



A Family of Keystream Generators with Large Linear Complexity

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Dedicated to Beatriz with love from her father

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Abstract—In this work, a new class of keystream generators with a large linear complexity has been derived. The design criteria are easily compatible with those given in the literature to prevent correlation attacks. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Most common sequence generators in stream cipher systems are based on a combination of LFSRs and nonlinear functions. Depending on whether the keystream involves one or more than one LFSR, the sequence generators are commonly classified into filter generators and combination generators. In both cases, the linear complexity is a measure of the suitability of a keystream for its cryptographic application [1–7]. In fact, the linear complexity of sequences obtained from a nonlinear combination of LFSR-sequences is mostly predictable. Such is the case of many well-known generators proposals [5] (e.g., clock-controlled generators, alternating step generators, cascade generators, etc.) whose linear complexity is either linear or exponential in the number of

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storage cells employed. On the other hand, the linear complexity of the filter generators depends exclusively on the particular form of the filter and the LFSR minimal polynomial. Generally speaking, there is no systematic method to predict the resulting complexity. This is the reason why only a few authors have faced the problem of the determination of the linear complexity for filter generators.

The present work is concerned with the problem of the determination of the linear complexity for filter functions. Three different steps can be pointed out. First, a new class of nonlinear filter functions has been introduced. These functions are based on the product of m PN-sequence phases. Second, the linear complexity of such functions has been analyzed. Last, as the characterization of these functions affects the maximum order terms exclusively, a wide class of filter functions with a guaranteed large linear complexity can be derived. Moreover, this characterization is clearly compatible with the conditions described in [8] which prevent the nonlinear filter generators from several correlation attacks (inversion attacks, conditional correlation attacks, fast correlation attacks).

2. A NEW FAMILY OF NONLINEAR FILTERS

Let f be an m^{th} -order function applied to the stages of an LFSR of length L and minimal polynomial $P(D)$. $f = a_{n+t_1} a_{n+t_2} \times \dots \times a_{n+t_m}$ with $t_i = 2^k \cdot \delta$ where $k, \delta \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\gcd(\delta, 2^L - 1) = 1$, and let $\alpha \in GF(2^L)$ be a root of the minimal polynomial of the sequence produced by the LFSR of length L . Then α^e with $e = 2^{e_1} + 2^{e_2} + \dots + 2^{e_m}$ where $0 \leq e_1 < e_2 < \dots < e_m < L$ is a root of the minimal polynomial of the sequence generated by f if and only if the next determinant A_e does not equal zero. That is,

$$A_e = \begin{vmatrix} \alpha^{t_1 \cdot 2^{e_1}} & \alpha^{t_2 \cdot 2^{e_1}} & \dots & \alpha^{t_{m-1} \cdot 2^{e_1}} & \alpha^{t_m \cdot 2^{e_1}} \\ \alpha^{t_1 \cdot 2^{e_2}} & \alpha^{t_2 \cdot 2^{e_2}} & \dots & \alpha^{t_{m-1} \cdot 2^{e_2}} & \alpha^{t_m \cdot 2^{e_2}} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \alpha^{t_1 \cdot 2^{e_m}} & \alpha^{t_2 \cdot 2^{e_m}} & \dots & \alpha^{t_{m-1} \cdot 2^{e_m}} & \alpha^{t_m \cdot 2^{e_m}} \end{vmatrix} \neq 0$$

If the determinant A_e equals zero, then the corresponding cyclotomic coset is said to be degenerate for the function f . Let us analyse this choice of the stages of the filter, that is, replacing t_i by its value and making the next substitution $\alpha^{2^k \cdot \delta \cdot 2^{e_i}} = \lambda_i$, the determinant A_e will be as follows

$$A_e = \begin{vmatrix} 1 & \lambda_1 & \lambda_1^{m-2} & \lambda_1^{m-1} \\ 1 & \lambda_2 & \lambda_2^{m-2} & \lambda_2^{m-1} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ 1 & \lambda_m & \lambda_m^{m-2} & \lambda_m^{m-1} \end{vmatrix}$$

This determinant is a Vandermonde determinant. Its value is well known

$$A_e = \prod_{i < j} (\lambda_i - \lambda_j), \quad i = 1, \dots, m-1, \quad j = i+1, \dots, m$$

As we can see in the previous expression, $A_e \neq 0$ if $\lambda_i \neq \lambda_j$. Therefore,

$$\alpha^{2^k \cdot 2^{e_i} \cdot \delta} \neq \alpha^{2^k \cdot 2^{e_j} \cdot \delta} \Rightarrow \alpha^{2^k \cdot 2^{(e_i - e_j)} \cdot \delta} \neq \alpha^{2^L - 1} = 1 \Rightarrow 2^k \cdot 2^{(e_i - e_j)} \cdot \delta \neq 2^L - 1$$

and the above fact only happens if $\gcd(\delta, 2^L - 1) = 1$. Consequently, the linear complexity of this new family of filter functions is lower bounded by $\binom{L}{m}$ because all the cosets of weight m are nondegenerate. For $L = 257$ and $m = 129$ (typical values for the length of LFSR and the order of the filter in communication systems), $LC \approx 10^{76}$, that is, a very large linear complexity!

3. CONCLUSIONS

The keystream generators presented here provide a new class of sequence generators which satisfy the standard cryptographic requirements of large linear complexity and correlation immunity

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