

Interregnum: Concept, Criticism and Vindication in the 21st Century¹



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1. Introduction

The Crisis of Globalization and the International Order

The current crisis of globalisation and of the liberal international order has ushered in a period marked by economic turmoil, socio-political fractures, and escalating global risks, as exemplified by the climate emergency and the COVID-19 pandemic. Alongside these challenges, the intensification of opposition to the international order, heightened geopolitical rivalry, and the resurgence of armed conflicts and interstate warfare further define this period. These developments have led to an increase in human insecurity and the growing securitisation of societies, economies, and international relations. Against this backdrop, this article addresses these phenomena through the Gramscian notion of interregnum—a phase of systemic instability in which “the old is dying and the new cannot be born.” Moving from its original metaphorical use, the term is reconstructed here as an analytical category within critical theory. In response to critiques within academic discourse, the article contends that this concept provides a coherent framework for interpreting contemporary dynamics in political economy, political ecology, geopolitics, and international relations. This is particularly relevant in the context of systemic instability, uncertainty, polycrisis, and a non-hegemonic order, all of

1 This article revisits, updates, and responds to critiques of the author's previous work, particularly Sanahuja, 2022b and Sanahuja, 2024a.

which challenge foundational norms of the international system and underscore the return of armed conflict.

Within the broader crisis of globalisation, the 2008 financial crash—symbolised by the collapse of Lehman Brothers—stands as a defining milestone. Although it was initially presented as a financial crisis, its ramifications were far-reaching. The crash exposed the contradictions and limits of the prevailing economic order, 2008 marked the onset of the globalisation crisis and the erosion of the liberal international order.² It also revealed a leadership crisis in the West along with a diminished capacity to uphold that order. In this context, the emergence of the G-20, which included key emerging economies, failed to resolve the governance and viability challenges of a poorly regulated and highly financialised globalisation. Since 2008, the international order has been sustained only through massive and sustained intervention by major central banks. Compounding this were austerity measures implemented in numerous countries, which precipitated severe social crises (Tooze, 2018). These responses intensified the erosion of public expectations and social rights, thereby undermining the neoliberal narrative of progress and inclusion, as well as the existing social contract. Heightened socio-economic insecurity has, in turn, generated widespread disaffection with institutions, ruling elites, and—in countries with democratic systems—even democracy itself. This dynamic is substantiated by global surveys (Ipsos, 2021) and comparative studies (Scheiring, Serrano-Alarcón, Moise, McNamara, & Stucke, 2024; Rodríguez-Pose & Dijkstra, 2024). This growing discontent has contributed to the disintegration of established party systems, the electoral ascent of political outsiders, and a global trend marked by the rise of national populism and the far right (Forti, 2024). This phenomenon has become a pivotal factor in the mounting challenges to multilateralism and the liberal international order (Sanahuja & López Burian, 2023; Sanahuja, Forti & López Burian, 2025).

This historical and conceptual framework offers an interpretive lens for analysing Latin America's position within the international system and its various evolving dynamics.

2. Interregnum: Metaphor and Historical Analogy

This scenario of systemic instability—marked by overlapping and simultaneous crises in the economic, social, ecological, and security realms on a global scale—cannot be adequately analysed through ambiguous or narrow concepts such as the economic cycle or shifts in political or military polarity (unipolar, bipolar, multipolar) within the international system (Sanahuja, 2020a; Tocci, 2023). To provide a productive historical reference for interpreting the current conjuncture, the interwar period of the 20th century is instructive; it was a time of profound societal crisis that fostered the rise of fascism, the resurgence of warfare, and ultimately a radically transformed world order. However, it is essential to note that history does not repeat itself and, as Siegmund Ginzberg (2024) aptly warns, “analogies are slip-

² This topic has been developed in greater depth in other works by the author. See especially Sanahuja, 2017 and Sanahuja, 2020c.

perly ground” (p. 11). Analogical methods, while useful for explanation or interpretation, have both significant value and inherent limitations (Keulen, 2023). Bearing these caveats in mind, one might argue that both the current crises and those of the interwar years constitute an organic crisis of capitalism, liberal democracy, and the international order. In both instances, such crises extend beyond mere expressions of great power rivalry or geopolitical competition. Rather, today’s systemic crises reflect the exhaustion, internal contradictions, and structural limitations—productive, social, ecological, and institutional—of a deeply transnationalised and financialised phase of globalisation and its technological underpinnings (Sanahuja, 2017). In this context, with liberal democracy increasingly on the defensive and unable to meet growing demands for state-led protection and control (Gerbaudo, 2023), new illiberal and far-right forces have gained traction. They offer retro-utopias—visions of an idealised past that never truly existed—alongside nativist, securitised discourses on migration and the seductive, though deceptive, promises of authoritarian technosolutionism. These developments can be understood as manifestations of a counter-movement, as theorised by Karl Polanyi in his analysis of the socio-political dynamics of the 1930s: The Great Depression, the crisis of liberalism, and the rise of nationalism, militarism, and fascism (Seeliger & Sommer, 2019).

Antonio Gramsci employed the metaphor of interregnum to describe the organic crisis of the interwar years. In 1930, while imprisoned by Italian fascism, he wrote one of the most frequently cited passages from his *Prison Notebooks*: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 276). In this passage, interregnum is used metaphorically. Neither Gramsci himself nor subsequent theorists developed it into a fully conceptualised or systematically theorised notion. Tellingly, the term does not appear as an independent entry in the *Gramscian Dictionary* compiled by the University of Cagliari; it is mentioned only under the entry for “organic crisis” (Liguori, Modonesi & Voz, 2022, pp. 112–115). In the original text—an excerpt from the “Past and Present” series within the *Notebooks*—Gramsci argues that the organic crisis of capitalism and its socio-economic consequences, understood as an epochal rupture, would lead to a loss of authority by the ruling classes. These classes, no longer able to govern through consent, are compelled to resort to coercion. In this framework, the organic crisis and the rise of fascism are interconnected phenomena (Liguori et al., 2022, pp. 109–110). In essence, the interregnum is understood as a period marked by the absence of hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, as a consequence of an organic crisis. During such a phase, the crisis cannot be resolved through coercion, nor can the previous consensus be reconstituted. No actor or political project possesses sufficient legitimacy (Theophanidis, 2016). What emerges instead is a climate of “diffuse scepticism” and a “realistic and cynical” mode of politics. It is a period characterised by societal morbid symptoms, born of an old order in decline (Achcar, 2021). In simplified versions of Gramsci’s original phrase, the interregnum becomes a time of chiaroscuro—a twilight in which “monsters” emerge: popular disaffection with traditional elites, widespread expressions of grievance, political violence, nativism and xenophobia, the rise of extremism and authoritarian leadership, and, in Gramsci’s own terms,

new forms of Caesarism, militarism, and war. All of these symptoms, once again, resonate with remarkable clarity in the contemporary moment.

Thus, Gramsci was able to discern—within the context of his own time—what would later be widely recognised by historiography and collective memory: that the interwar period constituted an interregnum which exposed the exhaustion of existing structures, eroded by their internal contradictions and limitations, and revealed the impotence of ruling elites to respond effectively. It also gave rise to new forms of Caesarism, fascism, militarism, war, and genocide—some of which Gramsci, who died in 1937, did not live to witness. This was a crisis of economic, social, and political dimensions that fundamentally undermined and delegitimised liberal democracies and the international order of the time—namely, the iteration of the liberal order rooted in *laissez-faire* capitalism and Wilsonian liberal internationalism as embodied in the League of Nations. Only with the defeat of fascism and the Axis powers in 1945 was space created for “the new”: a long technological and productive cycle grounded in Fordist industrialism and post-war Keynesian social compacts. For several decades, these arrangements endowed the political projects of the West, of real socialism, and of the newly independent post-colonial states with the material capacities and political legitimacy upon which their respective hegemonies were built. This, in turn, sustained the post-war international order. Although predicated on nuclear deterrence and, in the case of many post-colonial states, on a commitment to non-alignment, this order was relatively effective in delivering order and a degree of stability—albeit imperfect, and not without conflict or tension. Despite enduring asymmetries, it also enabled sustained economic growth and a certain degree of material well-being within its spheres of influence.

The parallels between the interregnum of the 1930s and the present moment are striking. However, the analogy should not be overstated: there are also significant differences when comparing the current wave of nativism and anti-immigration sentiment with the anti-Semitism that characterised the interwar period; or the association between capital and fascism in the interwar period—which was shaped by the confrontation with communism and the Soviet-aligned labour movement—with the Western response to the rise of China, whose official ideology is, rather, nationalism; or the supposed threats of communism or “cultural Marxism” invoked today as bogeymen by the contemporary far right, with the radical ideological confrontations of the past, such as those that defined the Second World War or the Cold War, and with current patterns of geopolitical competition. Taking these differences into account, and more generally the uniqueness of each historical period, it is worth asking whether the international system is currently experiencing another historical interregnum—one marked by characteristics distinct from those Gramsci originally described.

The interwar period was one of those non-hegemonic interregnum phases, as Gramsci himself correctly identified, pointing to developments such as the rise of fascism and the emergence of Fordism—another term drawn from Gramsci’s intellectual repertoire—as manifestations of radical transformation in the technological and productive spheres, in social relations, and in the role of the state and the international order. In this sense, the contemporary crisis of globalisation and the lib-

eral international order may likewise be interpreted as another historical period of interregnum, marked by distinct features, an open-ended trajectory, and uncertain outcomes—driven by the emergence of new social actors advancing counter-hegemonic projects in response to the exhaustion of globalisation.

Understood in this way, the concept of interregnum enables us to position and interpret the current crisis—as outlined at the beginning of this chapter—within an analytical framework grounded in a shared historical and causal logic. Today's period of crisis and instability is not merely the result of coincidental, unfortunate, or disruptive events. Nor can it be reduced to “black swans”—that is, discrete, random, or exogenous events deemed highly improbable and disruptive—as they have sometimes been described, without reference to the deeper historical and social processes that underlie their emergence.

3. Theorising the Interregnum: Crisis of Hegemony, Historicity, and Critical Theory of International Relations

In its original appearance in the *Quaderni di Carcere*, the term *interregnum*, as noted, appears to function as little more than a metaphorical aside. As such, it requires further theorisation and redefinition as an analytical category if it is to be of use in interpreting the current historical stage, marked by multiple, overlapping crises within the international system.

Firstly, the notion of interregnum is characterised by its essential historicity—both because of its situated origin and because it forms part of a Marxist reflection that distances itself from economic determinism and the teleological philosophy of history characteristic of classical Marxism. It is embedded within a socio-historical epistemology that Gramsci himself advanced, one which breaks with linear and deterministic conceptions of historical development and emphasises that the future remains open to human agency, which cannot be explained solely—or even primarily—through the economic base.

Building on Gramsci's theoretical universe, and particularly his concept of “organic crisis,” Runo Møller Stahl (2019) argues that the interregnum constitutes a phase of prolonged crisis and exhaustion of the existing hegemonic order, in which no new social forces have yet emerged capable of establishing an alternative hegemony. Accordingly, the interregnum is not merely a transitional moment between hegemonic configurations or a temporary crisis. Rather, it should be understood as a distinct historical phase, whose trajectory remains open and which does not conform to the teleological assumptions of classical Marxism—assumptions Gramsci explicitly rejected. During an interregnum, elements of the preceding order—ideologies, discourses, institutions, material resources—continue to exist, but they have lost their effectiveness, legitimacy, and capacity to sustain the existing order. Simultaneously, the contradictions that had accumulated during the previous hegemonic phase become increasingly visible. Yet, no social forces—no *nuovo blocco storico*, as Gramsci called it—have emerged with the capacity to resolve these contradictions or consolidate a new hegemonic order.

Along similar lines, Milan Babić (2020) identifies three distinctive features of the interregnum when compared to other historical phases. First, it is a process, not a situation, clash, or discrete event; as such, it unfolds over the long term, within Braudel's *longue durée*. Second, it is organic or structural in nature, expressing contradictions that cannot be resolved without a comprehensive transformation of the system and its socio-economic and power relations. Third, it develops simultaneously and interdependently across different spheres—the global political economy, the state, and society—with *morbid symptoms* manifesting in each of them.

From a sociological perspective, Wolfgang Streeck (2016) defines the interregnum as a rupture at the macro level, which at the micro level, deprives individuals of their institutional structure and collective support. As a result, individuals are left to navigate and organise precarious forms of social life on their own, securing only a minimal degree of safety and stability through improvised social arrangements. For these reasons, the society of the interregnum is described as deinstitutionalised and, in essence, ungovernable.

Various theories of international relations have linked hegemonic crises and power transitions to periods of systemic instability, often marked by morbid symptoms such as those discussed above. Power transition theory, the neorealist theory of hegemonic stability, and world-systems theory all make this connection, typically using the interwar period—and the difficult transition from *Pax Britannica* to *Pax Americana*—as a historical reference point. However, these theoretical frameworks are heavily influenced by rationalist and purportedly “scientific” assumptions that tend to dismiss history as a foundational causal factor. In contrast, due to its historical-structural orientation, the neo-Gramscian school within critical theory of international relations explicitly embraces this historical foundation (Sanahuja, 2015). The contributions of Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, and the authors associated with the Amsterdam School offer a valuable point of departure for theorising the interregnum, and for operationalising this concept in ontological, theoretical, and methodological terms within the field of international affairs. Notably, they allow us to interpret the current crisis of globalisation and the liberal international order as a crisis of hegemony, and thus to conceptualise it as a new interregnum of the 21st century (Cox, Booth & Dunne, 1999; Bieler & Morton, 2004; Sanahuja, 2020c). This theoretical approach is grounded in the concept of historical structures, composed of three core elements: material forces, institutions, and ideas. These structures assume specific forms in each historical period, and when their elements are internally congruent—as in the cases of the Cold War or the globalisation era—they establish a restrictive framework that limits human agency and conditions interactions within the international system. When social forces transform these elements and their congruence breaks down, hegemony weakens, and the space for agency expands.

This conceptualisation enables us to analyse the current historical moment as a crisis of hegemony, marked by several defining characteristics:

- a) Material forces are undergoing a process of transformation, driven by technological and productive changes that are also reshaping the international division of labour.

b) Institutions and norms are facing growing problems of representativeness, legitimacy, and effectiveness, as they no longer reflect the actual distribution of material capabilities and/or fail to address the demands of regulation, risk management, and the interdependencies arising from new technological, productive, environmental, and socio-economic conditions. As expressions of “the old that refuses to die,” these institutions are increasingly being questioned and contested by both established and emerging social actors.

c) Ideas—principles, values, or shared understandings with a semblance of universality that shape the common sense of a given era—are likewise the subject of dispute. When dominant ideas cease to produce legitimacy and alternative discourses and worldviews emerge, hegemony by consent becomes unsustainable, and coercion is increasingly employed—though such coercion is ultimately insufficient to restore long-term order and stability (Theophanidis, 2016).

The interregnum, therefore, is not to be confused with a temporary crisis or with the concept of a “critical juncture”, as understood in historical sociology. The latter refers to exogenous shocks or short-term contradictions that do not alter deep structures but rather open “crossroads” for agency. The interregnum, by contrast, is a long-term, endogenous historical process, generated by the internal contradictions and structural limitations of the existing order. The COVID-19 pandemic can be seen as an example of a critical juncture—a “crisis within a crisis”: an exogenous event that exposed and intensified the tensions, limits, and contradictions of an already unfolding interregnum, itself rooted in a globalisation process in crisis and undergoing broader structural transformations (Sanahuja, 2020c; Tooze, 2021).

When the historical structure weakens and structural power erodes to the point of giving rise to a non-hegemonic stage, greater margins for action and new frontiers of possibility emerge for both agency and collective mobilisation. The interregnum thus constitutes a stage characterised by the emergence of counter-hegemonic actors and projects—whether progressive or regressive—which contest the existing order and engage in struggle, yet without being able to impose themselves or consolidate a new order (Cox, 1981, p. 139). This is the moment of the counter-movement described and theorised by Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, his seminal work published in 1944.

By taking these three dimensions—material, institutional, and ideological—as variables for analysis, it becomes possible to model the different ways in which historical structures and hegemony may be weakened, depending on their specific configurations, as proposed by Esther Barbé (2014). However, without detracting from the analytical value of such formal models, any attempt to theorise and operationalise the interregnum must begin with an acknowledgement of its essential historicity. This implies an analysis rooted in concrete historical contexts, recognising from the outset that different periods of interregnum will exhibit distinct and historically specific features.

For Zygmunt Bauman (2012), the social crisis—stemming from the disconnect between territory, state, and society, and from the global diffusion of power driven by transnationalisation processes—can be understood as a form of interregnum. Such a condition entails a significant weakening of the state and its capacity to act, a drifting of sovereignty, and the emergence of a scenario marked by global risks and chronic, persistent uncertainty—an uncertainty that cannot be resolved until political representation, law, and jurisdiction are realigned beyond the confines of state territoriality. Fulvio Attiná (2022) has also employed the concept of interregnum to analyse the decline in the authority, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the contemporary multilateral system. This system is increasingly being challenged by revisionist state and non-state actors, in the absence of any coalitions capable of advancing norms, institutions, or an alternative international order grounded in a universalist perspective.

4. Interregnum and Change of Era: Criticism and Response

In current debates surrounding the transformation of the international system, the Gramscian notion of interregnum is often invoked as a metaphor or rhetorical device. It has become a frequent reference in media commentary and think tanks, where it is often employed in ambiguous, imprecise, and decontextualised ways (Tooze, 2024). This criticism is valid. As this article has argued, to prevent such trivialisation, it is essential to theorise the concept and employ it as a formal analytical category, anchored in the theoretical foundations of international relations.³

Beyond this superficial misuse, there are more substantial critiques that warrant careful consideration and response. These critiques converge around three interconnected arguments: a) the teleological character of the concept and the philosophy of history in which it is embedded; b) its inherent analytical limitations; and c) its Eurocentric orientation, given that it is derived from a specific Western historical trajectory and associated with the West's hegemonic role. Each of these arguments will be addressed below and will, in turn, be subjected to critical examination and response.

The teleological nature of the concept of interregnum has been questioned by Tooze (2024) and, more fundamentally, by Ramalho (2025). Tooze refers to the Marxist philosophy of history underpinning Gramsci's theorisation, specifically criticising the *regnum–interregnum–regnum* sequence, which presumes the eventual “birth of the new” following the interregnum. He also argues that defining fascism—or other phenomena such as the bureaucratic and authoritarian degeneration of communism under Stalin—as *morbid symptoms* entails a normative judgement that exceeds the explanatory scope of history or the social sciences. This critique, however, overlooks the open-ended nature of Gramsci's thought, as well as his radical rejection of economic determinism and the mechanistic and Eurocentric historical teleology characteristic of classical Marxism. Tooze's argument relies on a misiden-

³ For this theory, see the aforementioned Streeck (2016), Møller Stahl (2019), Babic (2020) and, by the author, several works: Sanahuja 2017 and 2022b, which are essay-like, and, with a theoretical approach, Sanahuja 2020c and 2024.

tification of interregnum with Giovanni Arrighi's (1994) notion of historical cycles—an approach that indeed leans toward historical determinism. As Achcar (2024) notes, saying “the new has not yet been born” is fundamentally different from saying “the new cannot be born.” It is therefore unfounded to interpret Gramsci's phrase, as Tooze does, as implying that “the new [...] will be born.” Accordingly, the interregnum should not be understood as implying a linear or normative conception of human progress. Rather, it affirms the role of history in shaping social and international orders. Once again, it is an intrinsically historical concept for understanding a specific process of decline or hegemonic crisis. Being conflictual and even chaotic, as mentioned, the interregnum is also a “productive” historical process: it is necessary to resolve these contradictions in the long term and to resolve themselves—or not—into a new hegemonic equilibrium. The concept does not presuppose a cyclical historical evolution through hegemonic and non-hegemonic phases. It should therefore not be interpreted teleologically, nor judged normatively with respect to either the declining order or the one that may emerge. In other words, it should not be interpreted or evaluated through the teleologies of human progress derived from Enlightenment-inspired and Eurocentric conceptions of modernity, such as the liberal or Marxist traditions. In the conceptualisation presented in these pages, the interregnum is the expression of an organic crisis whose resolution is open and not predetermined, and will therefore depend on how history itself unfolds.

In turn, Tooze (2022) has proposed the concept of *polycrisis*—originally coined by Edgar Morin and Brigitte Kern (1999)—to refer to the simultaneity of multiple crises and the amplified effects of their interaction, which are understood to be more severe than the mere sum of their individual impacts. In the context of a worsening environmental crisis, both authors drew on systems theory and complexity analysis to describe what they saw as the imminent risk of a planetary-scale polycrisis, involving intertwined and overlapping crises, antagonisms, and uncontrollable processes—ultimately producing a condition of systemic instability and profound uncertainty. In such a scenario, partial solutions would be insufficient, and a holistic and global response would be required—one that the system itself, mired in crisis, would be incapable of generating (Lawrence, Janzwood & Homer-Dixon, 2022; Tooze, 2023).

However, this concept—which, like interregnum, is frequently used in imprecise and rhetorical ways—also presents serious analytical limitations. Its systemic orientation tends to encourage a synchronic analysis which, as Tooze himself acknowledges, obscures the historical genesis and dialectics of the dynamics and actors involved. It overlooks power relations and questions of distribution, situating the problem primarily in the functionality and reproduction of the system. This perspective implicitly carries a normative judgment and a specific notion of progress, insofar as it presupposes a prior “normality”—globalisation, the liberal international order, etc.—that has been disrupted by the polycrisis (Sanahuja, 2024a, pp. 270–271). In 2025, Tooze himself conceded that the term was no longer adequate for grasping the current moment, given the scale and nature of the ongoing economic transformations.

A second group of critics highlights the analytical limitations of the interregnum and the broader theoretical framework within which it is embedded. This is the case with Ramalho (2025) and Hirst, Russell, Sanjuan, and Tokatlian (2024). The former misattributes a teleological character to the concept of interregnum, and with it a predictive capacity it does not possess. On this basis, Ramalho explicitly refrains from engaging in an analysis of the present, appealing instead—somewhat generically and inconsistently—to the complexity and chaos that have overtaken the international system and the resulting impossibility of anticipating the future.

The critique advanced by Hirst et al. is more consistent. These authors argue that, due to its inherent historicity, the concept of interregnum is not well suited to contemporary analysis of international affairs. They also contend that the emphasis on structural change—implicit in the notion of interregnum and its neo-Gramscian foundations—obscures certain phenomena: on the one hand, elements that have “already died,” such as the post-Cold War order or neoliberal globalisation; and on the other, those that have “already been born or reborn,” such as the rise of China or the return of protectionism in the West. These developments, they argue, are better captured by other analytical lenses, such as theories of hegemonic transition. In light of the limitations of both perspectives, they propose the category of “non-hegemonic order” as an alternative analytical framework.

Several objections can be raised to these criticisms. First, an understanding of the crisis of hegemony based on the notion of historical structure—as developed in this work and others—within the framework of critical theory, does allow for a comprehensive grasp of the “dead” and “living” facts and processes, as well as those that persist as the “zombies” of a decaying order. Moreover, the analytical advantage of this approach over other international relations theories lies in the fact that it does not presume any causal predetermination located “in theory,” external to historical processes. Instead, it requires careful analysis of those processes to assess the specific causal factors driving historical change. As already noted in response to Tooze’s critique, the concept of interregnum provides an explanation for the instability and uncertainty that characterise the contemporary international system—one that is grounded in theory and accounts for both structural and agential causal factors, open to a plurality of actors, without falling into statocentrism or the polarity-centred perspective reflected in the critique by Hirst et al. It should also be emphasised that the so-called “non-hegemonic order,” if taken as an ontology rather than merely a category, is itself an expression of an interregnum stage, and not something of a fundamentally different nature. Thus, there is no substantial divergence from the conclusion reached here. Finally, it may be argued that this category is, in fact, a contradiction in terms: if anything defines a period of hegemonic crisis, it is precisely the absence of order and the struggle over what should constitute an acceptable international order as a whole.

Finally, the Eurocentric nature of this concept has been questioned (Pezzini, 2022). In response, it is essential to consider the perspective of global history and international relations. This approach, while acknowledging the systemic nature of the current crises, decentres historical interpretation and the analysis of causal factors away from the West, and recognises the diversity of contexts that define this global

cycle, along with the agency of non-Western actors (Acharya, 2014)—in particular, the rise of the Global South and China, as well as the political forces that challenge the liberal international order beyond the Western core (Sanahuja et al., 2025). As Nilsen (2025) observes, there is also a “southern interregnum,” in which the development trajectories of countries in the Global South intersect—trajectories shaped by globalisation and its subsequent crisis, social fractures, and the rise of authoritarianism and democratic backsliding, all of which are also manifest in the Global South.

5. Politics, Economics, Ecology, Geopolitics, and Wars in the New Interregnum of the 21st Century

How are political economy, political ecology, geopolitics, and global (in)security evolving in the context of the new historical interregnum of the 21st century? This question frames ongoing political disputes, social conflicts, and international relations. It also sets out a relevant research agenda for understanding and interpreting this period of systemic crisis and instability, as outlined at the beginning of this article.

To begin with, the political economy of the interregnum is shaped, as previously noted, by the crisis of a model of production and accumulation, and the exhaustion of a technological cycle—namely, post-Fordism or Toyotism and the transnationalisation of production. At the same time, a transition is underway toward a new model, the contours of which remain uncertain, driven by the rise of new technologies and digital platforms.

In addition to this process of structural transformation, agency must also be taken into consideration. The elites and social forces of both Western liberal capitalism and state capitalism—particularly in China—are increasingly turning to economic nationalism and protectionism, engaging in trade and technology wars. They are also weaponising interdependence, whether through direct coercion or sanctions, fully aware that such measures carry significant costs for those who impose them (Farrell and Newman, 2019). These dynamics are ushering in a cycle of global production reorganisation, based on automation and digitalisation, the shortening of supply chains, and a return to vertically integrated production and relocation. This includes the redefinition of regionalism through strategies such as onshoring, reshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring. Added to this are de-risking policies aimed at reducing foreign control over supply chains and critical sectors or infrastructure—as seen in the measures adopted against China by the Trump administration, or, more moderately, by the European Union and various developing countries that are also raising tariff barriers on Chinese imports (Lubin, 2025).

In short, the new political economy of the interregnum has left behind the world of neoliberal globalisation, which was based on the separation of economics from politics and geopolitics. In a short span of time, the global political economy has ceased to function as a space in which global supply chains operate—efficiently and harmoniously, insulated from social tensions or international politics. Today, productive and industrial policy is once again at the forefront (Stiglitz, 2022), driven

by considerations of security and strategic autonomy. This shift is illustrated by a rising China, a retreating United States—under both Trump and Biden—and a “geopolitical Europe,” which in 2023 formally adopted an economic security strategy for the first time. While these developments can be attributed to technological change and factors related to profitability or sustainability, they are also rooted in concerns over security and resilience in a global economy marked by geopolitical instability. As Jean Pisani-Ferry (2021) argues, this context raises questions about the promises of free trade theory and its purported role as the “great peacemaker” in international relations. All of these points to the visible securitisation of supply chains, guided by economic security imperatives and geopolitical alignments, in stark contrast to the past logic of efficiency (The Economist, 2023; Gopinath, Gourinchas, Presbitero, and Topalov, 2024; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2024).

However, the interregnum should not be understood merely as a shift in the hierarchy of states based on their material capacities, as some authors have argued, drawing on a limited conceptualisation of power as the capacity and function of the state and its agencies (Morales Ruvalcava and Rocha, 2024). This is clearly insufficient in a highly transnationalised system, in which private actors—particularly the new technopolies—play a fundamental and increasingly autonomous role.

The politics of the interregnum can largely be explained by the socio-economic dynamics of late globalisation and its subsequent crisis. In the social sphere, the promise of welfare and inclusion through the globalised market has been only partially fulfilled. While there have been significant gains in poverty reduction and the expansion of middle classes—and their expectations—in emerging economies, particularly in China, these middle strata have stagnated or declined in the wealthiest countries, where inequality has increased and upward social mobility has diminished. Simultaneously, and to varying degrees, processes of labour precarisation, material dispossession, and growing economic insecurity have emerged, contributing to a widespread crisis of expectations for the next generation. Global inequality has deepened, and the capacity of states to uphold the basic social contract and shield citizens from market risks and the uncertainties of technological change has been substantially eroded. As Étienne Balibar (2013) has pointed out, inequality is not limited to income and wealth but also encompasses disparities in education, opportunity, and social recognition. These dimensions are strongly shaped by gender, ethnicity, and generational divides, and have been further aggravated by misguided responses to the 2008 financial crisis. Crucially, inequalities and the insecurity they generate are themselves distributed unevenly across international, regional, and national levels. This produces a second order of inequality—or “inequality within inequality”—which pits poor and excluded groups against other segments of the population that are also marginalised. The result is a growing brutalisation of society, with destructive consequences for the legitimacy of both national and supranational institutions.

Thus, the politics of the interregnum entails the erosion of both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ruling elites and the old order, which are no longer capable of generating the necessary consensus or delivering legitimate and effective governance at either the national or international level. As Wolfgang Münchau (2016)

observed at the height of the euro crisis, these elites were experiencing a veritable “Marie Antoinette moment”. Unable to secure consent, they increasingly resort to the coercive elements of the declining order to contain agents of change, resorting instead to superficial adaptations and modifications, which Gramsci referred to as transformism, to temporarily prolong a decaying system. It should also be noted, however, that those actors advocating progressive change remain weak and have yet to articulate viable alternative strategies. In this context, new illiberal and far-right forces are emerging that capitalize on public discontent—and simultaneously amplify it—contesting dominant discourses, norms, and institutions, while challenging the elites and hegemonic groups still in power. All of this reflects a dynamic of repoliticisation and contestation of the liberal international order, including the regional and global institutions and normative frameworks that underpin it—often framed by these actors as a rejection of “globalism”⁴. This is manifest in contemporary forms of populist Caesarism, fuelled by digital media ecosystems, and including movements influenced by the so-called “dark enlightenment”—distinctive political expressions of the current interregnum (Empoli, 2025).

This is evident in the liberal democracies of wealthy countries, where the rise of far-right movements poses a growing threat. However, as previously noted, there is also a visible “interregnum of the South” in emerging economies, where the regime of accumulation associated with failed globalisation is increasingly generating legitimacy crises for ruling elites and established systems of governance.

The political ecology of the interregnum is dominated by the climate emergency, biodiversity loss, and the onset of a new mass extinction. These phenomena reveal that the patterns of production and consumption promoted by globalisation are neither viable nor desirable on a planetary scale. The eco-social conflicts driven by the environmental crisis extend into the productive, technological, and energy spheres, as they entail intensified land use, resource extraction, and extractive pressures associated with transitions centred on digital and green technologies. These pressures, in turn, collide with growing social and ecological demands for climate neutrality and environmental justice. Three temporalities converge in the ecological crisis of the 21st-century interregnum. First, historical events such as the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Second, the long-term structural crisis of globalisation. And third, the crisis of the Anthropocene, which alters the long-term temporality of geological epochs by exposing the physical and biological limits of a socio-economic and socio-cultural model that cannot be universalised.

As Mario Pezzini (2022) has pointed out, in the dispute over political projects to bring the interregnum to an end—largely a contest between competing hegemonic visions—there are proposals advocating a neoliberal restoration, as well as dystopian alternatives marked by greater authoritarianism, securitisation, and inequality, championed by the ideologues of the new far right or the techno-authoritarian Caesarism of the “dark enlightenment”. These projects are subordinated to new forms of governmentality grounded in the social control technologies of surveillance cap-

4 This term is used here in the sense developed by Antje Wiener in her theory of contestation (Wiener, 2017; Hooghe, Lenz and Marks, 2019).

italism. In contrast, other proposals aim to renew social democracy, whose critical and emancipatory potential partly derives from its deep roots in society, its moral economy, and shared conceptions of justice. However, the capacity of these proposals to constitute a real alternative will depend on the extent to which they integrate environmental imperatives and demands for climate justice, currently present in the political arena, into their formulations of *green deals*. The success of such efforts will hinge on how these environmental commitments are translated into new macroeconomic, monetary, and fiscal policies, as well as into trade, industrial, and labour strategies—policy fields that, although under debate, remain difficult to consolidate in many contexts. Rebuilding the social contract through these new green deals entails politicising—or repoliticising—issues that affect people’s everyday lives. However, the asymmetric distribution of costs among countries, regions, and social groups may, in turn, fuel nationalist and far-right movements, as exemplified by the case of Trumpism.

Finally, the geopolitics of the contemporary interregnum is marked by dynamics that challenge and erode the liberal international order (Sweijts and Pronk, 2019; Ekman and Everts, 2024); by a geopolitics shaped by international relations and economic or energy interdependencies, which are increasingly being weaponised (Farrell and Newman, 2019); and by the reconfiguration of global actor coalitions. This is evident in the collective West, where the United States is redefining its relations with Europe and other regions, as well as in the Global South, through groupings such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Several powers—both major and mid-sized—are demonstrating a willingness to reorder the global system, or at least their immediate spheres of influence, particularly in terms of economic, technological, and human flows. This shift is unfolding in the face of the passivity or disorientation of the former elites of the liberal order and of countries that, while still formally committed to liberal internationalism and multilateral rules and institutions, have proven largely ineffective in advancing meaningful reform. Indeed, the problems of representativeness, legitimacy, and effectiveness in post-war multilateralism—as a framework for global governance—are among the “morbid symptoms” of this phase of interregnum. They call into question its supposed universality and expose the limits of global governance discourses and practices, as well as of regionalism and regional integration (Balibar, 2013). These shortcomings have further constrained the international community’s capacity to respond to global risks, as exemplified by the inadequate and fragmented response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this increasingly transnational and ungoverned scenario—which cannot be adequately described as merely multipolar—revisionist actors are emerging. The revisionism long associated with emerging powers, which have demanded greater voice and voting power, is now joined by the United States under the Trump administration, reflecting the anti-globalist challenge posed by the ascendant far right. However, none of these actors appear to possess either the will or the capacity to establish an alternative world order.

In the wake of market hegemony during the era of neoliberal globalisation, geopolitical competition is now emerging or intensifying in strategic regions such

as the Arctic, the South China Sea, Taiwan, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, the Sahel, and the Indo-Pacific—a geopolitical construct largely devised in Washington. These geopolitical disputes cannot be disentangled from the resurgence of nationalism, which has become both a vector of social mobilisation and a discursive tool for legitimising securitarian and authoritarian tendencies promoted by states. Accordingly, the illiberal or authoritarian drift of international politics and the global order—challenged by revisionist actors in the Global South, such as China, or shaped by the rise of far-right forces in various contexts—constitutes the foundation of these new geopolitical projects.

In the non-hegemonic and geopolitically contested context of the interregnum, these actors are engaging in geopolitical gambles that defy rational calculation and established consensus. Often high-risk, such bets can trigger systemic chain reactions and frequently lead to unforeseen and highly disruptive consequences. They may ultimately fail, exacerbating uncertainty and deepening global instability. Most notably, these geopolitical wagers may involve the use of force, signalling a resurgence of wars of aggression and a challenge to fundamental norms of international law—as illustrated by the illegal invasion of Ukraine and the widespread commission of crimes against humanity in Gaza.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine constitutes an extreme case of such geopolitical gambles. It can therefore be defined as a “war of interregnum” (Sanahuja, 2022): an invasion that was unexpected for many—including, hypothetically, Putin’s own Russia—which, rather than launching a full-scale war, envisioned a “special military operation” aimed at overthrowing the Zelensky government, swiftly reincorporating Ukraine into its sphere of influence, and seizing parts of its territory at low cost. Yet, this geopolitical gamble involved serious miscalculations, and history—always open to human agency—has taken a different course. This was evident in the unexpected resilience of the Ukrainian resistance and the early Russian military setbacks, the robust Western response in terms of military support, sanctions, and unity of purpose, and the visible discomfort of China and India in the face of a war they neither anticipated nor desired. As a result, the conflict has opened a scenario of radical uncertainty in Ukraine, marked by critical risks of military escalation—including Russia’s threat to use tactical nuclear weapons—the involvement of additional powers, and global repercussions: inflation, disruptions in supply chains, food insecurity, and new political tensions. The war has also become entrenched, with no favourable conditions or mutually acceptable frameworks for a peace agreement (Sanahuja, 2024b). In the context of this conflict, significant strategic realignments have emerged, such as the Trump administration’s shift toward Russia and disengagement from Europe. Furthermore, the war has driven a strong dynamic of securitisation in European and global politics, marked by the return of a traditional, state-centric conception of national security, evident even within the European Union. This highly militarised notion of security is fuelling a sharp increase in defence spending, the return of “military Keynesianism” as the foundation of industrial policy, and the erosion of hard-won disarmament and arms control regimes—such as the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mines, which has now been rejected by countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Nordic region. All of these points toward a new era of rearmament and, potentially, nuclear

proliferation, a renewed arms race, and the resurgence of classic security dilemmas theorised during the Cold War (Bell and Hofmann, 2025).

Although this is a long-standing conflict rooted in Israeli settler colonialism, the Gaza war can also be understood as a war of interregnum. It was triggered by the terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas—a high-stakes geopolitical gamble aimed at derailing the Abraham Accords and the normalisation process between Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, it has also provoked a genocidal response by Israel, linked to the ascent of the Zionist far right—yet another dangerous geopolitical gamble. This response goes beyond the occupation and “ethnic cleansing” of Gaza, extending to the West Bank, and reflects a broader intent to regionalise the conflict against Iran. This escalation is exemplified by the Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025, which effectively dismantled the European-led diplomatic efforts to contain proliferation through negotiated arrangements with Iran.

Conclusion

The interregnum as a global crisis, between Carr, Polanyi and Gramsci

Historical analogies—always requiring caution in their application—might suggest that the international system is undergoing a new “twenty-year crisis”, the term used by Edward Hallett Carr in 1939 to describe the interwar period (1919–1939), when the liberal international order succumbed to the politics of power, the rise of nationalism, militarism, fascism, wars of conquest, and genocide. However, as John Ikenberry (2018) has argued, although we are currently witnessing a period of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, this is not a “Carr-type crisis” reducible to a return to power politics, a supposed bipolarity or new Cold War, or to “Thucydides traps” in which strategic competition inevitably leads to great-power conflict (Allison, 2017). Rather, the present international system could be interpreted as a new “Polanyi-type crisis”—one marked by the erosion of its environmental foundations, its economic and social structures, its institutional and regulatory frameworks, and the collapse of the collective consensus surrounding democracy, society, and the market, along with their universalist claims. This signals a new “great transformation” and heralds an epochal shift.

But if Polanyi’s image or interpretation is plausible, so too—as argued throughout these pages—is the view that the current historical moment represents a “Gramscian crisis”: a new, yet distinct, interregnum of the 21st century. It is an epochal crisis, as previously noted, brought about by the hegemonic breakdown of globalisation—an organic crisis that encompasses the collapse of ruling elites and their narratives of order and progress. This crisis is both driven by, and itself fuels, the global rise of nationalist and authoritarian forces that challenge the legitimacy and viability of the liberal international order.

If the starting point is a ‘Polanyi crisis’ or a ‘Gramscian crisis’, the way out of the interregnum cannot be reduced to the emergence of a new hegemonic balance among great powers that merely restores an appearance of order, as the Trump administration appears to seek. Rather, it would require acknowledging the socio-economic

roots of the crisis and rebuilding the social contract—not only with current generations, but also with the planet and future generations—both within national societies and between rich and poor countries, across local and global levels. Without such renewed social compacts, there can be no meaningful resolution to the interregnum that aligns with broad conceptions of justice, democracy, and sustainable development, nor a viable international order grounded in peaceful coexistence and cooperation. In contrast, as expressions of the “morbid symptoms” of the 21st-century interregnum, the dystopias of the new Caesarisms of the “dark enlightenment” are gaining traction. These are marked by increasingly authoritarian, securitised, and militarised policies; more segmented, precarious, and unequal societies; and a transformed capitalism dominated by new digital oligopolies that subordinate public authority. They are also sustained by new forms of governmentality rooted in the technologies of social control characteristic of so-called “surveillance capitalism”, and by a world where the foundational norms of the previous international order—sovereignty, non-intervention, territorial integrity, and restrictions on the use of force—are no longer respected.

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