerial capabilities for acquiring technologies, developing a continuous stream of improvements, and generating innovations" (167) might even be more useful than specialization.

The learning of learning—of generating, acquiring, and applying knowledge—becomes more important than the learning of knowledge. The school—the basic institution in which the future citizens of the community are formed intellectually, and morally—will then no longer be a place for the conveyance of traditional knowledge but a place for acquiring the ability to understand, to bear, and to cope with the variety and openness of knowledge and values. (Preuss, 2006:314)

Additionally,

Since most of the knowledge that companies use for innovation, especially in developing countries, comes from outside, their “absorptive capacity”—that is, their ability to recognize the value of new external information and to assimilate and apply it—becomes essential for innovation (Allinson 2006).(2010:167)

That is why international organizations such as the World Bank are trying to increase the awareness of knowledge exchange, or peer-to-peer learning, especially in activities oriented to capacity building and strengthening, in projects that try to bridge gaps in geographical proximity through the use of information technology systems, and gaps in non-geographical proximity through sharing, replicating and up scaling solutions that have worked in similar problems.




Figure 5: Five Steps to a Successful Knowledge Exchange (Kumar & Leonard, 2012:iii)

To achieve this, they suggest the use of “a strategic, results-oriented approach to learning based on the World Bank Institute’s Capacity Development and Results Framework.” (Kumar & Leonard, 2012:i) (see Figure 5). In the end, as Freinkman (2014) suggests, “for many developing countries, the relevant policy challenge is not about production of new knowledge, but about efficient application of global knowledge for solving local problems” {K→D}.

Embodiments of Knowledge

The subtle balances and strong linkages between the knowledge, the person, and the social dynamics often blur the boundaries between three distinct concepts: knowledge, human capital, and social capital.

Knowledge refers to society's understanding about how the world works. Human capital refers to the resources expended transmitting this understanding to the labor force. Put crudely, knowledge is the quality of society's textbooks; human capital is the amount of time that has been spent reading them. (Mankiw et al., 1995:298)

Furthermore,

[Human capital] is owned and used individually, whereas [...social capital] is owned and used jointly. This difference stems from the very nature of social capital that, to quote Coleman (1990, p. 302), ‘social capital inheres in the structure of relations between people and among people’ unlike human capital which ‘is lodged in individuals’. (Hayami, 2009:99)

In other words, human capital is the personal embodiment of ideas and how it improves the productivity of an individual, with the emphasis of the concept in “personal embodiment” rather than in the role of the ideas *per se* (Jones, 2008). Similarly, social capital makes emphasis in the collective embodiment of shared tacit knowledge and how it improves the productivity of a group of people, with the emphasis of the concept in “collective embodiment” rather than in the role of the tacit knowledge *per se* {I↔K}.

Human Capital as an Individual Embodiment

While notions of the contribution of people to an economy can be traced back to Sir William Petty as far back as 1691¹⁷, several authors credit Adam Smith with being the first to include useful skills and abilities of workers in his category of fixed capital in the eighteenth century.

Economists who considered human beings or their skills as capital include such well-known names in the history of economic thought as Petty, Smith, Say, Senior, List, von Thünen, Roscher, Bagehot, Ernst Engel, Sidgwick, Walras, and Fisher. (Kiker, 1966:481)

Most of these economists held that human beings should be included in the concept of capital for three reasons: (1) the cost of rearing and educating human beings is a real cost; (2) the product of their labor adds to the national wealth; (3) and expenditure on a human being that increases this product will, *ceteris paribus*, increase national wealth. (485)

The debate on human capital gained notoriety in the early 1960s, when the term itself was popularized by the works of Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker, who emphasized the effects of higher education (Schultz, 1960; 1961; 1961b) and on-the-job training (Becker, 1960; 1962) on the development of skills and abilities that would improve the overall productivity of individuals, even if it was unclear to what extent the expenditure in education—public and private—and the cost of opportunity incurred by students foregoing earnings could be considered as consumption or investment.

Moreover, despite the fact that “[o]ur values and beliefs inhibit us from looking upon human beings as capital goods, except in slavery, and this we abhor” (Schultz quoted in Keeley, 2007), Edward Denison further cemented the metaphor of capital goods on human beings, by arguing that since “the skills and abilities acquired by an individual are inalienable, it is the skilled individual who is the capital.” (Kiker, 1966:488)

During decades of evolution, the concept has also been linked to other elements known to improve human productivity: health, nutrition, and other social and civic engagements such as the advance of gender equality in the workforce (Guilmoto & Sandron, 2003). However, while the causality of

¹⁷ Petty attempted to estimate the money value of a human being for the first time, as he was convinced that labor was the real “father of wealth” (Kiker, 1966:482)

these relationships has not always been straightforward and some are still subjects of controversy¹⁸, the consensus among authors remains that skills and useful abilities—embodiments of knowledge—are the key components of human capital (Keeley, 2007; World Bank, 2006).

Formal (higher) education and work-oriented training are good estimators of human capital, together with work experience, and the economic value of the work performed. In 2001, Lowell and Findlay suggested a definition of high skilled workers that—with the exception of outstanding talents in sports, arts, and culture—requires “tertiary education of at least four years beyond the twelve years of primary and secondary education.” (D’Costa, 2008:46)

However, authors still discuss different views on the role of education, some in the sense that it might only help some individuals “to gather private information about their capacities and potential performance in labour markets”, while “the most able individuals who have a high level of self-confidence will skip (higher) education and go directly to the marketplace, often as entrepreneurs, [...avoiding] the potentially large opportunity cost of spending several years pursuing a career.” (Solimano, 2008: 34)

Regarding innovative entrepreneurs, historian Joel Mokyr found that in the cases where these could have used some scientific understanding, “the innovators typically ventured ahead of science using their hunches and experimenting accordingly. [...Moreover,] Paul Johnson observes that the vast majority of inventors were born poor and could afford little education. It was enough to be creative and smart.” (Phelps, 2013:11-2)

However,

[s]ome might think to say that gifted inventors, even if untrained, were adding to scientific knowledge when their tinkering led to an invention. But these inventors did not create scientific knowledge any more than bartenders inventing new drinks create chemical knowledge: they lacked the training to do so. An addition to scientific knowledge occurred if and when trained theorists managed to understand why the invention worked. (It took a musicologist to see how Bach’s cantatas “worked.”) If an invention at the proof of concept stage went on to be developed and adopted, thus becoming an innovation, it did create economic knowledge. (Failure also added knowledge of a sort—the economic knowledge of what apparently does not work.) (13)

¹⁸ “For instance, good health helps people to develop their human capital – healthy children are better able to learn. But it’s also one of the fruits of human capital – people with higher levels of education tend to be healthier.” (Keeley, 2007:97) Similar arguments could be made for the rest of this non-exhaustive list.

Collier summarizes it quite succinctly: “Productivity is not directly determined by education, but by what people do with it.” (2013:205)

Human Capital Is More than Years of Schooling

Nonetheless, education is still a very good proxy for human capital and is one of the most widely used. Recent studies in the subject go further into depth in the relation between development and the composition education, and not only its length. For example, Benjamin Jones (2008) has proposed that the usual proxy for human capital measured as duration of education should be complemented by a second dimension of content to differentiate individuals as generalists or as specialists. While such a distinction might show no difference in the measure of years of education, it does imply important differences in the quality of human capital as an economy mainly composed by diversified specialists holds a deeper collective body of knowledge than one mainly composed by generalists.¹⁹

Moreover, Jones describes this last type of economy as a “knowledge trap” that caps the overall development potential by eroding opportunities and incentives for individuals to acquire specialist knowledge in the domestic market, mainly due to a lack of social interactions required to disseminate and improve the use of human capital, or as Lucas (2009) suggests, “the social or reciprocal character of intellectual activity: Each person gains from the knowledge of the people around him; his ideas in turn stimulate others.”⁽¹⁾²⁰

In transition countries, the quality of education and education relevant to the market are often poor. In terms of the quantity, quality, and relevance of education, the picture of the readiness of many countries for the knowledge economy is quite bleak. (World Bank, 2010:170)

This increased awareness of the interpersonal dynamics around human capital has motivated some authors to make further distinctions between the individual and the relational dimension of these embodiments by introducing the concept of social capital, which is defined by the OECD as

¹⁹ However, the relevance of generalists in an economy should not be undervalued. The tradeoff between specialism and generalism comes into play in the fast-paced changing economic environment: “While specialists may enjoy advantages when demand for their product is high, generalism serves as a hedge against shifts in demand across specialties over time” (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:939).

²⁰ See related discussion on the definition of skills regarding migrants {K↔M} on page 61, where we also discuss the importance of the practicality of skills when applied to the local needs of labor markets.

“networks, together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups”. (Keeley, 2007:103).

As human capital, social capital is also by definition an embodiment of knowledge, since those norms, values and understandings are important sources of know-how, know-where, know-when, knowledge in its tacit form, that can only be picked up through the process of socialization. A good way to view the knowledge component of both human and social capital is made evident in Hayami’s classification (Figure 6), which also addresses the aforementioned duality of knowledge behaving both as a public and as a private good.

Attributes of	Embodied in:	
	Physical goods	Humans
Private goods	Private physical capital = alienable / tradable goods e.g. machines & factories	Private human capital = personal work skills & patentable knowledge
Local public goods	Local infrastructure: e.g. village roads, local schools & municipal drainage systems	Social (relation) capital = informal social relationships, local voluntary associations
Global public goods	Global infrastructure: e.g. lighthouses & national highways	Global human / social capital non-patentable scientific knowledge, formal institutions, cultural values & ideologies

Figure 6: Classifications of capital (adapted from Hayami, 2009:105)

Social Capital as a Collective Embodiment

People working together tend to achieve things that they could not have achieved by themselves. Such collective efforts require “making connections with one another, and keeping them going over time [...] to the extent that these networks constitute a resource, they can be seen as forming a kind of capital.” (Field, 2003:1)

Echoes of this argument were present in earlier sections when we have characterized these assets as the tacit knowledge required to make and keep those connections and the process of learning by interacting and the other four types of social learning (see page 41), as those elements to achieve the required proximities for innovation (p.45), and as the collective embodiment of shared knowledge (p.48). However, while some progress has been made in the conceptualization of these

relational assets as a form of social capital, the nature—or even the adequacy of the metaphor—remains controversial.²¹

Efforts to consider the social element as an asset akin to capital can be traced as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville or Émile Durkheim, and the notion seems to have been discovered independently some six times in the twentieth century (Field, 2003). According to Ostrom, Ahn and Olivares (2003), the earliest use of social capital in its modern notion happened in 1920 in a study by Hanifan, who analyzed the role of communities in the satisfaction of individual's needs. Yet, the term only gained relevance in some circles around the late 1980s with the groundbreaking work of Pierre Bourdieu, and went mainstream in the early 1990s thanks to the influential works of James Coleman and Robert Putnam.

For French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who saw it from a cultural materialism perspective, social capital is defined as “the sum of resources, actual or virtual that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant quoted in Field, 2003:15), and as all other forms of capital, he saw it as the exclusive property of elites who used it to secure their relative position, creating and reproducing inequality.

Despite being limited by his Marxist view that did not allow for the possibility of less privileged individuals or groups benefitting in their own social networks and norms, Bourdieu's ideas on the logic behind the use, accumulation and interplay of cultural and social capital with other forms of capital became instrumental in its further conceptualization and theorization.

It was a rational-choice sociologist, James Coleman who would demonstrate that the benefits of social capital were not limited to the elites through his research of educational attainment and social mobility in American ghettos. Influenced by the work of Becker on human capital, he modeled society as an aggregation of social systems and individual behavior, using social capital as a way to explain cooperation as the exception in game theory, even when competition would better serve immediate self-interest.

In Coleman's view, social capital makes cooperation possible by imposing “obligations and expectations between actors, building the trustworthiness of the social environment, opening channels for information and setting norms that endorse particular forms of behaviour while

²¹ For an overview of the ongoing debate on the appropriateness of the use of capital as an economic metaphor for these social and relational assets, see Hayami (2009).

imposing sanctions on would-be free-riders” (Coleman quoted in Field, 2003:24), therefore effectively bridging the individual and the collective. However, he thought social capital was an unintended by-product of personal relations and did not contemplate it as an intentional goal of actors as human or physical capital would be.

Moreover, Coleman’s theory distinguished how different types of relationships and social structures bound individuals differently:

kinship in general and the family in particular represented a societal keystone, and [Coleman] was frankly pessimistic about the prospects of social control rooted in a more artificial set of arrangements [..., sharing Ferdinand Tönnies] lament over the decline of *Gemeinschaft* [community] or primordial solidarity and its replacement by *Gesellschaft* [society] or constructed solidarity. (Field, 2003:26-7)

So, while in Bourdieu’s perspective social capital was an oppressive asset used by elites to perpetuate their position of privilege, in Coleman’s it was a positive force that allowed for the cooperation of individuals for their mutual benefit. Yet, despite this fundamental difference, both authors’ theories share the view of social capital as (1) a source of educational achievement, (2) a subject of exchange, and (3) entirely rational, discarding the emotional component between people.

American political scientist Robert Putnam would draw on the term in a series of studies on how civic engagement could generate political stability and economic prosperity. After using Italy as a primary case-study, in 1995 he turned his attention on the United States in an attempt to demonstrate how the decline of such civic engagement would explain the erosion of American politics and public institutions, as well as an increased mistrust from the citizens on their government.

For de Tocqueville, [...] associational life was an important foundation of social order in a relatively open, clearly post-aristocratic system. A high level of civic engagement, far from inviting despotism, taught people how to cooperate across civil life; it was the nursery of a democratic society. Putnam’s message has found such a wide audience precisely because he suggests that the Tocquevillian foundation stone of American democracy is starting to crumble. (Field, 2003:32)

This was precisely the message of *Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital* (Putnam, 1995), and amongst the wide audience it found was the then president William Clinton who would turn Putnam into an academic celebrity of sorts, catapulting the concept of social capital (see Figure 7)

from the rather niche realms of sociology into the realms of political science, and further beyond the corset of the academia into the mainstream media.




Figure 7: Growth in articles on "social capital" (Halpern as quoted by Putnam, 2004:9)

Putnam's understanding of social capital stems from the works of Coleman, Granovetter, Loury and Jacobs²², and while he expressly states that he does not intend to contribute to the development of the theory of social capital (1995:67), he inadvertently does in at least three ways:

- 1) by adopting an institutionalist approach that included formal types of social organization, in addition to those features of informal social organization such as networks and norms that authors like Coleman and Bourdieu had previously used {I↔K},
- 2) by introducing the elements of social trust and reciprocity as a facilitators of the coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, regardless of the rational element (Field,2003), and
- 3) by making social capital an attribute of the community itself, as opposed to Coleman's and Bourdieu's view of social capital as an attribute of the individual (Portes,2000).

For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital. In the first place, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. When economic and political negotiation is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism are reduced. At the same time, networks of civic

²² "To my knowledge, the first scholar to use the term "social capital" in its current sense was Jane Jacobs, in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961), 138." (Putnam, 1995:77)

engagement embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. Finally, dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants' sense of self, developing the "I" into the "we," or (in the language of rational-choice theorists) enhancing the participants' "taste" for collective benefits. (Putnam 1995:67)

Critique and Controversy around Social Capital

The main criticisms leveled at Putnam's theory accuse him of the use of circular definitions (Portes, 2000) and the lack of theoretical precision, particularly for not providing

[...]an account of the production and maintenance of social capital (Misztal 2000:120), and 'takes for granted' the 'causal link that connects trust and a rich network of associations' (Sztompka 1999:196). [...] Putnam has also come under attack for underestimating the importance of politics [...; since] he views social capital as generated solely through long-term social and economic processes, there seems to be little scope for human agency in his account [...being] highly path dependent. (Field, 2003:38-9)

So, despite influencing an increasing number of social scientists since the 1990s, the development of social capital's theoretical framework remains the subject of controversy. For instance, highly influential scientists such as Nobel laureates Robert Solow and Kenneth Arrow have called for an overall abandonment of the concept "because the metaphor of capital is irrelevant for what this term intends to represent in terms of the standard concept of capital used in economics, even though they both considered the substance of social capital important as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs." (Hayami, 2009:96-7)

Also "[m]uch of the controversy surrounding social capital has to do with its application to different types of problems and its use in theories involving different units of analysis" (Portes, 2000:2), overarching its use to overlap with other better developed concepts such as social mobility, social inclusion/exclusion, social cohesion, and even its expansion to include formal associations has also taken social capital overlap with the research carried out by scientists working in the field of institutionalism, dulling "the cutting edge of social capital analysis by reducing its focus" (Hayami, 2009:98).

Modern organizations are governed by rules. There are accepted procedures for making or appealing decisions, and responsibilities are usually defined clearly in terms of a position rather than a person. [...] However,] to make things happen, people often prefer to bypass the formal system and talk to people that they know [...which] usually seems to work faster and often produces a better outcome. (Field, 2003:2)

While “individual and collective benefits derived from primordial ties are not incompatible”, the conflict becomes evident when “the right ‘connections’ allow certain persons to gain access to profitable public contracts and bypass regulations binding on others[,] ‘individual’ social capital [...] consists precisely in the ability to undermine ‘collective’ social capital—defined as civic spirit grounded on impartial application of the laws.” (Portes, 2000:3-4)

This lack of a consistent understanding of social capital makes it a difficult concept to study empirically. Dudwick, Kuehnast, Nyhan Jones and Woolcock (2006) suggest that qualitative and quantitative approaches to measuring social capital empirically should consider six sometimes overlapping dimensions—“(i) groups and networks, (ii) trust and solidarity, (iii) collective action and cooperation, (iv) information and communication, (v) social cohesion and inclusion, and (vi) empowerment and political action”⁽¹⁾—in order to reflect a wider range of views, from Bourdieu to Putnam.

Regaining Focus with Different Social Embodiments

To regain focus over the scope of the concept, several authors have dissociated Putnam’s individual and collective attributes of social capital. In Dayton-Johnson’s view, social capital is the individual investment, while social cohesion becomes the collective yield²³; similarly, for Easterly, Ritzan and Woolcock (2006) social capital remains a micro-level variable while social cohesion, instrumentally understood as the “nature and extent of social and economic divisions within society” (4), becomes a macro-level variable as an attribute of society as a whole.

Moreover, to further refine the concept, the fundamental contradiction found at the heart of social capital as explored both by Bourdieu and Coleman still needed to be considered: as mentioned earlier (page 54), Bourdieu noticed how social capital was used to strengthen the internal dynamics of groups for maintaining their privilege status, while Coleman saw it as a way to increase social mobility. These distinctions drove Michael Woolcock to identify three different types of social capital:

- (a) bonding social capital, which denotes ties between like people in similar situations, such as immediate family, close friends and neighbours;

²³ “[...]SOCIAL CAPITAL *is an individual's sacrifices (time, effort, consumption) made in an effort to promote cooperation with others [...], while* SOCIAL COHESION *is a characteristic of society which depends on the accumulated social capital.*” (Dayton-Johnson paraphrased in Oxoby, 2009:5)

- (b) bridging social capital, which encompasses more distant ties of like persons, such as loose friendships and workmates; and
 - (c) linking social capital, which reaches out to unlike people in dissimilar situations, such as those who are entirely outside the community, thus enabling members to leverage a far wider range of resources than are available within the community.
- (Woolcock quoted in Field, 2003:42)

In his subsequent work, Putnam (2000) addresses the concerns on his definition and refines it into a more concise notion “to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”(19). Additionally, he acknowledges Woolcock’s three distinctions, but concentrates them into two main types, touching upon the notions of social mobility²⁴ and social inclusion/exclusion²⁵.

On the one hand, Putnam understands bonding social capital as exclusive: “by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups [...strengthening] specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity”(22) as in ethnic and fraternal networks, fashionable clubs, or church-based clubs. On the other hand, Putnam’s bridging social capital is inclusive: “outward looking and encompass[es] people across diverse social cleavages [...linking] to external assets and for information diffusion”(22) as in civil rights movements, or youth service groups.

In network analysis language, we could argue that these two types of social capital could be framed in a strategic tradeoff between maximizing redundancy and maximizing non-redundancy in the interactions of an actor with various clusters of networks. Bonding social capital will take a redundancy strategy, by establishing more ties between the actor and one specific group, resulting in a stronger connection with a limited reach. Conversely, bridging social capital will take a non-redundant strategy, by establishing ties between the actor and more than one specific group of actors, resulting in wider-reaching connections albeit weaker (we will revisit this and other tradeoffs on page 175).

As we’ve seen repeatedly, the knowledge economy puts a premium on human capital and can worsen the job prospects of people with limited education, who are also often the least well off

²⁴ “Bonding social capital is, as Xavier de Souza Briggs puts it, good for ‘getting by,’ but bridging social capital is crucial for ‘getting ahead.’”(Putnam, 2000:23)

²⁵ Oxoby (2009) defines inclusion as “*an aspect of how one perceives her access to institutions and resources in the decision making environment. As such, inclusion affects the way individuals perceive the returns of investing in various forms of capital (e.g. human and social)*”(7).

in our societies. Some analysts speak of the emergence of an “underclass” in developed countries, a group that is outside the mainstream of society and has little chance of re-entering it, both because of a lack of human capital and, arguably, the “right” sort of social capital. Indeed, that twin absence may not be a coincidence. A case can be made that human capital and social capital are inextricably linked. (Keeley, 2007:105)

By drawing on the notions of identity and attitude formation, these typologies (Putnam’s and Woolcock’s) give social capital a useful edge for addressing some concerns over marginalization and development {K→D}. Oxoby (2009) suggests such an articulation can be achieved when considered through Sen’s ideas of capacity building or capacity strengthening: people invest in assets or commodities—networks, norms and shared values—with given characteristics—social capital—to obtain certain capabilities—trust and reciprocity—that will allow them to achieve certain utility—cooperation and reduction of those transaction costs related to uncertainty.

Notwithstanding the controversy behind its theoretical framework,

social capital broadly does what the theorists have claimed: to put it crudely, people who are able to draw on others for support are healthier than those who cannot; they are also happier and wealthier; their children do better at school, and their communities suffer less from anti-social behaviour. (Field, 2003:45)

Collective Knowledge Embodiments Have Trust as a Goal

Ostrom and Ahn (2007) consider that social capital’s success and growth in influence is due to the limits of the “‘standard’ approaches to the problems of economic development and political order” which did not contemplate factors that are central to social capital, namely “trust^[26] and norms of reciprocity, networks and forms of civic engagement, and both formal and informal institutions”(2). Moreover, they suggest reframing the concept of social capital into the collective action theories, which are those applicable to settings where a group of individuals share a common interest and yet face a potential conflict between the shared interest and their individual interests.

In this collective action frame, trustworthiness as an attribute of individuals and their relationships becomes a key form of social capital for achieving cooperation. As it has been extensively studied by game theorists—as in the prisoner’s dilemma, or in Axelrod’s cooperation theorem with tit-for tat

²⁶ Defined as “a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action.” (Gambetta quoted in Ostrom & Ahn, 2007:9)

strategies, to name a couple of the best known examples—incentives to behave in a trustworthy fashion and reciprocate in direct interactions with other actors stem from repeated exchanges.

However, when exchanges are not of a repetitive nature or when there is no prior history of interaction between two actors, the latter can still assess the trustworthiness of their counterpart indirectly with another key form of social capital, by reference of their reputation on a wider network. “People rely especially on [‘interpersonal trust networks’] when they are carrying on long-term, crucial enterprises such as procreation, child rearing, religious or political commitment, long distance trade, and, of course, migration.” (Tilly, 2007:5)

‘Communities depend on mutual trust and will not arise spontaneously without it’ (Fukuyama 1995:26) [...] Trust [...] has often been compared to a lubricant, oiling the wheels of a variety of social and economic transactions which might otherwise prove extremely costly, bureaucratic and time-consuming. [...] Self-evidently, a high-trust network will function more smoothly and easily than is the case of a low-trust one. (Field, 2003:63)

Membership to these networks provides a tap into the collective knowledge and other social assets of the group, but also imposes stringent obligations and constrains. Failure to comply with the latter, usually result in varying types of social punishment that range from criticism and shunning from other members to outright rejection and the consequent loss of access if the “offending party” fails to conform (Tilly, 2007).

Nonetheless, Ostrom and Ahn remind us that

[t]he potential of modern market economies and democratic political orders makes it imperative for individuals to deal with others beyond the confines of intimate relations and close networks. The very condition for a successful market economy and democracy is that a vast number of people relate in a trustworthy manner when dealing with others—many of whom do not know one another and cannot incorporate repeated interaction or a network—to achieve collective actions of various scales. (2007:14)

When actors cannot assert each other’s trustworthiness neither through previous interactions nor through a wider network, institutions, rules and norms become a third form of social capital that create behavior incentives by establishing mechanisms of rewards and punishment. This three-tiered approach to social capital in collective action is graphically expressed by Ostrom and Ahn in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Trust, forms of social capital and their linkage to collective action (Ostrom & Ahn, 2007:35)

Moreover, trust is not a permanent quality once achieved; in fact, quite the opposite. Trust needs to be reconfirmed constantly either through repeated interaction, or through specifically designed identity-building trust-generating arrangements within the institutions. An example of the latter for public institutions used to be the “array of rituals and myths that helped sustain trust in government, from the quasi-political role of royalty in some European countries to the widespread reinforcement of governmental authority in [...the] media landscape.” (Hajer, 2003:184)

Knowledge Embodiments Can Generate Self-Reinforcing Dynamics

Once we understand how these elements of the social environment can help to make human interactions more efficient through trust fostering and risk reduction, the relevance of the embodiments of knowledge to development becomes evident. Thus, not only there is a growing consensus among researchers of the positive associations between economic growth and social cohesion—as a macro-level yield of the abundance of social capital measured in terms of trust, rule of law or quality of institutions, to name but a few examples of proxies—{K→D}, but evidence also suggests that a high level of social cohesion makes it easier to further improve the quality of institutions (Easterley, Ritzan & Woolcock, 2006) {I↔K}.

When members of the society do not trust each other, do not take an active civil position, and where income inequality is high, formation of effective institutions, i.e. stable generally accepted “rules of the game”, is hindered. And vice versa, in a coherent society it is much easier to implement necessary reforms: citizens trust their government and, in particular, are ready to accept official arguments about withstanding short-run difficulties of reformation to be rewarded with the expected in the long-run benefits of the reforms. Common values of the society, which are related to the societal cultural and religious foundations and depth of linguistic differences, are another characteristic of social cohesion in Easterly et al. model. (Freinkman & Dashkeev, 2011:15)

In fact, the direct link between institutions and development (via their influence in human capital) has also been clearly established {I→D}, whether it is by authors like Glaeser who claim that better institutions are the consequence of higher human capital, or those like Acemoglu who claim that the level of human capital is in itself a consequence of institutions (Voigt, 2009).

Freinkman and Dashkeev characterize this as an endogeneity problem: “whether institutions [are] the initial source of growth or, to the contrary, development of the institutions and their subsequent influence is itself the result of some other deeper growth determinants.” (2011:10)

Many scholars consider basic social characteristics of society as another fundamental source of international growth differences. For instance, Paulo Mauro (1995) pointed to importance of integrity of society for stability of institutions. This author based his analysis on the results of a model that used ethnolinguistic fractionalization indicator for explanation of corruption persistence in the society and government, i.e. degree of “underdevelopment” of national institutions. According to Mauro’s research, countries with a highly developed sense of national identity, i.e. socially coherent states, *ceteris paribus*, have more developed and more stable national institutions, and, therefore, better prospects for economic growth. (2011:15)

Additionally to trust, and providing deeper linkages with previous sections of this chapter, institutions learn—not only in the cognitive sense of the term, but also in the moral sense²⁷ as Preuss (2006) suggests, by “creating models of thinking, reasoning, and social behavior” (313)—and are key vessels for preserving knowledge and values across generations as much as for transferring it from individuals to the collective and vice versa.

Just as much as, for instance, patents can be understood as private stores of knowledge that continue to exist after the death of the person who created this knowledge, the constitution is a store of public knowledge in that it objectifies the will of the constituent powers for the use of subsequent generations. (307)

For these reasons, attempts at understanding how to improve the social environment to achieve higher levels of growth and development usually lead through the analysis of institutional reform; a relationship which has been clear since the early stages of the endogenous theories development, when Paul Romer (1994) proposed the two questions he deemed as the most relevant from a policy perspective:

²⁷ “Cognitive learning is ‘a process of acquiring information and knowledge’; moral learning is a social practice in which the normative orientation of individuals that affect their social conduct are formed.” (Preuss, 2006:313)

In a developing country [...] what are the best institutional arrangements for gaining access to the knowledge that already exists in the rest of the world? In a [developed] country [...] what are the best institutional arrangements for encouraging the production and use of knowledge? (21)

Due to the relevance of the subject of institutions and policy to this dissertation, we devote an entire chapter to them (page 107) {I→D}.

Knowledge and its Embodiments in Empirical Research

From this conceptual review on knowledge and its embodiments, we have seen that endogenous growth theories suggest a direct relation between the level of knowledge embedded in an economy and its stage of development. There is a growing body of empirical evidence that supports this premise to be found in the research of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the IMD Business School, under the umbrella concepts of Global Competitiveness and World Competitiveness respectively {K→D & I↔K}.

Unfortunately, much like with globalization and social capital, the concepts around international competitiveness reached the mainstream rhetoric before they could develop sufficient theoretical rigor. Paul Krugman (1994, 1999) thought this led to the misconception that competitiveness meant “that a country’s economic fortunes [were] largely determined by its success on world markets”(1994:30), in a competition that was much like a zero-sum game, and fiercely criticized such reduction. He went as far as to call it an obsession and concluded that when people talked about competitiveness, it “sadly, almost always [meant] that they [did not] know what they [were] talking about”(1999:14)²⁸.

Concerned about the wrong public policy decisions that this obsession could bring about in the name of competitiveness, from wasteful government spending to outright protectionism and trade wars (1994:41), Krugman advocated that the main focus for any national economy should be on productivity and its growth, and much less on its success on the world markets.

Nowadays, the ideas around international competitiveness are still in fashion and may still be an obsession to some politicians and policymakers around the world. However, the concept seems to be “coming of age” from a theoretical point of view, and most of Krugman’s criticisms seem have been taken into consideration. For instance, IMD Business School considers competitiveness in the

²⁸ In both of Krugman’s quotes, the verbs are written in present tense in the original.

light of productivity. The main assumption is that although economic value (productivity) can only be created by enterprises, the context around business will also be a determinant factor in fostering or hindering this process.

Competitiveness of Nations is a field of Economic knowledge, which analyses the facts and policies that shape the ability of a nation to create and maintain an environment that sustains more value creation for its enterprises and more prosperity for its people. (Garelli, 2003:702)

The World Economic Forum's view on international competitiveness is quite similar, as they directly link the concept to the potential for the world's economies to attain sustained economic growth over the medium and long term (Blanke et al., 2004). In a recent revision of the concept, the WEF defines:

competitiveness as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy. [...] The concept [...] thus involves static and dynamic components: although the productivity of a country clearly determines its ability to sustain a high level of income, it is also one of the central determinants of the returns to investment, which is one of the key factors explaining an economy's growth potential. (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2010:4)

In both cases, IMD and the WEF²⁹ have developed extensive catalogues of the elements that determine the complex process of economic growth and development. For 2010, the WEF's Global Competitiveness Ranking took into consideration 117 criteria, while IMD's World Competitiveness Ranking was comprised of 327 elements (Rosselet-McCaulay, 2010).

These methodological differences are mainly explained (1) as a problem of depth *versus* scope due to data homogeneity—the WEF's study reduces the amount of variables to gather comparable data for an increased scope of 133 countries, while the IMD's study goes deeper into the analysis of a narrower scope of 58 economies (IMD, 2010:481)—and (2) in the criteria of the weighted impact of each of these variables on competitiveness as a whole. Nonetheless, the important overlap in the variables both methodologies consider to be fundamentals for potential economic growth is quite telling, as it can be seen from Figure 9 and Figure 10.

²⁹ For other different definitions of International Competitiveness, see Garelli (2003:712-713)




Figure 9: The 12 pillars of competitiveness (WEF & Schwab, 2010:9)




Figure 10: The Breakdown of Competitiveness Factors (IMD, 2010:475)

Furthermore, both methodologies agree in the growing impact of knowledge in the potential to achieve sustainable economic growth, with an interesting twist. For the IMD, knowledge “*is perhaps the most critical competitiveness factor*” (Garelli, 2003:704), since as economies become more developed, they also increase their knowledge dependency for productivity and economic performance. In the WEF’s perspective, however relevant, knowledge is regarded as another asset, and the main emphasis is placed in the actual drive towards knowledge –innovation– and its total embedment in the economic process. {K→D}

In the long run, standards of living can be enhanced only by technological innovation. Innovation is particularly important for economies as they approach the frontiers of knowledge and the possibility of integrating and adapting exogenous technologies tends to disappear. (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2010:8)

This distinction is also evident in the WEF’s model of development, which suggests a clear progression of development for national economies in three stages:

- Factor-driven: characterized by primarily unskilled labor and natural resources
- Efficiency-driven: with better-skilled labor and efficient production processes that improves product quality and increases wages
- Innovation-driven: with the most sophisticated production processes, capable of creating new and unique products and greater value.

The model also leaves room for countries to be in between two stages, and considers them as countries in transition³⁰.

In their own empirical research, the OECD (1996) has also found evidence that “productivity and growth are largely determined by the rate of technical progress and the accumulation of knowledge” (18). Their later studies focus on the transformation of that accumulated knowledge and ideas into economic value through innovation strategies followed by companies, universities, governments and civic communities around the world. In the study *Measuring Innovation*, the OECD (2010) tries to go beyond the traditional macroeconomic and demographic research on innovation, going deeper into how innovation happens in institutions and organizations through microdata collected in surveys applied both in the private and public sectors, as well as its social impacts. It looks into the personal and relational qualities of innovation (as human and social capital), as they place innovation “in the broader context of its contribution to aggregate economic performance” (13) and not as an objective in itself.

Their findings are consistent to those of competitiveness studies, arguing that

firms' spending on new knowledge, i.e. investment in intangible assets, contributes to their output growth not only at the time of investment but also in later years. Estimates of the contribution of intangible assets to labour productivity growth show that, in some countries, they explain a good portion of multifactor productivity growth. (21)

This view is also consistent with recent research in which World Bank (2006) has developed a methodology that not only measures the wealth of 120 countries worldwide, but also disaggregates its economic components to identify its sources. Their analysis shows that nations' wealth may be measured through “the per capita values of agricultural land, minerals, forests, produced assets, and an aggregate termed *intangible capital*. Intangible capital includes raw labor, human capital, social capital, and other factors such as the quality of institutions” (3). From this study, we highlight two revealing findings.

³⁰ For a list of countries and their stage of development, see Sala-i-Martin et al. (2010:11), or the latest WEF report.

First, that intangible capital, when measured in this way, is the source of 80 percent of the total wealth of high-income countries, and deeper disaggregation shows that 93 percent of its variations are explained by just two elements: social capital (57 percent, measured by proxy of a rule of law index) $\{I \leftrightarrow K \ \& \ I \rightarrow D\}$, and human capital (36 percent, measured by proxy of years of schooling) $\{K \rightarrow D\}$.

Second, that some major oil exporting countries obtain low to even negative values in this measure of intangible capital³¹ because it is “calculated as a residual—the difference between total wealth (the present value of future consumption) and the sum of produced and natural capital” (28), in what is interpreted by the authors as a symptom of the natural resource curse.

Insights and Conclusions {K}

From the synthesis of theories and empirical studies reviewed, we can extract at least four major insights. The first is the dynamic quality of the knowledge-based economy, which entails not only the continuous pursuit of the creation of proprietary knowledge and indigenous innovation, but also its application and dissemination.

This echoes earlier research by the OECD (2001) where knowledge is regarded as a “stock” concept while, learning is a “flow” concept that results in both the dissemination and production of new knowledge. For this reason, some authors prefer alternative names that incorporate the active emphasis to the knowledge-based economy, such as the learning economy (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994) or the creative economy (Florida, 2002; Howkins, 2001), or the innovation-based economy (Lester & Piore, 2004; Sachs, 2003)³².

The second insight is that while knowledge may be a potentially valuable asset in itself, it still needs to be understood and applied to the economic and social processes for its true potential to be realized, and in order to do so, both qualified people and adequate social support are essential. If information is widely abundant, the capacity to use it in meaningful ways is in short supply. To be transferred, processed and built-upon, knowledge—both in itself and embedded in people and organizations—depends on the complementarities of other different types of knowledge, learnings,

³¹ Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Algeria, Syria, Gabon, Venezuela, Moldova, Guyana, and the Russian Federation.

³² Semantic and conceptual differences considered, the active emphasis is clear, and we use the term knowledge-based economy as the wider umbrella that can encompass the rest of these.

and proximities. This is achieved mainly through formal and informal networking, effectively making the knowledge-based economy a networking economy (De Voldere et al., 2006:16-7).

As a figure of speech borrowed from information technology jargon, it could be said that knowledge is like software. By itself it is just a bunch of zeros and ones, of little consequence unless it is enabled by human hardware. And much like with computers, a single human workstation by itself may be important, but thanks to the synergies obtained by linking it to a network of several human workstations we increase the overall capabilities of the system. This association effectively places the human and social elements at the center of the knowledge-based economy, on an equal footing with knowledge (both as a stock and a flow concept). Understanding how people interact and embody knowledge becomes then paramount, not only from an epistemological perspective³³, but also certainly from the perspective of other scientific domains relevant to organizations, both public and private, in a multi-layer environment that goes from the individual to the collective {I↔K}.

As a third insight, all—but especially developing—economies need to have a better understanding of their absorptive capacity, in order to increase their ability to acquire the adequate mix of skills and competences to succeed in the knowledge-based globalized context. As Figure 11 shows, the factors that impact on both developed and developing countries’ innovation capabilities largely rely on capturing and adapting the knowledge and technologies available internationally to local contexts.




Figure 11: Determinants of Technology Upgrading in Developing Countries (World Bank, 2010:8)

³³ For a good primer in epistemology and the study of knowledge, see Pritchard (2006)

In the words of Yevgeny Kuznetsov (2009): “[b]ecause development depends on learning and learning on searching, development almost invariably depends on linking the domestic economy to the larger, foreign world, for even the strongest economies quickly rediscover (if they have ever forgotten) that they cannot generate all world-beating ideas in isolation.” (2)

The fourth insight involves the influence that a growing awareness around the knowledge-based economy has had on the behavior of public and private actors around innovation. Since nations aspire to become knowledge-based economies, important investments in schooling and training have spawned an increase in the educational levels (and therefore in the quality of human capital) worldwide, in the hope that, as recent literature suggests, a skilled labor supply will create its own demand (Kapur & McHale, 2005) {K→D}.

However, since the economic model for growth in developing countries has traditionally relied on the exploitation of natural resources and on efficiency-oriented production processes, empirical research shows that the leap may not be as simple as improving some macroeconomic and demographic variables due to some inertial forces (Lorentzen, 2008). On the one hand, the effect of the abundance of natural resources on the growth process is well documented in economic literature as the natural resource curse, also known as the paradox of plenty³⁴. On the other hand, the dependence on efficiency-oriented production processes usually generates an incentive for investors (local and foreign) to look for low-cost rather than for high-value.

In either case, one of the repercussions for the labor markets of these countries is the inability to timely generate the appropriate amount and type of jobs to absorb an initial surge of highly-qualified professionals, leading to either the underutilization or the delocalization of the human capital gained from the investments in education, often ending in the economic international migration of the more entrepreneurial of these professionals {K↔M}.

To conclude, through this chapter we have explored the notions of knowledge and its embodiments as the first theoretical root to nourish our dissertation:

³⁴ For a deeper debate on knowledge and the development of resource-intensive nations, see Lorentzen (2008); for a debate on its institutional roots see Caselli & Cunningham (2009) and Kolstad (2009).

- Linking backwards to our dissertation's introduction, the review of the endogenous growth theories, as well as of the growing body of empirical evidence linking knowledge and growth, helps us to keep our dissertation development-oriented.
- Linking sideways along this theoretical background, our review of the phenomena of agglomeration economies and the concepts of proximity, will help us to better understand the logic behind the migratory patterns of these highly-skilled individuals, as it will be further explored in chapter two.
- Similarly, a better comprehension of how the absorptive capacity of firms, institutions and nations can be expanded through linking the domestic economy to the international pools of knowledge, will help us to understand the mechanisms through which migrants can act as bridges of knowledge between their hostlands and their homelands, as it will also be further explored in chapter two.
- Our review of social capital and other relational assets will also prove to be crucial in our understanding of the building of institutions and policies, and how these change, as it will be further explored in chapter three.
- The abundance of empirical evidence supporting the nexus between knowledge and its embodiments and development, particularly through intangible assets, helps to strengthen our claim that new development opportunities can be obtained through the modernization of institutions. Also in chapter three, we will explore how these can be brought about by innovative diasporas.
- Linking forward to our methodology of analysis, a better grasp of the different types of knowledge and learning, as well as of the concepts of human and social capital, are essential to understand the elements that will build our model of a highly-skilled migrant.
- Also, a better understanding of the knowledge-based economy helps us to narrow our focus on those migrants who originate in countries on the verge of entering this category.

Chapter 2: On the Migration of Skills

“Scientists are like painters. Michelangelo became a great artist because he had been given a wall to paint. The United States gave me my wall.”

Riccardo Giacconi, Italian-born Nobel Laureate (2002)³⁵

In the previous chapter, we reviewed how the positive effects of knowledge and its embodiments on development $\{K \rightarrow D\}$ have gathered important consensus among experts. However, when it comes to the second central concept to this dissertation—migration—the

[d]evelopment practice tends to be focused on particular regions (especially ‘developing countries’), bounded by national borders. The aims of development tend to be concerned with enabling people to improve their quality of life where they currently live. In as far as migration has come into the picture at all, it has commonly been seen in a negative light. (Bakewell, 2009:790)

Therefore, the ideas of “considering migration as a policy lever to enhance development, or vice-versa, development as a policy lever to ‘manage’ migration” (796) remain controversial as the jury is still out on whether the same positive correlation exists between development and international migration, and particularly that of skilled labor, both for the destination country, and more importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, for the country of origin and those who stay behind $\{M \rightarrow D\}$.

In this chapter, we will try to address these questions by reviewing the causes of labor migration, how these apply to the migration of skills, and by analyzing the cocktail of consequences this migration of skills may have for the homeland economies $\{K \leftrightarrow M\}$. Additionally, we will introduce the notion of transnational communities, and characterize them as one of the main actors in the overall aim of the dissertation $\{M \leftrightarrow I\}$.

³⁵ Quoted in Margolis et al. (2004:30).

Causes of Labor Migration

The frameworks to study the migration of skilled labor are not much different from the frameworks for the migration of labor in general.

While most of the fundamental economic authors (Adam Smith, Robert Malthus, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, to name but a few) brush tangentially upon the issue of labor mobility in their works³⁶, the first attempt to theorize specifically upon migration takes place towards the end of the nineteenth century—hardly surprising given the historical context explored in the introduction (see page 28)—with two trailblazing papers by cartographer and geographer Ernst Georg Ravenstein (1885; 1889) who would effectively set the foundations of future studies on the subject.

Bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation), all have produced and are still producing currents of migration, but none of these currents can compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to “better” themselves in material respects. (1889:286)

Ravenstein charted migratory “streams” or “currents” within the United Kingdom (1885) and in other advanced nations of his time (1889) through the analysis of available census and parish data. From patterns he found in those flows, he went on to formulate a general explanatory framework for migration building a taxonomy of migrants in terms of the distance of relocation, as well as a taxonomy of places in terms of “absorption” and “dispersion” based on whether these had a net gain or a net loss of inhabitants.

He held an overall positive view on this phenomenon claiming that migration “means life and progress [while] a sedentary population stagnation” (1889:288). Yet, even though his conclusions were praised as insightful and adequate by his peers, they also came to be regarded as a high extravagance on the author’s part and Ravenstein was much criticized for elevating them to the rank of Laws of Migration:³⁷

³⁶ For a good overview of these authors’ views on labor mobility, see Roldán Dávila (2008:51-115).

³⁷ In the discussion of both papers, one Mr. Rowland Hamilton objected to the use of “law” as an accurate word for the findings, and one Mr. Stephen Bourne went further to assert that “it did not appear to him [...] that there was anything, strictly speaking, in the way of law to be discovered which regulated the migration [...] unless it was the simple law of demand and supply” (1885:233). Moreover, as one Mr. A. K. Donald phrased: “Before the laws of migration were discovered the causes of emigration must be known” (1889:304).

1. Most migrants will proceed a short distance at a time, producing a universal displacement of the population which flows in currents toward what he calls the great centers of commerce and industry.
2. Centers will exert a stronger attraction pull upon those potential migrants who live closer; the strength of such pull will decrease with distance.
3. The dispersion process will be a mirror of the absorption process.
4. Main migratory currents will generate a compensating counter-current.
5. If migrants are to proceed long distances, they will tend to prefer the great centers.
6. Natives of towns are less migratory than those born in rural areas.
7. Females are more migratory than male in short distances.

In retrospect, although these seven principles were not in fact laws, scholars in the field widely came to accept that Ravenstein managed to capture the development essence of economic migration and several dynamics present in this complex phenomenon $\{M \rightarrow D\}$, to the extent that these became the ruling paradigm in the field until they were further developed by sociologist Everett S. Lee and reworked to address their shortcomings, not surprisingly, with a rekindling of international migration on the wake of the Second World War.

Regardless of the distance, duration or difficulty, Lee (1966) stated that migration has four essential elements: an origin place, a destination place, the road, and a person; therefore he constructed a model which proposed that migratory flows are affected by four factors directly related to these elements. Every place, he suggested, has qualities that attract (+), repel (-) or are neutral (o) to people, while every road has intervening obstacles (such as distance, migration laws, associated costs, etc.) which may be insurmountable or not. Furthermore, these factors, which he schematized in Figure 12, are individually gauged by each migrant's set of personal conditions, life-cycle stage, interests, values, available information, and the actual elements of ignorance or even mystery of their destination, all together making the final decision to migrate never an entirely rational one.




Figure 12: Origin and destination factors and intervening obstacles in migration (Lee, 1966:50)

At the core of both Ravenstein's and Lee's theories we find the study of individual decisions to migrate and of characteristics that attract or repel people between places. This focus on pull-push

factors became the base of most subsequent migration studies. Depending on the application of these theories, as well as on their interactions with other disciplines, they generated several schools of thought that may be classified into three main framework categories: (1) from a micro-level approach, (2) from a macro-level approach, and (3) from an integrative approach.

The micro-level approach, also called functionalist approach, is an umbrella for several different migration theories that suggest that individuals make rational decisions to migrate based on their “available knowledge of objective conditions”. (Goss & Lindquist, 1995:320)

Neoclassical economics focuses on differentials in wages and employment conditions between countries, and on migration costs. It generally conceives movement as an individual decision for income maximization (Lewis 1952; Todaro 1969; Borjas 1989). New economics of migration, in contrast, consider not only the labour market as reasons to migrate, but also conditions of other markets, such as the capital market or unemployment insurance market. It views migration as a household strategy to minimize family income risks or to overcome capital constraints on family production activities (Stark 1991). Decision-making models (Langenheder 1968; Esser 1980) consider a variety of factors influencing migration decision, but still remain in the push pull framework. (GLOPP & Thieme, 2007:1)

The second framework, the macro-level approach, combines the pull-push theory with a neo-Marxist or structuralist approach, and is another umbrella for schools of thought that explain “migration in terms of the exploitative political-economic relationship between sending and receiving societies.” (Goss & Lindquist, 1995:322)

Dual labour market theory, world systems theory and the world society approach focus on forces operating at an aggregated macro-level. Dual labour market theory links immigration to the structural requirements of modern industrial economies (Piore 1979). World systems theory sees migration as a natural consequence of economic globalization and market penetration across national boundaries (Wallerstein 1974). The world society approach focuses on cultural globalisation, where people increasingly share cultural values world wide, and therefore also perceive economic imbalances and migrate as a consequence (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1989). (GLOPP & Thieme, 2007:1)

Lastly, the third framework, the integrative approach, originates in the realization that migration is the result of both individual decisions made at the micro-level and the patterns of behavior imposed by society at the macro-level, as well as in the specification of intermediate objects of analysis. (Goss & Lindquist, 1995)

The 'new economics approach,' for example, expands the decision making focus of microeconomic functional approaches to incorporate larger social units [...for] risk minimization (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark, 1991). [...] The 'systems approach,' [...] focuses on [...] both the political-economic relations and personal relationships between individuals and families (Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Fawcett, 1989; Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992). [...] Massey (1990:5), in his "networks approach," argues that migration decisions are made jointly by family members within households; that household decisions are affected by local socioeconomic conditions; that local conditions are, in turn, affected by evolving political, social and economic structures at the national and international levels; and that these interrelationships are connected to one another over time. (Goss & Lindquist, 1995:326)

Theories within the integrative line seem to be the better suited to explore migration in a global context such as the one described in the introduction as they “understand migration as a collective process shaped by both agency and structure” (Gold, 2005:260). Moreover, in the context of social capital described in the previous chapter, we particularly favor the networks approach to migration, as described by Tomas Faist who defines networks

as a set of individual or collective actors—ranging from individuals, families, firms and nation-states—and the relations that couple them.... Network patterns of ties comprise social, economic, political networks of interaction, as well as collectives such as groups—kinship groups or communities—and private or public associations. Network is a concept or strategy to study how resources, goods and ideas flow through particular configurations of social and symbolic ties. (2000, pp. 51–52) (quoted in Gold, 2005:4-5)

A recent book by Paul Collier (2013) suggests a change of focus from the traditional question of why people migrate, to the slightly different question of what accelerates or decelerates migration rates. To answer the question, Collier has come up with what he calls his “workhorse” model, based upon three building blocks:

- 1) That the rate of migration depends on the size of the diaspora. A larger diaspora makes the process easier, thus increasing the rate of migration.
- 2) That while new migrants increase the size of the diaspora, the absorption³⁸ of migrants by the host society reduces it. There are several combinations of migration and diaspora that keep the same yield, which Collier calls the diaspora schedule.

³⁸ We will explain this process to a higher level of detail when we explore the concept of diaspora in page 78.

- 3) That the rate of absorption depends on the size of the diaspora. The bigger the diaspora, the more interactions they have with one another and the fewer they have with their host society. Therefore, a larger diaspora decreases the absorption rate.

Essentially, Collier’s model suggests that there might be a point of equilibrium (E) at the intersection of the migration function and the diaspora schedule, where the rate of migration and the rate of absorption can sustain a constant diaspora without any need for control mechanisms (Figure 13, left). However, this equilibrium may be very fragile, or even elusive to begin with. If the migration function is shifted upwards due to an increased migration rate it can miss the diaspora schedule altogether (Figure 13, right). As a result, migration will continue to accelerate and the diaspora to accumulate in the absence of control.




Figure 13: Collier's workhorse model (adapted from Collier, 2013:44-8)

The corollary is, then, that to better manage the stocks and flows of migration in order to maintain equilibrium between the migration function and the diaspora schedule, policies should focus on the two main variables for intervention: on the one hand, the rate of migration through border controls, quota policies, selective migration, etc.; on the other hand, the rate of absorption through integration policies.

Warningly, Collier reminds us that the debate on migration elicits highly emotive reactions and that policy decisions should be carefully considered upon data, and not be “politicized before it has been analyzed.”(12)

International Flow of Human Capital

Narrowing our focus on the peculiarities of highly-skilled migration, it is precisely the concept of skill that has been quite challenging for the literature of migration.

A farmer from sub-Saharan Africa who migrates to Europe may be nearly illiterate (and therefore counted as “unskilled”), but he may also embody highly specialised and productive knowledge about agricultural practices: this knowledge is a loss of skills to his home country when he migrates. Moreover, many migrants explicitly recognised as “skilled” are unable to practise their professions in OECD countries, a phenomenon known as “skill waste”: everyone has heard of migrant engineers driving taxi cabs. (OECD, 2007:33)

In a policy brief for the Brussels-based think-tank Bruegel, Jakob von Weizsäcker argues that while the most obvious definition of skill is traditionally defined in terms of formal qualifications, from an economic perspective it ought to go beyond this: when a migrant achieves “high earnings in the host country, he could be argued to have sufficiently rare talent so as to be regarded as highly skilled. This is the salary-based definition of skill. It is a highly flexible definition, capturing all kinds of professional excellence, including sports such as football and creative professions, which are difficult to standardise” (2006:7).³⁹

However, even if we could argue that the salary-based definition of skills is a better fit for the concept of human capital as it follows the premise that embedded skills should enhance productivity, it is due to data (un-)availability that the level (or years) of education seems to be the most widely used proxy for the concept of skill, and as a result, most literature on highly skilled migrants relates to people with tertiary education {K↔M}.

For the best educated, society has created an impressive series of rewards for migration. Presidencies of firms and professorships in universities come fastest to those who are willing to migrate, and many organizations have adopted a deliberate policy of moving their top employees from place to place. [...] Thus the interests of the economy and of the individual are best served by the fluid movement of those who are hardest to replace. The relationship between migration and education is indeed a necessary one. (Lee, 1970:441)


³⁹ In addition to skills, the concept of talent “is about creativity and new ways of doing things [...and although it] is impossible to measure, [...it] can be seen in unusual personal trajectories [...which] are all the more unusual when one considers the international migration of talent.” (Kuznetsov, 2006:222) See related discussion on page 35.

As early as the 1970s with the increasing awareness of human capital⁴⁰, a first group of theorists focused on the migration of skills using the—then state of the art—push-pull framework, and coupling structuralist and functionalist approaches to find the determinants behind the loss of highly qualified personnel from certain countries (Portes, 1976). This trend has been revived during the past decade with the advent of endogenous growth theories and an increased recognition of the value of other forms of intangible capital.

Recent studies on the highly-skilled segment of migration still build upon the progress around the theories of human capital (Iredale, 2001). After all, as Guilmoto and Sandron propose, “human capital is, with financial capital, the type of investment that ‘travels the least bad’: a migrant endowed of a certain qualification may also expect to extract value from it in a different country” (2003:20)⁴¹, and much like financial capital, the international mobility of human capital may also be analyzed in terms of stocks and flows (D’Costa, 2008).

The gap between the growth in demand and the growth in supply of talent, 2011 to 2021

(Red indicates a trend deficit, green a trend surplus, yellow a broad balance. Numbers show trend growth as annual percentages.)



Since “well educated and/or talented people are often more internationally mobile than unskilled workers” (Solimano, 2008:21), when highly-skilled individuals cannot maximize the potential value of their human capital on their domestic labor market—due to market failures in the allocation of talent; international wage differentials; or as the “relative deprivation” theory would have it, differences in working conditions and career advancement opportunities; adverse political conditions, etc.—they might consider finding chances for better self-development abroad { $K \leftrightarrow M$ }.

Some neoclassical economic models would suggest that as people migrate, equalizing market dynamics take place—meaning that the reduction in the supply of highly-skilled workers and the consequent reduced competition for job opportunities demanding qualified personnel will eventually increase the wages of the source country’s labor markets with a mirror effect in the destination country—and “remittances together with the return of skilled migrants to the source region [and other spillovers] will stimulate economic growth, eventually eliminating spatial inequality and the wage differential that drives migration”(Goss & Lindquist, 1995:320; Solimano, 2008) arriving to a new equilibrium. { $M \rightarrow D$ }

However, as Ellerman (2006) reminds us, this theory holds only under the assumption of diminishing returns, characterized by negative feedback or self-limiting mechanisms. This assumption might not hold if “[i]ncreasing returns lead to multiple equilibriums, perhaps of a high and low variety (the twin peaks dynamics of divergence)”(44), as is the case when facing self-reinforcing mechanisms and positive feedback induced by agglomeration and disagglomeration economies.

To better illustrate these dynamics (see Figure 15), Ellerman uses the example of restaurants and nightclubs: “a group of people leaving the waiting line at restaurant A to go to less crowded restaurant B may help equalize conditions between the two establishments, but a group of people leaving one nightclub to go to another may induce even more migrations in the same direction.”(27)

Above the critical mass C, the “more the merrier” dynamics of agglomeration set in to drive toward the high-level equilibrium at B. Below the critical mass, the dynamics of disagglomeration work to ghettoize the scientific community, until the low-level equilibrium is reached at A. Starting at B, if a few key people are cherrypicked or poached by the developed countries, the system may be pushed down below the critical mass at C, which would trigger the self-reinforcing downward spiral to A.(25)




Figure 15: Critical Mass Dynamics of Emigration (Ellerman, 2006:26)

These divergence dynamics can be seen at work on the study by Benjamin Jones (2008) briefly mentioned in the previous chapter (page 51), as it would be one of the main dynamics behind the “knowledge trap” in economies with generalist human capital. Furthermore, on the specific subject of highly-skilled migrants, Jones suggests that individuals wishing to acquire specialist knowledge must either import the skill—unlikely due to the lack of incentives in the knowledge trap—or migrate to specialist economies. In the case of generalist individuals, Jones’s model suggests that

Skilled immigrants, as generalists, are unable to find local specialists willing to team with them. Moreover, they won’t work alone; the specialized equilibrium of the rich country raises the low-skilled wage enough to make unskilled work a more enticing alternative to the immigrant generalist than using his education. [...Therefore, in specialist economies, local] workers and early immigrants have extremely similar occupational patterns. However, late immigrants with professional or doctoral degrees have a much smaller propensity to work in occupations that rely on such degrees.(23-4)⁴²

In addition, since “specialization may be worthwhile only when a sufficient mass of complementary specialists already exists”(1) the individuals who migrate to improve their human capital “will earn higher real wages by remaining in the rich country”(25), which is also consistent with Friedberg’s findings that potential immigrants are usually better off accumulating human capital after they have

⁴² Keeley (2009) suggests that a lack of mastery of the local language, no recognition or equivalence of skills obtained abroad, no social contacts or “networking” options, and discrimination are some of the main barriers to finding appropriate jobs at the countries of destination.

migrated, as “education acquired after immigration has a very high return.” (Kapur & McHale, 2005:75)

The fact that “‘their’ brains produce ‘better’ knowledge [...] abroad than if they had remained at home” (Kuhn & McAusland, 2006:15) may be—at least partly—explained by the agglomeration economies that influence the location of knowledge clusters, and it is the skilled migrants’ relocation to these places what allows them to experience “the ability to cooperate with other factors of production (including critical masses of highly skilled workers)” (16) {K↔M} much in the way we described in the previous chapter (page 44).

Additionally, “a person’s skills may increase considerably over the course of migration, even if new skills are predominantly learnt on an informal basis” (Hofer, 2009:61) as is the well documented case of students going abroad to obtain higher education; or the case of low- or unskilled workers evident in the research by Iskander, Lowe and Riordan (2009) on the skills acquired by Mexican construction workers in the United States and by Iskander (2010) on the skills acquired by Moroccan and Mexican migrants; or the case of highly-skilled specialists who migrate to benefit from the agglomeration effects of knowledge and innovation clusters around the world.

The logic behind these flows is consistent with Robert Lucas’s (1988; 1990; Mankiw et al., 1995) observation that the movement of capital—human capital being no exception—usually follows a pattern from places where it is scarce to where it is abundant, and is supported by the fact that over 9 percent of the population in developed countries was born abroad while this is less than 2 percent for less developed countries (Figure 16), and data on international migration flows during the 1990s (Figure 17).




Figure 16: Going North, Migrants as percentage of the population (Keeley, 2009:113)




Figure 17: Economic migration in the 1990s (Le Monde Diplomatique, 2006)

Human capital transfers embedded in migratory flows is commonly believed to represent as much of a loss of human capital to their country of origin as it is a gain for their destination country. This specific phenomenon is usually referred to as brain drain, a concept that has been extensively discussed in literature from several perspectives⁴³ since it was first coined by the Royal Society in the 1960s when studying the negative effects on the United Kingdom of the emigration of British scientists to the United States.

[While] rural [migrant] workers from the Third World, poor and uneducated [...] will usually earn wages lower than the national average [...] eventually entering into competition with the local lower classes[,] other migratory flows are more a result of local shortages in human capital and, on the opposite, target educated migrants. These migrations follow very different channels from those of unskilled labor. A high amount of them come from industrialized countries, but the brain drain also affects the elites of developing countries [...] (Guilmoto & Sandron, 2003:20)⁴⁴

⁴³ For a comprehensive review of the brain-drain literature, see Commander et al. (2004), and for a review of literature on the migration of human resources in science and technology, see OECD (2002).

⁴⁴ Freely translated from the French original: [Tandis que] les travailleurs [migrants] originaires des campagnes du Tiers monde, pauvres et peu éduqués [...] gagneront le plus souvent un salaire inférieur à la moyenne nationale [...] entrant éventuellement en compétition avec les classes défavorisées autochtones[, d']autres courants migratoires répondent plus à des pénuries locales en capital humain et concernent au contraire des migrants éduqués. Ces migrations suivent des canaux très différents de ceux de la main-d'oeuvre non qualifiée. Un grand nombre d'entre eux vient des pays industrialisés, mais l'exode des cerveaux (brain drain) affecte pareillement les élites des pays en développement [...]

Consequences: from Brain Drain to Brain Circulation

According to Simon Commander, Mari Kangasniemi and Alan Winters (2004), interest in brain-drain studies has been recently rekindled, as “the emigration of skilled labor from developing countries has again accelerated over the last decade, not least in association with the growth-of-information and knowledge-intensive activities” (236). Furthermore, “from a developmental point of view, the distributional question of who gains from the mobility of talent and how best to capture the benefits of mobility for national development become salient.” (D’Costa, 2008:45) {M→D}

While early studies of brain drain concluded that “skilled migration lowered welfare for the population remaining behind in the sending country” (Commander et al., 2004:264), recent studies might offer a silver lining to the dark cloud, suggesting that “with new opportunities in sending countries, [brain drain dynamics] do not necessarily capture the more ‘circular’ movements of professionals between sending and receiving countries” (D’Costa, 2008:47) as can be seen in Figure 18, especially in the upper right quadrant.

It is this struggle between the mainly-negative- and the mainly-positive-effects views that characterizes recent literature on the subject. The camp leaning towards a negative view holds that brain drain still causes the countries of origin to lose the positive externalities of skilled workers documented by Özden and Schiff as “(i) spillover productivity of other workers, (ii) public service provision (e.g. education and health), (iii) tax revenues, and (iv) public debate and policy institution influence” (Wescott & Brinkerhoff, 2006:4). This list is supplemented by Kapur and McHale (2005) with the loss of specialized skills—a growing development concern under the endogenous growth paradigm—and sector-specific effects that weaken indigenous research focusing on local problems.




Figure 18: The Effects of the International Mobility of Technical Talent (D’Costa, 2008:65)

Nevertheless, the camp leaning towards a positive view argues that the countries of origin may gain some positive effects unavailable without migration

[...as it] motivates others in the sending country to acquire more education raising human capital and possibly promoting growth [...so] emigrants may, in due course, return or, through networks and resource repatriation (such as through remittances) [...] promote a more effective flow of knowledge and information [...which] may be limiting the extent to which skills are actually lost. (Commander et al., 2004:236)




Figure 19: Hierarchy of Migration Impacts (Kuznetsov, 2009:36)

Yevgeny Kuznetsov (2009, 2011) identifies five categories for these positive effects—remittances, philanthropic contributions, investments, technological and organizational knowledge transfers, and opportunities for incremental institutional development—organized in a pyramid hierarchy (see Figure 19) that goes from a subsistence agenda at the base, towards a self-actualization agenda at the top, as a ranking based on the relevance of their contribution toward the development of the countries of origin.

To this regard, we acknowledge that, at the base of the pyramid, remittances and other donations and micro-transfers are extremely important sources of income for many nations, funding poverty-reduction world-wide in total volumes that significantly outpace the investments in aid for development (Irving, Mohapatra, & Ratha, 2010)⁴⁵.

⁴⁵ Even if these lately seem to be the subject of growing controversy on their potential to generate development: whereas on the one hand, they can be extremely useful tools for community-driven development if used as a part of a wider strategy, on the other hand, there are growing concerns that the short-term expenditure-oriented assistance derived from

Mexican migrants to the United States remit an astonishing 31 percent of their earnings. But some migrants are even more generous. Migrants from El Salvador living in Washington remit 38 percent. The Senegalese in Spain remit a world-beating 50 percent of their earnings; the Ghanaians in Italy remit around a quarter; Moroccans in France remit a tenth of their earnings, while Algerians are a bit lower at around 8 percent. Counting down the league table of generosity, both the Chinese in Australia and Filipinos in the United States, come in at around 6 percent. Two high-profile migrant groups skulk near the bottom: Turks in Germany and Cubans in America return a measly 2 percent. In aggregate, all this generosity adds up to enormous sums. Remittances during 2012 from high-wage countries to developing countries total around \$400 billion. This is almost four times global aid flows and roughly on a par with foreign direct investment. (Collier, 2013:207)

We also acknowledge that while the role of migrants in the attraction of foreign direct investment to their homelands is relevant when these are in decision-making or decision-influencing positions of large companies, Richard Devane suggests that migrants themselves are not likely to be pioneer investors as “most investors prefer investments located within five hours of their home so they can easily supervise their progress” (2006:64).

Therefore, this dissertation will largely ignore the lower three echelons of the pyramid and focus on the upper two, as we consider knowledge and innovation $\{K \leftrightarrow M\}$, as well as the potential for institutional reform $\{M \leftrightarrow I\}$ to be the key contributions that differentiate highly-skilled migrants from those with lesser levels of skill.

The most likely role of international migration as a catalyst is as a transmission channel for ideas. Having a diaspora exposed to societies where the social model is more functional might fast-track the absorption of the ideas that make a difference. But there is little evidence to suggest that resident diasporas, as opposed to temporary student migrants, are important. (Collier, 2013:221)

These positive effects of brain drain are a welcome contribution to developing—and to some developed—nations, given what seems to be a recent consensus around its unavoidability, compounded by countries that actively and openly compete to attract talent via their immigration

this type of contributions might demotivate public actors to generate much needed mid- and long-term capacity-building/strengthening poverty-reduction policies, thus effectively eroding this tool's development potential (Bakewell, 2009; Ellerman, 2006). “Remittances need to be understood exactly as what they are: foreign savings. As with any other source of foreign savings, like aid, trade, or investment, remittances interact with the structure of the local economy.” (Orozco, 2008:213)

policies⁴⁶, due to the increased dependence on skills for the knowledge-based economy, the aging of populations throughout the developed world, and the lack of international integration of labor markets to cope with sudden domestic shortages of certain required skills. (Kapur & McHale, 2005)

Since the mental image of a brain drain evokes negative connotations, the existence of a “beneficial brain drain” causes interesting semantic conflicts which have generated an evolution in the vocabulary of the field that is succinctly summarized by Clay Wescott and Jennifer Brinkerhoff as ranging:

from the traditional “brain drain” (e.g., Özden and Schiff, 2005) to the increasing use of “brain gain” (e.g., Meyer and Brown, 1999a; Hunger, 2002; Margolis et al., 2004) and subtle variations on these, including “brain strain” (e.g., Lowell et al., 2004), “brain waste” (e.g., Özden and Schiff, 2005), and “brain exchange” and “brain circulation” (Gamlen, 2005; Vertovec, 2002; Saxenian, 2002; Pellegrino, 2001). The latter two are often linked to discussions of globalization and its impact. (2006:4)

The above list is further expanded by Ajay Agrawal, Devesh Kapur, and John McHale with the self-explanatory “brain bank” to denote the accumulation of knowledge abroad and how it may play a role on its transfer back to the knowledge workers who remain at the country of origin. In their model, these authors focus on the tradeoff of the positive and negative dynamics of brain drain: as it leads to a reduction in the domestic innovator stocks, but it may also lead to an increased access to foreign-produced knowledge. Therefore, they attempt the calculation of an “emigrant stock that maximizes national knowledge access” which they call an “optimal diaspora.”(2008:3)⁴⁷

From these conceptual views of the phenomenon, brain circulation provides a better fit for the contextual references we analyze in this dissertation. This concept relies on the models of globalization we overviewed in the dissertation’s introduction; on the models of endogenous economic growth, and proximities reviewed in the previous chapter; on an integrative approach to migration which blends macro-level structuralist social constrains and micro-level efforts by individual migrants and their networks related to human capital flows; and takes into consideration

⁴⁶ This international competition is not limited to some fields of knowledge, and as Andrés Solimano (2008) suggests, talents may be categorized depending whether they are devoted to productive, academic or socio-cultural activities into: technical, scientists and academics, professionals in the health sector, entrepreneurs and managers, professionals in international organizations, and cultural talents, to which we might add sport talents.

⁴⁷ For the definition of diaspora see page 75, and for a deeper look into the organizational and institutional implications of diasporas as development actors see next chapter (page 112). {M↔I}

the tradeoff between the positive and negative effects of the international migration of highly-skilled labor. (Saxenian, 2002; Saxenian & Sabel 2008)

Regarding the net result of this tradeoff between simultaneous positive and negative effects, different regions experience different outcomes {M→D}: while most African and Caribbean experiences usually report a worsening skill gap from brain drain, several Asian and some Latin American experiences have turned out to be success stories in capitalizing the gains of migration (Wescott & Brinkerhoff, 2006). However, Paul Collier (2013) based on data by Corden, explains that the size of the country has a direct impact on whether they are winners or losers of the talent migration:

Most of the countries that remain very poor are small, and this matters for their rate of emigration: small countries have proportionally much higher emigration rates than large countries. So unless there are strong additional effects to the contrary large countries will tend to be the net gainers and small countries the net losers. (199)

The variety of results in cross-country studies have motivated several studies to analyze the different conditions and policies that promote the beneficial—and/or mitigate the negative—effects for better development opportunities in the sending countries.

On the side of the conditions, research by Peter Kuhn and Carol McAusland (2006) focuses on the characteristics and context of the country of origin, and finds that the beneficial effects are better capitalized when the market of the destination country is sufficiently larger than the market of the country of origin, and if the knowledge produced abroad “is not *too* irrelevant” (1) to consumers back home.

On the side of policy, they find that the country of origin may increase its benefits from brain drain when it maintains a weaker level of protection of intellectual property rights relative to the stronger intellectual property rights at the destination country. This allows the homeland to keep a low price on knowledge goods while specializing in “*out of* knowledge goods production”, especially when their brains abroad are engaged in the production of public rather than private goods (16).

For Kapur and McHale (2005), the foremost condition for a positive net effect of diaspora communities in the development of their homelands relies on the characteristics of emigrants, since “[a] diaspora’s ability to affect its country of origin varies positively with its own success” (120) as they are more likely to be persuasive with and imitated by actors at home. Additionally, this “interplay between the diaspora and its country of origin” (121) is reliant on: (i) ethnic, class, or social differences between the diaspora and the elites in their homelands; and (ii) the length of the

diaspora's absence from the homeland, since "the greater vintage of a diaspora, the less intimate its links with its country of origin" (120).

Regarding policies, the authors are of the view that since there is no escape to the negative aspects of brain drain, there should be a focus on the local creation of human capital and some degree of control to avoid losing talent abroad by working on the improvement of push factors and without reaching levels that would thwart the personal freedom of their citizens⁴⁸. In addition, when migration does take place, they suggest that the diasporas should contribute to the development of their homelands through fiscal compensation schemes⁴⁹, and propose countries to work on the communication mechanisms to encourage the interactions described in the previous paragraph.

For Katseli, Lucas, and Xenogiani (2006) the idea of "circulation" comes in the fourth and fifth stages of the economic migration cycle (see Figure 20) with which they try to explain the mechanisms that account for differences in net effects migration has on various sending countries: in the fourth stage through networking mechanisms between the diaspora and the home country, and in the fifth stage through the return of migrants and their increased entrepreneurship.

PHASE	LABOUR SUPPLY	PRODUCTIVITY	REMITTANCES	GROWTH	POVERTY REDUCTION
EXIT	↓	↓	○	○/↓	↓
ADJUSTMENT	↓/○	?	○/↑	○/↓	○/↓
CONSOLIDATION	○	↑	↑	↑	↑
NETWORKING	○	↑	↑/○	↑	↑
RETURN	↑	?	↓	?	?

Figure 20: A Model of the Migration Cycle, Its Effects on the Sending Country (OECD, 2007:54)

Exit stage: [...] involves a decline in the supply of labour and [...] in the case of skilled emigration, productivity declines as well. [...] Moreover, intra-household inequality may increase and family roles may also change as a result.

Adjustment stage: [...] output continues to fall [...], however, continuing migration improves the information flow and thus reduces the information and transaction costs [...]; households start using migration as a livelihood strategy. Furthermore [...] those left behind [...] start investing in

⁴⁸ The UN Declaration of Human Rights enshrines the right to leave one's country: "a state may not lawfully erect barriers, like the Berlin Wall, to prevent its citizens from leaving. [...] However, to] declare it absolute would be very close to denying the legitimacy of all immigration control, since a right to leave one's country would be nugatory unless at least some other country had the duty to take one in." (Dummett, 2001:31)

⁴⁹ Kapur & McHale analyze the American Model, a tax sharing regime, and an exit tax on human capital.

skills required to leave the country and seek improved prospects abroad. [...] However, massive skilled labour migration may turn out to be disastrous for the home country if a critical mass of human capital and skilled labour is seriously depleted with no prospects of replenishment.

Consolidation stage: [...] labour supply is likely to stabilise [...and there is a] growing inflow of migrant remittances, economic restructuring or human capital accumulation. [...] Growth is likely to increase and poverty be reduced in this consolidation stage.

Networking stage: [...] associations in the receiving country with links with the home country improve the communication between the two countries and enhance market activities [...]; migrants acquire the knowledge of markets in both countries and become good trade and investment intermediaries. [...] Human capital accumulation spurred by remittance flows and improved incentives contribute to skill formation. [...] Positive growth does not guarantee that inequality will decline.

Repatriation, immigration or circulation stage: [...] home region starts experiencing labour shortages especially in unskilled- type jobs in selected local markets which are covered by inflows mostly from neighbouring countries. [...] Return migrants often choose to settle in cities, which often leads to rising urban population, and increasing pressures on urban labour markets. New immigrants, [...] settle in areas where the shortages appear, such as rural areas, [...] migration for seasonal or contract work facilitates the creation of economic and social networks leading to positive externalities in trade and investment. In this stage, the impact on growth and poverty is ambiguous. (2006:28-30)

For Katseli and his colleagues, the key actor is the returning migrant. Therefore, they suggest that it is equally important to attend the reasons behind the return—they identify a typology of four: (1) policy induced (mainly involuntary) returnees, (2) voluntary returnees as push factors at origin improve or pull factors at destination change, (3) returnees whose migratory experience did not materialize the expected gains, and (4) those who had planned to return from the outset—and the availability of opportunities for these to be re-assimilated at their home economy. While the authors support Gosh's idea of increased entrepreneurship in returning migrants to utilize the human capital acquired abroad, they also insist better empirical data are required to further explore the notion.

Nevertheless, and as a complementary note, human and social capital acquired during the migration is known to affect the political attitudes of returned migrants. Lisa Chauvet and Marion Mercier recently found three particular effects: (1) “returning migrants are significantly more likely to vote than nonmigrants”; (2) “this behavior gets copied by nonmigrants [...] living in the vicinity”; and (3) “among nonmigrants, the ones most inclined to copy the behavior of returning migrants were the least educated” (Collier, 2013:186-7).

For Yevgeny Kuznetsov and Charles Sabel (2006, 2008), the conditions for brain circulation to occur require a gradual, heterogeneous, and spontaneous step-by-step process, based on the social notions of open migration chains and diasporas as search networks.

Open migration chains are sequences of educational or job opportunities, which allow a migrant to move to progressively complex educational and job tasks necessary to work in the global environment. Diaspora networks (or expatriate networks) are the locus of concerted action by expatriates to promote their collective interests or to help them engage in their home countries. (2008:84-5)

These two social notions {M↔I} evolve from the second generation literature—where diasporas have a direct role “as investors, consultants, scientists, and doctors”—into the third generation, where the diasporas’ role is rather as “bridges, mentors and antennae” (93)⁵⁰ for a homeland society engaged in the articulation of self-actualizing development reform processes.

Diasporas generate not just information about opportunities but the opportunities themselves: many migrants establish small businesses, a natural consequence of the conjunction of the aspirations associated with migration and the discrimination they often encounter in the jobs market. [...] In addition to information and opportunities, diasporas directly lower the costs of arrival: while searching for work, migrants can live with their established relatives. (Collier, 2013:163)

Although Kuznetsov and Sabel insist on the need for spontaneity in the creation of these chains and networks and on how “serendipity seems to be much more important than government interventions” (96), they do not forsake the idea of using public policies to blow full fires out of identified organically grown sparks—much in line with Phelps’s element of randomness in innovation (see page 42). The authors call this a process of “guided serendipity” to transform the vertical-style industrial policy—focused on the promotion of linkages along the traditional value chain—into a “new industrial policy” that uses search networks⁵¹ to create missing connections by

⁵⁰ First generation being the early debate on brain drain literature (1960s-1990s), we discussed earlier in this chapter, see also Kuznetsov (2006) and Ellerman (2006).

⁵¹ Isofar as these act as middleman in the provision of a “bridge between actors in separate groups, communities, or markets who are disconnected *and* who value one another’s resources [as experts] at translating or reframing information for different audiences” (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:933)

solving issues of cognitive limitations in fast-paced industries⁵², limited capacity of the public sector, and vested or entrenched interests that might lead to unbecoming rent-seeking⁵³.

Alasdair Rutherford (2009) takes the role of government in the diaspora engagement one step further by suggesting that an optimum level cannot be realized unless policy interventions are designed to address three specific market failures: (1) network effects—when participation attractiveness increases with the network size, so the government should assist and foster the network until it reaches the critical mass to produce benefits—, (2) transaction costs/information failure—when the cost of information is high, it motivates private activity but it might leave out a large share of the market; when the cost of sharing is low, the value of information is also low and private actors have little incentive to provide it; either case, the government can facilitate the service—, and (3) other externalities—“when there are both private and public benefits of an activity, but the individual makes decisions to act based only on a comparison of the private benefits and the cost.”(9)

Understanding Diasporas as Transnational Communities

Rubin Patterson (2006) claims that for brain drain to occur, talented migrants moving from developing to developed countries should be “permanently uprooted from the homeland, without future involvement in its affairs”(189). However, as we have seen, that seldom is the case as migrants tend to group formally or informally into social, economic, or cultural transnational communities to reaffirm their identities and consolidate ethnic or kinship ties. While we will explore how those socially constructed and socially reinforced identities are consolidated in further detail in part two (see page 176), the psycho-social context where this takes place is explained by Wenger’s theories briefly mentioned in page 41.

There is an increasing consensus amongst experts that, given our globalized context, the fact that these migrants change their residence from their homelands to host countries does not necessarily imply an uprooting or an abandonment of the ties that link them to their countries of origin (Collier, 2013; Bakewell, 2009; Gold, 2005; Patterson, 2006; Shain & Barth 2003).

Distant proximities are real-life experiences that both integrate and fragment relationships outside and inside borders. Immigrant laborers are key protagonists of distant proximities; they integrate their home and host countries into the global economy as they seek to keep their

⁵² Directly related to our insight on improving the absorptive capacity of an economy as suggested in page 53.

⁵³ Directly related to our discussion on how knowledge is incorporated into the policy process on page 108.

families together. The end result is a transnational lifestyle, characterized both by opportunities and hardships that feature this paradox of distance and closeness. (Orozco, 2008:208)

Gabriel Sheffer (1986) calls these communities modern diasporas and defines them as “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their homelands”(3). Similarly, building on work by William Safran, Patterson refers to these transnational communities as “a people disperse from their original homeland, a people possessing a collective memory and myth about a sentimental and/or material links to that homeland, which fosters a sense of sympathy and solidarity with co-ethnic diasporans and with putative brethren in the ancestral homeland”(1896).

Furthermore, Patterson suggests that, at times, these kinship and identity ties are so strong amongst those members of these transnational communities that “a member who has never lived in the homeland can have an even greater sense of obligation to support the homeland as another member who was born there”(1896), and asserts from a world systems perspective (see page 74) that “transnationalism is an efficient means of transferring knowledge, skills and wealth from core nations to those in the semiperiphery and the periphery”(1892); transfers which “reflect individual and group exercises of migrant’s transnational identity through symbolic and material commitments to the homeland.”(Orozco, 2008:209)⁵⁴

It is also worth observing that while diasporas can operate as a cohesive actor, they are organizations, and as such, they are subject to internal dynamics among its own members, who can be classified in different ways. Following Bakewell (2009), while membership of a diaspora is indeed a question of identity, it “should not be assumed on the basis of migration history, ethnic or racial background; it should be established by research.” (794)

Many authors appear to use the term diaspora as a synonym for migrants or the descendants of migrants (so called second and third generation migrants). [...However, t]here will be members of a diaspora who are not migrants, having been born in their country of residence. Likewise some migrants may not choose to identify with any diaspora and therefore, should not be considered as part of one. [...] These distinctions become particularly important when one

⁵⁴ Not unlike the processes by which corporate strategies that aim to build worker identification with the company to reduce exit: “Identification becomes an important means for removing or reducing those inefficiencies that are labeled by the terms moral hazard and opportunism,” writes Simon (1991, p. 41). This is one of the keystones of human resource policies in Japanese firms and firms using Japanese-style policies (Kagono and Kobayashi 1994). As each firm develops its own routines and procedures in a path-dependent manner, an increasing proportion of worker training may be firm specific, so that retention becomes self-reinforcing over time.” (Ellerman, 2006:40)

considers the role of the migrants and diasporas in development. Much of the policy discussion is focused on how states can exploit the active engagement of migrants and their descendants in development. [...] As a result, maintaining, or re-establishing, contact with the diaspora and encouraging its members to live up to these expectations – ‘courting the diaspora’ (de Haas 2006) – has become an important policy concern [...]. An inclusive definition broadens the pool of people to whom they can appeal. (793)⁵⁵

Alasdair Rutherford (2009) takes the identification of diaspora membership one step further, in a typology that, whilst still identity-based {K↔M}, expands the possible membership of diasporas by access to count both an overseas and a domestic group with three different subcategories each. Moreover, he underscores the fact that placing diasporans in either of these six groups is never black and white as these circulate between types at different stages of their lives, or even exit altogether if the identity connections to the analyzed country are severed, as graphically presented in Figure 21.

On the one hand, the overseas groups include the lived diaspora—composed by “individuals who have spent some part of their life” in the analyzed country regardless of their origin—, the ancestral diaspora—composed by those “who can trace their heritage” to the analyzed country—, and the affinity diaspora—composed by individuals who have a bond to the analyzed country “without drawing a direct family link” (3-4).




Figure 21: Movements Between Diaspora Groups (adapted from Rutherford, 2009:7)

⁵⁵ We will take a closer look at these policies in the next chapter (see p. 119)

On the other hand, the domestic groups include the reverse diaspora—composed by people who have migrated “on a permanent or medium-term basis” to the analyzed country and who will become lived diasporans if they leave in the future—, the returning diaspora—composed by overseas diasporans who return to the analyzed country—, and new diaspora—composed by residents who are planning to move overseas (4-5).⁵⁶

Accepting that diaspora membership is a matter of identification and behavior, cultural distance—or proximity—becomes an important measure between migrants and locals, especially considering Collier’s concept of an absorption (see p.76), by which “an unabsorbed diaspora gradually merges into mainstream society” (2013:41).

An immigrant might simply lose touch with, and interest in, the society that she has left. A child of immigrants might redefine itself as a member of the host society [...]. Or, over time, each successive generation of descendants from immigrant families may become more psychologically distant from their country of origin. The proportion of the diaspora that switches every year may be high or low, and [we] will refer to it as the *absorption rate*. (2013:42)

“Over time, those migrants that are culturally proximate to the indigenous population absorb into it, while those who are culturally distant remain in the diaspora” (Collier, 2013:91). The attitudes by which migrants integrate and merge into their mainstream societies typically take the form of either assimilation or fusion, each with a distinctive set of cultural and ethical implications.

In the case of assimilation, immigrants forsake their own cultural heritage, language, and social norms, in favor of those of their host nation. This can be done either voluntarily or by policy incentives, and although controversial in the contemporary multiculturalist paradigm, having “a common cultural behavior, the indigenous and immigrants come to recognize each other as the same people.” (99)

In the case of fusion, the attitude for integration

readily affords equal dignity to the migrant as she is and to the indigenous. There is no hierarchy of cultures, but rather the excitement and creativity of cultural blending. [...] In practical terms, fusion has consequences similar to assimilation. The only difference is the potential risk that the

⁵⁶ An example using Scotland as the analyzed country for the possible membership in each of these six categories, see Figure 33 on page 115.

social model will become blended in such a way that damagingly dilutes its functionality: remember that in economic terms, not all cultures are equal. (99-100)

Once that the issue of membership has been relatively clarified⁵⁷, Shain and Barth (2003) categorize diasporans into three types: (1) core members—an elite of active organizers in a position to appeal the mobilization of other diasporans—, (2) passive members—those who are willing and able to mobilize when called upon by their leaders—, and (3) silent members—comprising a large pool of typically uninvolved diasporans, but who may react in times of crisis. Furthermore—and coinciding with the findings of Kuznetsov (see page 84)—Brinkerhoff (2008) suggests that

[t]he sophistication of individuals' participation is also likely to increase with progressive integration. The literature on voluntary associations finds that membership increases with education, income, and professional employment (Moya 2005). It should be anticipated, then, that as diaspora members progress educationally and economically in the adopted homeland they, too, may join more associations. More-educated diaspora members are also more likely to organize for homeland interventions that are national in scope (Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2005). (159)


However, it might be useful to remember that “not all diaspora pressure is for the good” (Collier, 2013:188). In fact, the composition of the diaspora matters greatly, as

diasporas are [sometimes] disproportionately drawn from ethnic minorities that have been oppressed in their countries of origin and harbor lingering resentments. At their worst, [some] diasporas are seriously out of touch with present-day realities in their countries of origin but continue to nurse grievances over long-past conditions as badges of differentiated identity within their host society.(188)

For this reason, it is important that the diaspora is constantly engaged with the people and the realities of their homeland, if they want their contributions through institutional and knowledge transfer to be meaningful.

⁵⁷ The same way in which assimilation and fusion help migrants close the cultural gap with the locals and integrate, Paul Collier (2013) also identifies two attitudes that prevent migrants from being absorbed. Moreover, taken to the extreme, these two attitudes might push cultural distances to the perilous limit of stressing the coexistence of both groups. These consist in attitudes of sheer separatism (self- or externally imposed), on the one hand, or by attempting to culturally colonize the host society, on the other. In either case, marginalization and social exclusion cause migrants to perpetuate the inefficient social norms and institutions that they brought with them, without realizing that it is precisely those what they might be wanting to escape from through migration. However, for the moment, these escape the scope of our dissertation.

A Road Map for Diaspora Engagement



©Migration Policy Institute 2010.

Figure 22: MPI's Roadmap for Diaspora Engagement (as quoted in Heleniak & Canagarajah, 2011:8)

[T]he resident population of a society may be better placed than the diaspora to absorb and apply ideas. It is able to download the international models it learns of through the Internet and through a spell of education abroad, but it has its finger on the pulse of how its own society is evolving and so can develop viable domestic institutions. In contrast, a diaspora is at once too close to the host society to distill the big picture and too distant from its society of origin, which it recalls in nostalgic fantasies. (222)

To foster the links between the diaspora abroad and the people back home, the Migration Policy Institute has been developing a roadmap for engagement over the past few years depicted in Figure 22. We will continue to analyze these and other interventions from diasporas in their homelands in the next chapter, when we place them in the context of policy and institutions (see page 128) {M↔I}.

The Migration of Skills in Empirical Research

Several of the theoretical studies cited earlier include some sort of empirical component. Yet, their contributions are mainly conceptual. In contrast, we will now take a look at studies more heavily reliant on empirical research in order to assess the observable links between the migration of skills and development, especially for the countries of origin $\{M \rightarrow D \ \& \ K \leftrightarrow M\}$.⁵⁸

Empirical research in the field of development and migration has experienced a boom over the past decade, and while most studies are concerned with the general flows of migrants and their remittances, there is still a fraction concerned with the migration of skills which tends to be quite specific and case oriented at country- and region-level. An explanation for this characteristic lies in the aforementioned insufficiency of the quality and quantity of data on international migration stocks, flows, returns, and particularly on their human capital endowments, which until recently ranged from limited to poor to outright inexistent.

This fact was acknowledged in the proceedings of the OECD Seminar on International Mobility of Highly Skilled Workers that took place in Paris in June 2001, where the editors stated that there was an urgency to “assess the quality of available data and concepts used and to help improve their comparability” (OECD, 2002:7). Since then, international organizations—such the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (UNDESA, 2009), the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2010), the OECD’s Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI, 2010), the European Union and the World Bank (Alqu zar Sabadie et al. 2010) to name a few—have established initiatives in an attempt to correct this deficit, and to provide researchers with better empirical data for deeper insights into the complex phenomenon of the migration of skills, and its impact on growth and development.

Whereas these initiatives will take some time to flourish in full, there are already some encouraging results in the form of studies, like the two we present in this section, the first of which, was conducted by Alqu zar Sabadie, Avato, Bardak, Panzica, and Popova (2010), published jointly by the World Bank and the European Training Foundation. Its empirical part consisted of fact-finding missions and field surveys to potential and returned migrants with various levels of qualifications⁵⁹ which took place in 2006—that is, before the current economic downturn—in four countries:

⁵⁸ For this reason, we have limited our scope to those empirical studies that present a cross-country approach. We will explore more examples of diaspora-led development efforts in our next chapter (see page 82), when we analyze the institutional and policy implications of migrants.

⁵⁹ Classified in terms of the skills and responsibilities required by their jobs into “high management”, “middle management”, “professional”, “skilled worker”, “unskilled worker”, and “other”.

Albania, Egypt, Moldova, and Tunisia. While this study covers a narrow geographical scope, the surveys allowed for a deeper analysis of the data collected, through correlation tables and econometric models to explore the “link between migration and human capital development [...] for achieving an optimal “win-win-win” situation for all the parties involved in the migration process.”

(16) {M→D & K↔M}

At times, the findings of this study were in line with the expectations based on the theories: for example, in terms of socioeconomic factors where the authors report younger single males without children are the demographic most likely to migrate, or that the language skills may become an important obstacle for migration when lacking. Also more than half of the potential migrants of all four countries mentioned their reason for leaving was to improve their standards of living—consistent with the wage differential and relative devaluation theories—and economic factors overall outweighed all other factors put together. Additionally, when considering the main destinations of these migrants, these follow the logic we covered in Figure 17 (see page 82) with North America as the main destination for highly-skilled migrants from Albania, Moldova and Tunisia, or the Gulf countries in the case of Egyptians.

Yet and perhaps more interestingly, at times, the findings of the study did not match what would have been anticipated from the theoretical appraisal. For example, an expected direct relation between the migration desire and education level of potential migrants only showed statistical relevance for Egypt. Looking further into this anomaly, the authors believe that there is a relevant link between migration and education for Egypt because of the visibility of job opportunities highly-educated Egyptians can get in the Gulf countries which are their main destination⁶⁰, and there is no equivalent visibility of job opportunities in their main destinations for the other studied countries.

In spite of these results, highly-educated individuals who said they were seriously thinking of leaving their country ranged between 39 percent in Moldova to 63 percent in Tunisia, and about a third of them mentioned they would expect to work in a lower skill level if they migrated to the European Union.

Moreover, when the researchers explored the intention to re-emigrate in the group of returned migrants, the link between migration and education was statistically relevant, especially for Albania, but it showed an inverse relation to what researchers expected: lower levels of education expressed a higher desire to re-emigrate, a finding explained by both internal and external factors. Externally,

⁶⁰ Which could be related to the diaspora networks and open migration chains of Kuznetsov and Sabel (see page 74) that makes these opportunities visible.

the higher difficulty for unskilled and low-skilled workers to get a job in Albania, coupled with the availability of these kind of jobs in their main destination countries. Internally, that most of these individuals were either sent away by authorities or their permits abroad expired, a failure that “becomes a push factor for remigration” (27).

Regarding the issue of brain drain, Alquézar Sabadie and his colleagues found that labor markets in these four countries cannot absorb the increasing supply of workers with higher education, and that there is a skill mismatch with the real needs of those economies, that is, the types of job opportunities locally available. This same problem was found to be a factor preventing the adequate reinsertion of returned migrants into the local labor market to capitalize on the skills acquired or improved abroad. Nevertheless, the Government of Tunisia plans to continue expanding higher education “including for the purpose of sending skilled labor abroad” (48) in a policy the authors consider to run the risk of a financial and human capital waste both for the country of origin and destination.

One last interesting finding linked to brain drain from this study is a deeply telling disparity among the four countries. While for Albania and Moldova more than 60 percent of the highly-educated migrants had worked abroad as unskilled labor, this percentage was only 12,5 percent and 4,5 percent for Tunisia and Egypt respectively.

These differences can be explained by the migration cycle of Katseli and his colleagues, and by the diaspora network model of Kuznetsov and Sabel (page 90): as Tunisia and Egypt are “traditional sources of migration” they have “consolidated diaspora networks that can facilitate the potential access to better-quality jobs” (46) {M↔I} avoiding the brain waste that Albanian and Moldovan highly-educated migrants suffer.

The second study, edited by Jeff Dayton-Johnson for the OECD Development Centre (OECD, 2007), offers a much wider field of analysis with data on economic and migratory patterns reported in United Nations statistics and other official sources, as well as several case studies world-wide, and also sheds some light on the nexus between the migration of skills and development. Among its findings, this study suggests five interesting conclusions:

1. *Observed patterns of mobility respond (if imperfectly) to immigration policies in OECD countries.* [...] Language ties, history (e.g. colonial links in the past) and contiguousness also drive migrants' decisions. (25)

2. *People moving from developing countries make up a sizeable share of today's international labour mobility.* International migrants make up a bigger share of the population in OECD countries, on average, than in the developing world. (26)

Dependent variable: number of people born in country i, living in country j/total population of country i)			
	(1) All	(2) High-skilled	(3) Low-skilled
1 if common official language in the two countries	2.543 (0.131)**	2.561 (0.127)**	2.014 (0.144)**
1 if colonial relationship after 1945	3.288 (0.283)**	3.000 (0.270)**	3.544 (0.298)**
1 if the two countries are contiguous	2.048 (0.449)**	1.724 (0.433)**	2.231 (0.476)**
Log distance in km between the two countries [®]	-0.893 (0.057)**	-0.679 (0.059)**	-0.848 (0.066)**
Constant	-2.896 (0.499)**	-5.927 (0.510)**	-4.264 (0.571)**
Observations	3671	3057	2919
R-squared	0.2142	0.2247	0.1930

Notes: Description of explanatory variables (by row): (1) 1 if there is common official language in the two countries; (2) 1 if there is a colonial relationship between the two countries after 1945; (3) 1 if the two countries are contiguous; (4) bilateral distance in km between largest cities, weighted by share of the city in total population in the country.

Standard errors in parentheses.

*: significant at 5 per cent

**: significant at 1 per cent

Source: variables on colonial ties, language, contiguousness and distance are from CEPII (2006). The stock of migrants comes from OECD (2004, 2005).

Figure 23: Stocks of Foreign Born as a Function of Distance, Language and Colonial Ties (OECD, 2007:36)

These two conclusions give as a result the analysis of migratory patterns to OECD countries graphically represented as Figure 16 (see page 81), and suggests that while the policies of governments in the global competition for talent might be indeed succeeding at influencing migration patterns worldwide, there are three other variables—common language, post-1945 colonial relationship, and geographical proximity—that can help explain the choice of destination of migrants in up to 20 percent (Figure 23) in a similar fashion on both high- and low-skilled migrants. These variables could provide a complementary explanation, for example, as to why the highly-skilled Egyptian migrants from the previous study tilted towards the Gulf States rather than towards North America in their choice for destination.

Moreover, these two conclusions have important implications for developed countries, who are called to awareness and action on the unintended and unwanted externalities that their policies of active recruitment of skills have towards developing countries (see conclusion 5).

3. *Mobility of the low-skilled has a greater impact on poverty reduction in the sending country than mobility of the highly skilled.* [...] Compared with the highly skilled, they travel shorter

distances, they have a strongly expressed intention to return and they tend not to be accompanied by their family members. All of these factors promote higher remittance volumes. [...] Moreover, low-skilled emigration reduces unemployment (and possibly raises wages) among low-skilled workers who remain behind. (26)

This remark emphasizes the role of remittances and intermediation for trade and investment that diasporas have abroad, accounting for the first three levels of Kuznetsov's pyramid framework of in Figure 19 (page 84), falling short of considering the last two levels of these diaspora impacts that, while less frequent and much harder to analyze, seem to have a potential for deeper and longer-lasting repercussions for the countries of origin.

4. *Low-skilled migrants to OECD countries come disproportionately from middle-income countries.* Only 3 per cent of low-skilled foreign born in the OECD come from sub-Saharan Africa, and only 4 per cent from South Asia; these are the poorest regions of the world. The numbers of low-skilled migrants from the middle-income economies of Latin America, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia are much higher. (27)


5. *Mobility of the highly skilled – those with a tertiary education – disproportionately affects low-income countries.* While some high-income countries, such as Ireland, experience high rates of “brain drain”, they are endemic to low-income countries, and are especially worrisome in sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and a number of small island states. Ironically, low-income countries tend to participate in the emerging global mobility system in ways inconsistent with poverty reduction. (27)

These two final conclusions are based upon the analysis of the data graphically represented in Figure 24, and provide empirical support to the “migration hump” theory, which is based on the premise that potential migrants may be dissuaded by the high costs of the process, and only after reaching a certain means threshold they can afford to migrate, thus “the relationship between income and migration tends to be hump-shaped, first rising, then falling” (117).

While this minimum means threshold may be unreachable for low- or unskilled workers in the poorest regions, it may be reachable for the same skill group in middle-income countries. Additionally, highly-skilled workers in the poorest of regions might be more likely to take the opportunity to migrate compared to the same demographic in middle-income countries.

In the specific issue of brain drain, the authors subscribe to a negative net effect view for low-income countries, where imperfections in labor markets and impoverished institutional arrangements might constrain the positive development effects expected when returning migrants, or even the knowledge transfers, attempt to put their skills to good use. This view also provides

indirect support to the theories of agglomeration economies we have seen in the previous chapter, as well as to Jones’s model of the knowledge trap as it claims that “rates of return in poorer economies may be insufficient to generate meaningful transfer of skills and technology” (63).



Note: Turkey and Mexico are OECD Member countries. Each figure is defined as the total born in country *i*, living in the OECD, divided by the total foreign born in the OECD (percentage); only the main sending countries in each region have been included in the charts.
Data source: OECD (2004), based on census data 1999-2003.

Figure 24: Composition of Foreign-born Living in the OECD, by Level of Skill and non-OECD Country of Birth (OECD, 2007:32)

Regarding brain circulation, this study acknowledges that these dynamics are possible and even common among migration between advanced economies, which makes up the 40 percent of the highly-skilled migrants. While it also devotes a section to research diaspora networks and returning migrants, it mostly describes the experiences of the United Nations Development Programme’s Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Networks (UNDP’s TOKTEN) program and other similar policies⁶¹, touching upon the concept of co-development as expressed by the Programme

⁶¹ “Governments and expatriate groups have tried to form mutually beneficial transnational communities in countries with sizable diasporas, including Argentina, Armenia, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa. In addition, many Internet-based networks specialize in science and engineering. These networks build on the experience of the United Nations Development Programme’s Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals Program. The South African Network of

Développement Local Migration (PDLM) of the French government to help finance micro-projects and start-ups by returned migrants in Mali, Senegal and Mauritania.

Insights and Conclusions {M}

From the conceptual and empirical studies reviewed in this chapter, we can extract at least four major insights. The first, refers to the well-founded and growing consensus around the inevitability of skilled migration, which has caused a shift in the migration-development nexus debate from the previous paradigm of “more development for less migration” to the new paradigm of “better migration management for more development” (Alquézar Sabadie et al., 2010) to benefit those developing countries which tend to be the origin of migrants {M→D}.

This consensus is visible in a recent prospective study by the OECD (2009) in which five scenarios were pieced together for migration towards 2030—under the descriptors of “progress for all”, “OECD long boom”, “uneven progress”, “globalization falters”, and “decoupled destinies”—finding a constant-to-rising demand for skilled migrants and an intensified competition for talent in all five {K↔M}.⁶²

The second insight is that while all countries should have a coherent policy to deal with the implications of highly-skilled migration on the knowledge-based globalized economic context, the aforementioned prospects make this particularly important for traditionally sending countries. However, this is not an easy task given the disparity of net effects that positive and negative forces at play have in different parts of the world at different times.

Skills Abroad has identified some 40 networks, such as the Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad, the Network of Colombian Researchers Abroad, the Iranian Scientific Information Network, the Global Korean Network, the Philippines Brain Gain Network, the Polish Scientists Abroad group, the Association of Thai Professionals in North America and Canada, and the Tunisian Scientific Consortium (Brown 2000; Solimano 2002)” Ellerman (2006:39) to which we might add the Mexican Talent Networks.

⁶² “Depending on the scenario, the kind of talent sought ranges from most categories of skills to the highest qualifications. The BRICs’ role varies somewhat as a function of the scenario: under strong domestic growth conditions (e.g. Progress for All), for example, they compete with OECD countries for internationally mobile skills, under weak economic conditions (e.g. OECD Long Boom) they are net exporters of migrants or at least experience much lower inflows over the period to 2030, and where both OECD countries and BRICs show strong growth (e.g. Uneven Progress), top talent may increasingly circulate between the developed and emerging economies. Similarly, the situation in developing countries is not bleak in all scenarios. Weak domestic growth, persistent problems of weak governance, insecurity and environmental degradation combine to add pressure to out-migrate; but where economic growth prospects improve to 2030 (e.g. Decoupled Destinies), pressures to migrate to richer countries relent somewhat.” (OECD, 2009:41)

So, the better countries understand the dynamics behind brain drain and brain circulation, the higher the chances for them to achieve the conditions and policies that allow for the harnessing of their diasporas' development potential in ways that span from the short-term poverty relief financial transfers (subsistence agenda) to mid- and long-term capacity building and strengthening through knowledge, technology and institutional transformation (self-actualizing agendas) {M↔I}.

However, as Bakewell (2009) reminds us, notions such as brain drain and brain waste imply some failure of diasporas to contribute "as they should" to their homelands. In that sense, the current trend for diaspora engagement places the burden of homeland development in migrants through the expectation that they ought to maintain their ties and, moreover, ought to contribute to its development.

The third insight takes this argument from Bakewell and concurs that while migrants are indeed in a privileged position to contribute to the development of their homelands, this cooperation should (be induced to) come forth voluntarily and without the moralistic and patronizing overtones of the expectation that diasporas ought to provide some sort of development assistance not only to their kin but to the homeland as a whole.

Finally, the fourth insight is that whereas there is no one-size-fits-all solution to realize the development contributions of diasporas, despite their differences and variety of angles and foci, the case studies and theories reviewed throughout the current section tend to have a common guiding thread: all of them emphasize the need of maintaining and cultivating close ties of organization and cooperation between the diaspora and home country as *sine qua non* for achieving positive brain-circulation dynamics {M↔I}.

Maybe, as Ellerman (2006:38) suggests, it is time to rescue the "pave the paths" metaphor used by Williams in 1981, in which instead of paving paths of a campus at the time new constructions are built, one should leave the grass to see the footpaths that people actually follow and then pave those worn paths: instead of creating new institutions for the use of members of the diaspora to help in the development of their homelands, policies should aim at supporting the self-organized diaspora initiatives.

To conclude, through this chapter we have explored the migration of skills as the second theoretical root to nourish our dissertation:

- Linking backwards to our dissertation's introduction, the growing consensus on the inevitability of migration seems to be long overdue from a historical perspective, and the

epistemological rupture described in our first insight is a welcome change that strengthens the case of our overall aim.

- Linking sideways along this theoretical background, our review of the causes of labor migration in general, and of the causes of skilled migration in particular, has strong ties with elements explored in chapter one. These include, for instance, the conceptualization of the notion of skills, the identification of the human capital component of migration, the role of the different proximities as pull or push factors, and the use of social capital in the form of networks, just to mention a few.
- Similarly, a more systematic comprehension of the contributions that migrants offer to their homelands, allows us to focus our attention on those particularly relevant to highly-skilled migrants: on the one hand, the innovation and knowledge impacts which are related to those we explored in chapter one such as the expansion of the absorptive capacities of the economies of origin, and on the other hand, the institutional reform impacts which we will explore in more detail in chapter three.
- Another relevant aspect of the brain-circulation dynamics, and on how the impacts high-skilled migrants take effect in their homelands is through the ties of these individuals with wider networks of transnational communities and institutions. In chapter three, we will explore how these diasporas interact with the institutional and policy landscape of their homelands.
- Linking forward to our methodology of analysis, a finer grasp of the general dynamics of the migration of skills is essential to better characterize the context surrounding the overall aim of our dissertation, that is, in which our proposed methodology will be set.
- Also, our review of the simultaneous positive and negative consequences of the migration of skills allows us to better identify the dynamics and processes leading to brain circulation, as opposed to those leading to brain drain.
- Our review of the conditions and policies identified to foster brain circulation dynamics in the countries of origin will also prove to be helpful when defining a basic catalogue of policy interventions that could be associated to our proposed methodology.

- Finally, we have portrayed diasporas as transnational communities, which will serve as the basic approach to characterize highly-skilled or talented diasporas as one of the main actors relevant to our overall aim.

Chapter 3: On Institutions and Policies

The Governor of She asked Confucius about government. The Master said, "Make the local people happy and attract migrants from afar."

Confucius, The Analects (ca. 475 BC - 221 BC)⁶³

In chapter one we touched upon the subject of institutions and how they are part of the social and collective embodiments of knowledge to build trust and minimize transaction risks in an economy {I↔K}. Moreover, through our review of empirical studies on international competitiveness, we explored how institutions are considered essential to economic growth and how they can generate self-reinforcing development dynamics {I→D}.

In chapter two we briefly touched upon how policies and institutions are essential to our understanding of the migration of skills, whether when discussing the agglomeration effects and talent-poaching policies that draw talents to knowledge clusters, or the guided and spontaneous creation of open migration chains and diaspora networks, or the way institutions at origin and at destination relate to migrants {M↔I}.

However, we still need to specifically consider institutions and policies as the third central concept of this dissertation. As our overall aim is, on the one hand, to devise a methodology that helps highly-skilled diasporas to reconnect with their homeland governments, and on the other hand, the articulation of institutional reforms as a lasting contribution of diaspora-led development, this chapter will explore institutions and policies in three ways.

First, from a deliberately broad and general analytical perspective to ground our methodological choices appropriately. Then, from the role and interplay of actors involved in the change process, to locate and situate our own actors—diasporas and governments—into the process. Finally, from the specific focus of our overall goal by exploring the empirical research of institutions and policies that is directly related to engage diasporas. These three sections should complete our quest for elements to build our analytical approach.

⁶³ Quoted in Weizsäcker (2006:2).

The Evolution of (Economic) Institutionalism

Many different "institutionalisms" have flourished at various times and places within the social sciences and the discipline of economics. Over time, the interest in institutions has come from different sources and with different, even opposing, motivations. Institutional analysis has been used both to explain the failings of unfettered markets and the need for a greater degree of government intervention, and the failings of government interventions and the need for a greater degree of market freedom. But a common theme is that institutions matter a great deal, and that economists need to think hard about the ways in which institutions shape economic behavior and outcomes, and are themselves shaped by economic, political, and ideological factors. (Rutherford, 2001:190)

The idea of the economic study of institutions was first proposed by Hamilton in 1919 under the manifesto "The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory", and was further developed by economists such as Veblen, Ayres, Mitchell and Commons into what is now known as the Original Institutional Economics (OIE) (Parada, 2003).

Veblen's overall framework was one which stressed the cumulative and path-dependent nature of institutional change, the role of new technology in bringing about institutional change [...as] institutions were more than merely constraints on individual action, but embodied generally accepted ways of thinking and behaving. Thus, institutions worked to mold the preferences and values of individuals brought up under their sway. (Rutherford, 2001:174)

This early psychological tradition of institutional economics was soon complemented by the addition of three streams of theory. First, a legal tradition through the contributions of Commons, whose approach was built at the micro-level through the use of working rules—"legal rights, duties, liberties and exposures" (2001:176)—and economic bargaining power as the main determinants of his basic units of analysis, transactions. Second, the use of empirical science in an attempt to be "closer to reality and more open to empirical testing than 'orthodox' theory" (2001:177). Third, a cultural tradition through which Ayres suggested institutions are formed (Parada, 2003).

Nevertheless, for a period from the late 1940s through to about 1970, institutions became almost a prohibited subject within the mainstream of economics—banished to the ill-regarded discipline of sociology. As Furubotn and Richter (1991, p. 2) have put it: "The existence of political, legal, monetary, and other systems was certainly recognized; but either these systems were regarded as neutral in their effect on economic events and ignored, or they were taken as given and then specified in so perfunctory a way as to suggest that institutional influence was not of much importance." (Rutherford, 2001:186)

A need of reincorporating institutional arrangements into the study of economics led to the resurgence of institutionalist thinking. However, this revival branched into authors who followed on the tradition of OIE and authors who subscribed to a different view of institutional economics, labeled as “new”, operating in the fringe of neoclassical theory and originating in Coase’s theorem of transaction costs (Parada, 2003). This New Institutional Economics (NIE) argues that institutions usually provide efficient solutions to economic problems through competition in order to select the most efficient organizational arrangements, routines or rules (Rutherford, 2001).

The rift between both branches stems from three fundamental methodological differences. On the one hand, NIE adheres closely to neoclassical economics on its formalism—understood as “the use of abstract languages such as mathematics or symbolic logic instead of linguistic or natural literary methods of presentation” (Parada, 2003:94)⁶⁴—, on its use of the deductive method, and on its use of the rational individual grounded in game theory—even if such rationality is now acknowledged to be bounded or limited—as the fundamental unit of analysis.

On the other hand, OIE tends to adopt a much less formalistic approach—which has led to an erroneous criticism from the NIE side for “lack of theory” (94)—, usually adheres to Dewey’s inductive method, and it takes a holistic approach by “stressing the role of society in the definition of values, habits and formal institutions, and not denying the interaction and the feedback processes between the individual and society.” (95)⁶⁵

In the tradition of OIE, current proponents develop and reach “to others’ systems to complete holistic approaches for analysis, planning, and policymaking — approaches such as the social fabric matrix (Hayden 2006), system dynamics (Radzicki 2009), and social accounting matrix (Pyatt and Round 1985)” (Hayden, 2011:465) and use a model under which legitimate and illegitimate norms, rules, regulations, and requirements affect institutions and personal attitudes (see Figure 25).

⁶⁴ Freely translated from the Spanish original: “el uso de un lenguaje abstracto como las matemáticas o la lógica simbólica en vez de los métodos lingüísticos o literarios naturales de presentación.”

⁶⁵ Freely translated from the Spanish original: “subraya más el papel de la sociedad en la definición de los valores, costumbres e instituciones formales, sin negar la interacción y los procesos de retroalimentación entre el individuo y la sociedad.”




Figure 25: Simplified Deontic Representation of a Normative System Process ⁶⁶ (Hayden, 2001:466)

In the tradition of NIE, while the notion of institution at its broadest encompasses all rules, guides or restrictions—formal or informal—that structure, order and reduce the uncertainty in all aspects of social, economic and political interactions (North, 1991; 1995). However, we prefer to structure our definition of institutions on the framework suggested by Elinor Ostrom (2007) as “the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms and strategies.”(23)

Delving deeper into the elements of this definition, Ostrom understands (1) rules as the “shared prescriptions (must, must not, or may) that are mutually understood and predictably enforced in particular situations by agents responsible for monitoring conduct and for imposing sanctions”, (2) norms as the “shared prescriptions that tend to be enforced by the participants themselves through internally and externally imposed costs and inducements”, and (3) strategies as the “regularized plans that individuals make within the structure of incentives produced by rules, norms, and expectations of the likely behavior of others in a situation affected by relevant physical and material conditions.”(23)

Moreover, it is convenient to make a further distinction between the concepts of institutions and organizations, defining the latter as groups of people who associate with the purpose of taking advantage of the opportunities offered by a set of existing constrains—institutional or others from economic theory—and to act as change agents of these said constrains in the benefit of the collective interest of the group members (North, 1995; Polsky & Ostrom, 1999). In other words,

⁶⁶ Where N, VarC and I stand for legitimate norms, illegitimate variant criteria and institutions, and subindexes B, E, T, A and P stand for social beliefs, ecological, technological, authority and processing, respectively.

while organizations are institutions *per se* with internal actors, norms, rules and strategies of their own, they also have the quality of acting and interacting with other actors as single collective agents.

Other New Institutionalisms Beyond Economics

The resurgence of institutionalism is not just limited to economic theory, and due to its relevance, understanding institutions has constantly been a subfield in almost every discipline within the social sciences, each through its own specific variables. For example, in history through the impact of time, in sociology through the collective, in political science through power, and as we have seen, in economics through choice (Goodin, 1998).

Historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism emerged in reaction to the behavioral revolution in political science during the 1960s and 1970s. Although they developed along relatively independent paths, the three approaches were commonly interested in analyzing the impact of institutions on social and political outcomes. (Barzelay & Gallego 2006:532)

In an attempt to summarize the main differences among those new institutionalisms, Jostein Askim (2005) suggests that rational-choice neoinstitutionalists typically characterize their subjects as calculating actors with preferences exogenous to the institutional analysis, interacting strategically to affect the political outcomes. Historical neoinstitutionalists, however, tend to focus more on the asymmetrical relations of power among the actors, as well as a path-dependent trajectory for institutions, suggesting that equal behavior from the actors will lead to different outcomes in different contexts. Sociological neoinstitutionalist, contrary to rational-choice scholars, take preferences of actors as endogenous to the analysis as they are also influenced by institutions, and include cultural dimensions such as “symbol systems, cognitive scripts and “moral templates that provide ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action.”(6)

Graham and Naím (1998) propose another new institutionalism that takes an even narrower view and focus solely on the public institutions, which being “political in nature, [...] have authority over the allocation of resources and power”(326). In their deeply managerial perspective, these authors suggest that institutions have six specific functions: (a) growth and economic performance, (b) governance, (c) equity, (d) effect on policy outcomes, (e) public administration, and (f) provision of public good and services (see Figure 26), and that they do so by serving four specific purposes: (1) making rules or laws, (2) enforcing the said rules or laws, (3) providing public services, and (4) providing public goods.

PERSPECTIVES	INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS ANALYZED					
	<i>Growth / economic performance</i>	<i>Governance</i>	<i>Equity</i>	<i>Effect on policy outcomes</i>	<i>Public administration</i>	<i>Public goods/ services</i>
<i>Regulatory (new institutional economies; multidisciplinary)</i>	Borner et al. Fukuyama Kornell and Kalt North Putnam	Bates Borner et al. Fukuyama Levi Putnam Shepsle Thelen and Steinmo	North Putnam			Putnam Ostrom
<i>Economic</i>	Alesina et al. Barro Birdsall and Sabot	Alesina	Alesina Benabou Birdsall and Sabot			Birdsall and Sabot
<i>Political economy (political science; new institutional economies)</i>	Haggard et al. Grindle Geddes Naím	Haggard et al. Nelson Weaver and Rochman	Nelson Graham	Naím Cox and McCubbins	Geddes Grindle Naím McCubbins	Graham
<i>Industrial organization</i>			Hommes Londoño		Hausmann Hommes Londoño	Hausmann Hommes Londoño
<i>Public administration</i>					Wilson McCubbins	Wilson

Figure 26: A Taxonomy of Approaches [with their corresponding Authors] to the Study of [Public] Institutions (Graham & Naím, 1998:344)

Regardless of the approach, a common feature of these institutionalisms is the aim for trust that we referred to in chapter one (see page 59). Since the goal of these rules, norms and strategies is to provide a social structure in which the uncertainty of interaction is minimized, institutions tend to be relatively stable over time. Such stability

[...] is not an incidental by-product of institutionalization – not merely the consequence of “coming to value a certain organization or procedure” for some independent reasons. Instead, that very stability and predictability is, to a very large extent, precisely why we value institutionalized patterns and what it is we value in them. (Goodin, 1998:22)

On How Institutions Change

Yet, stable as they may seem and regardless of the approach, institutions are far from immutable. Being partly a direct result of a society’s past choices, experiences or behaviors, institutions carry on the influence of the past into that society’s present and future choices, preferences or behaviors and within certain margins they effectively “delimit [the] capacity for social change” (Polsky & Ostrom,

1999:5) $\{I \leftrightarrow K\}$. In other words, societies constantly help to shape and re-shape institutions, while institutions in turn, simultaneously help to shape and re-shape societies⁶⁷.

To understand the complexities of this relationship, several theories and frameworks have emerged to analyze how institutions and societies interact and modify one another. Kingston and Caballero (2009) classify these frameworks into three distinct categories: (1) those where institutions change by either design or collective choice in order to change society, (2) those where institutions organically evolve from their own societies evolution, (3) those where both design and evolutionary pressures are integrated.

However, as Askim (2005) points out, the question of “why does environmental pressure x bring about institutional change in organisation (a) and not in organisation (b)?” (1) has been the blind-spot of these new institutionalisms, which tend to focus more in the institutions and their stability, rather than in the processes around them:

The processualist approach is especially attentive to flows of interaction, to the subtle interplay between belief and action as experience unfolds, and to temporal context (Abbott 2001; Elster 1998; George 1980; Schelling 1998; Weick 2001). The institutional approach is especially attentive to how situated interaction is influenced by stable context, whether organizational or cultural (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Like both processualism and institutionalism, institutional processualism takes a strong interest in how situated interaction (and, in this way, human agency) can feed back upon context (Tendler 1997). (Barzelay & Gallego, 2006:538)

In this sense, Barzelay and Gallego emphatically assert that their approach, institutional processualism⁶⁸, is fundamentally different to other (new) institutionalisms, as they set the process as their main object of study⁶⁹ and their main tool of analysis is processual, that is

describing, analysing and explaining the what, why and how of some sequence of individual and collective action. The driving assumption behind process thinking is that social reality is not a steady state. It is a dynamic process. It occurs rather than merely exists (Sztompka, 1991). Human conduct is perpetually in a process of becoming. The overriding aim of the process analyst therefore is to catch this reality in flight. (Pettigrew, 1997:338)

⁶⁷ “Institutions do not just constrain options: they establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences. In other words, some of the most important sunk costs are cognitive.” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:11)

⁶⁸ An evolution of Askim’s own “processual institutionalism” (2005)

⁶⁹ As defined by Pettigrew as “a sequence of individual and collective events, actions, and activities unfolding over time in context” (1997:338)

An echo of the ideas behind institutional processualism can also be found in Ostrom's model of nested system of rules, which understands institutional reform as those processes used to change the rules and norms—often based on higher-level rules and norms themselves—in order to transform the contexts in which actors interact and the strategies they follow. Moreover, in such nested system of rules not all of them share the same degree of rigidity or stability, and the processual approach becomes useful for the analysis of the more unstable institutions: the (public) policies⁷⁰.

Can Policies Be Considered as Institutions?

While policy is excluded from some definitions of institutions that usually attribute the latter a much stronger degree of permanency⁷¹ and “purpose transcending individual human lives and intentions” (Merrey, Meinen-Dick, Mollinga, & Karar, 2007:196), they do fall well within the scope of Ostrom's framework as “public policies are clearly very central rules governing [actors'] interactions. [...Furthermore,]leaving aside the informal institutions typically explored by sociologists, the institutions that impinge on the modern citizen most directly and intensively as she goes about her daily life are in fact public policies, *not* the formal political institutions that have preoccupied political scientists” (Pierson, 2006:115-6) {I→D}. For instance,

[w]hile institutions undoubtedly affect economic outcomes, the macroeconomic policies that governments choose to implement may exert just as much (or more) influence on the trajectory of their economies as the broader institutional framework within which those policy decisions take place. (Henry & Miller, 2009:2)

An idea consistent with empirical evidence Henry and Miller (2009) found on their “tale of two islands”, comparing the economic performance of Barbados and Jamaica after gaining their independence from the United Kingdom. With an almost identical inherited set of political, economic and legal institutions, the authors argue that it is the policy differences—especially the macroeconomic management—what can explain the differences in the living standards of both countries (see Figure 27).

⁷⁰ “[...]since policies, unlike formal institutions, are “relatively easy to change (or “plastic”), [some authors regard them as] essentially epiphenomenal.” (Pierson, 2006:116)

⁷¹ “An institution that is in constant need of affirmation is not really an institution, because it fails to shape preferences and expectations in durable ways.” (Offe, 2006:22-3)




Figure 27: Standards of living in Barbados and Jamaica after independence (Henry & Miller, 2009:3) {I→D}

However,

[t]here is an important distinction between policies and institutions. Policies can be considered as choices made within a given political and social structure, e.g., the tax rate and fiscal policies. In contrast, institutions can be thought of as determinants of the political and social structure that are more durable and, as such, constrain future choices and policies. [...] Although institutions are often predetermined at the point in time when certain policy choices are made, they are also chosen by the society. (Acemoglu, 2003:621)

According to Jenkins (quoted in Merrey, Meinzen-Dick, Mollinga, & Karar, 2007), policy is “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve” (196).

In that sense, policymaking is “not simply about finding solutions for pressing problems, but [...as mentioned earlier (see page 61) is] as much about *finding formats that generate trust* among mutually interdependent actors” (Hajer, 2003:184), a goal that can only be achieved through consistent, coherent and stable behavior through time. Evidence of this was also found in Henry and Miller’s tale, as they explain Jamaica’s lower performance as a problem of policy volatility:

[...] the proximate source of Barbados’ superior performance was a set of growth-facilitating policies [...] that had the side effect of enabling the monetary authority to maintain the exchange rate parity without losing external competitiveness. In contrast, Jamaica’s policies were never consistent with maintaining commitment to any parity the government might have wanted to adopt. (2009:9)

Although the authors of this study remained puzzled by “why some democratic societies [...] manage to reach constructive policy compromises while others [...] do not”(9)—an issue we will explore ahead (see page 121 onwards)—for us this example suggests a clearer answer to the question that opens this section, on whether policies can be considered as institutions: only in the sense that they generate rules by which virtue of their stability and capacity to foster trust, create venues for the interaction of actors.

Moreover,

[t]he idea that economic dynamism sprouted from natural and accidental causes implies that countries had no need to devise a set of economic institutions or possess an economic culture favorable to commercial innovation—it implies that the system was already there waiting. Though most if not all peoples, it appears, found self-expression in acting creatively and embracing novelty as far back as prehistoric times, it would be bizarre to exclude the possibility that some countries were more advantaged—politically or culturally—in identifying and building institutions that would enable and facilitate innovation and fostering attitudes towards experimentation, exploration, and imagination that would inspire and encourage people. (Phelps, 2013:79-80)

After all, as Paul Collier reminds us, “poor countries are poor [partly] because their social models are dysfunctional”(2013:96). Politically incorrect as it may seem, it is now clear that some institutions are more desirable than others. Phelps asserts that any study of the modern economies will invariably conclude that certain freedoms such as personal liberty (or self-ownership), private property, and other economic and financial liberties are responsible for taking human development to the levels we can currently enjoy. And yet,

[t]he statement that freedoms are good, notably for the expression of creativity and the achievement of innovation, does not imply that freedoms are good in every case—the overstatement for which the libertarian Ayn Rand became famous. Not all freedoms are good for dynamism. A regulation curbing some producers’ freedom may allow a consumer to risk trying a new product without having to fear electrocution, poisoning, or the like. (82)

On How Policies Change

Since the leading paradigm regards policy as a product of institutions (Blomquist, 2007), policy change is often overlooked in the main theories of institutional reform. Therefore, it comes with its own toolkits for analysis which, according to Hajer (2003), usually coincide in three defining elements: (1) polity—a pre-existing and stable political order—, (2) knowledge—“for politics but in

itself not political but scientific” (181-2) $\{I \leftrightarrow K\}$ —, and (3) intervention—to change a given course of events.

A rationalist and linear perspective assumes that policymaking has sequential steps from problem formulation, to evaluation of alternatives, to implementation (policy as prescription; Mackintosh 1992). This perspective is associated with expert managerial approaches to intervention and with thinking in terms of models to be applied generally. Policymaking can also be seen as an inherently political activity, with different perceptions and interests contested at all stages (policy as process; Mackintosh 1992). Policy is a bargained outcome, the environment is conflictual, and the process is characterized by diversity and constraint. The intervention perspective emphasizes negotiation, participatory design and implementation, and situation specificity (Gordon, Lewis, and Young 1997). These different perspectives on policy directly translate into different understandings of reform, of transforming policy, institutions, organizations, and governance structures. (Merrey, Meinzen-Dick, Mollinga, & Karar, 2007:196)

As methodologies and theories for the policy process go, Sabatier (2007) offers a comprehensive compilation of the most widely accepted and used approaches, each presented by one of their main proponents: institutional rational choice, multiple streams framework, social construction and policy design, network analysis, punctuated equilibrium, advocacy coalition framework, innovation and diffusion models, and large-N comparative studies.




Figure 28: Nested Levels of Analysis (with information from Ostrom, 2007)

In the second chapter of Sabatier’s compilation, Ostrom (2007) comments on the need for a greater clarity on the methodological approaches to policy change, and delineates three levels at which analyses are conducted (see Figure 28). At the most particular level, models “make precise assumptions about a limited set of parameters and variables” (26), and while they usually help to develop, test and revise specific parts of theories, they can also be developed, tested and revised independently. One level higher, theories place values on some of the relevant variables, posit relationships and make predictions about likely outcomes, so models built independently run the

risk of developing fundamental flaws. In turn, both models and theories are derived from frameworks which, at the most general level, provide them with a “metatheoretical language that can be used to compare theories” (25).

At the model level, Stokes Berry and Berry (2007) describe in their chapter some policy innovation and diffusion models which provide an interesting linkage to the chapter on how knowledge and innovation is disseminated, requiring some sort of proximity (see page 45), be it geographical as in the regional diffusion and the neighbor models, or non-geographical (cognitive, technological or behavioral) as in the national interaction, the leader-laggard, the isomorphism and the vertical influence models. While Stokes Berry and Berry suggest that there are problems inherent to the structure of these models, they also suggest workarounds for them, and assert their value in tracing the way policy diffuses from place to place $\{I \leftrightarrow K\}$.

Echoes of these models are also noticeable in the econometric modified gravity models for studying cross-country differences in the levels of institutional development, which are based on the premise that institutional differences among countries are negatively correlated with the intensity of their economic bilateral exchanges:

To support higher volumes of mutual trade countries need to make adjustments in their economic institutions and ensure some degree of their compatibility. Trade-related needs are an important driver of institutional innovation, which often takes place the form of institutional imports (borrowing new institutions from a more institutionally developed trade partner). In this framework, various traditional drivers of intensity of bilateral trade (such as geographic distances, existence of common border, membership in the same economic bloc, etc.) would also be the factors that shape core institutional differences between the countries. (Dashkeev & Freinkman, 2011:3-4)

Towards the end of Sabatier’s compilation, and taking at heart Ostrom’s methodological comments, Edella Schlager (2007) makes a comparison of these different views in a helpful exercise that maps the methodological landscape of policymaking, focusing on frameworks (see Figure 29) and theories (see Figure 30).

From this comparative exercise, Schlager concludes that most of these methodologies, particularly those regarding policy agenda setting and adoption could fit under a single framework. She suggests some variation of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) as the better suited, provided it is modified to capture the “parallel and serial information processing capabilities of governments” (317) essential to the punctuated-equilibrium theories, as well as to include more dimensions than beliefs and resources in the decision-making process of its model of individual.

	Types of Actors	Variable Development	Units of Analysis	Levels of Analysis
Institution Analysis and Development (IAD)	identify the structure of preferences, general types of selection criteria, levels and types of information, and so forth.	best developed at the action arena (participants, positions, actions, information, outcomes, distribution of costs/benefits), less developed structuring action situation (rules-in-use, physical environment & community).	flexible: analyst's questions & setting can define it.	explicit attention: operational, collective-choice & constitutional-choice, even if focused on one, the three always interplay, situation oriented .
Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF)	close to IAD but less specific, with hierarchically ordered set of beliefs, ability to process information, set of goals or preferences.	best developed characterizing mature policy subsystems & belief systems, less developed in hypotheses (fora where coalitions engage, contest and learn policy).	while specific to the unit of policy subsystem, these can be flexible to different instances.	implicit: while it seems to be designed to focus on collective-choice level, it also does on operational level through coalition day-to-day actions, polymaking oriented .
Hofferbert's Framework for Comparative Studies (H)	not very developed as the models derived do not attempt to represent individual actions, however the individual as actor at the final stage before policy adoption is elite behavior.	best developed within each of the policy stages and relations between them (historical-geographic to socio-economic to mass political behavior & so on), except at gov institutions & elite behavior.	flexible: analyst's questions & setting can define it.	implicit: mainly to structure collective-choice level through operational-level variables, policy adoptions oriented .

Figure 29: Comparison of Frameworks of the Policy Process (with information from Schlager, 2007)

	Boundaries & Scope	Model of Individual	Collective Action	Institutional Arrangements	Policy Change
Common-pool resources (CPR)	conditions that support self-governance by citizens, largely concentrated on local and regional settings worldwide, encompassing all stages of the policy process.	not maximizer but satisficer , constrained & guided by norms and rules, complex situations & incomplete info make preferences evolve trial-error learning. updater .	suggests individuals can achieve superior outcomes acting together rather than alone, posits attributes to resources and appropriators to support collective action, entrepreneurs unimportant.	core variable, provide structure & incentives for interaction, nested system of rules, unusually complex micro level for identification & configural relationships.	mostly as incremental & iterative process, substantial change through cumulation of small steps.
Advocacy coalitions (AC)	focused on agenda setting & policy adoption, considers complete policy process, in advocacy groups (belief systems, not institutional arrangements), long-term.	choices & actions explained by inner world (belief systems: basic values, assumptions & perceptions) as information filters of reality, belifer .	strong emphasis in verified coalitions (both through belief systems & action), empirical link still missing.	significant, explain structure & dynamics of policy subsystems, changes in belief systems, influence & resources of coalitions, regulate the policy change process.	dramatic events, changes in gov coalitions & legislative turnover set stage for major changes; history, serendipity & ability of entrepreneur matter, internal & external shocks are also considered.
Social constructions (SC)	focused on agenda setting, similar to AC but not only beliefs affect policies, policies also affect beliefs and participation.	not well specified but ties to belief systems suggest similarities to AC, belifer .	policy explains patterns of which populations are politically active and which aren't.	little attention, institutions are seen mostly as cultural, relevant only for policy designs.	over-reaching policies may stimulate mobilization & opposition as corrective efforts to bring change or overturn, policy explain politics and policy change.
Policy networks (PN)	focused on agenda setting, similar to AC but does consider institutional arrangements, not belief systems.	not well specified but ties to game theory and institutions suggests similarities to CPR, updater .	similar to PE, focus on the distribution of power between actors.	core variable, institutional distribution of power & interactions with policy subsystems are key, also how they affect policy implementation.	ties type of change with types of actors' interaction in network: concentrated power & high conflict = mod likely major change, bargaining relations = low/mod incremental change.
Punctuated-equilibrium (PE)	focused on agenda setting & policy adoption, accounts for patterns of incrementalism/major change, with few variables.	similar to CPR, preferences fixed but interpretation based, change explanation grounded in processes, not learning, manipulation of information is key, selective attender .	similar to MS entrepreneurs yet collective action also relevant (mass mobilization interest groups & policy groups), less on how they organize more on results.	significant, structure the governing systems of political decision making, thus control processes & venues, define strategies of individuals & groups.	similar to AC, but change depends on positive feedback of policy system (magnitude related to frequency of occurrence).
Multiple-streams (MS)	focused on agenda setting & policy adoption, attempts to explain why some policies get adopted and not others, with several variables.	grounded in Simon's bounded rationality & the garbage can model of choice, satisficer	focus on critical roles of certain individuals as policy entrepreneurs who anticipate & bend events, not so much on collective action.	limited to behavioral factors that affect individual choice & how institutional position give more or less influence, less integrated networks= larger+open+innovative.	similar to AC, but serendipity revolves around the ability of political entrepreneurs to identify windows of opportunity and couple the streams.

Figure 30: Comparison of Theories of the Policy Process (with information from Schlager, 2007)

Nevertheless, most methodologies seem to agree with the general statement that institutional transformation—policy change included—usually is, on the one hand, contingent, context-specific, non-linear and therefore with uncertain outcomes (Merrey, Meinzen-Dick, Mollinga, & Karar, 2007:208), and on the other hand,

[...] inherently political and typically slow and difficult, with losers and winners and “outsiders” who also have their own interests. Some interests are more politically powerful than others, often distorting outcomes in favor of special interests. (218)

Type of malfunction	Source of malfunction	Characteristics	Institutions most at risk
Resource-related	Chronic congestion (overdemand and underfunding)	Typical for new initiatives. Erodes quality, equity, tax/resource base. May limit access to those who wield sufficient influence. Private alternatives flourish.	☐ ▲ ◆
	Inadequate input	Insufficiently educated workforce. Lack of thorough, competent legal and regulatory standards, outdated hardware resources.	◆
	Concentration of funding on personnel costs	Insufficient resources for resolving key organizational issues/objectives. Precludes flexibility and innovation.	◆
Politically driven	Capture by special interests	An external, related group exercises influence over directives and ideology.	☐ (regulatory agencies) ◆
	Corruption	Distorts objectives of the institution. Affects all levels of functions, from personnel to executive decisionmaking.	○ ☐ ▲ ◆
	Politization	Recruitment, appointments and remunerations heavily influenced by political patronage.	○ ☐ ▲ ◆
Organizational	Volatility	Institutional priorities fluctuate due to shift in internalized priorities or political turnover.	○ ☐ ▲ ◆
	Goal ambiguity	Lack of clarity manifested in overambitious objectives (e.g. overregulation).	☐ ◆
	Monopoly/monopsony control	Only one body provides service and only one body supplies workers.	◆
	Degree of government involvement	A “hands-on approach” by government (especially in terms of the economy or monetary policy).	☐ (too much) ◆ (too little)

Key: ○ Rule/lawmaking ☐ Enforcement ▲ Providers of public services ◆ Providers of public goods

Figure 31: Sources of Institutional Malfunction (Graham & Naím, 1998:330)

Even the more managerial view on institutional reform adopted by Graham and Naím (1998) that suggests that public institutions can malfunction mainly in three ways (see Figure 31), acknowledges that “the politics of reforming institutions is complex and skewed towards maintaining the *status quo*. [...] Given these political asymmetries, there is an important role for strategies that change performance incentives within public sector institutions, as well as those that alter the political balance in favor of consumers” (338).

So, while it makes sense intuitively that every society attempts to assume the most efficient institutional arrangement to achieve the highest possible welfare level befitting its inherent geographic, historic, cultural, and socioeconomic profile as NIE rational-choice authors would suggest, in reality this seldom happens.

Daron Acemoglu (2003) suggests that this is due to the unrealistic application of Coase's theorem to political situations⁷², and that an alternative hypothesis closer to empirical evidence is one based on what he calls "theories of social conflict", where certain "societies choose different policies, some of which are disastrous for their citizens, because those decisions are made by politicians or politically powerful social groups that are interested in maximizing their own payoffs, not aggregate output or social welfare." (621) In this alternative hypothesis, not only the asymmetry of power between the ruler and the citizens is determinant, but also the decision-making horizon and the identity of the actor who designs or controls the formal rules.

Regardless of the approach, one important inference we can state of this first part, is an ample consensus around the heightened importance of the human elements in the process to reform both institutions and policies. Whether it is through the influence of interests and preferences, or through the influence of beliefs and resources. Consequently, persuading the people in control of the reform processes (elites or interest groups, for example) becomes paramount.

Understanding Elites and Power

Elites have been traditionally understood as "those political, economic, and military circles, which as an intricate set of overlapping small but dominant groups share decisions having at least national consequences. Insofar as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them" (Mills, 1956:18). A more contemporary idea characterizes elites as "global leaders [...] who shape the world, without anyone noticing: those with enough brains, money or influence to affect the lives of large numbers of others. These three things often go hand in hand, but not always." (Guest, 2011:3)

In either case, dominance and influence reintroduce the concept of power—"understood in the Weberian sense of the 'probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance'" (Weber quoted in Preuss, 2006:308)—into an analysis of policies and institutions dominated by the views of collective action and cooperation.

Both power and cooperation are essential, therefore, to any effort to understand public agencies.
[For example, b]ureaucracies are institutions that are imposed by winners on losers. But they are

⁷² "Typically, contracts and explicit promises are enforced by the state. Hence, contracts that the state, or social groups controlling the state, wish to write with the rest of the society are non-enforceable. This implies that the allocation of political power creates an inherent commitment problem that undermines the potential to achieve efficient outcomes." (Acemoglu, 2003:648)

also cooperative and mutually beneficial for the subset of actors who agree to their creation. [...] It is precisely because they cooperate that the winners are able to use public authority to impose their will on the rest of society. And it is the prospect of exercising this power that motivates the winners to cooperate. (Moe, 2006:43)

However, Moe (2006) highlights that “what looks like an exercise in cooperation often hides the underlying exercise of power” (56), for example:

[...]consider a stylized situation in which a criminal presents his victim with the classic choice: “your money or your life”. An economist might say that this is just another case of voluntary exchange [...as it entails] acting on his preferences and making a rational choice. [...] However, [t]he criminal is using threats of violence, and he is coercing the victim [...so, t]he victim “voluntarily” gives up his wallet when faced with the power-constrained choice-set, because he is better off giving up his money than getting killed. (58)

For Moe, political elites often control a specific agenda of alternatives much in the way the criminal of the example controls the choice-set: by revoking an original *status quo* and replacing it with the choice of either playing by the new rules or being penalized. After all, it is those rules that distribute and allocate power on different actors, placing some of them in positions of relative advantage in the decision-making process vis-à-vis other actors, and making the exercise of power conflicted, controversial, contested, and in need of legitimating mechanisms (Offe, 2006).

Yet, as Michel Crozier (1996) probes, “who could believe that a society may do without elites, that it can abolish power? It can, in any case, organize power in a completely different way, have wider elites, more open, more varied, to better respond to the needs of a less hierarchical society.” (29)⁷³

To paraphrase Collier’s example, there is an excellent reason of why the French revolutionaries used the three concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity together: “*fraternity is the emotion that reconciles liberty with equality*. Only if we see others as members of the same community do we accept that [...the exercise of power of by the State] needed for equity does not infringe our liberty.” (2013:237)

While in pluralistic societies the exercise of power is legitimated through the democratic processes and institutions that reconcile freedom and authority, Ulrich K. Preuss (2006) notes that “democracy has until now not found reliable mechanisms for the selection of the persons most able

⁷³ Freely translated from the Spanish original: “¿Quién es capaz de creer que una sociedad puede prescindir de las élites, que puede acabar con el poder? Puede, en todo caso, ordenar el poder de un modo totalmente distinto, tener élites más numerosas, más abiertas, más variadas, para así responder mejor a las necesidades de una sociedad menos jerárquica.”

to exercise democratic rule [...and therefore suggests that] the legitimacy of democratic institutions in modern societies requires openness for generating, preserving, and enhancing both cognitive and moral knowledge.” (303) {I↔K} ⁷⁴.

The basic conflicts of advanced contemporary societies cannot be understood in the conceptual framework of “individual freedom versus sovereign power.” The functional differentiation of modern societies; the acceleration of technological innovations and socioeconomic transformation; and processes of globalization, with its shifting patterns of production, trade, financing, migration, environmental use, cultural orientation, and political domination, have changed the character of conflicts and problems with which these societies have to cope. (309)

This argument is derived from two normative principles. On the one hand, that democracy only legitimizes power when citizens are able to “articulate and discuss their political will among themselves on the highest level of knowledge to which they have access” (318), as opposed to when such legitimacy is based on ignorance (self-inflicted or externally-imposed). On the other hand, that “ruling over others requires a minimum of concern for their welfare” (305). So, even if democratically elected, when political elites use their power to ignore or suppress knowledge on the insufficiencies of society for the benefit of their own special interests, they act illegitimately.

When the political or economic power elites are able to let the knowledge about the society run dry by neglecting it, then it is not sufficient to shield the institutions of knowledge production from the effects of the noncommunicative quality of power. In such a case, mechanisms have to be found that pressure the centers of power to learn. (317)

In that context, our mention of elites resonates with our earlier references to social capital as understood by Bourdieu (see page 54), and to Woolcock’s (p.57) and Putnam’s (p.58) typology of bonding social capital as a resource that forms ties of an exclusive nature. However, we have also seen how bridging or linking social capital may lead to a more inclusive system, and how institutions can learn (p.62) {I↔K}. In that sense, Crozier suggests that

Reform should work on the intelligence. Change is only possible through the transformation of people, and people change when an intellectual model demonstrates its superiority. It may seem utopian, but when we analyze the evolution of human affairs, we realize that any change in practice has come about through the appearance of new ways of reasoning. (32) ⁷⁵

⁷⁴ See also footnote 27 on page 46.

⁷⁵ Freely translated from the Spanish original: “Hay que reformar sobre la inteligencia. El cambio sólo es posible mediante la transformación de los hombres y los hombres cambian cuando un modelo intelectual demuestra su superioridad.

As Collier suggests, “democratic and political institutions only function well if ordinary citizens are sufficiently well informed to discipline politicians.” (2013:30)

Inclusive political institutions are now seen by economists as valuable for economic development, but they have usually been produced by political struggle. Modern productivity is built on back of past street demonstrations and protests that cracked the power of self-serving, extractive elites. (151)

Understanding Interest Groups and Lobbying

In other words, arguments for elite legitimating and transformation situate knowledge, yet again, at the heart of policy change and institutional reform. In that sense, knowledge is an input that oftentimes gets introduced to the policy processes by the participation of interest groups, which Wright (1996) defines as

a collection of individuals [...] linked together by professional circumstance, or by common political, economic, or social interests, that meets the following requirements: (1) its name does not appear on an election ballot; (2) it uses some portion of its collective resources to try and influence decisions made by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of national, state, or local governments; and (3) it is organized externally to the institution of government that it seeks to influence (22-3)

through the activity of lobbying—understood as the attempts to influence legislation and government through the acquisition and transmission of information via contacts with decision-makers (Wright, 1996)—, which in turn is highly dependent upon the institutional arrangements of each policy subsystem, and on how they pool their resources through communities, or networks, or coalitions {I↔K}.

Policy communities, as understood by Jordan, are

special type of *stable* network, which has advantages in encouraging bargaining in policy resolution. In this language the policy network is a statement of shared interests in a policy problem: a policy community exists where there are effective shared ‘community’ views on the problem. *Where there are no such shared views no community exists* (Jordan, 1990, p.327, original

Puede parecer utópico, pero si analizamos la evolución de los asuntos humanos, nos damos cuenta de que, finalmente, el cambio de las prácticas se ha producido gracias a la aparición de nuevos razonamientos.”

emphasis) [...Furthermore, Rhodes repeatedly states that] policy communities are networks characterized by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based upon shared delivery responsibilities and insulation from other networks and invariably from the general public (including Parliament). (Quoted by Judge, 1993, p.122) (Richardson, 2000:1006-7)

A trend noted by Hecló since the 1970s, when he suggested that

[i]ncreasingly, it is through networks of people who regard each other as knowledgeable, or at least as needing to be answered, that public policy issues tend to be refined, evidence debated, and alternative options worked out—*though rarely in any controlled, well-organized way*. (Hecló, 1978, pp.102-3, emphasis added) (2000:1009)

Coalitions, in turn, consist “of individuals who share a particular belief system - i.e., a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions - *and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time*” (Sabatier quoted in Schlager, 1995:245) who “attempt to realize a set of shared policy beliefs 'by influencing the behavior of multiple governmental institutions over time' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a: p. 212)” (245).

This seems to be confirmed by Simon Matti and Annica Sandström (2011) who suggest that while a “rival explanation to the formation of coalitions in an environment of competing interests is found within the Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) [... in which the] basic assumption [...] is that actors are primarily power driven, each aiming toward the possession of strategic resources increasing their ability to effectively control and influence both the behavior and the beliefs of other actors, and thus the decision making within the subsystem” (387-8), empirical studies point towards “perceived belief correspondence, and not perceived influence, [to be] the driving mechanism behind coordination.” (406)

Due to its uneven distribution, access to policy oriented knowledge can empower different actors in different ways, allowing for what Ron Burt calls structural holes⁷⁶. In that sense, interest groups function as the knowledge brokers of the policy process {I↔K}, but as Reagans and Zuckerman remind us, “valuable ‘structural holes’ can be expected to close quickly (Burt, 2002) and that it is

⁷⁶ “Through his study of corporate managers, Burt determined that individuals able to broker beneficial information and resources between distinct, otherwise disconnected networks were especially effective and successful at their jobs. ‘People on either side of a structural hole circulate in different flows of information. Structural holes are thus an opportunity to be a broker of information between people, and control the projects that bring people together from opposite sides of the hole’ (Burt, 2000, p. 4).” (Gold, 2005:19)

questionable whether incumbents can sustain a valuable middleman position (Ryall and Sorenson, 2007)” (2008:938) unless they are able to erect entry barriers.

So, even as some interest groups can exert control over policy agendas, most of the times “interest group activity begets yet more interest group activity thus increasing, not decreasing, uncertainty as the number of stakeholders increases” (Richardson, 2000:1008) with negative consequences for the overall system as “[...]the real import of asymmetric information is not that it somehow empowers the agent, but that it creates problems for the principal and the agent [...by affecting the trust between them.] The source of his power is also the source of his undoing.” (Moe, 2006:36)

Risk avoidance and uncertainty reduction strategies lead to promiscuity by interest groups—and, of course, promiscuity increases the risk and uncertainty still further. [...] A central feature of the lobbying strategies of [...] interest groups is that partners in the ‘policy game’ are unreliable. No single actor can control a game with so many different players or deliver the desired payoff. [...] Promiscuity not only begets promiscuity—it also breeds mistrust between actors. (Richardson, 2000:1014-5)

As an essential component of the social environment (see page 61), trust must be reasserted for the system to work, and this is done through trust-fostering networks—understood as “*ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others*” (Tilly, 2007:7)—that tend to be identity-based—that is, based on “the classification of some actors (by these same actors and their audiences) as members of a family, group, or community where secrets are (supposed to be) shared and the identification of others as outside that ‘circle of trust’ (Herzfeld and Hamburg, 2000).” (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:937)

Reagans and Zuckerman suggest these identity-based trust networks create a tradeoff between the insider and the stranger, as well as a tradeoff between a simple and a complex identity, similar to the one we described when discussing bonding and bridging social capital on page 58.

Since the stranger’s very identity renders her ineligible for full group membership, she cannot compete for status within the group. According to Simmel, this makes her a more dispassionate observer of the group’s affairs who is sought out as a confidant because she cannot use such confidences to vie for relative status within the group. [...] Bearman points to another trade-off between knowledge and power that inheres in the stranger role—i.e., while the stranger may be well-positioned to accumulate a large amount of compromising information on the insiders, she is limited in the extent to which she can exploit it without being sanctioned by everyone in the role structure for violating her role. (937)

Some complex identities may be potentially advantageous due to their flexibility to respond and interact in multiple roles with different groups. However, as Reagans and Zuckerman demonstrate, these can also be problematic in the sense that in defying typecast narrow identities, their loyalties, skills or interests may be questioned, misunderstood or perceived as confusing, potentially causing social penalties.

While “social network analysis has gradually become more central to structural research on power, as the advanced techniques developed since the 1960s have allowed more rigorous investigations into the formation of cliques and other sub-groupings” (Scott, 2004:90), the increasing irruption of information and communication technologies in the public sphere over the past few decades has stimulated this field of study.

In social network analysis, individual positions are represented as points in a diagram or as rows in a matrix, while the social relations that connect these positions are represented as lines connecting the points or as the individual cells of the matrix. Mathematical techniques are now available to chart the size and structure of social networks through such measures as density, centralization, and fragmentation (Scott 1991b; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Density measures the coherence or integration of a network — how closely connected its members are. Centrality, on the other hand, concerns the relative prominence of members in the network. At an overall level, centralization measures examine the extent to which a network is organized around focal units. Particularly important measures in structural analysis are those that identify cliques, clusters, and other sub-groupings that cross-cut the formal boundaries of institutions (Knoke 1994). (Scott, 2004:90)

Taking this networks approach one step further into the analysis of power, Manuel Castells (2011) offers an alternative view of four different types of power (and counterpower) in the networked society:

1. **Networking Power:** the power of the actors and organizations included in the networks that constitute the core of the global network society over human collectives and individuals who are not included in these global networks.
2. **Network Power:** the power resulting from the standards required to coordinate social interaction in the networks. In this case, power is exercised not by exclusion from the networks but by the imposition of the rules of inclusion.
3. **Networked Power:** the power of social actors over other social actors in the network. The forms and processes of networked power are specific to each network.
4. **Network-making Power:** the power to program specific networks according to the interests and values of the programmers, and the power to switch different networks following the strategic alliances between the dominant actors of various networks.

Counterpower is exercised in the network society by fighting to change the programs of specific networks and by the effort to disrupt the switches that reflect dominant interests and replace them with alternative switches between networks. Actors are humans, but humans are organized in networks. Human networks act on networks via the programming and switching of organizational networks. In the network society, power and counterpower aim fundamentally at influencing the neural networks in the human mind by using mass communication networks and mass self-communication networks. (773)

In this Network Theory of Power (NTP) approach, elites and interest groups are recasted as power (or counterpower) brokers who can be either programmers—actors with the capacity of defining and redefining the goals, as well as of configuring and reconfiguring the network—or switchers—actors who control the connections to other strategic networks—in a complex environment that prevents any unified power clique from emerging.

Characterizing Diasporas as Interest Groups

These notions around interest groups neatly fit our earlier characterization of diasporas as transnational communities (see page 91), and strongly resonate with our review of both learning as belonging and as becoming (p. 41), of knowledge proximity (p. 45), the ideas of social capital as networks (p. 61), as one of the elements to upgrade the absorptive capacity of economies (p. 68), in Kuznetsov and Sabel's model of migration chains and networks (p. 90) {K↔M}.

An important premise of the brain circulation dynamics analyzed in the previous chapter suggests that transnational communities can act as knowledge and information brokers (Gold, 2005; Shain & Barth, 2003) or facilitating intermediaries (Brinkerhoff, 2008) to bridge the structural holes between their homelands and hostlands.

Either passively—when diasporas are forced to react to external events imposed on them by their homelands or their host countries—or actively—as special interest groups (Shain & Barth, 2003)—“diasporans who engage in the building of institutions, conducting transactions and generally influencing local and national events in their respective homelands [...] have a huge comparative advantage over those [...] diasporans who fail to nurture transnational social fields with the homeland.” (Patterson, 2006:1891) {M↔I}

The motivation to take an active stance is usually twofold and widely documented in the literature on migration. On the one hand, an interest to influence their homelands, acting upon a desire to contribute to the welfare of “their people” as seen from their host countries and shaped by feelings

of identity, solidarity, kinship, maintenance of memory, as by security, financial, economic, or development considerations, among others.

On the other hand, an interest to influence their host countries, acting upon a desire to either improve their living conditions as members of a minority as a collective or altruistic motivation, or maintain and increase their organizations' influence in the political agenda as an interest group or self-interested motivation (Gold, 2005; Shain & Barth, 2003).

Diasporas, as other transnational actors, thus enjoy a privileged status of exerting influence as an interest group in both the homeland and the hostland, often affecting the homeland *because of* influence in the hostland [and vice-versa...] In any case, as interest groups, diasporas may use whatever clout they can to advance their interests. (2003:461)

Yet, in order to do so, diasporas should first have the desire and achieve the capacity, or as Shain and Barth word it, “there should exist motive, opportunity, and means” (462). These elements inextricably linked to the efficacy of diasporas depend, in turn, on a series of highly contingent interconnected factors: (1) the degree of motivation, (2) the nature of the hostland and (3) homeland—that is, on how the institutional arrangements allow or limit the interplay of interest groups on both sides of the divide, and more specifically on the social environment and attitudes towards the transnational community at both ends—, and (4) the strength of the engagement between the diaspora and the homeland—a factor that includes the level of cohesion within the diaspora {K↔M & M↔I}.

In that sense a diaspora can also be considered as a social movement with the three distinctive features—a social grievance, the organization and resources to mobilize politically, and the opportunity to do so—identified by Klandermans:

“Social movements are collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites and authorities” (Tarrow, 1994, p. 4; see also Klandermans, 1997, p. 2). This definition includes three key elements that deserve some elaboration. First, social movements are collective challenges. They concern disruptive direct action against elites, authorities, other groups, or cultural codes. There is an obvious reason why this is the case. Social movements typically encompass people who lack access to politics. Had they had access there would have been no need for a social movement. Disruptive collective action forces authorities to pay attention to the claims brought forward. Second, it concerns people with a common purpose and solidarity. Social movement participants rally behind common claims, they want authorities to do something, to change a state of affair or to undo changes. Such common claims are rooted in feelings of collective identity and solidarity. Third, isolated

incidents of collective action are not social movements. Only by sustaining collective action does an actor turn a contentious episode into a social movement. (2004:269)

In other words, an activist diaspora that is engaged with the homeland institutions and that has access to the policy process would act like an interest group, while an activist diaspora attempting to exert its influence from without the policy process will act like a social movement.

To that extent, “Paul Burstein (1998) argues that social movements and interest groups are essentially the same, and that even differences between these ‘interest organizations’ and parties have diminished” (Minkoff, 2004:286). However, this might only be the case if societies become more pluralistic and their political processes become more open and participative. Otherwise, social movements cannot be incorporated in the traditional repertoire of political participation.

All these considerations, together with the factors identified by Shain and Barth, will help determine the role of diasporas as development players⁷⁷ in three distinctive influence areas—business, knowledge, and culture (Rutherford, 2009)—and in three distinctive levels of influence, which according to Mohann (cited in Patterson, 2006:1897) and to Robinson (cited in Orozco, 2008:211), can be identified as:

- a) Development *in* the diaspora: entails the use of networks in the host country in the “formation of ethnic businesses, cultural ties, and social mobilization” (2008:211). Sometimes, this type of activity is also supported by the homeland in order to improve the living conditions of their nationals abroad, and when possible, to capture spillovers from that development (2006).
- b) Development *through* the diaspora: results from the “networking within and between diasporas of the same [...] group in different parts of the world” (2006:1898) as a way to harness these diffuse global connections and facilitate the groups’ overall well being (2008).
- c) Development *by* the diaspora: refers to the “flows of ideas, money, and political support to the migrant’s home country” (2008:211); in other words, the diaspora works mainly “if not exclusively in helping the homeland develop.” (2006:1899)

⁷⁷ “A development player aims to find solutions to human needs and to offer alternative ways to promote self-sustainability. In more practical terms, economic development is a conditions by which individuals and society at large enjoy a good quality of life, are free, have opportunities for upward mobility, and are able to improve their material circumstances.” (Orozco, 2008:207)

Figure 32 “offers a matrix depicting migrant economic activities and their three dimensions” (2008:212) to help clarify the different dynamics and activities associated with each of them. Figure 33 offers a matrix depicting an example using Scotland as the country of analysis for each of the six diaspora groups identified by Rutherford (see page 93) and the influence areas mentioned just earlier to help clarify who could be considered a member of these groups {M↔I & M→D}.

Development Activities	In the diaspora	Through the diaspora	By the diaspora
Family remittances	Banking The unbanked	Financial intermediation; Micro-finance institutions	MTOs, e.g., Thamel.com
Consumption of goods and services	Supporting demand for products	Supply of home country commodities	Small business development
Investment of capital	Setting up minority owned business	Technical training in remittance receiving areas	Manufactured goods; nostalgic trade; tourism
Cash and in kind donations	Capacity building	Project identification; networking	Social philanthropy

Figure 32: Three Dimensions of Diasporas' Links to Development (Orozco, 2008:212)

Link	Role		
	Business	Knowledge	Cultural
Lived	Individuals who have worked in Scotland, and now work overseas	Foreign students who have returned home; Scottish academics working overseas	Scots in the art, media or culture industries who now work overseas
Affinity	Business leaders who have an affinity for Scotland;	Knowledge professionals with an interest in Scotland, perhaps through their research	Artists, musicians or other creatives based overseas who draw on Scotland for their work
Returning	Diaspora returning to work in Scotland	Diaspora returning to study in Scotland; to work in academia in Scotland	Diaspora from the culture industries returning to work in Scotland
New	Scots leaving to work overseas;	Scots leaving to work in the knowledge sector in other countries	Scots in the art, media or culture industries intending to leave Scotland
Reverse	Skilled immigrants coming to work in Scotland	Foreign academics coming to work in Scotland; foreign students coming to study in Scotland;	Artists, musicians or other creatives immigrating to Scotland
Ancestral	Individuals of Scots descent who wish to invest in Scotland	Students and academics who want to study or work in Scottish knowledge sector because of their roots	People who claim a Scottish ancestry and want to see and experience Scotland for themselves

Figure 33: Example for Scotland of Diaspora Subgroups by Link & Role (Rutherford, 2009:31)

However, there are also important challenges to the efficacy of diasporas as interest groups. First, that proactive diasporas are still learning to integrate their initiatives and strategies to the formal development efforts of other more experienced development players. Manuel Orozco (2008) suggests this learning process has not been easy in practice, for six reasons: (1) development experts' disbelief about diasporas' role in development; (2) uninformed expectations and limited knowledge of diasporas' presence, work, and quality by some traditional development players; (3) lack of expertise and focus from some organized diasporas; (4) academics' poor contributions to develop systematic approaches to link diasporas and development; (5) the political implications; and (6) the poor communication between diasporas and other players.

Second, that sometimes diasporas are passive actors which require other players to court them. In that sense, Rutherford (2009) identifies six challenges: (1) identifying diaspora members is complicated; (2) poor quality of communication; (3) diasporas are not always receptive to be engaged; (4) the extension of rights to diasporas for engagement to be sustainable might be politically complicated; (5) continuous engagement requires constant follow-up contacts; and (6) diaspora-oriented initiatives must be considered within a broader strategic framework in which there might be conflicting initiatives.

Third, that the context in which diasporas work as interest groups is systemically pervaded by mistrust, and the complex identities of diasporas as both insiders and strangers (see p.126) becomes an issue to articulate adequate relations with the institutional establishment at both the host- and homeland:

Economically powerful ethnic minorities have traditionally been suspected of having greater loyalty to their ethnic community than to the host country and of being tempted to exploit the latter to benefit the former. [...However, w]hether diasporas are seen as adjuncts to rather than adversaries of domestic elites depends on how the two groups have interacted historically. (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006b:46)

Moreover,

Few governments or nongovernmental organizations adopt [a participatory process] approach to diaspora mobilization: expatriate leaders are rarely invited to help design national development programs or support the formation of new strategic partnerships between the government and diaspora leaders. Instead, suboptimal forms of cooperation between home country governments and diasporas dominate. These include traditional, broad, and unfocused government pleas for support, usually for humanitarian relief; intensive political consultations between governments and traditional political leaders of the diasporas; and sporadic attempts by diasporas to rearrange themselves and establish new organizations with a stronger focus on

home country developments that usually do not receive adequate support from the government.
(Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006:232)

Finally, that when diaspora's influence and activism become strong enough to challenge the *status quo* of either the hostland or the homeland, there is potential for conflict to spark with the power elites who might perceive their privileges—usually derived from their dominant positions in closed polities and institutions, or crony capitalism—as threatened.

Diasporas may be latent assets, yet many governments of countries of origin regard them as latent dangers. Diasporas are breeding grounds for political opposition: dissidents can find a safe haven, money can be raised to support opposition parties, and ideas and examples can become influential. [...] Many of the governments of countries of origin should indeed be threatened by their diasporas. After all, a key reason that some countries remain very poor is that they have not developed functioning democratic institutions, including accountability to electorates, respect for the rights of minorities and individuals, the rule of law, and checks and balances on arbitrary power. (Collier, 2013: 181)

Consequently, these elites may become entrenched (Kuznetsov, 2009) and may mobilize their power and resources to stifle or even outrightly block any diaspora-oriented or -led initiatives, much in the way we discussed earlier on Acemoglu's theory of social conflict (p. 121), or on Moe's exercise of power by revoking an original *status quo* (p. 122).

When the entrenched elites in a developing country see highly educated young people emigrating, does that steel their resolve to make the changes necessary to staunch the brain drain? Or does it reduce the pressure on them to give up the privileges that are barriers to development and that lead to the brain drain in the first place? (Ellerman, 2006:44)

Fortunately, as Kuznetsov and Sabel (2008) remind us, “[s]ave infernal traps (interlocking political and economic equilibrium traps which block learning before it gets started), any developing economy [...] has segments or at least some high ranking officials which are forward looking, dynamic, and efficient. The same applies to the private sector [...] Old and new elites co-exist side by side.”(93) The challenge, thus, lies in locating these points of entry to articulate institutional changes.

Once living in high-income host countries, migrants can see what decent governance looks like, they now that their countries of origin lack it, and they want to pressure for change. To my mind the key issue for migration is whether this pressure is effective (Collier, 2013:181)

Institutions and Policies in Empirical Research

In chapter one, we have already partly covered the topic of how the effectiveness of certain institutions and policies for development can be assessed empirically during our review of competitiveness theories (page 64), and how their contributions impact the wealth of a nation through intangible capital during our review of the World Bank study (p. 67) {I→D & I↔K}. Nevertheless, the sheer variety and vastness of empirical research on the specific subject of institutions and policies is overwhelming.

For example, while studies like the one by—and those similar to—Docquier, Lodigiani, Rapoport and Schiff (2010) explore the impacts of emigration on the quality of homeland institutions, it still falls under the brain drain/brain circulation debate we explored in chapter two. Instead, we focus this section directly on studies that helps us to better achieve the overall aim of our dissertation: namely the research of policies and institutions focused on the diasporas and how these impact economic growth.

An ample volume of empirical literature is devoted to diaspora-oriented policies that are institutionalized with lesser involvement by governments or public sector actors, such as is the cases of home-town associations (HTAs) and other form of community-driven development (CDD) initiatives {M↔I & I→D}. Nonetheless, it might be “naïve to think that home associations [and other forms of CDD initiatives] are not engaged in political work” (Mercer, Page & Evans, 2008:231), as Andrea-Rosalinde Hofer concludes from her compilation of an insightful toolkit of policy practices—especially for sending countries—on assessing the loss of skills in migration, drawing on “selected case studies and interviews in sending countries, including Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Mexico, Romania and Sierra Leone, as well as previous LEED work in Albania and Italy” (2009:57).⁷⁸

Managing migration for skills and economic development is not a new phenomenon. Diaspora and hometown associations have long been active in community development back home. While such activities are rarely driven by public policies, governments are increasingly choosing to support them, understanding “transnational communities” to be key drivers for the re-orientation or technological adaptation of local economies on both sides of the sending and receiving relationship. The often cited spill-over between the very different development trajectories of Silicon Valley in California and Hsinchu-Taipei region in Taiwan is not unique, but provides an instructive example of how appropriate public policy intervention can utilise skills migration for knowledge and technology transfer, which, in turn, can stimulate policies to

⁷⁸ LEED is the OECD’s Local Economic and Employment Development Programme.

enhance the growth potential of sending economies and a change of direction towards a high-technology development path. (2009:57) [M↔I & I↔K]

Region	Country	Type of Diaspora Engagement Policy						
		Capacity Building			Extending Rights			Extracting Obligations
		Symbolic nation-building	Institution building	Political incorporation	Civil and social rights	Investment policies & lobby promotion		
		Inclusive rhetoric & symbols	Shaping media & PR Cultural promotion & induction	Conferences & conventions Ministerial level agency	Dedicated bureaucracy Monitoring efforts Building transnational networks Consular and consultative bodies	Special membership concessions Dual nationality (no vote) Must return to vote Embassy voting Postal voting Indefinite, unconditional vote Parliamentary representation	Can run for office Tourism services Welfare protection	Mandatory payments Special economic zones Remittance and FDI capture Knowledge transfer programmes Promoting expat lobby
Europe & Asia Minor	Armenia							
	Turkey							
	Greek Cyprus							
Middle East & Africa	Morocco							
	Eritrea							
Asia & Indian Sub-continent	India							
	China							
Asia Pacific	Philippines							
	Australia							
	New Zealand							
The Americas	Mexico							
	Dominican Republic							
	Argentina							
	Brazil							
	Haiti							

Figure 34: Selection of Countries Using Diaspora Engagement Policies (Gamlen, 2006:9)

However, the individual studies that delve into these very specific topics are still too numerous to fully cover in this section⁷⁹. So, we narrow our focus deeper onto those that deal with analyzing and cataloguing different policies and institutions associated to diaspora-engagement, and institutionalized diaspora-led development {M↔I & I→D}.

The studies on diaspora engagement we are to review {M↔I}, comprise research by two authors: the work of Alan Gamlen from the University of Oxford’s Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), and on the other hand, the research of Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias from the Migration Policy Institute, an independent think-tank based in Washington.

Gamlen’s research examines how a large number of states relate to their diasporas. In 2006, he mapped how governments approach the engagement of diasporas through policies and institutions that aim at capacity building, at extending rights to their compatriots abroad, and at extracting obligations from them (see Figure 34).

⁷⁹ We have included some of these as sources for our own country-specific case-study in part three.

States:	Diaspora Building		Diaspora Integration		
	Cultivating a diaspora: Celebrating national holidays; honoring expatriates with awards; convening diaspora congresses; proclaiming affinity with and responsibility for diaspora; issuing special IDs/visas; national language and history education; extended media coverage	Recognizing the diaspora: Expanded consular units; commissioning studies or reports; improving statistics; maintaining a diaspora program, bureaucratic unit, or dedicated ministry	Extending rights: Permitting dual nationality, dual citizenship or external voting rights; special legislative representation; consulting expatriate councils or advisory bodies		Extending rights: Providing pre-departure services; extensive bilateral agreements; intervening in labor relations; supplementing health, welfare and education services support; upholding property rights
Argentina					
Armenia					
Australia					
Algeria					
Azerbaijan					
Bangladesh					
Benin					
Brazil					
Bulgaria					
Burkina Faso					
Chile					
China					
Colombia					
Croatia					
Dominican Republic					
Ecuador					
Egypt					
El Salvador					
Eritrea					
Estonia					
Ethiopia					
France					
Ghana					
Greece					
Grenada					
Guatemala					
Haiti					
Honduras					
India					
Ireland					
Israel					
Italy					
Japan					
Lithuania					
Mali					
Mexico					
Morocco					
Mozambique					
New Zealand					
Nigeria					
Pakistan					
Peru					
Philippines					
Poland					
Portugal					
Romania					
Russia					
Senegal					
Serbia & Montenegro					
Slovenia					
Somalia					
South Africa					
South Korea					
Switzerland					
Syria					
Thailand					
Turkey					
Tunisia					
Ukraine					
Uruguay					
UK					
USA					
Venezuela					
Zimbabwe					

Key:

- Many activities: many nation-building activities, a bureaucratic unit, legislative representation, social justice focus, initiatives to leverage the diaspora
- Some significant, relatively recent activity, covered substantively in literature
- "Under discussion": e.g. recommended by leading think tanks, significant academic literatures, and/or debated substantively in government

Figure 35: Diaspora Mechanisms in Selected States (Gamlen, 2008:845-6)

A subsequent revision of this research led Gamlen (2008) to rework his original typology into two broader categories—diaspora building and diaspora integration—that contained five different types of policies aimed at cultivating a diaspora, recognizing the diaspora, extending rights related to citizenship, extending rights related to services, and extracting obligations from those citizens (see Figure 35).

Furthermore, Gamlen concludes that by cross-analyzing the policies his typology, four types of countries can be identified on whether they apply: (1) diaspora-integration and diaspora-building mechanisms—called engaged states, (2) or only diaspora-integration mechanisms—called incoherent states, (3) or only diaspora-building mechanisms—called paper-only states, (4) or no mechanisms—called disengaged states (see Figure 36).

		Coordination mechanisms (diaspora building)	
		Yes	No
Mechanisms with a diaspora dimension (diaspora integration)	Yes	Engaged	Incoherent
	No	Paper only	Disengaged

Figure 36: Typology of Emigration States (Gamlen, 2008:852)

Dovelyn Agunias's research (2009) deals with the specific subject of institutions created to engage with diaspora. Covering the objectives and activities of 45 different institutions in 30 developing countries⁸⁰, she groups them into three types: (1) homeland government institutions—at: (a) ministry level, (b) subministry level, (c) special offices including diaspora committees, and (d) local level—, (2) consular networks—providing (a) help in the hostland, and (b) links to the homeland—, and (3) quasi-government institutions—as: (a) foundations, and (b) advisory councils.

Agunia's study concludes that diaspora institutions are "in many ways no different than other institutions in developing countries" (18) and allows her to draw four specific suggestions for country governments interested in improving their diaspora engagement activities:

1. Do the homework: meaning preparatory work—(1) "understanding diasporas' needs, wants, and potentials", (2) "apprising the current government approach", and (3) "learning from the experience of other countries"—to "ensure that institutions adopt policies based on skills, capacities and intentions that complement one another." (18)
2. Value the process as much as the outcome: as it is crucial "how institutions were created and how activities were chosen" (19) to generate trust and ownership with the diaspora, ensure legitimacy, operational transparency, and avoid political manipulation.
3. Invest in capacity building: through adequate funding with appropriate levels of expenditure and learning, through cost-sharing with the private sector and the organized civil society, through improving technical know-how to define and pursue goals efficiently, and through

⁸⁰ Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Chile, China, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Haiti, India, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Yemen.

the creation of meaningful partnerships with the private sector both at home and where diasporas live.

4. Link institutions to national development priorities {M→D}: as “governments face serious challenges in clearly identifying the professional, financial, and social capital of diasporas abroad, and in matching these forms of capital with concrete development strategies at home”(24); however, sometimes the bigger challenge is political, as “treating migrants as development actors [...may be interpreted as if] the government cannot fulfill its obligation to promote development.”(25)

Now, let us turn to the studies on institutionalized diaspora-led development we are to review {M→D}, which also comprise two sets. One includes the research by Clay Wescott and Jennifer Brinkerhoff—individually or in tandem—starting with a book they edited together in 2006, published by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This book includes a series of case studies on China, Philippines and Afghanistan, and their focus draws heavily from Wescott’s earlier works on the exchange of knowledge through diaspora networks (2005).

They follow the case-study methodology proposed by Barzely, Gaetani, Cortázar Velarde and Cejudo (2003), which aims at answering two types of questions: those that help derive inferences with a broader applicability, and those that help to structure each particular case.

Type A questions have a high level of generality. Examples would include: Can knowledge exchanges increase the development impact of remittances? Can knowledge exchanges (KE) facilitate foreign direct investment? Can development agencies like ADB make better use of diasporas for capacity development?

Type B questions help to structure thinking about a particular case. What is the size and characteristics of professional diaspora? What are the channels of knowledge transfer and types of knowledge transferred? What are the key government institutions and policies, and how have they changed during the period? Is the policy emphasis on promoting investment, donations, or KE? How effective are government institutions and policies in promoting KE? What is the respective role of government and non-governmental diaspora networks in promoting KE? (2005:4)

Wescott and Brinkerhoff’s results (2006) regarding the general inferences on government relations with diasporas come in line with those obtained by the previous researchers, suggesting that these vary according to a range of factors that include the national ethos of the homeland, the composition of the diaspora communities with regards to the reasons of their migration, the

contribution of their remittances to the homeland economy, and their homelands' citizenship laws.
 {M↔I & I→D}

On the one hand, the authors identify factors conducive achieving general diaspora contributions for the homeland: (a) an ability to activate and mobilize their communities abroad; (b) the existence of structures and contexts to generate opportunities, which are in turn dependent on diasporas' access to economic, social, political informational, moral, and physical power resources; (c) a motivation to act that should be sustained through a sense of efficacy and impact.

On the other hand, they identify factors conducive to specific diaspora knowledge transfer and exchange, which are highly interdependent with the aforementioned general factors. These include (a) for mobilization, the existence of diaspora networks and professional associations, an information technology system to support projects and interactions, and intermediary associations and institutions, similar to those researched by Agunias; (b) for opportunities, the existence of regulatory policies both at home- and hostland to reward and publicize legitimate knowledge contributions and information exchange, and to attempt to inhibit the penalization—including cultural or social—of non-returning diasporans who actively engage, similar to those researched by Gamlen; and (c) for motivation, from simple things such as exemption for import tariffs on capital goods and free passport issuance, to more subtle social and moral legitimation of identity expressions.

Wescott and Brinkerhoff's results regarding policy options are classified as those oriented to migration management, remittance and investment capture, diaspora networking, diaspora integration, and democracy and development. Each of these five is analyzed through the lenses of the specific strategies and activities, examples of access, outcomes of empowerment, potential homeland impacts, and potential drains that might be countered.

Subsequent work by Jennifer Brinkerhoff—(2008) exploring diaspora's contributions to development, and her work (2009) on digital diasporas⁸¹ which focuses on identity and transnational engagements—also seems to concur in general terms, calling for diasporans and governments to move beyond remittances and coordinate development efforts on a more inclusive scale.

Indeed, when the focus is on specific development objectives and means to those ends, instead of engaging in a cocreated process that generates meanings and outcomes previously

⁸¹ An issue she had previously addressed in Brainard & Brinkerhoff (2002).

unimagined, the true potential of diaspora-inclusive development efforts is limited and may be wasted. (2008:160)

Moreover, Brinkerhoff (2011) has proposed a framework (see Figure 37) for understanding diaspora diversity and its impact on development. By categorizing the diasporans by their skills—into labor, entrepreneurial and highly-skilled other than business—she analyzes the financial and human capital contributions, as well as the most usual organizations in which they participate.

Diaspora	Financial Capital	Human Capital	Organizations
Labour Diasporan(s)	Remittances Directed investments 1 & possibly 4 Philanthropy through HTAs (collective remittances)	Through philanthropic projects	Individuals HTAs Church groups
Entrepreneurial Diasporan(s)	Remittances Directed investments 1-4 Business start up and investment Other financial investment Corporate social responsibility	Mgt skills; business sector-related expertise; financial mgt Professional networks Corporate social responsibility Political networks	Investment clubs Professional associations Businesses/corporations Business networks NGOs
Highly Skilled other than business	Remittances Directed investments 1-4 Philanthropic donations Corporate social responsibility	Management skills Technical skills and expertise Professional networks Corporate social responsibility	Professional associations Educational institutions Formal networks w/ recruitment agencies, governments, foundations, international organizations Businesses/ corporations NGOs

Figure 37: Diaspora Types and Their Respective Contributions (Brinkerhoff, 2011:30)

This is where the second set of studies on institutionalized diaspora-led development comes handy, comprising research by Yevgeny Kuznetsov, former senior economist at the World Bank Institute’s Knowledge for Development Program { $M \leftrightarrow I$ & $I \rightarrow D$ & $I \leftrightarrow K$ }. In previous sections, we have made reference to some ideas on how learning depends on searching (p.68), on how diasporas may contribute to their homelands (p.84), on how diaspora studies are evolving towards a third generation where (p.90), and on how entrenched elites may attempt to block diaspora-led innovation (p.133), all of which are part of an “appreciative theory [⁸²] of Diaspora engagement” (2011:173) that Kuznetsov has been developing in over half a decade.

⁸² “Appreciative theorizing tends to be close to empirical work and provides both guidance and interpretation. Mostly it is expressed verbally [or narratively, as opposed to mathematically] and is the analyst’s articulation of what he or she thinks really is going on. However, appreciative theory is very much an abstract body of reasoning. Certain variables and relationships are treated as important, and others are ignored. There generally is explicit causal argument. On the other hand, appreciative theorizing tends to stay quite close to the empirical substance.” (Nelson, 1994:3)

However, Kuznetsov's research (2009, 2010, 2011; Kuznetsov & Sabel 2008) turns from the mainstream ideas we have reviewed so far by shifting the focus from the institutional effects on individual diasporans, to a focus on how the individual contributions of talented diasporans affect the institutional and organizational environments instead. This emphasis implies that single talented actors can have a very powerful role in setting those institutional changes in motion—which he calls “a non-linear quality” of impacts to homeland development—as opposed to other types of contributions by migrants which would require a wider volume of diasporans to bring changes into effect.

These particularities of Kuznetsov's diaspora-engagement theories, together with its accent on how the key to institutional reform stems from the interactive processes between talented diasporans and the homeland elites, makes the Diaspora Mobilization Framework (DMF) an extremely attractive approach to explore for extensive use as a part of our analytical framework. Therefore it will be revisited for a more detailed explanation in chapter four (see p. 153).

Insights and Conclusions {I}

From the different theories on institutional and policy change presented throughout this chapter, and from our review of the empirical research on the institutional engagement of diasporas with their homelands, we can extract at least four major insights. First, that in a sense, institutions are like bridges linking the past and the future of societies. By providing stability to the shared concepts that shape human interactions (rules, norms and strategies) they help to foster trust in economies too complex for direct interaction and reputation networks.

Yet, as with bridges, without maintenance institutions might become unsuitable leaving a society stuck in the past. Every so often, changes in the shared concepts that shape human interaction arise, requiring institutions to be adapted. Sometimes, these changes happen seamlessly and by way of collective decisions. Other times, these changes happen by way of a legitimate or illegitimate use of power from the actors that control the institutional processes. In either case, the need for a multidisciplinary study of institutionalism and the insufficiency of Coase's theorem in political situations suggests that we need a re-introduction of the concept of power into our approach. Therefore, we conclude that an original institutional economics (OIE) perspective is a more suitable choice for our dissertation.

Moreover, the second insight is that—in so far as policies could be considered as a less stable kind of institution under Ostrom's definition, and as intergenerational bridges in our metaphor above—

the theories that address the process of policy changes can be a useful tool to approach the processes for institutional change. This is particularly true as policy change depends highly on the change of interests and beliefs of a society in a macro level, and of individuals—or collective actors acting as individuals, as in the case of organizations—who are in control of the processes of reform in a micro level.

For this reason, any attempt at understanding institutional change must address, on the one hand, both the formal and informal meta-rules for reform and, on the other hand, the way actors coalesce around their beliefs and negotiate their interests in an attempt to influence one another. So, in the quest for a methodological framework that enables us to achieve the overall goal of our dissertation and that fits within the OIE approach, we consider Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to be the best suited to our needs.

The third insight is that, in the globalized and widely interconnected world of the twenty-first century, institutional and policy change may come about through the influencing of networked actors in control of the processes (elites) by other actors who are also organized in a myriad of ways that range from tight networks to loose interest or belief coalitions. For that reason, we regard Castells's network theory of power (NTP) to be a good complement to our ACF approach in analyzing the different mechanisms that distribute power and other resources to the different members of coalitions.

However, while Castells's theory makes keen emphasis on the relevance that communication and the media have in the policy and institutional change processes, it does not offer an analytical tool for these. To provide that extra dimension to our analytical methodology, we have chosen to incorporate the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) (Jones & McBeth, 2010) which, like Castells's theory, as it was developed under the banner of the ACF's school of thought (Shanahan, Jones & McBeth, 2011).

The fourth insight ties our analytical methodologies directly to the specific aim of our dissertation, and is about the non-linearity of diasporans contributions to their homeland development. This non-linearity implies that sometimes, one talented individual is all that is required to have a deeper impact in diaspora-led development through institutional change, and while the game of numbers do help, it might be less determinant than other diaspora contributions such as, for example, remittances.


After comparing the different bodies of empirical research, the one that better incorporates this idea is Kuznetsov's appreciative theory for diaspora-led development, and it is therefore our pick as the

better suited to work with our previous methodological choices. From its construction of the individual overachieving diasporan, to the way in which the personal narrative and the professional networks are articulated to the control of institutions and policies by the diasporan's homeland elites, Kuznetsov's diaspora mobilization framework (DMF) completes our quest for analytical tools, all of which will be combined in our next chapter dealing with the analytical methodology.

To conclude, through this chapter we have explored different approaches to institutions and policies as the third theoretical root to nourish our dissertation:

- Linking backwards to our dissertation's introduction, through the growing body of evidence that highlights the nexus between the appropriate policies and institutions and development in general, and how the appropriate policies and institutions can foster specific diaspora-led development efforts.
- Linking sideways along this theoretical background, our review of institutionalism in general, and of the way beliefs play a role in transforming institutions and policies in particular, has strong ties with elements explored in chapter one. These include, for instance, the role of networks and the identification of social capital and other relational assets which are the essential building blocks of institutions.
- In chapter two, we explored the way in which diasporas are formed through wider networks of transnational communities and institutions. In chapter three, we have explored how these activist diasporas interact with the institutional and policy landscape of their homelands, characterizing their organized efforts as those of interest groups when articulated to institutions, or as social movements when acting from without.
- Also, after exploring the brain-circulation dynamics in chapter two and concluding that the engagement of homelands and diasporas are a *sine qua non* condition for diaspora-led development, in this chapter we have explored the different mechanisms in which homeland governments approach said (re)engagement either through policies, institutions or both.
- Similarly, we explored how the knowledge of individual talented migrants—as explored in chapter one—can have deep lasting impacts in the institutional environments at both ends of the migratory trail—as explored in chapter two—especially in their countries of origin as a way of expanding the absorptive capacities of the institutions in their homelands, bringing together all three chapters of this theoretical framework.

- Linking forward to our methodology of analysis, a finer grasp of the general dynamics of the way in which institutions and policies are transformed was necessary from a multidisciplinary approach. From that review, we have taken the methodological choices that seemed appropriate as exposed in the insights for this chapter—within the OIE tradition: ACF + NTP + NPF + DMF—which will be developed further and more specifically in the next chapter.
- Additionally, a better understanding of the interplay of the different actors—especially homeland elites and talented diasporans within their organizational contexts—was essential to develop the appropriate combination for our methodology of analysis.
- Finally, our review of the different catalogues of policies and institutions dedicated to the (re)engagement of diaspora in different homelands will prove useful when analyzing the contexts for our selected case study.



PART TWO: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In part one, we reviewed the roots of what we consider to be the three main subjects—the knowledge economy, migration and institutions—required to understand how to build the analytical framework to fulfil our dissertation’s overall aim. However, given the structure chosen to review this interdisciplinary theoretical background, it might appear that our discussion has been too dispersed.

For this reason, in part two we refocus the most relevant of those concepts around our dissertation’s aim: to propose a methodology that helps highly-skilled diaspora of countries in transition to knowledge-based economies and the governments of these homelands to reconnect and to establish brain-circulation dynamics, in order to generate new—or draw on previously untapped—opportunities for modernization and development, particularly through the promotion of institutional reform.

Taking the processes for institutional reform as our target, talented diasporans abroad and elites in control of homeland institutions as the actors, and the different embodiments of knowledge as the

tools to affect the change, we have pieced together the puzzle of an analytical framework from the building blocks described in that conceptual review.

We have established why public policies and institutions are two of the most widely studied objects within the social sciences. Their relevance to development and economic growth has been sufficiently demonstrated theoretically and empirically over the past two decades in innumerable studies from a wide variety of academic perspectives, and in almost every contextual setting conceivable. Consequently, the specific topic of their transformation, change, reform, evolution, etc., is of paramount importance to comprehend to improve our daily lives in society.

However, despite being deeply intertwined through their processes, the change in public policies and the reform of institutions tend to be taken as independent phenomena and each is examined through their own analytical toolkits. Moreover, the theories and models comprised in those toolkits tend to be, on the one hand, confined within the limits of their academic disciplines' traditions, and on the other hand, focused on a narrow set of elements to simplify what otherwise would be a vast and complex phenomenon.

These three issues imply that researchers willing to gain a better understanding of any given case study must make three methodological sacrifices: (1) characterizing the case study under either an institutional reform or a policy change model, (2) then adopting an academic discipline through which to focus the analysis depending on which may offer the most appropriate tools, and (3) narrowing down the case study enough to fit the elements comprised in the theories or models selected, discarding the elements that are not fitting.

In an attempt to address those three issues—that is, to be able to treat institutional reform or policy change indistinctly, to use an approach that is compatible with several academic disciplines' traditions, and to make use of all the elements possible in any given case-study—we propose the use of an interdisciplinary nested multilevel analytic framework for the study of both public policy change and institutional reform:

- An analytic framework, understood as the most general level of a methodological toolkit, to build a common metatheoretical language that can be used across the different theories and models selected to be under its umbrella;
- Applicable equally to the study of changes in public policies and to the reform of institutions, as both are defined as rules that govern actors' interactions, and as we center

our efforts on the transformation mechanisms and processes and not so much on their stability or degree of permanence;

- Interdisciplinary, because the choice of the theories and models that comprise our methodological toolkit is made from the existing theories and models of a wide array of different fields of knowledge within the social sciences such as political science, public administration, sociology, psychology and economics;
- Multilevel, because the framework may make use of any elements in the case study that range from the macro-most level of systems and structures, to the micro-most level of individual narratives of the key people that hold sway over the reform attempt, and three additional levels—policy subsystem, interaction core, and coalition network configuration—in between;
- And nested, because it aims to integrate the independently conceived methodological tools through coherently linked variables across the different levels, in order to reinforce and supplement each other's explanatory powers.




Figure 38: Matryoshka Framework – analytic levels for policy and institutional transformation

The resulting framework is, therefore, an integrated structure of five distinct analytic levels, embedded or nested within each other, not too different from one of those Russian matryoshka dolls (see Figure 38). These levels analyze different aspects of the policy and institutional transformation incorporating variables from the realm of the individual key actors and their supporting networks, making a strong emphasis to the social interactions that push for/against the

transformation, and all the way up to the realm of the environment in which the interactions takes place.

This matryoshka framework should ideally lead to three type of applications: (i) a descriptive usage, by an in-depth case-study analysis that explores the prevailing *status quo* detailing the key conditions, key actors, key processes, etc., that hold sway over the transformation under review; (ii) a prescriptive usage, offering a set of bespoke recommendations to either lock or break the *status quo* towards different possible scenarios; and (iii) a feedback usage, as a dashboard in which to monitor the evolution of the *status quo*, providing guidance for interested actors on how to adjust their strategies in the dynamic environment.

The challenges of building such an ambitious framework were daunting from the methodological perspective. Not only suitable models and theories to analyze these phenomena across different disciplines had to be found, these models and theories had to share compatible foundational assumptions and criteria. Although reviewed throughout part one, it is convenient to summarize them here to refocus on our overall aim and for added clarity:

- That they could fit under the umbrella of the endogenous growth theories, in which the notions of institutions as containers of knowledge, human capital, social capital, and learning as a social process, are important explanatory elements of economic growth (Nelson & Roemer, 1996; Aghion & Howitt, 1998; Cortright, 2001; Pinch et al., 2003; Lang, 2005; Florida, 2005; UNIDO, 2009);
- That they could subscribe to the theories by which variations in institutions and policies are the main explanatory elements behind the variations in economic development amongst nations (Henry & Miller, 2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Ferguson, 2012);
- That they were compatible with Ostrom's definition of institutions as "the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms and strategies" (2007:23), since this notion can also encompass public policies, given that "public policies are clearly very central rules governing [actors'] interactions. [...Furthermore, l]eaving aside the informal institutions typically explored by sociologists, the institutions that impinge on the modern citizen most directly and intensively as she goes about her daily life are in fact public policies, *not* the formal political institutions that have preoccupied political scientists" (Pierson, 2006:115-6);

- That they allowed for the premise that policies are some of the most unstable institutions, but that both institution building and policymaking share the same root which is “not simply about finding solutions for pressing problems, but [...it is] as much about *finding formats that generate trust* among mutually interdependent actors” (Hajer, 2003:184), a goal that can only be achieved through consistent, coherent and stable behavior through time; therefore
- That they accepted that stable as they may seem, institutions are far from immutable, and societies constantly help to shape and re-shape institutions, while institutions in turn, simultaneously help to shape and re-shape societies (Polsky & Ostrom, 1999; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991), allowing for human agency in their transformation;
- That they would be compatible with institutional processualism—in itself an evolution of Jostein Askim’s (2005) processual institutionalism—which “is especially attentive to flows of interaction, to the subtle interplay between belief and action as experience unfolds, [...within an institutional setting where the] situated interaction is influenced by stable context, whether organizational or cultural.” (Barzelay & Gallego, 2006:538); so,
- That the process could become the main object of study and the main tool of analysis to be processual, that is “describing, analysing and explaining the what, why and how of some sequence of individual and collective action. The driving assumption behind process thinking is that social reality is not a steady state. It is a dynamic process. It occurs rather than merely exists (Sztompka, 1991). Human conduct is perpetually in a process of becoming. The overriding aim of the process analyst therefore is to catch this reality in flight” (Pettigrew, 1997:338);
- That they accepted institutional change as a process compatible to that of public policy change, whereby actors can exert their influence either as individuals or as members of formal and/or informal coalitions (Askim, 2005; Barzelay & Gallego, 2006; Pierson, 2006; Sabatier, 2007); and
- That they could still be comprised within the original institutional economics, as this branch of institutional economics is multidisciplinary by nature, as it entails a holistic model of individual (different to the rational, interest-driven individual of the new institutional economics and game theories), as it is expressed in narrative language, and as it accepts both inductive and deductive reasoning methods (Parada, 2003);

- That they were compatible with the integrative approach to the theories of migration that accept both the macro (or structural) and micro (or individual) motivations to explain international mobility (Goss & Lindquist, 1995; GLOPP & Thieme, 2007);
- That they understood diaspora models from an identity perspective, beyond the traditional “homeland” definition (Orozco, 2008; Bakewell, 2009; Rutherford, 2009);
- That though the holistic model of individual that makes decision based on beliefs and that is boundedly rational at best, they permitted the social identification perspective required to operationalize the motivations that bring together social movements and other identity-based coalitions (Jenkins, 2008; Archer, 2005; Knorr-Cetina, 2005; Cohen, 2001);
- That they could characterize the processes behind policy change and institutional reform as network-based processes, and that therefore permit network analytic tools (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008; Castells, 2010, 2011);
- That they acknowledged resource and power asymmetries amongst actors and coalitions, to allow bargaining and conflict as alternative interaction mechanisms to cooperation (Acemoglu, 2003; Moe, 2006; Offe, 2006; Preuss, 2006);
- That they could be articulated as an appreciative theory, namely, with a narrative structure, with explicit causal arguments, closer to empirical work, and that can provide both guidance and an interpretation (Nelson, 1994:3);




Figure 39: Matryoshka Framework – analytic tools for policy and institutional transformation

Following these criteria, we assigned one of the explanatory models or theories we selected towards the end of part one to each of the four nested levels of analysis (see p.141), plus the best-fitting case-study methodology for the macro-most level (Figure 39). Each model and theory within this collection is used as a particular zooming lens to understand different levels of the same object of study from the most micro of the individual, to the most macro of the policy and institutional systems surrounding the brain-circulation dynamics of diaspora-led institutional reform of the homeland.

We set out from the premise that lasting institutional reform starts with the change of individual actors' knowledge and beliefs. At this level, we propose the analysis of narratives—Jones & McBeth's NPF—to understand how actors shape their identities and share their beliefs in a world of competing narratives in an attempt to gather support for their institutional reform goals.

Once we have characterized our main actors (talented diasporans, homeland elite members, or any other possible character that is involved in the institutional reform), we move on to analyze how our main actors generate, expand, or use networks to acquire all kinds of resources for their cause. At this level, it is not the individual *per se*, but the actor's networked interaction what counts. Therefore, we propose the use of network analysis of power—Castells's NTP—to gather a more complete picture of how each institutional reform situation stands.

As a third level of analysis, we have gathered enough information of the actors and situations on both sides of the institutional reform to try to foresee the dynamics of their relationships when the initiatives towards institutional change are introduced. At this level, the diaspora mobilization framework—Kuznetsov's DMF—is a very useful tool for an initial characterization of the interactions between the talented diasporans and the homeland elites, as well as for monitoring their evolution through time.

Next, building up on the three previous levels, we include as the fourth what is traditionally called the policy subsystem which takes into consideration additional environmental elements—outside the interaction of the talented diasporans and the homeland elites—directly related to the success or failure of the policy change. At this level, we have adopted the advocacy coalition's framework—Sabatier's ACF—as our method of analysis to ensure we systematically capture the complexity surrounding each situation of institutional reform.

Finally, we zoom out to the fifth and uppermost level of the case study, which gives us not only a view of the policy subsystem, but a general perspective of how this subsystem is immersed into the

general environment of the highest unit under analysis (country-level, company-level, industry-level, etcetera). At this level, we will make use of a slightly adapted version of the case-oriented research in policy change methodology—Barzelay, Gaetani, Cortázar Velarde & Cejudo's CORPC—so that different individual case studies can be contrasted and compared.

Part two of our dissertation will be structured in four chapters. Since our dissertation's overall aim is to help talented diasporas and their homelands reconnect and establish brain-circulation dynamics to generate opportunities for modernization and development through the promotion of institutional reform, we set the core of our Matryoshka framework in Kuznetsov's DMF, which will be presented in detail in chapter four.

Chapter five will present the two analytical methods zooming in to the individual actor realm—that is NPF and NTP—to a higher level of detail than previously introduced. Like in chapter four, we will emphasize the internal cohesion between the levels and we will extract the operational dashboard variables for its empirical application.

Chapter six will present the two analytical methods zooming out to the environmental issues—that is ACF and CORPC—to a higher level of detail than previously introduced. Also, we will emphasize the specific connections that link each theory to one another and to DMF. Then we will extract a set of operational dashboard indicators for empirical application.

Chapter seven will close part two with the vertical reintegration of the framework, as well as with the detailed explanation of how it is operationalized on the three usages described earlier—descriptive, prescriptive and feedback—through the five-level dashboard. Moreover, it will introduce the possibility to use the Matryoshka framework in different institutional reform contexts where there is an asymmetry of power between coalitions, and regardless of the migratory component by a slight tweak of the DMF at its core level.

Chapter 4: The Interaction of Coalitions at the Core

Money, of course, doesn't begin to tell the whole story. We, at the IOM, speak of diaspora and the three Es: engagement, enabling and empowerment, the components that create what might just as easily be termed the "diaspora synergy".

William Lacy Swing, IOM Director General (2014)

As established earlier, institutions and policies are in essence complex social systems. It takes different forces pushing in different directions to dislodge an existing *status quo*, and to move towards a new situation where structural changes generate for new and different equilibria. For this reason, we assert that the core of the policy and institutional transformations necessarily lie in the interaction between those different social forces pushing and the trajectories they follow.

Customarily, it is the new institutional economics theorists who have explored rigorously this level of analysis by way of the game theories. However, as these models do not fit our archetype of individual who is rooted in psychology, who makes its decisions through a belief system, and who is boundedly rational at best, we have found an alternative model that fits the criteria set initially: Kuznetsov's Diaspora Mobilization Framework.

This chapter starts by picking up the discussion we left open towards the end of chapter three (see page 141), expanding on the main tenets behind DMF. Then we will explore the way in which this methodology can be incorporated within the Matryoshka framework. To conclude, we will extract the operational dashboard indicators for empirical application.

The Interaction Level and Kuznetsov's Diaspora Mobilization Framework

Kuznetsov's earlier research on talent migration (2006, 2006b; Kuznetsov & Sabel 2006, 2006b) understands diasporas as groups characterized by two different roles: (1) direct, as actors, and (2) search networks, as tools much in the way we described in the chapter two (see page 90).

Diasporas' direct role can include financial contributions, both commercial and noncommercial, and contributions in terms of knowledge transfer [...]. In contrast to diasporas' direct

contributions, their indirect role—as members of search networks— is more difficult to define, in part because the variety of possible roles is so extensive. (2006b:225)

Moreover,

In a search role, expatriates open doors and make connections, but someone else still has to do the work. This is why the government and private sector of the home country are so crucial because they, not diaspora members, need to do the work. Diasporas may be crucial in helping formulate innovative projects, but it is up to home country organizations to implement them. However, because those organizations are often weak and rudimentary, diasporas are sometimes expected to compensate for this weakness by substituting for the underdeveloped institutions. This is an understandable expectation, but it is wrong. Diaspora members can complement the activities of home country organizations, and can be instrumental in strengthening home country organizations, but cannot substitute for them. (2006b:225)

However, it is here where Kuznetsov's research (2009, 2010, 2011; Kuznetsov & Sabel 2008) deviates from other authors, by taking to explain how individual contributions of talented diasporans affect the institutional and organizational environments given an appropriate combination of factors.

These talented diasporans are usually overachievers—or “new Argonauts” in the words of Saxenian and Sabel (2008), and very close to the “innovation heroes” of Phelps (2013:32)—who become champions and pioneers devoted to the achievement of an ambitious, yet humble idea. The process usually starts when these overachievers make use of their established—or create new—social networking resources and their role in the organizational and institutional arrangements both at their home- and host-lands to search for strategic allies and partners to bring about the sought institutional changes.

The mechanism for this, is a suggested two-tier approach (Kuznetsov, 2006b), that involves two type of interventions which reminds us of the act of walking: (1) discussions—involving communication, interactions, actual discussions, websites, and other activities that require minimum input and is equivalent to standing on a leg—and (2) transactions—involving actions that require a greater commitment and effort to achieve the changes desired, which are the equivalent of balancing forth to take a step and stand on the next leg—in an alternating sequence, each step being “a set of discreet activities and outcomes that can be measured” (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2008:100)

Diaspora activities are easy to initiate, but difficult to sustain. Enthusiasm about getting involved is enormous and manifests itself in diaspora Web sites, conferences, and other

meetings—activities that do not require major commitments of time or money. But initial enthusiasm tends to evaporate as easily as it emerges: people get tired of meetings and discussions alone. The most common mistake in trying to harness a diaspora is to be carried away by discussions without turning them into tangible outcomes. People like to see tangible outcomes, such as the initiation of joint research projects with home country scientists and the provision of assistance to a start-up in the home country so it can find new markets. These tangible activities can be referred to as transactions or projects. Thus a project is a set of discrete activities and outcomes that can be measured. A project can be as small as the visit of a professor to a home country, but does require active commitment in terms of time and money. (Kuznetsov 2006b:227)

When unsuccessful in these transactions, overachievers are able to draw valuable lessons from each experience, but are not easily discouraged, persisting and learning from each attempt. When successful, each completed initiative usually becomes the seed for a new initiative that goes gradually *in crescendo* in terms of both ambition and results, due to the trust and credibility—an increased social capital for the diasporan, and a better social cohesion for the network—generated by the continual successful engagements.

The overachievers' search networks, in time, might become institutionalized and these talented diasporans can eventually become what Kuznetsov calls “Archimedean levers” (2009). This metaphor, like in the concept borrowed from physics, implies people that through the—geographical and/or institutional—distance given by being part of the diaspora abroad, are able to generate enough influence and force to push certain changes that might have otherwise been either impossible—or, at best, extremely difficult—to implement. If “individuals are crucial to initiate the process[,] it is home country organizations which sustain it.” (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2008:101)

Under this logic, the organizational and institutional roles of the talented diasporans become relevant resources for the success or failure of the overall initiative. In a juxtaposition of the individual drive by the overachievers and the level of organizational support they can accrue, Kuznetsov (2010, 2011) classifies initiatives into four distinct and very self-explanatory categories, represented in Figure 40.

As mentioned in chapter two (see page 90), most diaspora-led initiatives⁸³ usually start as serendipitous sparks, which would be located in the “hit the wall” quadrant of this diagnostic

⁸³ Diaspora-led or non, innovation initiatives in general undergo a very tough selection mechanism to survive: “A study by McKinsey estimated that, from 10,000 business ideas, 1,000 firms are founded, 100 receive venture capital, 20 go on to raise capital in an initial public offering of shares, and 2 become market leaders.” (Phelps, 2013:24)

model. Diaspora-led development ideas usually start as small items, typically derived from the issues diasporans face in their daily lives. If these ideas are not accompanied by either the individual drive to challenge the *status quo*, nor by any organizational support to help them gather momentum, they are bound to fade away.




Figure 40: Diagnostic monitoring model for diaspora initiatives (Kuznetsov, 2010:17)

At times, talented diasporans devote all their efforts to seeing through their initiatives, and yet are unsuccessful in their attempt to gather enough support from the different organizational environments to which these reforms are linked, following the traditional bottom-up logic of reform. If, in spite of all odds, diasporans are able to implement those initiatives, these “heroic successes” may become inspirational epic narratives of one-of-a-kind projects, almost impossible to replicate.

Other times, some initiatives to engage the diaspora in the homeland development start with all the backing and support of the diverse organizational environments to which changes are linked, and yet they fail to capture the interest of the talented diasporans who are an essential element for their success. By following the traditional top-down logic of reform, these projects are usually doomed to be left running without having the desired developmental impacts or reforms—suboptimal in the best-case scenario, total failures in the worst—thus becoming “living dead” initiatives.

However, when the talented diasporans and the organizational environments converge in their full support and commitment towards the proposed initiatives, their initiatives might achieve what Kuznetsov calls “guided serendipity” and reach the upper-right quadrant of the model. While that would be the most desirable outcome of diaspora-led development initiatives, only a minor fraction of all projects manage to obtain this level of support required from both sides.

For this guided serendipity to take place, Kuznetsov and Sabel suggest the use of an iterated co-design⁸⁴ whereby applying principles such as benchmarking and error detection and correction, both parts may trigger disciplined discussions of pragmatic cooperation—as the first of the two-tier process described earlier (see p.154)—“in response to both the need to formalize collaboration in volatile conditions and the impossibility of doing so completely.” (2008:107)

Characteristics of diaspora			
	Strategic Large and connected to the home country	Emerging Focused on the professional development of its members	
Characteristics of domestic elites	Strategic	Possibility of inside-out reform (South Korea, China, Israel, Ireland, Scotland, Taiwan)	Articulation of promise of areas to make an impact (Japan, Malaysia, Thailand)
	Heterogeneous: existence of a pragmatic segment	Outside-in transformations (Mexico, India, Morocco, El Salvador, Armenia now)	Tantalizing promise: diversity of success stories (Philippines, Chile, Argentina, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Egypt)
	Rent-abundant societies dominated by entrenched interests	Social and economic shock absorber (Armenia in the 90s, Nigeria, some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia)	

Figure 41: Diasporas and domestic elites - diversity of impact (Kuznetsov, 2009:31)

The key, Kuznetsov suggests, might lie in the elites in control of the organizational environments, and how these articulate with the diasporas. Figure 41 describes a juxtaposition that combines on the one hand, the control that elites exert over the institutional *status quo* to be reformed; and on the other hand, the state of relations between diasporans and the elite either as a whole or with factions at its core.

This juxtaposition describes two types of diaspora: (1) strategic, which already has some sort of formal or informal connections to the homeland elites; and (2) emerging, which is at a state of consolidation and might be more focused on the professional development of its members.

⁸⁴ While the authors use the term in the context of industrial relations and industrial policy (Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2008:106-8), the idea may equally be applied to the design of other type of initiatives between the talented diasporans and the homeland elites.

Simultaneously, the juxtaposition identifies three types of elites: (a) strategic, which are highly homogeneous and with a tight core that control over the organizational and institutional processes, but with enough pragmatism to realize the need for reform; (b) heterogeneous, with different internal factions—some of which might be more receptive and pragmatic towards reform—and therefore with a shiftier control of the organizational and institutional processes; and (c) entrenched, which act as shock absorbers to any external initiative that might threaten their *status quo*.

From the resulting combinations, the author proposes a view that challenges the traditional linear logics of institutional reform—either bottom-up or top-down—and replaces it with a structuralist idea of reform with regards to the strategic diasporas and their organizational ties to the different elites in control of the institutions: if initiatives from strategic diasporas meet strategic elites (1+a), these will follow a center-periphery (or inside-out) logic; if initiatives depart from the diasporans and require to be articulated in specific factions of heterogeneous elites (1+b), these will follow a periphery-center (or outside-in) logic.

When diasporas are still emerging, however, the outcome of initiatives is typically more uncertain. If the strategic elite proposes initiatives that match the emerging diaspora's interests, an articulation of promise (2+a) might be reached for mutual cooperation. However, the lack of institutional or organizational links between the diaspora and the elite will make the articulation unstable. This effect is worsened when the elite is heterogeneous, and while its promises of cooperation with an emerging diaspora might be tantalizing (2+b), the process will have to be taken in smaller steps to avoid the risks of bigger losses due to lack of organizational support.

Finally, there will be times when, regardless of the diasporas' organizational conditions, the elites become entrenched and unresponsive to reform initiatives, with the exception of those that serve to strengthen the *status quo*. As a result, these elites will attempt to stifle and outright block any diaspora-led initiative—as described in chapter three (see page 133)—acting as shock absorbers (1+c & 2+c).

Focusing on the cases where reform is possible, Kuznetsov (2011) offers a series of recommendations towards a new generation of diaspora initiatives. He suggests that the organizational focus should remain on: (1) the identification and support of these overachievers as strategic first movers, (2) the leveraging and reliance upon the heterogeneity of the elites, (3) the management of surprises through continuous monitoring for detection and correction of errors, and (4) the mentoring for nourishing joint products and avoid dependencies in the long run.

So far, we have seen that Kuznetsov's DMF frames the policy or institutional reform interaction in terms of two coalitions, a diaspora network and a homeland elite, each with a particular belief system. However, it also acknowledges that these interaction would not be possible to articulate unless links are built between both stances. This effectively means that some level of (re-)engagement or coordination should exist between the diaspora and the homeland elite.

While this idea is useful to monitor the types of initiatives and frame the diversity of impacts (see pages 156 and 157), it might not be convenient to frame the discussion in terms of articulating mixed coalitions. We contest that since heterogeneity might be a challenge for the coordination of both sides—that is, that there might be dissent in some factions within the diaspora and some factions within the elite—a better way to frame these pro-reform and against-reform coalitions might recognize a mix composition of diasporans and elite members on both sides.




Figure 42: Belief system juxtaposition for DMF

This mixed composition effectively gives us, not two, but four different viewpoints at play in the coalition interaction (see Figure 42). These four viewpoints can be typecasted by juxtaposing the diaspora/homeland elite duality with the pro- and against-reform stance, and are useful to identify the four different belief systems that key actors can use to influence the final result of the interaction, as well as to identify allies across the border for coalition articulation.

To conclude this section, by applying DMF at the core level of our Matryoshka, we can better understand the interaction between the homeland elites and the diaspora networks, and through which mechanisms these can articulate institutional reforms in the homeland. As originally

intended, this allows a descriptive usage of our framework from a pure research perspective. Moreover, it can also be used to attempt interventions through a prescriptive usage, in suggesting either coalition how to articulate the appropriate interaction to fulfill their intentions. Finally, by a continuous monitoring of these interactions in a dynamic environment, this type of analysis can provide a feedback usage to help practitioners of each coalition to adjust their strategies in reaction to everyday developments.

Articulating DMF to the Matryoshka Framework

However, and despite been the best model for our purposes, DMF still has some limitations that can be overcome through an added juxtaposition we have proposed at this level, and through its usage as a part of the Matryoshka framework.

At the micro level, Kuznetsov suggests that there are key actors to consider in both groups: on the one hand, the diaspora leaders and champions who are determined to see the initiative through, and on the other hand, the elite's members who have a strategic role in either accepting or rejecting the change initiatives. However, DMF does not explain how these actors can be influenced or motivated to assume their roles in the system to kick-start the process. To either identify and/or incentivize these actors to participate in the system, we suggest the use of a slightly adapted version of the narrative policy framework (see page 180) at the key-actor level.

At the network level, Kuznetsov suggests that the level of internal cohesion and homogeneity of the groups is as relevant as the interaction between them. However, only a brief explanation of gradualism is given to support the idea that the group increases its cohesion through a succession of repetitive successful interactions between the members of the diaspora—in a fashion similar to the way the diaspora and the homeland institutions strengthen their ties—and a constant social learning process. To increase the explanatory power at this level, we add a combination of approaches: some general notions of network analysis and the network theories of power (see page 164).

At the subsystem level, Kuznetsov's DMF does not seem to consider important variables that may affect the interaction between the two groups, such as how the actual rules for policy and institutional transformation that the incumbent group supposedly controls are enacted both *de jure* and *de facto*; power struggles inherent to the political timing; changing socio-cultural values, priorities, resources and support structures; etc. To become mindful of such elements, we add the advocacy coalition framework (see page 195) as our tool explore the policy subsystem level.

At the macro-most level, while Kuznetsov's DMF is an extremely useful analytical tool, providing a protocol to structure case-studies in order to maintain comparability among different instances escapes its scope. We therefore suggest to supplement the framework with the case-study oriented research in policy change protocol (see page 204) to increase consistency.

Finally, by adding these extra layers of intertwined variables, we believe that the framework can help overcome other shortcomings of DMF at its own core level, such as the issue of how to deal with entrenched elites when the diasporan's initiatives are desirable for the homeland prosperity.

DMF Key Variables for Operationalization

At the core interaction level, DMF application requires a definition of the following variables:

- Define the diaspora network
 - Characterize type of diaspora network
 - Strategic
 - Emerging
 - Select and characterize the main diasporans
 - In favor of institutional transformation (engaged)
 - Against institutional transformation (disengaged)

- Define the relevant homeland elite
 - Characterize type of homeland elite
 - Strategic
 - Heterogeneous
 - Entrenched
 - Select and characterize the elite's main actors
 - In favor of institutional transformation (open faction)
 - Against institutional transformation (closed faction)

- Characterize previous and current diaspora-homeland elite interaction *status quo*
 - 1-a: inside-out logic
 - 1-b: outside-in logic
 - 2-a: articulation of promise
 - 2-b: tantalizing promise
 - 1 & 2-c: shock absorber

- Characterize the evolution of initiatives
 - How has the discussion-transaction framework worked so far
 - In the individual-organizational juxtaposition
 - Against the wall
 - Living dead
 - Heroic success
 - Guided serendipity

Chapter 5: Zooming in to the Realm of the Actor

All the world's a stage, | And all the men and women merely players: | They have their exits and their entrances; | And one man in his time plays many parts..

As You Like It, William Shakespeare (1600)

As we have seen in chapter three, institutions are neither a spontaneous occurrence, nor they are monolithic. Built by—and, in the case of organizations, from—individual actors in a combination of intentional design, path dependency and unintended consequences, the human element as the essential building block becomes the fundamental part in the reform process.

One of the main premises of our framework is that, given the appropriate conditions, an individual actor may gain sufficient sway over a coalition to dislodge an existing policy or an institutional *status quo* that is seen as outdated or inefficient, and perhaps even gain sufficient traction to bring the reformist impulse to achieve its goal in bringing about growth and development.

This premise directly supports one of DMF's main characteristic, which is the identification of key actors (these overachievers, or new Argonauts) and their motivation to kick-start the institutional transformation process, both within the diaspora groups and the homeland elites. Similarly, this premise would also entertain the possibility to identify those individual actors with enough clout to lock the *status quo* and block reformist attempts, as hinted in DMF through the entrenched elite category.

But these are not the only two roles that actors can play in bringing about institutional reform. Leaders within a group are important, indeed, but so are certain influencers that act as bridges between different groups who might not necessarily be the leaders, or individuals who act as gatekeepers in structures that control access to the policy or institutional transformation processes, for example. In this chapter, we cover the realm of these actors in two levels.

First, by modeling how coalitions are a pool of social resources expressed as networks that operate as organizational actors in their quest for (or against) institutional reform. As our approach tool for this coalition level, we make use of Castell's network theories of power (NTP) to identify key nodes

within the coalitions, to explore the power asymmetries between the different actors in a network, and to analyze how these coalitions are held together.

Second, by modeling our individuals through the identities and beliefs as expressed in their personal narratives and key policy ideas. As our approach tool at this level, we propose a slightly modified version of the narrative policy framework (NPF) fine-tuned with variables specific to other matryoshka levels, especially those that customize the NPF to the analysis of talented diasporans and their counterparts in homeland institutional elites.

Finally, we will assess the contributions of these two methodologies to our overall matryoshka, extracting the key operational indicators and variables.

The Network Level and Castell's Network Theories of Power (+)

Earlier, we explored the different traditions in the academic literature to characterize the way in which actors come together to gain access and influence on the policy and institutional transformation processes, such as special interest or lobby groups (Wright, 1996), policy communities (Jordan, 1990 as quoted in Richardson, 2000), knowledge networks (Hecló, 1978 as quoted in Richardson, 2000), policy networks (John, 2004), and the advocacy coalitions (Weible, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 2011) that we adopted as our tradition of choice (see page 124).

The ACF tradition will be explored in higher detail in chapter six (see page 195), but for now, as we will be extensively analyzing the internal dynamics of advocacy coalition networks, it is convenient to remember that they consist “of individuals who share a particular belief system - i.e., a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions - *and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time*” (Sabatier quoted in Schlager, 1995:245) who “attempt to realize a set of shared policy beliefs 'by influencing the behavior of multiple governmental institutions over time' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a: p. 212)” (245).

Also, we established how not only cooperation, but also power, shape the relationships between actors in their tug-of-war over policy and institutional transformation processes. We reviewed how elites can assert control over an agenda by revoking an original *status quo* of choice-sets and replace it with the choice of either playing by the new rules or being penalized. Controlling these rules is important because they distribute and allocate resources among the actors, thus altering their positions of relative advantage in the decision-making process (see p. 121).

Following Parsons and other theorists of modern politics, Luhmann (1968, 1981) defines the special function of the political system for society as the *production of collectively binding decisions*, anytime and anywhere such decisions are needed by other societal subsystems. To fulfil its function the political system uses *power* as its generalized medium of communication. The binary code of having or not having power ('powerful'/'powerless') guides all political operations. Gaining power, increasing one's power, or at least preventing its decrease is what politics is about. (Lange & Schimank, 2004:64)

For Scott, there are three main research traditions on power: reputational, structural and decision-making. However, it is the structural tradition which “provides a basis for incorporating the insights of the rival approaches” (2004:84). This matches our own perspective offered in chapter three, as it offers social network analysis as a tool for studying data and focuses on the positions of power within a structure.

These relationships are important not only between the different coalitions in a policy subsystem—something that is well studied in our core level by the DMF—but also internally to how these coalitions are actually formed and how their members interact with one another. Although the relevance of coalitions' internal dynamics to their potential success in bringing about reform is acknowledged by DMF through the distinctions between strategic and emerging diasporas, as well as through the distinctions between homogeneous, heterogeneous and entrenched elites, the processes by which these coalitions move between categories is either overlooked or simplified to the discussion-transaction trust-building process (see p.154).

[N]etworks are seen to be constituted by and bound together by ideas. Thus they are epistemic communities of actors who debate common sets of ideas [...]. In another formulation, policy advocacy coalitions of actors within the same policy domain engage in policy oriented learning [...]. In a further refinement, [...] some analysts refer to discourse coalitions where language and debate characterize the relationships between the participants in public decision-making (Hajer 1993, 1997). But the multiplication of labels disguises a similar description that can be summarized as “decision-making = policy networks + ideas.” (John, 2004: 141-2)

Generally speaking, at this level, we aim to trace how key actors create, use and manage their social environment in either the construction of ad-hoc networks, or the strengthening of natural coalition networks through which their beliefs and preferences are socialized and disseminated to generate synergies and redundancies for achieving increased influence over the policies and institutional transformations debated at the core interaction level.

As Jenkins reminds us,

not all collectivities are organisations. [...] Nor are spontaneous collectivities (crowds, audiences, mobs, refugees in flight and so on). Nor are loosely knit networks of individuals pursuing the same or congruent goals but lacking organised divisions of labour or authority structures (Boissevain 1968; Mayer 1966; Wellman 1999). The word ‘organisation’ covers most collectivities, but not all. In terms of identities, organisations are constituted simultaneously in a distinction between members and non-members, on the one hand, and in an internal network of differentiation among members, on the other. An organisation without internal differentiation doesn’t make much sense: organisation is the harnessing and orchestration, under a symbolic umbrella, of difference. (2008:169-170)

If “[o]rganizations matter, but mainly insofar as they provide local networks that can be used for mass recruitment and support the development of an insurgent consciousness or ‘cognitive liberation’” (Minkoff, 2004:284), then the question is how can participants make an efficient use of them.

To that purpose we take Castell’s (2010, 2011) network theories of power (NTP), as well as some common theories of network analysis such as the trade-offs between redundancy and non-redundancy strategies (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008) explored in chapter three (see pages 126 and 127)—a combination for which we will use the NTP+ shorthand—and apply it to the diaspora and the homeland elite to characterize its internal dynamics.

Particularly speaking,—that is, articulating the NTP+ with DMF and our dissertation aim—at this level we will describe different mechanisms by which an emerging diaspora network may become a strategic network to increase its chances for success in pushing reforms. Or how the members of a heterogeneous elite who favor reform may gather enough clout within their structures to enable and articulate a proposed institutional transformation deemed desirable. Furthermore, NTP+ as an analytical tool allows us to study the different mechanisms at work on the side that opposes the reformist impulses, such as in the event of entrenched elites, or when attempting to block a reform that is deemed as undesirable.

In our theoretical review we briefly explained the four types of power and counterpower that Manuel Castells (2011) has identified as characteristic from network structures (see page 127). Now let us revisit that typology with a focus on our dissertation’s aim and the Matryoshka framework:

- **Networking Power:** refers to the power that actors and organizations derive from being interconnected with a wider global society, as opposed to those who are not. This power is exercised mostly by “gatekeeping” mechanisms.

- In the diaspora, this type of power is exercised between diasporans and their compatriots back home, as well as between diasporans who are members of a migrant network and those who are not. In the first case, networking power is inherent to diasporans as the cross-boundary and cross-cultural nature of their identities allows them a higher degree of proximity to knowledge and innovations hardly available to other actors back in their homeland. In that sense, networking power is a paramount asset in the diasporas' quest to push for institutional innovation, as the belief that these connections to knowledge and innovation are desirable becomes an incentive for certain homeland elites to initiate strategic connections with the diasporans.

In the second case, there are several advantages to being part of a migrant network as individual relational assets of different diasporans are pooled together into a collective asset as they organize (see pages 90, 91 and 128). While some of the synergies achieved by a network can have positive spillovers towards non-member diasporans, the lion's share is usually available only to those who are "in". This level of access comes at a price, expressed as a demand for certain obligations and reciprocity from the individual towards the group. When the individuals believe that the benefits of membership outweigh the social costs, the incentives to join the network increase and, as the resource pool does, so does the networking power it conveys.

- In the homeland, this type of power is exercised by homogeneous and entrenched elites in tight control of the transformation processes of institutions over those who are not members of the elite. The model is quite straightforward, only those who are members will have access. Thus, the elite's networking power drives diasporans to try to bridge or strengthen a relationship with the homeland elite as a way to persuade them of the mutual convenience of reform.

When the control of institutional transformation processes is fragmented, as with heterogeneous elites, the factions or sub-networks also exercise this type power over each other. Intentional control fragmentation, as a trait of pluralistic societies, may sometimes be attempted structurally as an element of institutional design, such as with checks-and-balances systems. Nonetheless, there is always the possibility that the combined relational assets provided by the elite networking power may be so highly sought after by the different factions, that the *de jure*

structural divisions may not actually work *de facto*, case in which these elites act as homogeneous.

Conversely, effective fragmentation benefits from organically occurring drivers alongside structural divisions—and sometimes in spite of the latter’s absence—which settle as informal norms rising from the actors’ long-term interplay. In either case, the actual level of heterogeneousness is contingent upon the compatibility of the actors’ different belief systems, as that will determine the degree of cooperation and coordination that can be achieved not only between elite sub-networks, but also between different sub-networks and the diaspora networks.

- **Network Power:** refers to the power resulting from imposing standards—or protocols of communication, or etiquette, or rules for permanence—to coordinate social interaction in the networks.

This type of power is exercised by both, diaspora networks and homeland elites, over their members in the form of codes of conduct, commitments to the group, levels of reciprocity expected, etc. Each network sets its own standards, deciding how strictly these are applied, and the penalties for noncompliance, and these specificities should be characterized for operationalization within the Matryoshka framework.

- **Networked Power:** refers to the power that some actors exercise over other actors within the same network. This power is usually exercised through agenda-setting and/or managerial and editorial decision-making power.

This type of power is exercised by both, diaspora networks and homeland elites, over their members by means of a defined hierarchical structure, social convention, seniority, reputation, knowledge, etc. Again, each network has its own specificities, and these should be characterized for operationalization within the Matryoshka framework.

- **Network-making Power:** refers to the power exercised by some actors who are able to program and reprogram their networks according to their interests and values, as well as to liaise with other actors from different networks to generate strategic alliances.
 - In the diaspora, this type of power is exercised by the diasporans who create, coordinate or curate the migrant networks, effectively expressing and transferring their belief systems—either consciously or unconsciously—through the everyday

operations and alliances. This particular category is relevant to the DMF mode as it clearly links to the overachiever diasporans, and they are the actors that homeland elites should target for generating development-oriented coalitions.

- In the homeland, this type of power is exercised by members of the elite who, on the one hand, hold the actual capacity of pushing through the policy and institutional transformations. On the other hand, this type of power is also exercised by members of the elite who act as liaisons with the diaspora networks. Both of these types of people also express and transfer their belief systems through their everyday activities into the policies and institutions they shape, and these are, therefore, the targets actors for diasporans to generate development-oriented coalitions.
- Counterpower: refers to the same typology of powers expressed above, but when considered within the Matryoshka framework, these are exercised by the actors fighting the changes to the programs of specific networks and to their effort to disrupt the pro-transformation coalitions.
 - In the diaspora, counterpower may be exercised by the diasporans whose belief systems are—either consciously or unconsciously—in direct opposition to or conflict with those within the homeland elites. Therefore, these actors will attempt to boycott any type of engagement from the migrant network. In our DMF belief system juxtaposition (see Figure 42 on page 159) they would be the disengaged diasporans.
 - In the homeland, counterpower is exercised by members of the elite whose belief systems are in opposition to or conflict with the changes and transformations proposed by the diasporans, and by any elite members who support the latter, if any. This behavior is typical of the entrenched elites who might fear their dominance eroded by reforms, as well as of the closed elite factions of our DMF belief system juxtaposition (see Figure 42 on page 159).

In both cases,

[t]he more pressure there is on communities to change as part of this process, the more vigorously boundaries will be symbolised. Difference will be constructed and emphasised and we-ness asserted in opposition to them. A symbolically contrived sense of local similarity may be the only available defence. In some cases the hardening of an apparently 'traditional' identity

may actually serve as a smokescreen, behind which substantial change can take place with less conflict and dislocation. (Jenkins, 2008:138)

In the Matryoshka framework, elites and diaspora networks are power and counterpower brokers. Just as with any other NTP analysis, two roles are particularly taken into account for the key actors, who can be either programmers—actors with the capacity of defining and redefining the goals, as well as of configuring and reconfiguring the network to better reflect their belief systems—and switchers—actors who control the connections to other strategic networks in order to form special coalitions—at both sides of the pro- and against-institutional transformation alliances.

In that sense, Castells (2010:778) reminds us that programming and switching, are the processes that can help enforce or resist domination of a specific belief system, configuring the structure of power through interaction. Additionally, while programmers and switchers can be individual actors, they can also be organizational actors or sub-networks in themselves.

Analyzing the role of our key actors as nodes, and the power relationship between them as the arches can help us assess the inter-coalition relations from the DMF, as much as the intra-coalition relations at this level. The latter analysis would provide strategic options and elements for understanding and improving the internal dynamics and management of the network, as part of the development of our Matryoshka's three possible applications (descriptive, prescriptive, and monitoring).

Nevertheless, types of nodes and types of arches are not enough to monitor a network's level of internal cohesion, as is our intention. For that purpose we include the use of another tool, expressed as the tradeoff between having multiple and strong concomitant bonds between the different nodes in a compact network, and those less compact, more permeable networks that aim for a wider reach. This is usually known as the network redundancy tradeoff, and while we have touched upon redundancy tradeoffs in the previous part of our dissertation when explaining different concerns for knowledge dissemination and trust generation, it might be useful to explain how they shape networks at this level in combination with NTP, and in the Matryoshka context.

At the heart of the redundancy tradeoff dilemma lies the finite nature of assets and resources: we cannot devote unlimited time and effort to cultivating every relationship that will help us generate a network that spreads endlessly in all directions with a tight level of cohesion. In fact, the “Dunbar constant proposes that there is a ceiling of around 150 to the number of people with whom we can maintain a meaningful relationship” (Collier, 2013:276n11). Therefore, actors must decide how they

optimize their resources to build a coalition network that suits their needs by following either redundancy or non-redundancy strategies.⁸⁵

A redundancy (or R-) strategy essentially concentrates in the creation and maintenance of concomitant ties with different nodes within the same cluster to ensure access to essential assets. If a link breaks or a node falls from the network, the essential asset can still be reached through different alternative paths. This strategy allows for longer-lasting, more focused and cohesive networks, albeit less diverse and extensive.

Conversely, a non-redundancy (or NR-) strategy essentially attempts to capture as many assets as possible by building and maintaining ties with nodes in as many different clusters. However, access to these assets might be more ephemeral if ties break or nodes fall from the network without having alternative paths to reach them. This strategy allows for further-reaching, more flexible, and more diverse networks, albeit weaker and less cohesive.

Figure 43 maps the different outcomes of fully committing to either strategy, given the case in which node Ego has enough resources to build and maintain four connections. After building ties to node Alter 1, optimizing for redundancy (dashed lines) would ensure access to the resources in Cluster 1 sacrificing every other cluster; optimizing for non-redundancy (dotted lines) would allow Ego to become a hub between all four clusters at the expense of having certainty of access to any one given cluster.

While these optimized examples are useful to see the different outcomes of each strategy, in reality, actors do not fully commit to one strategy but adopt a mixed approach, according to their different needs. Continuing with the example in Figure 43, let's assume that access to the resources of Cluster 1 is a priority, but access to at least one other cluster may also be required for Ego's needs. In that case, Ego can build ties to Alter 1 and to another node in Cluster 1 for ensuring access (redundancy), and devote the resources left to generate ties to a node in whichever other two clusters Ego perceives as more desirable (non-redundancy).

⁸⁵ An echo of Granovetter's "the strength of weak ties", as quoted by Erickson (2004:322).




Figure 43: Redundancy vs Non-Redundancy strategies (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:904)

To better understand the consequences of deciding which strategy to use, Reagans and Zuckerman (2008) have identified a family of four different tradeoffs based upon network redundancy, and to which we add three more that are relevant to our overall aim and our Matryoshka framework:

1. Exploitation vs. Exploration: as explained earlier (see page 46), exploration “involves wide search for new alternatives to existing activities, while exploitation is characterized by refinement of existing activities. [...]if exploitation involves repeated exposure to the same or highly similar bits of knowledge, this is clearly best achieved through interaction with redundant alters. By contrast, the widest access to new alternatives is obtained from an NR-strategy.” (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:936)

This first tradeoff is relevant to our overall aim as diaspora engagement represents the untapped way to expand the absorptive capacities of the homelands (see pages 47 and 68) we propose through this dissertation. Diaspora networks willing to contribute with the brain circulation dynamics should aim to balance their network-building strategies accordingly, both in their host- and homelands.

2. Localism vs Cosmopolitanism: while “*cosmopolitanism* [...] reflects the recognition that experience in many and diverse social worlds confers upon an actor a facility with interacting and exchanging productively in new social worlds [as in an NR-strategy, ...] *localism* [...] involves a familiarity and facility with a particular ‘terrain’ [as through an R-strategy].” (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:936)

This second tradeoff is relevant to our overall aim, since it might help to frame the attitude of openness or reticence that homeland elites may show towards the contribution of diasporans abroad. Both extremes are undesirable: on the one hand, elites who believe that any imported idea is always consistently better than those locally sourced regardless of whether the conditions for adoption are adequate or not; on the other hand, elites who deny their homelands access to any foreign ideas and attempt to “invent the wheel” locally every time. However, homeland elites (or at least factions) leaning towards cosmopolitanism might be more willing to articulate and engage in brain circulation dynamics, as opposed to those who lean towards localism.

3. Insider vs Stranger: we came across these social classifications in part one (see page 126); as opposed to insiders, strangers are “actors who interact regularly with a group or community but are classified both by group members and themselves as outsiders. [...] While there are certain classes of knowledge that may flow more easily between actors with highly redundant alters, there are a parallel set of mechanisms that favor actors whose contacts are nonredundant. [In this case,] while the stranger may be well-positioned to accumulate a large amount of compromising information on the insiders, she is limited in the extent to which she can exploit it without being sanctioned by everyone in the role structure for violating her role.” (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:937)

This third tradeoff is relevant to both coalitions of our dissertation, particularly to those actors who may be in bridging (or switching) positions. An elite member acting as bridge might be seen with reticence as a stranger by some in the diaspora network, as much as a diaspora member trying to articulate reforms at the periphery of the elite would. An appropriate balance should be struck if actors are willing to remain stable in their paramount and delicate position.

4. Complex (or Robust) vs Simple identities: as mentioned earlier (see page 127), “[c]omplex identities are potentially advantageous because ‘actors who could potentially be associated with multiple roles or groups retain flexibility in responding to interactants whose more narrowly defined identities induce commitments to restricted lines of action’. [...] However,

in] optimizing for nonredundancy [...], the would be robust actor ‘risks sowing confusion among potential audiences, thereby producing social penalties in the form of lack of attention or outright rejection [...].’ In general, actors whose loyalties, skills, or interests are understood (as compatible with one’s own) are preferred [..., a]nd in social network terms, such a simple identity entails an R-strategy.” (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:938-9)

This fourth tradeoff is again relevant to both coalitions of our dissertation very similarly to the previous one. Bergesen suggests that “[h]umans are not creative and flexible because of multiple cultural identities, but have multiple cultural identities because they are flexible.”(2005:35) So, it is not so much the structural position of the key actor in the diaspora or the elite network as an insider or a stranger, but more about the actual actor’s identity and his strategic behavior of interaction with different clusters what can generate or erode trust. In order to strike the right balance, Luhmann suggests that

society at large consists of numerous social systems on different levels (interactions, organizations, societal subsystems) so that actors know all the time in which particular system or systems they are situated. This in turn provides them with situational meaning. In particular they know what they are up to at any given moment. (Lange & Schimank, 2004:61)

5. Specialism vs Generalism: we came across this tradeoff earlier (see page 51), and although it is not explicitly classified as part of the family Reagans and Zuckerman identify, they do mention that, “[w]hile specialists may enjoy advantages when demand for their product is high, generalism serves as a hedge against shifts in demand across specialties over time. [...]Even if returns from enlarging knowledge and creating value through an NR-strategy seem less certain than the returns from focusing on value-capture through an R-strategy, there is a sense in which no actor can afford to focus solely on capturing value from others.” (2008:939-40)

This fifth tradeoff is again relevant to the nature of the diaspora networks and the connections these are able to engage in the homeland for achieving brain circulation dynamics, and even as alternatives abroad to break the phenomenon that would otherwise conform a knowledge trap (see page 51) in the homeland.

6. Bonding vs Bridging social capital: we have also touched upon this previously, and while Reagans and Zuckerman do not mention the notion of social capital explicitly, their bibliographic references include the works of social capital authors such as Coleman, Burt and Moore, among others. Framed as a redundancy tradeoff, the relation is quite direct as

the cohesive forces of bonding social capital benefit from an R-strategy, while the outreaching forces of bridging social capital benefit from an NR-strategy (see page 58).




Figure 44: Redundancy in networks along the Bonding/Bridging continuum (adapted from Ramírez-Sánchez & Pinkerton, 2009:6)

This sixth tradeoff is, again, quite straightforward, as it refers to how the actors in both networks—diasporas and elites—can adjust their strategies to achieve the right balance between the bonding and bridging social capital (Figure 44) from which they will later derive the different powers in the network to achieve their objectives. If the bonding social capital is too dense, reformist efforts will have fewer chances since “[t]ight and sophisticated linkages eventually repel innovation because of its disruptive capacity [...as] the result of the situational logic of *protection*.” (Archer, 2005:27)

7. Programming vs Switching: while these processes recently discussed (see page 170) are not in direct opposition, they do benefit from actors adopting opposite strategies. That is, in order to be able to switch between clusters, actors require to have a certain number of non-redundant connections. Conversely, actors willing to occupy a programming position in the network would benefit from having a deeper knowledge of their cluster and would therefore be encouraged to adopt an R-strategy.

Again, the key word in this seventh tradeoff is that of balance. Key actors from the two relevant networks of our dissertation must learn to curate their coalitions in order to capture the structural positions that will help them access resources and assets as well as to maximize their power in the network to forward their belief systems.

Keeping in mind the network redundancy tradeoffs and integrating its analysis to the NTP helps operationalize the notion of cohesion at this level, thereby completing the NTP+ model of our Matryoshka framework.

An important consideration to keep in mind during our empirical application of NTP+ analysis includes the scope of the network we are capable of mapping. For that, it is convenient to remember Bonnie Erickson's advice:

Studying whole networks gives us important information about the position of social actors within a social structure. [... However, a]lthough whole network studies are wonderful they are not always feasible. A popular and powerful alternative is the study of actor-centered networks consisting of a focal actor and those tied to that actor. This approach combines neatly with sociology's most popular research tool, the survey: sample and interview people as usual, but include questions about each person's contacts. Not only is this strategy often the only practical one, but it is also one that lets us ask some profound questions. People's networks are their immediate social environment, the part of society they live in. What are such networks like, how do they get to be that way, and what difference do they make to people's lives?

To conclude this section, by applying NTP+ at the network level of our Matryoshka, we can map and understand the power relationships inside each coalition of interest, as well as the strategies followed by key actors. As intended, this allows a descriptive usage of our framework from a pure research perspective. Moreover, it can also be used to attempt interventions through a prescriptive usage, by advising networks how they can enhance their internal cohesion and expand their coalitions in order to improve their chances of achieving their goals. Finally, by continuously monitoring the dynamic environments of these networks, this type of analysis can provide a feedback usage to help everyday practitioners adjust their strategies.

Articulating NTP+ to the Matryoshka Framework

According to our Matryoshka framework, this level is nested into the DMF interaction level. Just as taking any material under a sufficiently potent microscope would reveal its molecular structure, if we were to take the DMF diagram in Figure 45 and zoom into the parts shaded in red, we would be able to observe each network's structure as those diagrams in Figure 43 or Figure 44. These graphical representations derived from the NTP+ analysis allow for a better analysis and understanding of the internal life of each group or coalition.

In the previous section we already advanced some notions of how NTP+ fits our Matryoshka towards the more macro levels, feeding from and complementing DMF and ACF. Moreover, several NTP+ concepts are already directly represented in DMF, although not explicitly named.

For example, on the one hand, when assessing the potential value of the contributions of diaspora networks to the homeland institutions, we are acknowledging Burt's structural holes where

diasporans' role is that of knowledge brokers between the advanced institutional environments where they reside and their homelands' institutional environments which is one of the key sources of power in the network as understood by Castells.

		Characteristics of diasporas	
		1. Strategic Large and connected to the home country	2. Emerging Focused on the professional development of its members
Characteristic of domestic elites	a. Strategic	Possibility of inside-out reform [1-a] (South Korea, China, Israel, Ireland, Scotland, Taiwan)	Articulation of promise of areas to make an impact [2-a] (Japan, Malaysia, Thailand)
	b. Heterogeneous Existence of pragmatic segments	Outside-in transformations [1-b] (Mexico, India, Morocco, El Salvador, Armenia now)	Tantalizing promise diversity of success stories [2-b] (Chile, Philippines, Argentina, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Egypt)
	c. Rent-abundant societies Dominated by entrenched interests	Social and economic shock absorber [1 & 2-c] (Armenia in the 90s, Nigeria, some other Sub-Saharan and Central-Asian countries)	

Figure 45: NTP+ nested in DMF's diagram (adapted from Kuznetsov, 2009:31)

Similarly, on the other hand, the issue of trust heavily explored in our theoretical review and that appears at the core of the DMF model—not only at the articulation of reform between the diaspora network and the homeland elite, but also at the level where individual diasporans come together as a coalition—is operationalized through the use of network redundancy strategies by the key actors.

Another crucial contribution of our analysis at this level, is that it allows us to better understand the power that key actors can exercise in the network to build the coalitions to push institutional transformations. Yet, understanding these types of power that can be exercised within the network is important, but as Dahl reminds us, not every potential holder of power goes on to actively exercise that power. In fact, Dahl

concluded that a great many people were involved in initiating or vetoing proposals, and that they tended to be actively involved only in those areas where they had particular professional or occupational interests. Only the democratically-elected politicians were centrally involved in more than one proposal (Dahl 1961: 181-3). The positional resources of the economic and social notables gave them only the potential for power, but very few of them either tried or succeeded in converting their potential into actual influence in decision-making processes. He further

argued that political decisions were shaped by the lobbying and pressuring activities of a variety of groups. (Scott, 2004:87)

In other words, key actors are only key in as much as they decide to exercise their power. If we follow John's (2004) formula "decision-making = policy networks + ideas" (see page 165), once we have charted the policy network, we need to understand the ideas (or belief systems in our ACF jargon) that could trigger this decision to exercise power and set the policy subsystem in motion.

In that sense, the NTP+ level sets the stage for the level of individual actors to carry their narratives and identities in search for support, as we will analyze in our next section. In this regard, Castells (2011) theories understand that, throughout history, social power "operates primarily by the construction of meaning in the human mind through processes of communication" (779).

The smooth functioning of society's institutions does not result from [elites'] policing ability to force citizens into compliance. How people think about the institutions under which they live, and how they relate to the culture of their economy and society defines whose power can be exercised and how it can be exercised. [...] The process of constructing meaning operates in a cultural context that is simultaneously global and local, and is characterized by a great deal of diversity. There is, however, one feature common to all processes of symbolic construction: They are largely dependent on the messages and frames created, formatted, and diffused in multimedia communication networks. (779-80)

A cohesive coalition network shares meaning. From the field of the symbolic construction of community, Cohen arrives to the same conclusion when he asserts that

to understand the phenomenon of community we have to regard its constituent social relations as repositories of meaning for its members, not as a set of mechanical linkages. [...] Community exists in the minds of its members, and should not be confused with geographic or sociographic assertions of 'fact'. By extension, the distinctiveness of communities and, thus, the reality of their boundaries, similarly lies in the mind, in the meanings which people attach to them, not in their structural forms. As we have seen, this reality of community is expressed and embellished symbolically. (Cohen 2001:98)

In the end, the individual-collective boundary at the identification level is navigated through the political processes of negotiation, transaction, mobilization, imposition and resistance. (Jenkins, 2008:157)

Not only are these notions an excellent fit for the archetype of individual we adopted to build our framework, but they also set the tone to move on to our micro-most level of the actor.

NTP+ Key Variables for Operationalization

At the intra-coalition network level, NTP+ application requires a definition of the following variables:

- Sketch a network map for the pro-reform coalition, departing from its key actors identified in DMF
 - Identify clusters (engaged diasporans and open elite factions), and characterize them according to their relation and strength
 - Allies
 - Adversaries
 - Take stock of the coalition's and clusters' assets
- Sketch a network map for the against-reform coalition, departing from its key actors identified in DMF
 - Identify clusters (disengaged diasporans and closed elite factions), and characterize them according to their relation and strength
 - Allies
 - Adversaries
 - Take stock of the coalition's and clusters' assets
- Characterize each relevant actor's assets attractiveness and their strategic position in network following NTP typology
 - Network power
 - Networking power
 - Networked power
 - Network-making power
- Characterize each key actor's strategy in terms of their network redundancy tradeoffs
 - Exploration/Exploitation
 - Localism/Cosmopolitanism
 - Insider/Stranger
 - Complex/Simple identity
 - Generalism/Specialism
 - Bonding/Bridging
 - Programming/Switching

- Emphasize each key actor’s situation in the network
 - User
 - Programmer
 - Switcher

The Key Actor Level and Jones & McBeth’s Narrative Policy Framework

At the micro-most level, we required an analytic tool to identify which are the key individual actors whose narratives (biographies, identity, and embedded knowledge) can help to build the coalitions that will shape policies and institutions. However, from an analytical perspective, and following the logic of the previous Matryoshka levels, we had to start by making a distinction between two deeply intertwined elements: the key actor and the key ideas or belief systems.

To use Archer’s example of “singing”,

the song and the singer have separate properties, some of which are irrelevant to the practice, such as the circumstances of the song’s composition or the marital circumstances of the singer, and some of whose interplay is vital to the practice – the song’s difficulty and the singer’s virtuosity. (2005:20-1)

This type of analysis is enough for our Matryoshka purposes, as our interest lies in the singing, that is, on how the singer sings the song. Therefore, we will focus on describing the constitutive elements of our analysis at this level—the relevant policy ideas and the relevant identity traits of the individual—rather than on the causality and feedback these elements have over one another. After all, as Archer reminds us, “human agents shape culture, but are themselves culturally molded” (2005:23).

From the onset we stated that our individual archetype was that of a person who makes decisions based on beliefs, and is incapable of being entirely rational or of acting out of pure self-interest. To better understand this individual’s life narrative and identity (or even influence, if required, depending on whether the usage is descriptive, prescriptive or monitoring) we have selected Jones and McBeth’s (2010) narrative policy framework. NPF is the only model of our toolkit selection that has not been developed independently, but which is already incorporated under the hood of the ACF.

Whether it is to understand or to influence,

[t]he power of narratives in shaping beliefs and actions is supported in a variety of academic literatures including communications (e.g., McComas & Shanahan, 1999), marketing (e.g., Mattila, 2000), neuroscience (e.g., Ash et al., 2007), and psychology (e.g., Gerrig & Egidio, 2003). These disciplines study narratives as an empirical concept, using traditional methodologies to build explanatory theories of narratives. Yet despite the apparent power of stories in public policy (design, formation, and implementation), policy studies has largely remained on the sidelines of the empirical study of narratives, choosing instead to leave this important topic to other disciplines. (2010:330)

According to Jones and McBeth (2010), this lack of interest from the main proponents of public policy theories in narrative research is derived from the later's common reliance on poststructuralist and postpositivist traditions of research, where clear concepts, testable hypotheses and falsification tend to be rejected on grounds that normative values are considered to be highly subjective, ensuing hidden ideologies, and tending exclude marginalized groups.

While that certainly is the case with an important volume of literature which "adhere[s] to a postpositivist ontology and epistemology, inductive, resistant to hypotheses testing, and qualitative in design" (2010:333), there is a second growing body of literature that "is theoretically deductive, operationalizes narrative structure, tests hypotheses, is cognizant of reliability and falsification, and embraces quantitative methods" (2010:333) to the extent that it attempts to integrate narrative research into the policy change literature.

Some examples that have been successfully integrated under the ACF include the use of content analysis and hypothesis validation to demonstrate how narrative analysis can be used to discover preferences and interests competing with each other.

Specifically about the NPF, the tool is grounded in structuralist narratology, which conceptualizes other narratives based upon in generalizable content (such as belief systems that act as cognitive filters derived from ideologies, political partisanship and cultural theory), as well as in certain minimum qualities:

[...] (i) a setting or context [...]; (ii) a plot that introduces a temporal element (beginning, middle, end) [...], providing both the relationships between the setting and characters, and structuring causal mechanisms [...]; (iii) characters who are fixers of the problem (heroes), causers of the problem (villains), or victims (those harmed by the problem) [...]; and (iv) the moral of the story, where a policy solution is normally offered [...]. (2010:340)

Regarding the levels of analysis for this tool, Jones and McBeth identify two. On the one hand, a meso level, as narratives are susceptible to become institutionalized and affect individual actors,

either personally, or in the composition of the different coalitions from their influence in public opinion. “Just as viewing narratives as reflective of belief systems, viewing narratives as strategic mediates criticisms that narratives are relative and thus not amenable to scientific investigation. Viewing narratives as strategic helps ground them in traditional policy theory as narratives are told by political actors (particularly interest groups and elites) in efforts to expand their power and ultimately win in the policy process.” (2010:345)

At this meso level, we already use DMF and ACF as tools for analysis, both of which are entirely compatible with NPF.

On the other hand, at the micro level of analysis, NPF allows us to analyze the ways in which narratives are persuasive enough at an individual level to aggregate public opinion. For our Matryoshka framework purposes, at the micro level analysis we are be interested in observing two types of narratives.

First, we are interested in the narratives of those key ideas or belief systems that are aggregated towards the meso level and that provide the backbone of the coalitions in favor and against institutional transformation.

These narratives become the basic building blocks for shared meaning, that is, for the construction of a coalition network which could be construed as a mobilized community or social movement. After all, Cohen (2001) reminds us that a “‘community’ provides not so much a model, but more an expedient medium for the expression of very diverse interests and aspirations”(108), and that “the sense of social self at the levels of both individuality and collectivity are informed by implicit or explicit contrast”(115), that is, similarity and difference.

Whilst ‘community’ might not have the structure or direction which we associate with social movements, it may nevertheless serve a similar need. It is a largely mental construct, whose ‘objective’ manifestations in locality or ethnicity give it credibility. It is highly symbolized, with the consequence that its members can invest it with their selves. Its character is sufficiently malleable that it can accommodate all of its members’ selves without them feeling their individuality to be overly compromised. Indeed, the gloss of commonality which it paints over its diverse components gives to each of them an additional referent for their identities. (109)

In other words, understanding these belief systems and constructing a structured coherent narrative for their socialization is the fuel that we need to mobilize a coalition, that is, to set in motion the decision-making of exercising power in the policy network in the NTP+ level and in the

DMF interaction core level. This narrative of the belief system is the equivalent of the song from Archer's singing example.

Second, we are interested in the narratives of key actors' identities, and how these could impact the efficacy of the key belief systems as these are pushed towards the public opinion.

If we assert that the key actor's identity matters, and we aim to construct this identity narrative, we must first clarify our understanding of the concept. For this purpose we will draw heavily on Jenkins (2008), for whom

identity is the human capacity – rooted in language – to know 'who's who' (and hence 'what's what'). This involves knowing who we are, knowing who others are, them knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on: a multi-dimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places in it, as individuals and as members of collectivities (cf. Ashton *et al.* 2004). It is a process – *identification* – not a 'thing'. It is not something that one can *have*, or not; it is something that one *does*

[...] In addition, because identification makes no sense outside relationships, whether between individuals or groups, there are hierarchies or scales of preference, of ambivalence, of hostility, of competition, of partnership and co-operation, and so on. (5-6)

Continuing with Jenkins, on the one hand, identity is social by definition as the acquisition of meaning always depends on the interaction through agreement, disagreement, convention, innovation, communication, negotiation, etc. On the other hand, identity is always plural, multi-dimensional, and since it is an on-going process, in permanent evolution.

Linking these notions of identity with the need to construct a narrative with the minimum qualities discussed earlier (see page 181), we can find useful elements across three distinct orders:

- Individual: a person's identity "formation has its roots in our earliest processes of socialisation. [...] identities which are established this early in life – selfhood, humanness, gender and, under some circumstances, kinship and ethnicity – are *primary identities*, more robust and resilient to change in later life than other identities." (41)
- Interaction: "It is not enough simply to assert an identity; that assertion must also be validated, or not, by those with whom we have dealings. *Identity is never unilateral*" (42). Labels applied to us by others may be internalized or rejected depending on the authority and capacity of those others to make them stick. "[G]roup identification is characteristically

constructed [...] in transactions at and across the [group's] boundary. During these transactions a balance is struck between (internal) group identification and (external) categorization by others.” (44)

- Institutional: “*Institutions* are among the more important contexts within which identification becomes consequential [..., as these] are established patterns of practice, recognised as such by actors, which have force as ‘the way things are done’. [...Moreover, some] are also constituted as networks of differentiated membership positions which bestow specific individual identities upon their incumbents.” (45)

“Without repertoires of identification we would not be able to relate to each other meaningfully or consistently” (Jenkins, 2008:27). Since the construction of a structured coherent narrative identity around the different key actors is paramount in the socializing of their ideas—that is, in helping them persuade others of the need to create a coalition network—this narrative of the key actor’s identity is the equivalent of the singer in Archer’s singing example.

The construction of these narratives remind us of Luhmann’s concept of “*Autopoiesis* [which] literally means self-production. An autopoietic system produces its elements from its elements and, in this way, maintains its structural identity over time even though all of its elements change.” (Lange & Shimank, 2004:62)

To become operative, NPF suggests that belief systems should be framed in the context of specific categories that allow for quantifications or generalizations and to limit the variability. To that respect, the authors endorse to frame belief systems through political ideology and partisanship on the one hand, and cultural theory on the other.

However, in integrating NPF’s model to our Matryoshka, since the setting of diaspora induced institutional transformation is quite stable, there is no need to control for extreme variability in either type of narrative—the one of the “song” and the one of the “singer”—and would just require an adaptation of these frames to our juxtaposition of belief systems identified in Figure 42 (see page 159), and to the categories of overachieving diasporans and selected elite members on the side of the key actors, but would follow the same NPF minimum structure:

- i) Setting or context: narratives should be connected to the institutional or policy settings. A brief description of the basic assumptions behind each key ideas pro- and against reform, or the basic assumptions behind the relevance of each key actor’s identity would suffice.

On the side of the belief systems, the context that triggers the pro-coalition desire to effect an institutional or policy transformation back in the homeland, and the context that triggers the resistance of the coalition against the change. On the side of the key actors, the context elements that make the key diasporans and elite members acquire special relevance in their respective coalition networks.

- ii) Plot: narratives should have a clear temporal element—beginning, middle, and ending—, should provide the relationships between the setting and characters, and should suggest structuring causal mechanisms that determines their plausibility. Some pattern plotlines suggested by Stone and endorsed by Jones and McBeth as a good starting point to operationalize this level include “the story of decline, stymied progress stories, or change is only an illusion. Stone (2002, p. 191) also argues that narratives have causal stories that can be considered part of a plot. Such causation stories include intentionality, inadvertence, accidental, and mechanical” (2010:340). In integrating NPF and NTP+, it might be convenient to include the different network redundancy tradeoffs (see page 172) as part of the structuring causal mechanisms within the plots.

On the side of the belief systems, a pro-reform plot could tell the story of where and how the current institutional or policy *status quo* has room for improvement, why and how the key idea would be useful in carrying out that said improvement, and the risks of not doing so. From the pro *status quo* camp, the plot would reflect the advantages of maintaining the institution or policy the way it is, as well as the dangers of the proposed reform.

On the side of the key actors, an identity plot would essentially acquire the form of a biography that explains how the three orders that conform the identity of our key diasporan or our key homeland elite member—individual, interaction and institutional—converge, as well as the network strategy used in imbuing each of them with the legitimacy or power to influence their respective coalitions.

- iii) Characters: the actors in a policy narrative usually adopt certain basic roles that help us understand their position with respect to the issue discussed. Those who are fixers of the problem are typecasted as heroes and allies, as opposed to the causers of the problem who become typecasted as the villains and enemies, and those harmed by the problem who are typecasted as the victims. In integrating NPF to NTP+, we should aim to include the roles of programmers and switchers to the narrative.

On the side of the belief systems, each coalition will have its own heroes, villains and victims, which might even be mirrored images relative to one another; nonetheless, to better understand them, it is important to let each coalition present itself in its own best light. On the side of the key actors, our selected overachiever diasporans and elite members would usually be typecasted as the heroes or valued allies of their own coalition.

- iv) Moral of the story: every narrative should include a prompt to action where a policy solution is traditionally offered. This is quite straightforward on the side of the belief systems narratives. However, on the side of the identity narrative of key actors, the moral of the story should be the conclusion of why our overachiever diasporan or our selected elite member should be the key person to influence their coalition.

Once we have built our narratives with these minimum structural elements, Jones and McBeth (2010:343-44) suggest the use of four types of analysis at the micro-level to evaluate their degree of persuasion and influence towards the public opinion, introducing a prototype hypothesis for each:

- 1) Canonicity and breach: the first implies that in the absence of mayor changes in the narratives, our expectations will be constantly fulfilled and there will not be any need to alter our behavior or set of beliefs. The second implies the opposite: the break with expectations, and narrative theory suggests that persuasiveness is largely in function to the extent of the breach.

The associated hypothesis is: *“As a narrative’s level of breach increases, the more likely an individual exposed to that narrative is to be persuaded.”* (2010:343)

- 2) Narrative transportation: which is a concept describing the level of immersion and identification between the reader and the narrative. Usually measured on an eleven point scale, the higher the transportation, the more persuasive.

The associated hypothesis is: *“As narrative transportation increases, the more likely an individual exposed to that narrative is to be persuaded.”* (2010:344)

- 3) Congruence and incongruence: since narratives are processed by the brain in the same way as everyday experiences, a story that is congruent with the individual’s beliefs system (in terms of content, symbolism, plot, language, sequences, etc.) will be more persuasive than an incongruent one This is due to the fact that congruent elements act a cognitive

shortcuts, while incongruent elements challenge our understanding of the world, and are thus instinctively rejected.

The associated hypothesis is: *“As perception of congruence increases, the more likely an individual is to be persuaded by the narrative.”* (2010:344)

- 4) The narrator’s credibility: besides the inherent importance of the message, the quality of the messenger is equally important: the messenger’s trustworthiness, accuracy, perceived objectivity, and expert status are crucial elements for the acceptance of the message. In other words, the credibility of the messenger is paramount to the persuasiveness of the message.

The associated hypothesis is: *“As narrator trust increases, the more likely an individual is to be persuaded by the narrative.”* (2010:344)

The use of narratives to improve the handling of complexity as “readily digestible theories-in-miniature” (Collier, 2013:30) was proposed as early as Keynes. However, one should be careful that in simplifying complexity, the narratives did not stray away much from reality. In that sense, narratives could “support, complement, or undermine institutions” (30). “Of course, truth matters, not just influence [...]. A truer narrative would be a more valuable one—provided it is not so much harder to grasp than the next-truest.” (Phelps, 2013:80)

In terms of content, Phelps suggests that a truer narrative would be better off by drawing upon core ideas in the stories already told, but it is Jenkins who reminds us that our language in crafting the narrative matters just as much as the elements it contains, since language is what makes a community:

Along with the idioms of kinship, friendship, ethnicity and faith, ‘community’ is one way of talking about the everyday reality that the human world is, collectively, more than the sum of its individual parts (Jenkins 2002a: 63–84). As such, ‘community’, and its analogues in languages other than English, is among the most important sources of collective identification. Whatever we do with it, it isn’t to be ignored. (2008:133)

To conclude this section, by applying NPF at the micro level of our Matryoshka, we can structure the narratives of ideas and actors, and understand their level of persuasiveness. As expected, this allows a descriptive usage of our framework from a pure research perspective. Moreover, it can also be used to attempt interventions through a prescriptive usage, in suggesting new frames for key ideas or in engaging key actors through their identities. Finally, by a continuous monitoring of the

narratives in a dynamic environment, this type of analysis can provide a feedback usage to adjust the strategies of everyday practitioners.

Articulating NPF to the Matryoshka Framework

This level is nested at each of the key nodes of the two coalition networks for our Matryoshka. Using the microscope metaphor (see page 176) and assuming the nodes shaded in red in Figure 46 were the key actors of each network, if we were to zoom into this nodes, regardless of the coalition to which they belong, we would be able to discover the narratives that best describe the belief systems and the identities of the key individuals for our Matryoshka analysis.

To that purpose, NPF fits well with the two levels discussed so far. Integrating upwards to the network level, structuring the narratives of the key belief systems behind our relevant coalitions and the identities of their key actors is useful to track the strategies that these can follow and the roles they can play in exercising the different types of power under NTP+ as the lodestones that strengthen the cohesion of their respective networks.




Figure 46: NPF nested in NTP+ diagrams (adapted from Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008:904 and from Ramírez-Sánchez & Pinkerton, 2009:6)

At the interaction core level, DMF contributes with narrative of an “overachiever” as formulated by Kuznetsov, or as a “new Argonaut” in Saxenian and Sabel’s terminology and described earlier (see page 154). Also, DMF suggests that the key member of the domestic elite tends to have certain profile of openness to the reformist ideas and pragmatism to engage with or be engaged by the diaspora, but the characterization does not go much further.




Figure 47: NPF meso-level perspective embedded in ACF (Shanahan, Jones & McBeth, 2011:543)

Nevertheless, DMF at the interaction core has an important focus on how contributions of knowledge and individual actors’ interactions affect the overall success or failure of the institutional reform process. Therefore, the use of NPF for the detection of these key persons both on the side of

the talented diaspora and on the side of the elites in control of the homeland institutions is paramount to fulfil that DMF void, as is the detection of the key ideas or belief systems supporting each side.

Integrating one level up, the original proponents of NPF have developed the tool under the framework provided by Sabatier's ACF. Therefore, implementing either a micro level analysis as we have suggested—impacting on individual opinion, hence aggregating to public opinion—or a meso level analysis—influencing coalition composition, as well as aiding interest groups and elites to maintain or expand their power—NPF is able to suggest empirically testable hypotheses that can be useful to understand political maneuvering, different ideologies and the problem definition within the ACF's policy subsystems (Shanahan, Jones & McBeth, 2011), as can be seen graphically represented on Figure 47.

Finally, reaching the macro-most level of the case-study, structuring the narratives of the foundational elements of our framework in a systematic way, on the one hand, facilitates the collection of relevant environment information, while on the other hand, reinforces the robustness of the framework by supporting the standards that CORPC suggests for increased comparability among different case studies.

NPF Key Variables for Operationalization

At the key actor level, NPF application requires a definition of the following variables:

- For the diaspora + pro-reform juxtaposition
 - Structure a narrative for the key belief systems of the engaged diasporans
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze the engaged diasporan belief system narrative persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
 - Define key engaged diasporans identity elements
 - Individual (Primary)
 - Interaction (Labels)

- Institutional
 - Structure each key engaged diasporan's identity narrative
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze engaged diasporans' identity narratives persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
- For the diaspora + against-reform juxtaposition
 - Structure a narrative for the key belief systems of the disengaged diasporans
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze the disengaged diasporan belief system narrative persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
 - Define key disengaged diasporans identity elements
 - Individual (Primary)
 - Interaction (Labels)
 - Institutional
 - Structure each key disengaged diasporan's identity narrative
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze disengaged diasporans' identity narratives persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility

- For the homeland elite + pro-reform juxtaposition
 - Structure a narrative for the key belief systems of the open elite faction
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze the open elite faction belief system narrative persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
 - Define key open elite member identity elements
 - Individual (Primary)
 - Interaction (Labels)
 - Institutional
 - Structure each key open elite member's identity narrative
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze open elite members' identity narratives persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility

- For the homeland elite + against-reform juxtaposition
 - Structure a narrative for the key belief systems of the closed elite faction
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze the closed elite faction belief system narrative persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence

- Narrator's credibility
- Define key closed elite member identity elements
 - Individual (Primary)
 - Interaction (Labels)
 - Institutional
- Structure each key closed elite member's identity narrative
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
- Analyze closed elite members' identity narratives persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility

Chapter 6: Zooming out to the Realm of the Environment

No man is an island, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine.

Meditation 17, John Donne (1642)

While Kuzentsov's diaspora mobilization framework is useful to model the relationships of talented diasporans and homeland elites, this interaction is never as simple as a one-on-one liaison. Elements such as power asymmetry, institutional constrains, issue coalitions, or even momentum and timing of narratives offered to the public opinion, are issues to be considered in the power play for institutional reform.

These environmental concerns are addressed in this chapter. First, we will focus on characterizing the policy subsystem for the specific institutional reform case-study through the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). Second, we will characterize our macro-most environment of study through the use of the case-oriented research on policy change methodology (CORPC). Finally, we will assess the contributions of these two methodologies to our overall matryoshka toolkit.

The Policy Subsystem Level and Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework

The policy domain [—or in our ACF jargon, the policy subsystem—] is the largest unit of analysis in organizational state theory. It is defined as a social system within which collectively binding decisions are made, implemented, and evaluated with regard to a specific type of public policy. A domain is comprised of all the important actors holding common interests in those policies, regardless of whether they agree on preferred outcomes to policy events. Indeed, every policy domain is split among two or more opposing blocks of political organizations attempting to persuade policy-making authorities to approve different options. The alternative that eventually prevails results from more or less intense political struggles to assemble sufficient support to pass a bill or enact a regulation. Policy domains develop fairly stable power structures dominated by the most powerful peak interest groups and governmental actors. Gaining access to a domain's central positions requires an organization to acquire and deploy information (both technical expertise and political knowledge) and resources (both material and symbolic). (Knoke, 2004:333)

Whether they act as individual influencers or as organized groups, whether they have the concentration of power to be considered elites or not, actors' strategic use of information seems to be one of the main currencies of power and the explanation for their shifts of behavior. Therefore, the strategic use of information remains one of the key issues associated to policy change as explored in the main theories we have reviewed in part one (see page 125).

For example, Hofferbert suggests that the strategic input of an individual's knowledge into policy change happens at the policy adoption stage and that it is highly dependent of elite behavior⁸⁶ (Schlager, 2007). For Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework, these shifts are captured by her modeling of the individual with three main characteristics:

These relate to (1) the capability of boundedly rational individuals to learn fuller and more reliable information in repeated situations when reliable feedback is present, (2) the use of heuristics in making daily decisions, and (3) the preferences that individuals have related to benefits for self as well as norms and preferences related to benefits for others (see Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010: chap. 9; E. Ostrom 1998). (Ostrom 2009:430)

This boundedly-rational individual would also seem to be the heart of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), albeit "rooted more deeply in psychology, rather than macroeconomics" (Weible, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 2011:349). This distinction makes IAD to be considered within NIE tradition and ACF within the OIE tradition (Hayden, 2011), and opens the possibility to introduce psychological elements such as fear and concern—like in the 'devil shift'—or other "cognitive aspects, values, beliefs, learning, etcetera [which] go beyond power relationships or interest conflicts"⁸⁷ (Martinón Quintero, 2007:282) and thus are usually foreign to game theory models, but still play an important role in real bargaining situations.

Due to that distinction, when confronted with explaining behavior shifts, the ACF suggests these occur through (a) policy-oriented learning—defined as "relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience and or new information that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives" (Sabatier & Weible, 2007:198)—, (b) external and (c)

⁸⁶ Although this seems to be one of the least-developed aspects of his model, as it is not designed to capture individual's actions. Blomquist suggests the difference is akin to that between etiology and epidemiology: the first "can describe the course [disease] will take in an individual patient [...while the second] may be able to provide a scenario for the spread of the same disease across a population" (2007:282-3). ACF and IAD are longitudinal and provide a narrative account of policy change over time, while Hofferbert's framework offers cross-sections.

⁸⁷ Freely translated from the Spanish original: "los aspectos cognitivos, los valores, las creencias, el aprendizaje, etcétera [...que] van más allá de las relaciones de poder o los conflictos de intereses"

internal perturbations—both of which may redistribute critical resources or affect policy core beliefs by confirming or generating doubts in coalition members—, and (d) negotiated agreements—drawing upon the alternative dispute resolution theories for negotiating and implementing agreements (2007:205), and not just by “competition among diverse interests, in so that financial resources and institutional norms are the only fundamental issues to consider.”⁸⁸ (Martín Quintero, 2007:286)

Tracing ACF’s tradition on the systematic analysis of political belief systems, Martín Quintero (2007) suggests that it may stem from taking Putnam’s challenge to Converse’s early idea “that political elites had more constrained belief systems than did the general public” (Sabatier & Hunter, 1989:229) one step further. While Putnam found four key elements to elite belief systems—(1) cognitive orientations, (2) normative orientations, (3) interpersonal orientations, and (4) political partisanship—, Sabatier and Hunter argued that fifth element consisting of causal perceptions⁸⁹ should also be considered as these were “probably most susceptible to change over time because, unlike abstract normative orientations, they are susceptible to modification on the basis of experience and evidence [...and could] play a critical role in the selection of policy alternatives to which they accord serious consideration.” (1989:231-2)

“Clearly diverging from earlier rational goal-selection models of elite and mass beliefs” (Matti & Sandström, 2011:390), for the latest revision of the ACF, actors’ beliefs and behavior are embedded within the formal and informal networks that structure policymaking, which is in itself the setting of a competition amongst stakeholders to translate components of those beliefs into actual policy.

These beliefs are analyzed through a three-tiered hierarchical structure that go from deep core beliefs—which “involve very general normative and ontological assumptions about human nature, the relative priority of fundamental values such as liberty and equality, the relative priority of the welfare of different groups, the proper role of government vs. markets in general, and about who should participate in governmental decisionmaking [sic]” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007:194)—through policy core beliefs—which are applications of the deep core beliefs to an entire policy subsystem,

⁸⁸ Freely translated from its Spanish original: “de la competición entre diversos intereses, de modo que los recursos financieros y las normas institucionales sean los únicos factores fundamentales a tener en cuenta.”

⁸⁹ Defined as “attributions of causation or effect. These can involve either perceptions of relationships among variables [...] or perceptions of what causes/affects individual or group behavior[...]. We are also interested in perceptions of the values of important system variables [...]” (Sabatier & Hunter, 1989:231)

and their operationalizing helps to identify different coalitions⁹⁰—to secondary beliefs—relatively narrow in scope and thus require less evidence and fewer agreements amongst actors to change.

The special role for ideas⁹¹ in the ACF is clear, and in that sense, ideas

[...]have a virus-like quality and have an ability to disrupt existing policy systems, power relationships and policies. As Reich suggests, public preferences and support for policies grows and changes ‘as people have come to understand and engage with the ideas underlying them’ (Reich, 1988, p.4). Such exogenous shifts in preferences, influenced by new ideas and knowledge, are rather like viruses present in the atmosphere we breathe. Policy systems, particularly when they are engaged transnationally, contain a plethora of ideas at any given time. (Richardson, 2000:1018-9)

While Jacobsen suggested that ideas, institutions and interests were intertwined in such a way that they could not be separated and that “particular ideas are nothing more than a smokescreen for the institutional and personal interests that are really animating and guiding action” (Richardson, 2000:1019), Schalger reminds us that in some situations, the interests of coalition members may be in conflict even if they share a core belief system, and that if interests are not disassociated from the guiding factors that motivate action it would not be possible to explain strategic and opportunistic behavior (Martín Quintero, 2007).

Traces of these notions can also be seen at the three distinct levels that serve as the “foundation stones” of the ACF:

(1) a macro-level assumption that most policymaking occurs among specialists within a policy subsystem but that their behavior is affected by factors in the broader political and socioeconomic system; (2) a micro-level “model of the individual” that is drawn heavily from social psychology; and (3) a meso-level conviction that the best way to deal with the multiplicity of actors in a subsystem is to aggregate them into “advocacy coalitions.” These foundations, in turn, affect our dependent variables, belief and policy change, through two critical paths: policy-oriented learning and external perturbations. (Sabatier & Weible, 2007:191-2)

⁹⁰ At this level, there are also the “policy core policy preference” beliefs, which “(i) are subsystemwide in scope, (ii) highly salient, and (iii) have been a major source of cleavage for some time. [...Being normative, these] provide a vision that guides coalition strategic behavior, and helps unite allies and divide opponents.” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007:195)

⁹¹ “Everybody has ideas, yet nobody thinks” (Crozier & Tillette, 1996:38). Freely translated from its Spanish original: “Todo el mundo tiene ideas, pero nadie piensa.”

These foundation stones work under four main assumptions—(1) that the policy subsystem remains the primary unit of analysis, (2) that there is a long-term perspective⁹², (3) that actors within the subsystem are aggregated into coalitions, usually two to five per subsystem, and (4) that policy designs are understood as expressions of coalition beliefs—to explain issues such as the origin and permanence of coalitions, policy-oriented learning⁹³, and policy change through the framework graphically represented in Figure 48 (Weible, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 2011).




Figure 48: Flow Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Weible, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 2011:352)

Furthermore, Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen suggest that the

role of scientific and technical information in the policy process is best understood in combination with the context of the policy subsystem. In adversarial policy subsystems marked by high levels of conflict, coalitions will more likely use scientific information as political salvo against an opponent, learning will more likely occur within coalitions than between coalitions, professional forums will more likely be ineffective, and coalitions will more likely rely on different analytical disciplines in making their arguments. In collaborative policy subsystems marked by intermediate levels of conflict, many of the expectations are reversed: coalitions will more likely

⁹² A decade or more is suggested to fully understand the subsystem affairs.

⁹³ While Hecl is considered to be the one who coined the term political learning (Martín Quintero, 2007:304), Sabatier regards policy-oriented learning “within, and between, coalitions [as] the role played by scientific and technical information in the policy process.” (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009:135)

use scientific and technical information for cross-coalition learning, professional forums will more likely be effective, coalitions will more likely rely on multidisciplinary sources of information, and belief change will more likely occur at both the policy core and secondary belief level. The factors that contribute to a shift from an adversarial subsystem to a collaborative policy subsystem include a hurting stalemate, external event, or both. (2009:135)

To conclude this section, by applying ACF at the policy subsystem level of our Matryoshka, we can expand on the DMF elements relevant to the interaction between our two coalitions of interest to encompass those elements from the close environment. As intended by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, this allows a descriptive usage of our framework from a pure research perspective. Moreover, the resulting analysis can also have a prescriptive usage to attempt interventions, by advising the different coalitions how, through the management of the relevant subsystem elements, they might enhance their chances of success in the policy process. Finally, by using ACF to continuously monitor the policy subsystem, this type of analysis can provide a feedback usage that informs the different coalitions on how adjust their strategies in reaction to the dynamic environment.

Articulating ACF to the Matryoshka Framework

It is quite straightforward how the considerations behind the policy subsystem in general and the analytic tools of the ACF in particular connect directly with the interaction level in general and the tools of the DMF in particular. For example, ACF provides some guidance for when dealing with actors that concentrate resources with high levels of asymmetry, such as those of the entrenched elites characterized in DMF.

Also, ACF complements our DMF analysis by offering some clues on elucidating which are the key actors to take into consideration, as well as on how to use the knowledge to engage them. ACF considers Hecló's idea that "looking for the few who are powerful, we tend to overlook the many whose webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise of power" (as quoted by Richardson, 2000:1009) when Sabatier and Hunter acknowledge that

[...]most elites do not operate across a wide variety of policy areas but rather specialize in one or two related areas. This is certainly true of bureaucrats and interest group leaders. While legislators must vote on a wide variety of policy proposals, there is a wealth of evidence which suggests that they are most influential in those one or two areas in which they are policy specialists; in other areas, they rely on "cues" from specialists whom they trust (Matthews and Stimson 1975; Kingdon 1981; Sabatier and Whiteman 1985). In short, most elites are influential—not over a wide variety of policy areas—but rather in the one or two areas in which

they are specialists. Thus portraits of elite belief systems ought to give particular attention to their beliefs in those areas of specialization. (1989:253)

As Richardson suggests, a “key issue for the entrenched interests is the degree to which new ideas and knowledge can be accommodated in existing and agreed ‘policy frames’ (Schön and Rein, 1994) or whether completely new frames emerge, backed by new ‘adversarial coalitions’ (Dudley and Richardson, 1998)” (2000:1018), as policy transfer between countries or regions are very likely to generate cross-system learning opportunities that could be “put forward as politically neutral truths. [...However, l]ike new scientific knowledge, or new ideas, policy transfer can be a powerful and disturbing exogenous shock.”(2000:20)

Moreover, knowledge, ideas and information are not the only resources a coalition can use under the ACF analysis. Going beyond the DMF analysis, the ACF considers formal legal authority to make policy decisions, public opinion support, mobilizable troops, financial resources and skillful leadership as policy relevant resources that actors can use to influence public policy (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). It is due to the use of these additional elements that ACF provides the best fit for our framework, covering some of the blind spots of our core level tool.




Figure 49: DMF nested in the ACF flow diagram (adapted from Weible, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 2011:352)

For a graphic representation of how the core level and the policy-subsystem level interact through the DMF and ACF respectively, we take the ACF diagram as a reference. In Figure 49, the DMF

interaction patterns would fit neatly within the box where the different coalitions interact in the policy subsystem, and the additional boxes would be the elements that ACF contributes to the analysis. Or to express it using the microscope metaphor (see page 176), zooming into the red box of Figure 49, we would be able to see the interactions represented in the DMF juxtaposition of Figure 41 (see page 157).

And yet, robust and flexible as it is to accommodate other analytic tools under its hood, ACF also benefits from its inclusion in the Matryoshka framework. Zooming outwards, once again at the case-study level, the use of a protocol for systematizing the comparability among different experiences is a plus.

Zooming inwards, the DMF's scenarios offer a very clear and direct explanation tool to operationalize an otherwise abstract and vague notion of the interaction between coalitions, not only those at the heart of our dissertation's specific subject (diaspora-elite), but also for a more open type of institutional change scenarios where the coalition challenging the *status quo* faces an elite type of incumbent group under resource asymmetry conditions (see page 213).

Zooming further inwards, the use of network theories and the identification of key-actors also facilitates the comprehension of how the belief systems and other power resources may be more effectively and efficiently deployed for enhanced strategic impact within each coalition (see pages 176 and 188). At this point, it might be worth reminding the meso-level usage of NPF in which this tool is directly embedded into ACF through Figure 47 (see page 189).

ACF Key Variables for Operationalization

At the policy subsystem level, ACF application requires a definition of the following variables:

- Definition of the specific policy subsystem
 - Definition of the pro-reform advocacy coalition (mixed with engaged diasporans and open elite members)
 - Characterize belief systems
 - Deep-core beliefs (general normative & ontological assumptions)
 - Policy-core beliefs (deep-core applied to a specific subsystem)
 - Policy-core policy preferences (to glue coalitions together)
 - Secondary beliefs
 - Characterize their possible assets
 - Catalogue assets

- Definition of the advocacy coalition against the reform (mixed with disengaged diasporans and closed elite members)
 - Characterize belief systems
 - Deep-core beliefs (general normative & ontological assumptions)
 - Policy-core beliefs (deep-core applied to a specific subsystem)
 - Policy-core policy preferences (to glue coalitions together)
 - Secondary beliefs
 - Characterize their possible assets
 - Catalogue assets
 - Characterize institutional rules for interaction
 - Define the possible policy change paths
 - Policy-oriented learning
 - External shocks
 - Internal shocks
 - Negotiated agreements
 - Define the policy outcomes
 - Define the policy impacts
- Characterize short-term constraints and assets of the pro-reform coalition
 - Catalogue constrains
 - Catalogue assets
 - Characterize short-term constraints and assets of the coalition against reform
 - Catalogue constrains
 - Catalogue assets
 - Characterize opportunity structures
 - Degree of consensus required for policy change
 - Openness of political subsystem
 - Overlapping societal cleavages
 - Describe the relatively stable parameters
 - Basic attributes of the problem area and distribution of natural assets
 - Fundamental sociocultural values and social structure
 - Basic constitutional and institutional structure
 - External subsystem events

- Changes in socioeconomic conditions
- Changes in public opinion
- Changes in systemic governing coalition
- Changes in other related policy subsystems

The Case-Study Level and Barzelay et al.'s Case-study Oriented Research in Policy Change

As explained in our theoretical review, policy change and institutional reform are extremely context-dependent phenomena. Therefore, it is common practice to include some sort of case-study methodology when researching empirically to help gather and understand all the required contextual information. However, these protocols are not always standard and the comparability between the different cases to derive specific insight can become problematic.

At this macro-most level, our framework suggests the use of a specific tool flexible enough, and yet fitting all the criteria suggested in the introduction to part two (see page 148), to ensure that the resulting analyses of different subsystems are compatible and comparable. This methodological tool is the case-study oriented research in policy change (CORPC) protocol proposed in Barzelay et al. (2003), which comprises two sets of guidelines: one aimed at the structuring of the research process, and another one aimed at the structuring of the case-study itself.

Concerning the structure of the case study, the protocol suggests to start with the adoption of a narrative form, very similar to the way narratives are structured in the NPF (see page 181). This narrative must first identify the specific episode to be described as the dependent variable, which in our dissertation would be the interaction at the heart of our DMF object of study. Then, all the relevant events that contribute to the explanation of the specific episode should be considered.

The narrative of the case study is derived from classifying the episode and relevant events surrounding the episode into five kinds of basic narrative elements: (i) prior events to provide the episode being analyzed with context and an initial *status quo* for comparison, (ii) contemporaneous events to the specific episode that contextualize but whose influence might not be directly identifiable, (iii) the central elements in the specific episode, (iv) related events that could have direct influence over the specific episode, and (v) later events relevant to the specific episode that can offer valuable information about the results and the revised *status quo* for comparison purposes (see Figure 50).




Figure 50: CORPC - Narrative structure for a case-study (Barzelay, et al., 2003:25)

Once our narrative structure has been constructed, the set of guidelines dealing with the research process suggests to find the relevant case-study questions that Barzelay and his colleagues categorize into two types:

- “Type A”: questions that have a general interest and from which we may extrapolate broader knowledge from our case to other similar cases, and
- “Type B”: specific research questions to the identified events in order to establish how the specific episode generated the policy or institutional outcomes that moved from the initial to the modified *status quo*.

The selection of questions, particularly those of type B, is highly specific to each case. Therefore, the selection of the analytical tools for the analysis of the policy change or institutional transformation are entirely question-dependent and the authors do not provide any guidelines on this matter. However the protocol does suggest a very self-explanatory diagram to steer the research process, which we have adapted as seen on Figure 51.

To conclude this section, by applying CORPC at the case-study level of our Matryoshka, we aim to add consistency and comparability to the overall effort. As the research protocol guides the whole process into a narrative form, the end result is a case study with a descriptive usage. Moreover, since it keeps the properties of the different methodologies to address the specific episode, it can support the prescriptive usage. As for the feedback usage, the collection of some additional

elements more loosely related to the specific episode still allows for a continuous monitoring of the case study environment.




Figure 51: CORPC applied to the Matryoshka Framework (adapted from Barzelay et al., 2003:22)

Articulating CORPC to the Matryoshka Framework

CORPC as an overarching protocol helps to standardize the research process across the different analytical tools of the Matryoshka. On the one hand, the way in which it suggests to depart from the specific episode of interest helps to gain focus in an otherwise vast and complicated pool of variables. On the other hand, the pre-selection of the analytical tools for the four nested levels helps to guide and contextualize which are the relevant questions that might supply an explanation for this specific episode.

As CORPC's narrative structure for the case study revolves around this specific episode, it is understandable to place the DMF interaction at the core of our Matryoshka in this narrative element. Moreover, as the DMF interaction is essentially at the heart of the policy subsystem coalition interaction of the ACF, this specific episode embodies the vertical integration of our study focus throughout the three macro-most levels of the Matryoshka.

To use the microscope metaphor (see page 176), starting from the CORPC diagram and zooming into the red box of Figure 52, we also would be able to see the interactions represented in the DMF juxtaposition of Figure 41 (see page 157).

As for the additional ACF elements that are not the interaction, these are also integrated as they are distributed among the other four narrative elements in the CORPC. For example, ACF's relatively stable parameters can construe the information to build the narrative of the CORPC's prior events, as it sets a wide part of the *status quo* from which we depart.




Figure 52: DMF nested in the CORPC diagram (adapted from Barzelay et al., 2003:25)

Other elements such as those in the ACF's external subsystem can be fitted in either the contemporaneous or the related events of CORPC, depending on the directness of their relation to the specific episode. The same is true for the ACF's long-term structures and short-term constrains. Regarding ACF's policy outputs or policy impacts, these could be counted as the result of the specific episodes and could provide us with the information to build the narrative of the CORPC's later events.

CORPC Key Variables for Operationalization

At the case-study level, CORPC application requires a definition of the following variables:

- To structure the research according to the protocol
 - Choosing and focusing on a research goal
 - Understand brain-circulation triggered institutional transformations
 - Choosing the type of research design and detailing
 - Choosing the case(s)
 - Identify the case outcomes
 - Define the type of usage (descriptive, prescriptive, or feedback)
 - Use operational summary as dashboard to organize case evidence
 - Generate relevant research questions
 - Type A general questions
 - Type B highly contingent-dependent specific questions
 - Answer the relevant research questions
 - Applying the explanatory Matryoshka tools
 - Preparing and doing interviews
 - Gathering evidence and data
 - Analyzing the events
 - Answering the research questions
 - Prepare the report
 - Designing the narrative structure
 - Writing up

- To structure the case-study narrative
 - Prior (triggering) events
 - Contemporaneous events
 - The specific episode

- Related events
- Later (consequential) events

Chapter 7: Operationalizing the Matryoshka Framework

(1) In theory, theory and practice are the same, except in practice. (2) Theory is when you know everything and nothing works; practice is when everything works and you don't know why. (3) There is nothing as practical as a good theory.

Three popular sayings from unknown authorship

We have devoted the previous three chapters of part two disaggregating in detail how each of the five Matryoshka levels and their analytic tools operate and are integrated under the framework. In this final chapter of the analytical framework, we will reintegrate the model vertically through the metaphor of spaces.

Then, we will introduce the possibility of utilizing the Matryoshka framework in other institutional reform contexts when there is an asymmetry of power between the two coalitions and these are not associated with any migratory component. To achieve this goal, we suggest a slightly reinterpretation of the DMF at the interaction core level.

Finally, we will include with a detailed explanation of how our framework can be empirically applied through three types of usages mentioned earlier: descriptive, prescriptive and feedback. In preparation for its application to a case-study, we will conclude part two with the reintegration with the framework as an operational summary for its empirical deployment through a dashboard of indicators and variables.

The Matryoshka Framework in Spatial Terms

While the Matryoshka metaphor is particularly suited to explain the theoretical linkages between the different levels at hand in this nested framework, it might be quite difficult to grasp its meaning empirically. As an alternative to explain how this framework is integrated in practice, let us use the metaphor of different interrelated “spaces” where each analytical tool takes place; for example the spaces in an office building depicted in Figure 53.

At the micro-most level, in light blue, we start with the space inside each person’s mind: each individual has its own identity and belief systems narratives which are socialized in the company and the department where the person works. In a way this identity and belief systems narratives are this person’s knowledge contribution to the colleagues: if the person has the ability to persuade and a position that carries some sway, he or she will be followed by others becoming the key influencer actor of his department. To understand how these narratives can be built and improved, we have selected the NPF.




Figure 53: Matryoshka framework reinterpreted as a spatial metaphor

One level higher, in dark blue, the different departments of an office are the space where a collection of individuals join forces to carry out specific activities they consider to be of value: the way in which these individuals interact socially to aggregate their individual belief systems to the top of the coalition’s agenda follows closely the network behavior patterns and power exercises we have discussed as NTP+.

The third (and our core) level of the framework is the space best represented as the company’s meeting room or boardroom inside a green oval, where the—often conflicting—interactions of the different departments take place. Here each department tries to push forward their own belief

systems and agenda, ideally on what they would believe to be in the overall company's best interest. To represent the different nature of these interactions, we use the DMF lens.

One level higher, in orange, is the office space used by the whole company. This would be our equivalent of the policy subsystem and the fourth level of our framework. In practice, this implies that while the interactions that take place in the boardroom, the outcomes are also influenced by additional elements (such as the company's infrastructure, its philosophy, traditions, unwritten rules, the corporate history, other persons and departments not directly involved in the boardroom interactions, etc.) that may be external to the specific negotiations between departments, but still within the company's scope to manage. Pretty much like a political subsystem. To better understand this level, ACF is our tool of choice.

Finally, we take the environment in which that office is inserted, as the dotted red line, as the space representing the fifth and macro-most level. This environment or context can indirectly affect the company's overall operations, but is mostly out of its management scope. Examples could be the industry conditions and competition, the overall economic environment, the myriad of governmental policies affecting that specific company, the consumer behavior, etc., all which sets a context for different specific case-studies. To consider these variables within our framework we use the CORPC tool.

Scope of Usage for the Matryoshka Framework

The Matryoshka Framework has been developed with Kuznetsov's Diaspora Mobilization Framework at its core in the context of how qualified migrants can influence the institutions of their homelands. However, the type of institutions that our definitions encompass may include a very wide range that go from public to private, from profit to non-profit and all the shades of gray in between.

Moreover, while DMF has a strong component for the diaspora-elite relationship, all other analytical tools attached to the different levels do not necessarily reference the issue of brain circulation, opening the door to extend the scope of usage to a less specific institutional change scenario.

Therefore, we believe that the Matryoshka Framework can provide us with an adequate working template to be adapted to more general interactions by slightly tweaking Kuznetsov's DMF to reflect the interaction between a coalition proposing a policy change or an institutional reform—let us call it a challenger coalition—and a coalition trying to maintain the current *status quo*—let us call it an incumbent coalition.

For Kuznetsov's purposes, the challenger coalition is a modernizing reformer qualified and innovative diaspora trying to improve on the incumbent coalition's (read homeland elites in control of institutions and policy processes) outdated policies or institutions. Therefore, the main emphasis of the interaction is how the reform can be articulated between both groups.

To that effect, Kuznetsov focuses on the human elements in both groups, identifying, on the challenger group, the key actors who become leaders or champions of their initiative, and on the incumbent group, the key actors who although are part of the current *status quo*, feel that the changes proposed are desirable.

Moreover, Kuznetsov adopts a structural view of the process, characterizing the challenger group as peripheral or external, and the incumbent group as part of the center or an elite. On the one hand, he proposes a typology of incumbent groups based on their cohesion and receptiveness to change with three categories: (a) strategic, which while homogeneous and with a high degree of control over the institutional processes, is nevertheless pragmatic enough to embrace transformational initiatives; (b) heterogeneous, which tend to be more fragmented and with less internal control, therefore some parts may be more receptive to change than others; and (c) entrenched, which is mostly homogeneous, but whose main aim is to maintain the *status quo* from where they derive their elite privileges.

On the other hand, he also proposes a typology of challenger groups based on their level of cohesion and degree of mobilization with two categories: (1) strategic, which tends to have a higher degree of internal cohesion, and has already devoted resources and effort in establishing certain linkages with the incumbents' group; and (2) the emerging, with lower cohesion and connectedness levels.

By juxtaposing these typologies, we still arrive at the five combinations that characterize five possible scenarios for institutional and policy transformation (see Figure 54). When the challenger group is of the strategic type, the likeliness of the transformation is quite high and replaces the managerial vertical logic of transformation (top-down or bottom-up) with a structural view of transformation. If the transformation initiatives of the strategic challenger group are met by a strategic incumbent group (1+a), these initiatives will follow a logic from the center towards the periphery (or inside-out). If the strategic challenger group's initiatives are met by a peripheral faction of the heterogeneous incumbent group (1+b), then they will follow a logic from the periphery towards the center (or outside-in).

Characteristics of challenger groups			
	1. Strategic High cohesion and connected to the incumbents	2. Emerging Lower cohesion and disconnected from the incumbents	
Characteristic of incumbent groups	a. Strategic Homogeneous and in control of change processes	Possibility of inside-out reform [1+a]	Articulation of promise in areas of shared interest [2+a]
	b. Heterogeneous Existence of some factions who may be receptive to change	Possibility of Outside-in transformations [1+b]	Tantalizing promise requiring repeated smaller success stories [2+b]
	c. Entrenched Unresponsive to change and in complete control	Social and economic shock absorber [1 & 2-c]	

Figure 54: Adapted Diaspora Mobilization Framework - Challenger and incumbent groups' interaction scenarios (adapted from Kuznetsov, 2009:31)

When the challenger group is still emerging, the result of the initiatives will be more uncertain. If these initiatives are met by a strategic incumbent group (2+a) the promise of mutual cooperation may be articulated, but the lack of linkages between both groups may make the interaction unstable. If the initiatives are met by a change-oriented faction of the heterogeneous incumbent group (2+b), then the instability of the interaction increases making the promise of success tantalizing. In both cases, the success of the initiative depends on building trust between both groups through repeated interaction in smaller initiatives to establish the ties that would turn the challenger group from emerging into strategic.

Last, there will be occasions when regardless of the nature of the challenger group, their initiatives will be met by an entrenched incumbent (1&2+c), whose main characteristic is to be repellent to any type of transformation initiative that may even-so-slightly threaten the privileges these incumbent groups derive from the *status quo*. These elites will consequently act as a buffer or a shock absorber, much in the same way as Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012) extractive elites.

While in adapting Kuznetsov's DMF to a framework that deals with challenger and incumbent coalitions, other than diasporas and domestic elites, we rather still adopt a more neutral view on the desirability of the policy change or the institutional reform, its usefulness remains unaffected. DMF still provides this level with the three components of our framework: descriptive, as it helps to

build a case-study of the interaction; prescriptive, as it includes a set of suggested actions to increase the chances of seeing the reform initiative through; and a dashboard for feedback to monitor an ongoing interaction’s progress within the different scenarios. Even the juxtaposition for belief systems that we have proposed as our contribution to DMF can be adapted for this extended usage without (see Figure 55).




Figure 55: Adapted belief systems juxtaposition for extended DMF usage

Once we have applied these slight adaptations at our core level, the changes should affect the other four levels accordingly without too much difference, effectively expanding the original scope of usage of our Matryoshka Framework to a more general scenario for policy and institutional transformation between two opposed advocacy coalitions working from a position of power asymmetry.

Types of Usages for the Matryoshka Framework

From the onset we have developed this Matryoshka Framework with the idea that it should lead to three kinds of usage, depending on who decided to apply it and for which purpose.

The first, a descriptive usage. From a pure research perspective, people who apply the Matryoshka framework can obtain an in-depth case-study analysis that minutely explores all the intricacies (key conditions, actors, processes, belief systems, power relationships, etc.) by which institutional reform or policy change is affected—or not—from the knowledge contributions of talented diasporan abroad.

Such type of usage can provide social scientists, academics and other researches a sound basis for comparative studies to better understand the relationship between brain circulation and homeland prosperity, hopefully leading to useful generalizations of how certain key issues can affect—favorably or adversely—the policy and institutional environment of brain-circulation dynamics.

The second, a prescriptive usage. Given that the idea of brain circulation for homeland prosperity has a developmental aim at heart, it is important to support initiatives to (re-) engage the diaspora and their countries of origin, whether these stem from the overachieving diasporans or from selected factions of the elites.

Diasporans, elite members, consultants or other policy practitioners willing to improve the efficacy of brain-circulation initiatives can benefit from the application of the Matryoshka framework, as the in-depth knowledge of each case-study can by provide them with a diagnostic of areas of improvement, as well as the internal logic of the analytic tools can be used to generate a set of bespoke recommendations to either lock or break the *status quo* towards different desirable scenarios.

The third, a feedback usage. Our Matryoshka framework understands its study object as dynamic and complex, especially as it is an ongoing never-ending process in which every actor's actions are met by other actors' reactions. Therefore, in opening the possibility for policy interventions through the prescriptive usage, the necessary collection of data to build each case study can also lead to the generation of a dashboard in which the researcher can monitor the evolution of the *status quo*.

By timely tracing the actions and reactions of different actors in the networks, the way in which identities or belief systems are aggregated into the public opinion, or the changes in the prevailing subsystemic and environmental conditions, our Matryoshka model can provide additional guidance to those diasporans, elite members, consultants or policy practitioners playing within the system to adjust their strategies in the dynamic environment accordingly.

Unified Matryoshka Framework Diagram and Operational Summary of the Key Variables and Indicators

In the previous chapters, we have summarized a set of key elements required for the application of the selected analytical tools after each level (see pages 161, 179, 190, 202 and 208). Now, to conclude with the vertical reintegration of our framework, we recollect these key elements and

reorganize them as our Unified Matryoshka Framework Diagram (see Figure 56 on page 228) and as an operational summary of key indicators and variables.

To do so, we use the two CORPC diagrams adopted and adapted for our Matryoshka framework at the case-study level as our macro research protocol (see Figure 51 on page 206) and macro case-study narrative templates (see Figure 50 on page 205). Over these two, we nest the subsequent layers of levels and tools accordingly.

Although this operational summary of the protocol is presented sequentially, its application follows the iterative and flow pattern marked by the arrows in Figure 56 on page 228:

- Choosing and focusing on a research goal
 - Understand brain-circulation triggered institutional transformations
- Choosing the type of research design and detailing
 - Choosing the case(s)
 - Identify the case outcomes
 - Define the type of usage (descriptive, prescriptive, or feedback)
 - Use unified diagram as dashboard to organize case evidence (see Figure 56 on page 228)
- Generate relevant research questions
 - Type A general questions
 - Type B highly contingent-dependent specific questions
- Answer the relevant research questions
 - Applying CORPC, ACF, DMF, NTP+ and NPF as unified framework
 - Preparing and doing interviews
 - Gathering evidence and data
 - Analyzing the events
 - Answering the research questions
- Construction of the case-study narrative
 - Prior (triggering) events
 - Including ACF's opportunity structures
 - Degree of consensus required for policy change

- Openness of political subsystem
 - Overlapping societal cleavages
 - Including a history of DMF's individual-organizational juxtaposition (against the wall, living dead, heroic success, or guided serendipity)
 - Including a history of DMF's initiatives in the discussion-transaction framework
- Contemporaneous events
- Including ACF's external subsystem events
 - Changes in socioeconomic conditions
 - Changes in public opinion
 - Changes in systemic governing coalition
 - Changes in other related policy subsystems
- The specific episode
- Define and characterize Diaspora Network (strategic vs emerging)
 - Define and characterize Homeland Elite (strategic vs heterogeneous vs entrenched)
 - Characterize diaspora-elite interaction *status quo*(outside-in, inside-out, tantalizing promise, articulation of promise, or shock absorber)
 - Define and characterize pro-reform coalition:
 - Identify key engaged diasporans
 - Define key engaged diasporans' identity elements
 - Individual (Primary)
 - Interaction (Labels)
 - Institutional
 - Structure each key engaged diasporan's identity narrative
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze each key engaged diasporan's identity narratives persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility

- Emphasize each key engaged diasporan's situation in the network
 - User
 - Programmer
 - Switcher
- Characterize each key engaged diasporan's strategy in terms of their network redundancy tradeoffs
 - Exploration/Exploitation
 - Localism/Cosmopolitanism
 - Insider/Stranger
 - Complex/Simple identity
 - Generalism/Specialism
 - Bonding/Bridging
 - Programming/Switching
- Characterize each key engaged diasporan's assets attractiveness and their strategic position in network following NTP typology
 - Network power
 - Networking power
 - Networked power
 - Network-making power
- Define key engaged diasporans' belief system elements
 - Deep-core beliefs (general normative & ontological assumptions)
 - Policy-core beliefs (deep-core applied to a specific subsystem)
 - Policy-core policy preferences (to glue coalitions together)
 - Secondary beliefs
- Structure a narrative for the key belief systems of the engaged diasporans
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
- Analyze the engaged diasporan's belief system narrative persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach

- Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
- Identify key open elite members
 - Define key open elite members' identity elements
 - Individual (Primary)
 - Interaction (Labels)
 - Institutional
 - Structure each key open elite member's identity narrative
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze each key open elite member's identity narratives persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
 - Emphasize each key open elite member's situation in the network
 - User
 - Programmer
 - Switcher
 - Characterize each key open elite member's strategy in terms of their network redundancy tradeoffs
 - Exploration/Exploitation
 - Localism/Cosmopolitanism
 - Insider/Stranger
 - Complex/Simple identity
 - Generalism/Specialism
 - Bonding/Bridging
 - Programming/Switching
 - Characterize each key open elite member's assets attractiveness and their strategic position in network following NTP typology
 - Network power
 - Networking power

- Networked power
 - Network-making power
 - Define key open elite members' belief system elements
 - Deep-core beliefs (general normative & ontological assumptions)
 - Policy-core beliefs (deep-core applied to a specific subsystem)
 - Policy-core policy preferences (to glue coalitions together)
 - Secondary beliefs
 - Structure a narrative for the key belief systems of the open elite members
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze the open elite members' belief system narrative persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
- Sketch network map for the pro-reform coalition
- Identify the clusters and classify by relationship strength
- Identify and catalogue long-term assets and constrains
- Identify and catalogue short-term assets and constrains
- Define and characterize against-reform coalition:
 - Identify key disengaged diasporans
 - Define key disengaged diasporans' identity elements
 - Individual (Primary)
 - Interaction (Labels)
 - Institutional
 - Structure each key disengaged diasporan's identity narrative
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters

- Moral of the story
- Analyze each key disengaged diasporan's identity narratives persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
- Emphasize each key disengaged diasporan's situation in the network
 - User
 - Programmer
 - Switcher
- Characterize each key disengaged diasporan's strategy in terms of their network redundancy tradeoffs
 - Exploration/Exploitation
 - Localism/Cosmopolitanism
 - Insider/Stranger
 - Complex/Simple identity
 - Generalism/Specialism
 - Bonding/Bridging
 - Programming/Switching
- Characterize each key disengaged diasporan's assets attractiveness and their strategic position in network following NTP typology
 - Network power
 - Networking power
 - Networked power
 - Network-making power
- Define key disengaged diasporans' belief system elements
 - Deep-core beliefs (general normative & ontological assumptions)
 - Policy-core beliefs (deep-core applied to a specific subsystem)
 - Policy-core policy preferences (to glue coalitions together)
 - Secondary beliefs

- Structure a narrative for the key belief systems of the disengaged diasporans
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
- Analyze the disengaged diasporans' belief system narrative persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
- Identify key closed elite members
 - Define key closed elite members' identity elements
 - Individual (Primary)
 - Interaction (Labels)
 - Institutional
 - Structure each key closed elite member's identity narrative
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
 - Analyze each key closed elite member's identity narratives persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
 - Emphasize each key closed elite member's situation in the network
 - User
 - Programmer
 - Switcher
 - Characterize each key closed elite member's strategy in terms of their network redundancy tradeoffs
 - Exploration/Exploitation
 - Localism/Cosmopolitanism

- Insider/Stranger
- Complex/Simple identity
- Generalism/Specialism
- Bonding/Bridging
- Programming/Switching
- Characterize each key closed elite member's assets attractiveness and their strategic position in network following NTP typology
 - Network power
 - Networking power
 - Networked power
 - Network-making power
- Define key closed elite members' belief system elements
 - Deep-core beliefs (general normative & ontological assumptions)
 - Policy-core beliefs (deep-core applied to a specific subsystem)
 - Policy-core policy preferences (to glue coalitions together)
 - Secondary beliefs
- Structure a narrative for the key belief systems of the closed elite members
 - Context
 - Plot
 - Characters
 - Moral of the story
- Analyze the closed elite members' belief system narrative persuasiveness
 - Canonicity/Breach
 - Narrative transportation
 - Congruence/Incongruence
 - Narrator's credibility
- Sketch network map for the against-reform coalition
- Identify the clusters and classify by relationship strength
- Identify and catalogue long-term assets and constrains
- Identify and catalogue short-term assets and constrains

- Describe ACF's institutional rules for interaction
 - Define ACF's policy change paths
 - Policy oriented learning
 - External shocks
 - Internal shocks
 - Negotiated agreements
 - Include DMF's specific episode's *status quo* of individual-organizational juxtaposition
 - Against the wall
 - Living dead
 - Heroic success
 - Guided serendipity
 - Include DMF's specific episode's *status quo* of the initiatives in the discussion-transaction framework
- Related events
 - Including ACF's relatively stable parameters
 - Basic attributes of the problem area and distribution of natural assets
 - Fundamental sociocultural values and social structure
 - Basic constitutional and institutional structure
- Later (consequential) events
 - Including ACF's policy subsystem elements
 - Policy outcomes
 - Policy impacts
 - Including the resulting DMF's individual-organizational juxtaposition (against the wall, living dead, heroic success, or guided serendipity)
 - Including the resulting DMF's initiatives in the discussion-transaction framework
- Prepare the report
 - Designing the narrative structure (bearing in mind NPF's structural elements)
 - Writing up

As mentioned in the types of usage of our Matryoshka framework, this operational summary and the unified diagram can also work as a dashboard where practitioners can monitor the evolution of

each case study through time, in order to derive sufficient knowledge to adjust their strategies and improve their chances to achieve their goals.

This unified diagram and its operational summary of key variables and indicators concludes part two and our analytical framework. Following the traditional structure of a doctoral dissertation, we will now apply the Matryoshka Framework to a case study in part three.





Figure 56: Unified Matryoshka Framework Diagram



PART THREE: EMPIRICAL APPLICATION

As we have repeatedly stated, this dissertation's aim is to propose a methodology that helps highly-skilled diaspora of countries in transition to knowledge-based economies and the governments of these homelands to reconnect and to establish brain-circulation dynamics, in order to generate new—or draw on previously untapped—opportunities for modernization and development, particularly through the promotion of institutional reform.

Therefore, in part one, we presented an in-depth review of the three basic pillars to achieve our goal: the knowledge economy, the international migration of human capital, and different perspectives on institutionalism and policy change. These state-of-the-art reviews, albeit done disconnectedly, helped us to understand each of these topics under the light of their own theoretical traditions.

In part two, we reconnected those three basic pillars with our dissertation's main aim. To do so, we deconstructed the fundamentals of five methodological tools that provided the best cross-compatibility between academic disciplines and the best fit for our goal. Then we re-assembled those fundamentals and merged these five tools into our dissertation's main contribution: a unified interdisciplinary, multilevel, analytic framework (see Figure 56 on page 228).

For part three, we will make this unified framework operational by applying it to an empirical case: the reengagement of the Mexican diaspora in Europe with Mexican institutions, in order to unlock the development potential of brain circulation dynamics. As we began explaining in the introductory section of this dissertation, the motives for our case-study choice are that:

- 1) Mexico is a perfect fit for our country prototype: an economy in transition to become a knowledge-based, often diagnosed as suffering from brain drain, and that struggles to take the next step on its institutional development stage;
- 2) Research of Mexican migration is dominated by a numeric bias on those moving north to the United States, and hardly any studies look at those who move to other destinations such as Europe despite this being a more skilled group in average (see chapter ten, page 289); and
- 3) An important paradigm shift has been taking place over the past decade in Mexican politics, which seems to be opening opportunities in the public sphere to hone the Mexican institutions to reconnect with the country's talent abroad.

To make the unified Matryoshka framework operational, we follow the set of steps enumerated towards the end of chapter seven (see page 217 onwards), splitting the process into three chapters, one for each proposed stage of empirical research.




Figure 57: Portion of the Unified Matryoshka Framework Operationalized in Chapter 8

Chapter 8 covers the preparatory stage, that is: (1) defining the breath and scope of the research by defining its specific goal and expected usability, (2) defining the type of research to carry out as per our methodological tools, and (3) refining the *ad hoc* design of the research protocol for specific concerns to be addressed (see Figure 57).

Chapter 9 focuses on the application of the said research protocol, addressing: (1) the identification of research questions, and the answers to those questions through (2) systematic data gathering for (3) the usage of our unified analytical framework as refined in the research protocol (see Figure 58).




Figure 58: Portion of the Unified Matryoshka Framework Operationalized in Chapter 9




Figure 59: Portion of the Unified Matryoshka Framework Operationalized in Chapter 10

Chapter 10 closes part three by presenting the long form narrative account of our chosen case study, as the result of the application of the unified Matryoshka framework (see Figure 59) and as a standalone report of the case study.

Chapter 8: Preparation of the Research Protocol

Some years ago the head of the Industrial Engineering Department of Yale University said, "If I had only one hour to solve a problem, I would spend up to two-thirds of that hour in attempting to define what the problem is."

The Manufacturing Manager's Skills, William H. Markle (1966)

In this chapter, we begin the operationalization of the unified Matryoshka framework through the implementation of the macro-most level of our methodological tools: the CORPC which, as we have explained in chapter six (see page 204), provides us with two sets of guidelines; one that structures the research process (left side of Figure 56 on page 228) and one that structures the case study (right side of Figure 56 on page 228).

From the guidelines that structure the research process, we take those that entail the preparation of protocol, namely, those that help us define the specific goals and expected usability of our research, and those that define and refine the methodological tools to be used (see Figure 57 on page 230).

Much of the analytical framework decision making related to this preparatory stage has been carried out in previous sections of this dissertation, especially regarding the methodological tools to implement as the layers of the unified Matryoshka. Nonetheless, we will make them explicit to the case study to follow the operationalization of the framework in the construction of a research protocol.

This will be more evident with the guidelines that structure the case study, as they allow us to anticipate the data and information required to build our dashboard. In either case, we will need to apply the items enumerated by the end of chapter seven (see page 217) line by line. However, the process is neither strictly hierarchical nor lineal, as represented by the arrows.

Just like in the unified Matryoshka framework diagram, the relationship arrows go back and forth the different stages of the process defining, redefining and refining our understanding of the case study as it progresses with new ideas, findings and data. This complex quality provides the framework with its feedback usability as it permits its continuous implementation over longer observations in extended periods, if so decided in the research goal and design.

Defining the research goal

- *Choose and focus on a research goal*

Our chosen case study aims to understand brain-circulation triggered institutional transformations for the case of Mexico, paying special attention to the relations the country's institutions keep with its talented diaspora in Europe. This special focus, however, is only fully understood in the wider current *status quo* and prospective outlook of the country's official policy towards its diaspora reengagement in general. Therein lies the benefits of using a multilevel framework.

Type of research design

Following the CORPC guidelines, we should now decide which methodological tools would be the most appropriate to achieve our research goal. However, we have already decided on the type of tools we are to apply: the analytical framework unified under the Matryoshka hood.

Moreover, we already know the overall requirements at each level: an observation period of at least a decade for ACF to be significant, a coalition of actors framed in an archetypical relationship of diaspora-homeland elite as defined in DMF, both actor coalitions expressed in terms of networks to be able to apply our NTP+ tools, and so on. (For specifics, see part two of this dissertation)

Lastly, from our research goal, we have even started to narrow down the universe of possibilities to the Mexican diaspora in Europe to execute our research design. Therefore, instead of repeating those stages of the selection process line by line, we hereby continue with the further stages of our selection process:

- *Choose the case(s)*

Given the unified Matryoshka framework, the case should take the form of a narrative structure for the engagement process of the diaspora and the institutional actors within a specific timeline. Therefore, let us start by selecting the actors.

From the diaspora actors' side, the past couple of decades have witnessed the successful institutionalization of several organizations of Mexicans abroad. Some are politically motivated (although mainly in the United States), yet most others take root on either leisure

and hobby-oriented activities (such as sports or dance clubs) or on University and professional ties (as Alumni or business clubs). As our focus is on the highly skilled diaspora in Europe, we have paid closer attention to the latter category, and we have found two excellent candidates for our case study that fit the aforementioned methodological criteria.

The first candidate, the alumni associations of the Tecnológico de Monterrey⁹⁴ (ExATec) across the European continent, is the most consolidated and institutionalized of the Mexican diaspora networks in Europe.

ExATec Europa originates from the initiative of 25 Mexicans living in France who formally constituted their organization under French law, becoming the first officially recognized alumni association of Mexicans with Europe-wide ambitions in October 2002. Currently, the network claims to cover over 1,700 alumni living in over 25 European countries, shared among nine sub-regional legally constituted ExATec networks (France, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Central and Eastern Europe, Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and Ireland).

ExATec Europa is a very interesting case in its own right, especially due to the importance of Tecnológico de Monterrey's contributions to Mexican development and its educational landscape, as well as due to the historical evolution of the networks' institutionalization and expansion. However, and despite its strong internal cohesion, this diaspora network still falls under the emerging diaspora network category of the DMF tools, as its strategic engagement with the public institutions⁹⁵ back home is quite loose.

Although its formation is contemporaneous to the European networks of ExATec, the second candidate is much more recent in its European incursion, and therefore, less consolidated. Nonetheless, the Red de Talentos Mexicanos (Network of Talented Mexicans Abroad or RTMs by their Spanish acronym) is the better strategically engaged diaspora network with potential influence in the public sphere back home.

⁹⁴ Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (or Tecnológico de Monterrey or ITESM for short) is one of the largest and best reputed educational institutions in Latin America. With over 95 thousand students and 9,500 professors in 31 campuses and 16 international offices, ITESM consistently leads in university rankings, patent applications, and in the performance and internationalization of its students and graduates. (ITESM, 2015)

⁹⁵ We must stress the public nature of institutions, as Tecnológico de Monterrey is a private university system.

Stemming from the combined initiatives of both the Mexican professional and civil societies abroad and a conscious policy by the Mexican federal government to engage the diaspora, these local organizations (usually country-wide in Europe) were born as strategically connected diaspora organizations from the outset. However, RTM networks are only recently consolidating, partly through a rebranding to Red Global de Mexicanos (RedGlobal.Mx), and partly through a reorganization into a much more coordinated global network with regional sub-networks for Americas, Europe and Asia-Pacific.

Since our current aim is to evaluate the reengagement and the relationship between the public institutions and the diaspora networks, we have opted for the case study of the RedGlobal.Mx for Europe as our chosen actor from the diaspora side. Nonetheless, a future case study might attempt to apply our unified Matryoshka framework to help the ExATec Europa associations improve their strategic engagement and impact, or even how a coalition of these two diaspora networks could benefit from further interaction.

From the homeland public-sphere actors' side, it is only fitting to choose the government institution that provides RedGlobal.Mx with its strategic homeland connection: the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (or IME by its Spanish acronym). This public institution under the authority of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in itself a perfect candidate for our study as it embodies the historic consolidation of policies of successive Mexican governments towards Mexicans living outside of Mexico.

Actors selected, we turn to our CORPC guidelines to frame our case study within a narrative perspective. To do so, we should build a timeline in which five categories of data are considered: (1) data fitting in the specific episode for our analysis, (2) data fitting in events prior and leading towards the specific episode, (3) in contemporaneous and (4) in related events that coexist with our episode, and (5) data that describe later events.

Given the further levels' methodological requirements, we have opted to build our narrative timeline from the landmark gestation of IME in August 2002, which we believe is the most important qualitative change in State-diaspora relations in Mexican history, and leading up to the current *status quo* as of April 2015.

Within this period, we define our "specific episode" for analysis from the landmark creation and expansion of the first RTM network in Europe (March 2010) and up to the consolidation of the European sub-network of RedGlobal.Mx in July 2014. Logically, events before this episode are categorized as "prior events", while events after this episode are categorized as

“later events”. Events associated to the “contemporaneous” and “related” categories will be assigned according to the criteria established by our unified Matryoshka diagram.

- *Identify the desired case outcomes*

Since we are interested in studying how the history and evolution of relations between the RedGlobal.Mx and the IME have evolved, we can foresee three desired descriptive outcomes:

- 1) To understand how events in our narrative have shaped brain-circulation dynamics between Mexico and its talent in Europe into their current *status quo*,
- 2) To understand how events in our narrative have come to influence the internal group dynamics of RedGlobal.Mx as a diaspora organization, and
- 3) To understand how events in our narrative have come to influence prospective outlooks of the country’s official policy towards its diaspora reengagement in general.

From these three specific understandings of the history and evolution of our case study, we would extract, on the one hand, as many of the elements and challenges as our framework allows (from the micro-most to the macro-most) which have made of RedGlobal.Mx the best strategically connected Mexican diaspora network so far. On the other hand, we would extract as many elements and challenges as possible which have made of IME a successful policy tool for State-diaspora relations.

These elements and challenges would become, in turn, building blocks to generate the prescriptive deliverables of our framework, both for RedGlobal.Mx and IME in particular, and for other similar type of actors in general. Moreover, these may be used for comparison and contrast with the available literature on the subject, and further on, ideally, with other case studies following the same methodology for insights into the diaspora-homeland (re)engagement processes.

- *Define the type of research*

As stated earlier, we will implement the unified Matryoshka framework. For that purpose, our case study will integrate both secondary and primary sources to fill the requirements of our different analytical tools.

The main secondary sources include (but will not be limited to) any documentary evidence of the relationship between RedGlobal.Mx and IME, as well as of the internal dynamics and evolution of each. Furthermore, secondary sources will be extensively used to outline the contextual setting of the case, applying the theoretical principles reviewed in part one of this dissertation.

Additionally, our main primary sources include (but will not be limited to) in-depth interviews with key actors within both diaspora organizations and government institutions, and a comprehensive survey to improve our knowledge of the Mexican diaspora in Europe. For an extensive list, see chapter nine page 256.

- *Define the type of usage*

From the abovementioned outcomes, our unified Matryoshka for this case would allow us to test two of the three types of usage. On the one hand, descriptive, in the tracking of the relationship evolution to better understand the current *status quo*. On the other hand, prescriptive, in two different forms: (a) in particular, with recommendations to IME and RedGlobal.Mx on how to improve their engagement and shared success prospects, and (b) by identifying elements and lessons useful to third-party similar actors with comparable aims.

Given our chosen timeline and specific episode, testing the feedback component of the model would require a practical and continuous research engagement with either observed institution (or both) to track the performance of the prescriptive deliverables, which at the time of writing this dissertation escapes our scope.

Detailing of the research design

- *Construction of a preliminary case-study timeline narrative*

This narrative timeline (see Figure 61 on page 253) will allow us to understand the events of the case to generate the skeleton structure of our study. These milestone events will be categorized in the different boxes of our unified Matryoshka framework, and will be fed into the right side of the framework here and in the next chapter to answer our research questions (see Figure 60).

The dates associated to some of these milestone events refer to an approximate timeframe. For example, regarding the establishment of a diaspora organization, the date it might refer specifically to its formal constitution; however, this might not reflect entirely the engagement, dialogues and preparatory work that occurs in the weeks or months prior.




Figure 60: Portion of the Unified Matryoshka Framework Operationalized in Chapters 8 & 9

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
Prior Events			
2002-05-30	1	Dr. Hector Ruiz, CEO of AMD receives award as Outstanding Mexican Engineer abroad. He meets President Fox, who tries to enlist his help in engaging talented Mexicans abroad and at home, in an <i>ad hoc</i> event. Dr. Ruiz agrees to organize an event bringing together Mexican engineers from both sides of the border for the following year. (See event 11)	Related Events
2002-07-01	2	President Fox's first approach to diaspora re-engagement aimed at rekindling the "service provision" policies of earlier administrations. This approach (and its execution) deeply disappointed in Mexicans living in the US who were lead to expect something different from the campaign promises. Two years after his victory, and as a reaction to that discontent, President Fox closes his public relations "Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad" and creates a task force within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to find a new approach for diaspora engagement. This taskforce would be unofficially called Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior' (IME).	Related Events
2002-08-08	3	One of the first results of the taskforce would be to recommend the creation of a National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad (CNCME), established by presidential decree with representatives of all government ministries and the mandate to meet and attend the requests and suggestions of Mexicans abroad made directly or by intermediation of IME.	Related Events
+Info: http://2006-2012.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/marconormativodoc/acuer17.pdf			

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2002-10-29	4	ExATec Europa is established (see page 235)	Related Events
2002-11-25	5	<p>Having sorted the government side of the re-engagement, the IME taskforce calls upon the Consulates of Mexico to invite the diaspora organizations in the United States to elect representatives to conform a Consultative Council for an Institute of Mexicans Abroad (CCIME).</p> <p>This diaspora council, although established by government initiative, would be fully autonomous as recognition of the important contributions of migrants, as well as their political and social engagement with the homeland communities whence they originate.</p>	Related Events
2003-03-19	6	<p>State-diaspora dialogue begins in earnest, with the first CCIME – CNCME meeting in Mexico City, hosted and intermediated by the IME.</p> <p>As a result, 110 policy reform recommendations are made across all government areas to better fit the needs of migrants, their communities, and strategic public policies.</p> <p>Some of these will be explored further along this timeline as examples of the interpretive engagement process. One of the main outcomes of this meeting is an agreement to institutionalize CCIME meetings twice a year.</p> <p>+Info: http://www.ime.gob.mx/images/stories/ime/CCIME/reuniones_ordinarias/i/nomenclatura.pdf</p>	Related Events
2003-04-16	7	<p>Given the success of the first State-diaspora engagement through the new approach, the IME taskforce is officially given an institutional personality: the Institute of Mexicans Abroad is established by presidential decree as a Mexican government institution under the administrative jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specifically within the Undersecretary for North American Affairs.</p> <p>+Info: http://ime.gob.mx/images/stories/ime/decreime11.pdf</p>	Related Events
2003-05-01	8	<p>While the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) is skeptic of the policy recommendations during the first CCIME Meeting, by IME's insistence and intermediation, it decides to engage in further dialogue iterations with the diaspora representatives.</p>	Related Events
2003-08-08	9	<p>After months of exchanges and listening and learning, the diaspora-SEDESOL dialogue results in reforms to the "Iniciativa Ciudadana" remittances fund-matching program.</p> <p>By incorporating valuable migrant recommendations to improve the commitment of migrant remittances, the projects for the communities, the changes also improved the efficiency of expenditure in areas of interest for the government.</p> <p>The program is also renamed 3x1 in honor of a successful trusted program ran by the Zacatecas State government (2x1) with an update to show the involvement of the Federal, State, and Municipal governments.</p>	Related Events
2003-09-01	10	<p>MexSocUK is established as the first network of networks of Mexican students in different Universities of the United Kingdom.</p>	Contemporaneous Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2003-09-29	11	Responding to President Fox's request in item 1 of this timeline, Dr. Hector Ruiz organizes "US-Mexico Collaborative Partnering for Technological Advancement" in New York. For the first time, an event of this nature would bring together many talented Mexicans abroad and talented Mexicans in Mexico on purpose and as its main aim.	Related Events
2003-10-01	12	First ExATec Europa Meeting in Paris, bringing together talented Mexicans (mostly alumni from Tecnológico de Monterrey) across Europe for the first time.	Contemporaneous Events
2003-11-07	13	Given the success of the first meeting, the second CCIME Meeting takes place. Progress on the first batch of recommendations is assessed and 60 new recommendations are issued. Diaspora organizations renew and increase their demand for voting rights abroad, a constitutionally recognized right that has not been legislated for implementation. +Info: http://www.ime.gob.mx/images/stories/ime/CCIME/reuniones_ordinarias/ii/nomenclatura.pdf	Related Events
2004-01-01	14	ExATec Barcelona is established as a local spin-off from the Paris-based ExATec Europa.	Contemporaneous Events
2004-04-01	15	IME organizes a tour of meetings between Mexican legislators from all parties and migrants in the United States to discuss voting rights for the following presidential elections. Progress is made with the discussions, but with no legal effects.	Contemporaneous Events
2004-05-20	16	Third CCIME Meeting. As a result, the dialogue dynamic is consolidated. Progress of previous recommendations is assessed and 41 new recommendations are issued, including the expansion of the 3x1 program to include private and corporate investments. However, still no political compromise for voting rights abroad is reached. +Info: http://www.ime.gob.mx/images/stories/ime/CCIME/reuniones_ordinarias/iii/nomenclatura.pdf	Related Events
2004-10-01	17	ExATec Reino Unido is established in the United Kingdom.	Contemporaneous Events
2004-10-01	18	Second ExATec Europa Meeting takes place in Paris.	Contemporaneous Events
2004-10-19	19	IME hosts the 1 st International Conference on State-Diaspora Relations (CIRED-I). This conference brings together the people in charge of State-Diaspora relations of Philippines, India, Morocco, Dominican Republic, Turkey, and Mexico, as well as academicians and experts in the field of those six nations, to exchange experiences and perspectives.	Related Events
2004-11-01	20	ExATec Belgium is established. Inspired by the Paris-based network, it assumes the organization of a 3 rd Europe-wide ExATec meeting the following year (see item 32).	Contemporaneous Events
2004-11-01	21	An Inter-ministerial commission is created to expand "3x1" Program to include private investors, as suggested during the 3 rd CCIME Meeting. Results of this commission would arrive in the shape of an expanded 4x1 Program operational less than a year later (see item 31)	Contemporaneous Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2004-12-01	22	<p>Fourth CCIME Meeting. Despite progress with the recommendations and different achievements in trust and dialogue, relations become tense due to the lack of results on the voting rights issue.</p> <p>While 31 new recommendations are proposed, some diaspora organizations pin the survival and continuity of the engagement on the vote of Mexicans abroad.</p> <p>+Info: http://www.ime.gob.mx/images/stories/ime/CCIME/reuniones_ordinarias/iv/nomenclatura.pdf</p>	Related Events
2005-01-01	23	ExATec Madrid is established.	Contemporaneous Events
2005-02-28	24	<p>Mexican entrepreneur Jorge Zavala establishes Tech BA in Silicon Valley, California. Tech BA is a high-tech business acceleration program aiming to link Mexican technology companies with the entrepreneurial environment of Silicon Valley. The Mexican Ministry of the Economy (SE) and the United States-Mexico Science Foundation (FUMEC) sponsor this program.</p> <p>+Info: http://www.slideshare.net/zavala55/overview-techba-silicon-valley</p>	Related Events
2005-04-25	25	<p>As a clear sign of commitment to the renewed State-diaspora dialogue and given a heightened state of diaspora pressure, a draft to operationalize Mexicans abroad vote is approved by the Mexican Senate only weeks before the 5th CCIME meeting. However, this draft law still requires Congress ratification to be enacted.</p> <p>+Info: http://www.ime.gob.mx/agenda_migratoria/voto/dictamen_voto.pdf</p>	Contemporaneous Events
2005-05-10	26	<p>5th CCIME Meeting. While 22 new recommendations are issued, the main headline from the event is a signed declaration in which all participating organizations urge the Congress to call for a special session to ratify the draft law (see item 25) on the operationalization of voting abroad.</p> <p>+Info: http://www.ime.gob.mx/images/stories/ime/CCIME/reuniones_ordinarias/vrecomendaciones/22recomendaciones.htm</p>	Related Events
2005-06-01	27	Following the operational rules of how CCIME was established, the Council renews its representatives for the 2006-2008 period through independent elections hosted by Consulates in the United States.	Related Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2005-06-05	28	<p>Applying the successful dialogue approach, and learning from the international experiences discussed at CIRED-I (see item 19), IME partners with the Mexican Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT) and the United States-Mexico Science Foundation (FUMEC) organize the First Meeting of the Mexican Talent Network (RTM).</p> <p>This meeting would bring together around 40 highly skilled Mexicans living and working in the United States (mainly Austin, Boston, Miami, San Diego, San José and Washington) with representatives from the World Bank, leading Mexican universities and high-tech companies from both sides of the border.</p> <p>+Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=162&Itemid=206</p>	Episode Events
2005-06-28	29	<p>Only weeks after the 5th CCIME Meeting, the Mexican Congress enacts the law that operationalizes the vote of Mexicans abroad. For the first time ever, the Mexican diaspora will be able to make use of their right to vote in the presidential elections in 2006.</p> <p>+Info: http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/AI/votoext/cronograma.jpg</p>	Contemporaneous Events
2005-10-03	30	<p>Building upon the success of the first one (see item 19 of this timeline), IME hosts 2nd International Conference on State-Diaspora Relations (CIRED-II), focusing their attention on Latin America and the Caribbean.</p> <p>Officials and experts review and share country experiences of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Uruguay and Mexico, as well as region-wide (South America and the Caribbean) experiences.</p>	Related Events
2005-10-12	31	<p>As another success of the State-diaspora engagement, the "4x1" Program is Launched with Western Union its first private partner</p>	Contemporaneous Events
2005-10-21	32	<p>Third ExATec Europa Meeting takes place in Brussels. The meeting is organized for the first time by a local network and outside of Paris.</p>	Contemporaneous Events
2005-11-09	33	<p>6th CCIME Meeting: three years from its initial dialogues, diaspora and State mutually acknowledge and evaluated their shared achievements in issues such as education, health, remittances, community investment and infrastructure projects for development, cultural exchange, and of course, the vote of Mexicans abroad.</p> <p>Additionally, improvements on the dialogue format and the agenda of issues towards the meetings to come with the new CCIME representatives are agreed upon.</p>	Related Events
2006-01-01	34	<p>ExATec Italia is established in Italy</p>	Contemporaneous Events
2006-01-01	35	<p>ExATec Europa del Este is established in the Czech Republic</p>	Contemporaneous Events
2006-01-01	36	<p>ExATec Alemania is established in Germany</p>	Contemporaneous Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2006-03-29	37	7th CCIME Meeting: New representatives are instated and commit to continue the dialogue on pending initiatives, as well as to promote new ones.	Related Events
2006-04-24	38	As agreed during the first RTM Meeting (see item 28), regional follow-up RTM Meetings take place in San Diego, San Jose, Los Angeles, Houston, Dallas and Boston. The goal of these meetings was to identify the best candidates to participate in a future second countrywide RTM meeting (see item 39), and to steer the Network forward.	Related Events
2006-06-18	39	Following-up on the dialogue initiated a year before (item 28), the second country-wide RTM Meeting aimed at consolidating the linkages between highly skilled Mexicans abroad and the institutions back home to articulate positive-reinforcing initiatives at both sides of the border. As a result, network members commit to institutionalize their efforts through the creation of local chapters of the RTM. + Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=163&Itemid=33	Episode Events
2006-07-02	40	Mexicans abroad vote for the first time. While over 10 million Mexicans live abroad, only 40,876 registered to vote. From those, 32,632 cast their vote: 58.3% for Calderon (PAN), 33.9% for Lopez (PRD), and 4.2% for Madrazo (PRI). The final election results for these parties was 35.9%, 35.3%, and 22.3% respectively. With a 0.6% victory margin, migrant votes made a difference despite their low participation.	Contemporaneous Events
2006-10-04	41	8th CCIME Meeting. Once the institutional normalcy of the mechanism has been explained through previous meetings, we will not be covering further CCIME meetings in detail as it escapes the scope of our case study. Nonetheless, we will continue to track them as they form the related prior events context of diaspora-State relationship.	Related Events
2006-10-13	42	4th ExATec Europa Meeting in Paris. Just as with the CCIME Meetings, we will not be covering the ExATec events in depth. However, we will be keeping record of them to track the expansion and cohesion of a network of highly-qualified Mexicans in Europe as part of the contemporaneous and prior event context.	Contemporaneous Events
2006-11-03	43	Building upon the successful networking experiences of TechBA, Jorge Zavala founds the first chapter of an RTM in Silicon Valley. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29&Itemid=104	Related Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2006-12-01	44	<p>Felipe Calderon succeeds Vicente Fox as president of Mexico. Elected by a very slim margin (see item 40) and amid allegations of fraud, Calderon's presidency was marked by constant political tensions with the left, and a conflicted relationship with a Congress controlled by the opposition. Moreover, his administration was consumed by a bloody war against Drug Cartels and Organized Crime, which cast a very dark shadow over almost every other domain of the public sphere and his policy achievements.</p> <p>Regarding his relations with the Mexican diaspora, Calderon maintained and consolidated the existing policies, and proposed a reform to improve the voting system for Mexicans abroad.</p>	Contemporaneous Events
2007-01-01	45	ExATec Suiza is established in Switzerland*	Contemporaneous Events
2007-04-25	46	9th CCIME Meeting	Related Events
2007-05-24	47	<p>Second chapter of RTM is established in Houston</p> <p>+Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31&Itemid=103 </p>	Related Events
2007-07-08	48	<p>The third RTM Meeting aims to assess the accomplishments of the young network, as well as to promote its expansion through the foundation of further chapters. Additionally the interpretive engagement starts to shape proposals to improve the cooperation between diaspora and homeland institutions.</p> <p>+Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=164&Itemid=32 </p>	Episode Events
2007-08-21	49	<p>RTM Ottawa is established as the first chapter outside of the United States.</p> <p>+Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=134&Itemid=202 </p>	Related Events
2007-10-05	50	5th ExATec Europa Meeting in Madrid	Contemporaneous Events
2007-11-14	51	10th CCIME Meeting	Related Events
2007-11-30	52	<p>RTM Montreal established</p> <p>+Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=186&Itemid=257 </p>	Related Events
2007-12-06	53	<p>RTM Detroit established (APROMEX)</p> <p>+Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28&Itemid=102 </p>	Related Events
2008-04-22	54	11th CCIME Meeting	Related Events
2008-05-12	55	CCIME elects new representatives for the 2009-2011 period	Related Events
2008-10-17	56	6th ExATec Europa Meeting in Berlin	Contemporaneous Events
2008-11-10	57	12th CCIME Meeting	Related Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2009-04-01	58	Carlos García de Alba becomes the new Executive Director of IME in place of Carlos González Gutiérrez	Related Events
2009-04-23	59	13th CCIME Meeting	Related Events
2009-06-25	60	RTM Orange County established (TECMA) +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106&Itemid=13	Related Events
2009-07-27	61	ExATec Barcelona (2004) and ExATec Madrid (2005) merge into ExATec España	Contemporaneous Events
2009-08-12	62	4 th RTM Meeting. The meeting aims to consolidate the Network and its chapters, as well as to develop a strategy to link contact points in Mexico with the chapters abroad through concrete projects 7 areas of mutual interest: 1) Cooperation for Development, 2) Information and Communication Technologies, 3) Nanotechnologies and New Materials, 4) Hydrocarbons and Alternative Energy, 5) Automotive Industry, 6) Environment and Climate Change, and 7) Food, Agriculture, Fishery and Biotechnology. Also, for the first time, invitations are issued to engage talented Mexicans outside of the North American region. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106&Itemid=13	Episode Events
2009-10-02	63	7th ExATec Europa Meeting in Milan	Contemporaneous Events
2009-11-11	64	14th CCIME Meeting	Related Events
2010-03-04	65	RTM Boston established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=133&Itemid=228	Related Events
Specific Episode			
2010-03-05	66	RTM Alemania is established in Germany as the first chapter in Europe (or outside of North America, for that matter). We consider this event as the milestone item that opens our case-study's specific episode. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=133&Itemid=228	Episode Events
2010-04-16	67	RTM Los Angeles established (MEXCLA) +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=118&Itemid=138	Related Events
2010-04-25	68	15th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2010-06-02	69	5th RTM Meeting. As with previous iterations of the interpretive engagement process, the meeting focused on the assessment of achievements, as well as on the consolidation of the initiatives around the 7 strategic areas of interest. Further topics of discussion included Roadmap Strategies and Creative Cities, Cooperation Opportunities between RTM Chapters and Sectorial Contact Points (PNCS) in México, success stories, and much more. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=166&Itemid=137	Episode Events
2010-06-19	70	RTM El Paso del Norte established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=131&Itemid=198	Related Events
2010-08-28	71	RTM Washington, DC established (MXDC) +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=129&Itemid=140	Related Events
2010-09-10	72	RTM Reino Unido is established as the second chapter in Europe. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=119&Itemid=139	Episode Events
2010-10-01	73	Javier Díaz de León becomes the new Executive Director of IME in place of Carlos García de Alba	Related Events
2010-10-06	74	RTM Toronto established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=130&Itemid=141	Related Events
2010-10-07	75	8th ExATec Europa Meeting in Prague. For the first time, Tecnológico de Monterrey withdraws its support from an association in Europe. Although the meeting takes place, there is no official representation from the University, and ExATec Europa del Este is eliminated from the roster of officially recognized ExATec associations.	Contemporaneous Events
2010-11-03	76	16th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events
2011-04-14	77	17th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events
2011-05-02	78	CCIME elects new representatives for the 2012-2014 period	Contemporaneous Events
2011-05-27	79	RTM Francia established as the third chapter in France. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=140&Itemid=204	Episode Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2011-06-08	80	6th RTM Meeting. By this meeting, the RTM has 13 official chapters (8 in the USA, 2 in Canada, and 3 in Europe), therefore part of the agenda is focused on establishing assessment and feedback mechanisms to increase the frequency and quality of the dialogue. Consolidation of the Sectorial Points of Contact in Mexico (PNCS) is still a work in progress. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=167&Itemid=207	Episode Events
2011-07-06	81	RTM Escandinavia established as the fourth chapter in Europe. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=135&Itemid=142	Episode Events
2011-10-07	82	9th ExATec Europa Meeting in Madrid	Contemporaneous Events
2011-11-10	83	18th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events
2011-12-14	84	RTM Beijing is established in China as the first Asian chapter. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=135&Itemid=142	Related Events
2011-12-19	85	RTM Holanda established in the Netherlands as the fifth European chapter. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=135&Itemid=142	Episode Events
2012-01-01	86	ExATec Associations in Europe go through a thorough reorganization within the Tecnológico de Monterrey structure. The ExATec Europa association (see item 4) is renamed ExATec Francia to show its local character, and the name ExATec Europa henceforth used to designate a Council with representatives of all the ExATec Associations officially recognized in Europe.	Contemporaneous Events
2012-04-25	87	19th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events
2012-08-28	88	7th RTM Meeting +Info: http://www.ime.gob.mx/es/950-jornada-informativa-red-de-talentos	Episode Events
2012-10-11	89	RTM Bélgica is established in Belgium as the sixth European chapter. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=155&Itemid=196	Episode Events
2012-10-19	90	10th ExATec Europa Meeting in Germany	Contemporaneous Events
2012-11-14	91	20th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2012-11-16	92	RTM Japón established in Japan as the second Asian chapter. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=173&Itemid=217	Related Events
2012-11-20	93	RTM Irlanda established (MexNet) in Ireland as the 7 th European chapter. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=160&Itemid=219	Episode Events
2012-12-01	94	Enrique Peña Nieto succeeds Felipe Calderon as President in a hotly contested election. Again, a narrow victory and allegations of fraud are keeping the country in a status of political polarization. A governance pact with the main opposition parties prior to his inauguration allowed him to enact important structural reforms at record-breaking speed during the first year of his mandate. However, two years in, the pact is dissolved and tensions return as high as ever. While it is clear Peña intends to reform the existing diaspora engagement policies, details on how will not be made public before the end of this timeline.	Contemporaneous Events
2013-01-11	95	Arnulfo Valdivia becomes the second Director of IME in place of Cándido Morales	Episode Events
2013-02-28	96	RTM Nueva Zelanda established in New Zealand +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=169&Itemid=216	Related Events
2013-04-17	97	21th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events
2013-04-30	98	RTM San Diego established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=160&Itemid=219	Related Events
2013-06-03	99	Francisco de la Torre becomes the new Executive Director of IME in place of Javier Díaz	Episode Events
2013-06-07	100	RTM Venezuela is established as the first chapter in Latin America. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=155&Itemid=196	Related Events
2013-09-01	101	ExATec Escandinavia is established.	Contemporaneous Events
2013-09-10	102	RTM San Francisco & Bay Area established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=172&Itemid=232	Related Events
2013-09-27	103	11th ExATec Europa Meeting in Paris	Contemporaneous Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2013-10-01	104	UNAM Alumni Network for Europe is established. UNAM stands for the National Autonomous University of Mexico: the largest and most prestigious public University in the country.	Contemporaneous Events
2013-10-01	105	RTM Quetzaltenango established in Guatemala as the second Latin American Chapter. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=174&Itemid=235	Related Events
2013-10-15	106	RTM Barcelona is established (Talentia) as the 8 th chapter in Europe. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=175&Itemid=248	Episode Events
2013-11-13	107	RTM Chicago established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=184&Itemid=215	Related Events
2013-11-13	108	8th RTM Meeting. By now, the dialogue mechanism is well established and has been tried and tested. However, due to the quick expansion of the network and its geographic diversification, new coordination challenges arise. As the first founder of the first chapter of the RTM Network, Jorge Zavala (see items 24 & 43) is elected by consensus as the Global Coordinator of the Network. Zavala, together with Luisa Luna, founding member of RTM Netherlands, David Oliva, founding member of RTM Belgium, and Daniel Bremer, founding member of RTM Washington, are tasked to find a coordination structure that would improve the institutionalization and further operation of RTM. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=176&Itemid=246	Episode Events
2013-12-09	109	22th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events
2013-12-16	110	Ernesto de Lucas Hopkins becomes the third Director of IME in place of Arnulfo Valdivia	Episodic Events
2014-01-01	111	ExATec Irlanda established in Ireland	Contemporaneous Events
2014-02-01	112	RTM Australia established as the second chapter in Oceania. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=182&Itemid=250	Related Events
2014-02-25	113	RTM Phoenix established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Itemid=255	Related Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2014-03-08	114	RTM Dallas established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=178&Itemid=242	Related Events
2014-04-08	115	RTM España established in Spain as the 9 th European chapter. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=177&Itemid=239	Episode Events
2014-05-01	116	CCIME elects new representatives for the 2015-2017 period	Contemporaneous Events
2014-05-01	117	RTM Kansas City established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=179&Itemid=244	Related Events
2014-05-08	118	1st RTM Regional Meeting for Americas. After the enactment of the new coordination structure, regional meetings with specific regional goals and subjects are held. The first Americas meeting takes place in Dallas, Tx. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=180&Itemid=245	Related Events
2014-05-30	119	RTM Suiza established in Switzerland as the 10 th European chapter. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=183&Itemid=252	Episode Events
2014-06-02	120	1st RTM Regional Meeting for Europe, and the first regional meeting to take place outside of the American continent. The meeting reached several concrete agreements along five overarching topics (Science and Technology, Entrepreneurship, Academic Mobility, Energy and Sustainability, and Creative Industries), as well as coordination goals such as the creation and promotion of a platform to improve the communication and cohesion of the network through webinars and mentoring. With this item we close the specific episode of the case study, as we understand it to be the milestone of an institutional consolidation for the RTM Network in Europe. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=179&Itemid=244	Episode Events
2014-06-04		Later Events	
2014-06-19	121	23th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events
2014-09-04	122	RTM Singapur established in Singapore +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=187&Itemid=258	Related Events

DATE	No.	MILESTONE	CATEGORY
2014-09-04	123	RTM Finlandia is unofficially launched in Finland. Although it has not been yet registered with the IME, it already holds meetings and social activities with the support of the Mexican Embassy in Helsinki. +Info: https://www.facebook.com/RedGlobalMexicanosFinlandia	Episode Events
2014-09-26	124	12th ExATec Europa Meeting in Milan	Contemporaneous Events
2014-10-22	125	RTM British Columbia established *Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=190&Itemid=263	Related Events
2014-11-01	126	RTM Sacramento established +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=189&Itemid=262	Related Events
2014-11-07	127	RTM Suecia is established in Sweden as the 11 th European chapter. +Info: http://www.redtalentos.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=191&Itemid=267	Episode Events
2014-11-10	128	24th CCIME Meeting	Contemporaneous Events
2015-10-01	129	13th ExATec Europa Meeting in Dublin	Contemporaneous Events

Preliminary Timeline of the Mexican State-Diaspora Relations




Figure 61: Preliminary Narrative Timeline for our Case Study.

Chapter 9: Application of the Research Protocol

It is not enough to be industrious; so are the ants. What are you industrious about?

Letter to H.G.O. Blake, Henry David Thoreau (1857)

In this chapter, we continue with the operationalization of the united Matryoshka framework, focusing on the generation of relevant general and specific research questions aimed at solving a problem statement, and the gathering of data to sketch answers for those questions through the application of our selected analytical tools (see Figure 58 on page 231).

By design, previous steps of our methodology have driven us to generate initial relevant proto-questions about our case study, both for Type A (general) and Type B (case-specific). Also by design, previous steps of our methodology have inadvertently driven us to gather relevant data to answer those proto-questions, for example, while extracting the narrative elements to construct our milestone timeline. By doing so, we have defined, redefined and refined our understanding of our case study along the way.

Given the non-linear nature of the Matryoshka framework, these proto-questions and their answer hypotheses have been evolving through the process and adapting through the prism of methodology (see Figure 60 on page 239) as we form a clearer picture of the case in our minds.

The final structure and format for our case study is given by the problem statement we have chosen: *Are brain-circulation dynamics achieved through the RTM ↔ IME interaction in Europe and, if so, how?*

Regarding the questions, by the end of several iterations, we have generated five Type A questions that should lead us to our main knowledge goals. Additionally, we have generated over 50 dependent Type B questions aimed at linking the knowledge goals of our case study with the analytical framework to obtain it. Then, when trying to obtain the answers, we have complemented the data already obtained with further primary and secondary sources.

For presentation purposes, and to avoid repetition, this chapter will first enlist the primary and secondary sources of data to complement the narrative timeline (see page 238). Then, it will enlist

the relevant questions and proto-answers. These proto-answers are our operational notes on how to solve these questions by referencing the specific relevant data sources. So, instead of answering each question here in full and duplicating the information later, we will only provide a full answer as we solve our case study in the final report in chapter ten (see page 271).

Primary sources (1): On-line in-depth survey of the qualified and highly-qualified Mexican diaspora in Europe

The Mexpats.EU questionnaire aimed to collect data from those Mexican professionals or postgraduates living in Europe for at least a year, using an on-line standardized in-depth survey of around 90 questions. Exactly 95 valid responses were collected from 5 October 2012 to 3 February 2015, from the Mexican diaspora in 15 countries. A full sample of the questionnaire and a complete summary of the responses is available as an Annex (see page 353 onwards).

Given the difficulty to locate the population in such a geographically extended area, we have used snowball sampling to trace the target respondents. We are aware of the shortcomings of this particular type of sampling technique for descriptive and causal research; however, the main use of our survey is exploratory. Furthermore, initial informant leads were diversified as much as possible both geographically and in terms of community membership, to be able to extract some general descriptive loose inferences from the target population.

Nonetheless, this information is not meant to be the centerpiece of our research, but to complement contextual information that is unavailable from any other sources.

Primary sources (2): Interviews with key individual actors

The following interviews were performed for the explicit purpose of this case study. All of them were carried out as informal semi-structured individual conversations, in which the key variables and indicators catalogued as the operations summary of the unified Matryoshka framework (see page 217 onwards) served as the interviewer guideline.

- Francisco de la Torre Galindo, current Executive Director of IME, member of the Mexican Foreign Service since 1998. Interviewed in person on 21 August 2014 at the Headquarters of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico City.
- Sofía Orozco Aguirre, former Subdirector in charge of relations with the RTM, and civil servant with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs involved with the support to Mexicans in the

United States since the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME). Interviewed thrice on 21 August 2014 and 28 August 2014 in person at the Headquarters of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico City, as well as on 08 April 2015 in Mexico City via telephone from Madrid.

- Arnulfo Valdivia Machuca, current Mexican Ambassador to Colombia, former Director of IME, former Diaspora Affairs Coordinator during the 2012 presidential campaign and the transition team of Enrique Peña Nieto. Interviewed in person on 28 May 2012 at the Goberna School of Government of the Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset in Madrid.
- Jorge Zavala Ontiveros, current Global Coordinator of RedGlobal.Mx, founder of the first RTM Chapter in Silicon Valley. Interviewed in San José, California twice on 19 August 2014 via videoconference from Mexico City, and on 06 April 2015 via videoconference from Madrid.
- David Oliva Uribe, founder of the first RTM chapter in Europe (RTM Germany), founder of the RTM Chapter in Belgium, first Regional Coordinator for Europe. Interviewed in Brussels on 7 April 2015 via videoconference from Madrid.
- Martha Estela Mondragón Ochoa, president of RTM in The Netherlands. Interviewed in Arnhem on 7 April 2015 via videoconference from Madrid.
- Francisco José López-Lira Hinojo, vice-president of RTM in Spain. Interviewed in person on 9 April 2015 in Madrid.

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General Question 1: What drove the Mexican government to pursue a diaspora engagement policy focused on brain circulation?

This general question essentially focuses on the prior events section of our CORPC tool, with a special focus on the Mexican public institutions. Therefore, to answer it, we could build the narrative structure from the specific questions:

- a) *How did the specific diaspora engagement policy currently known as the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME) come into being from an ACF perspective?*

Give an overview of the policy history based on the five eras of Mexican State-diaspora relations expanding from the account in Bustillos et al. (2009), then explain the latest institutional and policy changes towards the last 15 years from Iskander (2010). Frame the changes in a narrative form explaining how the policy subsystem changed to evolve from the no-policy policy to the service provision stage to the interpretive engagement stage.

- a.i) *How was the degree of consensus required for IME to pursue a policy change achieved?*

Use González Gutiérrez (2006, 2006b, 2009) and Iskander (2010). Contrast and expand with information provided by Orozco Aguirre (2014, 2014b). Add context and statistical data from World Bank (2015), IME (2015) and *ad hoc* sources.

- a.ii) *How did the political system in which IME is embedded become open enough to the policy change?*

Go in depth with the change from a service provision approach to the interpretive engagement approach. Exemplify through the events and milestones how the frequent exchanges between diaspora and State also affected improvements in the quality of these exchanges and generated trust enough to allow an articulation of migrants' demands to the policy process. Draw upon Iskander (2010) and Orozco Aguirre (2014, 2014b)

- a.iii) *Which specific societal cleavages helped/hampered the policy change to happen?*

Use the story of the political transitions of Mexico, especially from the Salinas de Gortari, Zedillo Ponce de León, and Vicente Fox Quesada presidential administrations. Also retrace how the Mexican society changed along this period, and how certain periods of the Mexico-United States relation affected the policy decisions towards migrants.

- b) *How can we characterize the initial IME's diaspora engagement policy in DMF terms?*

Chart how IME articulates the institutional – diaspora engagement from a strategic perspective, helping to open the homeland elites to reform proposals originating outside the system.

- b.i) *Regarding individual-organization juxtaposition?*

Use the diagram of Figure 40 on page 156 to chart progress of initiatives between the overall diaspora and the State, going back to the no-policy policy era and up to the consolidation of the IME to date.

b.ii) And regarding the discussion-transaction dynamics?

This will come from the milestone events (specifically items 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 37, 38, 39, 41, 46, 48, 51, 54, 55, 57, 59, 62, 64) and from the interview of De la Torre (2014) and Orozco Aguirre (2014, 2014b).

c) Regarding specifically the creation of IME, who are the key pro-engagement actors overall?

Explain how Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Vicente Fox, Juan Hernandez, Carlos González Gutiérrez, Cándido Morales were instrumental in the construction of IME as we know it. Also, explain how changes at the leadership of IME (Carlos García de Alba, Javier de León, and Francisco de la Torre as subsequent Executive Directors; Arnulfo Valdivia and Ernesto de Lucas as subsequent Directors) affected the institutional performance at the consolidation stage.

c.i) How do the biographies and identities of these key actors contribute to their role in NPF terms?

Describe the effects of relevant elements in their personal biography had on their actions towards the case study.

c.ii) What are the assets and liabilities of the key actors within the institution in NTP+ terms?

How Fox's presidential (constitutional) power fully supports the initiatives of his chosen representatives to engage the diaspora, first with OPME's Juan Hernández, and then with IME's Morales and González Gutiérrez. How OPME and IME acted both, as network programmers and switchers, and the migrants as users. How the actors in each context (OPME & IME) use their powers in the network to push forward their agendas, and make an emphasis on how these qualities killed OPME and enhanced the chances of success of IME.

c.iii) How can the actors' belief systems be characterized in narrative terms?

Use elements of the previous questions to build this answer.

c.iv) How can those belief systems translate into the pro-engagement message?

Use elements of the previous questions to build this answer.

- d) *Regarding specifically the creation of IME, who are the key against-engagement actors overall?*
- d.i) *How do the biographies and identities of these key actors contribute to their role in NPF terms?*
- d.ii) *What are the assets and liabilities of the key actors within the institution in NTP+ terms?*
- d.iii) *How can the actors' belief systems be characterized in narrative terms?*
- d.iv) *How can those belief systems translate into the against-engagement message?*

While there seems to be no formal coalition against the engagement, elements within the political subsystem seem to have posed certain degree of resistance stemming both from electoral politics opposition and from paternalistic ideas of government. Nonetheless, there is a series of resistances regarding the consolidation of OPME that could be explained albeit briefly with these questions. Also, by specifying the questions in the research protocol we keep an eye open in case we discover previously unknown information.

General Question 2: What drove the highly-qualified Mexican diaspora in Europe to organize and be receptive to engage?

This general question essentially focuses on the Prior Events section of our CORPC tool, with a special focus on the professional and talented Mexican diaspora. Therefore, to answer it, we could build the narrative structure from the specific questions:

- a) *How did the highly-qualified Mexican diaspora network known as Red de Talentos Mexicanos (RTM) formed in Europe from an ACF perspective?*

Give an overview of the creation, consolidation and expansion of the RTM network. Frame these events by how preexisting social tissue facilitated the creation of other associations and organization of professionals abroad, especially in the US and in Europe, and how this translated into RTM.

- a.i) *How was the degree of consensus required for RTM to pursue an engagement agenda in Europe achieved?*

Frame the creation, consolidation and expansion of the RTM network in Europe as a logical progression from its expansion in the United States.

- a.ii) *How did the political system in which RTM is embedded become open enough to the policy change?*

Explain how IME has been instrumental in articulating openness such as it was with CCIME, but stress the institutional shortcomings of RTM articulation.

a.iii) Which specific societal cleavages helped/hampered the diaspora's engagement agenda to happen?

Use the economic progression from late 1980s to date to frame the demographic changes leading to RTM. Emphasize the demographic differences of migrants in different destinations. Again describe how preexisting social tissue served as fertile soil to grow the European side of RTM.

b) How can we characterize the initial high-skilled Mexican diaspora engagement in DMF terms?

Chart the initiatives between Mexico and its highly-skilled diaspora. Reflect the strategic character of RTM and its potential to induce reform proposals originating outside the system.

b.i) Regarding individual-organization juxtaposition?

Use the diagram of Figure 39 on page 134 to chart progress of initiatives between highly-skilled diaspora and the State going back to the no-policy policy era, and up to date.

b.ii) And regarding the discussion-transaction dynamics?

Use data from the interviews of Jorge Zavala, Sofía Orozco, David Oliva, Martha Mondragón and Francisco López-Lira. Also, use the preliminary timeline milestone events: 1, 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 28, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, and 66.

c) Who are the key diaspora pro-engagement actors overall, but making emphasis at the point of transition?

For the initial expansion of RTM, focus on Hector Ruiz, Guillermo Arriaga, Carlos González Gutierrez, Bruno Figueroa and Jorge Zavala. For the European incursion, on David Oliva, the new leadership of IME, and the commitment of local diplomatic personnel.

c.i) How do the biographies and identities of these key actors contribute to their role in NPF terms?

Describe the effects of relevant elements in their personal biography had on their actions towards the case study.

- c.ii) *What are the assets and liabilities of the key actors within the institution in NTP+ terms?*

Describe how while IME's institutional power supports the initiatives of RTM, its commitment remains marginal when understood in the context of CCIME-CNCME engagement. Moreover, how towards RTMs European incursion, the institutional architecture of IME limits the possibilities of support. When articulating the internal networks of RTM, explain how the presence of programmers, switchers and users in the network build the coalition dynamics, as well as the redundancy tradeoffs.

- c.iii) *How can the actors' belief systems be characterized in narrative terms?*

Use elements of the previous questions to build this answer.

- c.iv) *How can those belief systems translate into the pro-engagement message?*

Use elements of the previous questions to build this answer.

- d) *Who are the key diaspora against-engagement actors at the point of transition?*

- d.i) *How do the biographies and identities of these key actors contribute to their role in NPF terms?*

- d.ii) *What are the assets and liabilities of the key actors within the institution in NTP+ terms?*

- d.iii) *How can the actors' belief systems be characterized in narrative terms?*

- d.iv) *How can those belief systems translate into the against-engagement message?*

While there seems to be no diaspora coalition against the engagement, elements within the diaspora seem to have posed certain degree of resistance. This will be described as related by the aforementioned interviews.

General Question 3: How did the IME ↔ RTM interaction move from virtually inexistent to success-story-in-the-making in such a short time?

This general question essentially focuses on the events occurring in the middle section of our CORPC tool: contemporaneous and related events, as well as the specific episode. Here, the special focus is on the IME↔RTM Europe interaction. Therefore, to answer it, we could build the narrative structure from the specific questions:

- a) *To consider the contemporaneous events, which where the ACF's external subsystem changes...*
 a.i) *...in socio economic conditions accompanying the specific episode?*

Stress the changes that Mexico underwent economically and politically in its recent history to identify elements that could be useful to our case, such as migratory trend changes towards Europe

a.ii) ...in public opinion?

Describe the feeling of pride that Mexicans now seem to have of the achievements of compatriots abroad. Also, how the influence of diaspora has changed to be regarded as a nuisance to a closed system, to be a sought after phenomenon by the homeland public institutions. Finally, how a seemingly disaggregated diaspora in Europe has started to consolidate through different private initiatives.

a.iii) ...in the governing coalition?

Describe how the change of governing political parties have influenced the policies at the RTM engagement level.

a.iv) ...in related policy subsystems?

For example, point out some changes at CONACYT and ProMexico, Ministry of Energy (SENER) and how these influence our case study episode, or could potentially do so, almost as much as the growth of other associations in Europe, such as ExATec.

b) To consider the related events, which are the ACF's stable parameters..

b.i) ...regarding the basic attributes of the brain-circulation situation?

Use stocks of migrants data (Mexican human capital) in Europe and how its social capital and knowledge resources has become more appreciated back home.

b.ii) ...regarding fundamental socio cultural values and structure?

How the growth and expansion of RTM in the United States and elsewhere, affects for the better the prestige and situation of RTM in Europe, for example.

b.iii) ...regarding basic constitutional and institutional structure?

Again, stress the structural advantages and limitations if IME as a strategic partner, but also how a rather organic and uncoordinated growth of RTM affected its initial consolidation and challenged its future expansion.

c) To consider the specific episode,

c.i) How can we characterize the RTM diaspora in Europe in DMF terms?

It goes from a disconnected array of organizations varying in levels of maturity between emerging with some minor strategic engagements via IME and fully mature strategic organizations well engaged, to a more coordinated array of associations.

c.ii) How can we characterize the IME in DMF terms?

IME is onto itself a point of articulation for diaspora contributions into a heterogeneous institutional system. However while it is extremely well calibrated to accommodate the CCIME-CNCME dialogue, it has not been able to articulate a similar mechanism for the RTM.

c.iii) How can we characterize the RTM↔IME interaction in DMF terms?

To answer these questions, we will make use of the entire gamut of timeline items between 66 and 120, as well as the interviews. The idea is to reply specifically for the type of diaspora, the type of homeland elite, and the type of expected interaction in the DMF framework's diagram of Figure 41 (see page 157).

c.iv) Which additional actors conform the pro-engagement coalition?

For RTM Europe, the additional coalition actors are the institutional adscriptions of individual Mexican talents abroad, the local diplomatic personnel, other professional and non-professional associations of Mexicans in the local countries, RTM as an arch-organization elsewhere, just to mention a few.

c.v) Is it possible to map the pro-engagement coalition to assess its strengths and weaknesses?

It could be possible but the time constrains for finalizing the case study limits our immediate efforts. Maybe further on.

c.vi) What are the short- and long-term assets and constrains of the pro-engagement coalition?

Use information discussed in previous answers to catalogue assets and constrains.

c.vii) Which additional actors conform the against-engagement coalition?

See answers 1.d and 2.d. Not applicable.

c.viii) Is it possible to map the against-engagement coalition to assess its strengths and weaknesses?

See answers 1.d and 2.d. Not applicable.

c.ix) What are the short- and long-term assets and constrains of the against-engagement coalition?

See answers 1.d and 2.d. Not applicable.

c.x) What are the ACF rules for interaction between both coalitions?

Although both are pro-reform and well-articulated in paper, we will take IME and RTM Europe as different coalitions as it is their interaction that will determine whether brain-circulation dynamics are achieved. This answer will draw heavily upon the interview responses and will trace the evolution of these interactions between the opening of the first RTM chapter in Europe and the consolidation of a European coordination of RTM.

c.xi) What are the ACF paths for policy change?

Since the ideal for policy change in this context is brain circulation in general, we understand that Policy-oriented learning and negotiated agreements to achieve interpretive engagement are the main change paths.

c.xii) How could the joint engagement initiatives be characterized in the DMF's individual-organization juxtaposition? Has it evolved?

This is a continuation of the evolution of our diagram in response to question 2.b.i (1982-2006), to include the 2007-2014 periods.

c.xiii) How could the joint diaspora-IME interactions be characterized under the DMF's discussion-transaction dynamics? Has it evolved?

Similarly, the answer of this question is a continuation of answer 2.b.ii, to include timeline milestones from the "specific event" category between 66 and 120.

General Question 4: What lessons could be extracted from the RTM ↔ IME interaction outcomes to consolidate and improve on their interaction in the future?

This general question essentially focuses on the final episode and later events of our CORPC tool. Therefore, to answer it, we could build the narrative structure from the specific questions:

d) What were the policy outcomes?

In this particular case, the question is if brain-circulation dynamics are present or not, and in either case, how and why.

e) What were the policy impacts?

This would be engagement outcomes between Mexico and the European branches of RTM, as resulting from initiatives that could qualify as brain-circulation dynamics, if these exist.

f) How could the joint engagement initiatives after the episode be characterized in the DMF's individual-organization juxtaposition? Has it evolved?

This is a continuation of the evolution of our diagram in response to question 2.b.i and 3.c.xii, to include the 2014-2015 period.

g) How could the joint diaspora-IME interactions after the episode be characterized under the DMF's discussion-transaction dynamics? Has it evolved?

Similarly, the answer of this question is a continuation of answer 2.b.ii and 3.c.xiii, to include timeline milestones from the "later events" category after 120.

h) From the analysis, what proposals could be suggested to IME to improve on the engagement from the homeland institutions side?

To answer this question, we will make use the analysis performed in the previous three general questions and the specific dependent questions. Also, this answer will serve as the case-study conclusions from the content perspective.

i) From the analysis, what proposals could be suggested to RTM Europe to improve on the engagement from the diaspora side?

To answer this question, we will make use the analysis performed in the previous three general questions and the specific dependent questions. Also, this answer will serve as the case-study conclusions from the content perspective.

General Question 5: What lessons could be extracted from the RTM ↔ IME experience for other countries?

To answer this question, we will make use of the analysis performed in the previous four general questions and their specific dependent questions. The answer to the fifth general question will also serve as the case-study conclusions from the methodological perspective, that is, regarding the experience of using the Matryoshka framework in the selected case-study context.




Figure 62: Summary diagram of Unified Matryoshka Framework applied to our case study.

Chapter 10: Results of the Research Protocol

Then his father said, 'Son, you are always with me, and everything I have is yours. But we had to celebrate and be glad because this brother of yours was dead and is alive. He was lost and is found.'

Prodigal Son Parable, Luke 15:31-32

We have devoted the previous two chapters of part three to prepare and apply the research protocol of the Matryoshka framework to the case study of how to improve the brain-circulation dynamics of the highly-skilled Mexican diaspora in Europe and the homeland institutions. In this chapter, we bring those efforts to fruition by drafting the report of the case study as dictated by our protocol (see Figure 59 on page 231).

While we have tried to minimize being repetitive, the case report is meant to be a stand-alone document and all references should therefore be self-contained. This report was drafted by turning the proto-answers of the previous chapter and the ideas in the summary diagram of Figure 62 (see page 270) into extended answers that follow our case study narrative structure methodology, and by adding contextual information from previous sections of this dissertation for readers who might be less familiar with the specifics of the case.

In other words, the report provides a reinterpretation of the milestone events as contained in the narrative timeline offered in chapter eight (see page 238), complemented by the data from sources enlisted in chapter nine (see page 256), and structured in a way to answer the questions (see page 260) generated to solve our case study's problem statement.

Case Study Report

RedGlobal.MX and the Institute for Mexicans Abroad: (Re)Engaging Mexican Talent in Europe as a Development Policy Tool

Brain drain is a well-known phenomenon: countries losing their most talented citizens as these emigrate in search of better opportunities abroad. Sadly, the equally important phenomenon of brain circulation remains rather obscurely in the domain of migration experts. Essentially, the brain circulation notion suggests that not only the emigration of talent should not imply a loss to the countries of origin, but that it might in fact represent an opportunity for development.

One of the main factors behind these development opportunities lies in the frequency and quality of exchanges that talented migrants maintain between their current places of residence and their homelands. Said exchanges can be as quantifiable and tangible as investment and business opportunities or other forms of financial transfers, or as unquantifiable and intangible as the knowledge and know-how that is quite often even inadvertently exchanged.

Therefore, if the frequency and quality of exchanges is a *sine qua non* condition to promote valuable brain-circulation dynamics, the (re)engagement of the diaspora to the homeland to increase and improve those exchanges should be an issue of the outmost interest for public officials in the countries whence talented migrants originate.

Mexico is one of those countries traditionally associated to migration in general, and lately to brain drain in particular. Since its origins as an independent nation in the nineteenth century, it has sustained a healthy stream of emigrants. However, never in its history had the country experienced an increase in outflows as it did over the past 50 years, and never in its history had Mexican public institutions sought to reconnect with its diaspora as they have tried over the past 13 years.

This case study is precisely about that. Our aim is to assess whether the policy efforts developed over the past 13 years to reengage Mexico with its talented diaspora have succeeded in establishing brain-circulation dynamics or not, and how. To narrow down our scope, we focus on the Mexican diaspora in Europe, and the specific policy efforts in question refer to the engagement between the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME by its Spanish acronym) and the RedGlobal.Mx (formerly Mexican Talent Network or RTM by its Spanish acronym).

However, to achieve our goal we must retrace the story of, on the one hand, how Mexican public officials become aware of the untapped development potential of the Mexican diaspora and

consolidate the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME) as the main policy tool for reengagement. On the other hand, we must retrace the story of the Mexican Talent Network (RTM), focusing on how came to be, to expand towards Europe, and how it articulated its organization to become receptive to the institutional engagement.

Only then can we explore how the actual interaction between IME and RTM develops, from the moment RTM gets a foothold in the European continent to the moment the Network is consolidated. This should allow us to assess the degree and quality of engagement articulation between the talented diaspora and the homeland institutions, and to establish the absence or existence of brain circulation dynamics.

To conclude, we will extract from this experience lessons on how to improve the engagement, both for the public officials and for the talented diasporans, as well as for other countries who might be interested in adopting a similar scheme.

Institute of Mexicans Abroad: The Dawn of a New Era in Mexican State-Diaspora Relations

Understanding the talent engagement policy in Europe is impossible without understanding the context of how the diaspora engagement policies came to happen. Researchers who have analyzed the history of the complex relationship between Mexico and its diaspora identify five broad eras of policy behavior (Durand, 2004; Alarcón, 2006; “Verduzco, 1997; Leite, Ramos & Gaspar, 2003; Massey, Durán & Malone, 2002” Bustillos et al., 2009) shown in Figure 63, each with its own characteristics, migratory patterns and peculiarities.




Figure 63: Timeline for the five eras of State-diaspora relations in Mexico.

This separation into eras is very helpful to identify and understand qualitative changes in the attitude between State and diaspora, which in turn explain historical inertias whence the current institutions and policies derive.

1. *An open border era, extending from mid-19th century to the beginning of the Great Depression.*

Following the annexation of former Mexican northern territories by the United States in 1847, this first era's main characteristic was a porous border in which Mexican northbound migratory flows were encouraged by the expansion of railroad infrastructure in both countries and restrictive legislation in the United States against Asian and Eastern European migrants. The labor demand left unsatisfied by said restrictive legislation would be eagerly covered by an influx of Mexican workers, particularly after 1900. A decade later, by 1910, this influx would become a "flood" as Mexicans escaped the Mexican Revolution, carving out the first historical northbound migratory stream of relevance.

2. *A mass deportation era, extending from the beginning of the Great Depression to the entry of the United States of America in World War II.*

The first era would end with the dramatic economic and social effects derived from the economic crack and the Dust Bowl phenomenon of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The open border policy would be replaced by massive deportations, and the consolidation of the United States Border Patrol. By 1940, these massive deportations would have brought the population of Mexican migrants down to the levels of 1910, before the flood generated by the Mexican Revolution.

3. *The Bracero Program era, extending from 1942 to 1967.*

The second era would end in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States would experience increased agricultural and manual labor demand due to the war efforts and post-war policies, and these would be covered by a series of bilateral agreements with the Mexican government. Collectively known as Bracero Program, these agreements would establish yearly quotas of guest workers or temporary labor migrants. The legal migration fostered by Bracero would grow in parallel with the migration of irregular, cheaper and more 'flexible' Mexican undocumented laborers, who would at times be tolerated, and at times deported. By 1967, the level of Mexicans in the United States had surpassed the previous peak experienced by the end of the first era, and Bracero would stop

being renewed amid criticism in the United States for the exploitation conditions under which Mexican migrants were kept, and for unfair competition with American workers.




Figure 64: Mexican Migrants in the United States 1850-1970 (Passel, 2013:40)

4. *A no-policy policy era, extending from the end of Bracero to the end of the De la Madrid Administration in 1988.*

In a way, Bracero would provide an escape valve for hundreds of thousands of field workers and manual laborers who had been completely neglected by a Mexican government who would embark from the mid-1940s forward on inward-looking infrastructure reconstruction and industrialization policies. So much so, that even in spite of the end of Bracero, rural Mexicans would continue to emigrate irregularly in the hundreds of thousands to the United States, while an urban middle class expanded and consolidated with the attention of policies fully focused on them. These abandoned migrants were not even acknowledged or recognized by what they considered an entrenched and unjust government elite towards which they bore resentment and mistrust⁹⁶. By the mid 1970s, the growth in migratory outflows would explode again when a series of crises, initially due to the external shock of the oil price collapse and subsequently due to the populist mismanagement of the economy and public finances, depleted the Mexicans' living standards (see Figure 65). In this period, the composition of Mexican migrants in the United States would also include middle and

⁹⁶ Some provincial governments with important migratory outflows, such as Zacatecas, would keep contact with their migrants, but mostly on an *ad hoc* basis.

upper-middle class educated Mexicans, and the amount would go from under a million to almost five million.




Figure 65: Purchasing power of Mexican minimum wage 1932-2010 (del Castillo Negrete Rovira, 2012)

5. *The recognition era, extending from the Salinas de Gortari Administration to date.*

Member of the ruling elite, an economist by training, and with postgraduates in Public Administration from Harvard, Carlos Salinas de Gortari rose through the ranks of academia and the civil service to become the Minister Budgeting and Strategic Programming of the De la Madrid Administration before being elected President of Mexico amid fraud allegations. A scholarly expert on the issues faced by the rural communities, he sought to regain economic and political stability (as well as legitimacy for his government) through an ambitious economic liberalization and poverty alleviation program through social expenditure, and by consolidating the international ties of Mexico to the world economy. In doing so, he actively sought the support of Mexicans living in the United States in defense of his policy interests, and in exchange, he became the first president to enact policies to provide social services, legal and consular protection to those most in need, and to engage in some ad hoc cooperation initiatives with the diaspora.

Our case study focuses on this fifth era, in which subsequent governmental administrations would recognize the *de facto* value of the diaspora to the country in different ways. For example, the Salinas Administration tacitly rewarded the crucial role played by the Mexican diaspora in the United States as a lobby for the North American Free Trade Agreement with increased social and community service provisions. These came in the form of three policy tools: Solidaridad

Internacional (a fund-matching program to supplement migrants' remittances for infrastructure), Paisano (a multi-Ministerial program to curb rampant corruption and abuse towards migrants returning or temporarily visiting Mexico), and the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (or PCME, to provide education, health and consular protection for Mexicans in the United States).

During the Zedillo Administration, there was an expansion of these programs (although Solidaridad Internacional under a different name) to improve poverty alleviation via hometown associations. The diaspora was helping their communities at home through an unprecedented growth in remittances, which were doubled (and later tripled) by State and Federal government funds when dedicated to infrastructure. Also, due to an increasingly hostile environment across the border against undocumented migrants, the Mexican government would make the diaspora recognition *de jure* in a historical decision approved the constitutional amendments to allow double nationality, so that migrants residing in the United States would not lose their Mexican citizenship. These amendments also provided for the right to vote from abroad pending additional legislation to operationalize the electoral logistics.

In other words, the participation and influence of the diaspora in Mexico's politics had become so relevant, that even if the vote abroad was not enacted, opposition candidates would campaign abroad to ask diasporans to convince their families in Mexico to vote for them. In this period, the then candidate Vicente Fox would even promise that in exchange of their support, his presidency would have a direct line open with the diaspora to make sure that their needs were considered and that they would be able to become full citizens empowered to decide on policies and to vote.




Figure 66: Mexicans in the United States by Place of Birth 1900-2000 (Fitzgerald, 2008)

Gradually but surely, the political reengagement and activism directed towards the diaspora was about to shake a sleeping giant and usher a new era. After all, at this point, we talk about an unprecedentedly strong diaspora of just under 10 million⁹⁷ compatriots in the United States and responsible for remittances amounting to almost 2% of Mexico’s GDP channeled directly to some of the poorest communities.

Fox’s experiences as Governor of Guanajuato, one of the main emigrant zones of Mexico, as well as his entrepreneurial experiences in agricultural businesses had helped to shape his conception of the Mexican migrant. His upbringing in rural areas and his complete disregard for elite politics gave him the public image of “a man of the people” suitable to better connect with the migrants archetypical background. Moreover, his aim to become the first president of Mexico from an opposition political party encouraged him to strive to fulfil his promises as a candidate as a personal mark of distinction from previous political regimes.

Having awakened the giant and won the 2000 presidential election, the now President Vicente Fox would have to deliver on his promises.




Figure 67: Evolution of State-diaspora initiatives in Mexico 1982-2000 (based on Kuznetsov’s DMF individual / organizational juxtaposition)

⁹⁷ Estimates increase to around 23 million when the diaspora includes Mexican descendants born abroad (see Figure 66).

To do so, he named the Texas-born Mexican-American poet Juan Hernández (who had coordinated his presidential campaign abroad) as the liaison person through an autonomous office called Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad (OPME). Simultaneously, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Castañeda would continue with the PCME (albeit with less resources, as some of these were diverted to fund the OPME) and would initiate negotiations with the United States to obtain a comprehensive migration agreement, affectionately nicknamed “the whole enchilada”, to achieve five goals:

1. A guest-worker program
2. A conditioned amnesty for migrants who fulfilled certain criteria
3. Support for development projects in the Mexican regions whence most migrants originate
4. Cooperation and coordination in border safety and management
5. Fostering favorable conditions for the reunification of migrant families.

For Fox, this two-pronged plan meant the satisfaction of his campaign promises. However, the great potential of his plan would fail to materialize. The first blow came from the backlash of the attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Center. After this tragic event, the United States government retreated from any negotiation on migration amnesty or cooperation in border safety and management, burying any hope for “the whole enchilada” for good.

The second blow came from the migrants’ discontent with the head of OPME, Juan Hernández. For starters, Hernández was an American born, which meant that he was not perceived as “one of them” migrants. This stranger quality, coupled with the OPME’s rhetorical fixation on remittances and their meddling on the decision-making process for the projects to benefit from the fund-matching schemes (now working under the name “Iniciativa Ciudadana”) pushed the migrant organizations to retreat from the engagement.

As if that was not enough, a third blow came in the form of an “a low-grade turf-war” (Iskander, 2010) between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the OMPE, an office Castañeda saw intruding in his Ministry’s competence. In other words, Hernandez was seen as a stranger both by the migrants and the public officials, and that meant he could hardly hold an articulation or switcher position between both sides. The result of this turf-war was a further restriction of the resources to the PCME, stoking migrant discontent further. Fox’s first attempt to reengage and empower the Mexican diaspora had failed.

As a result, Fox disbands his Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad, Hernández is dismissed, and on 2 August 2002, a taskforce within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is commissioned to find a new

engagement approach. It becomes clear that any successful policy must incorporate migrants since the design stage. This taskforce, unofficially known as Institute of Mexicans Abroad (or IME by its Spanish acronym⁹⁸) would bring together career diplomats with extensive consular experience with Mexican communities in the United States and administrative personnel with extensive experience in PCME and other migrant-oriented programs. Therefore, it is no surprise that their approach was similar to that of diplomatic mediation.

Even the choice of leadership for the taskforce was a product of the learning process. If OPME's failure was partly the product of Juan Hernandez being an outsider for both migrants and Mexican bureaucrats, IME's taskforce would require a leadership that could be seen as "one of us" by the diaspora, and that concurrently could command the institutional support of the Mexican public administrations; qualities hardly found on a single person.

The solution to this dilemma was a taskforce leadership designed for a team of two: a Director, who would fulfil the bonding nexus with the migrants, and an Executive Director who could fulfil the bridging nexus with the civil service. So, with Oaxaca-born migrant Cándido Morales as Director⁹⁹ and career diplomat Carlos González Gutiérrez as Executive Director¹⁰⁰ at the helm, IME's taskforce would be able to draw upon earlier successful engagement experiences, discard top-down policy-making, and adopt instead an interpretive engagement approach to make of migrants co-responsible subjects in policy-making.

One of IME's taskforce first contributions would be an attempt to reach out to the organizations of migrants in the United States and call upon them to form a Consultative Council (Consejo Consultivo del IME, or CCIME). This CCIME would have as its objective to gather the demands and requests of Mexicans in the United States, so that this taskforce would take those demands and deliver them to the Fox Administration.

Perhaps one of the keys to obtain the trust of these Mexican communities abroad was in the process of full autonomy decided to constitute the Council. Migrants themselves would decide the rules to elect their representatives for a period of three years without reelection, and would hold the

⁹⁸ For this case study, we use the official translation of the name: Institute of Mexicans Abroad. However, please bear in mind that, in the Mexican government context, the word Institute does not carry the traditional academic connotation as it carries in English, and that it is closer in meaning to the word Agency as a government body.

⁹⁹ For a good overview of how Cándido Morales's personal experiences as a migrant shaped his vision of IME see *Voices of Mexico* (2003).

¹⁰⁰ Carlos González Gutierrez is a figure with great personal legitimacy among both migrants and his peers for his history of involvement with the Mexican communities at his previous diplomatic postings in the United States.

elections themselves, only with the logistical support of the Consulate offices. In doing so, IME's taskforce would dispel the prejudice of the meddling government trying to control the migrants, and migrants would be encouraged to organize and participate freely, and empowered to decide responsibly.

The second taskforce contribution would be to ensure that the Fox Administration would take diaspora demands seriously. To do so, they recommend the creation of a legally-bound permanent commission in which representatives of all ministries of the Mexican government participate. Its mission: attend to the new demands of Mexicans abroad in the issues of political representation, health, sports, culture, education, contributions, remittances, social infrastructure, and the creation of productive projects for their origin communities. President Fox approves this approach, and enacts the National Council for Mexican Communities abroad (CNCME) by presidential decree in August 2002.

Having primed the diaspora organizations into CCIME and the homeland institutions into the CNCME, IME taskforce's mediation approach (see Figure 68) would be ready to stand its first major test in the first State-diaspora reengagement dialogue in March 2003. For the first time in its long history, the Mexican diaspora would be institutionally present at the decision-making process of the policies that would affect them the most¹⁰¹.



Figure 68: Framework to channel Diaspora demands into Mexican public institutions.

¹⁰¹ Carlos González Gutiérrez has written extensively on the birth process and the goals of IME. For further reference on this issue, we recommend González Gutiérrez (2006, 2006b, 2009).

The first meeting of CCIME was quite fruitful, resulting in 110 recommendations to the Mexican Government in all policy areas. Tracking the fate of all recommendations in this case study would not be a very profitable gargantuan task. So, we will limit ourselves to track two key recommendations as examples of how the engagement worked.

On the one hand, the revision of "Iniciativa Ciudadana" rules to prioritize organization-proposed projects and to include social infrastructure (churches, sport-halls, rodeos, etc.) as acceptable projects. On the other hand, the diaspora asked for training on grassroots movements for social development among their communities in the United States to increase the sense of shared responsibility and belonging, as the original successful Zacatecas "3x1" regional fund-matching remittances program that served as basis for what Solidaridad Internacional had done in 1986.

Also, afraid that their engagement would end on that first meeting (as it had happened in under earlier Administrations), they demanded that CCIME meetings would take place every six months in order to assess the progress of their recommendations, and move on with the dialogue.

Passing this first test with flying colors gave IME's taskforce institutional legitimacy over the engagement process and earned it its legal personality as a decentralized agency onto its own. Enacted officially by presidential decree on 16 April 2003, ratifying the leadership of Morales and González at the helm, and under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (specifically under the Undersecretary for North American Affairs), the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME) would prove to be more than just another bureaucracy.¹⁰²

Migrant proposals were channeled through the CNCME to the different competent ministries. In the case of "Iniciativa Ciudadana, to the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL), who at first saw the exchanges as an opportunity to educate migrants on the type of projects which were better conducive to economic development. This initial condescending, patronizing or paternalistic impulse, very pervasive in Mexican government culture, however, started to subside as conversations unraveled. The interpretive engagement in which shared meanings and codes are found through dialogue helped to ease prejudices on both sides and to find common ground to improve the efficiency of the program based on the actual needs of migrants and their communities, as much as on actual policy priorities.

¹⁰² For an extensive and detailed account of the engagement process between the 1970s and right up to the creation of IME, see Iskander (2010).

The results from the SEDESOL-CCIME dialogue held between May and October 2002, often but not always mediated by the IME, fundamentally changed "Iniciativa Ciudadana" to better suit the migrants' communities needs and almost every single recommendation of CCIME was met by a policy response. Migrants had become empowered and co-responsible parties in the development of their communities and not just passive beneficiaries that were sought after for their financial transfers, right on time for the second CCIME meeting in November 2002.

For the second CCIME meeting, 60 new recommendations were issued. By the third, 41 more were added, and so on every six months. Aside from new proposals, each meeting dealt with the assessment of progress and new discussions of interest to both sides. Through this discussion-transaction mechanism, further changes to the fund-matching schemes were implemented, migrant-oriented health programs such a vaccination campaigns were improved, etc. Even the most contentious of demands were met, such as the legal amendments to operationalize the vote of Mexicans abroad, a pending issue since 1998, which passed Congress only weeks before the 5th CCIME meeting.

Yes, the dialogue was difficult at times, but the trust generated by the frequent and candid interaction of the participants was key for its ultimate success. The sleeping giant of the Mexican diaspora was now fully awake, and IME lived up the engagement expectations as the interpretive engagement dynamic became institutionalized.

To expand on the policy-oriented learning paths, in October 2004, IME hosts the First International Conference on State-Diaspora Relations (CIRED-I). This conference would bring together the leading experts, academics, and authorities in State-Diaspora relations from countries such of Philippines, India, Morocco, Dominican Republic, and Turkey, to exchange experiences and perspectives with the Mexicans.

The conference would be so fruitful, that a year later, in October 2005, IME would host a Second International Conference on State-Diaspora Relations (CIRED-II), narrowing their attention focus on Latin America and the Caribbean. Once more, officials and experts would review and share country experiences of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Uruguay and Mexico, as well as region-wide (South America and the Caribbean) experiences.

Overall, based upon evidence rooted in the events following the political transition of Mexico in the early 21st century, a change of paradigm is quite noticeable. Sometime during the early years of Vicente Fox Administration, Mexicans abroad stop being considered as objects of policy (clients,

beneficiaries, receivers, etc.) with little or no say in the institutional decisions taken by a centralized paternalistic bureaucracy, and become engaged subjects of policy who are willing participants and co-responsible in the institutional and policy decisions.

This change is quite visible on Figure 69, where we continue to trace the progression of the State-diaspora initiatives between up to 2006. Using the individual/organizational juxtaposition tool of Kuznetsov’s Diaspora Mobilization Framework, we observe that went from relationship going from the “hit the wall” to the “living dead” quadrant in Figure 67, would now move to an initial stage of guided serendipity by the end of the Fox Administration.




Figure 69: Evolution of State-diaspora initiatives in Mexico 1982-2006 (based on Kuznetsov’s DMF individual / organizational juxtaposition)




Figure 70: Revised timeline to accommodate the sixth era of State-diaspora relations in Mexico.

This qualitative change in the conception of Mexicans abroad by their homeland was very powerful and had a revolutionary impact on the public policies and institutions aimed at migrants. For this reason, we posit that the fifth era understood as “service provision” ended at the beginning of the Fox Administration at the turn of the century, and that it has been succeeded by a sixth and current era, characterized by the interpretive engagement for development between the Mexican State and its diaspora (see Figure 70).

President Fox had kept his word towards the diaspora and, on July 2006, when Mexicans abroad were able to vote for the first time, the absentee ballots would overwhelmingly reflect support for the president’s party (PAN 58.3% | PRD 35.9% | PRI 4.2%). While the number of diaspora voters was a rather disappointing 32,632 in a diaspora of over 10 million, the tight race for the domestic votes resulted in the closest election Mexico had ever seen in modern history (PAN 35.9% | PRD 35.3% | PRI 22.3%). With a final victory for the president’s party hanging from a 0.6% margin, the diaspora vote had made a difference albeit its low turnout.

However, the State-diaspora relationship is not the only factor that was evolving over these two eras. The country itself was becoming radically different to the Mexico of the 1980s, experiencing an unprecedented level of economic growth and development even in spite of the systemic recurrent crises in 1988 and 1994.

Just to mention three indicators from the International Comparison Program of the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015), between 1980 and 2013, the country has gone from a GDP per capita of around 3,800 USD to around 16,500 USD; a life expectancy increase from 67 to 77 years; and school enrollment in tertiary education from 13% to almost 30%¹⁰³.

¹⁰³ GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$): “GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States” (World Bank, 2015). School enrollment, tertiary (% gross): “Gross enrolment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving.” (World Bank, 2015)




Figure 71: Mexican-born population in the United States 1850-2011 in millions (Passel et al., 2012:6)

This gradual transformation would also inadvertently change the type of migration and the policy priorities of the Mexican governments, but not the pace with which the outflows progressed (see Figure 71).

*Mexican Talent Network: Strategically Connected for Homeland Development*¹⁰⁴

A wider middle-class, a higher level of educational achievement, a much more integrated economy to the world, had transformed an important urban part of Mexico into a modern country aiming to become a knowledge-based economy. However, this modernity had its limits; in the words of De la Calle and Rubio (2012), Mexico had become a middle class society: “poor no more, developed not yet”. This is especially true when it comes to the innovation sector, which is not competitive enough to accommodate a growing surplus of specialized and talented people, many of whom would have to go abroad in search for the improvement or an adequate use of their skills and talents.

As Erick Vance diagnosed some years ago in *Scientific American*:

This schizophrenic quality of Mexican innovation—at once dynamic and bogged down—was a big part of recently elected Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidential platform. He has promised a more technological Mexico, one that cultivates an innovation-focused, knowledge-based economy. He

¹⁰⁴ The following account of events, relies heavily upon Zavala and Nemirovsky (2007), Zavala and Figueroa (2007), and Zavala, Aguirre and Figueroa (2007). Additionally, it relies heavily upon the interviews of Zavala (2014, 2015), Orozco Aguirre (2014, 2014b, 2015), and De la Torre (2014).

plans to start with cash—Mexico spends a paltry 0.4 percent of its gross domestic product on science and technology. The U.S. spends seven times as much of its GDP.

But Mexico’s innovation dysfunction is deeper and more widespread than just money. Innovation in Mexico gets stopped in three different stages: at the beginning, when an invention is only a germ of an idea; in the middle, when scientists and engineers set out to form the company that will bring an idea to fruition; and at the end, when an idea fails and it is time to begin again. [...]

The diaspora may indeed be the country’s greatest asset. Every Mexican scientist I spoke to said he or she hoped to go home someday to support Mexican science. Dozens of expat associations, akin to Mendoza’s, link Mexican researchers and entrepreneurs from New Zealand to Germany. (2013:68-71)




Figure 72: Mexico, the 10th largest economy in the world falls behind in R&D expenditure (Vance, 2013:69)




Figure 73: Growth of Highly Skilled Mexican Migration to the United States (Delgado Wise, 2013)

The destination of this new emigration outflows, however, would not just be determined by geographic proximity or economic constraints, as with the millions of low- or un-skilled migrants. Instead, talented Mexicans would enter in the international race of developed nations for the human capital that their knowledge clusters require to thrive. Yes, the United States would still be an attractive destination (see Figure 73), but so would be other regions in the developed world, such as Canada, Europe, Australia, and certain countries in Asia.

IME's official diaspora estimates suggest that by 2013 around 12 million Mexicans lived abroad¹⁰⁵, from which 97.85% lived in the United States. The remaining 2.15% (approx. 255,929 persons) would be distributed as depicted in Figure 74. While this figure suggests that the Mexican diaspora living in Europe represents 38% of the Mexican diaspora leaving outside of the United States, it is convenient to remember that, in reality, it represents less than the 1% of the total Mexican diaspora.


Nonetheless, this geographic subset of the Mexican diaspora makes for an interesting study because of three distinctive characteristics. First, an occupational composition with a bias toward the qualified and highly qualified of at least two thirds (see Figure 75). Second, a sufficient amount of Mexicans in absolute terms to be of consequence. Third, a diaspora growth of 76% between 2009 and 2013 (see Figure 76). No other region combines these three qualities.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ The estimate increases to over 33 million when the diaspora definition includes Mexican descendants born abroad.

¹⁰⁶ In the Americas, the amount of migrants in absolute terms might very well be massive, but the occupational distribution does not fulfil our aim (39%). In Asia, not only the diaspora is much smaller in absolute terms, but also the subset of students and professionals represent less than 37%. The figures for Africa are even more dismal. Oceania is the only region in which the occupational bias actually stronger (74%), but unfortunately, the diaspora in absolute terms is almost negligible and declining by the latest measurements (IME, 2015).

Top 10 destinations (excl. United States)

1.	Canada	96,045
2.	Spain	47,936
3.	Germany	12,274
4.	United Kingdom	11,000
5.	Bolivia	8,556
6.	Costa Rica	8,500
7.	Argentina	6,873
8.	Italia	5,739
9.	Netherlands	4,964
10.	Guatemala	3,778



Continental distribution (excl. United States)

Figure 74: Geographical distribution of Mexicans abroad, excl. United States (with data from IME, 2015)




Figure 75: Occupations of Mexicans in Europe (with data from IME, 2015)




Figure 76: Growth of Mexican diaspora in Europe (with data from IME, 2015)

These increasingly important outflows of human capital were bound to attract the attention of Mexican authorities sooner or later. Once again, it was the Fox Administration who caught on the Mexican brain drain, and again the first attempt to deal with the issue started from an anecdotal *ad hoc* initiative.

Héctor Ruiz is a Mexican-born United-States-educated engineer from Piedras Negras, a border town in the north of Mexico mirroring Eagle Pass in Texas, who would raise to become the CEO of AMD, one of the leading producers of microprocessors in the world. In May 2002, Dr. Ruiz earns recognition as the most outstanding Mexican Engineer abroad. On a trip to Mexico City to collect his award, he is received by President Fox who tries to enlist his help to connect the talented Mexicans abroad with those at home.

Dr. Ruiz accepts Fox's errand and, on 29 September 2003, organizes an event bringing together Mexican engineers from both sides of the border: the "US-Mexico Collaborative Partnering for Technological Advancement" in New York. For the first time, an event would bring together many talented Mexicans abroad and talented Mexicans in Mexico as its sole main aim, and Ruiz would call upon president Fox to give the newly found engagement institutional continuity. Also attending the event are other representatives of the Mexican government, like Guillermo Aguirre Esponda from the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT), Adriana Tortajada Narváz from Nacional Financiera (a Government run Development Banking Institution), and a delegation from the Ministry of the Economy.

Just weeks after the event, Aguirre Esponda, then Assistant Director for Technology in CONACYT calls upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IME with the follow-up idea to find a way to detect who are the skilled Mexicans abroad and where are they live. Not an easy task, as skilled Mexicans are but a small fraction of the overall diaspora, well integrated in the destination societies and who, therefore, have no regular use of the service provision and consular protection policies of the consulates. From this meeting, a first approach to look for the skilled diaspora would be decided: open an online registry via a website managed by Annie Carrillo and Sofía Orozco from IME, and hope to get people signed up via word-of-mouth.

Almost in parallel, in early 2004, the Ministry of the Economy, through the Program for Micro and Small Enterprise, decides to finance a business mission in which Mexican entrepreneurs would visit Silicon Valley companies in San Jose, California, with the help of Bruno Figueroa Fischer, the local Consul. Because of this successful business mission, the Ministry of Economy, with the support of the Mexico-United States Foundation for Science (FUMEC) and CONACYT, decides to formalize this newly discovered knowledge bridge by sponsoring the establishment of TechBA, a Mexican business accelerator program directly in Silicon Valley in February 2005.

These three seemingly disconnected events, however, had one participant in common: Mexican entrepreneur Jorge Zavala Ontiveros, who would be chosen to spearhead the TechBa initiative. From his new role, Zavala would use the natural networking power of his business acceleration

activities to connect the dots between the Mexican talents mainly in the San Jose area, but also in other places of the United States, effectively making TechBa the first proto-RTM chapter to jump out from virtual social networks.

There were already some preexisting professional networks and associations in the area that had been useful to connect Mexican talent abroad, such as MexPro or Hispanic-Net¹⁰⁷, or even closely-knit alumni associations from Mexican universities such as ExATecs. These, however, had little or no real engagement with Mexico or its institutions beyond their aim to improve their members professional development, lacking the strategic connections to make the deeper and sustained development impact that brain drain dynamics suggest. Nonetheless, the existence of this social tissue had laid important groundwork for the proto-RTM to take root, as they would meet on a monthly basis.

In June 2005, and applying the collective knowledge learnt from the diaspora interpretive engagement experiences, the international experiences discussed at CIRED-I and the progress made by the TechBA project, IME partners with the Mexican Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT) and the United States-Mexico Science Foundation (FUMEC) to organize the first official Meeting of the Mexican Talent Network (RTM).

This meeting would bring together around 40 highly-skilled Mexicans living and working in the United States (mainly Austin, Boston, Miami, San Diego, San José and Washington) with representatives from leading Mexican universities and high-tech companies from both sides of the border, Mexican government officials and economists from the World Bank.

Moreover, while some minor progress is made in the discovery and reengagement of Mexican talent abroad through IME's RTM virtual social network, only a couple of dozen people join at this point. For this reason, we posit that by 2006, no meaningful interaction has yet been achieved, and RTM remains a "living dead" initiative (see Figure 77); quite a contrast with the progression of other diaspora-oriented initiatives such as the CCIME dialogue evolution represented in Figure 69.

¹⁰⁷ Asociación de Profesionistas Mexicanos en Silicon Valley (MexPro) was founded in 1993 during the negotiations for the North America Free Trade Agreement as an informal forum for networking, having up to 150 active members at its peak. Hispanic-Net, was founded in 2001 in Palo Alto as an association of Latin American high-tech business professionals. Figueroa and Zavala (2008)




Figure 77: Evolution of State - talented diaspora initiatives in Mexico 1982-2006 (based on Kuznetsov's DMF individual / organizational juxtaposition)

Much better progress is made through the personal networking approach, and as a result of the first RTM meeting, regional follow-up RTM Meetings are agreed to take place in San Diego, San Jose, Los Angeles, Houston, Dallas and Boston in the spring of 2006. The goal of these meetings would be to keep the discussion-transaction process alive by identifying the best candidates to participate in a second RTM meeting, and to brainstorm on how the network can move forward.

In June 2006, a year after the first meeting, the second RTM meeting takes place, aiming to consolidate the connections and dialogue already in place. To improve the structure and cohesion of a very loose network, participants agree to institutionalize their efforts in the communities where they reside abroad by establishing local chapters of the RTM, each organized as the members see fit, in order to capitalize on the local diversity. In response to this agreement, by November 2006, building on the TechBA platform, Jorge Zavala would establish the first official RTM Chapter in Silicon Valley, and six months later, in Houston the second chapter would take root.

Once again, and recreating the CCIME successful experience, IME would grant the talented diasporans full freedom in the architecture and rules for their organizations abroad. This would give the founders and early-adopters a programmer role and network-making power to create the rules and shape the networks to better suit the needs of each organization: how to elect leadership, the decision-making process, the local and engagement activities, or even the collection of fees. After all, these chapters are run entirely on a volunteer basis and no monetary compensation is received from IME or any other Mexican agency.

In July 2007, the third RTM meeting takes place. For the first time stock is taken on the accomplishments achieved, and the challenges ahead. At this moment however, there is no clear policy vision of what the network can do or how the network can help, running the risk of becoming just another professional association of Mexicans abroad, and one of the main goals of the meeting is to discuss the possibilities for engagement of the network with intuitions in Mexico.

From these discussions, the institutional position of the Mexican government is settled through the following objectives:

- 1) To promote liaisons between Mexico and highly qualified professionals living abroad.
- 2) To foster the insertion of Mexico in the knowledge-based economy by creating synergies between this talent network and its counterparts in Mexico.
- 3) To facilitate the generation of high value-added projects in the areas of: business development, education for global innovation, and support to Mexican communities abroad.
- 4) To promote a better understanding of the contributions of Mexicans abroad which bring prosperity to Mexico as well as to their countries of adoption.
- 5) To promote Mexico's prestige abroad

Some of the contributions the network members could make in their relationship with Mexico are:

- Contribute to a strategic vision of sectors, technologies and global trends in their fields of specialty.
- Help in the promotion of Mexico's skills and capacities in order to obtain benefits from new market opportunities
- Support the creation of strategic alliances
- Promote the learning of better practices
- Facilitate the transference of knowledge and development of skills and capacities
- Support the development of specific projects
- Generate mentorship for Mexican companies looking to be internationally competitive.
- Support business learning and commercial missions
- Mentorship for academic programs
- Orientation about skills and capacities demanded at the global labor markets
- Create on-site professional practices and internships

(RTM & FUMEC, 2007:4)

The expansion of local associations continues over the following year: in August 2007, Ottawa becomes the first RTM chapter outside of the United States, closely followed by Montreal in November. By December, APROMEX, the RTM chapter in Detroit is established.

This sudden expansion was becoming difficult to consolidate. While the support from the Mexican government side was open and forthcoming, the program remained rather testimonial within the work of IME. After all, the mission of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad was to coordinate the relations with all the Mexican diaspora and the resources demanded by the 98% of the non-RTM diaspora had institutional priority, as oftentimes the assistance these required was related with the most basic of needs, and RTM members were much better off in comparison.

Nonetheless in 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CONACYT issue a call for the participation of Mexican Universities and research institutes to generate national points of contact to articulate RTMs projects. By January 2009, the results of this call are published and the attempt to coordinate the interaction with the domestic institutions begin.

In April 2009, the first change at the helm of IME takes place. Carlos García de Alba becomes the new Executive Director of IME in place of Carlos González Gutiérrez. Although seemingly innocuous institutionally, the change of person in the Executive Direction of IME would have an impact on how policies are enacted.

While González was a well-known and approachable figure amongst Mexican communities in the United States, García de Alba came from a diplomatic tradition that might have seem rather elitist for some sensibilities. Less in touch with the communities, his interests went into the fields of Education and Economic Development, having been General Director for International Relations at the Ministry of Education, and having been Deputy Representative of Mexico to OECD.

Mr. García de Alba's tenure as Executive Director was relatively brief; officially a year and half. His profile would prove a challenging fit with IME's institutional inertia towards the largest part of the low- or unskilled diaspora in the United States. For the same reason, during this period, he became an ardent promotor of RTM, which underwent some reforms to improve its consolidation and further expansion outside of the Americas. In June 2009, the Orange County chapter of RTM, TECMA, is established and by the fourth RTM meeting in August 2009, two changes are incorporated to the process.

First, the RTM would be poised to go global, as invitations to participate are sent to some talented Mexicans identified by Embassies and Consulates outside of the North American region. Second,

an overarching agreement is reached between IME and the Network to transform the chapters into project-based engagement powerhouses.

Seven strategic areas of mutual interest between diaspora and policy makers are identified for these projects to be pursued:

- 1) Cooperation for Development,
- 2) Information and Communication Technologies,
- 3) Nanotechnologies and New Materials,
- 4) Hydrocarbons and Alternative Energy,
- 5) Automotive Industry,
- 6) Environment and Climate Change, and
- 7) Food, Agriculture, Fishery and Biotechnology.

From this point on, it would not be sufficient to organize a chapter abroad in order to have an association of Mexican talents; it would be necessary to generate a plan of projects that would serve as a chapter engagement portfolio towards the national points of contact selected earlier in January. Five months after this fourth meeting, in March 2010, Boston’s chapter is established, and just days later, the first European chapter would be officially inaugurated in Germany.




Figure 78: Evolution of State - talented diaspora initiatives in Mexico 1982-2010 (based on Kuznetsov’s DMF individual / organizational juxtaposition)

At this time, the original “living dead” *status quo* seen in Figure 77 had begun to move in the right direction towards the “guided serendipity” quadrant (see Figure 78). Nevertheless, despite the chapters’ best intentions, the quality of the exchanges with Mexican institutions remained suboptimal to achieve the desired brain circulation dynamics. Engagement was simply not permeating deeply enough.

Mexican Talent in Europe: A Success Story in the Making

The incursion of the RTM in Europe bears some resemblance with its expansion in the Americas as much as it presents its own specificities and particular challenges. On the similarities side, we find the expansion and consolidation processes through the action of key actors, social tissue in the form of professional associations and networks predating the incursion of the RTM, and its connectedness with the Institute of Mexicans Abroad. On the European specificities side, we find significant demographic differences, different key actors to those from the initial expansion and consolidation in the Americas, and important challenges with the coordination and engagement with the Mexican institutions.

Let us start with the demographic differences of the Mexican diaspora in Europe. In the Americas, as we have seen, the density of Mexican talented migrants is much higher in absolute numbers, making the formation and consolidation of networks easier in the relatively close geographical proximity of a city. This is not the case for most countries in Europe, where oftentimes a critical mass of Mexicans for the formation of a chapter is only found dispersed throughout entire countries. Moreover, while in-depth data is hard to come by, our survey has discovered that there seems to be an important component of international mobility amongst the Mexican diasporans’ across European borders.

To compensate for these demographic differences, the need of preexisting social networks to support the expansion and consolidation of the RTM in Europe was even more determinant than in the Americas. In Europe, this role was played by the preexisting expansion and consolidation of student and alumni networks in specific countries, as MexSocUK, or across the continent as is the case of the ExATec Europa network.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ MexSocUK was the first “network of networks” of Mexican students established in Europe in 2002 (but officially launched in September 2003), bringing together 14 societies of Mexican students in different Universities across the United Kingdom. However, ExATec Europa would be the first alumni network to conquer the continent. From its launch in October 2002 and by the time the first European chapter of RTM would be established, ExATec chapters would extend from France (2002) to Barcelona, United Kingdom, Belgium (2004), Madrid (2005), Italy, Eastern Europe, Germany, and

Regarding the role of individual actors, just like Jorge Zavala and Bruno Figueroa (Mexican Consul in San Jose) would be the spearheads behind the American incursion, David Oliva Uribe and Alejandro Flores León (from the Mexican Consulate in Hamburg) would become the European instigators of RTM. From the IME side, these European ringleaders would receive the support of the by now well-seasoned Annie Carrillo and Sofía Orozco, initially under Carlos García de Alba as Executive Director of IME at the time, and of Javier de León¹⁰⁹ who would replace García de Alba in October 2010.

David Oliva Uribe, an ExATec himself, already had an outstanding academic and professional career as an electronic and telecommunications engineer, specialized in manufacturing systems in Mexico before moving to Germany as a visiting researcher while pursuing his PhD studies in 2007. Having achieved certain notoriety for his research in Europe, he was one of the 14 European diasporans to participate in the fourth RTM meeting in August 2009, where he was drafted by IME to establish the first European chapter of RTM.

Taking the challenge upon his return to Hamburg, Oliva teamed up with the Mexican serial entrepreneur Alejandro Flores León who at the time cooperated with the Mexican Consulate in Hamburg. Both went on to design the chapter's organization and to recruit over 40 founding talented Mexican members working for leading companies, Universities and institutions all over Germany. This first European chapter would be constituted under German law and launched in March 2010.

Just as Zavala's impulse was instrumental for the expansion of chapters in the United States, Oliva's influence is acknowledged to have been instrumental for the further expansion of RTM in France (May 2011), the Netherlands (December 2011), and Scandinavia (July 2011). Also, as a result of the aforementioned intra-European mobility we have detected in Mexican talents in Europe, Oliva moved to Brussels in 2011 to take up a Research position at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and shortly after, founded the Belgian chapter of RTM in October 2012.

Switzerland (2007). This expansion and consolidation would continue in the following years to include Scandinavia (2013) and Ireland (2014). Moreover, besides local chapter events, the network would hold since its inception a yearly region-wide meeting rotating among the different countries; the 13th European meeting will take place in Dublin in 2015.

¹⁰⁹ Having served his entire diplomatic career within the Undersecretary for North-American Affairs, first as Consul, then as Head the Hispanic and Migratory Affairs Section in the Mexican Embassy in Washington, Javier Díaz de León's profile would return the focus of the Executive Director's office to the migrant community-oriented approach.

In parallel, talented Mexicans in other European countries were organizing on their own. For example, in the United Kingdom (September 2010) under the leadership of José Bernardo Rosas Fernández who had also been cofounder of MexSocUK while doing his PhD in Cambridge, and in Ireland (November 2012) with the impulse of Carlos García de Alba, former Executive Director of IME and by now Mexican Ambassador to Éire.

The way in which Mexicans in Europe have pushed forward the expansion and consolidation of RTM is not a matter of chance. In fact, we posit that this desire was latent in these actors way before the initial sparks were kindled in the annual meetings coordinated by IME or in their contacts with other RTM members. Every single interview and survey we have carried out for this case study, as well as every single secondary source, points out to the fact that all RTM members are volunteers who give their time to the Network because they feel that they should “give back” or “help” their country in whichever way they can. The strength of this belief, that is whether some people believe it is an actual moral obligation or whether they believe its something they should be thanked profusely for, may vary; yet, this core belief is deeply rooted on both the IME and the RTM side and is what glues the coalition together.

A second level of motivation identified, less altruistic perhaps than the philanthropic desire to contribute to the fatherland, has to be with the success of the RTM in grouping together some of the most admired and respected Mexicans abroad in their respective fields. By joining such a prestigious group, some members aim to benefit from it, contributing in turn with their own qualities to the further advancement of the Network as a whole. Mexican pride (a source of primary identity) and professional pride (a source of interaction identity through the validation of their peers) would complement the pride of belonging to RTM (a source of institutional identity) and become important engagement hooks to tether de diaspora to the homeland institutions.

Just like the migrant workers had gained recognition in the previous decade, going from traitors to almost heroes (Durand, 2004), the qualified Mexicans had managed to change the mainstream narrative of *vendepatrias* (turncoats), to become sources of pride and hope. Mexico had become a much more globally interconnected nation, and Mexicans did not seem to view the world as a threat anymore, but rather as a good source for opportunities to prosper.

The talented Mexicans abroad would become the poster- boys and girls of this new canonical narrative and their actions would provide congruence and credibility to RTM and the policies pursued by IME. As cosmopolitan specialists who explore their networks from the complexity of their mixed identities, sometimes as insiders, and sometimes as strangers, they have a unique position as interpreters and bridges between both sides of the border. These strategies support

their role as switchers in the network and allows them to acquire soft power (and counterpower) to influence institutional development in Mexico, as much as to use this newly-found influence in increasing their value to their current places of work and residence.

The European expansion of the RTM inserts itself in the worldwide expansion of RTM: in the same period, new chapters are established in Los Angeles (April 2010), Paso del Norte (June 2010), Washington DC (August 2010), Toronto (October 2010), Beijing (December 2011), and Japan (November 2012).

Also, its embedded in the coordinated action of the global network through the chapters' participation in the annual meetings with IME. In the 5th meeting (June 2010), for instance, the goal was to consolidate projects along the 7 areas of interest agreed a year earlier, as well as with specific discussions on Roadmap Strategies, Creative Cities, and cooperation opportunities between the chapters and the would-be sectorial contact points in Mexico (PNCS).

While the idea of the contact points was key to the homeland engagement, something was not really clicking, and by the 6th meeting (June 2011), there is a shared feeling that these needed to be further consolidated. Emphasis was placed on this issue for the 7th meeting (August 2012), but with the policy subsystem's attention distracted in the presidential transitional period after the elections celebrated in July 2012, not much progress was achieved from the institutional side.




Figure 79: Evolution of the possibilities of engagement for IME and RTM in Europe 2007-2012 (based on Kuznetsov's DMF diversity of impacts juxtaposition)

In fact, the presidential campaign of 2012 would lead to a new external shock within the State-diaspora relations policy subsystem. In a hotly contested election, Enrique Peña Nieto would replace Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, who had given continuity to Fox's diaspora engagement policies¹¹⁰. The election of Peña would bring back PRI party back into power¹¹¹, and with it the historically mistrust of a wide base of Mexicans abroad.

In anticipation of these foreseen negative effects, and to counter them since the earliest days of his campaign, Peña followed two tracks of action. First, he started an intensive public relations campaign aimed at stressing how far Mexico had come, and how it would continue to go with his reformist government. This campaign got sufficient traction in the international media and all the first year of Peña Nieto's Administration was hailed as "the Mexican moment". A second track of action was the recruiting of Arnulfo Valdivia Machuca, the civil servant who had been in charge of International Affairs for the State of Mexico Government (2005-2012) as his Coordinator for Diaspora Affairs, to tour and campaign the main communities of Mexicans abroad to reassure them that the engagement would continue to be institutional.

On the one hand, Valdivia Machuca grew up surrounded by Mexican migrants from diverse communities in the United States. His father was the artistic agent of the most popular folk musical bands and frequently toured these communities with young Arnulfo. These first-hand experiences taught him to understand and respect migrants without the bias of stereotypes, and many Mexican communities who still remembered his father fondly, held him in good esteem.

On the other hand, when Arnulfo concluded his Bachelor's degree at Tecnológico de Monterrey, he had the opportunity to pursue postgraduate diplomas in the United States, in Italy, and in Cambridge University in the United Kingdom, where he obtained a Masters in Development Studies and a PhD in Political Economy. These experiences gave him a different perspective of migration, closer to that faced by the members of RTM, and a solid academic background to command the respect of his colleagues in public service.

¹¹⁰ In 2010, an assessment by Déllano Alonso for the Inter-American Development Bank found that IME's "structure was effectively responding to the main needs of Mexican communities abroad on the issues of health, education, financial education, and leadership." (2010:10)

¹¹¹ PRI was the party in power since the end of the Mexican Revolution and until Fox's Administration, thus widely seen as responsible for the previous eras of neglected State-diaspora relations.

As Coordinator of Diaspora Affairs in the transitional period between presidential administrations, Valdivia had a chance to meet with several leaders of RTM chapters abroad to pledge his support in the name of Peña Nieto. One of such occasions was a meeting held with the European chapters of RTM during a visit of Peña Nieto as president elect to the OECD headquarters in Paris on the 18 of October of 2012, which also happened to be one of the first meetings in which the leaders of several European chapters got together for the first time.

Valdivia's profile gave the rare mix of the two qualities we mentioned earlier for articulating relations between the public administration and Mexicans abroad (see page 280), and for this reason, he became the logical choice to replace Cándido Morales as Director of IME when the Peña Administration was inaugurated in December 2012.

However, Valdivia Machuca would only last at the helm of IME through 2013. In December 2013, he would be appointed Ambassador to Colombia, and Ernesto de Lucas Hopkins would succeed him as Director of IME. Albeit its briefness, Valdivia Machuca's tenure would kept true to his campaign promises, giving institutional continuity to the policies of engagement and support to the different types of diaspora. CCIME dialogue continued twice a year as usual, and RTM would continue its expansion to New Zealand (February), San Diego (April), Venezuela (June), San Francisco and Bay Area (September), Quetzaltenango and Barcelona (October), and Chicago (November).

In June 2013, Francisco de la Torre Galindo would be appointed to succeed Javier Díaz de León as Executive Director of IME. De la Torre Galindo is an international law scholar and career diplomat since 1998, whose background had a geographical focus on Latin America, and who had held diplomatic postings in Brazil and Argentina.

In November, Valdivia and Galindo chaired the 8th annual meeting of RTM (in Chicago) in which the challenges of the explosive expansion and geographical diversification arose. The RTM was becoming a victim of its own success, and an internal reorganization was required to accommodate to the new *status quo*. A taskforce within RTM was thus convened to find the best organizational structure to move ahead with the Network's vision and mission. Jorge Zavala, as the group veteran, would assume the role of Global Coordinator; David Oliva would assume the coordination for the Non-American chapters of the Network (Europe, Asia and Oceania), while Daniel Bremer would do the same for the Americas; Luisa Luna would assume the coordination of projects.

Given the need to further harmonize the efforts of the Network and present a united front worldwide, the taskforce proposed a rebranding in which the new geographical dimension of the

network was stressed. The Red de Talentos Mexicanos en el Exterior would be renamed Red Global de Mexicanos Calificados, or Red Global MX for short, as an umbrella designation.



Figure 80: Lines of action, or pillars, for RTM and the strategies to achieve them 2013-2018 (RedGlobal.MX, 2015)




Figure 81: Rearrangement towards a Network of Networks (RedGlobal.MX, 2015)

Also, they would come up with a strategic rearrangement of the network's aims and priorities into four pillars or lines of action, and four strategies to achieve these pillars. The lines of action would focus on (1) science, technology, research and academia, (2) entrepreneurship, (3) social responsibility, and (4) creative industries. The strategies to pursue them would focus on projects leading to (a) innovation, (b) knowledge transfer, (c) better promotion and showcasing of RTM globally, and (d) achieving self-sustainability of the organization (see Figure 80).

The strategic rearrangement proposed would also seem to affect the way in which the network would be articulated between the chapters and the Mexican points of contact. Up to this moment, each chapter in the network had been working with a high level of autonomy and independence to coordinate its projects with Mexico. This initial *modus operandi* could be quite efficient when the chapter or its members had direct access to the institutions at home, but could be quite dysfunctional when the homeland connections were not so clear. Under the new *modus operandi*, the engagement would be articulated through the Global Coordination (that is, the taskforce team) and IME (see Figure 81).

We should remember that up to this moment, there had been complete freedom of decision as to the internal rules of operation and even as to the name and image of each chapter. The only guideline adopted at the 4th meeting in 2009 had been the requirement of running a portfolio of engagement with Mexican institutions through specific projects. Therefore, the depth and scope of the reorganization, and the speed in which the process was taking place would become a challenge on its own, as not all chapters would be comfortable with all the changes.

From around this time, there was also a report by IME (2013) which stated:

We are working on the establishment of a Foundation for the Mexican Talent Network, which would also function as Technical Secretariat of the Network, for the procurement of resources for projects.

Chapter members are volunteers, highly committed migrants with their country of origin and willing to help, but it must be in Mexico's interest to receive that knowledge.

It would be very useful if the Directorate General of Technical and Scientific Cooperation of the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation could identify mechanisms of cooperation with RTM. According to the World Bank, there are opportunity areas for Mexico

with its Qualified Diaspora, and one of them is that of international cooperation for development. (IME, 2013:4)¹¹²

A couple of weeks after the Chicago meeting and after the Global Coordination started rolling the discussion on the network rearrangement, on 22 November, several chapters of RTM would take a first step to find their own engagement opportunities with other public institutions of the Mexican government, by signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Mexican Senate. This memorandum stressed the lines of action pursued by the new strategy, such as the need of increasing academic exchange, of improving entrepreneurial support, and of providing an international platform for Mexican artists and creators through the different chapters of RTM. The European signatories of these chapter would be RTM Germany, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Ireland.

In 2014, and already with IME under the leadership of De Lucas Hopkins and De la Torre Galindo, the expansion of RTM continued worldwide: Australia and Phoenix in February, Dallas in March, Kansas City in May, Singapore in September, British Columbia in October, and Sacramento in November. In the European front, Spain (separately from Barcelona) is established in April, Switzerland in May, Finland in September (still unofficially), and Sweden in November, bringing the overall tally of RTM chapters to 11 in the European continent.


This year, to reflect the spirit of the new rearrangement, separate continental meetings were held in the spring instead of the annual meeting that had been taking place: one for the Americas in Dallas, Texas on May 8, and one for Europe in Brussels, on June 2. Keeping the meetings separate would, in theory, help focus the discussion to the issues of each region for a more efficient coordination.

We consider the European meeting of 2014 as the landmark event that signals the consolidation of the Network in the region. Its taking place in Brussels is a tacit recognition of the relevance of the network outside the Americas, as is its focus on the regional issues. For example, the need of further consolidation through mentoring, and by increasing the frequency and quality of communication and exchanges.

¹¹² Freely translated from the Spanish original: “Se está trabajando en la creación de una Fundación de la Red de Talentos Mexicanos en México, que permita además de funcionar como Secretaría Técnica de la Red, que pueda procurar recursos para los proyectos. Los miembros de los capítulos son voluntarios, son migrantes con un alto compromiso con su país de origen y quieren apoyar pero debe ser del interés de México tomar ese conocimiento. Sería de mucha utilidad que la AMEXCID -DGCTYC pudiera identificar mecanismos de colaboración con la RTM. De acuerdo al Banco Mundial existen áreas de oportunidad para México con la Diáspora Calificada y una de esas áreas que se destaca es la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo.”

LIVING IN THE KNOWLEDGE WORLD


 Red Global
 de Mexicanos
www.redglobalmx.org



By Jose Luis Lopez - ez-mkt.com

Figure 82: Living in a Knowledge World, How to Generate Value through RTM Europe (RedGlobal.MX, 2015)

Also, the need of a specific value model of European projects in terms of human capital and new business development (Figure 82), and in terms of content, of a regional definition of the strategic areas of ongoing and future projects:

1. Science and Technology
2. Entrepreneurship
3. Academic Mobility
4. Energy and Sustainability
5. Creative Industries

Overall, the main objective behind these reforms of 2014 is that the consolidation of the European side of RTM network results in the successful establishment of engagement with Mexican institutions, a task that has remained elusive to this point in time. Yet, the scope and depth of the changes is proving a challenge to implement. Among the most “senior” chapters of RTM in Europe, the institutional inertia makes it difficult to steer towards a new strategy, and among the most “junior” chapters of RTM, the lack of internal cohesion and consolidation can be a hindrance.

Once more, outcome of these changes for the European chapters must be observed through the lens of the overall IME relation with the diaspora. The appointment of De Lucas Hopkins as Director of IME since December 2013 would be a sign of political change in the evolution of the diaspora engagement policies, if only because his profile hardly fits the previous occupants of this position. He is a politician who came from a brief tenure at ProMexico¹¹³, far removed from the diplomatic world and with no experience in the field of migration.

During the tenure of De Lucas Hopkins as Director and De la Torre Galindo as Executive Director, a series of changes have been initiated at IME. Perhaps the most relevant one is the restructuring of the way in which CCIME is conformed and how the dialogue works. Since the discussions held during the 24th Meeting of CCIME in November 2014, the last meeting of the 4th generation CCIME before its renovation, the Mexican authorities and the council members have been working on a redesigned CCIME to make it less representative-centered and more project-focused.

The main aim of these reforms would be to refresh a dialogue model that was becoming tired. After all, the number of policy proposals made during the last generation of CCIME was 38 in three years, which when compared with earlier generations is the lowest performance (see Figure 83). In

¹¹³ ProMexico is the government agency tasked to strengthen Mexico’s ties with the world economy, defending trade and investment interests abroad. De Lucas Hopkins was Head of ProMexico between December 2012 and April 2013.

addition, the renewal from the third to the fourth generation of CCIME had been the most contested election amid allegations that for some diaspora organizations corporatist interests primed in the selection of their representatives, and the representation model itself criticized for being closed to the unaffiliated diasporans.




Figure 83: Policy recommendations by CCIME generation and contests to its renovations 2003-2014 (IME, 2014)

While details of these changes have been kept well under wraps, from our interviews and access, we can say that the role of tutelage and involvement of Consulates has been increased, and that the new project-centered CCIME takes into consideration both organized communities and unaffiliated individuals on issues regarding the traditional focus of IME:

- 1) Education
- 2) Sports and health
- 3) Financial education and entrepreneurship
- 4) Culture and identity
- 5) Civic participation
- 6) Public image and knowledge of Mexico
- 7) Youth and gender

Projects as such will have to fulfil certain formal criteria on how to be registered, as well as include specific content such as diagnostics, strategies, critical routes, support requirements, and partial and final deliverables. Additionally, the dialogue process moves away from the biannual general

meetings and will now take place as three local meetings, a fourth regional meeting, and a final general meeting. For 2015, these meetings will be:

- a) First, local meetings (between January and April) in the consulate adscription with experts, the consular officers, Council members and opinion leaders, to diagnose the regional specificities of the communities.
- b) Second, local meetings (between May and July) to present and assess which projects will be supported by the pool of resources of the consulate, IME and *ad hoc* partners.
- c) Third, local meetings (between August and October) to select the projects that will be commissioned regionally.
- d) Fourth, regional meetings in each of eight regions considered (California, Texas, North-East, Mid-West, South-East, North-West + Central, Canada, and Border)
- e) Fifth, general meeting in Mexico (by year's end) to evaluate and review the progress of national and binational projects, as well as to assess the implementation of the new arrangement to make adequate changes for 2016.

In other words, instead of having the organizations choose their representatives, the council members will be elected from the projects presented, opening up the chances to be elected to Mexicans abroad who are unaffiliated to diaspora organizations. However, this also moves away from the non-governmental-meddling philosophy behind the original CCIME, and organizations are already becoming vocal about it.

Some see the new scheme as a way to revert to the times when policies were decided without fully considering the diaspora organizations, especially since not all communities are technically able to present projects under the rigid scheme implemented. In addition, the perceived lack of transparency (the distribution list of the new call to conform a new CCIME has not been as wide as it would be expected) and the rush with which the reform was prepared increases the skepticism of some migrants who feel the new administration is trying to deceive them (Galván, 2015).

It is not wonder why the new CCIME raises many alarms with Mexicans abroad. Memories of previous bad experiences in the State-diaspora relations are still fresh in migrants' minds, such as the meddling of OPME, and the *ad hoc* dialogues and "service provision" feeling of the 5th stage, for example. Since the team currently in charge at IME was not involved institutionally in those previous stages, we cannot be sure if these experiences were considered while designing the new reform, and if countermeasures have been taken.

Anyway, it will be up to the institutional memory and the current management of IME to demonstrate that the new scheme is a reform that builds upon the learning of previous policies and that the engagement will be enhanced. Nevertheless, if we continue to track the progress of the relationship, following from Figure 69 (see page 284), in Figure 84, we see a step back from migrant involvement as the new institutional arrangement stands its first test.




Figure 84: Evolution of State-diaspora initiatives in Mexico 1982-2015 (based on Kuznetsov's DMF individual / organizational juxtaposition)

Regarding the case of RTM, IME's continuity of the program has prevailed (so far). In 2015, one more chapter has been added to RTM (Nebraska-Iowa in March), and a seemingly simple internal change has taken place: the replacement of Sofia Orozco Aguirre, someone who had been a part of the engagement process since the times of PCME, with Edurne Pineda Ayerbe¹¹⁴ as the Director of Economic and Communitarian Affairs of IME. This effectively means that Pineda Ayerbe becomes the new contact person with the network since September 2014, and while we have seen how every main actor brings in something new to the evolution of the engagement relationship, it is still too early to assess how her personal style and profile will affect the engagement, if at all.

Continuing with our assessment of the evolution of the relationship between IME and the talented diaspora from Figure 78 (see page 295), Figure 85 presents how the continuous expansion and the

¹¹⁴ Edurne Pineda Ayerbe is an economist by training who also holds a Master in Diplomatic Studies from Instituto Matías Romero (the official Mexican diplomatic academy). A career diplomat since 1998, she has held different consular positions in the Chicago and Atlanta Consulates, again with an expertise focus in the United States communities.

kindled interest of qualified Mexicans abroad to belong to RTM chapters has finally pushed the individual initiative dimension towards the “guided serendipity” quadrant. However, on the organizational support dimension, the structural institutional limitations of IME in the management of the network would now seem to be limiting engagement, rather than enhancing it.




Figure 85: Evolution of State - talented diaspora initiatives in Mexico 1982-2015 (based on Kuznetsov’s DMF individual / organizational juxtaposition)

Finally, regarding the specific case of the European chapters of RTM, gradual adjustments to the coordination model are being currently implemented to improve the internal cohesion and the organizational digestion of the reforms. For example, assessing his experience as European Coordinator, David Oliva decided to step down in March 2015 with several suggestions for the implementation of his successor, Laura Hernández¹¹⁵. These suggestions would be socialized, discussed and adopted in an open, participative and collaborative environment among the chapters of the Region.

First, to limit the term of European coordinators to a one year tenure. Second, the creation of a position of vice-coordinator who would assist with the tasks of the European coordination. Third, regarding the succession rules, the vice-coordinator would be elected yearly, and every term’s end, the vice-coordinator would replace the coordinator. This would guarantee institutional continuity

¹¹⁵ Similarly as with Eurne Pineda Ayerbe, it is still too early to tell how Laura Hernández personal profile and style will impact the European coordination of RTM, if at all.

despite the leadership change. Fourth, due to the volunteer quality of the people involved, being simultaneously president of a chapter and part of the regional coordination is a burden too heavy to befall onto any one person. Thus, a chapter president may not be part of the coordination. Fifth, to ensure some diversity, coordinator and vice-coordinator may not be from the same local chapter.

Having reviewed the milestones of our case study, we can now fulfil the first objective posed in the introduction to our case study: to assess the degree and quality of engagement articulation between the talented diaspora in Europe and the homeland institutions, and to establish the absence or existence of brain circulation dynamics. This would be the continuation of an assessment that we have already started on Figure 79 (see page 299).




Figure 86: Evolution of the possibilities of engagement for IME and RTM in Europe 2007-2015 (based on Kuznetsov's DMF diversity of impacts juxtaposition)

In Figure 86, we suggest that while the European chapters continue to develop as a strategic diaspora, the engagement managed from IME's side has become more fragmented after the inauguration of the Peña Nieto Administration. The many changes at the helm of IME seem to have taken their toll, and the previously seemingly homogenous quality of engagement now seems to be slightly more challenging. We will see if the reforms regarding the homeland engagement (see Figure 81 on page 302) can improve this quite elusive issue.

Individual projects by different European chapters can qualify as brain circulation initiatives, but the critical mass to make the brain circulation institutional is still missing. The potential is there from the diaspora side and with the articulation at IME. However, the articulation with other homeland institutions is the leg still missing for the sustainability of the engagement for development. For this reason, we can call the case study of Mexican talent in Europe a success story in the making.

Looking Forward: Lessons for IME and RTM in Europe

During our case timeline reconstruction, we have analyzed how landmark events at different levels influence the way in which the relationship between IME and RTM in Europe has evolved to become what it is today. Using our descriptive analysis as a diagnostic tool, we have discovered that there is some room for improvement in the strategies followed by our main actors: the European chapters of RTM, the European Coordination, IME, and the national points of contact. In this section, we will enlist some suggestions for these actors on how to improve their chances to institutionalize the brain circulation dynamics.

These suggestions intend to be general guidelines. Turning these general guidelines into a work program of SMART objectives¹¹⁶ and related activities escapes the scope of this case study, but could be done at the request of the actors if they decide to pursue them. Application of the Matryoshka framework to assess the relationship between local chapters of RTM and the European and Global coordinations of RTM, as well as their relationship with their local environment and Mexican institutions would bring the regional assessment we have done here to a local level with much more specific recommendations for the RTM members.

Let us start from the RTM chapters in Europe. Since their establishment and up to the first European meeting in June 2014, each had enjoyed complete freedom to shape their organization, membership and projects. From this meeting on, some reforms have been introduced to strengthen the Global (and European) coordination of the Network, regarding the public image and engagement scheme with the homeland institutions.

Given the uneven expansion of RTM across the continent, some chapters are more consolidated than others at this point in time, and this degree of consolidation seems to determine how chapters react to the recent reforms. On the one hand, the more recent and less consolidated chapters seem

¹¹⁶ SMART is a commonly used acronym that stands for specific, measurable, achievable, result-oriented, time-bound.

to be having a hard time digesting the new rules of operation due to their own internal processes not being fully institutionalized yet. On the other hand, some of the older and better consolidated chapters may already have developed strong identities and internal processes that generate institutional resistances to the changes.

From our interviews with leading members of European RTM chapters, we have found that some of the more recently established organizations seem to be going through difficulties in their internal consolidation, which in turn affect their opportunities for homeland engagement. While each case is different, it is our recommendation that three types of activities should help improve those chapters' operations: (1) bonding activities towards the improvement of the internal cohesion of the network, (2) bridging activities towards the engagement with the institutions of the countries of residence, and (3) bridging activities leading towards the engagement with the homeland institutions.

The first type of activities should aim at strengthening the different identity elements we have discussed during our case study: Mexican pride, professional validation and the institutional prestige of the Network. The second type of activity should aim at improving the strategic position of the network and its members in the countries of residence by increasing the chapters' visibility, obtaining more material assets and recruiting human resources. The third type should aim at improving the quality and quantity of the contacts with relevant homeland institutions for establishing brain circulation dynamics.

The more frequently chapters attempt to carry out these three types of activities, the higher their chances to improve at each iteration. Capitalizing on success or learning from failure, the better they become at it, should also help to improve their cohesion and internal processes, improving in turn both the programming and switching capabilities of each chapter considerably. Moreover, given the volunteer quality of the leadership and membership of RTM chapters, gaining access to material and human resources might help ensure sustainability if properly used. In any case, focusing these three types of activities on the strategies suggested by the reforms implemented by the Global and European coordination should not only enhance the operations of these chapters, but the operations of the overall coordination.

Also from our interviews, we have identified that the reforms suggested by the Global and European coordinations have met some resistances from some of the older and more consolidated chapters. These chapters have managed to create strong identities in well cohered networks, and we believe these resistances stem from how some elements within might regard these attempts at a tighter coordination as external intrusions into the full autonomy of operation enjoyed so far.

For the reforms proposed to work properly, it is important that there is a better sense of belonging, not only to a specific chapter but also to the Global network (or to the European region of a Global Network at the very least). It is important for the leadership of these older chapters to understand and convey to the rest of their membership that the strength of their local networks would only stand to benefit when tapped into a network of networks.

Each chapter is different and a closer look at the interpersonal dynamics via a more detailed NTP+ analysis is required for a more detailed diagnosis. However, our recommendation to increase the frequency and quality of the inter-chapter interactions should help to improve the overall RTM synergy. The same three goals and logic as the activities proposed to local chapters should be pursued. As first step, we the implementation of a rotating annual meeting open to the wider-Mexican diaspora in Europe, as well as to membership of RTM in the region to complement any currently existing leadership meetings. To get a tradition of these meetings started, the leadership of the older and more consolidated chapters is paramount.

On the one hand, an event like this would go a long way in promoting a feeling of unity and a sense of belonging to the wider network. On the other hand, it would help members improve their networking possibilities in a wider scale. After all, several personal cross-country projects have already sprung from the first European meeting with limited attendance; more intra-regional projects might help consolidate the European region.

Finally, one last recommendation about the projects pertaining to chapters in the network, regardless of their consolidation status. Just as people embody the knowledge and talent of the network, projects are the networks' main social embodiment of the transfers of knowledge for development. For this reason, projects should be as important a component of RTM chapters as people are, and all recruiting efforts and new membership to the chapters should aim to be project oriented.

Given the volunteer quality of the membership and leadership of the networks, the choice of engagement projects should try to maintain a realistic assessment concerning the limited time and resources that can be devoted to them. Keeping the projects tied to the diasporans personal and professional spheres, and involving the support of the diasporans personal and professional networks might contribute to their success and sustainability. Keeping diasporans continually engaged in projects of their own volition helps reinforce the identity levers discussed earlier, and enhance the overall brain circulation opportunities.

Regarding the new regional coordination for Europe, we have four recommendations to make. The first recommendation is to learn from the experiences of similar situations in the region. While it may have the legitimacy of having been elected, its power to cohere and reform the autonomous independent networks into a network of networks will be limited to the acceptance of the local chapters. Some years back, the establishment of a European Council solved a similar issue faced by the European chapters of ExATec.

The institutional architecture of a council that serves as a network of network must be the cornerstone for the regional coordination. A council to give each chapter representation and equal opportunity to listen and be listened to in the discussion and adoption of coordination guidelines. Frequent candid dialogue will not always be easy, but appropriately guided discussions should improve the quality of decisions made and provide them with legitimacy for implementation across local chapters. The role of the coordinator and vice-coordinator in this scenario would be that of discussion moderators, cooperation enablers and conflict mediators.

The second recommendation is that the rebranding towards RedGlobal.Mx should be careful not to stifle the local chapter identities. The symbols of each local chapter (name, public image, etc.) are important cohesion assets to their members; the establishment of a global and regional common identity should try to incorporate them rather than replace them. Keeping and strengthening the local brands should help build a strong brand architecture for the Global and European network of networks.

The third is to try to diversify the homeland institutions for engagement beyond IME. While our case study has focused on IME as the main institution responsible for diaspora engagement in Mexico, diversifying the engagement towards other institutions is paramount for a sustainable brain circulation dynamics. CONACYT and other universities where contact has already been established have certain degree of involvement with *ad hoc* projects; however, the level of institutionalization of the projects towards Europe remains low.

If the new coordination strategy is to be implemented, access to the Mexican institutions should be a shared asset between chapters. Nonetheless, the way in which this may occur should also be considered in the institutional architecture of the council we have proposed. Different options available range between the total centralization of connections via the regional coordination as is planned with the latest reforms, and the total decentralization of connections to the local chapters who could consider these as part of their strategic assets. Again, an application of the Matryoshka framework on a local chapter level might help to define the right architecture for the council.

Moreover, we have uncovered that most of the current access to articulate initiatives with Mexican institutions seems to go through personal connections from RTM leaders. So, our fourth and final recommendation, is that all RTM chapters should attempt to institutionalize these connections to the organizations as such through the signature of bilateral memoranda of understanding or other different cooperation wide-frame agreements, so that their continuity and sustainability beyond a personal tie can be ensured.

While these issues regarding the local networks and their coordination in Europe are not minor, we believe that the main obstacles to achieving a more optimal engagement with the homeland institutions stem not from their side, but from the side of IME and the national contact points. Therefore, let us turn our attention to our recommendations for these actors.

For all the initial impulse and sustained support that IME has given to RTM since its conception, the talent engagement process was not in the original plan of the diaspora-oriented policy. In a way, RTM as government program has always been an afterthought; only secondary in priority to IME's main mission of engaging the wider Mexican diaspora which is 98% concentrated in the United States. Even a recent IME report recognizes the need for "defining a public policy that would allow certain clarity on the potential engagement between Mexico and its qualified diaspora" (2013:5)¹¹⁷.

This 98% is why IME's organizational adscription falls within the Undersecretary for North-American Affairs purview, and even when talent engagement began in earnest, its focus with Mexico's northern neighbor with the support of the Mexico-United States Foundation for Science (FUMEC). This bias towards the United States may have been useful in the beginning, as a critical mass of the talented diaspora lives there. With the global expansion of RTM, however, this geographical bias has become more of a limitation when it comes to the way in which the network is coordinated.

Moreover, while IME's experiences in institutionalizing CCIME-CNCME dialogue shaped much of the way in RTM was to engage with Mexico, there was an important implementation gap. Just like the diaspora was primed through the CCIME, RTM helped prime the talented diaspora for engagement. However, the dialogue with the national contact points (PNCS) within Mexico has never been fully institutionalized. CNCME was established by presidential decree as an inter-ministerial commission to engage the diaspora, but no equivalent was ever enacted to support RTM's engagement with the talent abroad.

¹¹⁷ Freely translated from the Spanish original: "Definir una política pública que permita tener claridad sobre el potencial del acercamiento de México con su diáspora calificada."

Even for an institution as austere as IME¹¹⁸ with a total staff of less than 40 people, to keep a global operation such as RTM without dedicated guidance seems a stretch. However, the network lacks a dedicated management and its supervision is tucked under the Directorate of Economic and Communitarian Affairs, whose head also acts as contact person for RTM chapters. This person, together with the local Consulate and Embassy personnel, shoulders the weight of the network's institutional articulation from the Mexican government side.

The second closest public institution with which the articulation took place at first was one of RTM main driving partners and founders, the Mexican Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT). However, as expressed by at least three of our interviewees, nowadays even at CONACYT only very few people know about the program, and even less people actually engage.

Other public institutions already cooperate in *ad hoc* projects, such as some universities or the National Institute for Entrepreneurs (or INADEM, an agency under the purview of the Ministry of the Economy). The support in this last case, again, originates in the personal initiative of Adriana Tortajada Narváez, who we mentioned earlier as one of the team who kick started the proto-RTM initiatives in the Fox administration while working at Nacional Financiera (see page 286). However, just like with CONACYT, the quantity and quality of interaction is still incipient for brain circulation.

Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that an organizationally misallocated, institutionally unarticulated, understaffed, under-resourced, and under-promoted program has fallen short from its potential for consolidation of the PNCS in Mexico to generate brain circulation dynamics.

For all these reasons, we believe that the fulfilment of the objective cited from IME's own report (2013) of defining a public policy to clarify the potential engagement with the talented diaspora could only come from an internal restructuring of the program, which should address the aforementioned shortcomings:

- 1) The organizational allocation of the program should reflect its global perspective. This is perhaps the trickiest of the proposals, especially if the RTM relationship were to stay within the SRE, as the Ministry's organization (and budgetary allocation) tends to be

¹¹⁸ "Mexico's spending on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a portion of the total executive-branch budget, is also quite low, at only 1 percent or 5.3 billion pesos (\$397 million) in 2009. [...] At approximately \$2.8 million, IME's budget for 2009 was the smallest portion of the ministry's total budget for services to Mexicans abroad." (Agunias & Newland, 2012:38) For the 2015 budget, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget is 8.1 billion pesos; from this amount, the Institute of Mexicans Abroad will receive 82 million (1%) (Cámara de Diputados, 2014).

geographically organized. Nonetheless, pursuing a global perspective from the public management of the program should free RTM from its North American bias.

- 2) RTM's institutional articulation in the PNCS should be the main priority of the Mexican side from the policy standpoint. Now that the networks abroad seem strong enough to pursue self-sufficiency and autonomy, it is time to focus on the construction of networks at home for engagement. An application of the Matryoshka framework on how the current PNCS articulate with the networks would allow us to better diagnose the situation and tailor specific recommendations around this general guideline.
- 3) Hand in hand with the previous two recommendations, we could suggest learning from previous policy experiences on the engagement policy. An inter-institutional commission much in the style of CNCME with a legal mandate to address RTMs suggestions via interpretive engagement might be a time-tested way to begin the improvement of articulation with the homeland PNCS.

Institutions that must be considered for this council should include CONACYT, ProMexico, and all ministries that stand to benefit from articulating projects with the networks, such as the Ministries of Energy, Economy, Education, Environment, Telecommunications, and Agriculture, but to name a few. Dialogue and interpretive engagement meeting once or twice a year like the original CCIME-CNCME experience should foster creativity and innovation to better anchor existing projects so that they have a greater impact, and to generate new projects.

- 4) For these recommendations to work, an investment in material and human resources will be required. These resources could come from the institutional budgetary commitments of the CNCME-style council, as well as from private-public funding from all institutions that could stand to benefit from the innovations and projects carried out by the collaboration, especially as the networks acquire the capability of self-sufficiency.
- 5) Finally, once the public image of the global network is legitimized and accepted for implementation by all chapters, an aggressive public relations campaign should be pursued for the promotion of the program pulling the identity dimensions we have outlined (Mexican pride, professional validation and institutional prestige from the Network's new brand).

We would like to make one final recommendation concerning the national points of contact. While specializing the institutional engagement might help to focus the dialogue thematically, it also impose silo mentalities to the exchanges. Special care should be taken so that this does not become an issue. Playing with engagement events that rock between the exploring/exploiting and generalization/specialization continuums should be a good way to prevent it.

Engaging Talent Abroad for Development: Extracting Lessons from the Mexican Experience

To engage compatriots abroad, in broad terms, means to keep their ties with the homeland alive and constant for the benefit of both the migrant and the communities whence they originate. On the one hand, migrants sometimes do so themselves by their organic personal linkages (family, friends, colleagues, etc.). However, these ties are *ad hoc* and have a limited impact. On the other hand, ties may be institutionally managed through diaspora engagement policies such as the ones we have seen in our review of the Mexican case.

These engagement policies can assume different forms and shapes, ranging from fleeting “almost-personal” decisions and actions from individuals in official capacity, to the creation of departments and full government agencies in a more institutionalized approach. Equally, these have as a goal to foster the interaction, to channel it in a particular direction, to difficult it, or even at times to block it. Finally, they can grow in a coordinated and planned manner, or evolve organically from the interactions between the diaspora and the institutions back home, although the most common occurrence is that they are mix of both approaches.

In any case, the actual structure of diaspora engagement policies is inextricably contextual, that is, completely dependent on each country’s migration and political structure specificities: diaspora size, composition, main reasons behind emigration, destination countries, cohesion of diaspora, degree of openness of homeland political institutions, etc. Moreover, these policies are oftentimes an actual reflection of the interactions between the diaspora and the population back home, which may not necessarily be perceived as positive or even desirable.

Depending on each country’s migration context, the relationship between elements within the diaspora and within the institutions back home might take shape of highly coordinated cooperation, or be strained and pervaded by mistrust, or even be of open conflict. Therefore, attempting to draw international comparisons on such a complicated (and complex) issue has been an important obstacle to gather prescriptive results to replicate success internationally.

Nonetheless, we believe that our case study can provide some insights to others. Upon exploring the stable building blocks common to all, actors and policies, we have found that owing to the specific dynamics and composition of the Mexican migratory and institutional patterns, the Mexican experience with diaspora engagement policies may present interesting lessons across several types of countries.


On the one hand, Mexican migratory dynamics and composition are so varied, that different countries may find interesting points to compare and contrast with their own experiences. For example:

- an historical mass migration of low- (and even un-)qualified labor concentrated in one country, both legally and illegally;
- a relatively recent migration of (highly-)qualified migrants to more diversified destinations (namely North America, Europe and Asia);
- some sizeable diaspora groups of political relevance in the destination country, but conflictive history with the homeland institutions,
- some smaller but well cohered high-skilled diaspora groups, well integrated in their destination countries, and open to cooperation with the homeland institutions,
- or some fragmented and disorganized diasporans unwilling engage in any meaningful way, among the main variations.

On the other hand, the Mexican political system is still undergoing an interesting transition from a mostly closed system almost impervious—at times even hostile—to outside influences to a much more receptive one open to cooperation and yet to consolidate. This means that traces and elements of both systems still coexist today embedded in the different institutions and organizations. Consequently, different eras or different institutions within the Mexican case may offer useful insight for different countries experiencing situations within this range of institutional development.

Finally, in addition to the analysis of actors and policies, the core of our methodology also relied in the analysis of the process in which these building blocks interacted and how they came to shape one another. This institutional processualist approach has demonstrated that, while the common aim may be to increase the quantity and quality of exchanges between diaspora and homeland, it is up to each country to discover, adapt and evolve their own set of policies and institutions within their own specificities and context.

For these reasons, the first lesson to extract is that there are no simple recipes to offer to other countries seeking to apply a silver bullet for their engagement policies. The second lesson is that any country willing to engage in any meaningful way with their diaspora must understand the specific qualities of their own migratory phenomenon. The third lesson is that no policy exists in a void, and all attempts should consider the different historical inertias and background of their system. The fourth and final lesson is that while the international comparative exercise is quite illustrative, the actual analogies apply only up to a certain limit.



CONCLUSIONS

We now come to the end of our dissertation. In part one, we reviewed the theoretical roots of the three subjects at the core of our overall aim: the knowledge economy, the migration of talent, and the reform of institutions. This exploration gave us an understanding of how to approach our dissertation's overall aim, by building an interdisciplinary multilevel nested analytical framework of our own in part two. Then, in part three, we put the unified Matryoshka framework to the test with the case study of the Mexican talented diaspora in Europe and its homeland engagement through the articulating policies of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad.

In this closing section, we present our conclusions structured under three headings. First, our final insights on the topic of brain circulation and institutional reform through the contributions of our unified Matryoshka. Second, an account of our experience in the operationalization of the Matryoshka for our case study and its results. Third and final, some of the challenges and further areas for the development and empirical application of the framework.

Final Insights

Thinking beyond remittances and other financial flows, the untapped value of highly-qualified migrants lies in their roles as interpreters and bridges linking the developed and the developing regions of the planet through the human networks of knowledge. Therefore, for developing economies to benefit from the skills and talents of their citizens abroad in the world's leading innovation centers, the answer inescapably requires their (re-)engagement to the homeland.

Stakeholders at both sides of the migration road must commit to modernize policies and institutions that strengthen structural links and foster brain-circulation dynamics. This effectively improves the countries' technological absorption capacities and shifts the development paradigm from a subsistence agenda towards a proactive self-managed agenda of deeper longer-lasting impact.

To achieve this development objective, our dissertation has built a methodological tool for its application to in a variety of projects aimed at countries interested in reaping the benefits from brain-circulation dynamics at the age of globalization. After all, as we have seen from our introduction, economic prosperity and development in a broader context depends on expanding and strengthening human capabilities, and policies and institutions are social embedment of this type of knowledge.

In that sense, although our unified Matryoshka framework is based upon well-established methodological tools from different academic disciplines and traditions, it is innovative in several respects.

First, from our literature revision we have seen that traditional studies around the migration of highly-qualified individuals tend to be divided into those mostly looking for evidence of brain drain and those mostly looking for evidence of brain circulation. Our methodology moves away from this false dilemma by acknowledging that both dynamics coexist and looks for evidence of both, together with the structural and temporary conditions behind them. After all, if the idea is to reduce the structural conditions causing the drain, while enhancing those causing the circulation with the appropriate provisions, we should understand each case in as much detail as possible.

Second, most of the migratory studies reviewed tend to focus on one specific level of the migratory phenomenon, and in those few cases where additional levels were considered, these seemed to have been incorporated as ad hoc afterthoughts without a unified framework that could allow for cross-case comparison. To overcome this limitation, our methodology adopts an intrinsically

coherent multilevel framework that, from the very beginning, takes into consideration elements ranging from the individual to the national context for an integral view and comparative ease.

Third, when dealing with the public realm, our framework moves away from the usual research limitations of having to opt in the dichotomy of either public policy or institutional analysis, or having to narrow down too much the scope of the case study. Instead, it takes the much less explored institutional processualism approach and ensures that all the different models composing the framework are integrated in a way to cope with the complexity of all the variables within the policy subsystem.

Fourth, most of the studies regarding talent migration tend to be descriptive by nature, and seldom propose recommendations of policy intervention to achieve an improved interaction between the diaspora and the homeland institutions. Even fewer include mechanisms for monitoring the interaction to adjust the recommendations as the *status quo* evolves. Due to its cross-disciplinary nature that combines theories from political science, economics and sociology, these three types of products can be obtained from the usage of our unified Matryoshka framework:

- a) A descriptive component, consisting of an in-depth case study of the prevailing conditions that motivate and/or dissuade talented migrants to (re-)engage with structures in their homeland;
- b) A prescriptive component, offering a set of bespoke recommendations to move towards a new scenario more conducive to (re-)engagement; and
- c) A feedback component, to monitor the evolution of the *status quo*, providing guidance on how to adjust the actors' strategies in the dynamic institutional environment.

To produce these components, our methodology makes use of a cross-disciplinary and multilevel nested analytic framework that takes into consideration the specificities of a country's institutional landscape, as well as the human-resource assets available at different micro, intermediate and macro levels. For the integration of a coherent framework, a set of five theories and models that are compatible with and complementary of each other were selected based on the following criteria (for an extensive and detailed list see pages 147-150):

- That they could fit under the umbrella of the endogenous growth theories, in which the notions of institutions as containers of knowledge, human capital, social capital, and learning as a social process, are important explanatory elements of economic growth

(Nelson & Roemer, 1996; Aghion & Howitt, 1998; Cortright, 2001; Pinch et al., 2003; Lang, 2005; Florida, 2005; UNIDO, 2009);

- That they could subscribe to the theories by which variations in institutions and policies are the main explanatory elements behind the variations in economic development amongst nations (Henry & Miller, 2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Ferguson, 2012);
- That they could be comprised within the original institutional economics, as this branch of institutional economics is multidisciplinary by nature, as it entails a holistic model of individual (different to the rational, interest-driven individual of the new institutional economics and game theories), as it is expressed in narrative language, and as it accepts both inductive and deductive reasoning methods (Parada, 2003);
- That they were compatible with the integrative models of migration theories that aim to capture both the macro (or structural) and the micro (or individual) impulses and motivations behind migratory flows (Goss & Lindquist, 1995; GLOPP & Thieme, 2007);
- That they understood diasporas from an identity perspective, rather than from the traditional “country of origin” view (Orozco, 2008; Bakewell, 2009; Rutherford, 2009);
- That they could benefit from network analytic tools (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008; Castells, 2010, 2011);
- That they could be articulated as an appreciative theory, namely, with a narrative structure, with explicit causal arguments, closer to empirical work, and that can provide both guidance and an interpretation (Nelson, 1994:3);
- That they accepted institutional change as a process compatible to that of public policy change, whereby actors can exert their influence either as individuals or as members of formal and/or informal coalitions (Askim, 2005; Barzelay & Gallego, 2006; Pierson, 2006; Sabatier, 2007); and
- That they recognized the existence of resource and power asymmetries between actors and coalitions, allowing for bargaining and conflict as alternative interaction mechanisms to cooperation (Acemoglu, 2003; Moe, 2006; Offe, 2006; Preuss, 2006).

Following these criteria, we assembled a unified framework that established five integrated levels of analysis, assigning each a specific explanatory model or theory, going from the micro-most of the individual actor to the macro-most of the national context, in a way akin to those Russian matryoshka dolls. These five nested levels and their analytic tools are:

1. An adaptation of Jones and McBeth's Narrative policy framework (NPF): to help identify which are the key individual actors whose narratives (biographies, identity, and embedded knowledge) can help to shape policies and institutions;
2. An adaptation of Castell's Network theories of power (NTP): to trace how these key actors create, use and manage social networks as coalitions through which their beliefs and preferences socialized, generating synergies and redundancies to increase their chances to shape policies and institutions;
3. Kuznetsov's Diaspora mobilization framework (DMF): to characterize the different forms in which diaspora networks and homeland institutional actors can interact towards the reshaping of policies and institutions, as well as to have an insight of how different outcomes may actually be forecasted;
4. Sabatier's Advocacy coalition framework (ACF): to complement the interaction analysis of the previous stage with additional elements of the broader policy subsystems which are not observed by Kuznetsov's framework; and
5. Barzelay, Gaetani, Cortázar Velarde and Cejudo's Case-study oriented research in policy change (CORPC): to ensure that results of different subsystems analyzed are compatible and comparable.

Methodologically, the resulting reassembly of the frameworks provides the researcher with two sets of guidelines. The first set structures the research process in terms of the steps to define the case study, fine-tune the methodological tools to the specificities of the chosen case, the selection of the key general and dependent questions to address, and how the narrative structure of the case should be woven. The second set responds to the actual content variables and context, which in turn answer the research general and dependent questions.

Given that these five methodologies share common variables across the different levels, the case study woven from their nested usage results in a richly detailed narrative to understand the dynamic relationship between these variables. Moreover, this understanding also provides the researcher

with access points to articulate suggestions that might lead to (or block un)desirable changes of the *status quo* of the system. Finally, its continued usage over a longer period, may allow to trace how the proposed suggestions have worked across the different levels and to reassess the strategy if necessary.

Experience and Results

When put to the test though our case study, the united Matryoshka framework met our expectations. The usage of the two sets of guidelines was quite straight forward, and its non-linear way of operationalization helped to control for thoroughness in the complexity of the system. From how key individual actors influence institutions, to how external circumstances help or hamper the achievement of brain circulation, the heavy amounts of relational data within the policy subsystem were well supported by our methodology.

For our empirical application in part three, we made sure that since its definition the case study would comply with the different requirements of all methodological tools. That is, that the period went over a decade to comply with ACF, that interactions between diasporans and public institutions could be the focus of analysis as per DMF, that diasporan and public policy organizations could be characterized as social networks to use NTP+, or that key actors and their contributions to these networks could be identified for NPF analysis. Moreover, that the case study would be structured in the narrative form of CORPC.

Then we followed the two sets of guidelines of the united Matryoshka framework as operationalized in the end of part two, almost line by line, also following the multiple feedback loops within the framework to define, redefine and refine our understanding of the issue at hand. The result was a problem statement concrete enough to approach: were brain-circulation dynamics being achieved through the interactions between the Mexican Talent Network (RTM) in Europe and the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME), if so, how, and if not, why.

To tackle our problem statement, we extracted five general knowledge questions relevant to the case and over 50 related specific questions as per our line by line research protocol. These, in turn, served as reference to gather and structure the available secondary data and to identify the information gaps to gather new data through primary sources.

Given the specificity of the issue and the limited availability of the information, our hunt for secondary data took us to places as far apart as the libraries at the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Geneva, at Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF) in Tijuana, and to the World

Bank-IMF joint library in Washington, DC. Also, to fill the gaps identified in secondary information, we were fortunate enough to obtain interviews with some of the most relevant key actors of the case study, both from the side of RTM and IME, some in person in Mexico City and Madrid, and others via videoconference from San José California, Brussels, or Arnhem.

As the data gathering went on, we processed the entries into a timeline that would become the narrative layout for our case study. This timeline, when fed into our different analytic tools that conform the unified Matryoshka framework, would help answer the different specific dependent questions and by extension our five general knowledge questions:

1) *What drove the Mexican government to pursue a diaspora engagement policy focused on brain circulation?*

On the one hand, external conditions to the policy subsystem changed: a structural move from an underdeveloped economy to a developing economy with a wider and better-educated middle class, better infrastructure and much more connected to the international economy. This move added to the historical migration of low or unqualified Mexicans to the United States, a new dimension of qualified and highly-qualified migrants and not only to the United States but also to other international poles of talent attraction in Europe and Asia.

On the other hand, internal conditions of the policy subsystem also changed: a systemic move from a closed system to one of political opportunism, and on to one of policy opportunity. For almost 30 years, the Mexican political system has gradually become more open and receptive to the contributions of its diaspora. An initial relationship that might arguably be portrayed as political or even electoral opportunism would later turn into a partnership based on identifying policy opportunities.

For this to happen, the vision and paradigm change of key politicians, public servants and businesspersons from the elite who understood the potential of harnessing the power of the Mexican diaspora (initially) in the United States for the development of the homeland was crucial. Equally important was to make good use of a series of opportunities in the subsystem to kick-off the different diaspora engagement initiatives. In that sense, the brain-circulation oriented policy is embedded in the wider diaspora engagement policy and a deeper study of it was necessary to fully understand our subject of study.

Throughout our case study, we have identified and reported in detail on the main events leading to these changes, on the key actors and their motivation, on the social networks behind them, and on how the context came shape the current *status quo*.

- 2) *What drove the highly-qualified Mexican diaspora in Europe to organize and be receptive to the engagement attempts?*

Social capital and social cohesion benefits are a major attractive quality for diasporans to organize for their own group purposes and interests. However, these network level reasons do not sufficiently explain the interest for actual engagement with the homeland institutions. We needed to delve deeper into the rationale of diasporans for engagement.

It was down to the individual, that our NPF methodology at the micro-most level uncovered the fundamental identity roots, paralleled by what ACF calls belief systems. These types of identity reasons are from three kinds: a fundamental national pride quite strong in the Mexican culture, the need for professional validation from the elite group that conforms most of RTM chapters, and the institutional prestige derived from belonging to a brand that carries meaning internationally.

Within the timeframe of the case study, we were able to perform a our analysis on a regional level. However, the detail level of the descriptive and prescriptive components would benefit greatly from more time to do network analysis on a per country basis within the region, in order to allow for a more sophisticated node mapping and the tracking of information flows. This additional analysis would allow us to better outline policy options for the institutional architecture of the RTM.

- 3) *How did the interactions between IME and RTM moved from virtually inexistent to success-story-in-the-making in the timespan of our case study?*

It is fair to say that our case study found evidence to support the different insights we posited from the theoretical tenets reviewed in the three chapters of part one. Equally so, from the fundamentals to generate our Matryoshka analytical framework as posited on part two.

In fact, some key elements such as those behind Kuznetsov's DMF models were crucial for the success-story-in-the-making. To name but a few, we observed empirically how the discussion-transaction mechanism helps to improve the quantity and quality of trust and initiatives between the diaspora organizations and homeland institutions. Or how a "paving-the-paths"

approach succeeded in capturing the interest of the diasporans where the original policy idea did not gather enough traction.

However, the full story that answers this question is probably the largest part of our case study and no summary would be able to do justice to the level of detail we have achieved. Precisely the richly detailed narrative woven from the empirical application of our united Matryoshka framework allowed us to focus on what was relevant for the case study making sense of the information overload.

4) *What lessons (if any) could be extracted from the interaction between IME and RTM to consolidate and improve future exchanges?*

The lessons extracted from our case study to improve the interaction, and thus to generate better brain circulation dynamics, took the shape of several recommendations aimed at three different levels: for local RTM chapters, for RTM regional and global coordinations, and for IME.

The lessons for the local RTM chapters in Europe suggest that they should increase the frequency and volume of their activities. Moreover these activities should always have at least one—preferably more—of the following aims: (a) to boost the internal cohesion of their members, (b) to strengthen and highlight their position and profile within the local communities, and (c) to increase engagement with homeland institutions.

Other important recommendation focused on how projects and the volunteer quality of the membership. On the one hand, that projects should take a role as central as the membership of the chapters, and how recruitment and membership efforts should always try to be linked to projects for brain circulation engagement to take place. On the other hand on how the volunteer quality of the membership should be realistic in the assessment of the projects they can carry out with the resource limits and personal assets they are willing to commit.

The lessons for the European and Global coordinations of RTM suggest that the regional leadership should emphasize the benefits of regional cooperation, allowing for as much free range to the local chapters as possible so as not to stifle internal diversity within the umbrella brand of the new RedGlobal.Mx. The establishment of a regional council with periodic meetings in which all members can express themselves and listen to their peers would help. So would a yearly meeting open to the full membership of the network, and to Mexicans in Europe in general.

Additionally, efforts should be taken to ensure the cooperation regarding institutional access. Options on how to do this range from the centralization of relationships on the regional and global coordinations to become the hubs to engage projects, to the decentralization of access to the local chapters of the RTM who would have to share the use of their institutional access, but keep control of it. Similarly, any personal connections to either local or homeland institutions should be converted into institutional connections to ensure their continuity and sustainability when certain members move on.

Finally, to the Mexican government in general, but perhaps articulated via the IME, five recommendations were derived from our case study:

- 1) RTM is not a North-American oriented project anymore and it should be organizationally reallocated accordingly,
- 2) The main policy objective should shift from international expansion of the network to the consolidation and articulation with the homeland institutions,
- 3) The establishment of an inter-institutional commission in the CNCME-style with a legal mandate to address RTM's suggestions and concerns via an interpretive engagement dialogue might prove to be a time-tested successful option,
- 4) Better support from the human and material resources perspective is required; it may come from the institutional budgetary commitments of the aforementioned inter-institutional commission and from the contributions of other investors or partners that stand to gain the most from the projects generated by the diaspora engagement, and
- 5) Stand behind the rebranding of the network, once it consolidates, to launch an aggressive PR campaign, giving the RTM the full backing of the Mexican government.

5) *What lessons (if any) could be extracted from the interaction between IME and RTM for other countries?*

Concerning lessons that could be extracted for third parties, four general brushstrokes were identified, which can be reproduced almost verbatim from the final paragraph of the case study:

- 1) there are no simple recipes to offer on engagement policies,
- 2) specific qualities of each case's migratory phenomenon must be understood in depth,
- 3) no policy exists in a void, historical inertias and background must be considered, and
- 4) international comparison analogies apply, but only up to a certain limit.

Despite our best efforts to be as extensive in our analysis as possible, the time and geography constraints proved to be challenging if we wanted to comply with the academic deadline for our dissertation. This slight inconvenience actually proved to be a good test for the framework as such, because although the variable dashboard offers a wide array of data entry-points to fill for analysis, it is still up to the researcher to decide the level of depth of the framework application.

While it might seem patent that the more data and information included, the more robust the conclusions, researchers should bear in mind that data and information inputs are also subject to diminishing marginal returns. In other words, after a certain threshold, the value of adding elements may actually be negligible and it might not yield a positive return on the cost of opportunity for collecting and processing them. Nevertheless, it is important that the research go over all possible data entries, so as not to discard some that might be key to the understanding of the dynamics.

This sacrifice is visible in our case study, in the policy recommendations section. We would have liked to have more interviews scheduled to get further details and go more into depth into each and every one of the European chapters, in order to produce SMART policy objectives. However, to take the analysis to that level, we should have needed to add two more type a general questions between questions 4 and 5 of our protocol:

- What are the specific recommendations to improve the articulation of the local European chapters of RTM with the newly consolidating Global and European regional coordinations?
- What are the specific recommendations to improve the consolidation of the PNCS and their engagement with RTM?

As for the type b dependent questions, these would have had to focus, on the one hand, on the analysis of how local chapters interact with the Global and Regional coordinations with the Matryoshka framework, with emphasis on the micro elements of the framework, and on the other hand, on the Matryoshka analysis of the extended subsystem of PNCS.

Nevertheless, we hope that the general recommendations and guidelines we have produced from our case study serve as a demonstration of our methodology, and opens the door to its further application with these additional implementation questions by the interested parties if so desired.

In summary, this first empirical application of the united Matryoshka framework was quite useful to calibrate the interaction of the integrated usage of the different models. It is our conclusion that

despite its apparent complexity, the framework gives as a result a simple and clear story that sharply focuses on the key questions posed, with well-defined and clear research outcomes that can be used both theoretically and empirically.

Future Challenges

As mentioned briefly in under the previous heading, our case study would have greatly benefitted from having additional time for collecting more data in interviews in order to go a bit deeper into the network generation analysis at a local level. Taking up this challenge in the future might be desirable. Even if it might not be a part of this dissertation anymore, it would be a useful tool both for RTM in Europe and for IME. The increased detail on the descriptive component will be able to allow for increased detail for the prescriptive component. Some initial contacts with RTM chapters in Europe suggest this might actually take place.

Equally, the fact that we have circumscribed our case study to current events has not allowed us to test the feedback component of the united Matryoshka framework. Again, this challenge could be taken in the future if either actor decides to follow up on the recommendations we have exposed, and engage the dashboard for monitoring the evolution of the interaction between IME and RTM.

Going beyond the case study of this dissertation, any country with a highly-skilled diaspora that resides in more developed regions could benefit from the application of this united Matryoshka framework upon attempting to (re)engage. Particularly, those aiming to modernize their institutional and policy landscapes through the impact of knowledge, innovation and technology available in the economies where their diasporans reside.

In addition, our methodology focuses on finding interaction mechanisms to improve the technological absorption capacities through a freer flow of the open-source ideas and expertise embedded in the human and social capital of the diasporans and their networks. Therefore, while a sizeable diaspora may facilitate its application, brain circulation does not maintain a linear relationship between the potential benefit and the amount of migrants. In any case, the quantity and quality of the connections between the talent abroad and the homeland structures is much more relevant to achieving the desired results.

In that sense, a future challenge of empirical application of the united Matryoshka framework may lie on its usage in other case studies that are currently relevant. For example, the case of Spain, whose talent migration outflows have recently increased due to the economic crises, with an active and organized diaspora willing to engage but a closed political subsystem that drives it to act as a

social movement. Or the case of Russia, with its supposed brain drain for alleged political reasons, but that seems to be disorganized and disenfranchised. These two are just a few that have been recently in vogue, and that have not yet been analyzed under a brain circulation paradigm, but the options are plentiful.

We are aware that the notions of institutional modernization and policy reform can be highly sensitive topics when it comes to the public sphere, and even more so if they involve nationals who live abroad. Therefore, our framework can be focused as widely or narrowly as the interest of the actors require, both in the general institutional landscape, or in specific sectors or institutions. While our case study focused on a national policy level, future challenges could explore more focal policies, for example those at provincial or local level to analyze particular microlearning regions, or any one particular migratory stream.

Furthermore, the cross-disciplinary nature of our methodology allows its application to virtually any kind of institutional setting or policy-subsystem, regardless of whether it is purely public, purely private, or a hybrid such as in public-private partnerships, as it concentrates in the interactions of stakeholders and their environmental constrains. This opens the door for the use of the united Matryoshka framework to a wider array of institutional environments.

Future challenges of this sort may include the link of private institutions and the diaspora. The case of ExATec briefly touched upon part three comes to mind, but might as well be applied to explore the links of diasporas with other universities, NGOs, or within particular productive chains in industries where ethnic ties are a relevant factor.

Widening our lens even further, in chapter seven we briefly theorized on the application of the united Matryoshka framework in non-diaspora related contexts. Although we expressly developed our analytical methodology with the Kuznetsov's Diaspora Mobilization Framework (DMF) at its core, given that the rest of integrated analytical tools were originally developed for their use on non-migratory institutional and policy analysis, we posit that DMF could be reconfigured for a more generalized use.

Future challenges may follow this path, using our dissertation's groundwork research as a first approach to incorporate a modified DMF on the theoretical corpus of ACF. Sabatier's original framework might benefit from the analysis that Kuzenetsov's models could have on the interaction core between coalitions. Once reworked, the unified Matryoshka framework could be virtually applied to any kind of institutional transformation or policy change analysis.

In either case, perhaps the most important future challenge for the Matryoshka framework lies in its further application to as many empirical cases as possible. This would allow us to generate a wider theoretical corpus to better calibrate the methodology, as well as to increase the opportunities for contrast and comparison of different case studies, and when applicable, to extract general inferences to generate appreciative theories.

Closing Remarks

As we come to the end of the journey of discovery that has been this doctoral dissertation, we must yet again revisit the mantra that we have been repeating all along: our main goal has been to find and understand the mechanisms through which networks of highly skilled migrants enter into brain-circulation dynamics with their homeland institutions. These brain-circulation dynamics are particularly relevant for those countries in transition to become knowledge-based economies, but struggle to keep their homegrown talent and modernize their institutions.

As a result of this goal, we were able to develop a multilevel, interdisciplinary nested analytical framework that would allow us to extract descriptive, prescriptive and feedback tracking conclusions upon its empirical application, and we tested it on the case of Mexican diaspora networks in Europe and how they articulate their engagement with the Institute of Mexicans Abroad.

Finally, along the way we have also managed to gather a sort of accessible textbook focusing on how different types of knowledge and its embodiments, international migration and institutional reform and policy change interrelate.

It is our hope that this research, its fruits, and potential applications will serve a modest steppingstone for future researchers who are in the subjects of public policy, institutionalism, and talent migration.

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ANNEX: MEXPATS.EU SURVEY


- You can see the full questionnaire here: <https://goo.gl/V1HdmC>
- You can see the summary of results here: <https://goo.gl/l7oxp9>

95 responses

Summary


I. Perfil del Mexpat

4. Eres



Mujer	58	61.1%
Hombre	37	38.9%


5. Selecciona tu rango de edad



20-24	2	2.1%
25-29	26	27.4%
30-34	38	40%
35-39	19	20%
40-44	4	4.2%
45-49	4	4.2%
50-54	1	1.1%
55-59	0	0%


60-64	0	0%
65-70	0	0%
más de 70	0	0%
menos de 20	1	1.1%

6. Además del pasaporte mexicano, ¿tienes alguna segunda nacionalidad?




Ninguna (sólo tengo pasaporte mexicano)	68	71.6%
Alemania	10	10.5%
Austria	0	0%
Bélgica	0	0%
Dinamarca	0	0%
España	5	5.3%
Finlandia	1	1.1%
Francia	4	4.2%
Irlanda	1	1.1%
Italia	3	3.2%
Noruega	1	1.1%
Países Bajos	1	1.1%
Portugal	0	0%
Reino Unido	0	0%
Rusia	0	0%
Suecia	0	0%
Suiza	0	0%
Other	1	1.1%


7. Selecciona tu país actual de residencia




Alemania	26	27.4%
Austria	1	1.1%
Bélgica	5	5.3%
Dinamarca	1	1.1%
España	16	16.8%
Finlandia	3	3.2%
Francia	18	18.9%
Grecia	0	0%
Irlanda	2	2.1%
Italia	1	1.1%
Noruega	1	1.1%
Países Bajos	4	4.2%
Portugal	4	4.2%
Reino Unido	10	10.5%
Rusia	1	1.1%
Suecia	0	0%
Suiza	1	1.1%
Other	1	1.1%

9. Además de México y de tu país actual de residencia, ¿en qué otros países has vivido por un año o más?






11. ¿Cuánto tiempo has vivido en tu actual país de residencia?




menos de un año	13	13.7%
más de 1 año, pero menos de 3 años	25	26.3%
más de 3 años, pero menos de 6 años	32	33.7%
más de 6 años, pero menos de 9 años	11	11.6%
más de 9 años, pero menos de 12 años	8	8.4%
más 12 años	6	6.3%

12. ¿Cuánto tiempo has vivido en Europa?





más de 3 años, pero menos de 6 años	28	29.5%
más de 6 años, pero menos de 9 años	16	16.8%
más de 9 años, pero menos de 12 años	8	8.4%
más 12 años	14	14.7%

13. ¿Cuánto tiempo has vivido fuera de México?




menos de un año	6	6.3%
más de 1 año, pero menos de 3 años	16	16.8%
más de 3 años, pero menos de 6 años	32	33.7%
más de 6 años, pero menos de 9 años	15	15.8%
más de 9 años, pero menos de 12 años	9	9.5%
más 12 años	17	17.9%

14. Mis razones iniciales para elegir Europa -y no otra región como EEUU o Asia- fueron:



Doble nacionalidad	24	25.3%
Permiso de estudiante	20	21.1%
Permiso de trabajo	22	23.2%
Permiso de agrupación familiar	26	27.4%
Other	3	3.2%


16. Deseo continuar viviendo en Europa indefinidamente



De momento, sí	64	67.4%
No necesariamente	31	32.6%


II. Perfil académico

II.1. Nivel máximo de estudios concluido en México




Primaria	2	2.1%
Secundaira	0	0%
Preparatoria	5	5.3%
Carrera técnica	1	1.1%
Licenciatuira	60	63.2%
Diplomado / Especialización / Postgraduado / o equivalente	5	5.3%
Maestría	18	18.9%
Doctorado	4	4.2%
Post-Doctorado	0	0%

II.2. Nivel máximo de estudios en general




Preparatoria / Highschool / o equivalente	0	0%
Carrera técnica / Educación vocacional / Associate degree / o equivalente	3	3.2%
Licenciatura / Bachelor / Licence / o equivalente	27	28.4%
Diplomado / Especialización / Postgraduado / o equivalente	6	6.3%
Maestría / Mágister / Master / DEA / DESS / o equivalente	50	52.6%
Doctorado / PhD / o equivalente	9	9.5%
Other	0	0%

II.3. Área de conocimiento en la que obtuviste tu nivel máximo de estudios




Field of Study	Count	Percentage
Business, Finance, Economics	33	36.8%
Otras Ciencias Naturales	15	15.8%
Artes	3	3.2%
Otros	0	0%

II.4. País donde obtuviste tu nivel máximo de estudios




Country	Count	Percentage
en México	46	48.4%
en mi país actual de residencia (seleccionado en la pregunta 7)	32	33.7%
Other	17	17.9%

II.5. Actualmente ¿continúas estudiando?




Study Status	Count	Percentage
No, por el momento no estudio.	66	69.5%
Sí, Carrera técnica / Educación vocacional / Associate degree / o equivalente	0	0%
Sí, Licenciatura / Bachelor / Licence / o equivalente	3	3.2%
Sí, Diplomado / Especialización / Postgraduado / o equivalente	2	2.1%
Sí Maestría / Máster / Master / DEA / DESS / o equivalente	14	14.7%
Sí, Doctorado / PhD / o equivalente	5	5.3%
Other	5	5.3%

II.6. ¿Dónde estudias actualmente?




No, por el momento no estudio	67	70.5%
en mi ciudad actual de residencia (presencial)	21	22.1%
en México (a distancia desde mi país de residencia)	1	1.1%
en mi país actual de residencia (a distancia desde otra ciudad)	5	5.3%
en un tercer país (a distancia)	1	1.1%

II.7. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es inexistente y 6 es abundante: ¿Qué tanto campo laboral tiene tu área de estudio en México?



Inexistente: 1	2	2.1%
2	12	12.6%
3	13	13.7%
4	25	26.3%
5	17	17.9%
Abundante: 6	26	27.4%

II.8. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es inexistente y 6 es abundante: ¿Qué tanto campo laboral tiene tu área de estudio en tu actual país de residencia?




4 **19** 20%

5 **32** 33.7%

Abundante: 6 **27** 28.4%

II.9. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es inexistente y 6 es abundante: ¿Qué tanto campo laboral tiene tu área de estudio en otros países europeos?



Inexistente: 1 **1** 1.1%

2 **3** 3.2%

3 **6** 6.3%

4 **18** 18.9%

5 **37** 38.9%


Abundante: 6 **30** 31.6%

III. Perfil Laboral

III.1. ¿Tienes experiencia de trabajo en México?

Sí **89** 93.7%


No **6** 6.3%



¿Viviste en México?


ninguna o menos de 1 año	11	11.6%
más de 1 año pero menos de 3 años	28	29.5%
más de 3 años pero menos de 6 años	29	30.5%
más de 6 años pero menos de 9 años	17	17.9%
más de 9 años pero menos de 12 años	6	6.3%
más de 12 años pero menos de 15 años	2	2.1%
más de 15 años	2	2.1%

III.3. ¿Tu experiencia de trabajo en México fue antes o después de haber vivido en el extranjero?



No aplica (no hay experiencia)	6	6.3%
Antes	62	65.3%
Después	4	4.2%
Antes y después	23	24.2%

III.3.a. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy difícil y 6 es muy sencillo: Conseguir empleo en México ANTES de una estancia en el extranjero fue:




3 **27** 28.4%

4 **14** 14.7%

5 **12** 12.6%

Más sencillo: 6 **11** 11.6%

III.3.b. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es más difícil y 6 es más sencillo: Conseguir empleo en México DESPUÉS de una estancia en el extranjero fue:



Más difícil: 0 **53** 55.8%

1 **1** 1.1%

2 **0** 0%


3 **11** 11.6%

4 **8** 8.4%


5 **9** 9.5%

Más sencillo: 6 **13** 13.7%

III.4. Tu experiencia laboral en México ¿tiene que ver con tu área de estudios?




III.5. Tus experiencias laborales en México ¿tuvieron algo que ver con el país donde actualmente resides?




Sí	14	14.7%
No	74	77.9%
No aplica (no hay experiencia)	7	7.4%

III.6. ¿Tienes experiencia de trabajo en algún tercer país?



Sí	38	40%
No	57	60%


III.7. ¿Cuántos años de experiencia laboral has acumulado en terceros países?



ninguna o menos de 1 año	59	62.1%
más de 1 año pero menos de 3 años	17	17.9%


más de 3 años pero menos de 6 años	12	12.6%
más de 6 años pero menos de 9 años	2	2.1%
más de 9 años pero menos de 12 años	1	1.1%
más de 12 años pero menos de 15 años	2	2.1%
más de 15 años	2	2.1%

III.8. De 1 a 6 donde 1 es muy difícil y 6 es muy sencillo: En tu experiencia, conseguir empleo en un tercer país como mexpat fue:




Muy difícil: 0	49	51.6%
1	7	7.4%
2	4	4.2%
3	11	11.6%
4	10	10.5%
5	6	6.3%
Muy sencillo: 6	8	8.4%

III.9. Tu experiencia laboral en un tercer país ¿tuvo algo que ver con el país donde actualmente resides?




Sí	13	13.7%
No	35	36.8%
No aplica (no hay experiencia)	47	49.5%

III.10. Tu experiencia laboral en un tercer país ¿tuvo algo que ver con México?




Sí	14	14.7%
No	34	35.8%
No aplica (no hay experiencia)	47	49.5%

III.11. ¿Tienes experiencia de trabajo en tu país de residencia actual?




Sí	74	77.9%
No	21	22.1%

III.11.a. ¿Dónde conseguiste tu primera oportunidad para trabajar en tu país de actual residencia?




No aplica (no hay experiencia)	19	20%
Desde México	13	13.7%
Desde mi actual país de residencia	58	61.1%
Other	5	5.3%

III.11.b. ¿Como te enteraste de esa primera oportunidad para trabajar en tu país de actual residencia?




No aplica (no hay experiencia)	17	17.9%
Por amigos, conocidos o familia (mexpats)	8	8.4%
Por amigos, conocidos o familia (residentes no mexicanos)	13	13.7%
Redes sociales (linked-in, facebook, twitter, etc.)	5	5.3%
Bolsa de trabajo directa del empleador	15	15.8%
Bolsas de trabajo de universidades o redes de exalumnos	16	16.8%
Servicios gubernamentales de empleo	2	2.1%
Bolsas de trabajo generales (por internet)	18	18.9%
Other	1	1.1%

III.12. ¿Cuántos años de experiencia laboral has acumulado en tu país de residencia?




ninguna o menos de 1 año	32	33.7%
más de 1 año pero menos de 3 años	27	28.4%
más de 3 años pero menos de 6 años	22	23.2%
más de 6 años pero menos de 9 años	5	5.3%
más de 9 años pero menos de 12 años	6	6.3%
más de 12 años pero menos de 15 años	2	2.1%
más de 15 años	1	1.1%

III.13. Tu experiencia laboral en tu país de residencia ¿tiene que ver con tu área de estudios?




III.14. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy difícil y 6 es muy sencillo: En general, para ti como mexpat, conseguir empleo en tu país de residencia fue:



Muy difícil: 0	17	17.9%
1	15	15.8%
2	9	9.5%
3	11	11.6%
4	21	22.1%
5	13	13.7%
Muy sencillo: 6	9	9.5%


III.14.a. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy relevante y 6 es casi irrelevante: Qué impacto tuvo tu experiencia laboral en México para conseguir empleo en tu país de residencia:



Muy relevante: 0	25	26.3%
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
1	20	21.1%
2	6	6.3%
3	7	7.4%
4	15	15.8%
5	10	10.5%
Casi irrelevante: 6	12	12.6%

III.14.b. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy relevante y 6 es casi irrelevante: Qué impacto tuvo tu educación EN México para conseguir empleo en tu país de residencia:



Muy relevante: 0	22	23.2%
1	16	16.8%
2	16	16.8%
3	10	10.5%
4	11	11.6%
5	14	14.7%
Casi irrelevante: 6	6	6.3%


III.14.c. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy relevante y 6 es casi irrelevante: Qué impacto tuvo tu educación FUERA de México para conseguir empleo en tu país de residencia:



Muy relevante: 0	42	44.2%
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
1	21	22.1%
2	9	9.5%
3	8	8.4%
4	2	2.1%
5	8	8.4%
Casi irrelevante: 6	5	5.3%

III.15. Tu experiencia laboral en tu país de actual residencia ¿tiene algo que ver con México?




Sí	17	17.9%
No	59	62.1%
No aplica (no hay experiencia)	19	20%

III.16. ¿Cuál es tu situación laboral actualmente?




Tengo empleo, estoy cómodo y no busco cambiar	22	23.2%
Tengo empleo, estoy abierto a cambiar, pero no busco activamente	29	30.5%
Tengo empleo, y busco activamente cambiarme	13	13.7%
No trabajo, busco empleo	22	23.2%
No trabajo, y de momento no busco empleo	9	9.5%

III.16.a. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy seguramente sí y 6 es muy seguramente no: Si encontraras empleo en otro país europeo distinto a donde actualmente vives, ¿crees que te mudarías?




Muy seguramente sí: 0	11	11.6%
1	21	22.1%
2	15	15.8%
3	18	18.9%
4	6	6.3%
5	11	11.6%
Muy seguramente no: 6	13	13.7%

III.16.b. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy seguramente sí y 6 es muy seguramente no: Si encontraras empleo en México, ¿crees que te mudarías de vuelta?



Muy seguramente sí: 0	11	11.6%
1	16	16.8%
2	10	10.5%
3	19	20%
4	9	9.5%
5	15	15.8%
Muy seguramente no: 6	15	15.8%


III.17. ¿Qué categoría aplica mejor a tu empleo actual (o tu último empleo en Europa)?



Empleado de una empresa privada local	9	9.5%
Empleado de una empresa multinacional	35	36.8%
Empleado de una institución académica	11	11.6%
Empleado en el sector público	6	6.3%


IV. Perfil Social

IV.1. Tu situación de pareja es




Soltero y sin pareja	17	17.9%
Soltero con pareja estable	24	25.3%
Casado o en unión civil	54	56.8%

IV.2. ¿Qué nacionalidad tiene tu pareja?




No tengo pareja	17	17.9%
de México	15	15.8%
del país donde resido (según pregunta 7)	50	52.6%
Other	13	13.7%

IV.3. ¿Tienes hijos?




Sí	30	31.6%
No	65	68.4%

IV.4. ¿Qué nacionalidad tiene tus hijos?



No tengo hijos	64	67.4%
Sólo de México	6	6.3%
Sólo de la de mi pareja	3	3.2%
Doble nacionalidad (México + la de mi pareja)	21	22.1%
Other	1	1.1%


IV.5. Tu pareja e/o hijos viven en



No aplica	25	26.3%
México	5	5.3%
conmigo en mi país actual de residencia	63	66.3%
Other	2	2.1%


IV.6. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es otros mexicanos y 6 es residentes locales: En tus

interacciones sociales cotidianas, suelo frecuentar más:




Otros mexicanos:	1	2	2.1%
	2	9	9.5%
	3	18	18.9%
	4	19	20%
	5	25	26.3%
Residentes locales:	6	22	23.2%

IV.7. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es otros mexicanos y 6 es otros extranjeros no mexicanos: En tus interacciones sociales cotidianas, suelo frecuentar más:




Otros mexicanos:	1	5	5.3%
	2	10	10.5%
	3	9	9.5%
	4	25	26.3%
	5	26	27.4%
Otros extranjeros:	6	20	21.1%

IV.8. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es residentes locales y 6 es otros extranjeros no mexicanos: En tus interacciones sociales cotidianas, suelo frecuentar más:




residentes locales:	1	17	17.9%
	2	14	14.7%
	3	11	11.6%
	4	19	20%
	5	21	22.1%
Otros extranjeros:	6	13	13.7%

IV.9. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy relevante y 6 es casi irrelevante: En tus interacciones sociales cotidianas, para ti mantener contacto con otros mexicanos en mi lugar de residencia es:



Muy relevante:	1	20	21.1%
	2	15	15.8%
	3	29	30.5%
	4	16	16.8%
	5	13	13.7%
Casi irrelevante:	6	2	2.1%

IV.10. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy relevante y 6 es casi irrelevante: En tus interacciones sociales cotidianas, para ti mantener contacto con otros mexicanos en Europa es:




3 **25** 26.3%

4 **25** 26.3%

5 **14** 14.7%

Casi irrelevante: 6 **3** 3.2%

IV.11. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy relevante y 6 es casi irrelevante: En tus interacciones sociales cotidianas, para ti mantener contacto con familia y amigos en México es:



Muy relevante: 1 **60** 63.2%

2 **25** 26.3%


3 **7** 7.4%

4 **2** 2.1%

5 **0** 0%


Casi irrelevante: 6 **1** 1.1%

IV.12. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy relevante y 6 es casi irrelevante: En tus interacciones sociales cotidianas, para ti mantener contacto con colegas o relaciones profesionales en México es:




5 **9** 9.5%
 Casi irrelevante: 6 **6** 6.3%

IV.13. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy relevante y 6 es casi irrelevante: En tu vida cotidiana, para ti mantenerte informado de lo que pasa en México es:




Muy relevante: 1 **47** 49.5%
 2 **21** 22.1%
 3 **20** 21.1%
 4 **4** 4.2%
 5 **3** 3.2%
 Casi irrelevante: 6 **0** 0%

IV.14. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy relevante y 6 es casi irrelevante: En tu vida cotidiana, para ti pertenecer a alguna red de mexicanos en el extranjero es:




IV.14.a. Actualmente pertenezco a las siguientes asociaciones de mexicanos en el extranjero:




ninguna	32	33.7%
de estudiantes	9	9.5%
de exalumnos	35	36.8%
profesionales	14	14.7%
artísticas	7	7.4%
deportivas	2	2.1%
Other	20	21.1%

IV.15. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es mucho y 6 es poco: ¿Te interesaría colaborar en proyectos profesionales con otros mexicanos en Europa?




Mucho: 1	36	37.9%
2	30	31.6%
3	16	16.8%
4	8	8.4%
5	3	3.2%
Poco: 6	2	2.1%

IV.16. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es mucho y 6 es poco: ¿Te interesaría colaborar en proyectos profesionales con otros mexicanos en México?



Mucho: 1	35	36.8%
2	29	30.5%
3	17	17.9%
4	3	3.2%
5	8	8.4%
Poco: 6	3	3.2%


IV.17. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es mucho y 6 es poco: ¿Te interesaría colaborar en proyectos profesionales con otros mexicanos en terceros países?



Mucho: 1	36	37.9%
2	20	21.1%


3	15	15.8%
4	7	7.4%
5	9	9.5%
Poco: 6	8	8.4%

IV.19. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es mucho y 6 es poco: ¿Te interesaría colaborar en proyectos sociales para incidir en México con otros mexicanos en Europa?



Mucho: 1	40	42.1%
2	29	30.5%
3	11	11.6%
4	7	7.4%
5	4	4.2%
Poco: 6	4	4.2%


IV.20. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es mucho y 6 es poco: ¿Te interesaría colaborar en proyectos sociales para incidir en México con otros mexicanos en México?



Mucho: 1	38	40%
2	23	24.2%
3	18	18.9%
4	5	5.3%
5	4	4.2%

Poco: 6 **7** 7.4%


IV.21. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es mucho y 6 es poco: ¿Te interesaría colaborar en proyectos sociales para incidir en México con otros mexicanos en terceros países?



Mucho: 1	37	38.9%
2	18	18.9%
3	17	17.9%
4	9	9.5%
5	6	6.3%
Poco: 6	8	8.4%


V. Relación con México

V.1. ¿Con qué frecuencia visitas México?




hace más de 2 años que no voy	10	10.5%
una vez cada 2 años	23	24.2%
una vez por año	48	50.5%
2 o más veces por año	14	14.7%

V.2. ¿Cuál es la duración promedio de tus visitas a México?




menos de 1 semana	6	6.3%
de 1 a 2 semanas	19	20%
de 2 a 3 semanas	32	33.7%
de 3 a 4 semanas	26	27.4%
4 semanas o más	12	12.6%

V.3. Cuando visito México, usualmente es:




para visitar familia y amigos	93	97.9%
por turismo	34	35.8%
de trabajo por iniciativa propia	8	8.4%
de trabajo enviado por mi empresa	5	5.3%
para eventos académicos	7	7.4%
Other	1	1.1%

V.4. Desde mi país de residencia, aún mantengo contacto con amigos y colegas en México que forman parte de:




V.5. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las pequeñas y medianas empresas mexicanas, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas: 0	39	41.1%
1	10	10.5%
2	19	20%
3	14	14.7%
4	5	5.3%


5	4	4.2%
Muy receptivas: 6	4	4.2%

V.6. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las grandes empresas mexicanas, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas: 0	41	43.2%
1	3	3.2%
2	11	11.6%
3	11	11.6%
4	14	14.7%
5	9	9.5%
Muy receptivas: 6	6	6.3%


V.7. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las filiales mexicanas de empresas multinacionales, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas: 0	46	48.4%
1	3	3.2%
2	3	3.2%
3	7	7.4%
4	11	11.6%


	5	14	14.7%
Muy receptivas:	6	11	11.6%

V.8. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las instituciones académicas mexicanas, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas:	0	33	34.7%
	1	8	8.4%
	2	4	4.2%
	3	13	13.7%
	4	12	12.6%
	5	15	15.8%
Muy receptivas:	6	10	10.5%


V.9. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONGs) mexicanas, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas:	0	63	66.3%
	1	2	2.1%
	2	4	4.2%
	3	8	8.4%


	4	9	9.5%
	5	5	5.3%
Muy receptivas:	6	4	4.2%

V.10. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las filiales mexicanas de organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONGs) internacionales, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas:	0	65	68.4%
	1	2	2.1%
	2	3	3.2%
	3	8	8.4%
	4	7	7.4%
	5	4	4.2%
Muy receptivas:	6	6	6.3%


V.11. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las instituciones de gobierno local, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas:	0	57	60%
	1	17	17.9%
	2	7	7.4%


3	5	5.3%
4	4	4.2%
5	4	4.2%
Muy receptivas: 6	1	1.1%

V.12. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las instituciones de gobierno estatal, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas: 0	63	66.3%
1	14	14.7%
2	6	6.3%
3	4	4.2%
4	3	3.2%
5	4	4.2%
Muy receptivas: 6	1	1.1%


V.13. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las instituciones de gobierno federal, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas: 0	59	62.1%
1	12	12.6%
2	5	5.3%


	3	6	6.3%
	4	6	6.3%
	5	5	5.3%
Muy receptivas:	6	2	2.1%

V.14. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las representaciones de México en el exterior, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas:	0	55	57.9%
	1	5	5.3%
	2	9	9.5%
	3	10	10.5%
	4	3	3.2%
	5	8	8.4%
Muy receptivas:	6	5	5.3%


V.15. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las organizaciones y cámaras empresariales mexicanas, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas:	0	66	69.5%
	1	6	6.3%

2	2	2.1%
3	4	4.2%
4	4	4.2%
5	9	9.5%
Muy receptivas: 6	4	4.2%


V.16. De 1 a 6, donde 1 es muy cerradas y 6 es muy receptivas: En mi experiencia, las organizaciones sindicales mexicanas, con respecto de nuevas ideas procedentes del extranjero, son:



Muy cerradas: 0	73	76.8%
1	11	11.6%
2	4	4.2%
3	1	1.1%
4	2	2.1%
5	3	3.2%
Muy receptivas: 6	1	1.1%


VI. Opciones de contacto

...ser contactado para aclarar alguna duda o profundizar en el tema exclusivamente sobre esta encuesta...




Sí	87	91.6%
No	8	8.4%

...ser contactado para recibir un resumen de los resultados de mi estudio de caso cuando termine el análisis...




Sí	91	95.8%
No	4	4.2%

...ser invitado a participar en el proyectos que hayas marcado que podrían ser de tu interés, en el marco del portal mexpats.eu...




Sí	87	91.6%
No	8	8.4%

...ser invitado a participar en redes sociales colegas de mexpats.eu (como redes de talentos, de estudiantes, etc.), siempre filtradas para que se ajusten a tu perfil de mexpat...



Sí	85	89.5%
No	10	10.5%



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Thinking beyond remittances and other financial flows, an untapped value of highly-qualified migrants lies in their roles as interpreters and bridges linking the developed and the developing regions of the planet through the human networks of knowledge. So how can developing economies benefit from the skills and talents of their citizens abroad in the world's leading innovation centers? Any answer inescapably requires the (re)engagement of both the talented diasporans and the homeland stakeholders to modernize the policies and institutions that strengthen structural links and foster brain-circulation dynamics. This effectively improves the countries' technological absorption capacities and shifts the development paradigm from a subsistence agenda towards a proactive self-managed agenda of deeper longer-lasting impact.

Dissertation objective

This dissertation attempts to build a methodological tool that can be applied in a variety of projects aimed at countries interested in reaping the benefits from brain-circulation dynamics. By using this tool, three main products can be obtained: (i) a descriptive component, consisting of an in-depth case study of the prevailing conditions that motivate and/or dissuade talented migrants to (re)engage with structures in their homeland; (ii) a prescriptive component, offering a set of bespoke recommendations to move towards a new scenario more conducive to (re)engagement; and (iii) a feedback component, to monitor the evolution of the *status quo*, providing guidance on how to adjust the actors' strategies in the dynamic institutional environment.

Innovative Features

Traditional studies around the migration of highly-qualified individuals tend to be divided into those suggesting brain drain (by which more opportunities are lost than gained from the migration to the countries of origin) and those suggesting brain circulation (by which the country of origin can reap benefits otherwise unavailable from migrants). The proposed methodology moves away from this faux dilemma, acknowledging that both dynamics coexist, and that with the appropriate provisions, the structural conditions causing the drain can be reduced, while those causing the circulation can be enhanced.

Also, migratory studies often focus on a single level of the migratory phenomenon making them easier tools to use but, by missing several layers of detail, these can be severely limited in their explanatory power. In the few cases where additional layers are considered, these are usually

incorporated as afterthoughts and in the absence of a coherent framework that allows for cross-case comparison. Instead, the proposed methodology adopts an intrinsically coherent multilevel framework that takes into consideration elements ranging from the individual to the national context for an integral view and comparative ease.

Moreover, traditional (academic) studies of talent migration tend to be descriptive by nature, and seldom propose recommendations of policy intervention to achieve an improved interaction between the diaspora and the homeland institutions. Even fewer include mechanisms for monitoring the interaction to adjust the recommendations as the *status quo* evolves. Due to its cross-disciplinary nature that combines theories from political science, economics and sociology, the proposed methodology addresses those issues by default.

Brief Methodological Description

To produce the abovementioned descriptive, prescriptive and feedback components, this methodology makes use of a cross-disciplinary and multilevel nested analytic framework that takes into consideration the specificities of a country's institutional landscape, as well as the human-resource assets available at different micro, intermediate and macro levels. For the integration of a coherent framework, a set of five theories and models that are compatible with and complementary of each other were selected based on the following criteria, obtained from an extensive theoretical review in part one:

- That they could fit under the umbrella of the endogenous growth theories, in which the notions of institutions as containers of knowledge, human capital, social capital, and learning as a social process, are important explanatory elements of economic growth (Nelson & Roemer, 1996; Aghion & Howitt, 1998; Cortright, 2001; Pinch et al., 2003; Lang, 2005; Florida, 2005; UNIDO, 2009);
- That they could subscribe to the theories by which variations in institutions and policies are the main explanatory elements behind the variations in economic development amongst nations (Henry & Miller, 2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Ferguson, 2012);
- That they could be comprised within the original institutional economics, as this branch of institutional economics is multidisciplinary by nature, as it entails a holistic model of individual (different to the rational, interest-driven individual of the new institutional economics and game theories), as it is expressed in narrative language, and as it accepts both inductive and deductive reasoning methods (Parada, 2003);

- That they were compatible with the integrative models of migration theories that aim to capture both the macro (or structural) and the micro (or individual) impulses and motivations behind migratory flows (Goss & Lindquist, 1995; GLOPP & Thieme, 2007);
- That they understood diasporas from an identity perspective, rather than from the traditional “country of origin” view (Orozco, 2008; Bakewell, 2009; Rutherford, 2009);
- That they could benefit from network analytic tools (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008; Castells, 2010, 2011);
- That they could be articulated as an appreciative theory, namely, with a narrative structure, with explicit causal arguments, closer to empirical work, and that can provide both guidance and an interpretation (Nelson, 1994:3);
- That they accepted institutional change as a process compatible to that of public policy change, whereby actors can exert their influence either as individuals or as members of formal and/or informal coalitions (Askim, 2005; Barzelay & Gallego, 2006; Pierson, 2006; Sabatier, 2007); and
- That they recognized the existence of resource and power asymmetries between actors and coalitions, allowing for bargaining and conflict as alternative interaction mechanisms to cooperation (Acemoglu, 2003; Moe, 2006; Offe, 2006; Preuss, 2006).

Following these criteria, we have assembled a methodology that establishes five integrated levels of analysis, assigning each a specific explanatory model or theory, going from the micro-most of the individual actor to the macro-most of the national context, in a way akin to those Russian *matryoshka* dolls. These five nested levels and their analytic tools are:

1. An adaptation of Jones and McBeth’s Narrative policy framework (NPF): to help identify which are the key individual actors whose narratives (biographies, identity, and embedded knowledge) can help to shape policies and institutions;
2. An adaptation of Castell’s Network theories of power (NTP): to trace how these key actors create, use and manage social networks as coalitions through which their beliefs and preferences socialized, generating synergies and redundancies to increase their chances to shape policies and institutions;

3. Kuznetsov's Diaspora mobilization framework (DMF): to characterize the different forms in which diaspora networks and homeland institutional actors can interact towards the reshaping of policies and institutions, as well as to have an insight of how different outcomes may actually be forecasted;
4. Sabatier's Advocacy coalition framework (ACF): to complement the interaction analysis of the previous stage with additional elements of the broader policy subsystems which are not observed by Kuznetsov's framework; and
5. Barzelay, Gaetani, Cortázar Velarde and Cejudo's Case-study oriented research in policy change (CORPC): to ensure that results of different subsystems analyzed are compatible and comparable.

Part two is devoted to explaining in detail how the different levels and their analytical tools are integrated and interact among them to produce the descriptive, prescriptive and feedback components.

Empirical Application

Part three is devoted to the empirical application of the Matryoshka framework to the case study of the relationship between the talented Mexican diaspora in Europe and the Institute of Mexicans Abroad. By following our Matryoshka research protocols, we generated five general questions and over 50 related dependent questions to elucidate whether brain circulation dynamics are present or not, and how to improve the status quo to foster them.

The results are presented as a standalone case study report in chapter 10, that traces the story of the diaspora engagement between the Mexico and its diaspora overall and the Institute of Mexicans Abroad and the Mexican talented diaspora in Europe in particular. With the guidance of the Matryoshka framework, we explore the way in which different variables have impacted the relationship between the homeland institutions and the talented diasporas, and we describe how we have come to the current *status quo*.

Moreover, our study concludes with a set of general recommendations to improve the chances of achieving brain circulation, directly addressed at the relevant actors from the diaspora side and from the homeland institutions side. Albeit general, these recommendations serve as a first step towards a further application of our Matryoshka framework to improve the level of analysis.

Further Application Contexts

Any country with a highly skilled diaspora in more developed regions could benefit from the application of this methodology. Particularly, those aiming to modernize their institutional and policy landscapes through the impact of knowledge, innovation and technology available in the economies where their diasporans reside.

In that sense, this methodology focuses on strengthening the technological absorption capacities through an improved flow of the open-source ideas and know-how embedded in the human and social capital of the diasporans and their networks. So, while a sizeable diaspora may facilitate its application, brain circulation does not maintain a linear relationship between the potential benefit and the amount of migrants. In any case, the quantity and quality of the connections between the talent abroad and the homeland structures is much more relevant to achieving the desired results.

We are aware that the notions of institutional modernization and policy reform can be highly sensitive topics when it comes to the public sphere, and even more so if they involve nationals who live abroad. Therefore, this methodology can be focused as widely or narrowly as the interest of the actors require, both in the general institutional landscape, or in specific sectors or institutions. Furthermore, the cross-disciplinary nature of our methodology allows its application to virtually any kind of institutional setting or policy-subsystem, regardless of whether it is purely public, purely private, or a hybrid such as in public-private partnerships, as it concentrates in the interactions of stakeholders and their environmental constrains.

RESUMEN EJECUTIVO

Pensando más allá de las remesas y otros flujos financieros, uno de los grandes valores inexplorados de los migrantes altamente calificados radica en sus roles como intérpretes y puentes conectando las regiones desarrolladas y en desarrollo del planeta, por medio de redes humanas de conocimiento. Entonces, ¿cómo pueden las economías en desarrollo beneficiarse de las habilidades y talentos de sus ciudadanos radicados en los más importantes centros de innovación del mundo? Cualquier atisbo de respuesta requiere forzosamente la (re)vinculación de la diáspora talentosa con aquellos actores del país de origen que impactan en la modernización de políticas públicas e instituciones que refuerzan los enlaces estructurales y fomentan las dinámicas de circulación de cerebros. El objetivo es mejorar las capacidades de absorción tecnológica de los países y cambiar el paradigma de una agenda de subsistencia a una agenda proactivamente auto-administrada con un impacto más profundo y duradero.

Objetivo de la tesis

Esta tesis intenta construir una herramienta metodológica de aplicación a una variedad de proyectos enfocados a países interesados en cosechar los beneficios de las dinámicas de circulación de cerebros. De su uso, pueden obtenerse tres productos: (i) un componente descriptivo, que consiste en un caso de estudio a profundidad de las condiciones prevalecientes que motivan y/o disuaden a los migrantes talentosas para (re)vincularse con las estructuras de sus países de origen; (ii) un componente prescriptivo, que ofrezca una serie de recomendaciones específicas para moverse hacia un nuevo escenario más conducente a la (re)vinculación; y (iii) un componente de retroalimentación, para monitorear la evolución del statu quo, ofreciendo a su vez una guía para ajustar las estrategias de los actores en el entorno institucional dinámico.

Características innovativas

Los estudios tradicionales sobre la migración altamente cualificada tiende a dividirse entre aquellos estudios que sugieren la existencia de una fuga de cerebros (por la que los países de origen pierden más oportunidades de las que se ganan con la migración) y aquellos que sugieren la existencia de una circulación de cerebros (por la que los países de origen pueden cosechar beneficios que sin la migración no existirían). Nuestra metodología escapa a este falso dilema reconociendo que ambas dinámicas coexisten y, mediando los preparativos adecuados, las condiciones estructurales que causan la fuga de cerebros pueden ser reducidas, mientras que las que causan la circulación de cerebros pueden ser realizadas.

También, los estudios migratorios suelen enfocarse en un nivel particular del fenómeno migratorio mediante modelos sencillos de usar, pero que al perder varias capas de detalle pueden estar severamente limitados en su poder explicativo. En algunos casos en los que capas de detalle adicional son consideradas, suelen tratarse de adiciones a posteriori y en ausencia de un marco coherente que permita la comparación entre casos. Para subsanar esta limitación, la metodología propuesta adopta un marco intrínsecamente coherente y multinivel que toma en consideración elementos que van desde lo individual hasta el contexto nacional para dar una visión integral y tener mayor facilidad comparativa.

Adicionalmente, los estudios (académicos) tradicionales tienden a ser descriptivos por naturaleza y rara vez proponen recomendaciones de intervenciones en políticas públicas para lograr mejores interacciones entre la diáspora y las instituciones de los países de origen. Aún menos estudios suelen incluir mecanismos para monitorear la interacción e ir ajustando las recomendaciones a medida que el statu quo evoluciona. Debido a su naturaleza interdisciplinaria que combina teorías de ciencia política, economía y sociología, la metodología propuesta evita esas limitaciones de origen.

Breve descripción metodológica

Para generar los componentes descriptivos, prescriptivos y de retroalimentación, esta metodología hace uso de un marco interdisciplinario, multinivel y anidado que toma en consideración las especificidades del panorama institucional de los países, así como los activos en recursos humanos disponibles en los diferentes niveles micro, intermedio y macro. Para la integración de un marco coherente, un conjunto de cinco teorías y modelos compatibles y complementarios entre sí fueron seleccionados basados en los siguientes criterios, obtenidos de nuestro exhaustivo repaso a la teoría en la primera parte:

- Que fueran compatibles con las teorías económicas de crecimiento endógeno, para compatibilizar las nociones de instituciones como contenedores de conocimiento, de capital humano, de capital social, de aprendizaje un como proceso social, así como la gran incidencia que todo esto tiene sobre el desarrollo (Nelson & Roemer, 1996; Aghion & Howitt, 1998; Cortright, 2001; Pinch et al., 2003; Lang, 2005; Florida, 2005; UNIDO, 2009);
- Que suscribieran la explicación institucional y de política pública de las variaciones de desarrollo económico entre naciones (Henry & Miller, 2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Ferguson, 2012)

- Que fueran compatibles con las teorías de la economía institucional original, ya que esta es intrínsecamente multidisciplinaria al agrupar un modelo de individuo holístico (contrario al individuo calculador y racional anclado en la teoría de juegos de la nueva economía institucional), se expresa de un modo narrativo (en lugar de matemático), y acepta el uso del razonamiento inductivo de Dewey junto con el método deductivo (Parada, 2003);
- Que fuera compatible con los modelos integradores de las teorías de migración que buscan utilizar los impulsos macro (o estructurales) y micro (o individuales) para explicar los movimientos humanos (Goss & Lindquist, 1995; GLOPP & Thieme, 2007);
- Que entendieran el modelo de diáspora desde la perspectiva identitaria, más allá de la tradicional perspectiva del “país de origen” (Orozco, 2008; Bakewell, 2009; Rutherford, 2009);
- Que fueran compatibles con los estudios que hacen uso del análisis de redes (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008; Castells, 2010, 2011);
- Que pudieran articularse a manera de una teoría apreciativa, es decir de expresión narrativa, con argumentos causales usualmente explícitos, más “cercana al trabajo empírico y que provee tanto de guía como interpretación” (Nelson, 1994:3) ;
- Que adoptaran una metodología compatible entre el cambio institucional y el de políticas públicas como un proceso donde los actores pueden incidir ya sea como individuos o como grupos formales e informales (Askim, 2005; Barzelay & Gallego, 2006; Pierson, 2006; Sabatier, 2007); y
- Que aceptaran la existencia de asimetrías de recursos y poder entre los actores, y por tanto, la existencia de margen para la negociación y el conflicto político como mecanismo alternativo a la colaboración colectiva (Acemoglu, 2003; Moe, 2006; Offe, 2006; Preuss, 2006).

Con estas guías metodológicas de selección, hemos ensamblado una metodología que establece cinco niveles integrados de análisis, asignando a cada uno de ellos un modelo o teoría explicativa específica, yendo de lo más micro del actor individual a lo más macro de los contextos nacionales, de un modo parecido a las muñecas rusas *matryoshkas*. Estos cinco niveles y sus herramientas analíticas son:

- 1) El actor individual y su narrativa personal frente al entorno, observado a través una adaptación del Marco de Narrativas de Políticas (Narrative Policy Framework) o NPF por sus siglas en inglés (Jones & McBeth, 2010; Shanahan et al., 2011);
- 2) El actor y su red de soporte, visto a través de una adaptación de la Teoría en Red del Poder (Network Theory of Power) o NTP por sus siglas en inglés (Castells, 2010, 2011);
- 3) El plano de interacción entre los actores de la diáspora talentosa y los actores de las élites en control de las instituciones en su país de identidad, estudiado a través del Marco de Movilización de Diásporas (Diaspora Mobilization Framework) o DMF por sus siglas en inglés (Kuznetsov & Sabel 2008; Kuznetsov, 2009, 2010, 2011);
- 4) El subsistema de política pública o de cambio institucional específico a la discusión entre los actores, analizado a través del Marco de las Coaliciones Promotoras (Advocacy Coalition Framework) o ACF por sus siglas en inglés (Sabatier, 2007; Wieble et al., 2009, 2011);
- 5) El entorno contextual y espacio-temporal donde se enmarca el subsistema específico, explorado a través de la metodología de investigación de cambio político orientada a estudios de caso (Case-Oriented Research in Policy Change) o CORPC por sus siglas en inglés (Barzelay et al., 2003).

La segunda parte de nuestra disertación se dedica a explicar en detalle cómo los diferentes niveles y sus herramientas analíticas se integran e interactúan entre sí para producir los componentes descriptivos, prescriptivos y de retroalimentación.

Aplicación empírica

La tercera parte de la tesis se dedica a la aplicación empírica del marco Matryoshka al caso de estudio de la relación que guardan las diásporas talentosas de México en Europa con el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior. Siguiendo los protocolos de investigación, generamos cinco preguntas generales y más de 50 preguntas relacionadas para dilucidar si las dinámicas de circulación de cerebros están presentes o no, y como mejorar el statu quo para fomentarlas.

Los resultados se presentan como un reporte casi independiente por sí mismo en el capítulo 10, que rastrea la historia de la vinculación de México con su diáspora, y en particular de la vinculación entre el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior y la diáspora talentosa de México en Europa. Bajo la guía del marco Matryoshka, exploramos la forma en la que diferentes variables afectan la relación

entre las instituciones del país de origen y las diásporas talentosas, y describimos como se ha llegado hasta el statu quo actual.

Además, nuestro estudio concluye con un conjunto de recomendaciones generales para mejorar las oportunidades de obtener una circulación de cerebros, que van dirigidas directamente a los actores relevantes tanto del lado de la diáspora, como del lado de las instituciones públicas. Aunque generales, estas recomendaciones sirven como un primer paso hacia una futura replicación del marco Matryoshka para mejorar el nivel de análisis.

Otros contextos de aplicación

Cualquier país con una diáspora altamente calificada que radique en regiones más desarrolladas del mundo puede beneficiarse de la aplicación de esta metodología. En particular aquellos países que busquen modernizar sus panoramas institucionales y de política pública mediante el impacto del conocimiento, la innovación y la tecnología disponibles en las economías donde sus migrantes residen.

En ese sentido, esta metodología se enfoca en fortalecer las capacidades de absorción tecnológica mediante un flujo mejorado de ideas libres u “*open source*” y de conocimiento técnico o “*know-how*” inmanente al capital humano y social de los emigrantes y sus redes. Por tanto, mientras una diáspora de tamaño considerable puede ayudar a su aplicación, la circulación de cerebros no mantiene una relación lineal mediante el beneficio potencial y la cantidad de emigrantes. En todo caso, la cantidad y la calidad de las conexiones entre el talento en el exterior y las estructuras domésticas son mucho más relevantes para obtener los resultados deseados.

Somos conscientes que las nociones de modernización institucional y reforma política pueden ser temas altamente sensibles cuando se trata de la esfera pública, y aún más cuando involucran a compatriotas que radican en el extranjero. Por lo tanto, esta metodología puede enfocarse tan amplia o cerradamente como lo requiera el interés de los actores, tanto en el panorama general de las instituciones, como en sectores u organizaciones específicas. Además, la naturaleza interdisciplinaria de nuestra metodología permite su aplicación a virtualmente cualquier tipo de contexto institucional o subsistema político, sin importar si es puramente público, puramente privado, o híbrido como pueden ser las asociaciones público privadas, ya que se enfoca en las interacciones con los *stakeholders* y sus limitantes contextuales.