Histoire @ Politique

Histoire Politique
Revue du Centre d'histoire de Sciences Po

46 | 2022
Les communistes et l'Europe : de l'eurocommunisme au rêve de Maison commune européenne

Sharing the Iberian Room in a "Common Home"? The Portuguese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Spain in a Changing Europe, 1985-1994

Partager la chambre ibérique dans la « maison commune » ? Le Parti communiste portugais et le Parti communiste d'Espagne dans une Europe en mutation, 1985-1994

Carlos Sanz and Emanuele Treglia

OpenEdition Journals

Electronic version
URL: https://journals.openedition.org/histoirepolitique/2765
ISSN: 1954-3670

Publisher
Centre d'histoire de Sciences Po

Electronic reference
Carlos Sanz and Emanuele Treglia, "Sharing the Iberian Room in a "Common Home"? The Portuguese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Spain in a Changing Europe, 1985-1994", *Histoire Politique* [Online], 46 | 2022, Online since 01 February 2022, connection on 17 March 2022. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/histoirepolitique/2765

Sharing the Iberian Room in a “Common Home”? The Portuguese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Spain in a Changing Europe, 1985-1994

Partager la chambre ibérique dans la « maison commune » ? Le Parti communiste portugais et le Parti communiste d’Espagne dans une Europe en mutation, 1985-1994

Carlos Sanz and Emanuele Treglia

1 In Europe during the late Cold War, the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português, PCP) and the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) are an example of two sister organizations that, despite sharing a common ideology and being rooted in similar contexts, maintained for decades discordant conceptions on a series of fundamental questions, including the project of European construction and its role in the dynamics of blocs. In what Mikhail Gorbachev defined as the “common European home”, these two parties shared the “room” of the Iberian Peninsula. For years, however, this coexistence in the same geographical space did not result in a convergence of positions.

2 The purpose of this article[1] is to make a comparative analysis of the attitudes adopted by the PCP and the PCE towards the momentous changes that shook Europe’s political scene between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s.[2] Indeed, in 1985 Gorbachev assumed the leadership of the USSR and promoted several novel policies that had a powerful transformational impact on the Soviet bloc and on international dynamics, leading to the end of the Cold War and, unintentionally, to the resounding demise of “actually existing socialism” between 1989 and 1991. At the same time, the European integration

project was taking large steps forward leading to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

3 How did the Iberian communists react to the unfolding of *perestroika*, the fall of the Soviet bloc, the birth of the European Union (EU), and the new international balances of the post-Cold War era? This study focuses on these key issues, emphasizing the interrelations between the evolution of the international scene and the political-ideological transformations undergone by the Spanish and Portuguese communists at that time[3]. The PCP and the PCE, that since 1986 was integrated into the United Left coalition (Izquierda Unida, IU), were at odds with one another until the end of the 1980s[4]. However, from 1990 onwards they experienced a rapprochement which, favoured by a “leftist turn” experienced by the Spanish party under the new leadership of Julio Anguita, led them in 1994 to jointly participate in the creation of a new group in the European Parliament: a group conceived as a “common home” in which PCP and PCE, paradoxically distancing themselves from Gorbachev’s vision, shared an “Iberian room” founded on Eurosceptic ideas.

Communists in a Changing Iberian Scenario

4 In the early 1970s both the PCP, led by Álvaro Cunhal, and the PCE under the secretariat-general of Santiago Carrillo, were focused on the clandestine struggle against the two dictatorships that were established in the 1930s and continued to rule in their respective countries. Although they faced similar challenges, many of their approaches were at odds.

5 The PCP was among the Western communist parties that most closely adhered to Moscow’s Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. In the late 1950s, Júlio Fogaça made a tepid attempt to de-Stalinize the party but this reformist approach described as a “turn to the right” was quickly suppressed. Against the vision of Fogaça, who thought that the Salazar regime would fall alone and that the PCP should prepare for that moment by approaching the non-communist opposition, the thesis of Cunhal, the party’s general secretary since 1961, prevailed, who considered that the revolution was inevitable in Portugal and the PCP would lead it without alliances with the bourgeois forces. In the dynamics of the Cold War, the PCP was completely on-board with the so-called proletarian internationalism, faithfully abiding by the directives issued by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), despite the fact that Cunhal’s theses did not fit well with the “peaceful coexistence” adopted by Moscow. In 1968, for example, it was the first Western communist party to send a delegation to “normalized” Czechoslovakia, applauding the suppression of the Prague Spring by the Warsaw Pact troops. Likewise, since the birth of the European Economic Community (EEC), the PCP adopted a position that can basically be described as “ideological anti-Europeanism,” within the framework of an across-the-board rejection of the Western bloc based on the premise that the European integration project was driven and dominated by the forces of international monopoly capitalism.[5]

6 In comparison with the orthodoxy of its Portuguese counterpart, at the beginning of the 1970s the PCE could be considered a heretic within the international communist movement. Since the mid-1950s, it had been renewing its theories and *praxis*, gradually embracing the pluralistic and democratic principles typical of Western liberal systems. In 1956, the party adopted a policy of "national reconciliation" that sought the

collaboration of all political forces, including the bourgeois parties, to end the dictatorship.[6] At the same time, the PCE had distanced itself considerably from Moscow. In 1968, it condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia and, in the years that followed, repeatedly criticized the despotism and deformations that characterized the Soviet model, sparking bitter clashes with the CPSU. These positions clearly diverged from those held by the PCP in the same years, deepening the ideological and tactical distance between both parties.

7 Moreover, although in the 1950s and 1960s it shared an "ideological anti-Europeanism" with the PCP, in 1972 the PCE came out in favour of the process of European integration. Several factors had a bearing on the adoption of this new position: the idea that the Spanish economy would benefit from participating in the Common Market; the fact that Europeanism was a feature common to most of the Spanish democratic forces with which the communists aspired to forge closer alliances; and, last but not least, the perspectives that promised to open up thanks to *détente*. In this connection, it should be noted that the PCE believed that *détente* gave Western Europe an opportunity to extricate itself from both blocs contributing to the "democratization of international relations". Spanish communists also believed that the project of European integration could lead to a new "authentically egalitarian" and democratic socio-political model capable of harmonizing "the democratic conquests achieved by the bourgeoisie when it was a revolutionary class" as well as "socialist conquests".[7] All of these ideas gave shape to what, since the mid-1970s, has been called Eurocommunism.

8 Far from bringing the PCP and PCE closer together, the triumph of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in April 1974 and the end of the Franco dictatorship in Spain in November 1975 actually deepened their differences, widened by radically divergent national contexts: a revolutionary process of "construction of socialism" and the end of a long colonial war in the Portuguese case, in contrast to the gradual political transition, characterized by a high level of compromise between the Francoist ruling elite and the anti-Francoist political forces, and the careful avoidance of colonial warfare through a process of controlled decolonization, in the Spanish case.[8] Actually, during the processes of democratic change taking place at that time in the Iberian Peninsula, the parties led by Cunhal and Carrillo launched forceful mutual attacks. The PCE, which pragmatically accepted the Monarchy of King Juan Carlos and cooperated with the other parties (including those who came from the Francoist establishment) to draw up the founding pacts for the new democratic system, criticized the PCP for its misgivings towards parliamentary pluralist democracy and for its attempts to establish an authoritarian leftist and anti-capitalist regime of sorts with the help of military support. In this regard, in August 1975 a Spanish communist leader told an American diplomat in Paris that:

> "Cunhal has lived too long in Moscow and this is enough to turn one into an idiot".[9]

9 Although both the orthodoxy of the PCP and the ideological imprint of the Muscovite years in the thought of Álvaro Cunhal – who lived a large part of his exile in Paris – must be assessed in the light of historical analysis, this phrase sums up well the perception of the Portuguese communist leader among his Spanish comrades.[10] On the other end of the spectrum, the PCP, isolated in the Portuguese political scenario after the end of the "*Processo Revolucionário Em Curso*" (Ongoing Revolutionary Process) in November 1975, condemned Spanish Eurocommunism for its moderation, its tendency to collaborate with class enemies and its "willingness to ignore the experience of

Lenin’s party”.[11] In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the PCP, due to its orthodoxy, became a reference and example for those Spanish communist groups that split from the PCE during the seventies and early eighties in the name of loyalty to the USSR and Leninism.[12]

10 The decision taken by the governments of Portugal and Spain to request membership in the EEC in May and July 1977 respectively, confirmed the chasm that separated the PCE, which supported this measure, from the PCP, which rejected it. With regard to the Spanish case, it is important to note that the development of Eurocommunism throughout the transition was not without strong internal dissension and controversy that plunged the PCE into a major crisis in the early 1980s. After obtaining 9.3% and 10.7% of the vote in the 1977 and 1979 elections respectively, and unable to capitalize on the social discontent expressed in the numerous strikes that took place in the late Francoism and during the transition period,[13] support for the PCE declined dramatically in 1982, when it recorded only 4%. This electoral disaster led to the resignation of Carrillo and the appointment of Gerardo Iglesias as the new general secretary.[14] In any case, despite this crisis and the conclusion of *détente,* the new leader of the PCE continued to base party policy on the key postulates of Eurocommunism, including continued support for European integration. In fact, in the parliamentary debate on Spain’s accession to the EEC held in June 1985, the communist spokesperson Fernando Pérez Royo affirmed the PCE’s “resounding *yes*” with respect to “the construction of an economically and politically united Europe” that was “not subordinate to either the US or the USSR”. And he notably added:

> “Our European option makes sense on more than just the international level. [...] It makes a lot of sense for our nation. [...] Our secular isolation from European processes [...] has not done us a bit of good. [...] Spain’s participation in the construction of a united Europe is an essential factor of democratic stability if we are to achieve far-reaching economic and social transformation”.[15]

11 In contrast, for the Portuguese communists, integration into the EEC posed a threat to national sovereignty and the achievements of April 25: it was tantamount to surrendering to the “counter-revolutionary” forces that sought to ensure the dominance of global capitalism over Portugal and that were already at work in the country promoting an “anti-socialist” constitutional review, the reversal of the agrarian reform and the re-privatization of many nationalized companies.[16] In this regard it has been pointed out that the PCP’s opposition to the European project was part of its rejection of pluralist liberal democracy.[17] The opposition to the EEC must be explained, however, both in a domestic and international perspective. Accused of having wanted to install a regime of popular democracy in 1974-1975, and isolated since then in the political scene by the Socialist Party and the moderate and conservative political forces, the PCP was left alone in its rejection of the EEC in the name of defence of national sovereignty, the preservation of the "conquests" of April 25 (nationalizations, the role of the State in the economy) and the rejection of a Europe organized on capitalist principles.[18]

12 During the long period of negotiation with the EEC between 1977 and 1985, PCP leaders focused on conveying the idea that the Community was not synonymous to Europe and on denying the inevitability of the accession process. For example, in the debate on Portugal’s signing of the accession treaty to the Common Market, Carlos Carvalhas affirmed that:

> “Europe is not the EEC ; the EEC is the Europe of monopolies and not the Europe of the workers”.

13 During that same debate Carlos Brito again stressed that the PCP considered European integration a political ploy whose objective was “to undermine the democratic transformations achieved in Portugal after April 25” which were enshrined in the Constitution.[19] Throughout this period, unlike the PCE, the PCP maintained significant support in legislative elections: after achieving 14.6% in 1976, 19% in 1979, 17% in 1980, and 18.2% in 1983, it received 15.6% of the vote in 1985.

14 In the mid-1980s, therefore, the politics of the PCP and PCE were substantially divergent. The two parties shared the same geographical area, but there was no shared Iberian communist identity.

The Iberian Communists in Times of *Perestroika*

15 Starting in 1985, the PCP and the PCE were confronted with profound changes in Europe. With the formulation of the “new thinking” in foreign policy, that complemented the internal reforms summed up in the concepts of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, Gorbachev entered into negotiations with the United States in search of a peaceful conclusion to the Cold War, while also gradually decreasing Moscow’s control over its satellite countries and loosening the CPSU’s “iron link” with the other communist parties, which he encouraged to find their own paths towards renewal. Gorbachev did not personally place a priority on cultivating transnational relations within the international communist movement but was rather more inclined to strengthen ties with socialist and social democratic parties. In fact, the Soviet leader showed little interest in the Iberian communists and, with regard to Spain, declared himself much closer to the President of the Government, the socialist Felipe González, whom he considered his favourite foreign politician.[20]

16 Within the framework of the “new thinking,” Gorbachev no longer viewed Europe as an area of conflict between blocs. He now approached it as a “common home” which should be based on dialogue and cooperation between all the countries of the continent to peacefully implement shared solutions to collective needs and challenges.[21] Based on this conceptualization, the Soviet leader embraced a positive vision of the European integration project which, among other things, led to the establishment of official relations between the EEC and COMECON in 1988.

17 The new winds blowing in from the Kremlin did not favour even the slightest rapprochement between the PCP and PCE. Indeed, a notable distance persisted between the Iberian communist parties until the end of the 1980s, not only because of their persistent differences regarding European integration but also because of their different assessments of Gorbachev’s proposals.

18 At least until 1989, the PCE expressed great admiration for and was encouraged by the policies promoted by the Kremlin’s new leader. Spanish communists viewed *perestroika* as a project potentially capable not only of revitalizing the Soviet model, freeing it from its authoritarian deformations, but also of providing renewed legitimacy to the emancipatory ideals born of the October Revolution. The PCE applauded the freeing of dissidents such as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov and declared that the reforms promoted by Gorbachev had the indisputable merit of gradually

democratizing the political, social and economic system of the USSR, pointing it "in the direction of greater pluralism".[22]

19 In this same vein, the Spanish party praised Gorbachev's foreign policy for having replaced "the balance of terror with the balance of trust",[23] ushering in "a new period in international relations where dialogue, détente and negotiated dispute resolution" were becoming the "dominant trend".[24] Consistent with this approach, the PCE applauded the 1988 EEC-COMECON agreement as an historic milestone and enthusiastically endorsed the "common home" concept. At its national conference held in January 1989 it declared that:

> "The idea of a European Common Home [...] is vital as a reference marker on the path towards a new order of stability which can only be achieved through increasing demilitarization and cooperation [...] which means going from coexisting back-to-back to living face-to-face, [...] from hostile deterrence that generates mistrust to shared security that generates trust".[25]

20 The Spanish communists believed that rapprochement and interaction between the two Europes could generate a virtuous circle, stimulating democratic transformation in the East while at the same time favouring the progressive evolution of Western countries and community institutions. It should be noted that in the light of the clear similarities between the approach taken by *perestroika* and that of Eurocommunism, in 1987 the PCE resumed its relations with the CPSU and, taking advantage of the thawing of relations with Moscow, it managed to bring back into its ranks the main pro-Soviet factions that had broken away in the 1970s and early 1980s (especially the one that led to the founding of the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain [Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España, PCPE]).

21 The PCP was more cautious and ambivalent than the PCE in the way it approached *perestroika*. The Portuguese communists officially supported the reforms in the USSR out of loyalty to the CPSU, but from the outset Cunhal showed a degree of distrust towards the "ambitious" goals that Gorbachev had set.[26] In their public speeches and in the party press, PCP leaders selectively analysed the new Soviet roadmap, providing a clearly different treatment to each of its aspects: they emphasized the positive features of the Kremlin's new approach to foreign policy – particularly its proposals to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe – while ignoring internal reforms.[27] In any case, privately Cunhal was more explicit in expressing his unease and misgivings about *perestroika*. For example, after returning from a trip to the USSR in 1987 he told Zita Seabra and other Portuguese communist leaders that "he was shocked by what he had heard and seen there".[28] At its XIIth Congress held in December 1988, the PCP doubled down on an orthodox line and rejected the ideological influences coming from the reformist winds blowing in from Moscow. On that occasion Cunhal, while praising the ambition of *perestroika* to restructure socialist society in accordance with the "communist ideal", criticized both the weakening of the hegemony exercised by the Communist Party in Soviet society and the Soviet state, and the introduction of market mechanisms.[29]

22 Hence, after Gorbachev came to power the views held by the PCE and PCP towards Moscow shifted 180 degrees: the Spanish, after years of dispute and confrontation with the CPSU were now sympathetic to Kremlin policies while the Portuguese, traditionally loyal to the party of the Soviet motherland, began to manifest, albeit cautiously, certain misgivings. At the same time, European politics continued to separate the Iberian Communists.

23 As demonstrated by its support for the ratification of the Single European Act in 1986, the PCE – and by extension the United Left – maintained its firm support for the community integration process, although it did raise two essential criticisms against the existing EEC: its “democratic deficit” and the predominance of a neo-liberal conservative mindset that had been prioritizing the Community’s economic interests to the detriment of its social policy. In the view of the Spanish communists, highlighting these negative aspects should not lead to “total opposition” to integration, which would have been irrelevant and merely “testimonial”. The PCE believed that the EEC’s shortcomings could and should be overcome by fully developing the “progressive potential” of the European project.[30] In this connection, it called for the comprehensive democratization of community institutions which implied not only “endowing the [European] Parliament with much broader powers”, but also “transferring sovereignty” from the national to the European sphere.[31] In short, the Spanish communists called for “more Europe”, embracing a supranational perspective of a federal nature, while demanding the extension and strengthening of cohesion measures and labour and civil rights. In the ranks of European communism, the PCE’s ideas were essentially shared by the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI).

24 The PCP, on the other hand, maintained its fundamental reticence towards European integration which, until 1986, it had fully rejected.[32] Although from that year forward the party begrudgingly agreed to accept the *fait accompli* of Portugal’s membership in the EEC, it did continue to criticize the threat that membership in the European Common Market posed to the country’s independence.[33] Hence, the PCP rejected the Single Act, considering it “a symbol and banner of a triumphant ideology in the EEC expressed in the trilogy: Deregulation, Economic Darwinism (i.e. survival of the fittest) and Expropriation of powers from national parliaments (‘democratic deficit’)”. According to the Portuguese communists, this was “in short, the embodiment of the axiom: ‘big fish eat little fish’”.[34]

25 Despite their differences, in 1987 both the United Left and the PCP joined the European Parliament’s Communist and Allies Group. However, after the 1989 European elections, [35] IU and PCI found that they could no longer work with the Portuguese and French communists as their views were too divergent. As a result, they created the Group for the European Unitarian Left which was also joined by the Socialist People’s Party of Denmark and the Greek reformist coalition Synaspismos. This new group, which stood for progressive and supranational Europeanism, no longer considered the other communist parties as its privileged partners, attaching more importance to collaboration with the Socialist Group. In contrast, the PCP, together with the French, Greek and Irish communists, formed the Left Unity group which was more critical of and unyielding towards the European project.[36]

26 Hence, in 1989 Iberian communists occupied two different rooms in a common European home for which they proposed plans that were incompatible. Nevertheless, soon thereafter the views of the PCP and PCE began to converge.

The Challenges of 1989-1991

27 The response of the PCP and PCE to the events that threw Eastern Europe into turmoil in the second half of 1989 started to converge and significant points of agreement emerged. In his trip through Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the German

Democratic Republic (GDR) (June 26-July 6, 1989), Cunhal treated Gorbachev's reformism with scepticism, although for the time being he avoided publicly condemning *perestroika*.[37] In reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the PCP's Central Committee published a still very cautious note regarding events in the GDR and in other socialist countries. It asserted that these events could only be interpreted "in the light of the serious delays, errors and deficiencies now revealed in the socialism-building process" in East Germany. Interestingly, it expressed a conception of European security based on maintaining the *status quo*, warning of the danger that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)'s "retaliatory forces" could take advantage of the situation to question the sovereignty of the GDR and the borders that emerged in the aftermath of World War II, resulting in the destabilization of the continent. In other words, for the PCP the existence of the GDR remained a "decisive factor for security and peace in Europe".[38] Before long, the Portuguese party began to publicly express deeper criticism of *perestroika* as demonstrated by an article published by *Avante!* on December 7, 1989, which drew attention to the shortcomings that affected the Soviet State, the economy and the CPSU, and placed the blame on Gorbachev for having adopted a reformist approach inconsistent with "the standards, ideas and essential values of the communist ideal" passed down by Marx, Engels and Lenin.[39]

28 Cunhal realized that the inevitable collapse of "actually existing socialism" had a delegitimizing effect on the PCP. In this context, in April of 1990 the Portuguese communist leader referred to the changes in Eastern Europe – the emergence of non-communist governments in countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the abrogation of the CPSU's leading role in the USSR – as "disastrous defeats".[40] A month later, the PCP held its XIIIth Congress (extraordinary). On that occasion the party highlighted with concern the threat of a possible "restructuring of the economic, political and military map of Europe in favour of imperialism" as a consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crisis of the Soviet bloc. He warned that the instruments of Western imperialism, among which he included the "IMF, World Bank, EEC policy, NATO, bourgeois parties" and "secret services", were interfering in Eastern Europe to encourage the advance of anti-socialist forces.[41]

29 The PCE was similarly bitter and uneasy regarding the decline of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the repercussions this could have on international balances and dynamics. It is important to point out that in 1988 Julio Anguita, the former mayor of Cordoba, took over the leadership of the PCE and one year later would also became Coordinator-General of the United Left. Especially since 1989, Anguita abandoned the reformist approach of Eurocommunism which his predecessor, Gerardo Iglesias, had pursued, and shifted the party to the left with the adoption of policies and interpretative schemes based on the principles of class struggle. This change was supported and applauded by significant sectors of the party who considered that the moderation typical of Eurocommunism had been responsible for the party's decline since the late 1970s. The PCE's identity, after nearly two decades, again revolved around anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, in a context of growing discontent with the social repercussions of the liberal modernization model promoted by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), in government since 1982. Social unrest in Spain reached a peak when the two main trade unions, including the socialist General Union of Workers (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT), declared in December 1988 a general strike against the government that paralyzed the

country for 24 hours.[42] Trying to take advantage of these dynamics, at national level the Spanish communists began to openly oppose the government of the PSOE, a tactic that bore its first fruits in the general elections of October 1989 in which IU obtained 9% of the votes, doubling the result of 1986 (4.6%). Internationally, this “leftist turn” took the form of harsh criticism against the new international order of the post-Cold War era, characterized by the expansion of neo-liberalism and the consolidation of North American hegemony.[43]

30 After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the PCE recognized that the “irreversible crisis” of the Soviet bloc was due to the deformations of a “totalizing” system, based on “doctrinarism” and “lack of freedom and democratic control”.[44] Nevertheless, Anguita lamented the fact that in the East, “the unyielding truths of the Party-State” were being replaced by the irrational celebration of the “virtues of a different dogma: the Capitalist Market”.[45] From the vantage point of their interpretative schemes, the Spanish communists could not understand how the citizens of what had been “actually existing socialism” could possibly long for an economic model where marginalization, “injustice and misery” flourished.[46] Like the PCP, the PCE observed with dismay and hostility the “absorption” of the GDR by the FRG. It believed that a reunified Germany would become the focal point of imperialism in Europe and, by clearly predominating continental balances, would favour a dynamic of integration “driven by a market controlled by the great oligopolistic powers”.[47] The Spanish party also criticized the fact that in the aftermath of bi-polarism, “liberation movements” that fought “against the despots propped up by the North American Empire” were deprived of the “support they used to receive from the USSR”. No longer was there any counterweight to US supremacy as demonstrated by the Gulf War (1990-1991).[48]

31 The attempted coup in the USSR in August 1991 and the disintegration of the “homeland of socialism” in December of the same year, accentuated the debates among Iberian communists regarding *perestroika* and its legacy. The PCP, clearly stating its position against Gorbachev’s reformist course and in favour of the old Soviet establishment, immediately published a statement in support of the coup plotters.[49] While the failure of the coup was extremely embarrassing for the Portuguese party, its Central Committee ratified an orthodox line and, leaving no doubt about its assessment of *perestroika*, provided a “frankly negative evaluation of its results”.[50] As from the disappearance of the USSR, harsh criticisms of Gorbachev’s legacy by Cunhal and other leaders abounded in the publication *Avante!*.[51] Miguel Urbano Rodrigues, for example, blamed the Soviet leader for a “political fragility” and a “vanity” that had been exploited by Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl to manipulate him.[52]

32 The PCE condemned the August coup, characterizing it as violent and undemocratic. But at the same time, a significant part of the Spanish communist leadership openly expressed harsh animosity towards *perestroika*, describing it as a project that, regardless of its initial intentions, led to the abandonment of all revolutionary standards and favoured the advance of conservative and reactionary forces. Thus, the “leftist turn” promoted by Anguita put the PCE in line with the PCP in terms of its essentially negative assessment of Gorbachev’s legacy.[53] In the late summer of 1991, the promoter of the “new thinking” was being described as an opportunist who, yielding to the interests of imperialism and big capital, had dealt a death blow to the USSR and contributed decisively to the emergence of the reviled new world order. In this same vein, an article published in 1995 in *Nuestra Bandera* (the theoretical journal of the PCE)

asserted that Gorbachev had “betrayed emancipatory politics” insofar as his proposals and actions paved “Dante’s path to hell”, leading to the establishment of the “reign of capitalist oppression[54].”

33 It is interesting to note that during this period both the PCP and the PCE had similar dissents within their ranks led by sectors that demanded a reformist approach. In the case of the Portuguese party, from 1987-1988 those that disagreed with the official orthodox line formed two groups: *grupo dos seis* and *Terceira Via*. Both were inspired by Gorbachev, fully supported *perestroika* and proposed an ideological and organizational renewal of the PCP. They believed that it was absurd to move into the 21st century with principles and ideas dating back to the 1920s.[55] These dissidents criticized the democratic centralism of the PCP and demanded new leadership. They also supported Portugal’s membership in the EEC and the notion of a more integrated Europe. They did not view the world as a “struggle between two opposing systems” and therefore applauded the fact that, as a consequence of the changes in international relations brought about by the Soviet “new thinking”, the bi-polar logic was giving way to dialogue and “interaction” between East and West.[56]

34 While *grupo dos seis* had a very short history, already falling by the wayside in 1989, the *Terceira Via* remained active until the end of 1991. Its criticism of the official party line set by Cunhal, and its firm condemnation of the August coup in the USSR, triggered the most profound crisis in the PCP since the days of clandestine activity; a crisis that, once again, resulted in the reaffirmation of orthodox positions and the defeat of reformist dissidents who were either expelled from or left the party.[57] In any case, the PCP found it increasingly difficult to overcome the shock waves caused by the loss of the long-standing Soviet model and, in light of its misgivings towards the European project, it virtually had no alternative for the future to offer its voters in the context of the post-Cold War. It was no coincidence that in the general elections held in October it obtained 8.8% of the votes, down more than three points with respect to the 1987 elections (12.2%); the worst result since the Carnation Revolution.

35 Since 1990, in the PCE the “leftist turn” promoted by Anguita met with the opposition of the so-called *renovadores* who supported the ideas of Eurocommunism and assessed Gorbachev’s work as essentially positive, believing that the crisis of “actually existing socialism” had irreparably de-legitimized communist identity. They therefore proposed the dissolution of the PCE and the transformation of the IU coalition into a modern and plural reformist party which would integrate different progressive points of view and abandon rigid ideologies. The *renovadores,* who rejected a political strategy anchored in anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, also saw the need to seek collaboration with the parties of the Socialist International, including PSOE. The debate over whether or not to dissolve the PCE culminated in the XIII Party Congress held in December 1991. On that occasion the “hardliners”, with Anguita at the helm, prevailed. Upon seeing their ideas defeated, the *renovadores* eventually left the PCE but most of them remained in the IU forming the New Left faction (Nueva Izquierda, NI) in 1992.

A Eurosceptic “Common Home” ?

36 While international relations were still shaken by the earthquake caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the profound changes in Eastern Europe, in 1992 the members of the EEC took a further step in deepening their

integration project by signing the Treaty of Maastricht. The Iberian communists stood together in their opposition to this founding treaty of the European Union (EU) and this led to their rapprochement by accentuating the convergence of their interpretation of international events.

37 In 1992 the PCE declared its support for the opening of a supranational "constituent process" designed to culminate in a solidarity-based federal Europe characterized by "forward-thinking social policy" and the full democratization of its institutions and decision-making mechanisms, starting with the European Parliament. In this context, the party led by Anguita called for the implementation of strong economic cohesion measures such as, for example, the adoption of a social charter for all European workers and the creation of a European Finance Ministry that would be entrusted with executing a common fiscal policy. The Spanish communists also stressed the urgent need to endow the nascent EU with a fully autonomous shared foreign and security policy. This position was coherent with their demand for "more Europe", in the sense that, in order to build a progressive Europe, it was necessary to provide it with an effective foreign policy independent from the US.

38 Based on these visions concerning the future of Europe, the PCE believed that Maastricht was "a step in the wrong direction and not at all conductive to a true union founded on solidarity" and the well-being of its citizens. Anguita argued that the EU Treaty had ratified an integration project based on a neo-liberal philosophy that opted for a monetarist policy and promoted aspects of free trade without sufficient cohesion measures which, in his view, would produce "perverse effects," "growing imbalances" and "serious social injustice and marginalization." The leader of the PCE also criticized the fact that a serious democratic deficit persisted in the new institutional architecture of the EU in light of the meagre expansion of the European Parliament's powers. "We are aware", – Anguita said in the Congress of Deputies, "that European construction entails yielding sovereignty, and we accept that. However, [...] we cannot accept that in vital matters such as monetary policy, states are expected to yield sovereignty to an institution that is practically out of the reach of political power: the European system of Central Banks and the European Central Bank."[58]

39 Lastly, it should be noted that the Spanish communists were unwilling to preserve the Western European Union (WEU), the European military alliance created in 1954 and which Spain had joined in 1990, as that would mean perpetuating subordination to the US and NATO.

40 In short, through interpretive schemes anchored in anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, the PCE believed that the Maastricht agreements formed a key piece of the offensive that the continent's conservative forces were waging, in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, to put an end to all emancipatory perspectives. Consequently, the party opposed Spain's ratification of the Treaty. Within the United Left, the party line towed by Anguita was challenged by the *renovadores* of the New Left faction and Initiative for Catalonia (Iniciativa per Catalunya, IC) who, calling for straightforward reformist Europeanism, voted in favour of Maastricht with a "critical *yes*". Nevertheless, given that the PCE was the dominant force in IU, the coalition ended up opposing the Treaty and unsuccessfully urged the Government to call a referendum on it.

41 Hence, 1992 marked a decisive turning point in terms of the international stance of the PCE and IU which had moved towards a position of Euroscepticism. In any case, it was *soft* Euroscepticism insofar as the party's questioning of Maastricht was not

accompanied by rejection of European integration *per se*. In fact, the Spanish communists continued to clamour for a "different" sort of Europe. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the PCE was also starting to interpret international reality through a new interpretive bi-polar prism which, "since the end of the East-West confrontation" viewed "relationships of domination" as being based on the "Centre versus Periphery" or "North versus South" dichotomy. "The lifestyle of the Centre", declared the Manifesto approved at the XIV Party Congress in 1995, – "[is based] on the economic plunder and ecological ravaging of the Periphery. [...] In order to overcome injustice in today's world, [...] we must overcome the limits of capitalism that has risen with political hegemony from [...] the North of the world."[59]

42 This perspective places the PCE's position within the framework of the then incipient alter-Europeanism movement which was (and still is) characterized by the establishment of an explicit nexus between the criticisms of the model taken on board by the EU and opposition to neo-liberal globalization, i.e. the European version of the alter-globalization movement.[60]

43 As for the PCP, it also called for (albeit in vain) a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and voted against its ratification. Already in January 1991, the PCP's Octávio Teixeira submitted ten proposals before the Assembly of the Republic focusing on European integration which included the rejection of an Economic and Monetary Union without economic cohesion and social harmonization, the rejection of a two-speed Europe and the call for "a whole Europe of cooperation, peace and collective security" based on the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the two founding documents of a Europe without blocks and that had turned the page of the Cold War.[61] In line with the Spanish communists and explicitly invoking their example, the Portuguese called for the elimination of the Western European Union and rejected the entry of their country into this organization which in their view was anchored in the Cold War. According to PCP parliamentary member João Amaral speaking before the Assembly of the Republic in 1990, the communists rejected joining the WEU because it dangerously overextended Portugal's military commitments and because it was an outdated organization in the face of the radical changes that had taken place in Europe during the past year:

> "In today's circumstances, the WEU does not contribute to European construction but rather hinders it" ![62]

44 The disintegration of the USSR would make these assertions more relevant.

45 In December 1992, the PCP held its XIVth Congress in which Álvaro Cunhal, nearly 80 years old, handed over the post of secretary-general to Carlos Carvalhas, although he continued to exert notable influence over party politics. On that occasion, a political resolution was approved in which the party lamented the "tremendous loss for workers and peoples around the entire world" in light of the advance of the exploitative and aggressive forces of imperialism. In the view of the PCP, "the reverses suffered by socialism in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the USSR" and "the disappearance of socialism as a world system" have complicated international relations by posing multiple "dangers to international peace and security" while at the same time ushering in "reactionary, racist, obscurantist and fascist forces." Three major imperialist centres of power were described in this interpretation of the world: USA, "EEC/Germany" and Japan. According to the PCP, with the Maastricht Treaty and the persistence of the WEU, the

EEC intended to operate "as a political-military bloc" coordinated with NATO as its "European pillar". This negative analysis of the "new world order," nearly identical to the one formulated by the Spanish communists, also included a condemnation of the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and held Germany responsible for that debacle.[63]

46 Interestingly, in January 1993 the PCE's theoretical journal *Nuestra Bandera* published an article in which PCP's Sergio Ribeiro explained the reasons why his party was opposed to Maastricht. The Portuguese communist emphasized that the EU Treaty was the embodiment of a "capitalist project based on worker exploitation" and "completely subordinated social progress to financial and monetary advances." Ribeiro pointed out that the path to a "social Europe" was inevitably "blocked" by the "class and economistic nature of the integration process," and warned that the application of the Maastricht philosophy, among other things, entailed manipulative adjustments and "wage restraint." Regarding foreign policy, the Portuguese communist also critically observed that perpetuating the WEU meant confusing "Europeanist and Atlanticist tendencies while remaining under the tutelage of the United States."

47 The biggest difference between the two Iberian communist parties was that the PCP was extremely wary of the federalist perspective and of yielding national sovereignty; in lieu of a supranational model for the EU it preferred one based on "cooperation between States".[64] In this connection, in 1992 the PCP voted against the constitutional reform that was needed to make Portugal's legal framework compatible with the ratification of the EU Treaty. Octávio Teixeira argued that the changes made to the Constitution implied "a loss of national sovereignty in matters related to national independence" and "rendered the Assembly of the Republic void of any real power."[65] In any case, as Marina Costa Lobo has pointed out, the PCP's European discourse became "relatively more moderate" after Maastricht, evolving from an anti-European stance to a Eurosceptic one.[66]

48 Despite certain differences that persisted, there is no denying that in 1992 the way the Iberian communists conceived the international scene had become remarkably similar. It was not by chance that in the Spring of that year the PCE attended a meeting of European communist parties organized by the PCP near Lisbon. The participants at that meeting, who shared "the concern that the bi-polar order" was "being replaced by a unipolar order predominated by the US," aspired to jointly promote a "socialist alternative against predominant conservatism" which, as demonstrated by the Maastricht Treaty, was presiding over "the European construction project."[67]

49 The strongholds of European communism which had survived the Soviet collapse were thus beginning to join forces in the difficult task of promoting a new internationalism adapted to the post-Cold War scenario. In this same vein, in February and December 1993 the PCE and IU organized two meetings, one in Madrid and another in Barcelona, of the so-called New European Left Forum. In the second of these (in which the PCP also participated) a declaration was approved calling for "a radical transformation" of the "elitist political order" prevailing in Europe: an order that, "as a consequence of the liberal economy and right-wing politics," was "increasingly characterized" by "social exclusion, systematic destruction of the environment, increasing marginalization of citizens from the political process, growing reactionary nationalism and xenophobia and the ruthless exploitation of workers and consumers."[68]

50 The process of rapprochement of the Iberian communists, who now converged on an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist form of Euroscepticism, culminated in 1994. In the European elections held in June of that year, IU achieved the best results in its history with 13.4% of votes, while the PCP, with 11.2%, fell three points compared to 1989. After the elections, in the European Parliament IU and PCP participated in the creation of the Confederal Group of the European United Left which overcame the existing division between the Group for the European Unitarian Left and the Left Unity group.[69] In its founding declaration, the new Confederal Group declared its “commitment to European integration, although in a different form from the existing model,” adding:

> “We want to see a different Europe, without the democratic deficit which the Treaty of Maastricht served to confirm and free from the neo-liberal monetarist policies that go with it.”

51 As far as EU foreign policy was concerned, the group advocated strengthening the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the dissolution of “all those structures which, like NATO and the WEU,” were “a hangover from the political blocs of the Cold War.” Using the interpretive scheme “Centre versus Periphery” mentioned above regarding the international vision of the PCE, the declaration went on to say :

> “A secure peace cannot be guaranteed by military instruments but rather by ensuring that democracy gains a firm hold throughout the world and, above all, by reducing the huge gap separating the ‘centre’ from the ‘periphery’.”[70]

52 Thus, in 1994 the rapport between the Iberian communists was consummated in a “common home” built on a Eurosceptic and alter-Europeanist foundation, very different from the one that had been imagined by Gorbachev ten years earlier.

Conclusions

53 Despite sharing the geographic space of the Iberian Peninsula, the communist parties of Portugal and Spain diverged profoundly in their conceptions of the Cold War and the future of Europe for decades. Indeed, since the end of the 1960s the PCE, within the framework of the elaboration of the Eurocommunist formula, distanced itself from the USSR and embraced a pro-European line, while the PCP despite its problematic relationship with the idea of “peaceful coexistence” remained closely aligned with Moscow orthodoxy which meant its rejection of the integration project under way in Western Europe. The different position of the PCP and PCE in the political spectrum of their respective countries after the recovery of democracy in 1974-1975 had deepened the differences between the two at the height of 1986, when Portugal and Spain joined the European Communities. The end of the Revolutionary Process in Progress had left the PCP alone in the defence of the conquests of April 25 and the rejection of European integration as it was being carried out in the EEC, while the PCE saw no problem in reconciling its Eurocommunism with support for Spain’s participation in European integration.

54 The tremors caused by Gorbachev’s policies altered the international references of the Iberian communists. Although the PCP and the PCE held different views on *perestroika* and European integration up until the end of the 1980s, their perspectives converged as they entered the 1990s. Indeed, both parties had a negative overall opinion of Gorbachev’s work, harshly criticized the post-Cold War international order and

opposed the Maastricht Treaty. Given that the PCP always staunchly defended an orthodoxy based on the principles of class struggle, the progressive rapprochement of the Iberian communists was possible thanks to the “leftist turn” taken by the PCE under the leadership of Julio Anguita which led to the abandonment of the moderate approach of Eurocommunism and the adoption of a policy anchored in anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism.

55 It is worth noting that, although the “leftist turn” seemed to bear fruit over the short-term insofar as it enabled the party to capitalize on the wear and tear suffered by PSOE after more than a decade leading the government, at the end of the 1990s it led the PCE-IU to a marginal position. In contrast, the left-leaning Portuguese party continued to receive a degree of electoral support.[71]

56 In any case, in 1994 the convergence of their points of view led the PCP and PCE to share the “Iberian room” within the same European Parliamentary group ; a group forged around a shared Euroscepticism that was repeatedly confirmed in subsequent years when the Portuguese and Spanish Communists rejected the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the European Constitution (2004).

NOTES

1. This article was written as part of the research projects *Spain and Portugal Facing the Second Enlargement of the European Communities: a Comparative Study, 1974-1986*, Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Spain), reference HAR 2017-84957-P, and *European Construction from the South. From the Mediterranean Enlargement to the Northern Enlargement (1986-1995): the Contours of Europeanization in Comparative Perspective*, reference PID2020-113623GB-100. The authors wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers, as well as Céline Marangé, for their comments on the original manuscript.

2. In the period under study here, in addition to the PCE numerous independent personalities and parties such as the Republican Left (Izquierda Republicana, IR) and the Socialist Action Party (Partido de Acción Socialista, PASOC) participated in the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU). The PCE, being the member with the greatest political and organizational weight, played a dominant role in the coalition. See Luis Ramiro, *Cambio y adaptación en la izquierda*, Madrid, CIS, 2004.

3. While the research on the PCE benefits from the accessibility of the party’s archives, the PCP’s archives remained closed to researchers at the time of writing. The authors have tried to compensate for this imbalance through the use of official PCP’s documents, press, speeches, statements and parliamentary debates. The monolithic image that these sources offer about the PCP, well cultivated by its cadres, could nevertheless hide internal debates whose reconstruction will only be possible with full access to the party’s archives.

4. There are no comparative studies on the policies of the PCP and the PCE in the time period under discussion here. In some collective works on the European communist parties, chapters have been devoted to the PCP or the PCE, sometimes overlooking one or the other and lacking a needed comparative analysis. See, for example, Francesco Di Palma (ed.), *Perestroika and the Party*, New York, Berghahn, 2019, which includes the chapter by Walther L. Bernecker, “The Spanish Communist Party and perestroika,” p. 298-322; and Francesco Di Palma, Wolfgang Mueller (eds.),

Kommunismus in Europa. Europapolitik und –vorstellungen europäischer kommunistischer Parteien im Kalten Krieg, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016, with a chapter by Aurélie Denoyer entitled „Die Kommunistische Partei Spaniens: aus dem sozialistischen Block in die europäische Gemeinschaft,“ pp. 196-204. As for Portugal, see Pedro Miguel Ferreira Rios Pinto, *O PCP e a desagregação da URSS: (1985-2007)*, Lisbon, ISCTE-IUL, 2018 (Master’s Thesis).

5. João Madeira, *Historia do PCP. Das origens ao 25 de Abril*, Lisbon, Tinta da China, 2013; Salvador Forner, Heidy-Cristina Senante, “El relato comunista de la integración europea: ideología y estrategia política,” *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, n° 187, 2020, p. 137-165.

6. Carme Molinero, “La política de reconciliación nacional. Su contenido durante el franquismo, su lectura en la Transición,” *Ayer*, n° 66, 2007, p. 201-225.

7. *II Conferencia Nacional del PCE*, 1975, Historical Archive of the PCE (AHPCE), Documentos PCE, box 56; José Faraldo, “Entangled Eurocommunism: Santiago Carrillo, the Spanish Communist Party and the Eastern Bloc during the Spanish Transition to Democracy,” *Contemporary European History*, vol. 26, n° 4, 2017, p. 647-668.

8. On Portugal, see Judith Manya, *Le Parti communiste portugais et la question coloniale, 1921-1974*, IEP Bordeaux, 2004 (PhD Thesis).

9. *Spanish Communist Leader on a Number of Issues*, 28 August 1975, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Central Foreign Policy Files, Telegrams.

10. On Álvaro Cunhal see the extensive biography written by José Pacheco Pereira: Vol. 1: *“Daniel “, o Jovem Revolucionário*, Lisbon, Temas e Debates, 1999; Vol. 2: *“Duarte”, O Dirigente Clandestino*, Lisbon, Temas e Debates, 2001; Vol. 3: *O Prisioneiro*, Lisbon, Temas e Debates, 2005; Vol. 4: *O Secretário-geral*, Lisbon, Temas e Debates, 2015.

11. “Duros ataques de Cunhal al eurocomunismo,” *El País*, 2 November 1977.

12. Eduardo Abad García, “Vecinos, camaradas y referentes. Los comunistas portugueses en el imaginario colectivo de la militancia leninista española,” *Ayer* (in press).

13. Arnaud Dolidier, *Tout le pouvoir à l’assemblée ! Une histoire du mouvement ouvrier espagnol pendant la transition (1970-1979),* Paris, Éditions Syllepse, 2021; Emanuele Treglia, *Fuera de las catacumbas. La política del PCE y el movimiento obrero*, Madrid, Eneida, 2012.

14. Carme Molinero, Pere Ysàs, *De la hegemonía a la autodestrucción*, Barcelona, Crítica, 2017.

15. *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, 25 June 1985, p. 10210-10211.

16. João Madeira, “O PCP e a União Europeia,” in Alice Cunha (ed.), *Os Partidos Políticos Portugueses e a União Europeia,* Coimbra, Almedina, 2019, p. 122-131; Vasco Rato, “A negação da realidade: os comunistas e a Europa”, *Política internacional*, vol. 1, n° 1, January 1990.

17. António Costa Pinto, Marina Costa Lobo, “Portugal und die EU”, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, n° 46, 2006, p. 5-6; Carlos Cunha, “L’opposition du parti communiste portugais à l’adhésion à la CEE”, in Pascal Delwit, Jean-Michel De Waele (eds.), *La gauche face aux mutations en Europe,* Brussels, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1993, p. 119-132.

18. José Neves, *Comunismo e Nacionalismo em Portugal. Política, Cultura e História no Século XX,* Lisbon, Tinta da China, 2010.

19. Assambleia da República, III Legislatura, 2ª sesión legislativa (1984-1985), I Serie, n° 68. Plenary Meeting of 11 April 1985.

20. Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 116; William Taubman, *Gorbachev: his Life and Times,* London, Simon & Schuster, 2017, p. 571.

21. Marie-Pierre Rey, “Europe is our Common Home. A study of Gorbachev’s diplomatic concept,” *Cold War History*, vol. 4, n° 2, 2004, p. 33-65.

22. *Informe al CC*, 2 July 1988, AHPCE, Fondo PCE 1978-1991, box 401-5.

23. *La Perestroika*, 5 April 1989, Fundación 10 de Marzo (F10M), Archivo Santiago Álvarez (ASA), box 29.

24. *Informe al CC*, 26 November 1988, F10M, ASA, box 22.

25. *Un proyecto de izquierda para una Europa de progreso*, 1989, F10M, ASA, box 22.

26. *Avante!,* 14 November 1985, p. 15.
27. *O Militante*, n° 142, March 1987, p. 17; *Avante!*, 9 June 1988, p. 6-7.
28. Zita Seabra, *Foi assim*, Lisbon, Alêtheia Editores, 2007, p. 299.
29. Maria T. Patrício, Alan D. Stoleroff, “The Portuguese Communist Party: Perestroika and its Aftermath”, in Martin Bull, Paul Heywood (eds.), *West European Communist Parties after the Revolutions of 1989*, Basingstoke, Macmhillan, 1994, p. 97-99.
30. *Por la Unión Europea*, 1989, F10M, ASA, box 23.
31. *La Presidencia española y la cumbre europea*, 29 June 1989, F10M, ASA, box 23; Salvador Forner, Heidy-Cristina Senante, “La política europea del PCE (1972-1992): del viraje europeísta al euroescepticismo,” *Historia y Política*, n° 41, 2019, p. 348-349.
32. João Madeira, “O PCP e a União Europeia,” *op. cit.*, p. 134-137.
33. Carlos Cunha, “L’opposition du parti communiste portugais à l’adhésion à la CEE,” *op. cit.*, p. 123.
34. *O Militante*, n° 164, January 1989, p. 20. Also see Grupo Comunista e Afins do Parlamento Europeu, *Factos e Documentos. Portugal e a CEE. Seminário sobre a CEE, o Acto Único e a Soberania Nacional*, Lisbon, 1987; and PCP, *Portugal e a CEE hoje. Contribuções para o XII Congresso do PCP*, Lisbon, Edições Avante!, 1988.
35. IU and the PCP obtained 6 % and 14.4 % respectively of the votes.
36. *Resumen de las intervenciones en el encuentro con el PCI*, 15-VI-1989, AHPCE, Fondo PCE 1978-1991, box 407-15.
37. *Avante!*, 13 July 1989, p. 3-6.
38. *Nota do Comité Central do PCP. Sobre os acontecimentos na RDA e noutros países socialistas*, 14 November 1989.
39. *Avante!*, 7 December 1989, 4° cuaderno, p. 6-7.
40. *Avante!*, 12 April 1990, 4° cuaderno, p. 5.
41. *Resolução Política do XIII Congresso do PCP (Extraordinário)*, 20 April 1990.
42. Sergio Gálvez, *La gran huelga general. El sindicalismo contra la “modernización socialista”*, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 2017.
43. This topic has been analysed in detail by Emanuele Treglia in his article: “Contra el nuevo orden mundial El comunismo español ante la posguerra fría,” *Pasado y Memoria*, n° 19, 2019, p. 127-155.
44. *El PCE ante las nuevas realidades*, 1990, F10M, ASA, box 22.
45. *Informe al XIII Congreso*, 1991, AHPCE, Documentos PCE, XIII Congreso.
46. *Desde el PCE: un debate para la izquierda*, 1990, F10M, ASA, box 22.
47. Manuel Monereo, “El conflicto del Golfo, el nuevo orden internacional y el papel de la izquierda europea,” *Nuestra Bandera*, n° 148, 1991.
48. *Manifiesto del PCE para la izquierda*, 1991, AHPCE, Documentos PCE, XIII Congreso.
49. *Resolução do Comité Central. A situação na União Soviética*, 29 August 1991.
50. Maria T. Patrício, Alan D. Stoleroff, “The Portuguese Communist Party: Perestroika and its Aftermath,” *op. cit.*, p. 111-112.
51. *Avante!*, 23 January 1992, p. 3-4.
52. *Avante!*, 6 January 1994, p. 18.
53. Emanuele Treglia, “Surviving the collapse. Spanish communism and the decline of the Soviet system (1989-1991),” in José M. Faraldo (ed.), *Collapsed Empires*, Zurich-Münster, LIT Verlag, 2020, p. 188-189.
54. José Laso, “Los ideales del socialismo permanecen,” *Nuestra Bandera*, n° 165, 1995.
55. Maria T. Patrício, Alan D. Stoleroff, “The Portuguese Communist Party: Perestroika and its Aftermath,” art. cit., p. 99-101.
56. Raimundo Narciso, *Álvaro Cunhal e a dissidència da terceira via*, Porto, Ambar, 2007, p. 145-155.

57. Maria T. Patrício, Alan D. Stoleroff, “The Portuguese Communist Party: Perestroika and its Aftermath,” art. cit., p. 111-112.
58. *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, 29 October 1992, p. 11088-11089.
59. *Manifiesto del PCE para la izquierda*, 1995, AHPCE, Documentos PCE, XIV Congreso.
60. Birte Wassenberg *et al.* (eds.), *Contre l’Europe?*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 2010.
61. Assambleia da República, V Legislatura, I Sessão Legislativa (1990-1991), I Série, nº 33. Plenary session of 22 January 1991.
62. Assambleia da República, V Legislatura, 3ª Sessão Legislativa (1989-1990), I Série, n° 52. Plenary session of 13 March 1990.
63. *Resolução Política XIV Congreso do PCP*, 6 December 1992.
64. Sergio Ribeiro, “Preguntas y respuestas sobre Maastricht,” *Nuestra Bandera*, n° 154, 1993.
65. *Intervenção de Octávio Teixeira na Assembleia de República*, 17 November 1992.
66. Marina Costa Lobo, “Da consolidação democrática à qualidade da democracia: a União Europeia e os partidos políticos portugueses,” Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais, *Working Paper*, n° 20, 2006, p. 9.
67. “La reunión de Lisboa,” *Mundo Obrero*, n° 10, June 1992.
68. “Declaración del Foro de la Nueva Izquierda Europea,” *Mundo Obrero*, n° 29, January 1994.
69. In addition to IU and the PCP, the founders of the new group were the communist parties of France and Greece, the Italian Communist Refoundation (created in 1991 by the sector of the PCI that refused to accept the abandonment of the communist identity promoted by Occhetto) and the Greek coalition Synaspismos. Kate Hudson, *The New European Left*, London, Palgrave, 2012, p. 35-38.
70. Confederal Group of the European United Left, *Constituent Declaration*, 14 July 1994.
71. IU obtained 10.5 % of the vote in the 1996 general elections. However, after the right-wing People’s Party rose to power, its results fell to 5.4 % in 2000. In the European elections of 1999, IU also suffered a notable decline in its results compared to 1994, obtaining 5.7% of the vote. In contrast, the PCP won 8.6 % in the general elections of 1995 and 9 % in 1999 and 10.3 % in the European elections that same year.

ABSTRACTS

The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) evolved from divergence to convergence in the face of European integration between 1985 and 1994. Both parties started from opposite positions since the times of the struggle against the dictatorships of Salazar and Franco, when the PCP aligned itself with the Moscow orthodox line while the PCE opted for Eurocommunist heterodoxy. Gorbachev’s theses on the “common European house”, perestroika, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War forced the two Iberian communist parties to position themselves before vertiginous changes that also had their translation in European construction. The changes in the international relations, the form that European construction took with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and the anti-capitalist and third-world turn to the left that the PCE gave as of 1988 facilitated a convergence with the PCP that resulted in cooperation between both in the European Parliament. This article analyses the evolution of the ideological positions and the tactical decisions of two main Iberian communist

parties through documents, press, speeches, statements, parliamentary debates of both organizations and, when possible, their historical archives.

Entre 1985 et 1994, les vues des Parti communiste portugais (PCP) et le Parti communiste espagnol (PCE) à l’égard de l’intégration européenne évoluent : elles commencent par diverger mais finissent par converger. Les deux partis ont d’abord eu des positions opposées pour des raisons qui remontent à l’époque de la lutte contre les dictatures de Salazar et de Franco, le PCP s’étant aligné sur la ligne orthodoxe de Moscou, tandis que le PCE avait opté pour l’hétérodoxie eurocommuniste. Les thèses de Gorbatchev sur la « Maison commune européenne », la perestroïka, puis la dissolution de l’Union soviétique et la fin de la guerre froide contraignent cependant les deux partis communistes ibériques à se repositionner face à des mutations vertigineuses qui trouvent aussi une traduction dans la construction européenne. Les changements dans les relations internationales, la forme que prend la construction européenne avec le traité de Maastricht de 1992, ainsi que le virage à gauche anticapitaliste et tiers-mondiste que le PCE opère à partir de 1988, facilitent une convergence avec le PCP qui se traduit par une coopération au Parlement européen. Cet article analyse l’évolution des positions idéologiques et des décisions tactiques des deux principaux partis communistes ibériques en s’appuyant sur des documents des deux partis, la presse, des discours, des déclarations, des débats parlementaires et, lorsque cela est possible, leurs archives historiques.

INDEX

Keywords: Portuguese Communist Party, Communist Party of Spain, Perestroika, Common European Home, Cold War
Mots-clés: parti communiste portugais (PCP), parti communiste d’Espagne (PCE), Perestroïka, Maison commune européenne, guerre froide

AUTHORS

CARLOS SANZ

Carlos Sanz, PhD in History, is Professor of Contemporary history at the Complutense University of Madrid and Head of Studies at the Diplomatic School of Madrid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation). He has been a visiting researcher at Harvard University, Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt Universität Berlin and the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschungen Potsdam. His current research interests include international relations and Spanish foreign policy in the Cold War, and Southern Europe in European integration. Latest publication: “Europa del Sur en los años ochenta”, special issue edited at *Historia del Presente* (37, 2021).

EMANUELE TREGLIA

Emanuele Treglia, PhD in Contemporary History, is Professor of Contemporary History at the Complutense University of Madrid and deputy director of the academic journal *Historia del Presente*. His main research has focused on the history of the Spanish left during the Franco dictatorship and the democratic era. His publications include the books *Fuera de las catacumbas. La política del PCE y el movimiento obrero* (2012), *Las convulsiones del 68*, with A. Mateos (eds.) (2019) and *Patria, pan... amore e fantasia. La España franquista y sus relaciones con Italia*, with J. Muñoz, (eds.) (2017), as well as numerous book chapters and articles published in journals such as *Ayer*, *Pasado y Memoria and Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*.