UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA TESIS DOCTORAL Actividades en la zona gris y vulnerabilidad socioeconómica en Italia Grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR PRESENTADA POR Alessandro Arcobasso DIRECTORA Concepción Anguita Olmedo © Alessandro Arcobasso, 2024 UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA PROGRAMA DE DOCTORADO EN CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN Y RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES TESIS DOCTORAL Actividades en la zona gris y vulnerabilidad socioeconómica en Italia Grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR PRESENTADA POR Alessandro Arcobasso DIRECTORA Concepción Anguita Olmedo “It was a matter of defending the State against those who were representing it, who was holding it. The State was detained. And it had to be released.” Leonardo Sciascia, Il Contesto “World War III is a guerrilla information war with no division between military and civilian participation.” Marshall McLuhan, Culture is Our Business “New ideas, and the combination of old ideas in new ways, are essential elements of effective analysis.” Richards J. Heuer Jr., Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis Agradecimientos / Acknowledgements. Un sincero agradecimiento a la Profesora Concepción Anguita Olmedo, directora de mi tesis, por apoyarme amistosa y pacientemente a lo largo del programa de doctorado. Sin ella, esto no habría sido posible. Agradezco también al Profesor Antonello Miranda por animarme, aconsejarme y honrarme con su amistad desde hace tiempo, así como por acortar las distancias entre las universidades de Palermo y Cambridge. Dirijo también unas palabras de reconocimiento a los que, en diferentes lugares y tiempos, han inspirado mis estudios. A mi familia y a los que ya no están. 1 INDEX I. Identification and relevance of the research topic. ........................................................... 25 II. Methodology. ................................................................................................................... 31 a. Doxa, episteme and exercise of power. ..................................................................... 34 b. Temporal dimensions. ............................................................................................... 35 c. Research questions, hypotheses, and objectives........................................................ 36 d. Methods, techniques, and documentary sources. ...................................................... 41 e. Research process and structure of the thesis. ............................................................ 48 1.1 Towards the understanding of grey zone activities. .................................................. 52 1.1.1 The meaning of grey zone activities in the Anglo-American and European studies. ............................................................................................................. 53 1.1.2 Characteristics and line of actions of the grey zone activities. ....................... 57 1.1.3 Ambiguous use of force and legal implications. .............................................. 59 1.2 The similar concepts. ................................................................................................. 63 1.2.1 The forerunner concept of Political warfare. .................................................. 63 1.2.1.1 The manipulation of perceptions in the infosphere. ...................................... 67 1.2.2 The similarities: cognitive, hybrid, unrestricted, non-linear, and virtual Abbreviations and acronyms. .................................................................................................4 Glossary..................................................................................................................................7 List of charts.........................................................................................................................11 List of figures. ......................................................................................................................14 List of pictures......................................................................................................................15 List of tables. ........................................................................................................................16 Abstract. ...............................................................................................................................17 Resumen (ES). ......................................................................................................................21 INTRODUCTION: WILL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS................25 CHAPTER 1 - GREY ZONE ACTIVITIES AND SOCIOECONOMIC VULNERABILITY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. ................................................51 2 societal warfare. .............................................................................................. 73 1.2.3 The organized crime groups as non-state actors. ............................................ 79 1.3 Grey zone activities, Intelligence studies, and analysis. ............................................ 81 1.3.1 The academic experiences and the university-security nexus. ......................... 83 1.3.2 The analysts’ perspective on professional and academic commitment. .......... 86 1.4 Vulnerability factors, surveys, and statistical indicators. .......................................... 88 1.4.1 The Corruption Perceptions Index and the crimes against the public administration in Italy. .................................................................................... 89 1.4.2 False perceptions about the most relevant topics. ........................................... 91 1.4.3 Inequality, social divisions, and low turnout. .................................................. 93 1.4.4 Social apathy, economic uncertainty, and distrust in institutions. .................. 95 1.4.5 Criminal behaviours: Intimidation of local administrators and journalists. .. 97 1.5 A conceptual approximation to the socioeconomic vulnerability. .......................... 100 1.6 The concepts related to socioeconomic vulnerability. ............................................. 102 1.7 Socioeconomic vulnerability and Intelligence studies. ........................................... 105 1.8 Vulnerability signals, surveys, and statistical indicators. ........................................ 109 1.8.1 Social Mood on the economy, and dishonest behaviours. ............................. 109 1.8.2 Cost of living, and sense of powerlessness. ................................................... 111 1.8.3 Poverty, labour disputes, and social divisions. .............................................. 113 1.8.4 Expatriations and uncertainty about the future. ............................................ 115 1.8.5 Distrust in others, and risks to social cohesion. ............................................ 116 1.9 A SWOT Analysis of the theoretical framework. ................................................... 118 1.10 Un análisis DAFO del marco teórico (ES). ........................................................... 120 2.1 The selection criteria of the case studies. ................................................................ 131 2.2 Enrico Mattei’s strategic assassination. ................................................................... 138 2.2.1 Vulnerability factors and signals in the 1950-60s. ........................................ 144 2.3 Aldo Moro’s kidnapping and killing. ...................................................................... 150 2.3.1 Vulnerability factors and signals in the 1970-80s. ........................................ 154 CHAPTER 2 – THE DARKEST EVENTS IN THE ITALIAN FIRST REPUBLIC (1948- 1993)...................................................................................................................................122 3 2.4 The Mafia slaughters of 1992. ................................................................................. 160 2.4.1 Vulnerability factors and signals in the 1990s. ............................................. 164 2.5 A deductive illustration of the result achieved. ....................................................... 171 2.6 Una ilustración deductiva del resultado obtenido (ES). ......................................... 174 3.1 Italy’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. ............................................... 179 3.2 Operation ‘From Russia With Love’. ...................................................................... 186 3.3 The Prison Riots Affair of 2020. ............................................................................. 192 3.4 Vulnerability factors and signals in the last decade. ............................................... 196 3.5 An inductive illustration of the result achieved. ...................................................... 201 3.6 Una ilustración inductiva del resultado obtenido (ES). .......................................... 203 4.1 The evidence gathered. ............................................................................................ 208 4.2 The Quadrant Hypothesis Generation. .................................................................... 220 4.3 The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. ................................................................ 222 4.4 An abductive illustration of the result achieved. ..................................................... 230 4.5 Una ilustración inductiva del resultado obtenido (ES). .......................................... 232 Books and Book chapters. ............................................................................................. 251 Research papers and Articles. ....................................................................................... 265 Documents and Reports. ................................................................................................ 273 Audiovisual materials. ................................................................................................... 281 Articles and Press releases. ................................................................................................ 284 CHAPTER 3 – THE CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL EVENTS IN RECENT YEARS………………………………………………………………………………….. 178 CHAPTER 4 – A STRUCTURED ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE. ...........................206 Findings. .............................................................................................................................235 Conclusiones (ES). .............................................................................................................243 References. .........................................................................................................................251 4 Abbreviations and acronyms. ACH Analysis of Competing Hypotheses AGCOM Authority for Communications AGIP Italian National Oil Company AISI Internal Intelligence and Security Agency ARS Sicilian Regional Assembly BR Italian Terrorist Organisation “Brigate Rosse” BRI Belt and Road Initiative CASD Center for High Defense Studies CEMISS Military Centre for Strategic Studies CENSIS Study Centre for Social Investments CIA Central Intelligence Agency CPI Corruption Perceptions Index CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies CW Cognitive Warfare DC Italian Political Party “Democrazia Cristiana” DGSE French General Directorate for External Security DIA Anti-Mafia Investigation Division DoD U.S. Department of Defense EEC European Community EMS European Monetary System ENI Italian National Energy Group ETA Basque Homeland and Liberty or Basque Country and Freedom EU European Union EUROSTAT Statistical office of the European Union FOI Consumer Price Index for Blue and White-Collar Worker Households 5 GA Grey Area GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office GAI Global Attractiveness Index GRU Russian Military Secret Service GZA Grey Zone Activities GZW Grey Zone Warfare HW Hybrid Warfare ICJ International Court of Justice IEEE Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies IR International Relations IRA Irish Republican Army IRI Italian Institute for Industrial Reconstruction ISTAT Italian National Institute of Statistics IW Information Warfare JCS U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff KGB Soviet Union State Security Committee NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATOTerm Official NATO Terminology Database NEET Not Engaged in Education, Employment, or Training NIC Consumer Price Index for the Whole Nation NIOC Iranian National Oil Company NOG Non-Governmental Organization NGW New Generation Warfare NSC U.S. National Security Council OCGs Organized Crime Groups OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 6 OLP Palestine Liberation Organization OP Italian Magazine “Osservatore Politico” OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OSS U.S. Office of Strategic Services PARC Palo Alto Research Center PCI Italian Communist Party PCN Political-Criminal Nexus PRC People's Republic of China PSI Italian Socialist Party PSYOPS Psychological Operations QHG Quadrant Hypothesis Generation RAF Red Army Faction SDECE French External Documentation and Counter-Intelligence Service SIFAR Italian Armed Forces Information Service SISDE Italian Information and Democratic Security Service SMEI Social Mood on Economy Index SOE British Special Operations Executive TD Truth Decay UN United Nations UNDRR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction USAWC United States Army War College WW2 World War II 7 Glossary. Active measures Covert political operations ranging from disinformation campaigns to staging insurrections. They reflect the wartime mentality of the Soviet leadership. Similar tactics were used by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the Second World War. Mark Galeotti, 2019 Cognitive warfare The use of instruments of power which integrate cyber, information, psychological, and social engineering capabilities, and affect attitudes and behaviours by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual and group cognition to gain an advantage over an adversary. NATO Allied Command Transformation, 2023 Corruption Dishonest or illegal behaviour involving a person in a position of power, for example, accepting money for doing something illegal or immoral. Cambridge Dictionary Counterpropaganda Activities aimed at detecting and combating propaganda actions carried out by hostile actors. Italian Intelligence Glossary, 2019 Counterterrorism Activities to prevent, detect, contain, and counteract conduct of a terrorist nature. Italian Intelligence Glossary, 2019 Deception Deliberate measures to mislead targeted decision-makers into behaving in a manner advantageous to the commander's intent. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition Disinformation The deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead. NATO website, 2020 Economic coercion The commercial and financial practices that reinforce political pressure. Javier Jordán, 2020 8 Grey area A geographical and political space that hosts grey zone activities. It is often defined as an unclear situation between peace and war, in which there are challenges to face, conflicts to deal with, or unconventional demonstrations of power. Alessandro Arcobasso, 2023 Grey zone activities The political and economic actions, or other influence activities, carried out by state and non-state actors to undermine the socioeconomic and political stability of the target country, through an ambiguous but effective use of force, without meeting the standard of a military attack and its legal implications. Alessandro Arcobasso, 2023 Hybrid activities A mix of diplomatic, economic, security, information, and technological actions designed to quietly undermine democratic states and institutions […] while avoiding a traditional conflict. Lauren Speranza, 2020 Hybrid warfare A full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors […] to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict. Frank Offman, 2007 Information warfare The ability to, among other things, undermine political, economic, and social systems; carry out mass psychological campaigns against the population of a State to destabilize society and the government; and force a State to make decisions in the interests of its opponents. Timothy Thomas, 2016 Infosphere The whole system of services and documents, encoded in any semiotic and physical media, whose contents include any sort of data, information, and knowledge […] with no limitations either in size, typology, or logical structure. Luciano Floridi, 1999 The rapidly growing global network of military and commercial command, control, communications, and computer systems and networks linking information data bases and fusion centers that are accessible to the warrior anywhere, anytime, in the performance of any mission. U.S. Department of the Army, 1996 9 Intelligence Information that has been analyzed and refined so that it is useful to policymakers in making decisions specifically, decisions about potential threats to our national security. Federal Bureau of Investigation The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The activities that result in the product. The organizations engaged in such activities. U.S. DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2021 Misinformation Publishing wrong information without meaning to be wrong or having a political purpose in communicating false information. Yochai Benkler et al., 2018 Political-criminal nexus The collaboration of the political establishment with the criminal underworld. Roy Godson, 2003 Political disruption The support for anti-establishment actors in the domestic politics of the opponent for the purpose of disrupting decision-making processing and gaining a competitive advantage over the opponent. Javier Jordán, 2020 Political warfare The employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. [...] They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP – the Marshall Plan), and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare, and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states. George F. Kennan, 1948 Propaganda The information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition Propaganda The communication designed to manipulate a target population by affecting its beliefs, attitudes, or preferences in order to obtain behavior compliant with political goals of the propagandist. Yochai Benkler et al., 2018 10 Psyops Planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition Socioeconomic vulnerability The emotional and material condition of the fragility of the citizens of a country. It is linked to economic hardship or a possible loss of well-being, caused by or related to certain factors such as corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, or distrust in institutions. Each of them could correspond to a specific signal. Alessandro Arcobasso, 2023 Strategic psychological warfare The wartime use of long-range propaganda to enemies and neutrals in support of military and political operations. Central Intelligence Agency, 1949 Subversion Phenomenon consisting in the attempt to overthrow or subvert the constitutional order of the country, through conduct that can range from propaganda to terrorist acts. Italian Intelligence Glossary, 2019 Virtual societal warfare The purposeful, systematic generation and dissemination of information to produce harmful social, political, and economic outcomes in a target country by affecting beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. Michael J. Mazarr et al., 2019 War, warfare War is a hostile contest between states or other belligerents, carried on by degrees of coercion in order to achieve political objectives. Warfare is the conduct or act of engaging in war, primarily, though not exclusively by the use of military force. Munich Security Conference, 2015 White-collar crime An illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by non-physical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantages. Herbert Edelhertz, 1970 11 List of charts. Chart 1 – Connection between general research questions, hypotheses, and objectives. 37 Chart 2 – Connection between specific research questions, hypotheses, and objectives related to the general research question n. 1 (grey zone activities). ................................ 38 Chart 3 – Connection between specific research questions, hypotheses, and objectives related to the general research question n. 1 (socioeconomic vulnerability). .................. 38 Chart 4 – Connection between specific research questions, hypotheses, and objectives related to the general research question n. 2. ................................................................... 41 Chart 5 – Sequence of the chapters and reading levels. .................................................. 50 Chart 6 – Acts of intimidation against local administrators in Italy, years 2013-2022. .. 98 Chart 7 – Acts of intimidation against journalists in Italy, years 2018-2022. ................. 99 Chart 8 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 1971- 1980…... ........................................................................................................................ 113 Chart 9 – Incidence of poverty in Italy (%), years 2012-2021. ..................................... 114 Chart 10 – Italian expats, years 2012-2021. .................................................................. 116 Chart 11 – Comparison between young Italians seeking employment and NEETs (k), years 2012-2021. ........................................................................................................... 116 Chart 12 – Sample survey on trust in others, years 2012-2021. .................................... 117 Chart 13 – SWOT Analysis of the theoretical framework. ........................................... 119 Chart 14 – Análisis DAFO del marco teórico (ES). ...................................................... 121 Chart 15 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 1957- 1966…. ....................................................................................................... …………..146 Chart 16 – Natural population growth rate in Italy (%), years 1957-1966. ................... 146 Chart 17 – Italian expats, repatriates, and net migration, years 1957-1966. ................. 147 Chart 18 – Italian expats in working age (%), years 1958-1966. .................................. 148 Chart 19 – Labour disputes in Italy, years 1957-1966. ................................................. 148 12 Chart 20 – Turnout for the renewal of the Italian Parliament (%), years 1958, 1963, 1968. .............................................................................................................................. 149 Chart 21 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 1976- 1985…. .......................................................................................................................... 156 Chart 22 – Natural population growth rate in Italy (%), years 1976-1985. ................... 157 Chart 23 – Unemployment rate in Italy (%), years 1977-1985. .................................... 157 Chart 24 – Italian expats, repatriates, and net migration, years 1976-1985. ................. 158 Chart 25 – Italian expats in working age (%), years 1976-1985. .................................. 158 Chart 26 – Labour disputes in Italy, years 1976-1985. ................................................. 159 Chart 27 – Turnout for the renewal of the Italian Parliament (%), years 1976, 1979, 1983. .............................................................................................................................. 160 Chart 28 – Corruption Perception Index in Italy, years 1995-1999. ............................. 166 Chart 29 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 1990- 1999…. .......................................................................................................................... 167 Chart 30 – Natural population growth rate in Italy (%), years 1990-1999. ................... 168 Chart 31 – Unemployment rate in Italy (%), years 1990-1999. .................................... 168 Chart 32 – Italian expats, repatriates, and net migration, years 1990-1999. ................. 169 Chart 33 – Incidence of relative poverty in Italy (%), years 1990-1999. ...................... 169 Chart 34 – Labour disputes in Italy, years 1990-1999. ................................................. 170 Chart 35 – Turnout for the renewal of the Italian Parliament (%), years 1992, 1994, 1996. .............................................................................................................................. 171 Chart 36 – Corruption Perception Index in Italy, years 2013-2022. ............................. 197 Chart 37 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 2013- 2022….. ......................................................................................................................... 198 Chart 38 – Natural population growth rate in Italy (%), years 2013-2022. ................... 199 Chart 39 – Unemployment rate in Italy (%), years 2013-2022. .................................... 199 13 Chart 40 – Turnout for the renewal of the Italian Parliament (%), years 2013, 2018, 2022. .............................................................................................................................. 201 Chart 41 – Distribution of evidence related to treated case studies. .............................. 209 Chart 42 – General hypothesis no. 1 and specific hypotheses nos. 1.1-1.8. .................. 236 Chart 43 – General hypothesis no. 2 and specific hypotheses nos. 2.1-2.3. .................. 240 Chart 44 – Hipótesis general no. 1 e hipótesis específicas nos. 1.1-1.8 (ES). ............... 245 Chart 45 – Hipótesis general no. 2 e hipótesis específicas nos. 2.1-2.3 (ES). ............... 248 14 List of figures. Figure 1 – Partnerships between the Security Intelligence Department and Italian Universities. ..................................................................................................................... 29 Figure 2 – Truth Decay as a system. ............................................................................... 32 Figure 3 – GAO analysis of military concepts, briefing documents, and academic writings. ........................................................................................................................... 56 Figure 4 – Range of views on the concept of grey zone activities. ................................. 57 Figure 5 – Typologies of perception. ............................................................................... 72 Figure 6 – Combining instruments of power in hybrid conflict. ..................................... 78 Figure 7 – The Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 in EU countries. ............................. 91 Figure 8 – Crimes against the public administration in Italy between 2004 and 2022. .. 91 Figure 9 – Disinformation supply distribution in Italy by topic in 2018. ........................ 92 Figure 10 – Italians who believe to have the skills needed to recognize fake news. ...... 93 Figure 11 – Non-voters in Italy’s general elections, years 2006-2022. ........................... 95 Figure 12 – Expressions of social apathy, by age (%). .................................................... 96 Figure 13 – People’s opinion about Italy’s economic trend for the years 2016-2022 (%). .. ....................................................................................................................................... 96 Figure 14 – People’s opinion about Italy’s economic situation in the next 12 months, year 2022 (%). ................................................................................................................. 97 Figure 15 – Social Mood on Economy – Daily Index and Moving. ............................. 111 Figure 16 – Maps of the Belt and Road Initiative. ........................................................ 179 Figure 17 – Tweet of the National Security Council about Italy's participation in the BRI................................................................................................................................. 183 Figure 18 – Chen Weihua's reply to the tweet of the NSC about Italy's participation in the BRI. .......................................................................................................................... 183 Figure 19 – Quadrant Hypothesis Generation of Italy's perception. ............................. 220 15 Figure 20 – Result of the ACH. ..................................................................................... 230 List of pictures. Picture 1 – Giulio Andreotti and Francesco Cossiga at the time of the Aldo Moro case… ....................................................................................................................................... 128 Picture 2 – Enrico Mattei. .............................................................................................. 133 Picture 3 – Aldo Moro. .................................................................................................. 135 Picture 4 – Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. ..................................................... 138 Picture 5 – Enrico Mattei with Reza Pahlevi, Shah of Persia........................................ 141 Picture 6 – Remains of the aircraft on which Enrico Mattei was travelling. ................. 143 Picture 7 – Aldo Moro during his imprisonment. .......................................................... 151 Picture 8 – Aldo Moro is found dead. ........................................................................... 153 Picture 9 – Slaughter of Capaci, 23 May 1992. ............................................................. 162 Picture 10 – Slaughter of Via D'Amelio, 19 July 1992. ................................................ 163 Picture 11 – Russian military truck landing from an II-76 aircraft at Pratica di Mare airport............................................................................................................................. 187 Picture 12 – Russian military convoy in Italy. .............................................................. 188 Picture 13 – Russian specialists in bacteriological warfare. .......................................... 189 Picture 14 – Poggioreale prison during the riot of March 2020. ................................... 193 Picture 15 – Result of the vote on the motion of no-confidence against the then Minister of Justice. ....................................................................................................................... 196 16 List of tables. Table 1 – Examples of the darkest events that occurred in Italy in the period 1947- 1994.. ............................................................................................................................. 123 Table 2 – Matching between selection criteria and case studies of the past. ................ 132 Table 3 – Deductive illustration of the result achieved in Chapter 2. ........................... 173 Table 4 – Ilustración deductiva del resultado obtenido en el capítulo 2 (ES). .............. 177 Table 5 – False or inaccurate information spread during the prison riots affair of 2020… ... .................................................................................................................................... 195 Table 6 – Deductive illustration of the result achieved in Chapter 3. ........................... 203 Table 7 – Ilustración inductiva del resultado obtenido en el capítulo 3 (ES). ............... 205 Table 8 – Distribution of evidence for media sources and articles/press releases. ....... 210 Table 9 – Matrix of the evidence gathered. .................................................................. 211 Table 10 – ACH, assessment of evidence E75-E1. ....................................................... 226 Table 11 – Abductive illustration of the result achieved in Chapter 4. ......................... 232 Table 12 – Ilustración abductiva del resultado obtenido en el capítulo 4 (ES). ............ 234 17 Abstract. This thesis has two objectives. The first is to define the relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy, after having clarified the meanings of these expressions. The second objective is to show the development of an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, based on a combination of historical research, media content study, qualitative use of statistical indicators, and data analysis with free access tools. The structure and contents of this thesis are a practical application of the above scheme. The first chapter contains the results of the research conducted on several documentary sources, among which there are the scientific or informative contributions of over one hundred authors. To facilitate the reading of the text and highlight the links between some of its parts, 45 charts, 20 figures, 15 pictures, and 12 tables have been used. One of them shows two levels of reading. The first concerns the contents of the single chapters, while the second level concerns the interim conclusion. Two reasons have inspired the research on which is based this thesis. The first is the aim to establish if the darkest events that characterized Italian history, and some recent examples of foreign and criminal influence, may be attributable to those ambiguous contexts in which coexist legal and illegal practices. The above contexts are conventionally denominated grey zones and are often confused with the concepts of political warfare, hybrid warfare, virtual societal warfare, or active measures. The second reason is the aim to offer a scientific and unclassified contribution on the subject, to be attributed to the sub-field of internal security. The grey zone activities and similar concepts are usually addressed as issues of International Relations and Strategic studies, but they should also be addressed from a different perspective. Moreover, even considering all books listed in Intelligence Readings – the annotated bibliography published by Italy’s Intelligence System for the 18 Security of the Republic – it would appear that no one before has specifically looked for a connection between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in the country. Therefore, after illustrating the state of the art in the field of Intelligence and national security studies in Italy, in the introductory section, one exposes the methodological considerations about the relationship between doxa, episteme, and exercise of power; the temporal dimension of the research; the research questions, hypothesis, and objectives dealt with; the methods, techniques, and documentary sources used; the research process and the structure of the thesis. Chapter 1 is dedicated to the establishment of a theoretical framework. In detail, half of the chapter explains the meaning of ‘grey zone activities’ and ‘grey area’, as well as a long degression of similar concepts, and an overview of the vulnerability factors of a country, such as corruption, false perceptions, and inequality. Specularly, the other half of the chapter contains a conceptual approximation to the socioeconomic vulnerability, a reference to the link with Intelligence studies, and an overview of the vulnerability signals to consider, such as the significant changes in the social mood on the economy, the cost of leaving, poverty and labour disputes, or expatriations. In addition, at the end of the chapter, there is a SWOT analysis, by which were made explicit the strengths, weaknesses opportunities, and threats of the above framework. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the darkest events of the Italian First Republic. There, have been listed thirty bloody episodes that occurred between 1947 and 1994, some of which were partially declassified. Three of them are deepened along with the vulnerability factors and signals of the reference periods. The above cases are Enrico Mattei’s strategic assassination of 1962, Aldo Moro’s kidnapping and killing of 1978, and the two mafia slaughters of 1992. The result achieved will be illustrated with deductive logic. 19 Chapter 3 deals with three textbook cases of influence activity that occurred in the years 2019-2020: Italy’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, the operation ‘From Russia With Love’, and the Prison riots affair. They are deepened by reviewing the journalistic investigations, and the other articles and press releases of the reference periods, along with the vulnerability factors and signals. The result achieved will be illustrated with inductive logic. Chapter 4 contains a structured analysis of the evidence gathered during the research, referring to seventy-five articles and press releases about the six case studies above-mentioned. Among the techniques used, are the Quadrant Hypothesis Generation and the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. For the latter has been used the free software ACH 2.0. The result achieved concerns the perception of Italy as a grey area and will be illustrated with abductive logic. The main specialized terms and their meanings have been collected in the Glossary. The findings are at the end of the thesis, both in English and Spanish, as usual. They result from the confirmation of the general and specific research hypotheses. In brief, one can say that some characteristics of the grey zones, and some factors of socioeconomic vulnerability, are sides of the same coin. Therefore, they may be qualified as statistical evidence of the potential conflicts involving the cognitive domain of a country, which often result in the low turnout at the elections for the renewal of the Parliament. The bibliography is divided into two groups: References, and Articles and press releases. The first group contains references to glossaries, books, scientific articles, military reports, and analytical insights, concerning the concepts of grey zone, political warfare, information and cognitive warfare, hybrid threats, organised crime, and socioeconomic vulnerability, as well as the history of the above-mentioned darkest events, the academic study of intelligence, and the field of intelligence analysis. The 20 second group collects references to articles and press releases relating to the case studies, used as evidence in the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. The selection of the sources was made, respectively, on the basis of the importance of the authors, and the credibility and relevance of both the media and the published news. 21 Resumen (ES). Esta tesis tiene dos objetivos. El primero es definir la relación entre las actividades en la zona gris y la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica en Italia, después de haber aclarado los significados de estas expresiones. El segundo objetivo es mostrar el desarrollo de un esquema de análisis apropiado y replicable, basado en una combinación de investigación histórica, estudio de contenidos periodístico, uso cualitativo de indicadores estadísticos y análisis de datos con herramientas de libre acceso. La estructura y el contenido de esta tesis son una aplicación práctica de dicho esquema. El primer capítulo contiene los resultados de la investigación realizada con diversas fuentes documentales, entre las que se encuentran las contribuciones científicas o informativas de más de cien autores. Para facilitar la lectura del texto y destacar las relaciones entre algunas de sus partes, se han utilizado 45 gráficos, 20 figuras, 15 imágenes y 12 tablas. Uno de ellos muestra dos niveles de lectura. El primero se refiere al contenido de los capítulos individuales, mientras que el segundo nivel se refiere a las conclusiones parciales. Dos razones han inspirado la investigación en la que se basa esta tesis. El primero es establecer si los acontecimientos más oscuros que caracterizaron la historia italiana, y algunos ejemplos recientes de influencia extranjera y criminal, pueden atribuirse a esos contextos ambiguos en los que coexisten prácticas legales e ilegales. Dichos contextos se denominan convencionalmente zonas grises y a menudo se confunden con los conceptos de guerra política (political warfare), guerra híbrida (hybrid warfare), guerra social virtual (virtual societal warfare) o medidas activas (active measures). La segunda razón es el objetivo de ofrecer una contribución científica y no clasificada sobre el tema, que se atribuya al subcampo de la seguridad interior. Las actividades en la zona gris y los conceptos similares suelen abordarse como 22 cuestiones de relaciones internacionales y estudios estratégicos, pero también pueden abordarse desde una perspectiva diferente. Por otra parte, incluso considerando todos los libros enumerados en Lecturas de Inteligencia (Leggiamo l'Intelligence) – la bibliografía comentada publicada por el Sistema de Inteligencia para la Seguridad de la República Italiana – parecería que nadie antes ha buscado específicamente una conexión entre las actividades en la zona gris y la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica en el país. Por lo tanto, después de ilustrar el estado del arte en el campo de los estudios de inteligencia y seguridad nacional en Italia, en la sección introductoria, se exponen: las consideraciones metodológicas sobre la relación entre doxa, episteme y ejercicio del poder; la dimensión temporal de la investigación; las preguntas, hipótesis y objetivos de la investigación; los métodos, técnicas y fuentes documentales utilizadas; el proceso de investigación y la estructura de la tesis. El capítulo 1 está dedicado al establecimiento de un marco teórico. En detalle, en la primera mitad del capítulo se explican el significado de ‘actividades en zona gris’ y ‘área gris’, los conceptos similares y los factores de vulnerabilidad de un país, como la corrupción, las percepciones falsas y la desigualdad. La otra mitad del capítulo contiene una aproximación conceptual a la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, una referencia a la relación con los estudios de Inteligencia, y una visión general de las señales de vulnerabilidad a considerar, como los cambios significativos en el estado de ánimo sobre la economía, el coste de la vida, la pobreza, los conflictos laborales, o el número de los expatriados. Además, al final del capítulo, hay un análisis DAFO, por el cual se explicitan las debilidades, amenazas, fortalezas, y oportunidades del marco teórico. El capítulo 2 está dedicado a los eventos más oscuros de la Primera República Italiana. Allí, se han enumerado treinta episodios sangrientos que ocurrieron entre 1947 y 1994, algunos de los cuales fueron parcialmente desclasificados. Tres de ellos son analizados en profundidad junto con los factores y las señales de vulnerabilidad de los 23 períodos de referencia. Dichos casos son el asesinato estratégico de Enrico Mattei en 1962, el secuestro y asesinato de Aldo Moro en 1978 y las dos masacres de la mafia en 1992. El resultado obtenido será ilustrado con lógica deductiva, en el mismo capítulo. El capítulo 3 plantea tres casos de fundamentales sobre la actividad de influencia que se produjeron en los años 2019-2020: la participación de Italia en la Iniciativa Cinturón y Ruta de la Seda, la operación 'Desde Rusia con amor', y las revueltas en las cárceles. Se abordan revisando las investigaciones periodísticas y los demás artículos y comunicados de prensa de los períodos de referencia, junto con los factores y las señales de vulnerabilidad. El resultado obtenido se ilustrará con lógica inductiva, en el mismo capítulo. El capítulo 4 contiene un análisis estructurado de la evidencia recogida durante la investigación, en relación con setenta y cinco artículos y comunicados de prensa sobre los seis estudios de caso antes mencionados. Entre las técnicas utilizadas, se encuentran la Generación de Hipótesis Cuadrantes y el Análisis de Hipótesis Competidoras. Para esta última se ha utilizado el software libre ACH 2.0. El resultado alcanzado se refiere a la percepción de Italia como una zona gris y se ilustrará con lógica abductiva, en el mismo capítulo. Los principales términos especializados y sus significados han sido recogidos en el Glosario. Los resultados logrados se encuentran al final de la tesis, en las conclusiones, que se han redactado tanto en inglés como en español, como establece la normativa. En las Conclusiones se incorporan los que permiten la confirmación o refutación de las hipótesis generales y específicas de investigación. En síntesis, se puede decir que algunas características de las zonas grises, y algunos factores de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, son caras de la misma moneda. Por lo tanto, pueden calificarse como pruebas estadísticas de los posibles conflictos que afectan al dominio cognitivo de un 24 país, que a menudo tienen como consecuencia una baja participación en las elecciones para la renovación del Parlamento. La bibliografía se divide en dos grupos: Referencias (Referencies) y Artículos y comunicados de prensa (Articles and press releases). El primero de los grupos contiene referencias a glosarios, libros, artículos científicos, informes militares y análisis sobre los conceptos de zona gris, guerra política, guerra cognitiva e información, amenazas híbridas, crimen organizado y vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, así como sobre la historia de los eventos más oscuros antes mencionados, el estudio académico de la inteligencia y el campo del análisis de la inteligencia. El segundo de ellos colecta referencias a artículos y comunicados de prensa relativos a los casos de estudios y utilizado como indicios en el Análisis de Hipótesis Competidoras. La selección de las fuentes se realizó, respectivamente, en función de la importancia de los autores, y de la credibilidad y relevancia tanto de los medios de comunicación como de la noticia publicada. 25 INTRODUCTION: WILL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. I. Identification and relevance of the research topic. In the history of the Italian Republic, which began with the popular referendum of 1946, there have been several internal security issues which have affected, and probably still influence, the citizens’ lives and the decision-making processes. The reference is, above all, to aversive activity, criminal actions, and terrorist attacks that occurred between the late 1960s and early 1980s, which have been at the heart of parliamentary and journalistic inquiries, along with judicial proceedings and publishing initiatives. However, having regard to a wider time frame, one may realize that there is more. Between May 1947 and January 1994, for example, at least thirty episodes of slaughters of innocents, political murders, secret plots, alleged coups d’état and misdirections can be listed. Many of these events are still classified or clouded by lies and supposed truths. Others have been partially declassified and may be deepened with a little bit of patience, and some willingness. In both cases, it is necessary to deal with events seared into the national history and collective memory, for which every year there are several commemorative initiatives which involve as much of the authorities as the civil society. Enrico Mattei’s strategic assassination of 1962, and the Mafia slaughters of 1992, for example, are among them. Controversial political events, that have occurred more recently, have been added to the above-mentioned security issues of the past, making Italy look like a weak country contended by high-level state and non-state actors (Fabbri, 2020). 26 The release of about four hundred important detainees after several riots in the prisons of the country occurred in 2020, is probably the most emblematic case. Not just because it determined the resignation of the head of the Department of Penitentiary Administration, one of the Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Justice and, later, two parliamentary motions of no confidence in the Minister of Justice. The main reason consists of the potential impact on citizens' trust in institutions. Indeed, while Italian people were obliged to stay at home due to the lockdown, there were rumours concerning the role of organized crime in the prison riots affair. Meanwhile, the national press spread inaccurate information about the reason for the riots and the Government's stance, raising some concerns about the reliability of the narrative. As will be shown later, according to some academics and distinguished scholars, a permanent in-house and low-intensity conflict had divided and polarized the country. The mafia has had important responsibilities, but it has not been the only actor in this process. In more than one episode, it has become clear the involvement of intelligence services, both Italian and foreigners. A circumstance which, if it was not for the clarity of the constitutional statement, would have made it hard to frame the research context. According to the Constitution and Italian laws, the concerned activities represent a serious threat to the social and economic stability of the country. For this work, it is also necessary to highlight that, over the years, the use of warfare tools like information operations, political influence, economic coercion, legal and diplomatic measures, or cyberattacks have been detected. Yet, even considering the dynamics of the Cold War, Italy was not and is not a war zone, because the Parliament has never deliberated the state of war under Article 78 of the Constitution. Indeed, if a country is not at war, then it is, or it should be, in peace. However, in people’s perception, a context of peace does not seem compatible with propaganda, 27 disinformation, corruption, subversion, quasi-military actions, widespread poverty, or societal division. In other words, one of the reasons which have inspired this research is to establish if the above-mentioned events may be attributable to those ambiguous contexts in which coexist legal and illegal practices, conventionally denominated ‘grey zones’ and often related to the concepts of ‘political warfare’ (Kennan, 1948), ‘hybrid warfare’ (Robinson et al., 2018), “virtual societal warfare” (Mazar et al., 2019), or “active measures” (Rid, 2020). It is crucial to recognize and monitor some weak points like the poverty levels, the social mood on economy, the distrust in public institutions, or the flows of expatriation, considering that hostile activities exploit or affect the society, the economy, and the democracy of a country. In other words, was felt the need to understand which theoretical framework to refer to, to study the link between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability, namely among potential threats to national security and possible factors of instability. Assuming that this link in Italy exists, was arose the need to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, not based on the use of classified information, algorithms, or other sophisticated paid-form tools. Thus, for defining methods and levels of analysis, much attention was paid to open sources of data and Intelligence studies. Academic literature on the subject is not lacking, but it refers especially to political and military balances between the United States of America, Russia, and the People's Republic of China. Moreover, the grey zone activities and similar concepts are usually addressed as issues of International Relations and Strategic studies. On the contrary, the general objective of this research is to contribute to the sub-field of internal security. 28 Almost two decades ago, the field of Intelligence studies was not widespread, probably because of the poor culture of the State (Caligiuri, 2003). As Caligiuri and Valentini (2018) have argued, at that time national security issues were addressed as part of a dozen university courses in the fields of Political science, Criminology and Public communication, taught in the cities of Rome, Florence, Turin, Genoa, L’Aquila, and Reggio Calabria. Since then, there has been an increase in Intelligence studies which, nowadays, cover at least five subject areas: Cybersecurity, Criminology, Economic intelligence, Big data analytics and Behavioural analysis. To these, Intelligence analysis with a multidisciplinary approach is added. This renewed involvement of academia was also possible thanks to the legislative reform of 2007, which enabled the Security Intelligence Department to establish partnerships with more than twenty Italian universities (Figure 1). Interest in the above subjects has been supported by publishing and cultural initiatives. In the academic field, the first editorial series, named Public Communication and Intelligence (Comunicazione pubblica e intelligence), dates to 2002 and was promoted by the publisher Rubbettino. Furthermore, since 2009, it has been publishing several essays and collective volumes, including those of young scholars of the University of Calabria. Also worthy of mention is the publisher Aracne, which has given space to the research carried out at, or inspired by1, the prestigious Cesare Alfieri School of Political Science of the University of Florence. 1 See, for instance, Arcobasso, A. (2017): Sicurezza Economica. Intelligence, imprenditoria e programmazione per difendere l’occupazione, Canterano, Aracne. 29 Figure 1 – Partnerships between the Security Intelligence Department and Italian Universities. Source: SISR (2023), https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/cultura-della- sicurezza/collaborazione-con-le-universita/il-network-delle-collaborazioni.html To the institutional sphere belongs Gnosis, the journal of professional culture published since 2005 by the Italian Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI), balancing the scientific rigour and the need for dissemination. Initially, its name was Per Aspera ad Veritatem but, basically, today it has published interesting articles, interviews, and reviews regarding different subjects, as well as some thematic books named Notebook of Intelligence (Quaderni di Intelligence). Among the high-profile cultural initiatives that must be noted are those of the Italian Review of Geopolitics Limes, the think tank ICSA Foundation, and the Gino Germani Institute of Social Sciences and Strategic Studies. The latter periodically organized some courses in the fields of Intelligence and Counterintelligence and, more recently, has researched pro-Kremlin strategic narratives in Italy. Overall, among the most investigated topics, there are the legal aspects of national 30 security (Mosca, 2018; Valentini, 2017; Giupponi, 2010), especially the State secret (Pupo, 2018; Illuminati, 2011; Gambacurta et al., 2008); the economic and financial intelligence (Caligiuri et al., 2022; Gagliano et al., 2016; Jean and Savona, 2011); and the cyberspace (Teti, 2020; Marchetti and Mulas, 2017; Gori and Germani, 2011). In addition, there seems to be a progressive interest in disinformation and influence campaigns, also through the internet (Teti, 2023; Caligiuri, 2019; Germani, 2017; Gagliano, 2015). Surprisingly, few academics dealt with national interest (Gori and Martino, 2015; Jean and Napolitano, 2005), socioeconomic vulnerability (Corso and Talamo, 2019; Giolo and Pastore, 2018), and internal security (Ilari, 2009). Among the master’s thesis, however, there are some juxtapositions between civil defence against terrorist attacks and intelligence activities (Coscarella, 2021) or legal compliance protocols and criminal infiltration (Napoli, 2021). To find significant investigations about the notions of grey zone warfare (Beccaro, 2020) and hybrid threats (Beccaro, 2022), or about the emergencies and crises which affect civil society (Molle, 2023), attention should be paid to the Italian Center for High Defense Studies (Centro Alti Studi della Difesa - CASD). Maybe because domestic terrorism and power plots had almost entirely captured the attention of the researchers, especially that of historians (Giannuli, 2018; Macaluso, 2014; Frattini, 2013; Tranfaglia, 2011; Franzinelli, 2010; De Lutiis, 2007; De Prospo and Priore, 2001). Even considering all books listed in Intelligence Readings – the annotated bibliography published by Italy’s Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic – it would appear that no one has specifically looked for a connection between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability, offering a scientific and unclassified contribution on the subject. Therefore, a schematic and replicable approach to the internal security field, in which the similarities between historical and current events 31 had been underlined using rigorous definition, official statistics and structured analysis techniques for Intelligence analysis, should be useful to all those who aim to satisfy the need for moving closer to reality, whatever it might be. II. Methodology. During a recent study day on terrorism and grey zone2, some analysts of the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos - IEEE) have pointed out that the cognitive sphere is a space of conflict because in the society of the 21st-century people do not think, they simply inform themselves (Aznar Fernández- Montesinos, 2022). Thus, new approaches are sought to ensure that they can build their ideas, rather than being receivers of knowledge and meanings produced by others. Referring to political and civil discourse in the United States, Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael D. Rich (2018: XIII-XV) argued that contemporary society is experimenting the Truth Decay (TD), the phenomenon of diminishing role of facts and analysis, for which there are at least four causes (Figure 2): characteristics of human cognitive processing, such as cognitive bias; changes in the information system, including social media and the 24-hour news cycle; competing demands on the education system that diminish time spent on media literacy and critical thinking; and polarization, both political and demographic. 2 Live streaming of the study day, named "El terrorismo y la zona gris. El ámbito cognitivo como espacio de confrontación", organized by the Fundación de Estudios Parlamentarios y del Estado Autonòmico Manuel Giménez Abad, has been carried out on 16 November 2022. The recording is also available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iBRdKofJzE8 (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 32 Figure 2 – Truth Decay as a system. Source: RAND Corporation (2018), https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/about-truth-decay.html Therefore, if it is true that the cognitive domain concerns “the recall or recognition of knowledge” by individuals (Bloom, 1956: 7), and that the methodology of social research facilitates the knowledge of social reality (Corbetta, 2003), then some characteristics of the grey zones, and some factors of socioeconomic vulnerability, may be qualified as statistical evidence of the potential conflicts involving the cognitive domain of a country. Indeed, according to Chuliá and Agulló (2012: 62-63), “describing and explaining political phenomena, observable by data extracted from reality, is the fundamental objective of all research in Political Science”. As previously mentioned, the phenomena investigated are the internal security issues that occurred in Italy, in the past and in more recent times. Agreeing with the idea 33 that “the student of political science must be aware of multiple dimensions of reality and various approaches to problem-solving” (Kauffman, 2015:119), a multidisciplinary approach was chosen. Nevertheless, considering the Intelligence studies as an independent academic discipline (Caligiuri, 2016; Johnson, 2014; Denécé and Arboit, 2012; Krieger, 2004; Andrew, 1985; Kent, 1949), we are dealing with a single-subject approach. In this respect, the research process has been structured in several stages, considering the recommendations provided by Professor Rafael Calduch Cervera in Métodos y técnicas de investigación internacional, especially the distinction between identification of the research topic, search for documents and information, interpretation of them, explanation, and application of the results. Concerning the identification of the research topic, Professor Calduch (2014: 11) argued that is convenient to give maximum attention and time to this phase of the research process, because it is the most important of the whole process: La determinación del tema de investigación constituye, sin duda, la parte inicial y la más importante de todo el proceso de investigación, ya que su correcta o errónea resolución va a condicionar todo el trabajo realizado con posterioridad. Conviene, por tanto, conceder la máxima atención y tiempo a esta fase del proceso investigador […] Therefore, his recommendation about the determination of the plot of reality to be investigated (“¿QUÉ? se quiere conocer o investigar”), the personal motivations and conditioning which drive one to conduct the research (“¿POR QUÉ?”), as well as the scientific and practical purposes of it (“¿PARA QUÉ?”), and the type of knowledge, perspective and intrinsic limitations affecting the process (“¿CÓMO?”) were carefully considered. In detail, one tried to combine the three types of knowledge mentioned by Calduch: description of the state of the art (“conocimiento superficial”), summary and 34 analysis of information and data gathered (“conocimiento en profundidad”), and use of new techniques (“conocimiento innovador”) for the chosen field of research. In writing this doctoral thesis, two elements were also considered: what message the reader should take away; and how to present the analysis (Pherson y Pherson, 2013), wishing its future dissemination. a. Doxa, episteme and exercise of power. Greek philosophy teaches that there is an important difference between what we believe and what we know. In the first case, we deal with doxa, which is changeable and uncertain. In the latter case, we reach a certain and incontrovertible knowledge, called episteme. However, in everyday life, this dichotomy is quite nuanced, and perception seems to have taken over the knowledge. For example, according to Gustave Flaubert, one of the leading exponents of literary realism, there is no truth, there is only perception (Steegmuller, 1982). In the field of marketing, “perception is reality” was one of the recurring slogans attributed to the American political strategist Lee Atwater, whose tactics helped Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush to become president (Olsø, 2021). If we turn our attention to the field of Philosophy of information, about the notion of the infosphere, we see that perception of knowledge may also affect reality or build it (Floridi, 2014). Infodemic is a case in point. As highlighted by the World Health Organization on its website3, during the Covid-19 pandemic an excess of information, including false or misleading information, spread in digital and physical environments. It has caused confusion and risk-taking behaviours, led to mistrust in health authorities, and 3 See: https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 35 undermined the public health response. In other words, in that context, the distinction between doxa and episteme lost its meaning. Considering that disinformation, misinformation and state secrecy are ways of power exercise which make it harder to achieve a certain knowledge of reality, compared to the traditional dichotomy between doxa and episteme, it has been chosen a more pragmatic approach: moving closer to the reality of the facts investigated, for lack of all the pieces of the puzzle. The use of “power” here refers to “the ability to achieve one’s purposes by affecting the behaviour of others” (Nye, 2008: 30), often combining hard/command and soft/co-optive power4, which distinction, according to Joseph S. Nye Jr., in the real world is one degree. Disinformation refers to the NATO view as “the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead”, available on its website5. Misinformation, rather, refers to “publishing wrong information without meaning to be wrong or having a political purpose in communicating false information” (Benkler et al., 2018: 24). For convenience, these and other useful definitions have been collected in the Glossary. b. Temporal dimensions. Michel Foucault (1986: 22) argued that “space itself has a history in Western experience, and it is not possible to disregard the fatal intersection of time with space”. The spatial coordinates of this research are imprinted in the title of the thesis and 4 In Nye, J.S. Jr. (2008): The Powers to lead, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 30, is underlined that: «Command power - the ability to change what others do - can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power - the ability to shape what others want - can rest on the attractiveness of one’s values or the ability to set the agenda of political choices». 5 See: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 36 coincide with the territory of the Italian Republic. Temporal coordinates, however, depend on each stage of research. For the literature review, for example, it was considered the period between the late 1940s and today. The first definition of political warfare, in fact, dates to 1948 and was written by George F. Kennan, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, in the top-secret report entitled The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare. For reconstructing the most striking episodes of the so-called First Republic6, was considered the period between the first of May 1947 and the 23 January 1994 because these dates coincide, respectively, with the first mafia-political slaughter and the failed attempted bombing at the Olympic Stadium of Rome. After that date, a new political season was begun. In detail, for each darkest event deepened, were analysed the economic data of the reference decade: 1957-1966, 1976-1985, and 1990-1999. The most recent and controversial political events here examined, occurred in 2020, but the facts investigated took place in the period 2018-2021. Two of them concern the Chinese and Russian influence activities in Italy. The third concerns the influence of organised crime groups. Moreover, the economic data analysed refers to the years 2013- 2022. c. Research questions, hypotheses, and objectives. Along the lines of the classification presented by Professor Rafael Calduch Cervera in Métodos y técnicas de investigación internacional (2014), the hypotheses have been organized according to their importance. There are two general hypotheses (Chart 1) which are linked to some specific hypotheses, and all of them refer to research questions and objectives (Charts 2, 3 and 4). 6 Journalistic expression that identifies the period between 1948 and 1993, when Parliament was elected with the proportional electoral system. 37 Chart 1 – Connection between general research questions, hypotheses, and objectives. Research questions. The research questions are the following. 1. What is the relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy? 1.1 What does the term ‘grey zone activities’ mean? 1.2 Are there similar concepts, linked to national security? 1.3 To which field of study do these activities belong? 1.4 How are grey zone activities related to the vulnerabilities of a country? 1.5 What does the term ‘socioeconomic vulnerability’ mean? 1.6 Are there similar concepts, linked to potential instability? 1.7 To which field of study does this vulnerability belong? 1.8 How is socioeconomic vulnerability related to the concept of grey zone activities? 2. To study this relationship, is it possible to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, not based on the use of classified information, algorithms, or other sophisticated paid-form tools? General research questions • 1. What is the relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy? • 2. To study these relationship, is it possible to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, not based on the use of classified information, algorithms, or other sophisticated paid-form tools? General hypotheses • 1. There is a relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy. • 2. It is possible to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis studying historical examples, media contents and open-source data with free access tools. General objectives • 1. Defining the relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy. • 2. Developing an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, based on historical research, media content study, and data analysis with free access tools. 38 2.1 Is there any historical example of grey zone activity in Italy which can be analysed? 2.2 Have there been examples of grey zone activities in Italy recently? 2.3 Is there any condition to perceive Italy as a grey area, based on the evidence gathered? Chart 2 – Connection between specific research questions, hypotheses, and objectives related to the general research question n. 1 (grey zone activities). Chart 3 – Connection between specific research questions, hypotheses, and objectives related to the general research question n. 1 (socioeconomic vulnerability). Specific research questions • 1.1 What does the term ‘grey zone activities’ mean? • 1.2 Are there similar concepts, linked to national security? • 1.3 To which field of study do these activities belong? • 1.4 How are grey zone activities related to the vulnerabilities of a country? Specific hypotheses • 1.1 There is no single definition of grey zone activities. • 1.2 There are other concepts like grey zone activities, linked to national security. • 1.3 Grey zone activities belong to the field of Intelligence studies. • 1.4 Some characteristics of the grey zone activities are related to some indicators of the vulnerability of a country. Specific objectives • 1.1 Clarifying the meaning of grey zone activities. • 1.2 Exploring the similarities whit other concepts to understand if there is a link between grey zone activities and threats to national security. • 1.3 Establishing to which field of studies the grey zone activities belong. • 1.4 Highlighting how grey zone activities are related to the vulnerabilities of a country. Specific research questions • 1.5 What does the term ‘socioeconomic vulnerability’ mean? • 1.6 Are there similar concepts, linked to potential instability? • 1.7 To which field of study does this vulnerability belong? • 1.8 How is socioeconomic vulnerability related to the concept of grey zone activities ? Specific hypotheses • 1.5 There is no single definition of socioeconomic vulnerability. • 1.6 There are other concepts like socioeconomic vulnerability, linked to potential instability. • 1.7 Socioeconomic vulnerability belongs to the field of Intelligence studies. • 1.8 Some indicators of the socioeconomic vulnerability are related to some characteristics of the grey zone activities. Specific objectives • 1.5 Clarifying the meaning of socioeconomic vulnerability. • 1.6 Exploring the similarities with other concepts, to understand if there is a link between socioeconomic vulnerability and potential instability. • 1.7 Establishing to which field of studies the socioeconomic vulnerability belongs to. • 1.8 Highlighting how the socioeconomic vulnerability is related to the concept of grey zone activities. 39 Hypotheses. The hypotheses are the following. 1. There is a relationship between grey zone activities and socio-economic vulnerability in Italy. 1.1 There is no single definition of grey zone activities. 1.2 There are other concepts like grey zone activities, linked to national security. 1.3 Grey zone activities belong to the field of Intelligence studies. 1.4 Some characteristics of the grey zone activities are related to some indicators of the vulnerability of a country. 1.5 There is no single definition of socioeconomic vulnerability. 1.6 There are other concepts like socioeconomic vulnerability, linked to potential instability. 1.7 Socioeconomic vulnerability belongs to the field of Intelligence studies. 1.8 Some indicators of socioeconomic vulnerability are related to some characteristics of the grey zone activities. 2. It is possible to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis by studying historical examples, media contents and open-source data with free access tools. 2.1 In the history of the Italian Republic, there is at least one case of grey zone activity which can be analysed. 2.2 Recently, in Italy, there has been at least one example of grey zone activity. 2.3 Italy could be perceived as a grey area. Objectives. The objectives are the following. 40 1. Defining the relationship between grey zone activities and socio-economic vulnerability in Italy. 1.1 Clarifying the meaning of grey zone activities. 1.2 Exploring the similarities with other concepts to understand if there is a link between grey zone activities and threats to national security. 1.3 Establishing to which field of studies the grey zone activities belong. 1.4 Highlighting how grey zone activities are related to the vulnerabilities of a country. 1.5 Clarifying the meaning of socio-economic vulnerability. 1.6 Exploring the similarities with other concepts, to understand if there is a link between socioeconomic vulnerability and potential instability. 1.7 Establishing to which field of studies the socioeconomic vulnerability belongs. 1.8 Highlighting how the socio-economic vulnerability is related to the concept of grey zone activities. 2. Developing an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, based on historical research, media content study, and data analysis. 2.1 Identifying, understanding, and obtaining information and data from at least a historical example of grey zone activity in Italy. 2.2 Identifying, understanding, and obtaining information and data from at least a recent example of grey zone activity in Italy. 2.3 Analysing the “evidence” to understand if Italy could be perceived as a grey area. 41 Chart 4 – Connection between specific research questions, hypotheses, and objectives related to the general research question n. 2. d. Methods, techniques, and documentary sources. Methods. For this doctoral research, different methods were used, starting from the descriptive one, which for Calduch (2014: 29) consists of making a narrative, numerical and/or graphic exposition of the reality investigated, as detailed and comprehensive as possible: El método descriptivo. Consiste en realizar una exposición narrativa, numérica y/o gráfica, lo más detallada y exhaustiva posible de la realidad que se investiga. El objetivo de este método es disponer de un primer conocimiento de la realidad tal y como se desprende de la observación directa que realiza el investigador y/o del conocimiento que ha adquirido a través de las informaciones indirectas obtenidas. Por tanto, se trata de un método cuya finalidad es obtener, interpretar y presentar, con el máximo rigor o exactitud posible, la información sobre una realidad de acuerdo con ciertos criterios Specific research questions • 2.1 Is there any historical example of grey zone activity in Italy which can be analysed? • 2.2 Have there been examples of grey zone activities in Italy, recently? • 2.3 Is there any condition to perceive Italy as a grey area, based on the evidence gathered? Specific hypotheses • 2.1 In the history of the Italian Republic there is at least one case of grey zone activity which can be analysed. • 2.2 Recently, in Italy, there has been at least one example of grey zone activity. • 2.3 Italy could be perceived as a grey area. Specific objectives • 2.1 Identifying, understanding, and obtaining information and data from at least a historical example of grey zone activity in Italy. • 2.2 Identifying, understanding, and obtaining information and data from at least a recent example of grey zone activity in Italy. • 2.3 Analysing the evidence gathered to understand if Italy could be perceived as a grey area. 42 previamente establecidos por cada ciencia (tiempo, espacio, características formales, características funcionales, efectos producidos, etc.). This method has been particularly useful for obtaining, interpreting, and presenting the literature and data about grey zone activities, socioeconomic vulnerability, and related concepts. Moreover, it has also been used to illustrate the case studies of the second and third chapters. The analytical method, together with the descriptive, has been used to distinguish and classify some characteristics of the grey zone activities, and some indicators of the socioeconomic vulnerability. According to Calduch (2014: 30), it uses the general description of a reality to distinguish, know and classify its essential elements and the relationships they maintain between them: El método analítico. Utiliza la descripción general de una realidad para realizar la distinción, conocimiento y clasificación de sus elementos esenciales y las relaciones que mantienen entre sí. Se basa en el supuesto de que a partir del conocimiento general de la totalidad de un suceso o realidad podemos conocer y explicar las características de cada una de sus partes y de las relaciones que existen entre ellas. Ello presupone que en el proceso de descomposición del todo en sus partes la pérdida de información no es esencial, pero esta presunción no es del todo correcta. Con frecuencia, existe una pérdida de información esencial con respecto a los elementos dinámicos de la realidad, pues estos no siempre se pueden desagregar sin afectar a su funcionamiento, así como a la forma en que se producen las variaciones en la realidad a lo largo del tiempo (dinámica), y en todo caso, el modo en que se lleva a cabo la desagregación está directamente condicionado por los criterios de periodificación (medición del tiempo) que hayamos adoptado. Starting from the evidence gathered about the investigated events, the synthetic method has been used in the final chapter to understand if Italy could be perceived as a grey area. In fact, according to Calduch, (2014: 31), with this method one may try to 43 achieve a general and simplified knowledge of the reality investigated, beginning with the knowledge, its essential and indispensable elements, and the relationships between them: El método sintético. Es el método que parte del conocimiento de los elementos esenciales e imprescindibles de una realidad y de las relaciones que los vinculan para tratar de alcanzar un conocimiento general y simplificado de dicha realidad considerada como un todo. Descansa en la idea de que el todo puede ser comprendido y explicado mediante la conjunción del conocimiento de sus partes fundamentales. Ello nos facilita el conocimiento tanto de la estructura como de la dinámica interna de una realidad internacional como una totalidad, permitiéndonos tener una visión simplificada, aunque suficiente, del conjunto de esa realidad. Therefore, thanks to the combination of the three above-mentioned methods, it has been possible to find an answer for each research question, verifying the related hypotheses. Techniques. For this empirical research, different indirect techniques have been used. In particular, the initial aim of clarifying the meaning of grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability has been pursued with the use of documents, such as academic books and articles, military publications, and journalistic investigations. Considering that: official statistics focus on geographic areas; data provide empirical material for the study of innumerable social phenomena (Corbetta, 2003); and this research is circumscribed both geographically and temporally; the need for a quantitative description of actions, behaviours, and facts to match, has been satisfied with time series of data and recent public surveys. 44 The only exception for using indirect research techniques is represented by participant observation in the team of academics and scholars of the Department of International Relations of the University of Palermo, which every year takes part in the Italian panel at the Cambridge International Symposium of Economic Crime, held at the University of Cambridge, and lead by Professor Antonello Miranda. Thanks to this experience, the author of this doctoral thesis presented some partial results to the 37th and 38th edition of the above-mentioned symposium, with two speeches entitled Rethinking political warfare in Italy: a bottom-up approach7, and Mafia and Misinformation in Italy. In November 2019, at the I International Conference on Security and Defence Policies of the Complutense University of Madrid, held under the direction of Professor Concepción Anguita Olmedo, he gave also the presentation entitled Guerra política y vulnerabilidad socioeconómica en Italia: percepciones y propuestas. It is added that, after attending courses and conferences in the field of national security, a research paper entitled The Socioeconomic Vulnerability of Italy: evidence, perceptions and hypotheses was written, with the aim of self-evaluate the analytical skills acquired until then, as well as the suitability for publication of the related contents8. Documentary sources. For this research, were used two types of documentary sources: primary and secondary. 7 Arcobasso, A. (2023): "Rethinking political warfare in Italy: a bottom-up approach", Journal of Financial Crime, 30(2), pp. 437-452, https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-11-2019-0139 (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 8 Arcobasso, A. (2021): La vulnerabilità socioeconomica dell’Italia: evidenze, percezioni e ipotesi, Roma, Istituto Gino Germani di Scienze Sociale e Studi Strategici, https://fondazionegermani.org/wp- content/uploads/2021/08/lavulnerabilitasocioeconomicadellItalia.pdf (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 45 To the category of primary sources belong the laws and regulations produced by international and national institutions like the European Union and the Italian Parliament, to which are added other normative documents produced by intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations and NATO. Among them, there are the Treaty on European Union, the Italian Constitution, Law no. 124 of 2007 about Italy’s Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic and New Provisions Governing Secrecy, the Charter of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 1970, and the North Atlantic Treaty. To the category of secondary sources belong, above all, glossaries, books, scientific articles, military reports, and analytical insights, concerning the serious and acute threats to the stability of any country, posed by state and non-state actors, below the threshold of war, intending to undermine public trust in government institutions, and maintaining a high level of deniability. The most useful glossaries were the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP- 06, edition 2021, and the Italian Intelligence Glossary, edition 2019. Among the bibliographical collections, were particularly useful Intelligence Readings – A briefly annotated bibliography on Intelligence, its history, key figures, and disciplines, edited by the Italian Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic, and Terrorism and Slaughters – Tools for the study of political violence in Italy between the years Sixty and Eighty, published by the Tuscany Region. Regarding the concept of grey zone, among others, shall be mentioned the publications of Michael J. Mazarr (2015), Hal Brands (2016), Antulio J. Echevarria (2016), Josep Baqués (2017), Kathleen H. Hicks (2019), Melissa Dalton (2019), Lyle J. Morris (2019), Andrea Beccaro (2020), Donald Stoker (2020), Craig Whiteside (2020), David Carment (2020), Dani Belo (2020), Thomas Dobbs (2020), and Javier Jordán (2020). Many of the above publications are related to some centres for high defence 46 studies or distinguished policy research organizations, such as the United States Army War College (USAWC), the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE), the Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CEMISS), the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the RAND Corporation. Concerning the concept of political warfare, which is considered the forerunner of grey zone conflict, shall be mentioned the publications of George F. Kennan (1948), Paul A. Smith Jr. (1989), Carnes Lord (1989), Frank R. Barnett (1989), John J. Pitney, Jr. (2000), Kaeten Ministry (2006), Lowell H. Schwartz (2009), Thomas G. Mahnken (2018), and Thomas Rid (2020). For information and cognitive warfare, among others, were considered Ladislav Bittman (1972), Martin C. Libicki (1995), Frank L. Goldstein (1996), Benjamin F. Findley (1996), Jonathan Auerbach (2013), Russ Castronovo (2013), Luciano Floridi (2013), Timothy L. Thomas (2016), Luigi Sergio Germani (2017), Yochai Benkler (2018), Oliver Backes (2019), Andrew Swab (2019), Andrew M. Guess (2020), Benjamin A. Lyons (2020), and Elizabeth Fry (2022). Regarding hybrid threats as a concept, however, were considered Frank G. Hoffman (2007), Williamson Murray (2012), Peter R. Mansoor (2012), Hall Gardner (2015), Christopher S. Chivvis (2017), Andrew Radin (2017), Robert Johnson (2017), Ofer Fridman (2018), Magnus Normark (2019), Massimiliano Di Pasquale (2020), Brin Najžer (2020), Lauren Speranza (2020), and Tim Sweijs (2021). Concerning the infiltration of organised crime into the legal economy and public institutions, among others, were considered Herbert Edelhertz (1970), Roy Godson (2003), Dina Siegel (2012), Henk van de Bunt (2012), Tom Vander Beken (2014), Letizia Paoli (2014), Antonio La Spina (2014), Phil Williams (2014), Mark Galeotti (2017), Michele Riccardi (2018), Elena Conde (2020), Concepción Anguita Olmedo 47 (2020), Giancarlo Caselli (2020) and Guido Lo Forte (2020). In addition, the annual reports of the Anti-Mafia Investigation Division (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia – DIA), and Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic have been used. With respect to the academic study of intelligence, among others, have been considered Donald C. Watt (1988), Wolfgang Krieger (2004), Loch K. Johnson (2007), Stephen Marrin (2009), Eric Denécé (2010), Robert Dover (2014), Manuel Moyano (2014), Gustavo Díaz Matey (2015), Anthony Glees (2015), Mario Caligiuri (2016), Peter Gill (2016), Liam E. Pascovich (2017), Francis Gearon (2020), and Władysław Bułhak (2020). Regarding the field of Intelligence analysis, shall be mentioned, among others, the publications of Sherman Kent (1949), James S. Major (2009), Thomas Fingar (2011), Anthony Olcott (2012), Mark Phythian (2013), Charles Vandepeer (2014), Richards J. Heuer Jr. (2015), Peter C. Oleson (2016), Luciano Bozzo (2017), Karl Spielman (2018), Robert M. Clark (2019), Mark M. Lowenthal (2020), Aleksandra Bielska (2020), and Stig Stenslie (2022). Concerning the concept of socioeconomic vulnerability shall be mentioned the publications of Jorge Nef (1999), Ethan Ligon (2002), Laura Schechter (2002), Lino Briguglio (2004), Gordon Cordina (2004), Emanuela C. Del Re (2009), Piergiorgio Donatelli (2016), Orsetta Giolo (2018), Maria G. Bernardini (2018), Baldassare Pastore (2018), Lucia Corso (2019), Giuseppina Talamo (2019), and Piergiorgio Morosini (2020). In addition, it has been used above all information and data published by the statistical office of the European Union (EUROSTAT), the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), and the Study Centre for Social Investments (Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali – CENSIS) which, since 1967, elaborates the Annual Report on the social situation of the country. 48 With respect to the historical case studies investigated and their geopolitical context, among others, shall be mentioned the publications of Virgilio Ilari (1994), Gustavo Selva (2003), Eugenio Marcucci (2003), Rita Di Giovacchino (2005), Giuseppe De Lutiis (2007), Mario José Cereghino (2011), Nico Perrone (2012), Giacomo Pacini (2014), Giovanni Fasanella (2014), Stefania Limiti (2017), Mario Caligiuri (2022), Romano Benini (2023), Aldo Giannuli (2023), and Vincenzo Scotti (2023). In addition, the documents of the related Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry and some renowned audiovisual sources have been used. For examining the most recent and controversial political events, however, the press review of the major Italian newspaper was carried out. Among them, there are the Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, Il Sole 24 Ore, La Stampa, Il Messaggero, Il Giornale, Avvenire. Among the national online newspapers, shall be mentioned Il Fatto Quotidiano, Fanpage, Ansa, TgCom24, Il Giornale, Leggo, Il Post. For realizing the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, it has been used the free tool ACH 2.09, developed at the Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), with the advice of Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson. e. Research process and structure of the thesis. Considering the methodological choices set out above, the research has been structured in various stages, offering different reading levels (Chart 5). Each research phase corresponds to a chapter of this doctoral thesis. In the first stage, after reviewing the literature about the grey zones, the socioeconomic vulnerability, and the related concepts, some qualifying factors have been defined. To each of them, some surveys and statistical indicators have been matched 9 See: https://ach1.software.informer.com/2.0 (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 49 (Reading level 1, part 1). After that, it has been carried out an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the framework (Reading level 2, part 1), both in English (SWOT) and Spanish (DAFO). The first chapter deals with this stage. In the second stage, the darkest events of the so-called First Republic (1948-1994) were reconstructed, to understand which of them could be analysed. Some of them are still classified or partially declassified, but this does not diminish the research because the treatment of the available information was very strict. Thus, for the selected case studies, has been searched a match between the qualitative-quantitative elements of the framework and historical statistics (Reading level 1, part 2). The result achieved at this stage has been illustrated with deductive logic (Reading level 2, part 2). The second chapter deals with this stage. In this regard, it should be noted that the selection of the above case studies was based on some criteria considered to be useful in identifying three meaningful and representative events, concerning both the complexity of the issue and the range of the time frame. The chosen criteria were the availability of publications about the topic; the discussion into at least a technical, parliamentary, or judicial inquiry, plus a judicial trial on the topic; the periodic organisation of commemorative initiatives which involve as much the authorities as the civil society; the current value of the study, attested by the production of movies, drama series, documentaries, in-depth articles, or audiovisual material freely accessible online. In the third stage, the most recent cases have been examined and, for each of them, media content research has been carried out to obtain data with which evaluating the perception of Italy as a grey area. In this stage too, for selected case studies, has been searched a match between the qualitative-quantitative elements of the framework and recent statistics, also for verifying the similarities with the past (Reading level 1, part 3). The results achieved at this stage have been illustrated with the inductive logic (Reading level 2, part 3). The third chapter deals with this stage. In this regard, it should be noted 50 that there was no need for any selection criteria because of the uniqueness of the three case studies treated. In the fourth stage, data and information previously gathered, organized, and evaluated have been used for the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses to reach a clear assessment of the evidence, and an objective conclusion about the hypothesis to perceive Italy as a grey area (Reading level 1, part 4). The result achieved at this stage has been illustrated with the abductive logic (Reading level 2, part 4). The fourth chapter deals with this stage. Interim conclusions can be found at the end of each chapter. The findings are at the end of the thesis, both in English and Spanish. It should be also noted that to facilitate the reading of the text and highlight the links between some of its parts, 45 charts, 20 figures, 15 pictures, and 12 tables have been used. Chart 5, for instance, could be useful to understand which are the two above-mentioned levels of reading. Chart 5 – Sequence of the chapters and reading levels. Reading level 1 Reading level 2 Source: Own elaboration. CHAPTER 4 Analysis of competing hypotheses Abductive illustration of the result achieved CHAPTER 3 Analysis of recent cases Inductive illustration of the result achieved CHAPTER 2 Analysis of historical cases Deductive illustration of the result achieved CHAPTER 1 Literature review, surveys, and statistical indicators SWOT Analysis of the framework 51 CHAPTER 1 - GREY ZONE ACTIVITIES AND SOCIOECONOMIC VULNERABILITY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. It is common knowledge that, to define a theoretical framework, a literature review must be done, but it is also known that different authors could attribute different meanings to the same literal expressions. For this reason, to provide an answer to the general question no. 1 (What is the relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability?), almost exclusively the publications of high-profile authors, deemed more pertinent to the topics investigated, were consulted. The starting point was the hypothesis that a connection between them exists and should be sought in those activities visible only to a few, carried out by state and non- state actors to undermine the socioeconomic and political stability of a target country. This is, in fact, the resort to tactics usually used by intelligence and security services to exploit the weaknesses of a State or the emotional and material fragilities of its citizens. These fragilities, or vulnerabilities, can be observed from two perspectives – the offensive and the defensive one – using specific surveys and statistical indicators. Therefore, in the first case reference was made to the ‘vulnerability factors’ of a country, equated to pressure points exploitable by attackers. In the second case, however, reference was made to the ‘vulnerability signals’ of the given socioeconomic context. Finally, confirming the leading hypothesis, the concepts of ‘grey zone activities’ and ‘socioeconomic vulnerability’ were clarified. The corresponding definitions (own elaboration) can be found in Paragraph no. 1.9, and in the Glossary. 52 1.1 Towards the understanding of grey zone activities. The aim of this paragraph, and the following sub-paragraphs, is to provide an answer to the research question no. 1.1 (What does the term ‘grey zone activities’ mean?), taking inspiration from the work of some of the most authoritative academics, scholars, and professionals. Paraphrasing Anatole France (1891), the French poet and novelist who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1921, it can be said that a dictionary is the book par excellence: all the others are already inside it, just take them out. Indeed, the attempt at clarifying the literal expression “grey zone activities” started from the English dictionaries. According to the Cambridge dictionary, the grey zones are “activities by a state that are harmful to another state and are sometimes considered to be acts of war, but are not legally acts of war”10, while a “grey area” is described as “a situation that is not clear or where the rules are not known”11. The Collins dictionary provides only a definition of “grey area” – or US “gray area” – as a “part of something existing between two extremes and having mixed characteristics of both”12. In the dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy (Real Academia Española), however, there is no one of these terms13, while in the Italian online dictionary and encyclopaedia Treccani they are used to describe ambiguous situations in other fields14. As shown in the following pages, the literature review reflects a similar dynamic: grey zones or areas are often defined as unclear situations between peace and war, in 10 See: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/grey-zone (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 11 See: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/grey-area (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 12 See: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/grey-area (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 13 See: https://dle.rae.es/zona%20gris (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 14 See: https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/ricerca/zona-grigia (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 53 which there are challenges to face, conflicts to deal with or unconventional demonstrations of power. 1.1.1 The meaning of grey zone activities in the Anglo-American and European studies. For the concerned branch of studies, the starting point is the research report entitled Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War, published by the RAND Corporation, in which Lyle J. Morris et al. (2019: 8) argue that: The gray zone is an operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attribution for events. In Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict, Michael J. Mazarr, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, points out the blurriness of the parting line between peace and war, and between civilian and military activities. Notably, he believes (2015: 62) that grey zone “campaigns” are: The use of civilian instruments to achieve objectives sometimes reserved for military capabilities. They place all of society at risk and create a sense of ongoing conflict, even if not through the deployment of traditional military formations to seize territory. Gray zone campaigns thus continue the tendency of various forms of conflict, terrorism, insurgency, and nuclear threats included to make civilian populations a regular target. The definition provided by Mazarr highlights the risks for society, and the weird sense of permanent conflict which takes place, for example, in Italy. In addition, within 54 the same work, after having specified that grey zone conflicts cannot be considered as acts of war, Mazarr summarises the reasons for this: there is no clearly defined battlefield, they are not primarily conducted by military forces and do not usually provide for bloodshed. Even if the report of Mazarr is frequently considered the key academic text, Donald J. Stoker and Craig A. Whiteside (2017: 18-19) claim that “it does not provide a sufficiently clear definition of the grey zone”, also because of “the failure of analysts and policy makers to understand the difference between war and peace, and the frequent conflation of acts of subversion, harassment, and espionage among countries nominally and legally at peace”. According to Professor Hal Brands (2016), grey zone activities are ambiguous, aggressive, and “deliberated design to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflicts and open interstate war”. The 35th U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence, Kathleen H. Hicks (2019), defines the grey zone as “the space between routine statecraft and direct open warfare”. Professor Javier Jordán (2020: 2), likewise, argue that: The gray zone is neither peaceful relations nor armed conflict. In gray zone conflict, strategic competition between two or more states (with their respective conflict dyads) takes place below the threshold of armed conflict. Ambiguity is a distinctive element of the concept under consideration, on which many authors dwell. Professor Josep Baqués (2017), for instance, refers to operations and scenarios on the limit between legality and illegality, identifying the grey zone as a context between peace and war, characterized by a trend towards the increasing hybridization of risks, threats or conflicts. 55 In Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone, pointing out that “Cold War was a 45-year-long Gray Zone struggle”, General (ret.) Joseph L. Votel et al. (2016: 102) argue that the context at issue is a “competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war”. In a recent CSIS report, Melissa G. Dalton et al. (2019: 2), specify that their study team uses the following definition of grey zone challenges: An effort or series of efforts intended to advance one’s security objectives at the expense of a rival using means beyond those associated with routine statecraft and below means associated with direct military conflict between rivals. In engaging in a gray zone approach, an actor seeks to avoid crossing a threshold that results in open war. The aim of finding a clear definition of grey zone activities, sadly, is hampered by the juxtaposition of other concepts, which will be explored in specific paragraphs. Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II (2016: 5), for instance, evokes a Venn diagram (Figure 3) made by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) – based on military concepts, briefing documents, and academic writings – to describe grey zones as the overlap between regular and irregular conflicts, and refers to them as a synonym of hybrid warfare (HW). The careful scholar of the Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies, Andrea Beccaro, referring to the notion of grey zone warfare (GZW), highlights the similarity with HW and explains why, according to him, the use of these terms as synonyms is a mistake. In detail, Beccaro (2020: 13-14) argues that: HW is more related to the battlefield, focuses on kinetic operations and after all describes a tactic that a group can employ to achieve its goals. Gray Zone Warfare, despite the fact that its definition is as vague as that of HW, is less kinetic, is more related to politics and strategy and describe a strategic approach that encompasses both violent and nonviolent operations. 56 Figure 3 – GAO analysis of military concepts, briefing documents, and academic writings. Source: Echevarria II, A.J. (2016), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/425 In their research on conflict management, Professors David Carment and Dani Belo (2020: 23), of the Canadian School of International Affairs, illustrate the involvement of state and non-state actors in the grey zones, and their link with hybrid warfare: In gray-zone conflicts, it is unclear whether state and nonstate actors clearly understand their own long-term goal for engagement with opponents. In gray-zone conflicts, unconventional operations, and the increasing inseparability of civilian and military spheres, facilitate “situational ambiguity,” which states utilize to their advantage. Furthermore, equally useful is the contribution offered by some scholars of the Australian Defence College. Indeed, in Grey-Zone Activities and the ADF. A Perry Group Report, Thomas Dobbs et al. (2020) state the meaning of ‘grey zone activities’ as coercive statecraft actions short of war, show the wide range of views about it (Figure 4), and argue that the term under consideration is the successor of ‘political warfare’, as well as an element of hybrid warfare. 57 Figure 4 – Range of views on the concept of grey zone activities. Source: Dobbs, T. et al. (2020), https://theforge.defence.gov.au/perry-group-papers/grey-zone 1.1.2 Characteristics and line of actions of the grey zone activities. The literature review gave an overview of the main characteristics of the grey zone activities. Albeit with some differences, evaluations of the authors cited are substantially convergent, especially on the exploitation of the target vulnerabilities. However, not all of them provide a schematic list. In this regard, Morris et al. (2019) argue that there are eight typical aspects of these activities, listed below: 1) Remain below the threshold of a military response. 2) Gradual development over time. 3) Lack of attributability. 4) Alternatively, use of extensive legal and political justifications. 5) Stop before threatening the defender's vital or existential interests. 6) Use of the risk of escalation as a source of coercive leverage. 7) Prevalent use of nonmilitary tools. 8) Target specific vulnerabilities or discover weaknesses of the target country. According to Mazarr (2015), characteristics of the grey zone activities are essentially four: 1) Pursue political objectives through integrated campaigns. 58 2) Employ mostly non-military or non-kinetic tools. 3) Strive to remain under key escalatory thresholds to avoid outright warfare. 4) Move gradually towards its objectives rather than seeking decisive results in a short period. For Baqués (2017) there are five main features to consider: 1) Attempt to force the international status quo. 2) Be a coercive means. 3) Ambiguity. 4) Use of covert or clandestine operations. 5) Long-term planning of the objectives. Votel et al. (2016: 102), on the contrary, do not provide a list of typical aspects but define these activities as “characterized by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition”. Similarly, Carment and Belo (2016: 23) affirm that “low intensity is one of the key characteristics”. Referring to the United States adversaries, Morris et al. (2019: 16) highlight that Russia’s grey zone activities are “broken down along military measures, information operations, cyberattacks, legal and diplomatic measures, economic coercion, and political influence”, while those of China are mainly carried out through military intimidation, paramilitary activities, manipulation of borders, information operations, lawfare, and economic measures. According to them, information operations15 in the grey zones are used primarily to attack or undermine individuals and institutions, and to destabilize target states, shaping public opinion or influencing local political outcomes with specific narratives. Among the political influence measures, they also report the financing of individuals or political parties, the exploitation of weak institutions and high corruption levels. 15 Information operations includes the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the dissemination of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. See: https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 59 Brands (2016) refers to ‘unconventional tactics’, frequently shrouded in misinformation and deception. On the contrary, Jordán (2020) is more explicit and lists nine ‘lines of strategic action’: political disruption, influence operations, economic coercion, cyberattacks, aggressive intelligence actions, coercive military deterrence, feats accomplished, erosion tactics, and proxy wars. It is deemed necessary to specify that Jordán (2020: 10-11) defines political disruption as a “support for anti-establishment actors in the domestic politics of the opponent for the purpose of disrupting decision-making processing and gaining a competitive advantage over the opponent”, and economic coercion as the “commercial and financial practices that reinforce political pressure”. Moreover, he lists the following four levels of coercion, attrition, and degradation of the opponent’s decision- making processes: environment shaping, interference, destabilization, and direct, limited, and sporadic use of force. Dalton et. al. (2019), however, refer to a ‘grey zone toolkit’ of seven main measures: information operation and disinformation, political coercion, economic coercion, cyber operations, space operations, proxy support, and provocation by state- controlled forces. 1.1.3 Ambiguous use of force and legal implications. The review of the characteristics and line of action could lead to thinking that states and non-state actors involved in grey zone activities are not technically at war, but it is not sufficient. There are other elements to consider, among which are the legal implications. On the subject, Mazarr (2015: 65-66) argued that grey zone conflicts can last years or decades, and “create a vague, ambiguous environment for legal standards and judgement”. In addition, he affirms the following: 60 Because they do not reflect unambiguous use of force, gray zone techniques can create significant challenges from an international legal standpoint. It is not clear, for example, whether these coercive and often aggressive actions meet the standard of “armed attack” and therefore allow retaliatory action under Article 51’s guarantee of self-defense. In other words, the ambiguity of these activities makes it difficult to apply Article 5116 of the United Nations Charter, which states: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Paradoxically, the ambiguity in question could prevent the escalation of conflicts because a target state cannot invoke the right of self-defence. For example, in the Republic of Nicaragua v. the United States of America judgment of 27 June 1986, concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua – which is still considered a school case – the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reaffirmed that the right of self-defence may be exercised only in response to an ‘armed attack’, in the meaning of an “operation carried out by regular armed forces”. Furthermore, according to the Court's belief, the concept of armed attack does not include “assistance to rebels in the form of the provisions of weapons or logistical or other support”17. 16 See: https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 17 See: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/70/6505.pdf (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 61 Echevarria II (2016: xii) stresses that grey zone conflicts “occur below the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5 threshold and below the level of violence necessary to prompt a United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution”. Here it is helpful to recall what Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty18 states: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Equally important is the UN Security Council Resolution no. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, containing the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations19. In this respect, it should be noted that the mentioned principles do not apply to non-state actors, and do not seem to be compatible with those activities that, for instance, constitute a threat to the self-determination of peoples, the political independence of a State, or its economic, social, and cultural development. In this sense, should also be recalled the guideline of the International Court of Justice about armed attacks carried out by non-state actors, as noted in the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, concerning the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 18 See: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 19 See: https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/A_RES_2625-Eng.pdf (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 62 Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In that circumstance, the Court concluded that Article 51 of the UN Charter “recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self- defence in the case of an armed attack by one State against another State”. Thus, the featured article has no relevance when the threat – or the attack – is carried out by a non-state actor or originates within, and not outside, the target territory20. According to Pagliaro (2022), the above-mentioned jus ad bellum21 cases are examples of ‘legal asymmetries’ typical of hybrid operations. Sari (2021), instead, refers to them as ‘legal vulnerabilities’ of democratic societies under pressure from hybrid threats. The concepts of hybrid threats and conflicts, as well as that of vulnerability, will be described in the following paragraphs. Here, it should be pointed out that, in line with ICJ’s arguments, the meaning of grey zone activities does not cover the traditional direct military attack, in the sense of state operation carried out by regular armed forces. Moreover, since those activities are carried out by non-state actors, or have their origin in the national territory, national law shall apply. That has been the opinion expressed by the European Commission (2016), under Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union: Insofar as countering hybrid threats relates to national security and defence and the maintenance of law and order, the primary responsibility lies with Member States, as most national vulnerabilities are country-specific. 20 See: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/1677.pdf (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 21 Latin expression with which it is identified the right to wage war, to be distinguished from the jus in bello, or corpus of the laws and customs of war. See: https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20-110803100027481 (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 63 1.2 The similar concepts. The aim of this paragraph is to provide an answer to the research question no. 1.2 (Are there similar concepts, liked to national security?). For this reason, the following pages illustrate the meaning of political warfare and the conceptualizations which have followed each other since the 1940s, with special reference to the manipulation of perceptions. Among them, the similar concepts of cognitive, hybrid, unrestricted, non- linear, and virtual societal warfare, are used both in Western, Russian, and Chinese literature. Finally, a sub-paragraph illustrates the role of organized crime organizations as non-state actors. Therefore, the hypothesis no. 1.2 is confirmed: there are other concepts like that of grey zone activity, linked to national security. 1.2.1 The forerunner concept of Political warfare. According to Dobbs et al. (2020: 2), “Political warfare is the closest precursor term for grey-zone activities”, and both “encompass the same wide range of coercive statecraft techniques”. There should be no misunderstandings about the meanings of ‘political’ and ‘warfare’. As before, the starting point is the dictionary: ‘political’ means “relating to politics”22, while ‘warfare” means “the activity of fighting a war, often including the weapons and methods that are used”23. The first definition of political warfare was written by George F. Kennan, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, in the top-secret report entitled The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare. According to his classical definition (Kennan, 1948: 1), PW is: 22 See: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/political (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 23 See: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/warfare (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 64 the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. [...] They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP – the Marshall Plan) and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states. About forty years later, Smith (1989: 3) argued that the term ‘political’ is used “to describe purposeful intercourse between peoples and governments affecting national survival” and that, even if PW “may be combined with violence, economic pressure, subversion, and diplomacy, [...] its chief aspect is the use of words, images, and ideas”. Codevilla (1989: 77), however, pointed out that PW is “the marshaling of human support, or opposition, to achieve victory in a war or in unbloody conflicts as serious as war”. In the same period, Lord and Barnet (1989: xi) highlighted that PW “seems useful for describing a spectrum of overt and covert activities designed to support national political-military objectives”. A few years ago, this notion was actualized by the United States Army Special Operations Command (2015: 2): Political Warfare encompasses a spectrum of activities associated with diplomatic and economic engagement, Security Sector Assistance (SSA), novel forms of Unconventional Warfare (UW), and Information and Influence Activities (IIA). More recently, Pitney Jr. (2000: 3) has stated that “politics resembles warfare, so military literature can teach us something political action”, while Ministry (2006: 302), referring to the United States intervention in the Italian election of 1948, and the 65 influence of the campaign on attempts to formulate a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to defeat Soviet Communism, argued that: The US utilized propaganda, psychological warfare and covert operations, but, furthermore, attempted to integrate these methods with overt programmes in support of an evolving strategy that responded to, and ultimately transcended, the case of the Italian election. The campaign was distinctive, not in its introduction of a novel way to combat Soviet Communism, but in demonstrating the need for a more comprehensive, cohesive US strategy in the Cold War. In Political Warfare against the Kremlin. US and British Propaganda Policy at the Beginning of the Cold War, Schwartz (2009: 12) focuses on propaganda as a “subcategory of political warfare efforts which include a larger range of activities such as economic measures (for example, the Marshall Plan) or funding underground resistance in hostile states”. Similarly, intending to illustrate the PW history, Rid (2020) focuses on Russian active measures (“aktivnye meropriyatiya”), viewed as the Caucasian version of that mix of undercover revelations, falsehoods and subversion of the adversary called – from the CIA – ‘political warfare’. In particular, he explains that this term dates to the 1950s and was used in the Eastern bloc as a synonym for disinformation (“dezinformacija”) aimed at exacerbating the political tensions of that time. In his opinion, current disinformation campaigns are “attacks against a liberal epistemic order or a political system that places its trust in essential custodians of factual authority”, while “the line between fact and lie is a continuation of the line between peace and war, domestically as well as internationally”. Of the same opinion is Galeotti (2019), which defines active measures as “covert political operations ranging from disinformation campaigns to staging insurrections” that “reflect the wartime mentality of the Soviet leadership, as similar tactics were used 66 by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the Second World War”. Mahnken et al. (2018: 4) place at the same level Russian and Chinese styles of PW: due to their violent pasts, Russia and China view political warfare as a standard instrument of statecraft rather than a specialized tool and have spent decades refining that instrument. […] It is no surprise that both nations have demonstrated the ability to leverage economic, financial, political, diplomatic, news media, social media, educational, civic, social, military, paramilitary, and other tools to achieve their aims. Highlighting the importance of disinformation, several of the above-mentioned authors recall the writings of Ladislav Bittman, former Czechoslovak active measures specialist, who is considered “the single most important Soviet bloc defector to ever testify and write about the intelligence discipline of disinformation” (Rid: 2020: x). Bittman (1972), indeed, explained that, during the Cold War, entire bureaucracies were created to alter the facts or forge false realities, and more than ten thousand people have been the subject of disinformation operations. Referring to that period, Bittman (1985: xi) also argued that Soviet agents, under the mask of American civil liberties, proved to be particularly skilled: To manipulate politicians, governmental bureaucrats, and the press involve many participants: domestic opponents of the current administration and foreign adversaries, friends and foes, public opinion experts, businessmen, lawyers, journalists, and, last but not least, spies. 67 1.2.1.1 The manipulation of perceptions in the infosphere. The manipulation of people's perceptions takes place through the use of information against the human mind, to influence its functional mechanisms. In the commercial field, reference is made to ‘information consumption’ and the communication strategies that have the greatest impact on purchasing choices. In politics, and more in general in all activities in which power is exercised, reference is made to ‘propaganda’. In the field of defence, reference is made to ‘psychological warfare’. In the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition, the word propaganda is associated with the following meaning: “Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view”. While, as mentioned, “the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead” takes the name of ‘disinformation’. In the Italian Intelligence Glossary, propaganda is linked to other three words: counterpropaganda24, counterterrorism25, and subversion26. The word disinformation, however, is linked to the concepts of information warfare, information intoxication and psychological operations (PSYOPS). These activities, in the literature, are considered PW subcategories as well as useful tactics for environments short of a declared war. In its famous book Propaganda, for instance, Edward L. Bernays (1928: 9) wrote that: The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those 24 Activities aimed at detecting and combating propaganda actions carried out by hostile actors. 25 Activities to prevent, detect, contain, and counteract conduct of a terrorist nature. 26 Phenomenon consisting in the attempt to overthrow or subvert the constitutional order of the country, through conduct that can range from propaganda to terrorist acts. 68 who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized. For Auerbach and Castronovo (2013: 2), however, propaganda is a cultural practice related to “the ways in which human beings communicate, particularly with respect to the creation and widespread dissemination of attitudes, images, and beliefs”. Benkler et al. (2018: 29) define propaganda as “communication designed to manipulate a target population by affecting its beliefs, attitudes, or preferences to obtain behavior compliant with political goals of the propagandist”; and list its effects: induced misperceptions, distraction, disorientation, and misinformation. The latter is characterized by false information without intent to deceive, manipulate, or obtain a specific outcome. Guess and Lyons (2020: 11) have the same opinion: “Disinformation is meant to deceive, while misinformation may be inadvertent or unintentional”. The U.S. Department of the Army (1996), in the Field Manual no. 100-6, outlined the concept of information warfare (IW) adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the office who is now responsible for the management of the Department of Defense (DoD) Terminology Program27: Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, 27 The program was formalized in 2009 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to improve communications and mutual understanding through the standardization of military and associated terminology within DdD, with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and between the United States and international partners. See: https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/DoD-Terminology-Program (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 69 information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks. The JCS (1998) further defines information superiority as “the capability to collect, process, disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific enemy while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same”. The subject in question has been widely explored. It should be considered that only the U.S. Naval Information Warfare Command has collected more than one hundred suggested readings in its Information Warfare 2022 Book List28. For obvious reasons, here there is a reference to a selected sample to provide an answer to the research question no. 1.2. Libicki (1995), for example, has identified seven forms of IW: command and control warfare, intelligence-based warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, hackers’ warfare, economic information warfare, and cyber warfare. About psychological warfare, he has highlighted four categories: operations against the national will, operations against opposing commanders, operations against troops, and cultural conflicts. Referring to Russia’s armed forces activities in information space, Thomas (2016: 10) illustrates de definition of IW given by the Russian Ministry of Defence: The ability to, among other things, undermine political, economic, and social systems; carry out mass psychological campaigns against the population of a State in order to destabilize society and the government; and force a State to make decisions in the interests of their opponents. 28 See: https://media.defense.gov/2022/Aug/01/2003046714/-1/-1/1/2022%20information%20warfare- %20readi-ng%20list.pdf (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 70 In the first book published in Italy about disinformation as a threat to national security and competitiveness of the country – which is linked to the concepts of IW and PSYOPS – Germani (2017: 9-10) argues that it is a weapon of politics, military, and economic struggle used by state and non-state actors, whose power and effectiveness is multiplied by new ICT technologies and cyberspace exploitation. According to him: Disinformation is a tool of power and competitive struggle […] It can be defined as the intentional falsification of data and information in order to manipulate the perceptions of a target, influence its decisions and induce it to act in the manner desired by the disinformation agent. Sometimes it is also used to weaken cognitive and decision-making skills of the target, spreading news that generates confusion and uncertainty on it. Goldstein and Findley (1996: 7-11) argued that “psychological actions such as show of force, cover, and deception have been used throughout history to influence enemy groups and leaders” and now “are enhanced by the expansion of mass communication capabilities”. According to them, modern PSYOPS requires the identification and analysis of four characteristics of the target: vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, conditions, and effectiveness. In this regard, they have explained as follows: Susceptibilities include the degree to which the target audience can be influenced to respond to the message it receives. Conditions of the target audience include all environmental factors-social, economic, political, military, and physical-that influence the target audience. Audience effectiveness is the capability of the target audience to carry out the psyopser's desired response. Concerning campaigns which aim to change attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, and behaviours, Fry (2022: 198) raises a question: “If intent to deceive is key to popular understandings of propaganda, how can we distinguish propaganda from PsyOps?”. 71 Even in this case, the difference could concern the dichotomy between political and military approaches, as can be deduced by the Official NATO Terminology Database (NATOTerm)29, where the meaning of propaganda is “information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view”; while PSYOPS are defined as: Planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. To avoid misunderstandings, the meaning of ‘deception’ should not also be taken for granted. According to Watzlawick (1976), for instance, an action of deception aims to induce an opponent to think something wrong, to perceive a wrong reality. Similarly, in the NATOTerm it appears as a “deliberate measure to mislead targeted decision- makers into behaving in a manner advantageous to the commander's intent”. For Whaley (2007), deception rather both a psychological phenomenon and one mode on perception which falls in the main category called misperception (Figure 5). Manipulation of perceptions through disinformation, propaganda and PSYOP is nothing new, but the combination of technological innovation and functional illiteracy has reduced the costs of conflicts and made them potentially devastating, even in the absence of a traditional military campaign. 29 See: https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 72 Figure 5 – Typologies of perception. Source: Whaley, B. (2007), https://www.iwp.edu/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/20131119_TextbookofPolitical_MilitaryCounterdeception.pdf The above activities are held in a scenario characterized by the thinning of the boundary between the real and online world. Floridi (2013: 6) claims to have coined the neologism ‘infosphere’, “on the basis of ‘biosphere’, a term referring to that limited region on our planet that supports life”. Specifically, according to Floridi (1999: 8): The infosphere is the whole system of services and documents, encoded in any semiotic and physical media, whose contents include any sort of data, information and knowledge […] with no limitations either in size, typology or logical structure. Hence it ranges from alphanumeric texts (i.e. texts including letters, numbers and diacritic symbols) and multimedia products to statistical data, from films and hypertexts to whole text-banks and collections of pictures, from mathematical formulae to sounds and videoclips. The U.S. Department of the Army (1996), in the Field Manual no. 100-6, had already been defined infosphere as: The rapidly growing global network of military and commercial command, control, communications, and computer systems and networks linking information data bases and fusion centers that are accessible to the warrior anywhere, anytime, in the performance of any mission; provides the 73 worldwide automated information-of-exchange backbone support to joint forces; and provides seamless operations from anywhere to anywhere that is secure and transparent to the warrior; this emerging capability is highly flexible to support the adaptive command and control infrastructures of the twenty-first century. Nowadays, for Benkler et al. (2018: 4), society and democracy are threatened or made ungovernable by the rapid evolution of technology and its misuse: Technological processes beyond the control of any person or country the convergence of social media, algorithmic news curation, bots, artificial intelligence, and big data analysis were creating echo chambers that reinforced our biases, were removing indicia of trustworthiness, and were generally overwhelming our capacity to make sense of the world, and with it our capacity to govern ourselves as reasonable democracies. The reasons were investigated by Del Vicario et al. (2016) and attributed to three factors: selected exposure, confirmation bias, and echo chambers. These last can be summarized as follows: a lot of people have the habit of navigating always the same websites; they do not look for the truth but for news to confirm their perceptions; and use it to discuss in specific homogeneous and polarized communities of information. Consequently, those people are easy to profile and influence, no matter what happens in the future with artificial intelligence (Adkins and Hibbard, 2019). 1.2.2 The similarities: cognitive, hybrid, unrestricted, non-linear, and virtual societal warfare. The notion of PW is not the only one which has some similarities to that of grey zone activities. Among the adjacent concepts, there is that of cognitive warfare (CW). From a grammatical point of view, this is a term which refers to the human understanding and 74 decision-making processes (cognitive), affected by the experience of war across the spectrum of competition and conflict (warfare). On the practical side, according to the NATO Allied Command Transformation (2023), CW is an instrument of power which integrates “cyber, information, psychological, and social engineering capabilities”, and “affect attitudes and behaviours by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual and group cognition to gain advantage over an adversary”. The Italian General Staff of the Defence (2023), however, refers to CW as an intangible competition which involves ideologies, values, and societies through an ever more extensive use of media and new technological solutions, as well as the increasing military attention to the field of neuroscience and its applications. Burda (2023: 3) points out that, currently, “CW can be considered a conceptual descendant of psychological and information warfare, which have been influenced by advancements in the cyberspace domain”, whose peculiarity is the focus on influencing whole society by attacking the human brain with grey products or propaganda. According to him, even if CW is considered as an emerging concept, it has been used for decades. In 1949, for instance, the Central Intelligence Agency defined strategic psychological warfare as “the wartime use of long-range propaganda to enemies and neutrals in support of military and political operations”. Moshe Ya’alon (2019: 13), former Israeli Defence Minister, highlights the importance of some elements of the cognitive domain, during both times of peace and war: 75 The population’s morale; confidence in the leadership and defense and rescue forces; social solidarity; and belief in the justness of the cause are of the utmost significance before, during, and after the campaign. Du Cluzel (2020: 26-27) refers to Russian ‘reflexive control doctrine’ as the equivalent of CW, and explains that China uses CW to achieve the so-called ‘mind superiority’: China has defined the Cognitive Domain of Operations as the battlefield for conducting ideological penetration (…) aiming at destroying troop morale and cohesion, as well as forming or deconstructing operational capabilities. It encompasses six technologies, divided across two categories (Cognition, which includes technologies that affect someone’s ability to think and function; and subliminal cognition that covers technologies that target a person’s underlying emotions, knowledge, willpower and beliefs). Gagliano (2013), recalling the French studies on the relationship between CW and Economic Intelligence, emphasizes the dangerousness of social movements for companies. In particular, he remembers that the ability to interpret and assign meaning in real-time is the CW’s basics. Similarly, for Backes and Swab (2019), CW is a strategy that focuses on the malign use of information and cyber means, to alter how a target population thinks and acts. Barnal et al. (2020: 10), however, argue that CW is “the weaponization of public opinion by an external entity, for the purpose of influencing public and/or governmental policy or for the purpose of destabilizing governmental actions and/or institutions”. This view is widely and officially shared by the Johns Hopkins University and the Imperial College London, whose academics (Cao et al., 2021) argue as follows: In cognitive warfare, the human mind becomes the battlefield. The aim is to change not only what people think, but how they think and act. Waged 76 successfully, it shapes and influences individual and group beliefs and behaviours to favour an aggressor’s tactical or strategic objectives. In its extreme form, it has the potential to fracture and fragment an entire society, so that it no longer has the collective will to resist an adversary’s intentions. An opponent could conceivably subdue a society without resorting to outright force or coercion. Moreover, Orinx and Struye de Swielande (2021), who have contributed to the first NATO scientific meeting on CW, affirm that it is one of the understudied components of HW. In Western literature, the concept of HW is often associated with American military theorist Frank Offman (2007: 8), who equally refers to ‘hybrid threats’ or HW as follows: A full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors […] to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimension of conflict. Equally explicitly, Murray and Mansoor (2012: 2) define HW as “conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose”. Radin (2017: 5) argues that the term HW has no consistent definition and is used by Western analysts and officials about covert or deniable activities, aiming to influence the domestic politics of a target country: 77 Some use the term to refer just to irregular tactics, others use hybrid to describe a range of irregular and conventional tactics used in the same battlespace, and others use the term to describe the New Generation Warfare doctrine articulated by the senior leadership in the Russian General Staff. Regarding the latter (NGW), Adamsky (2015: 21) uses the definition of “amalgamation of hard and soft power across various domains, through skilful application of coordinated military, diplomatic, and economic tools”. According to Johnson (2018), HW is also known as ‘special warfare’, ‘ambiguous warfare’ or ‘grey operations’, in reference to a blend of conventional and unconventional warfighting. In that respect, Najžer (2020: 25) remind us that the Munich Security Conference of 2015 defined HW as a combination of multiple conventional and unconventional tools of warfare, highlighting the difference between the concepts of war and warfare: War is a hostile contest between states or other belligerents, carried on by degrees of coercion in order to achieve political objectives. Warfare is the conduct or act of engaging in war, primarily, though not exclusively by the use of military force. Speranza (2020: 2) focuses on hybrid activities as “a mix of diplomatic, economic, security, information, and technological actions designed to quietly undermine democratic states and institutions […] while avoiding a traditional conflict”. For Sweijs et al. (2021), by doing so, “hybrid actors typically move up and down the escalation ladder in what is called the ‘grey zone’ between war and peace, while avoiding the threshold that would traditionally lead to open (military) conflict” (Figure 6). 78 Figure 6 – Combining instruments of power in hybrid conflict. Source: Sweijs, T. et al. (2021), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27705.7 In Chinese literature, the concept of conflict beyond the traditional military domain described in the above figure takes the name of ‘unrestricted warfare’. According to colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (1999), it includes the following means and methods: Psychological warfare (spreading rumors to intimidate the enemy and break down his will); smuggling warfare (throwing markets into confusion and attacking economic order); media warfare (manipulating what people see and hear in order to lead public opinion along); drug warfare (obtaining sudden and huge illicit profits by spreading disaster in other countries); network warfare (venturing out in secret and concealing one's identity in a type of warfare that is virtually impossible to guard against); technological warfare (creating monopolies by setting standards independently); fabrication warfare (presenting a counterfeit appearance of real strength before the eyes of the enemy); resources warfare (grabbing riches by plundering stores of resources); economic aid warfare (bestowing favor in the open and contriving to control matters in secret); cultural warfare (leading cultural trends along in order to assimilate those with different views); and international law warfare (seizing the earliest opportunity to set up regulations). 79 About the Russian equivalent of HW, Gardner (2015) recalls the existence of the term ‘non-linear warfare’, while Chivvis (2017) summarizes its mechanism and levers: information and cyber operations, use of proxies, economic influence, clandestine measures, and political influence. In addition, Friedman (2018: 20) argues that, while HW is a product of US military thought, Russian specialists on the subject (gibridnaya voyna) focus on “avoid the traditional battlefield with the aim of destroying the adversary via a mixture of ideological, informational, financial, political and economic methods, ultimately leading to sociocultural disintegration and, eventually, social collapse”. Even in Italy, there is a certain interest in non-linear warfare. Di Pasquale (2020), for instance, recalling an essay of the Soviet general Machmut Achmetovicˇ Gareev, published in 1995, equates the concepts of PW and HW. It is also worthy of attention to the concept of ‘virtual societal warfare’ coined by Mazarr et al. (2019: 1), about the challenge of hostile social manipulation through social media platforms: The purposeful, systematic generation and dissemination of information to produce harmful social, political, and economic outcomes in a target country by affecting beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. 1.2.3 The organized crime groups as non-state actors. Normark (2019: 2) points out that “States with a strong and long-term interest in influencing, manipulating and creating events in other countries to promote their interests will probably utilize different non-state actors in a systematic manner”. Among them, the organized crime organizations, to which are attributed different criminal phenomena regarded as serious social problems (Paoli and Vander Beken, 2014). 80 The political-criminal nexus (PCN), for instance, which consists of the collaboration of the political establishment with the criminal underworld, is one of the most dangerous threats to the quality of life in the contemporary world, because it undermines the rule of law, and human rights, and economic development (Godson, 2003). In this regard, Anguita Olmedo (2020: 177-178) argues that organized crime organizations affect the political, social, and economic development of the States also due to their “great capacity to adapt to new technologies, the execution of increasingly complex operations, a flexible but at the same time complex structure, which makes its detection difficult, and their penetration into the international economic system”. Referring to the territorial context in question, La Spina (2014: 593) points out that “Cosa Nostra, the ‘Ndrangheta, and the Camorra were born and have their “headquarters” in Italy, where they exert a negative influence on politics, civil society, and the economic underdevelopment” of the central and southern regions. Paoli (2014: 121) does the same: Italy hosts a few large-scale, century-old criminal organizations that not only engage in profit-making criminal activities but also exercise quasi-political functions in their areas of settlement, heavily influencing the local economic and political life. It should be noted that foreign criminal groups can compete with native ones, especially in drug trafficking. The most rooted in Italy come from Albania, Nigeria, and China (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia: 2023). Regarding Chinese organized crime groups and their infiltration into the legal economy, Riccardi (2018: 122) recalls that they can act in numerous economic sectors, covering up illicit activities through a typical modus operandi: 81 The companies are dissolved soon after their incorporation, just before any controls are done by the tax agency, abandoning significant tax payables, and then are quickly re-opened thanks to the complicity of figureheads and local professionals. Galeotti (2017) focuses on Russian OCGs which operate in the shadow as allies, facilitators and suppliers for the European gangs and continent-wide criminal networks. In addition, they are used by the Kremlin as instruments of its statecraft abroad. In particular, he points out as follows: Russian-based organised crime groups in Europe have been used for a variety of purposes, including as sources of ‘black cash’, to launch cyber attacks, to wield political influence, to traffic people and goods, and even to carry out targeted assassinations on behalf of the Kremlin. Previously, Siegel and Van de Bunt (2012: v) highlighted the dangerousness of the OCGs “that are not only running the show in the illegal markets but are also in control of the wider economic sphere and the political arena through investments in legal markets and the widespread corruption of public administrators” recalling, implicitly, the definition of white-collar crime Edelhertz (1970: 3) as An illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by non-physical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantages. 1.3 Grey zone activities, Intelligence studies, and analysis. This paragraph aims to clarify the reason why the study of GZA or similar concepts mainly belongs to the field of Intelligence studies, providing an answer to the research 82 question no. 1.3 (To which field of study do these activities belong?). In this respect, once more, the starting points are the official definitions. In the NATOTerm30, intelligence is defined as follows: The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers. In the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2021: 107), however, there are three accepted meanings of the word intelligence: 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The organizations engaged in such activities. The related activities are inferable both from the recognition of Intelligence studies as an academic discipline in Western countries, and the publications about intelligence analysis. The reason is that, for more than twenty years, researchers in the field have combined concepts of other disciplines to understand and explain intelligence processes and organizations (Gill and Phythian, 2016), as well as innumerable former professionals, have switched to university teaching of the subject. 30 See: https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.mvc (accessed on: 30 September 2023).. 83 1.3.1 The academic experiences and the university-security nexus. In the United Kingdom, at the end of the 1980s, when Cristofer Andrew and Jeremy Noakes edited Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945, one moved the first steps towards a school of Intelligence studies. Commenting on the above volume, Watt (1988) argued that this field of study has greatly benefited from the work of professional historians. Krieger (2004: 68), who dealt with German School, described the reverse dynamic: During the two World Wars numerous German intellectuals became engaged in intelligence work. Many who later became leading figures in area studies such as in Russian or Balkan or Chinese or Arabic studies were employed by German intelligence, particularly military intelligence. The same was of course true of engineers, medical doctors, mathematicians and physicists – to name but a few branches of learning which were obviously needed in military intelligence. But few of them wrote about their experiences or even mentioned them privately after the war. More recently, comparing British and American Intelligence studies, Glees (2015) pointed out that, in the first context, the focus is on the use of secret information in policymaking, while in the second it is preferable to examine all types of information potentially useful for the Government, in respect of any policy or event. In general terms, Johnson (2007) identified the covert actions of IW, propaganda, political and paramilitary activities as sub-disciplines. While Denécé and Arboit (2010: 727), referring to the French context, drew attention to its double connotation: Intelligence work, with its negative connotations in the French psyche, is unjustly connected with ideas of espionage, privacy violations, and ‘‘dirty tricks’’ campaigns. Conversely, counterespionage, meaning the effort made to protect French military, industrial, and economic interests, is seen in a far better light. 84 Díaz Matey (2015, 2010) highlighted the increasing citizens’ expectations about the role of intelligence in Spain and identified four different approaches to this field of study: historical-military, journalistic, economic, and IR and Political science approach. The latter encompasses several academic disciplines, such as Philosophy, Philology, and Law. Navarro Bonilla (2012) focused on the relationship between intelligence analysis and learning lessons, proposing the application of military doctrine to different contexts, based on lifelong learning. Moyano et al. (2014: 226), in light of research based on the doctoral thesis on the subject, drawn up in the Spanish universities, argued that: The collaboration of the University with the intelligence services and with the business world, as well as the spread of the intelligence culture, have increased the production and dissemination of science in this area. In this regard, the former CIA analyst Marrin (2014: 266) stated that “Intelligence studies is an academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence; the contribution that higher education makes to interpreting its past, understanding its present, and forecasting its future”. Similarly, Dover et al. (2014: vii) defined this discipline as one of the most dynamic areas of academic study, because it has to deal with contemporary challenges, such as: Counterterrorism and intelligence, Cybersecurity, Globalisation and borders, Weapons of mass destruction, Energy and food security, Intelligence sharing, Communications, privacy and identity, Intelligence oversight and accountability, Organised crime. Contributing to the first Italian book on the subject, entitled Intelligence e scienze umane. Una disciplina accademica per il XXI secolo, Gori (2016: 67) noted that this 85 discipline evolves according to historical events, technological and scientific developments: There are no longer the elegant certainties of the bipolar period, but a multitude of threats coming from new actors, like the rogue states or the OCG, such as the terrorism, the cultural, economic, demographic, social and ecological threats, besides occult powers and various dangers arising from the cessation of the state’s monopoly on the use of force and weapons of mass destruction. Referring mainly but not exclusively to the Israeli academic context, Pascovich underlined that attention to security and intelligence issues has arisen to the point of involving numerous research institutes and think tanks. In particular, he (Pascovich, 2017: 139) argued that, for most scholars, the “research methodology is mainly historical, in keeping with the British tradition, as opposed to the American tradition of building models for understanding reality and the way it changes”. Paraphrasing Gill et al. (2009), one may say that activities related to national security are studied as statecraft tools to manage risks and uncertainties, shifting them to adversaries or competitors. In this sense, they believe that intelligence makes leaders more confident. To emphasize the role played by universities in the security of nation-states, Gearon (2020: 15) illustrates the so-called ‘university-security-intelligence nexus’ across four critical domains: the operational, the epistemological, the ethical, and the existential: The operational defines the different modus operandi of engagement between universities and security and intelligence agencies; the epistemological treats of knowledge as the critical currency of the universities-security-intelligence nexus; the ethical determines the framework for behavioural and moral judgements called into play, and called into question; the existential domain shows, at least in prospect, a common shared concern (put negatively) of forewarning and protection against threat 86 and (put constructively) survival (of states, societies, even, today, species) as a shared strategic teleology or purpose. In this regard, Bulhak and Friis (2020) assert the existence of a European School of Intelligence Studies, born from the participation of 398 researchers from 46 European and non-European countries at the annual conference of the International Intelligence History Association, and the Need to Know-conferences, respectively in the periods 1995-2019 and 2011-2019, during which 587 paper have been presented. 1.3.2 The analysts’ perspective on professional and academic commitment. To illustrate the intelligence analysts’ arguments which are useful to explain why GZA activities belong to the field of study in question, it is necessary to mention Professor Sherman Kent (1949: 3-4), who is considered the father of Intelligence studies, and his premise: Intelligence means knowledge. [...] Some of this knowledge may be acquired through clandestine means, but the bulk of it must be had through unromantic open-and-above-board observation and research. Similarly, Heuer Jr. (1999: 14) argued that “intelligence analysis deals with highly ambiguous situations”, as well as everything that usually happens in the GZ. Fingar (2011: 3), for its part, focused on reducing uncertainty or producing ‘new knowledge’, defined as “better understanding and new insights from thinking hard about the information we possess but have not considered or combined in the way that led to the new assessment”. Reflecting on the intelligence cycle31, Phythian (2013) emphasized the gap between 31 Planning and Direction, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Production, Dissemination. 87 reality and its representation, questioning the validity of those cognitive processes which do not take it into account. Vandepeer (2014), however, argued that Intelligence studies and analysis are helpful to deal with the complexity of some situations, and with uncertainty about the effective understanding of them. In this regard, Díaz Matey (2017) argued that Intelligence products will always be motivated by a need for information in a situation of uncertainty. In other words, as stated by Spielmann (2018: 5), “intelligence analysis has much in common with academic inquiry”. Therefore, all activities that interfere with national security are increasingly being studied at universities. In this regard, Oleson (2016) argued the affirmation of a multi-disciplinary approach to Intelligence studies and the wide availability of information and documents for scholars. Bozzo (2017), moreover, explained that considering the type of issues addressed, the approach to this field of study can only be multidimensional and multidisciplinary, as well as systematic and intuitive. Not far from Richards’ position (2010), expressed in The Art & Science of Intelligence Analysis, Bolchini (2019) has explicitly defined it as an analytical approach based on intuition. Referring to the research on open sources, about a decade ago, Olcott (2012: 110) pointed out that those who work in this field usually deal with: Widely available data and information; targeted commercial data; individual experts; and “gray” literature, which consists of written information produced by the private sector, government, and academe that has limited availability, either because few copies are produced, existence of the material is largely unknown, or access to information is constrained. The multidisciplinary nature of this approach has also recently been confirmed by Bielska et al. (2020: 3) in their work on OSINT, where they highlight that “it now 88 embraces a growing class of professionals in fields as diverse as journalism, cybersecurity, investment research, crisis management and human rights”. Even though they are rare, the academic studies on counterintelligence may reflect more than others on what usually happens in the GZ, because they are focused on hostile activities carried out by foreign states or non-state actors (Lowenthal, 2020; Clark, 2007). Among the fields of research and analysis covered by CI, such as espionage, influence operations and terrorist acts, political deception - which is often referred to by the elegant euphemism ‘perception management’ (Clark and William, 2019) - is probably the most striking example, because “adversaries seek to manipulate and distort the picture of reality upon which policymakers plan and implement national security strategies” (Van Cleave, 2013: 59). In short, paraphrasing Stenslie et al. (2022), one may affirm that GZA belongs to the field of Intelligence studies because they deal with activities short of war, and are evolving in parallel to the social contexts of each country. 1.4 Vulnerability factors, surveys, and statistical indicators. This paragraph aims to highlight the relationship between GZA and the vulnerabilities of a country, providing an answer to research question no. 1.4 (How are grey zone activities related to the vulnerabilities of a country?). These vulnerability factors result from the above-mentioned literature and constitute the natural targets of the grey zone campaigns (Morris et al., 2019). The vulnerability factors of a country include corruption, false perceptions, social divisions and low turnout, economic uncertainty, resulting needs and grievances, as well 89 as the lack of trust in public institutions. The latter mainly manifests itself during elections, when democratic societies are more vulnerable (Backes and Swab, 2019: x): They are moments of round-the-clock campaigning, non-stop media coverage, breathless public debate, and high domestic political and social tension. Elections surface the issues and identities that divide our societies. Most importantly, elections are the sacred moment in time when voters express their will, passing judgment on their governments and determining the future of their countries. Moreover, it should be also appropriate to consider the rise of organized crime organizations because it is “often attributed to the weakness of the state or inadequacies of governance” (Williams, 2014: 255). Each vulnerability factor is usually measurable, and the related data could be also used in a broader reasoning. The following sub-paragraphs are dedicated to highlighting the relationship between vulnerability factors and specific surveys or statistical indicators, referred to the Italian context. 1.4.1 The Corruption Perceptions Index and the crimes against the public administration in Italy. Corruption is a worldwide problem, and it is commonly defined as dishonest or illegal behaviour involving a person in a position of power, for example, accepting money for doing something illegal or immoral”32. As one can read on the website of the NGO Transparency International33, it is a dual phenomenon: Corruption undermines governments' ability to protect people and erodes public trust, provoking more and harder to control security threats. On the 32 See: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/corruption (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 33 See: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 90 other hand, conflict creates opportunities for corruption and subverts governments' efforts to stop it. Being an important vulnerability factor, it is regularly measured. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), calculated by the aforementioned NGO, is the leading global indicator in this field because it offers an annual snapshot of the relative degree of corruption by ranking almost two hundred countries and territories from all over the globe. The CPI uses a scale from 0 to 100 to measure how corrupt each country’s public sector is perceived to be, according to experts and businesspeople. In this scale, 100 means “very clean”, while 0 means "highly corrupt”. Each country’s score is a combination of at least 3 data sources drawn from 13 different corruption surveys and assessments. These data sources are gathered by a variety of reputable institutions, including the World Bank and the World Economic Forum. With an average score of 66/100, the European Union (EU) is the region with the highest CPI score. Italy is at the 17th position among the 27 EU member states, while Spain is at the 14th, France at the 10th, and Germany at the 5th. At the top list, there are Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. At the bottom, however, there are Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary (Figure 7). In Italy, the perception of corruption is strictly connected to the bureaucratic structure of the country. Consequently, the Italian Ministry of Interior and the Institute of Economic, Political, and Social Studies Eurispes analysed the official data concerning twelve types of crimes against the public administration related to corruption, among which the embezzlement, bribery, and abuse of office. The above data cover the period 2004-2002 and illustrate the evolution of this phenomenon at the national level (Figure 8). 91 Figure 7 – The Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 in EU countries. Source: Transparency International Italia, https://www.transparency.it/indice-percezione-corruzione Figure 8 – Crimes against the public administration in Italy between 2004 and 2022. Source: Italian Ministry of Interior, https://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/criminalita-realta-e-percezione 1.4.2 False perceptions about the most relevant topics. The phenomenon of false perceptions, which is a vulnerability factor, is linked to misinformation, disinformation, and deception. As illustrated in the sub-paragraphs nos. 1.1.2 and 1.2.1, these last are typical activities of the GZ conflicts. 92 Also in this case, the phenomenon is measurable and analysable. It was done, for example, by the Italian Authority for Communications (Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni - AGCOM) and the Censis, which is a distinguished socio-economic research institute. During the two years 2018-2019, AGCOM analysed the online disinformation supply distribution in Italy, measuring its concentration in the topics of European relevance. The data for 2018, for instance, highlight that crime (25%), immigration (25%) and unemployment (19%) were the issues with more disinformative content. Afterwards, taxation (8%), terrorism (7%), pensions (6%), economic situation (4%), inflation (4%), public finances (2%), and climate change (1%) (Figure 9). Figure 9 – Disinformation supply distribution in Italy by topic in 2018. Source: AGCOM (2019), https://www.agcom.it/osservatorio-sulla-disinformazione-online Censis (2023: 6) has recently observed that “76,5% of Italian people believe that fake news is increasingly sophisticated and difficult to detect; the 20,2% believes it does not have the necessary skills to recognize them; while the 61.1% think they have only 93 partially. Only a minority of 18.7% believe with certainty to be able to recognize fake news” (Figure 10). Figure 10 – Italians who believe to have the skills needed to recognize fake news. Source: Censis (2023), https://www.censis.it/comunicazione/disinformazione-e-fake-news-italia 1.4.3 Inequality, social divisions, and low turnout. In the 56th Report on the social situation in the country (Censis, 2022), one explains that the fear of being exposed to uncontrollable global risks makes Italians claim social equity and real prospects of prosperity. This confirms that among the vulnerability factors, there is also inequality, real or perceived, which determines or feeds the social divisions. These last may result in strikes, street protests or low turnout, which, in turn, are classic consequences of the GZA. Inequality is immediately detectable and monitorable through the Income Quintile Share Ratio (Eurostat, 2023) which represents the “ratio of total income received by 20% of the population with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by 20% of the population with the lowest income (lowest quintile)”. In particular, the latest data 94 show that the richest Italians earn 5.62 more than the poorest ones. In Europe, on average, the ratio is 4.74: in Germany is 4.35, in France is 4.60, and in Spain is 5.63. In this regard, the collective imagination acquires a socio-political value, as well as social envy and repulsion for the privileges because they are suitable for the uncontrolled spread of false or misleading news. In the current situation, for instance, Italians consider particularly unbearable the following phenomena (Censis, 2022): the excessive gap between the salaries of employees and managers (87,8%); the million- dollar severance bonuses for managers, paid to leave rather than work (86,6%); the too low taxes paid by web giants (84,1%); the easy, undeserved earnings of influencers, considered as characters without a proven talent and certain skills (81,5%); and the exhibition on social networks of holidays and luxury travel (69,4%). Another topic to consider is the social division between ordinary citizens and politicians because it often affects voter turnout and democracy. In this sense, it should be taken into consideration the widespread sense of dissatisfaction among the population, and its negative feelings toward the elites, as noted by Censis (2018): 73% usually believe that traditional parties and politicians do not care about the common people. In addition, in the same period, Italians described their country as weak, angry, and divided (Dixon et al., 2018). Not for nothing, in 2018, the number of non-voters in Italy’s general elections (13.697.502) has almost doubled, compared to that of 2006 (8.867.074), and in 2022 there has been a further significant increase (17.964.851) (Figure 11). In percentage terms, the number of non-voters moved from 18,82% in 2006 to 29,39% in 2018, coming in at 38,95% in 2022. 95 Figure 11 – Non-voters to Italy’s general elections, years 2006-2022. Source: Censis (2022), https://www.censis.it/rapporto-annuale/56%C2%B0-rapporto-sulla-situazione-sociale-del-paese2022-0 1.4.4 Social apathy, economic uncertainty, and distrust in institutions. Referring to the logic of GZA and the concept of CW, provided in sub-paragraph no. 1.2.2, the connection between individuals and their society could be considered as a pressure point by malicious actors. Even in this case, Censis (2022) offers an interesting survey on social apathy, understood as a modern Italian character trait, caused by the rapid succession of the Covid-19 pandemic, Russian-Ukrainian war, and energy and environmental crisis. In this respect, according to Censis, 89,7% of Italians feel sadness, while 54,1% feel the strong temptation to take refuge in their private. These feelings are widely shared by all age groups involved in the survey: 18-34 years, 35-64 years, 65 years and over (Figure 12). Indeed, perceptions about the economic situation are an important vulnerability factor and, as such, shall be subject to statistical investigation. In this regard, one highlights the Eurispes data concerning people’s opinion about Italy’s economic trend for the years 2016-2022, detected every year with the same query (“In your opinion, in the last year, the overall economic situation of Italy is…”) and six answer options (Significantly worsened; A little worsened; Remained stable; A little better; Significantly improved; Don’t know, refusal). 96 Figure 12 – Expressions of social apathy, by age (%). Source: Censis (2022), https://www.censis.it/rapporto-annuale/56%C2%B0-rapporto-sulla-situazione-sociale-del-paese2022-0 As shown in Figure 13, the above opinions have a negative trend. Looking at the sum of the 1st and the second answer options, for example, one notes that the relative values moved from 49,3% in 2016 to 59,1% in 2022, with a peak of 79,5% in 2021, related to the pandemic. Figure 13 – People’s opinion about Italy’s economic trend for the years 2016-2022 (%). Source: Eurispes (2022), https://eurispes.eu/ricerca-rapporto/rapporto-italia-2022 In the same Report, the Eurispes (2022) institute offers a look to the future. With another survey, it has noted people’s opinions about Italy’s economic situation in the next 12 months. Respondents were asked to choose between four options (Will worsen; Will remain stable; Will improve; Don’t know, refusal). Results are contained in Figure 14, and summarised as follows: for 47% Italy’s economic situation will worsen; for 97 24,3% there will be a period of stability; for 6,4% it will improve; while the 22,3% does not know or refuses to answer. Figure 14 – People’s opinion about Italy’s economic situation in the next 12 months, year 2022 (%). Source: Eurispes (2022), https://eurispes.eu/ricerca-rapporto/rapporto-italia-2022 In a broader reasoning, the above-mentioned information may be combined with those obtained by the surveys on public trust in key institutions, such as the Presidency of the Republic, the Parliament, the Government, the Law enforcement agencies, and the Secret services. The results are systematically noted in the cited Eurispes report. 1.4.5 Criminal behaviours: Intimidation of local administrators and journalists. Infiltration into the legal economy and public institutions is not the only security issue related to organised crime. Among the weaknesses of the State, might also be considered the phenomena of intimidation against local administrators and journalists. In Italy, these phenomena have different scales, they are monitored, and analysed by the Ministry of the Interior every quarter. The respective reports are published on its institutional website. The report Acts of Intimidation Against Local Administrators (Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2023b) contains the time series of intimidation, the georeferencing of these acts, and the surveys about their origin and modus operandi. In particular, the possible 98 origins are the following: unknown origin, private origin, social tension, political tension, common crime, organized crime, and terrorism. While the modus operandi may be one of the following: social network/web, letter, writing on the wall, verbal aggression, physical aggression, incendiary material, mass media, intrusion, sending parts of animals, and use of weapons. To understand the scale of the phenomenon may be useful to observe its numerical consistency and the trend of the last decade (Chart 6). Data contained in the report Acts of intimidation against journalists (Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2023b) are organised pretty much in the same way, but the time series of intimidation are not yet available on the official website. Therefore, it is not possible to observe the numerical consistency of this phenomenon and its trend in the last decade. Nevertheless, it is possible and potentially useful to observe the number of intimidating acts that occurred in the last five years, and their distinction between organized crime, sociopolitical and other origin (Chart 7). Chart 6 – Acts of intimidation against local administrators in Italy, years 2013-2022. Source: own elaboration based on the Italian Ministry of Interior’s data (2023). 674 805 619 693 660 589 656 624 722 580 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Acts of intimidation against local administrators 99 Chart 7 – Acts of intimidation against journalists in Italy, years 2018-2022. Source: own elaboration based on the Italian Ministry of Interior’s data (2023-2020). According to the data published by the Italian Ministry of Interior, the origin of intimidating acts against journalists is mainly sociopolitical, while the incidence of OCGs is lower than all others. Either way, this circumstance should not affect the importance of the topic compared to press freedom, and its perception. Regarding the Press Freedom Index 2023, Italy occupies the 41st position with a score of 72.05, below almost all major European countries34. In the corresponding country tab, made by Reporters Without Borders, has been reported that “press freedom in Italy continues to be threatened by organised crime, particularly in the south of the country, as well as by various violent extremist groups”35. Referring to the political context, in the above country tab, one can read as follows: For the most part, Italian journalists enjoy a climate of freedom. But they sometimes give in to the temptation to censor themselves, either to conform to their news organisation’s editorial line, or to avoid a defamation suit or other form of legal action. 34 See: https://rsf.org/en/index (accesed on: 30 September 2023). 35 See: https://rsf.org/en/country/italy (accesed on: 30 September 2023). 14 16 27 27 11 24 25 69 113 53 35 46 67 93 47 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Number and origin of intimidating acts against journalist Organized crime Sociopolitical Other 100 However, referring to their safety, organised crime and corruption are put on the same level: Journalists who investigate organised crime and corruption are systematically threatened and sometimes subjected to physical violence for their investigative work. Their cars or homes are sometimes destroyed by arson. Online intimidation campaigns are orchestrated against those who explore these issues. 1.5 A conceptual approximation to the socioeconomic vulnerability. This paragraph aims to clarify the meaning of the term socioeconomic vulnerability, providing an answer to the research question no. 1.5 (What does the term socioeconomic vulnerability mean?). Previously, we have seen that in grey zone conflicts, societies are a target. Thus, to define specifically what should be a stroke, or what should be protected, one may use specific surveys or indicators. Some of them are illustrated in the paragraph 1.8. Nef (1999: 69) argued that “chaos and turbulence have become the operational context of contemporary society”. In this context, social trends are determined by economic trends, which may underline some socioeconomic vulnerability factors. These last are intended as critical issues relating to the connection between society and the economy. In Guillaumont words (2000: 4), for instance, “vulnerability means the risk of being harmed, wounded (negatively affected) by unforeseen events, in general and in economics as well”. While Ligon and Schechter (2002) have approached the concept of vulnerability to the role played by poverty and risk in reducing the welfare state. 101 Referring to insularity, peripherality and remoteness, Cordina (2004) qualified as important economic vulnerability factors the high transport costs, the reduced attractiveness for businesses and investments, and the dependence on exports. Similarly, in Briguglio et al. (2008: 1), economic vulnerability was defined as “the exposure of an economy to exogenous shocks, arising out of economic openness”. By contrast, economic resilience was defined as “the policy-induced ability of an economy to withstand or recover from the effects of such shocks”. Referring to Italy, Del Re (2009) explained that a generic sense of vulnerability and the resulting need for protection are variables which affect the risk perception. The latter being understood, for example, as merits of the threat, geographical proximity of the one who threatens, or defence capability. Donatelli (2016), however, explained that vulnerability means the lack of something, with special reference to the sources of well- being. More recently, Re (2018) and Bernardini (2018) argued that the vulnerability concept is strictly related to the protection of human rights and the strengthening of substantial equality. Similarly, Giolo (2018) reminded us that this concept has been widely used in the field of law. Nevertheless, it is considered a concept with a wide meaning and is hard to define (Giolo and Pastore, 2018). Actually, in Vulnerability to institutions, and vulnerability of institutions (“Vulnerabilità di fronte alle istituzioni e vulnerabilità delle istituzioni”), Corso and Talamo (2019: xvi) defined socioeconomic vulnerability as “the possible loss of well- being, resulting from the combination of risks and risk management tools”. In other words, they referred to the mix between social change and the chance of worsening lifestyles. In addition, they highlighted the relationship between the vulnerability of institutions and their reputation and reliability, as well as the ability to pursue the development and well-being of the country. 102 In this regard, La Spina (2019) believes that one is vulnerable compared to uncertain and harmful events. Moreover, absolute poverty36, relative poverty37, and social exclusion38 are expressions of the vulnerability at issue. From this point of view, Morosini (2020) focuses on socioeconomic emergency and the mafia, highlighting the economic support to young people in difficulty, infiltration attempts in the local firms by the OCGs, and the resulting reputational damages to the country. From the perspective of Natural Hazard studies, Lee (2023: 1) argued that the concept under discussion “emerged from the political-economic view of linking people’s vulnerability as a result of larger socio-political conditions and lack of people’s access to resources to cope with the devastating effects of disasters and climate change”. In other words, there is no single definition of socioeconomic vulnerability because there is a concept of vulnerability in every field of study linked to the risk perception. 1.6 The concepts related to socioeconomic vulnerability. Originally, this paragraph aimed to explore the similarities between socioeconomic vulnerability and other concepts, providing an answer to the research question no. 1.6 (Are there similar concepts, linked to potential instability?). Nonetheless, in the literature were not detected explicit reference to similar concepts. Considering the socioeconomic vulnerability as an emotional and material condition of a country’s citizens, linked to economic hardship or the possible loss of well-being, one may find some related concepts in the fragility, and the lack of 36 The term absolute poverty refers to who is unable to buy a specific basket of essential goods and services. 37 The term relative poverty refers to the economic difficulties in meeting the average expenditure per person. 38 The term social exclusion refers to difficulties in entertaining certain social relations. 103 attractiveness and competitiveness of a country. Here there is no reference to the Maastricht criteria, nor the EU Stability and Growth Pact. The term ‘fragility’, which often stands for ‘lack of stability', is used about the social unrest of those who feel more directly exposed to the negative consequences of social and economic processes, including migration dynamics. Its typical signals are widespread uncertainty, non-peaceful protests, no confidence in the national economy and institutions, and low turnout. The term ‘instability’, however, refers to the “uncertainty caused by the possibility of a sudden change in the present situation” 39, and should be associated with the seriousness of the situation. The NGO Fund for Peace (2023: 37), which yearly basis elaborates the Fragile States Index, points out the following: Significant dysfunctionality exists not just in poorer and weaker countries, but in richer and more powerful ones as well. This raises the question of whether state fragility is still perceived as a security threat by the public and decisionmakers, as it was when the FSI was first published in 2006. The fear at that time was that state fragility, or actual state failure, in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, would lead to greater jihadist terrorism and violent extremism. Today, the rise of Great Power competition - and the concomitant rise of regional powers - appears to be supplanting these concerns. Country ‘attractiveness’ can broadly be defined as “the degree to which a country is preferred to others in the eyes of its relevant stakeholders on the basis of certain criteria, including tangible and intangible elements” (Lee, 2023: 815). This concept is usually used in the fields of trade, tourism, industry, and finance, with particular attention to foreign investment. 39 See: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/instability (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 104 At this respect, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2022: 17), “there is a need to look beyond mere business statistics” and “focus on resident well-being as a key determinant of territorial attractiveness”, because it covers some factors as health, employment, education, and social cohesion, besides the quality of public institutions and services. It should also be noted that, in 2016, NGO The European House Ambrosetti launched the Global Attractiveness Index (GAI) research project, intending to make available an innovative country index for Italian and international decision-makers, based on four macro-areas of attractiveness: openness, innovation, endowment and efficiency. As specified on its website the GAI analyses attractiveness from a dual perspective: the ability to retain resources already present in the area (internal), and the ability to attract new resources from the outside (external)40. Thus, a lack of attractiveness results in fewer opportunities, and may be considered a vulnerability factor. The World Economic Forum (2016), which has been measuring ‘competitiveness’ among countries since 1979, defines it as “the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country”, specifying that another way to think about competitiveness is to consider how a country promotes the citizens’ well- being. In the glossary of the EU official website, a competitive economy is defined as “an economy whose sustained rate of productivity is able to drive growth and, consequently, income and welfare”41. By contrast, according to OECD (2021: 34), “economic outcomes are undermined by weaknesses in competitiveness […] manifested in low job 40 See: https://www.ambrosetti.eu/en/global-attractiveness-index (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 41 See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/competitiveness.html (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 105 creation and high unemployment”. Thus, a lack of competitiveness results in spreading poverty, and may be considered a vulnerability factor. Finally, it should be considered that the term ‘instability’ is conceptually linked to the above-mentioned fragility, lack of attractiveness, and lack of competitiveness of a country. Therefore, the hypothesis no. 1.6 is partially confirmed: the concept of fragility of a country, as well as the opposite of attractiveness and competitiveness, take shape as conditions of potential instability. 1.7 Socioeconomic vulnerability and Intelligence studies. This paragraph aims to establish to which field of study socioeconomic vulnerability belongs, providing an answer to the research question no. 1.7 (To which field of study does this vulnerability belong?). In general terms, vulnerability is a multidisciplinary topic, widely used in several disciplines like Geography, Sociology, Public health, and Disaster Management (Biswas, 2023). Paraphrasing Downing (1991), it can be stated that the word vulnerability has been used in different ways, especially referring to adverse consequences, rather than causes. Indeed, Mclaughlin et. al. (2002) argued that politics can change socioeconomic scenarios and affect vulnerability. While for Cutter et. al. (2003), which have been focusing on the construction of an index of social vulnerability to environmental hazards, the studies on the subject are based on social and economic factors which affect people. As illustrated in the first part of the chapter, some of these factors (e.g., corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, etc.) may result from actions of influence and interference carried out by hostile states and non-state actors. 106 Consequently, the analysis of the socioeconomic vulnerability factors for national security purposes belongs to the field of Intelligence studies, especially to the subfields of Economic Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Nevertheless, in academia, the latter is not as widespread as the first. In this regard, it should be noted the book was recently edited by Charlotte Heath- Kelly, Professor of Counterterrorism and Public Policy at the University of Warwick, and Barbara Gruber, Lecturer in IR and Security Studies at the University of Groningen (2023). In fact, in Vulnerability. Governing the social through security politics, they connect the welfare state with national security purposes and argue that governments and international agencies use the language of vulnerability to frame some needs as potentially dangerous. Apart from them, the vulnerability notion in which reference is made to society and economy, as well as to national security, comes from the Sendai Framework Terminology On Disaster Risk Reduction of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR): The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards42. Regarding the binomial Economic Intelligence and academia in Europe, the French tradition is certainly a reference point. Among the most important contributions there are Manuel d’Intelligence économique, the book in which Harbulot (2012) set out the reasons why this discipline has emerged as an innovative approach in higher education; Intelligence économique, where Delbecque and Fayol (2012) explored the theoretical aspects and the operational issues to increase the national competitiveness; and 42 See: https://www.undrr.org/terminology/vulnerability (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 107 Intelligence économique, Mythes et réalités, the book in which Moinet (2011) highlighted the activities of interest. Among them are, the acquisition of strategic information; support for market conquests by French companies; the ability to impose international standards, images, and values; and the protection of confidential data. It should be also noted the contribution of Revel (2012) about influence activity as a key concept of Economic Intelligence. Among the contributions of the Spanish academics, it should be noted the book Inteligencia económica y competitiva, written by González Cussac and Larriba Hinojar (2012) and the reflections of Fonfría Mesa (2020, 2011) about the economic cybersecurity and the evolution of the crisis. Referring to Italy, the link between socioeconomic vulnerability and Intelligence results in both academic and institutional fields. Over the last decade, the relationship between Economic Intelligence, conflicts and national interest has been the subject of many publications (Ortolani, 2020; Rizzi and Stucchi, 2020; Arezzini and Gaiser, 2019; Gagliano et al. 2016; Gaiser, 2015; Jean and Savona, 2011). It should be also noted a contribution to the subject of economic security, with specific reference to the link between intelligence services, entrepreneurship, and safeguarding jobs (Arcobasso, 2017). Among the issues with a potentially devastating impact on the competitiveness of the small and medium-sized firms of the country – which are the backbone of Italy’s productive system – highlighted from the Italian Security Intelligence Department in the reports to the Parliament of the last decades43, there are above all the infiltration of OCGs, foreign investment with predatory purposes, industrial espionage, 43 See: https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/category/relazione-annuale.html (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 108 disinformation, and influence activities carried out by state and non-state economic actors. In the report about the activities of 2015 (Governo Italiano, 2016: 70), for example, one can read that “compared to the past, thanks to corporate artifices, fictitious headings and relocation of corporate control in trusts and offshore anonymous companies, criminal groups have shown a greater propensity to dressing up”. The subject of foreign investments is particularly sensitive, suitable for a twofold interpretation, and requires a balance of the interests involved. On the one hand, foreign investments can be directed to the control or acquisition of companies operating in relevant sectors, as has already happened in the manufacturing sector (Governo Italiano, 2013). On the other hand, they are considered physiological and may represent opportunities for the national economy (Governo Italiano, 2011). Industrial espionage is considered a serious threat because it mainly concerns intellectual property, market strategies and the formation of customer packages, undermining companies, and related jobs (Governo Italiano, 2012). Influence activities and disinformation campaigns are tools for altering market dynamics (Governo Italiano, 2020) or conditioning the policy-making processes (Governo Italiano, 2022). It has long been believed that the above activities affect national competitiveness (Governo Italiano, 2014) and, within specific hybrid campaigns, they can result in dangerous attempts to intoxicate the public debate (Governo Italiano, 2023.) In brief, considering both the possible adverse consequences of socioeconomic vulnerability and the activities aimed to determine or exploit it, as well as the existence of a specific branch of study, a better understanding of the related issues requires a specific multidisciplinary approach, based on sound technical and legal knowledge. 109 1.8 Vulnerability signals, surveys, and statistical indicators. This paragraph aims to provide an answer to the research question no. 1.8 (How is socioeconomic vulnerability related to the concept of grey zone activities?), highlighting the relationship between the vulnerability signals of a socioeconomic context and some ‘sources of problems’ like corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, and distrust in institutions. In paragraph 1.4, these last have been called ‘vulnerability factors’ because they have a dual characteristic: they are instruments of conflict, but they can exist regardless of a grey zone conflict, causing further problems. Moreover, they determine the lack of something, with special reference to the lack of well-being, which is a characteristic of socioeconomic vulnerability (Donatelli, 2016). The vulnerability signals of a country include the social mood of the economy, the cost of leaving, poverty and labour disputes, expatriations, and distrust in others. All of them are measurable, and the related data could be used in a broader reasoning. The following sub-paragraphs are dedicated to the relationship between vulnerability signals and specific surveys or statistical indicators, referred to the Italian context. 1.8.1 Social Mood on the economy, and dishonest behaviours. In Sub-paragraph no. 1.4.1 corruption has been defined as illegal or dishonest behaviour, especially by people in positions of power. It is common knowledge that countries with a high rate of perceived corruption are considered less reliable to local and foreign investors, generating damage not only economically, but also in terms of image and reputation. Certainly, corruption is not the only dishonest behaviour which affects individual perceptions and economic choices, but maybe it is the easiest one to understand. 110 According to Marchetti and Vitale (2014: 4), for instance, “political instability is usually considered a disincentive for foreign direct investments, but it constitutes an ‘attractive’ feature for official development aid”. Moreover, some investments can hide predatory purposes or sophisticated plans of influence but, due to lack of data, it is not clear how citizens perceive these complex dynamics. In this regard, should be noted that, analysing an average of about 26,000 tweets per day, ISTAT measures the Italian sentiment on the economy through the social network Twitter, with the Social Mood on Economy Index (SMEI). It has been available since 2018 on the official website of the institute, where there are some interactive plots, including the following (Figure 15). It shows the daily time series of the SMEI (green line), along with the corresponding 7-day (blue line) and 30-day (red line) moving averages. The higher the value of the index, the better the sentiment. The significant peaks and valleys of the daily index are annotated and highlighted with a small square. On the ISTAT official website, the dominating topics emerging from the tweets of the day can be viewed by positioning the mouse on the peak. Thanks to this, it is possible to get an idea about the level of socioeconomic vulnerability in each period. 111 Figure 15 – Social Mood on Economy – Daily Index and Moving. Source: ISTAT (2023), https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/219600 1.8.2 Cost of living, and sense of powerlessness. The cost of living is a topic which affects almost all the population. In Italy, its trend is expressed mainly through two indices: the consumer price index for the whole nation (NIC), which is usually used as a measure of inflation for the entire economic system, and the consumer price index for blue and white-collar worker households (FOI). Both are calculated regarding the price of a basket of products, representative of all goods and services purchased by Italian households. Inflation, that is a general increase in prices, makes consumption and investment decisions by households and businesses more difficult, and determines a rise in interest 112 rates, which in turn makes investments more expensive. According to the condition in which people are at that time, this dynamic can enrich or impoverish them. Observing the time series, can be noted that the above indices are almost always increasing, as if price increases were inevitable, as if behind them there were no political, economic, commercial, or military choices. This can result in a widespread sense of powerlessness among the population, as noted by the Censis (2022) in the 56th Report on the social situation of the country. Indeed, inflation is a lever which can be operated with the awareness of causing harm to millions of people, who do not always have the tools to defend themselves. The oil crisis of the 1970s can be considered a school case. October 6, 1973, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria had attacked Israel to recapture the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights territories, which they had lost after the Arab defeat against the Israelis in the Six-Day War of 1967. King Faisal of Arabia, in agreement with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in using oil as a weapon, and with the support of the Emir of Kuwait, had called a meeting of the Arab member states of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC decided to gradually reduce oil production and increase the price to undermine the support for Israel in the West. A few days later, the sale of crude oil to the United States and other Western countries, including Italy, was decreed. The cost of oil rose sharply by 400% (Galeotti, 2006), inflation skyrocketed across the European Community, and governments had to take drastic measures to cope with the energy emergency. In other terms, consumers in Western countries were particularly affected due to general price increases (Chart 8). 113 Chart 8 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 1971-1980. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series (2023), https://seriestoriche.istat.it As happened during the oil crisis of the 1970s, a rise in one of the indices or their percentage change is usually indicative of a remarkable event, while their decrease does not correspond to a fall in prices. Therefore, their fluctuation facilitates the understanding of the above-mentioned sense of impotence detected by the Censis, and acts as an alarm during the analysis of facts of the past or current events. 1.8.3 Poverty, labour disputes, and social divisions. In his famous book Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, published for the first time at the end of the 1980s, Ulrich Beck (2005: 275) argued that “uncertainty pervades the social foundations” and, inter alia, it causes confusion about the market prospects. Robert Castel (2011), moreover, pointed out that feeling protected means being able to face the main risks of existence but, unfortunately, in many contexts the reduction of this capacity is accompanied by a generalized feeling of powerlessness. From this point of view, data on the risk of poverty or social exclusion may be considered the boundaries between a state of relative stability and one of ordinary 5 5,6 10,4 19,4 17,2 16,5 18,1 12,4 15,7 21,1 0 5 10 15 20 25 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 FOI NIC 114 insecurity (Chart 9). In addition, there are at least two types of survey: relative poverty (blue line), which refers to the economic difficulties in meeting the average expenditure per person; and absolute poverty (red line), which refers to who is unable to buy a specific basket of essential goods and services. Belong to this category of people who are in a condition of severe deprivation. Chart 9 – Incidence of poverty in Italy (%), years 2012-2021. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT data (2022), http://www.istat.it Even if certain levels of poverty could be considered structural and, in any society, risks shall be treated as functioning mechanisms (Ranci, 1997), their trends may provide useful indications in terms of the risk of social instability. Furthermore, attention should also be paid to the economic aspects of poverty because work is universally considered the means par excellence to obtain income, that is, a source of subsistence. In this regard, additional insights may result from data relating to labour disputes. Referring to Italy, ISTAT has published a time series with all data concerning the period 1949-200944. 44 See: https://seriestoriche.istat.it (accessed on: 30 September 2023). 8 9,9 6,8 7,6 7,9 8,4 8,4 7,7 9,4 9,4 15,8 16,6 12,9 13,7 14 15,6 15 14,7 13,5 14,8 29,9 28,4 28,3 28,7 30 28,9 27,3 25,6 25,2 24,4 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Absolute Poverty Relative Poverty Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion 115 1.8.4 Expatriations and uncertainty about the future. Emigration to other countries is a vulnerability signal too, especially if one considers the data, about the expatriation of young graduates, which may be considered a consequence of the uncertainty about the future. When their expatriation is temporary, it represents a professional experience or work growth which can be reinvested upon returning home. On the contrary, if irreversible, it results in a loss of human capital which impoverishes the potential growth of the country of origin, depleting it of qualified resources (Istat, 2023a). This phenomenon can also be linked to a loss of competitiveness. In this regard, ISTAT data shown in Chart 10 can be used to understand the extent of the phenomenon. During the period considered, for example, there has been a significant increase both in the overall number of expatriates (blue column) and in the number of expatriates with a university degree (orange column). Relevant is also the number of young people, between 15 and 34 years, who are not engaged in education, employment, or training (NEET), especially when compared to the number of those who, at the same age, are looking for a job. As shown in Chart 11, during the period considered, the number of NEETs in Italy (green column) was about six times higher than the number of young Italians seeking employment (purple column). It should be noted that, since 2010, the EU has been referring to the NEET rate as the indicator of the waste of energy and intelligence of the new generations (Eurispes, 2022). 116 Chart 10 – Italian expats, years 2012-2021. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT data (2023), http://dati.istat.it Chart 11 – Comparison between young Italians seeking employment and NEETs (k), years 2012-2021. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT data (2022), http://dati.istat.it, http://dati-capumano.istat.it 1.8.5 Distrust in others, and risks to social cohesion. As specified in the concepts accompanying the ISTAT’s annual report on well-being and stability, the relational networks to which individuals belong and in which they recognize themselves represent an important resource that allows them to pursue their 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Italian expats Intalian graduates expat 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Italians seeking employment (15-34 years) Italians NEETs (15-34 years) 117 ends, being able to rely on additional resources compared to the endowments of economic and cultural capital at their disposal (Istat, 2023b). In this regard, prevails the conviction that a general climate of interpersonal trust, high participation in associative networks, and the widespread presence of civic culture increase individual well-being and social cohesion. The confidence that people are willing to give to their fellow citizens is one of the main indicators of social cohesion. The so-called generalized trust plays a fundamental role in the construction of a productive, efficient, cooperative, and cohesive society, with a reduced propensity for opportunistic behaviours and corruption. However, the country seems to be going in the opposite direction. As shown in Chart 12, in Italy the level of distrust in others is very high. During the period considered, on a sample of about 50.000 people interviewed, aged over 14 years, around 80% believe that most people are not trustworthy (dark blue column). Around 20%, instead, is possible (light green column) or do not know (grey column). Whether it is shared or not, this is a signal which cannot be ignored. Chart 12 – Sample survey on trust in others, years 2012-2021. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT data (2022), http://dati.istat.it 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Must be careful Others are trustworthy Don’t know, refusal 118 1.9 A SWOT Analysis of the theoretical framework. To define a theoretical framework, the contributions of over one hundred authors have been reviewed, along with several dedicated reports. Moreover, a dozen surveys and statistical indicators have been divided into two categories (vulnerability factors and signals) and matched to the concepts investigated. This work has allowed us to provide the following definitions of GZA and socioeconomic vulnerability, which have been used in the next stages of research: GZA are political and economic actions, or other influence activities, carried out by state and non-state actors to undermine the socioeconomic and political stability of the target country, through an ambiguous but effective use of force, without meeting the standard of a military attack and its legal implications. The socioeconomic vulnerability of a country results from the emotional and material condition of fragility of its citizens. It is linked to economic hardship or a possible loss of well-being, caused by or related to certain factors such as corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, or distrust in institutions. Each of them could correspond to a specific signal. From this perspective, stand out the following strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (Chart 13). The three Strengths are internal and consist of the high profile of the cited authors, the reliability of the mentioned data, and the applicability of the framework to other countries, using surveys and statistical indicators of the desired geographical context. The two Weaknesses are internal too, and consist of the lack of data and declassified information that can be accessed, as well as the choice of not looking for a mathematical correlation between the mentioned data. 119 Chart 13 – SWOT Analysis of the theoretical framework. Helpful Harmful In te rn a l Strengths ▪ High profile of the cited authors. ▪ Reliability of the mentioned data. ▪ Applicability of the framework to other countries. Weaknesses ▪ Lack of data and declassified information that can be accessed. ▪ No mathematical correlation between the mentioned data. E x te r n a l Opportunities ▪ Widening the framework with other types of data. ▪ Improving it through the experience. Threats ▪ Undervaluation of the research due to the qualitative use of the mentioned data. Source: own elaboration. Opportunities may come from the external. One of them should consist in the widening of the theoretical framework with other types of data, such as the consumption level of antidepressants, published by the Italian Drug Agency. These data could be used to clear actions of cognitive warfare. The opportunity to improve the framework may come from everyday experience. The only threat which has been thought is the undervaluation of the research due to the qualitative use of the mentioned data. In this regard, it should be noted that, in the application phase, some structured analytic techniques for Intelligence analysis will be used. 120 1.10 Un análisis DAFO del marco teórico (ES). Para definir un marco teórico, se han revisado las contribuciones de más de cien autores, junto con varios informes específicos. Además, una docena de encuestas e indicadores estadísticos se han dividido en dos categorías (factores de vulnerabilidad y señales) y se han adaptado a los conceptos investigados. Este trabajo ha permitido establecer las siguientes definiciones de GZA y vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, que se han utilizado en las sucesivas etapas de la investigación: GZA son acciones políticas y económicas, u otras actividades de influencia, realizadas por actores estatales y no estatales con el objetivo de socavar la estabilidad socioeconómica y política del país objetivo, a través de un uso ambiguo pero efectivo de la fuerza, sin cumplir el estándar de un ataque militar y sus implicaciones legales. La vulnerabilidad socioeconómica de un país es el resultado de una condición emocional y material de fragilidad de sus ciudadanos. Está relacionada a las dificultades económicas o a una posible pérdida de bienestar, causada o relacionada con ciertos factores como la corrupción, las falsas percepciones, las divisiones sociales, la incertidumbre económica o la desconfianza en las instituciones. A cada uno de ellos podría corresponder una señal específica. Desde esta perspectiva, destacan las siguientes debilidades, amenazas, fortalezas y oportunidades (Gráfico 14, Chart 14). Las dos debilidades (D) son internas y consisten en la falta de información desclasificada a la que se puede acceder y la elección de no buscar una correlación matemática entre los datos antes mencionados. Se ha considerado como amenaza (A) la posible infravaloración de la investigación debida al uso cualitativo de datos cuantitativos. A este respecto, sin embargo, cabe 121 señalar que, en la fase de aplicación práctica, se han utilizado algunas técnicas analíticas estructuradas para el análisis de inteligencia. Se han considerado fortalezas (F) el alto perfil de los autores citados, la fiabilidad de los datos mencionados, y la aplicabilidad del marco teórico a otros países, utilizando encuestas locales e indicadores estadísticos. Además, se consideraron oportunidades (O) la posibilidad de mejorar el marco teórico con el tiempo y su ampliación a otros tipos de datos, como el nivel de consumo de antidepresivos, que podría utilizarse en referencia a acciones claras de guerra cognitiva. Chart 14 – Análisis DAFO del marco teórico (ES). Internas Externas N eg a ti v a s Debilidades ▪ Falta de información desclasificada a la que se puede acceder. ▪ Falta de correlación matemática entre los datos mencionados. Amenazas ▪ Posible infravaloración de la investigación. P o si ti v a s Fortalezas ▪ Alto perfil de los autores citados. ▪ Fiabilidad de los datos mencionados. ▪ Aplicabilidad del marco teórico a otros países. Oportunidades ▪ Ampliación del marco teórico a otros tipos de datos. ▪ Mejorar el marco teórico con el tiempo. Fuente: elaboración propia. 122 CHAPTER 2 – THE DARKEST EVENTS IN THE ITALIAN FIRST REPUBLIC (1948-1993). This chapter and the next two aim to provide an answer to the general question no. 2 (To study the relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability, is it possible to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, not based on the use of classified information, algorithms, or other sophisticated paid- form tools?). The question above is linked to the specific research question no. 2.1 (Is there any historical example of grey zone activity in Italy which can be analysed?). The latter, in turn, is based on the hypothesis that at least one of the several internal security issues which, affected the history of the Italian Republic, can be considered an example of grey zone activity. The reference is, above all, to aversive activity, criminal actions, and terrorist attacks that occurred between the late 1960s and early 1980s, which have been at the heart of parliamentary and journalistic inquiries, along with judicial proceedings and publishing initiatives. However, having regard to a wider time frame, one may realize that there is more. Indeed, between May 1947 and January 1994, about thirty episodes of slaughters of innocents, political murders, secret plots, alleged coups d’état and misdirections can be listed (Table 1). Many of these events are still classified or clouded by lies and supposed truths. Others have been partially declassified and may be deepened with a little bit of patience, the right tools, and some willingness. 123 Table 1 – Examples of the darkest events that occurred in Italy in the period 1947-1994. DATE EVENT DETAILS 01/05/1947 Slaughter of Portella della Ginestra Partially declassified 27/10/1962 Assassination of Enrico Mattei (President of ENI) Partially declassified 07/08/1964 Alleged conspiracy at the Presidency of the Republic, related to the “Piano Solo” (feared coup d'etat) Insufficient info 12/12/1969 Slaughter of Piazza Fontana - Milan Partially declassified 22/07/1970 Slaughter of Gioia Tauro Partially declassified 16/09/1970 Assassination of Mario De Mauro (journalist) Insufficient info 7-8/12/1970 “Golpe Borghese” (attempted coup d'etat) Insufficient info 17/05/1972 Assassination of Luigi Calabresi (police officer) Insufficient info 31/05/1972 Slaughter of Peteano Partially declassified 17/05/1973 Slaughter of the Milan Police Headquarters Partially declassified 28/05/1974 Slaughter of Piazza della Loggia - Brescia Partially declassified 03/08/1974 Slaughter of the train “Italicus” - Bologna Partially declassified 16/03/1978 Kidnapping of Aldo Moro (former Prime Minister) Partially declassified 20/03/1979 Assassination of Carmine Pecorelli (journalist) Insufficient info 27/06/1980 Slaughter of Ustica Partially declassified 02/08/1980 Slaughter of Bologna Partially declassified 17/03/1981 Discovery of the masonic organisation “Loggia P2” Partially declassified 18/06/1982 Assassination of Roberto Calvi (President of Banco Ambrosiano) Insufficient info 06/08/1982 Dissolution of the bank “Banco Amborosiano” Insufficient info 03/09/1982 Assassination of the General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa Insufficient info 23/12/1982 Slaughter of the train “Rapido 904” - Vernio Partially declassified 02/02/1990 Assassination of Enrico De Pedis (leader of the gang “Magliana”) Insufficient info 24/10/1990 Revealing the existence of the paramilitary organization “Gladio” (arrangement CIA / Italian secret services) Partially declassified 23/05/1992 Slaughter of Capaci / Assassination of Giovanni Falcone (anti-mafia prosecutor) Court documents 19/07/1992 Slaughter of Via D’Amelio / Assassination of Paolo Borsellino (anti-mafia prosecutor) Court documents 14/05/1993 Bomb attack in via Fauro - Rome Insufficient info 26/05/1993 Slaughter of Georgofili - Florence Insufficient info 27/07/1993 Slaughter of via Palestro - Milan Insufficient info 28/07/1993 Bomb attacks to the churches of San Giovanni in Laterano, and San Giorgio al Velabro - Rome Insufficient info 23/01/1994 Failed attempt on the Olympic stadium of Rome Insufficient info Source: own elaboration. 124 Regarding the security classification of the related documents, one needs some additional information. Firstly, each state administration keeps its classified files, but a public list of them does not exist. This makes it almost impossible to know which documents are classified, and where they are stored. And, inter alia, the length of the security classification is at least thirty years. Secondly, when these documents are declassified, they must be transferred to the state archives. To do it, a specific act of the head of the government is required but, if some documents come from NATO or a foreign intelligence service, their authorisation is also required. Thirdly, the declassification of documents and information falls entirely within the competence and responsibility of the authority that originally arranged it. After that, they can be transferred to the state archives. Therefore, the only things certain came from the Prime Minister’s Directives of 8 April 2008, 22 April 2014, and 2 August 2021, with which the documents about some historical cases – given in above Table 1 – were partially declassified to encourage the reconstruction of the darkest events occurred in the period 1969-1980. In the specific, the Prime Minister’s Directive of 8 April 2008 ordered the declassification of the documents related to the kidnapping and killing of Aldo Moro (1978), then Chairman of the political party Democrazia Cristiana (DC), as well as former Italian Prime Minister. The above order has been reiterated with the Prime Minister’s Directive of 22 April 2014. According to the information published on the website of the Italian Central State Archive, the documents concerned came from the following six state administrations: Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior45. 45 See: https://search.acs.beniculturali.it/OpacACS/guida/IT-ACS-AS0001-0005098 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 125 The Prime Minister’s Directive of 22 April 2014 ordered the declassification of the documents related to the following events: Slaughter of Piazza Fontana (1969), Slaughter of Gioia Tauro (1970), Slaughter of Peteano (1972), Slaughter of the Milan Police Headquarters (1973), Slaughter of Piazza della Loggia (1974), Slaughter of the train Italicus (1974), Slaughter of Ustica (1980), Slaughter of Bologna (1980), and Slaughter of the train Rapido 904 (1984). According to the information published on the website of the Italian Central State Archive, the documents concerned came from the following five state administrations: Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of the Interior46. The Prime Minister’s Directive of 2 August 2021 ordered the declassification of the documents related to the discovery of the masonic organisation named Loggia P2 (1981), and the revealing of the existence of the paramilitary organization named Gladio (1990)47. Considering that the declassification does not appear on the website of the Italian Central State Archive48, it can be said that it has not yet occurred. Regarding the official recognition of the existence of the paramilitary organization named Gladio – considered a NATO’s secret service – should be noted that it took place on 24 October 1990 at the Chamber of Deputies, during the question time, by the then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. The latter (Parlamento Italiano, 1990: 63), stated the following: Si tratta di una istituzione che esiste nel quadro della NATO e che, riproducendo quella che fu la vita vissuta nel periodo dell'occupazione nazista, prevedeva, in caso di occupazione da parte di forze nemiche, che vi 46 See: https://search.acs.beniculturali.it/OpacACS/guida/IT-ACS-AS0001-0005107 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 47 See: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2021/08/10/21A04889/sg (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 48 See: https://search.acs.beniculturali.it/OpacACS/guida/IT-ACS-AS0001-0005097 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 126 fosse una rete di salvaguardia, sia informativa sia di reazione: tutto nel quadro dell'Alleanza, con regole estremamente rigide anche di controllo reciproco e con una successione nel tempo che ha visto, in un primo momento, togliere armi a disposizione di questa rete cautelativa (proprio per evitare che vi fossero armi diffuse nel territorio nazionale e concentrarle); e man mano adesso, nel clima di sicurezza che si sta fortunatamente sviluppando, ritengo che l'Alleanza possa facilmente attenuare o forse addirittura sopprimere questa forma di sicurezza. Essentially, without saying the name, Andreotti confirmed the presence in Italy, at least from the 1950s, of a security network of the North Atlantic Alliance, equipped with weapons, and ready to intervene in case of occupation of Italy by enemy forces, referring to the Soviet communists. During his speech, he also declared that maybe it was time to reduce or eliminate that security measure. Later, the President of the Republic, Francesco Cossiga admitted his membership to Gladio, the training basis of which was in Capo Marrargiu, near Alghero, in Sardinia, where he was born and raised. To shed light, it should also be noted what was stated in 1997 by Senator Giovanni Pellegrino, then President of the Bicameral Committee of Inquiry into terrorism in Italy and the causes of failure in identifying those responsible for slaughtering (Parlamento Italiano, 1997): Nell'immediato dopoguerra, in una logica direi occidentale ed atlantica, si sviluppano nel nostro paese reti segrete che avevano vertici istituzionali sia nel Ministero dell'interno sia nelle istituzioni militari. Si tratta di reti clandestine che in qualche modo costituiscono gli antenati, l'albero genealogico di Gladio, ma che con la costituzione di Gladio non cessano di esistere. In essence, Pellegrino confirmed that some secret networks grew in Italy in the immediate post-war period, and their leaders were at the top of the Ministry of the Interior and military institutions. These networks did non cease to exist with the 127 creation of Gladio, which occurred in 1956, thanks to a memorandum of understanding between the CIA and the Italian Armed Forces Information Service (Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate, SIFAR). The paramilitary organization Gladio was part of a network named Stay Behind, which had several ramifications in the countries of the western block, or close to them: LOK, in Greece; ROC, in Norway; Absalon, in Denmark; Aginter, in Portugal; SDRA8, in Belgium; Stay-Behind, in Luxembourg; L&O, in the Netherlands; Counter-Guerrilla, in Turkey; TD BDJ, in Germany; P26, in Switzerland; and OWSGV in Austria (Ceruti, 2021). Gladio is not a case study of this doctoral thesis because its temporal dimension is too wide, and little information is available. However, it is certainly a valid example of grey zone activity: despite the journalistic investigations, the committees of inquiry, and the judicial proceedings, the truth never came out and, to date, there are no proofs regarding the link between this organisation and some of the darkest and bloodiest facts of the 20th century. In other terms, due to the security classification of the related documents, it remains unclear how Gladio affected the domestic politics and the socioeconomic dynamics of Italy. Nevertheless, for many of the mentioned events, there is a common thread: the role of Giulio Andreotti and Francesco Cossiga (Picture 1), who is probably still considered the most authoritative among Italian politicians. Andreotti49, originally nicknamed “il Divo” and recently renamed “the great director” (Giannuli, 2023), was a leading member of the DC, a proven mediator between different political forces and, for a long time, in perfect harmony with the Vatican on important issues such as the foreign policy. During his career, he received seventeen honorary degrees from many foreign 49 See: https://archivi.sturzo.it/sturzo-web/inventari/item/IT-STURZO-HIST001-000001/giulio-andreo- tti.html (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 128 universities. In the period 1972-1992, he was Prime Minister seven times, while between the years 1993 and 2003, he was prosecuted for mafia association and the assassination of the journalist Carmine Pecorelli, director of the magazine Political Observer (Osservatore Politico - OP). Both charges were dropped at the third degree of judgment. Francesco Cossiga50, nicknamed “the breaker”, was a leading member of the DC too, a fine connoisseur of the hidden sides of power, and a reliable reference point for Washington. During his career, he was Under Secretary of Defence, Minister of the Interior in the governments led by Aldo Moro and Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister, and President of the Republic. Picture 1 – Giulio Andreotti and Francesco Cossiga at the time of the Aldo Moro case. Source: online magazine Fatti per la Storia, https://www.fattiperlastoria.it/stay-behind-gladio Having regard to the above, the darkest events of the so-called First Republic (1948-1993) were reconstructed using mainly a collection of 150 books on terrorism, slaughters, and the study of political violence in Italy between the years Sixty and 50 See: https://presidenti.quirinale.it/page/8/cos-biografia.html (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 129 Eighty (D’Agnelli et al., 2005), supervised by the intelligence historian Giuseppe De Lutis, and published by the Tuscany Region. It is structured in four sections. The first is dedicated to the slaughters and the strategy of tension, with subsections about the events of Piazza Fontana, Peteano, the Milan Police Headquarters, Piazza della Loggia, Ustica, and Bologna. The second is dedicated to terrorism, with subsections about the assassinations of the police officer Luigi Calabresi, and the former Prime Minister Aldo Moro. The third section is dedicated to secret services and facilities, with subsections about Gladio and the Masonic organisation named Loggia P2. The fourth and final part of the collection is dedicated to political crime, with subsections about the Roman gang named Magliana, and the assassination of the journalist Carmine Pecorelli. The literature review which led to the choice of the case studies cannot be defined as historical research, but rather as a reconstruction of the facts narrated by academics and experts who experienced them firsthand, or carried out targeted and in-depth research, whose findings were published by respected publishing houses, albeit with informative purposes. After all, to study the darkest events one has to deal with at least three issues: the lack of comprehensive information; the possibility to access and read tens of thousands of pages of judicial documents; and the skills for identifying the boundary between shallow investigations and misdirections. In this regard, investigative journalist Stefania Limiti (2013) argued that, in retracing the political-criminal events which plagued Italy for decades, one can catch the shadow of someone who meticulously worked to impede their comprehension, even in the courtrooms. According to her reconstructions (Limiti, 2018), the secret services and the judicial police played an important role, but they were not the only ones. The topic of hidden powers is considered essential for the comprehension of the concerned events. Rita Di Giovacchino (2005), who dealt with judicial news about the Aldo Moro case and the mafia slaughters of 1992, highlighted that several times, public 130 life in Italy has been conditioned and polluted by political violence, terrorism, interests and strategies of secret associations and powerful criminal groups. On that, the researcher Giacomo Pacini (2014) pointed out the impact of the secret anti-communist struggle, conducted during the period 1943-1991. Professor Aldo Giannuli (2018) referred to the period 1960-1976 as a low-intensity civil war, characterized by 10 slaughters, about 1.500 attacks of different kinds, almost 4,000 deaths, and over 35.000 people injured. A period during which there was a clash between different groups of power, both national and international. A clash which, according to him, made Italy an international textbook case in the field of destabilization, both for the complexity of the affair and the geographical position of the country. Similarly, the journalist Romano Benini and Professor Vincenzo Scotti (2023: 376), authors of the book Under Special Surveillance. Conditioning networks of the First Republic (Sorvegliata speciale. Le reti di condizionamento della Prima Repubblica), affirm that “history is also determined by geography”. In this respect, they argue that, at the end of World War II (WW2), even if it was a co-belligerent country, France and the United Kingdom pressed to put Italy on the losing side to protect their interests by controlling its internal politics, and its economic entrepreneurship in the Mediterranean area. Moreover, they point out that the particularity of the concerned affair lies in the so-called ‘logic of convergence’ with external influences, defined as “hybridization between interests and actions of some components of Italian political and economic power, with those of criminal, subversive, and terrorist groups. In this context, a grey area was born” (Benini and Scotti, 2023: 378). 131 2.1 The selection criteria of the case studies. Having regard to the above, the selection of the case studies was based on some criteria considered to be useful in identifying three meaningful and representative events, concerning both the complexity of the issue and the range of the time frame. The chosen criteria are the following: 1. Availability of publications about the topic. 2. At least a technical, parliamentary, or judicial inquiry, plus a judicial trial on the topic, may have inspired the above publications. 3. Periodic organisation of commemorative initiatives which involve as much the authorities as the civil society, demonstrating that the selected event is seared into the national history and the collective memory. 4. Current value of the study is attested by the production of movies, drama series, documentaries, in-depth articles, or audiovisual material freely accessible online. Because of the above criteria, were selected: the assassination of Enrico Mattei (1962), then CEO of the Italian national energy group (ENI); the kidnapping and killing of Aldo Moro (1978), then President of DC; and the mafia slaughters of 1992, in which were assassinated the anti-mafia judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino (Table 2). Much has been written about Enrico Mattei’s assassination, and the role of the company led by him. Consider, for example, Tedeschi (1968), Zangrandi (1970), Provvisionato (1993), Galli (1996), Li Vigni (2003), Guarnieri (2007), Andreotti and Moffa (2011), Fasanella and Cereghino (2011), Perrone (2012), Lannes (2016), Bovo and Gregolin (2016), Lo Bianco and Rizza (2019), Calia and Pisu (2020), Caligiuri (2022), Ferrara (2022), Giordano and Bruni (2022), Li Vigni, (2022), Lomartire (2022), Oddo and Antoniani (2022), Pinasco (2023), and Sapelli (2023). Probably, much will be written in the future. 132 Table 2 – Matching between selection criteria and case studies of the past. No. SELECTION CRITERIA MATTEI CASE MORO CASE MAFIA SLAUGHTERS CASE 1 Availability of publications about the topic Yes Yes Yes 2 No. of committees of inquiry on the topic 3 2 8 No. of judicial trials on the topic 1 5 7 3 Periodic organisation of commemorative initiatives Yes Yes Yes 4 Current value of the study: - production of movies on the topic - production of drama series - production of documentaries - production of in-depth articles - production of other audiovisual materials, freely accessible online Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Source: own elaboration. A technical committee of inquiry was established in 1962 by Giulio Andreotti, then Minister of Defence. In addition, there were two judicial inquiries on the topic: the first ended in 1966, while the second lasted from 1994 to 2003. The only trial dedicated to the so-called ‘Mattei case’ was held in 1999, in Pavia, but no one was found guilty. Among the commemorative initiatives about the disappearance of Enrico Mattei (Picture 2), there are: the Holy Mass celebrated in the church of Santa Barbara, in the municipality of San Donato Milanese51; the memorial procession52; and the ceremony at the memorial of Bascapè, where his plane crashed53. On the case were produced: a movie (Il caso Mattei, 197254); a drama series (Enrico Mattei, l'uomo che guardava al futuro, 2009); some documentaries (e.g., Enrico Mattei. Ribelle per amore55, 2023; Enrico Mattei, la sfida del petrolio56, 2019); and in- 51 See: https://www.comune.sandonatomilanese.mi.it/-/le-cerimonie-in-ricordo-di-enrico-mattei (accessed on: 30 October 2023). 52 See: https://www.ilcittadino.it/stories/sudmilano/san-donato-enrico-mattei-sessantanni-dalla-morte- video-o_80471_96 (accessed on: 30 October 2023). 53 See: https://www.comune.bascape.pv.it/it/page/17555 (accessed on: 30 October 2023). 54 See: https://www.raiplay.it/programmi/ilcasomattei (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 55 See: https://www.raiplay.it/programmi/enricomatteiribelleperamore (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 133 depth articles (e.g., Biondani, 2022; Mastrolilli, 2022; Morando, 2022; Riva, 2022; Bocca, 2000). Among the other audiovisual materials freely accessible on YouTube there are, for example, the following video: Quando Enrico Mattei trasformò l’Italia in una Superpotenza57 (Nova Lectio channel, 1,2 million views); Enrico Mattei - L’imprenditore italiano che sfidò gli Stati Uniti58 (Starting Finance channel, 185.246 views); Enrico Mattei - L’Italiano che sfidò i signori del petrolio59 (Dentro La Storia channel, 14.360 views). Picture 2 – Enrico Mattei. Source: ENI's Historical Archive, https://archiviostorico.eni.com 56 See: https://www.raiplay.it/video/2019/01/Passato-e-Presente-Enrico-Mattei-la-sfida-del-petrolio- d8deedbe-76d4-4cb6-baea-623a1dcf3ab4.html (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 57 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Ons2YnuDUM (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 58 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8MmDZHlRc2A (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 59 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7aQhs4BDMM0 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 134 The kidnapping and killing of Aldo Moro have long been too the subject of publications. Consider, for example, Sciascia (1978), Zupo and Marini Recchia (1984), Balducci et al. (1987), Flamigni (1988), Biscione (1993), Flamigni (1998), Martinelli (2003), Selva and Marcucci (2003), Satta (2008), Fasanella and Rocca (2014), Cucchiarelli (2018), Antonetti (2019), Gotor (2020), Veltroni (2021), Miccoli and Grassi (2022), Formigoni (2023), Imposimato and Provvisionato (2023). Two bicameral committees of inquiry were held in the periods 1979-198360 and 2014-201861, but the Moro case was also dealt with in the parliamentary committees of inquiry on terrorism, the masonic organisation Loggia P2, and the Mitrokin archives. There were five trials dedicated to this case, during which forty-five terrorists of the organization Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse – BR) were found guilty: the first two- handed in 1985, the third in 1993, the fourth in 1997, and the last one in the period 1999-2020. Among the commemorative initiatives about the disappearance of Aldo Moro (Picture 3), there is the ceremony in memory of the security officers killed in via Fani, in Rome62; that organized in his hometown, Maglie63; and the laying of a wreath of flowers in Pistoia64. On the case were produced: four movies (Buongiorno, notte65, 2003; Piazza delle cinque lune, 2003; L'anno del terrore, 1991; Il caso Moro66, 1986); two drama series 60 See: https://notes9.senato.it/Web/Senato.nsf/All/65D35702D4BC968C412563FC003EAA0D?OpenDo- cument (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 61 See: https://parlamento17.camera.it/165?shadow_organo_parlamentare=2508&id_commissione=88 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 62 See: https://www.poliziadistato.it/articolo/commemorati-a-roma-i-caduti-della-strage-di-via-fani (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 63 See: https://www.corrieresalentino.it/2023/05/maglie-la-commemorazione-di-aldo-moro-nella-sua- citta-natale/#google_vignette (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 64 See: https://www.quinewspistoia.it/pistoia-ricordando-aldo-moro-cerimonia.htm (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 65 See: https://www.raiplay.it/programmi/buongiornonotte (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 66 See: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8j9xmx (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 135 (Esterno notte67, 2022; Aldo Moro - Il presidente, 2008); some documentaries (e.g., Il caso Moro: i 55 giorni e una notte68, 2023; Aldo Moro, il Professore69, 2018; 55 giorni: l'Italia senza Moro70, 2018); and in-depth articles (e.g., Ferlicchia, 2023; Liconti, 2023; Muratore, 2023; Saturnì, 2023; Limiti, 2017). Among the other audiovisual materials freely accessible on YouTube there are, for example, the following video: Alessandro Barbero - Le Brigate Rosse ed il caso Moro71 (Alessandro Barbero fan channel, 3,3 million views); C'era una volta ALDO MORO: cronaca di una congiura di Stato72 (Nova Lectio channel, 1,03 million views); Il caso Aldo Moro. Andrea Purgatori al Festival delle Resistenze BZ 201873 (Generazioni channel, 520.850 views). Picture 3 – Aldo Moro. Source: online newspaper Avvenire, https://www.avvenire.it 67 See: https://www.raiplay.it/programmi/esternonotte (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 68 See: https://www.la7.it/atlantide/rivedila7/atlantide-il-caso-moro-55-giorni-e-una-notte-16-03-2023- 476102 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 69 See: https://www.raiplay.it/programmi/aldomoroilprofessore (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 70 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CVPm5VJ3Ipg (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 71 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwcVQ4dtIcY (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 72 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KWVFI7yYxs (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 73 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5R-pXH89y7U (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 136 The mafia slaughters of 1992, in which the anti-mafia judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino (Picture 4) were assassinated – as well as Falcone’s wife and their security officers – occurred respectively the 23 May and the 19 July. The first is known as the slaughter of Capaci, and the second one is the slaughter of Via D’Amelio, in Palermo. Much has been written about both. Consider, for example, La Licata (2012), Barra and Falcone (2013), Ayala (2017), Di Matteo and Lodato (2018), Cappuccio (2019), Mascali and Scarpinato (2019), Follain and Luni (2021), Arlacchi (2022), Bianconi (2022), Biondo and Ranucci (2022), Ceruso (2022), Lo Bianco and Rizza (2022), Lucentini et al. (2022), and Melati et al. (2022). Inside the Italian parliament, the inquiry committees about the mafia there have always been, or nearly. The first was established in 1962, with the Law no. 1720 of the 20 December. Since then, it has been reconstituted at the beginning of each new parliamentary term. At the regional level, in the Sicilian Regional Assembly (ARS), there is an equivalent committee. This last, at the end of 2018, referring to the Borsellino quater trial, stated that there was “one of the most serious misrepresentations of Italian judicial history”, sharing the findings of the Court of Caltanissetta (Assemblea Regionale Siciliana, 2018: 2). Overall, there were eight trials: two on the slaughter of Capaci, four on the slaughter of via D’Amelio, and two related to the latter. Every year there are dozens of commemorative initiatives for the assassination of Giovanni Falcone, Paolo Borsellino, and their security officers, which also involve the schools of any level, not only in the province of Palermo. Among them, should be noted: the moments of silence in front of the tree dedicated to Falcone’s memory74, and in the place of the attack75, along the highway that connects Palermo to the airport of 74 See: https://www.rai.it/dl/rai24/assets/template/iframe.html?/dl/rai24/tgr/sicilia/video/2019/05/sic- strage-di-capaci-minuto-di-silenzio-albero-falcone-0d9ebae5-26a5-4a8e-9a07-48324142f5e7.html (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 75 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIhB9e_tVNM (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 137 Punta Raisi; and the torchlight procession in memory of Borsellino76. The above initiatives bring together national, and local authorities and ordinary citizens. On the concerned cases were produced: three movies (Era d’Estate77, 2016; Paolo Borsellino - I 57 giorni78, 2012; Giovanni Falcone79, 1993); two drama series (Giovanni Falcone, l’uomo che sfidò Cosa Nostra80, 2006; Paolo Borsellino81, 2004); some documentaries (e.g., Attacco allo Stato82, 2022; Educazione alla legalità83, 2020; Frammenti di un discorso morale - Falcone e Borsellino, la tv, le parole84, 2019; In un altro Paese85, 2005); and in-depth articles (e.g., Adnkronos, 2023; Bellavia, 2023; Comi, 2023; Melati, 2022; Pipitone, 2022). Among the others audiovisual materials freely accessible on YouTube there are, for example, the following videos: Venticinque anni dopo le stragi di Mafia del 1992: "Fu un colpo di stato"86 (Fanpage.it channel, 1 million views); Strage di Capaci: la ricostruzione dell'attentato in cui perse la vita Giovanni Falcone87 (Fanpage.it channel, 189.160 views); Voci di Capaci: il documentario sulla strage88 (Poliziadistato channel, 76 See: https://www.rainews.it/tgr/sicilia/video/2023/07/fiaccolata-borsellino-19-luglio-palermo-e3dafef2- 3c5e-4074-9fb0-34f7562c0e00.html (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 77 See: https://www.raiplay.it/programmi/eradestate (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 78 See: https://www.raiplay.it/programmi/paoloborsellino-i57giorni (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 79 See: https://www.primevideo.com/-/it/detail/0ITRG3AN21JWRITDCCFEPD5JTV/ref=atv_dp_share_- cu_r (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 80 See: https://www.raiplay.it/programmi/giovannifalconeluomochesfidocosanostra (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 81 See: https://mediasetinfinity.mediaset.it/fiction/paoloborsellino_SE000000000409 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 82 See: https://tg24.sky.it/cronaca/approfondimenti/strage-di-capaci-speciale (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 83 See: https://www.raiplay.it/video/2020/11/Antonio-Balsamo-Educazione-alla-legalita-b987823f-7a4b- 4503-8b4d-aea9e1135957.html (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 84 See: https://www.raiplay.it/video/2019/12/frammenti-di-un-discorso-morale---falcone-e-borsellino-la- tv-le-parole-043f45ac-e145-4f60-ab54-0bf727cc1b9a.html (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 85 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPHiMmSekw0 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 86 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZG9LymAz-c (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 87 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NcflH3dnMo (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 88 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gyZGtmLFbjg (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 138 115.300 views); Palermo, 29 anni fa la strage di via D'Amelio: i momenti dopo l'attentato in un video del 199289 (La Repubblica channel, 4000 views). Given this premise, in the following pages will be presented the selected case studies, the data about the vulnerability factors and signals of the material time – if available – and their correspondence to the definitions of GZA and socioeconomic vulnerability, are provided in Paragraph no. 1.9. Picture 4 – Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. Source: online newspaper La Nazione, https://www.lanazione.it 2.2 Enrico Mattei’s strategic assassination. “Enrico Mattei, the innovator”. This is the title of the webpage dedicated to him on the internet site of ENI’s Historical Archive as founder and first chairman of the company. There, for the following reasons, he is described as “a key figure in post-war Italian history and a major player in Italy's energy policy from 1945 to 1962”90, the year of his death: 89 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vFzE2qiuRno (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 90 See: https://archiviostorico.eni.com/aseni/en/news/IT-ENI-CMS0001-000064 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 139 When Italy's war ended with defeat and devastation, the country's economy ground to a standstill. Mattei immediately saw that methane, an energy source hitherto unknown in Europe, was the key that would enable Italian industry to unlock the great economic boom of the 1950s. From 1949 to 1953 the Italian gas pipeline network grew at break-neck speed from 257 km to 2064 km, making it the third largest in the world after the USA and USSR. It was a gamble that soon paid off, making it possible to supply gas across Italy quickly and cost-effectively. A master of networking, Mattei struck up a partnership with Italcementi, Fiat and Pirelli that would make him one of the founding fathers of the Autostrada del Sole, the artery connecting the north and south of the Italian peninsula. This forged a new physical connection between Italians in the era of mass motorisation, encouraging them to move around the country. It was in these years that the Agip network of service stations was created, allowing motorists not only to fill up with fuel but also to stop and rest - essential for safe travel. Once again, the pace of work mirrored the pace of the new ideas, with the construction of around 400 service stations a year throughout the country, made possible by their modular architecture. Energy supply remained a constant necessity for Italy, which had a paucity of raw materials and was grappling with the reconstruction. Mattei once again took on a major challenge, signing an agreement with Egypt in 1954 that shook the world oil scene to its core. In the face of the 'colonialist' contracts practised by the big oil companies, since the 1950s Eni has chosen to rebalance the regulatory regime and develop equal relationships with producer countries, laying the foundations for a model of responsible economic development. Under Eni's agreement, oil producing countries have an active and equal decision-making role through the establishment of joint ventures, as well as permanent professional training for local supervisors and managers. 'The oil belongs to them', as Mattei was fond of saying, in the belief that producer countries had to become autonomous in terms of energy supply, choosing the path of dialogue and cultural respect. In March 1957, thanks also to the efforts accomplished by Italian diplomacy, Mattei went to Teheran (Picture 5) for a partnership agreement between the Italian national oil 140 company (AGIP) and the Iranian national oil company (NIOC)91. According to Bucarelli (2010: 465), that deal was very innovative: Since for the first time the producer country was involved in the management of its oil resources. As a result, a new contracting formula enabled the Iranian State authority to share in the profits of crude oil production in addition to the royalties arising as usual from the oil concessions granted to foreign companies: Iran would get 75% of the overall profits (50% as royalty payments and 25% as revenues), whereas the Italian company would gain only 25%. Such a revolutionary agreement was supposed to have been planned and proposed personally by Enrico Mattei, the president of the Italian national energy group ENI (AGIP’s parent company). To Mattei’s mind, the «75-25» formula (which was also called «Mattei formula») appeared to be the only way to break the monopoly of the major Anglo-American oil companies, which had founded their power in the Middle East oil market on the «50-50» principle. Mattei’s crucial objective was to attain a share in the Middle East oil market so that Italy could have its own international petroleum supply, independent of the other international corporations (which had prevented AGIP from participating in the Iranian consortium, established after the international crisis caused by the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry). As a consequence, Mattei was firmly convinced that there were no other alternatives than upsetting the «50- 50» principle and weakening the existing international oil arrangements. Consequently, the Seven Sisters – Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey, British Petroleum, Mobil, Chevron, Gulf, and Texaco – “which controlled the global oil market at the time, and were represented in the Iranian consortium, were furious and tried in all ways possible to stop the agreement, which had been a long time in negotiation. But they failed, and the agreement contributed to Mattei’s fame as a protagonist of change in the global oil industry” (Luciani, 2012: 837-838). 91 See: https://archiviostorico.eni.com/aseni/it/explore/documents/IT-ENI-ST0001-002643 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 141 Picture 5 – Enrico Mattei with Reza Pahlevi, Shah of Persia. Source: ENI's Historical Archive, https://archiviostorico.eni.com The above-mentioned Mattei formula allowed ENI to make deals in different African and Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, in 1961, during the Cold War, Mattei signed an important agreement for a substantial supply of Russian oil, in exchange for pipes and pumps to construct the new oil pipeline between the Soviet Union and Central Europe, causing a scandal in the Western oil world. In this regard, Cantoni (2015: 189) argued that “national reactions to the ENI-SNE deal were not limited to American diplomacy and industrial environments. French and British protest was as vehement as the American one”. Indeed, Mattei was opposed by France because he supported the Algerian Independence War of 1954-1961, and by the United Kingdom for his anti- colonial stance. In a recent book about the Italian way to IR of that time, there is an excerpt of a statement from the US National Security Council of April 1961. It says that Mattei attacked the major Western oil companies and their international structure of pricing, with a destructive impact on the relations between the above companies and the governments of the Middle East. In addition, his tactics fueled a rise in anti-colonialist feelings, especially in Africa (Pinasco, 2023). 142 As well as abroad, Mattei certainly had opponents at home because he was the recipient of several defamatory campaigns. Besides, he was a charismatic and influential man, at the head of an industrial giant of the State, which was an influential player in its domestic and foreign policy (Greco and Oddo, 2016). Italy, at the time, was a country which aroused some concerns but the US President- elect, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, opened to dialogue with ENI. Thus, on the 10th of March 1961, the JFK’s foreign policy adviser, Averell Harriman, met Enrico Mattei at the Excelsior Hotel in Rome. Mattei persuaded Harriman about the compatibility between ENI’s stance and the geopolitical strategies of Washington where, in the following months, the issue was discussed (Pinasco, 2023). The story of Enrico Mattei ended on the 227th of October 1962 in Bascapè, near Pavia, where his flight crashed due to the explosion of a low-charge bomb (Picture 6). This became certain after the investigations linked to Mattei’s trial of 2005 and the trial on the disappearance of the journalist Mauro De Mauro (2006-2011), who was investigating Mattei’s assassination, and whose body was never found (Calia and Pisu, 2017). In this respect, it should be noted that, according to the findings of the judicial inquiry, the conspiracy to kill Enrico Mattei was covered by several misdirections. Among them, is the alleged mafia’s involvement (Lo Bianco and Rizza, 2019; Marino, 2014). Moreover, a recent journalistic inquiry (Morando, 2021) refers to a book from 1968 in which was narrated the story of an oilman assassinated by the French External Documentation and Counter-Intelligence Service (Service de Documentation Extérieur et de Contre-Espionnage – SDECE), ancestor of the present General Directorate for External Security (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure – DGSE). The book title is Le monde parallèle, ou la vérité sur l’espionnage, and it was written by Yves Ciampi, Pierre Acocce and Jean Dewever. 143 Picture 6 – Remains of the aircraft on which Enrico Mattei was travelling. Source: online newspaper il Post, https://www.ilpost.it Yves Ciampi was a French director and screenwriter but, according to Faligot and Krop (1985: 31), he “produced short instructional films for SDECE”. In their book La Piscine. The French Secret Service since 1944 there is a paragraph entitled “The Mattei Rumor” (Faligot and Krop, 1985: 170-171), where one can read the following: A former head of SDECE reported: ‘We never received an order to execute him. Mattei was in any case well protected, and we never made any attempt upon his life.’ However, the rumour grew. Captain Henri Trautmann, by then retired, made some startling revelations on the subject. In the process of knocking the rough edges off the young recruits to the Boulevard Mortier, this former director of Research at SDECE had fallen into the habit of romanticizing about the history of the secret services. Thus when the ‘Admiral’ decided to pass on a few confidences to three journalists, he embroidered the truth a little. For example, in order to illustrate the role of Action Branch during the Algerian war, he quoted the case of the execution of a ‘big shot’ in the oil business, who was linked up with the Algerian ‘rebels’. By coincidence, two years later Thyraud de Vosjoli, a former member of SDECE who had taken refuge in the United States, accused the Gaullist regime of having had Enrico Mattei assassinated. 144 In the same paragraph, they wrote the text of an interview with a leader of the Action Branch of the SDECE (Faligot and Krop, 1985: 171): ‘It wasn’t SDECE, I am convinced.’ The authors received this assurance from one of the leaders of Action Branch at the time of these events. […] Who was it then? ‘The Americans,’ our interviewee from Action Branch replied without hesitation. This was a hypothesis recently taken up by the Soviet secret services, who accused the CIA of having put the assassination out to contract, via the Mafia. To highlight the absolute lack of certainties about the assassins and the likely involvement of some secret service, it should be noted that, in the above book of 1985, the paragraph following the one dedicated to Mattei is entitled “SDECE Ignores the OAS”. Why? In a recent Italian book (Caligiuri: 2022) it is stated that new secret service documents prove that the conspiracy to assassinate the founder of ENI was conceived by the OAS, a French paramilitary organization. 2.2.1 Vulnerability factors and signals in the 1950-60s. In the previous chapter, were illustrated the vulnerability factors and signals considered useful to recognize an emotional and material condition of fragility linked to economic hardship or to a possible loss of well-being. The above condition may be caused by or related to certain factors such as corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, or distrust in institutions. Each of them could correspond to a specific signal. In the 1950-60s, Italy was experiencing an unprecedented economic expansion, which transformed it from an agricultural country into one of the world’s industrial powers. In the county, probably, corruption was not statistically detected from ISTAT, 145 or this data is not available to the public, while the Social Mood on Economy Index is a recent indicator, as well as the Corruption Perception Index. Similarly, surveys on social apathy, sense of powerlessness, and false perceptions about the most relevant topics did not exist. Moreover, historical data about poverty, young Italians seeking employment, NEETs, and intimidation against local administrators and journalists are not available. However, it was possible to analyse the time series about the cost of living, natural population, labour disputes, turnout, and expatriations. As illustrated in the sub-paragraph no. 1.8.2, the progressive increase of consumer prices is usually indicative of a remarkable event. It is the same for a fall in prices or a progressive contraction of increases, as shown in Chart 14 for the years 1959 and after 1963. One of the very few cases of deflation in Italian history occurred in 1959 and was attributed to a combination of factors, among which the reduction of manufacturing costs, and a low level of corruption (Tanzi, 2017). The years between 1963 and 1968, however, are considered an “interlude” (Cesaratto and Zezza, 2018: 3) between the “Italian miracle” (1951-1963) and the period of social conflict (1968-1978). From this perspective, one might think that the progressive contraction of increases in consumer prices after 1963, shown in Chart 15, was a consequence of the lowest cost of the energy supply, resulting from ENI’s expansionist policies. A lower cost of living results in greater individual availability of money and, probably, in greater well-being. The latter should help people to reduce their concerns about the satisfaction of their own needs. The increased natural population growth rate of about 9% per year, in the period 1957-1966 (Chart 16), could be read in this way. 146 Chart 15 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 1957-1966. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Chart 16 – Natural population growth rate in Italy (%), years 1957-1966. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Data about underemployment in Italy for the concerned period are not available, but those about expats and repatriates highlight a positive progression of the net migration since 1961 (Chart 17). Compared to the previous year, it may be interpreted as a signal of greater attractiveness of the country. 1,9 4,8 -0,4 2,7 2,9 5,1 7,5 5,9 4,3 2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 FOI NIC 8,03 8,34 8,96 8,55 9,13 8,41 8,66 10,18 9,07 9,21 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Natural population growth rate per year 147 Chart 17 – Italian expats, repatriates, and net migration, years 1957-1966. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Data about Italian expats in working age (Chart 18) show that the number of employed expatriated (light blue column) grew until 1962, while the number of unemployed in working age who moved abroad (orange column), decreased. It returned to growth after the Mattei’s assassination. Therefore, if those who moved abroad were looking for greater well-being, one might think that uncertainty about the future was caused mainly by unemployed in working age. Data about Labour disputes in Italy in the period considered (Chart 19) show an increase from 1731 to 4145 cases between 1957 and 1963, followed by a decrease up to 2387 cases in 1966. This data lends itself to a double interpretation. On one side, in the context of well-being, the increase in conflicts can be interpreted as the legitimate demand for even better conditions. On the other, it could be the result of interferences from actors interested in destabilising the context. -178.456 -116.421-112.369 -191.673-176.927 -136.523 -56.461 -68.314 -86.267 -90.008 -300.000 -200.000 -100.000 0 100.000 200.000 300.000 400.000 500.000 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Expats Repatriates Net migration 148 Chart 18 – Italian expats in working age (%), years 1958-1966. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it At this regard, it should be noted for instance that in the OSS Simple Sabotage Field Manual – Strategic Services (Provisional) of 1944 there were dedicated sections to “General Interference with Organizations and Production” and “General Devices for Lowering Morale and Creatin Confusion”, regarding the following contexts and interlocutors: “Organizations and conferences”, “Managers and Supervisors”, “Office workers”, “Employees” (OSS, 1944: 28-31). Chart 19 – Labour disputes in Italy, years 1957-1966. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Employed expats Unemployed in working age expats 1731 1937 1925 2471 3502 3652 4145 3841 3191 2387 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Labour disputes 149 Those who are inclined to the second interpretation will note that labour disputes in Italy diminished two years after Mattei’s assassination. Maybe because no longer necessary. It would certainly have been interesting to know the names of the companies and organizations involved. Data on turnout could confirm the above interpretation about the attempt to destabilize a country which aspired to energy independence. As shown in Chart 20, in fact, in 1958 the number of voters for the renewal of the Italian Parliament exceeded 93%. In 1963, during the economic boom, the number of voters decreased by almost 1%, and it did not change in the following five years. In this respect, it should be noted that Mattei’s assassination occurred in 1962, and in 1966 no one had shed light on the causes. On the contrary, it was ruled out the possibility of a bomb on the plane. Chart 20 – Turnout for the renewal of the Italian Parliament (%), years 1958, 1963, 1968. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it 93,8 92,9 92,8 94 93,1 93 92,2 92,4 92,6 92,8 93 93,2 93,4 93,6 93,8 94 94,2 1958 1963 1968 Chamber of Deputies Senate of the Republic 150 2.3 Aldo Moro’s kidnapping and killing. Aldo Moro was a statesman, even before a party leader and a former Prime Minister. He was aware that, to govern, it is necessary to simplify. At the same time, his analysis and political action always considered the different factors involved, and their non-linearity. He was able to elaborate anticipatory visions of the future and to grasp the great and profound social, economic, and political processes. Moreover, he was a skilful mediator, and a firm believer in the co-decision and co-responsibility processes, which presuppose mutual trust and convergence between different actors (Alfonsi and d’Andrea, 2018). History is full of political crimes which had significant consequences on the management of power. A characteristic of this type of crime is that, in most of them, the attack is generally the result of a conspiracy and not the initiative of a single actor. The Moro affair is, for Italy, the most emblematic of these kinds of events. The silence about his kidnap and murder transcends the responsibilities of both single actors and secret services. Moreover, it is part of a context in which an official truth has been outlined, shielding it from any doubt or perplexity. According to the above truth, the terrorist organization BR kidnapped Aldo Moro, held him prisoner for 55 days (Picture 7) – in Rome – and finally killed him. All without internal or international complicity, or institutional (Bartali et al., 2008). Aldo Moro was kidnapped on 16 March 1978, in via Fani, a street in Rome. There, an armed commando killed his security agents, without hurting him. Rome was immediately armoured, and on the 19 of March, Pope Paul VI appealed for his release92. Nevertheless, on the 9 of May, the body of Aldo Moro was found inside the trunk of a red Renault 4, parked in via Caetani, in the centre of Rome (Picture 8). 92 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHhtBj7IvN4 (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 151 Picture 7 – Aldo Moro during his imprisonment. Source: online newspaper Corriere della Sera, https://www.corriere.it According to the former Deputy Gero Grassi, a member of the committee of inquiry on Moro’s death, the initial reconstruction was short-sighted. Moreover, Grassi stated that he received political attacks, and “invitations to take care of something else”. (Grassi, 2023: 62). Moreover, he argued that many people lied and that he came to this conclusion after reading the documentation of 4 million pages, coming from eight processes, the committees of inquiry on Moro’s death, four committees of inquiry on terrorism and slaughters, and the committees of inquiry about the masonic organisation Loggia P2 and the case Mitrokhin. Judge Ferdinando Imposimato (2013), who dealt with the inquiry about Moro’s kidnapping and murder, in his book entitled “The 55 days that changed Italy” (I 55 giorni che hanno cambiato l’Italia) reminded that, during the investigation, the shadow of the Soviet secret services and Mossad appeared, but there was no evidence of an internal or an international political conspiracy. Over time, he changed his mind. One of 152 the reasons was the discovery of some unpublished documents of the crisis committee established at the Ministry of the Interior, hidden from the magistrates until 1991. Another reason was the hearing of the Minister of the Interior Francesco Cossiga at the Mitrokhin Commission (2002-2006), during which he revealed that, two months before the Moro’s kidnapping, Sergej Sokolov, a captain in the KGB, was tailing him. Moreover, qualifying the above kidnapping as a textbook operation of urban guerrilla, Imposimato reflected on the possibility of support to BR by the terrorist group Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion – RAF). The latter was considered a satellite of the STASI, the secret police of East Germany which, as is known, collaborated with the KGB. In this regard, in his book about the military history of the Italian First Republic, Professor Virgilio Ilari (1994) argued that on the 1st of February 1981, replying to the charges of the then President of the Republic about the alleged Soviet support to BR, the news agency Tass and the political newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya stated that Moro’s assassins were led by the CIA. In addition, they stated that, previously, both Aldo Moro and the Spanish admiral Luis Carrero Blanco were rebuked and threatened by Henry Kissinger because of their unpleasant politics: the historical compromise with the Communist Party of Italy (PCI), and the opposition to Spain’s entry into NATO. The journalist and essayist Giovanni Fasanella (2018) reminds us that evidence of RAF direct involvement has never been found, maybe because there was a systematic cleaning of the traces, from the pictures taken at the abduction site to the documents hidden to the magistrates. Moreover, some lines of investigation led to Hyperion, the alleged language school Paris-based in Quai de la Tournelle no. 27, founded in 1977 by three representatives of the Italian extra-parliamentary left. The above school was suspected to be a coordinating structure for terrorist organisations like OLP, IRA, and ETA, besides BR, with links to the CIA, KGB, and Mossad (Parlamento Italiano, 1983). 153 Picture 8 – Aldo Moro is found dead. Source: online newspaper La Repubblica, https://www.repubblica.it In the same book, Fasanella also reminds us that, on the kidnapping day, Parliament was voting for the confidence of the new Andreotti government, with a DC majority but with the external support of the PCI. Inter alia, it was rumoured that Aldo Moro would be the 7th President of the Republic. However, with his death, Italy was relegated to the rank of third-order country. During the fifty-five days of imprisonment, Moro wrote several letters and thoughts addressed, among others, to his wife Eleonora and his four sons, to the Minister of the Interior, and the secretary of his party. These texts, written in response to the interrogatories of his jailers, typed or photocopied, were laboriously collected (e.g., Gotor, 2008) and studied by historians, archivists, and graphologists, and today constitute the so-called Memorial of Aldo Moro (Biscione et. al., 2019). As highlighted by Professor Miguel Gotor (2011), it came to light in three different moments, over twelve years. The first group of documents dates to the 10th of April 1978, while the second dates to the 1st of October 1978, and was found in a terrorist lair in Milan. The third group, however, was curiously found on the 9 of October 1990 in the above terrorist liar, hidden behind a plasterboard. In other words, this last group of documents 154 would have escaped the controls carried out in 1978 by the special anti-terrorism unit led by General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa. The investigative journalist Paolo Cucchiarelli (2018: 5), in his book entitled “The last night of Aldo Moro” (L'ultima notte di Aldo Moro) reported the statements made by the President of the Republic, Giuseppe Saragat, immediately after the discovery of Moro’s body: “Next to the Moro’s corps, there is the corpse of the First Republic which could not defend his life. I have nothing to add”. Those who leave at the time of the concerned events believe that Aldo Moro could have been saved. It did not, because for reasons never fully detailed but intuitable, at the government level prevailed line of firmness, consisting of not making deals with terrorists. From what has been written on the Moro affair, the above-mentioned decision of the government, at best, consigned to history the image of its political immobilism. All the experts agree: Aldo Moro could have been saved. 2.3.1 Vulnerability factors and signals in the 1970-80s. In the 1970s, Italy went through a period of economic crisis, primarily caused by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. The first has been illustrated in the sub-paragraph no. 1.8.2, and it is so synthesizable: to undermine the support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War by Western countries, OPEC decided to use oil as a weapon, gradually reducing its production and increasing the price by about 400% (Galeotti, 2006). The second one occurred because of the Iranian Revolution. The price increase and the increase in the cost of living were added to serious social conflicts. This period, named ‘years of lead’, was also characterized by the extremization of the political debate, which resulted in several street violence episodes, 155 and terrorist actions. Among them, those summarised in Table 1, at the beginning of the chapter. The recovery took place in 1984, thanks to the decrease in oil prices, and was accompanied by a significant increase in public spending. Among the main measures of the government, were those against tax evasion and illegal building, as well as the reform of the television system, which allowed the creation of private national television channels. The Prime Minister was the socialist Bettino Craxi. As established, some vulnerability factors and signals were considered useful to recognize the emotional and material condition of fragility of Italian citizens, linked to economic hardship or a possible loss of well-being. Data about the perceived corruption in the 1970s-80s are not available, but it can be assumed that it was high because of the Lockheed scandal of 1976-1979. At that time, many people involved in the negotiations for the acquisition of some C-130 aircraft by the Italian Ministry of Defence were accused of accepting bribes. Even if not related to the facts, on the 15 of June 1978 the President of the Republic, Giovanni Leone, resigned. In those years, there was also the case of the slush funds distracted from two companies of the group IRI – the Italian Institute for Industrial Reconstruction – for corruptive purposes (Parlamento Italiano, 1988). Even in this case, there is no data on the social mood of the economy. Those on the cost of living are instead available on the ISTAT Time Series archive and, all in all, reflect the cost trend for energy supply (Chart 21). However, it should be noted that in 1978 there was an increase of 12,4% (light blue line), even if the oil shock caused by the Iranian revolution occurred in 1979. From 1980, the price increases were more contained. To have an idea about the perception of a relevant topic like the cost of leaving, one may consider other indicators such as the natural population growth rate, 156 and the unemployment rate. Chart 21 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 1976-1985. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series (2023), https://seriestoriche.istat.it As stated in the sub-paragraph no. 2.2.1, a lower cost of living results in greater individual availability of money and vice versa, affecting well-being. The latter should help people to reduce their concerns about the satisfaction of their own needs. The trend of the natural population growth rate in the period 1976-1985 (Chart 22), however, reflects a different dynamic. It could be read both as a demographic decline and a signal of uncertainty about the future. During the period 1977-1985, the unemployment rate increased by over 3% (Chart 21). It certainly can be interpreted as a signal of socioeconomic vulnerability because it reflects an emotional and material condition of fragility. Moreover, if one considers it together with data on unemployed in working age expats (Chart 22), it can help to understand the high level of social conflict of this historical period. 16,5 18,1 12,4 15,7 21,1 18,7 16,3 15 10,6 8,6 0 5 10 15 20 25 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 FOI NIC 157 Chart 22 – Natural population growth rate in Italy (%), years 1976-1985. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Chart 23 – Unemployment rate in Italy (%), years 1977-1985. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Data about expats and repatriates highlight a negative progression of the net migration since 1976 (Chart 24). Overall, it may be considered as a clear signal of the low attractiveness of the country. In the concerned period, data about Italian expats in working age (Chart 25) were constant. Only in 1984, there was a noticeable change in the relationship between the number of employed expatriated (light blue column) and the number of unemployed in 4,15 3,47 3 2,34 1,52 1,55 1,72 0,87 1,09 0,7 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Natural population growth rate per year 6,4 6,6 6,9 6,9 7,5 8,2 9,1 9,6 9,6 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Unemployment rate per year 158 working age who moved abroad (orange column), coinciding with the economic recovery. Chart 24 – Italian expats, repatriates, and net migration, years 1976-1985. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Chart 25 – Italian expats in working age (%), years 1976-1985. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it 18.750 14.330 4.347 2.743 5.586 -335 -5.818 2.666 -316 540 -20.000 0 20.000 40.000 60.000 80.000 100.000 120.000 140.000 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Expats Repatriates Net migration 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Employed expats Unemployed in working age expats 159 Data about labour disputes in Italy in the period considered (Chart 26) show an increase from 2667 to 3259 cases between 1976 and 1977, followed by a slight decrease to 2465 in 1978, and a sharp and progressive decrease in the following years up to 1166 cases in 1985. The increase in labour disputes until the Moro affair could easily be considered a remarkable coincidence. Chart 26 – Labour disputes in Italy, years 1976-1985. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Data on turnout, as often happens, seems to confirm the emotional and material condition of fragility of Italian people linked to the consumer price increase between 1976 and 1980; the collapse of the natural population growth rate in the decade considered; the unemployment rate increase and the high percentage of Italian employed expatriated in the same period. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that concerned turnout was caused by the cited episodes of corruption, the high levels of social conflict, or the distrust in institutions driven by the Government's inaction during the Moro affair. As shown in Chart 27, in fact, in 1976 the number of voters for the renewal of the Italian Parliament exceeded 93%. In 1979, after Aldo Moro’s kidnapping 2667 3259 2465 1979 2224 2176 1741 1550 1759 1166 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Labour disputes 160 and killing, the number of voters decreased by almost 2%, then dropped by two more points. Chart 27 – Turnout for the renewal of the Italian Parliament (%), years 1976, 1979, 1983. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it 2.4 The Mafia slaughters of 1992. The first of the two mafia slaughters of 1992 occurred on the 23 of May, along the highway that connects Palermo to the airport of Punta Raisi, near the town of Capaci. For this reason, it is known as the ‘Slaughter of Capaci’ (Strage di Capaci). It was organized to assassin the anti-mafia judge Giovanni Falcone who, together with his colleague Paolo Borsellino, was fighting the organization known as ‘Cosa Nostra’. Killers placed a 500 kg bomb of Trinitrotoluene and Semtex T4 in a duct under the highway and detonated it while Falcone, his wife, and their security agents were passing. One of the cars on which they were travelling was disintegrated, while the other two were invested by debris. Falcone was aware of the risks of his job because 93,4 90,6 88 93,5 90,7 88,8 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 1976 1979 1983 Chamber of Deputies Senate of the Republic 161 often exclaimed: “People like us can blow up any minute, like the button of a jacket” (Di Giovacchino, 2005: 337). Indeed, Falcone and the other judges of the anti-mafia pool succeeded in bringing to trial – named ‘Maxi-trial’ (Maxiprocesso) – the heads of the organisation and hundreds of mobsters, for a total of 475 people. After 349 hearings and 35 days of the council chamber, 460 accused persons were judged. Among them, 346 were condemned and 114 were acquitted. Overall 19 life sentences and 2265 years in prison were inflicted93. Afterwards, Falcone and the anti-mafia pool began to investigate the relationship between the mafia and politics but did not have the time. The same thing happened to General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa on 3 September 1982, when he was Prefect of Palermo. In this regard, it should be noted that, according to the former Minister of Defence, Salvo Andò, Falcone was isolated both from politics and judges (Terranova, 2019). The reason is easily understandable. Benini and Scotti (2023: 35), for example, highlight as follows, in the original language: La Mafia è un’associazione criminale che possiede una caratteristica ben specifica: si nutre e cresce grazie ai rapporti con la politica e le istituzioni. Per questo motivo quell’«area grigia» tra poteri occulti e apparati dello Stato che caratterizza la rete di «condizionamento interno» che ha agito nei diversi momenti e nelle vicende della Prima Repubblica ha sempre trovato nell’organizzazione mafiosa e nei suoi rapporti con alcune componenti dello Stato un riferimento costante e decisivo. Proprio per questa sua necessità di relazionarsi con il potere e di nutrirsi di corruzione e appalti pubblici la Mafia agisce per condizionare la vita politica e costituisce un soggetto eversivo rispetto all’ordine democratico. 93 See: https://www.fondazionefalcone.org/maxiprocesso (accessed on: 15 October 2023). 162 Essentially, they argue that the mafia is a subversive actor of the democratic order, which acts in the grey area between occult powers and state apparatus, it feeds on corruption and public procurement and grows thanks to the relations with politics and institutions. On the 19 of July 1992, fifty-seven days after the Slaughter of Capaci, another explosion shook the city of Palermo. It was the car bomb parked in via D’Amelio, by which were assassinated the deputy public prosecutor Paolo Borsellino – a colleague and close friend to Giovanni Falcone – and his security agents (Picture 10). Picture 9 – Slaughter of Capaci, 23 May 1992. Source: online magazine Focus, https://www.focus.it/cultura/storia According to judicial reconstructions, Borsellino figured out who was the political orchestrators of Falcone’s assassination. Moreover, there were rumours about his possible appointment as National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor (Di Giovacchino, 2005). Such a possibility was not pleasing to Cosa Nostra and its political referents. In this respect, Benini and Scotti (2023) point out that there were several testimonies according to which an entity outside of the organization forced the then-leader of Cosa Nostra, Totò Riina, to bring forward Borsellino’s assassination. Among other things, alleged agents 163 of Italian secret services came first to the place of the slaughter, by subtracting the Borsellino's agenda. The so-called ‘red agenda’ was never found. Deepening the case of Giovanni Pantaleone Aiello, a former policeman suspected of engaging in the Slaughter of Via D’Amelio, the journalist Lirio Abbate (2021) refers to the alleged involvement of an unknown number of rogue agents of the secret services. In this regard, emblematic is the legal case of Bruno Contrada, a senior officer of the then Information and Democratic Security Service (SISDE). He was arrested in 1992 because accused of external complicity with the mafia. In 2007, he was unjustly sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In 2015, the European Court of Human Rights declared the illegitimacy of the above sentence, condemning Italy to pay compensation for damages caused to Contrada94. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Cassation consequently declared invalid the judgment of 2007. The legal battle for compensation, however, ended in 2023 (Ansa, 2023b). Picture 10 – Slaughter of Via D'Amelio, 19 July 1992. Source: online magazine Storica National Geographic, https://www.storicang.it 94 See: https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_20_1.page?facetNode_1=0_8_1_8&contentId=SDU11- 43400&previsiousPage=mg_1_20# (accessed on: 30 October 2023). 164 It should be also noted that, on the 25 of June 1992, about a month before being assassinated, Paolo Borsellino spoke to an event organized in Palermo, in the atrium of the city library. It was his latest public intervention and, referring to the hostility toward Giovanni Falcone and his commitment against Cosa Nostra, Borsellino stated as follows: “The judiciary, maybe, has more faults than any other”95. Indeed, as it has been recently reminded by one of the Borsellino’s daughters from the newspaper columns (e.g., Palazzolo, 2023), during the so-called ‘Borsellino Quarter’, the last trial on the Slaughter of Via D’Amelio, the magistrates indicated the former police official Arnaldo La Barbera, and the former prosecutor of Caltanissetta Giovanni Tinebra, like the primarily responsible for the misdirections on the case. Regardless of facts and opinions, one must deal with storytelling. In the historical section for Italy of the Nation Geographic, for instance, it is highlighted that after thirty years and four trials, the massacre of Paolo Borsellino and his security agents remains surrounded by mystery, and the judges of the court of Caltanissetta – where the trials were held96 – defined it as the greatest false lead in the history of Italy (Ferrara, 2022). 2.4.1 Vulnerability factors and signals in the 1990s. The slaughters of Capaci and via D’Amelio occurred in a particular period, mainly characterized both by the advancement in the European integration process, and the beginning of ‘Tangentopoli’ or ‘Clean hands’ (Mani pulite), the most important judicial inquiry in the history of the Italian Republic. On the 7th of February 1992, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the old European Community (EEC) became the European Union (EU), opening to the free 95 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKxGXuvjqVo (accessed on: 30 October 2023). 96 See: https://www.archivioantimafia.org/atti_damelio.php (accessed on: 30 October 2023). 165 movement of goods, workers, and financial resources. New business opportunities for OCGs, in a new global economic reality developed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to Loretta Napoleoni (2009), the above reality is managed by the rogue economy, an indomitable force in the hands of new generations of unscrupulous businessmen, entrepreneurs, and financiers. On the 7th of February 1992, during the election campaign for the renewal of the Parliament, the public prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro arrested a leading member of the Socialist Party (PSI), Mario Chiesa, surprised to accept a bribe from a well-known entrepreneur. Chiesa confessed his crimes and revealed some details about the public contracts award in Italy. Moreover, he declared that all major political parties took bribes. In a short time, the inquiry was extended to involve the main exponents of Italian politics97. On the stands also ended Bettino Craxi, former Prime Minister, and President of the PSI, who declared that all political parties received illegal contributions. In particular, the PCI was financed by the KGB98. Therefore, Tangentopoli swept away the old political class, determining the implosion of the so- called First Republic. 1992 also marked a watershed in the history of Italian capitalism because the profit- seeking public bodies (ENEL, ENI, INA and IRI), which contributed to the growth of the country after World War II, were transformed into joint-stock companies. It was argued that selling to private individuals would make public companies more efficient, strengthening the country’s productive fabric, but it was not so. It should be also noted that, in September 1992 the Italian currency suffered a speculative attack, which brought the country into recession. 97 See: https://www.raicultura.it/storia/accadde-oggi/Arrestato-Mario-Chiesa-01e3f941-5bc2-4a83-9300- 648693cc32da.html (accessed on: 30 October 2023). 98 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pcwbm2gL6k (accessed on: 30 October 2023). 166 As established, some vulnerability factors and signals were considered useful to recognize the emotional and material condition of fragility of Italian citizens, linked to economic hardship or a possible loss of well-being. The only data about the perceived corruption in the 1990s are those of the 1995- 1999 five-year period (Chart 28). At that time, the CPI used a scale from 0 to 10 to measure how corrupt each country’s public sector was perceived to be, according to experts and businesspeople. On that scale, 10 meant “very clean”, while 0 meant "highly corrupt”. Thus, available data shows a high level of perceived corruption in the years before 1997, when the score passed from 2,99 to 3,42. Chart 28 – Corruption Perception Index in Italy, years 1995-1999. Source: Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org Referring to the cost of living in the concerned period, Chart 29 shows a progressive contraction of increases in consumer prices. The only exception is the year 1995 when there was an increase of 5,4%. This trend was due to a combination of factors. Among them, a policy of wage moderation and the massive devaluation of the 2,99 3,42 5,03 4,6 4,7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Corruption Perception Index in Italy 167 currency, caused by its exit from the European Monetary System (EMS) exchange-rate mechanism in 1992 (Parlamento Europeo, 1998). Chart 29 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 1990-1999. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series (2023), https://seriestoriche.istat.it The study of the cost of living aims to perceive a possible widespread sense of powerlessness among the population – not detected by a specific survey – related to the concerns about the satisfaction of its own needs. As stated before, usually a lower cost of living results in greater individual availability of money and, probably, in greater well-being. However, the collapse of the natural population growth in the period 1990- 1999 (Chart 30) seems to indicate the opposite. Data about unemployment are clear: between 1990 and 1999 the rate passed from 9% to 10,9% with peaks of 11,2% (Chart 31), reflecting a situation of socioeconomic malaise. 6,1 6,4 5,4 4,2 3,9 5,4 3,9 1,7 1,8 1,6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 FOI NIC 168 Chart 30 – Natural population growth rate in Italy (%), years 1990-1999. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Data about Italian ex-pats in working age for the concerned period are not available, but those about ex-pats and repatriates highlight a negative progression of the net migration since 1992 (Chart 32). This is certainly a signal of the low attractiveness of the country, as well as a signal of socioeconomic malaise. Chart 31 – Unemployment rate in Italy (%), years 1990-1999. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it As stated before, the term relative poverty refers to the economic difficulties in 0,64 0,31 0,53 -0,04 -0,37 -0,51 -0,37 -0,43 -0,77 -0,6 -1 -0,8 -0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Natural population growth rate per year 9 8,6 8,7 9,7 10,6 11,2 11,2 11,2 11,3 10,9 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Unemployment rate per year 169 meeting the average expenditure per person. Consequently, its increase is both a vulnerability signal and a potential source of social divisions. Data about the concerned period show a decrease after the slaughters of 1992, followed by an increase since 1994 (Chart 33). Chart 32 – Italian expats, repatriates, and net migration, years 1990-1999. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Chart 33 – Incidence of relative poverty in Italy (%), years 1990-1999. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it 21.119 4.526 4.623 -5.719 -12.641 -6.414 -10.201 -8.632 -8.202 -24.131 -40.000 -20.000 0 20.000 40.000 60.000 80.000 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Expats Repatriates Net migration 11,7 11,8 11,7 10,7 10,2 10,6 10,3 12 11,8 11,9 9 9,5 10 10,5 11 11,5 12 12,5 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Relative Poverty 170 According to ISTAT data shown in Chart 34, the 1990s were not characterized by a particular increase in labour disputes. Both in 1990 and 1998, for instance, there was the same number of cases. Chart 34 – Labour disputes in Italy, years 1990-1999. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it Data on turnout, as often happens, seems to confirm the emotional and material condition of fragility of Italian people, linked to the collapse of the natural population growth rate in the decade considered; the unemployment rate increase, and the negative progression of the net migration since 1992. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that concerned turnout was caused by the cited scandal of illegal party funding, and the mafia attack against the state through the slaughters of Capaci and Via D’Amelio. As shown in Chart 35, in fact, in 1992 the number of voters for the renewal of the Italian Parliament was about 97%. In 1994, after the previously described events, the number of voters decreased by almost 1-2%, then dropped by three more points. 1094 784 895 1047 858 545 904 920 1097 753 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Labour disputes 171 Chart 35 – Turnout for the renewal of the Italian Parliament (%), years 1992, 1994, 1996. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT time series, https://seriestoriche.istat.it 2.5 A deductive illustration of the result achieved. GZA were defined as political and economic actions, or other influence activities, carried out by state and non-state actors to undermine the socioeconomic and political stability of the target country, through an ambiguous but effective use of force, without meeting the standard of a military attack and its legal implications. Enrico Mattei, Aldo Moro, Giovanni Falcone, and Paolo Borsellino were victims of GZA. Moreover, for each of these cases, there were several attempts to mislead, to hide the truth. As illustrated in the paragraph no. 2.2, Enrico Mattei was assassinated, and in the sabotage of his plane seems to be involved a foreign secret service or the OAS, a French paramilitary organization. Moreover, his assassination may be interpreted as an attempt to destabilize a country which aspired to energy independence: Italy. Aldo Moro’s kidnapping and killing, described in Paragraph no. 2.3, was a political crime committed by BR, an Italian terrorist organisation probably supported by the terrorist group RAF, manoeuvred by KGB. But there is also someone who thinks about 87,3 86,1 82,9 86,8 85,8 82,2 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 1992 1994 1996 Chamber of Deputies Senate of the Republic 172 a CIA operation because of Moro’s activism in promoting the DC-PCI government alliance. The slaughters of 1992 were committed by the mafia, which was a strong non-state actor with the aim to influence economic and political processes. Even in these events, there is the shadow of some secret service agents, domestic and foreign. The above assassinations occurred in periods characterized by socioeconomic vulnerability, intended as an emotional and material condition of the fragility of a country’s citizens, linked to the economic hardship or a possible loss of well-being, caused by or related to certain factors such as corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, or distrust in institutions. Enrico Mattei’s strategic assassination occurred in 1962. In 1963, during the economic boom, the number of voters for the renewal of the Italian Parliament decreased by almost 1%, and it did not change in the following five years, as shown in Subparagraph no. 2.2.1. Moreover, in the decade analysed, the number of labour disputes increases until the year after the Mattei’s death, even if there was a minor increase in the cost of leaving. Aldo Moro’s kidnapping and killing occurred in 1978. In 1979, the number of voters for the renewal of the Italian Parliament decreased by almost 2%, then dropped by two more points. This trend can be interpreted as an example of distrust in institutions, probably caused by the cited episodes of corruption, the high levels of social conflict, or the Government inaction during the Moro’s imprisonment by terrorists. For sure, an emotional and material condition of fragility of Italian people may have arisen from the consumer price increase of the period 1976-1980, and the unemployment rate increase shown in Subparagraph no. 2.3.1. The assassination of Giovanni Falcone, Paolo Borsellino, and the people who were 173 with them occurred in 1992. In 1994, the number of voters for the renewal of the two branches of the Italian Parliament decreased by almost 1-2%, then dropped by three more points. A lower turnout is, by definition, a signal of distrust in the political class which leads the democratic institutions, or aims to do it. For sure, an emotional and material condition of fragility of Italian people seems to be linked to the unemployment rate increase in the period analysed, and the negative progression of the net migration, as well as to the cited scandal of illegal party funding. Besides, the topic of politicians who enrich themselves illegally, as well as unfairly, can cause distrust in others, and concrete risks to the social cohesion. The cases examined demonstrate that socioeconomic vulnerability is linked to GZA. These last can cause an emotional and material condition of the fragility of a country’s citizens, or they can exploit it to undermine the stability of the target country. In both cases, feedback comes at least from the turnout to general elections. The aforementioned judgment on the relationship between socioeconomic vulnerability and GZA has been expressed by deductive inference, a rule of logical reasoning by which, following Peirce’s sequence Rule – Case – Result, from the truth of some propositions, one can deduce the truth of another proposition (Table 3). Table 3 – Deductive illustration of the result achieved in Chapter 2. Rule: Enrico Mattei, Aldo Moro, Giovanni Falcone, and Paolo Borsellino were victims of GZA. Case: Their assassinations occurred in a period of socioeconomic vulnerability. Result: Socioeconomic vulnerability is linked to GZA. Source: Own elaboration. 174 In this respect, for completeness, it should be pointed out as follows (Buchler, 1955: 197): The cognition of a rule is not necessarily conscious, but is of the nature of a habit, acquired or congenital. The cognition of a case is of the general nature of a sensation; that is to say, it is something which comes up into present consciousness. The cognition of a result is of the nature of a decision to act in a particular way on a given occasion. 2.6 Una ilustración deductiva del resultado obtenido (ES). Las actividades en la zona gris se definieron como acciones políticas y económicas, u otras actividades de influencia, realizadas por actores estatales y no estatales con el objetivo de socavar la estabilidad socioeconómica y política del país objetivo, a través de un uso ambiguo pero efectivo de la fuerza, sin cumplir el estándar de un ataque militar y sus implicaciones legales. Enrico Mattei, Aldo Moro, Giovanni Falcone y Paolo Borsellino fueron víctimas de las GZA. Además, para cada uno de estos casos hubo varios intentos de desviar, de ocultar la verdad. Como se indica en el epígrafe no. 2.2, Enrico Mattei fue asesinado, y en el sabotaje de su avión parece estar involucrado un servicio secreto extranjero o la OAS, una organización paramilitar francesa. Además, su asesinato puede interpretarse como un intento de desestabilizar a Italia porque aspiraba a la independencia energética. El secuestro y asesinato de Aldo Moro, descrito en el epígrafe no. 2.3, fue un delito político cometido por las Brigadas Rojas, una organización terrorista italiana probablemente apoyada por la RAF, a su vez maniobrada por el KGB. Pero también hay alguien que piensa en una operación de la CIA debido al activismo de Moro en la promoción de la alianza de gobierno entre los partidos políticos DC y PCI. 175 Las matanzas de 1992 fueron cometidas por la mafia, que era un actor no estatal fuerte con el objetivo de influir en los procesos económicos y políticos. Incluso en estos eventos existe la sombra de algunos agentes de servicios de inteligencia y seguridad, nacionales y extranjeros. Dichos asesinatos ocurrieron en períodos caracterizados por la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, entendida como una condición emocional y material de fragilidad de los ciudadanos de un país, relacionada a las dificultades económicas o a una posible pérdida de bienestar, causada o vinculada con ciertos factores como la corrupción, las falsas percepciones, las divisiones sociales, la incertidumbre económica o la desconfianza en las instituciones. El asesinato estratégico de Enrico Mattei ocurrió en 1962. En 1963, durante el auge económico, el número de votantes para la renovación del Parlamento italiano disminuyó en casi un 1% y no cambió en los cinco años siguientes, como se muestra en el epígrafe no. 2.2.1. Además, en la década analizada, el número de conflictos laborales aumentó hasta el año después de la muerte del Mattei, aunque hubo un aumento moderado del coste de la vida. El secuestro y asesinato de Aldo Moro99 ocurrió en 1978. En 1979, el número de votantes para la renovación del Parlamento italiano disminuyó en casi un 2%, luego se redujo en dos puntos más. Esta tendencia puede interpretarse como un ejemplo de desconfianza en las instituciones, probablemente causada por los citados episodios de corrupción, los altos niveles de conflicto social o la inacción del Gobierno durante el secuestro de Moro por terroristas. Sin duda, una condición emocional y material de fragilidad de los italianos puede haber surgido del aumento de los precios al consumidor 99 El secuestro de Aldo Moro se produjo el 16 de marzo de 1978 y apareció muerto el 9 de mayo de ese mismo año. 176 en el período 1976-1980 y el aumento del desempleo que se muestran en el apartado no. 2.3.1. El asesinato de Giovanni Falcone, Paolo Borsellino y las personas que estaban con ellos ocurrió en 1992. En 1994, el número de votantes para la renovación de las dos ramas del Parlamento italiano disminuyó en casi un 1-2%, luego se redujo en tres puntos más. Una participación más baja es, por definición, una señal de desconfianza en la clase política que dirige las instituciones democráticas, o pretende hacerlo. Sin duda, una condición emocional y material de fragilidad del pueblo italiano parece estar relacionada con el aumento del desempleo en el período analizado y la progresión negativa del saldo migratorio, así como con el mencionado escándalo de financiación ilegal de partidos políticos. Además, el tema de los políticos que se enriquecen ilegalmente, o injustamente, puede causar desconfianza en los demás y riesgos concretos para la cohesión social. Los casos examinados demuestran que la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica está relacionada con las GZA. Estas últimas pueden causar una condición emocional y material de fragilidad en los ciudadanos de un país, o puede ser explotada para socavar la estabilidad del país objetivo. En ambos casos, una confirmación puede venir de la participación en las elecciones generales. El antes mencionado juicio sobre la relación entre vulnerabilidad socioeconómica y GZA ha sido expresado por inferencia deductiva, una regla de razonamiento lógico por la cual, siguiendo la secuencia de Peirce “Regla - Caso – Resultado”, de la verdad de algunas proposiciones, uno puede deducir la verdad de otra proposición (Tabla 4, Table 4). 177 Table 4 – Ilustración deductiva del resultado obtenido en el capítulo 2 (ES). Regla: Enrico Mattei, Aldo Moro, Giovanni Falcone, and Paolo Borsellino fueron víctimas de las GZA. Caso: Sus asesinatos ocurrieron en un período de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica. Resultado: La vulnerabilidad socioeconómica es relacionada con las GZA. Fuente: elaboración propia. 178 CHAPTER 3 – THE CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL EVENTS IN RECENT YEARS. As with the previous, this chapter aims to provide an answer to the general question no. 2 (To study the relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability, is it possible to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, not based on the use of classified information, algorithms, or other sophisticated paid- form tools?). The question above is linked to the specific research question no. 2.2 (Have there been examples of grey zone activities in Italy recently?). The latter is based on the hypothesis that recently, in Italy, there has been at least one example of GZA. The reference is to three controversial political events that occurred in the period 2019-2020, which have been analysed to understand if they met the requirements for being considered examples of GZA. Unlike the events described in Chapter 2, those treated here are not conspiracies to assassinate statesmen. Two of them are alleged cases of Chinese and Russian influence and espionage, and one is related to Mafia power. The first concerns Italy’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, the second regards the operation ‘From Russia With Love”, put in place during the pandemic, and the third is the Prison riots affair of 2020. Since they consist of recent cases, there was no literature to consult, except for a recent book written by two journalists of the newspaper Il Foglio about the exercise of soft power by China and Russia, in Italy. Thus, for examining the concerned cases, a screening of the press coverage of the major Italian newspaper was carried out, especially for the investigation of the newspaper La Stampa on the operation ‘From Russia With Love”. In this regard, an excerpt from the interview with the then Prime 179 Minister, Giuseppe Conte, has been translated into English and written in the corresponding paragraph. The screening of the press coverage was also useful in deepening the Prison riots affair, highlighting the spread of inaccurate information about it. Moreover, in the study of the vulnerability factors and signals was considered that the above cases took place in the same period. Finally, at the end of the chapter, an inductive illustration of the result achieved was carried out. 3.1 Italy’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2013, in response to the 2008 crisis, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the New Silk Road, an initiative aimed at the definition of a new model of cooperation, and the restructuring of the Eurasian geopolitical space (Figure 16). Over the years, its name changed to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, during the XIX Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, it was included in the statute of the party (Bressan and Savignoni, 2018). Figure 16 – Maps of the Belt and Road Initiative. Source: Panorama magazine, https://www.panorama.it 180 Italy is the only G7 country that joined the BRI, despite the concerns of some members of the then government, in addition to the EU and the USA, because of the potential implications on national security and international alliances. A democratically elected government, of course, can freely decide its agenda but, in this case, it was thought that the posture of the government was influenced by both inside and outside. Regarding how it happened and how it was perceived, two positions were publicly expressed. The first one comes from the US think tank Freedom House, which studied the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to influence news and information flows around the world, using increasingly sophisticated, secret, and coercive tactics. Despite this, journalists, civil society groups and some governments responded to this campaign in ways that mitigated its effects. In the report Beijing's Global Media Influence, Italy is considered a vulnerable country. In this respect, on the Freedom House website,100 one can read the following: Italian perceptions of China were overwhelmingly negative in the mid-2010s but warmed in the run-up to the Belt and Road Initiative agreement in 2019. Public opinion reached a high point in early 2020 amid Chinese pandemic aid and pro- Beijing narratives in the media. The Italian public attributes blame for the COVID-19 pandemic to the Chinese government, but also views its crisis management as a model to emulate and pandemic support to Italy as genuine. By 2021, views were more cautious. Most survey respondents still supported greater cooperation in areas of shared concern, but a larger proportion saw China as a threat compared to 2018, preferring to ally with the United States and Europe. Concerning the freedom of the press, on the above web page there is a reference to a self-censorship due to Chinese embassy intimidation and media industry troubles: 100 See: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/beijings-global-media-influence/2022 (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 181 Government budget cuts for Italy’s traditionally state-dependent media have made foreign content deals and investments more attractive for news outlets and journalists, creating an incentive for Italian journalists to self-censor in order to maintain any Chinese patronage and access. Chinese diplomats also occasionally engage in intimidation to affect coverage. Regarding the amplification of the Chinese-backed messages by public figures, on the same internet page, Freedom House subtly brings into play Professor Geraci as a key figure of Italy’s participation in the BRI: Michele Geraci, former undersecretary of state at the Ministry for Economic Development, was invited to tour Xinjiang in May 2021 and subsequently published articles repeating Chinese state narratives. Geraci had a Twitter presence with around 15,000 followers as of July 2022 and has reportedly sent private messages to users who criticize the CCP. The influence of some of these individuals has waned since the Draghi government took power in early 2021, but they remain prominent in Italian public life. The second position about Chinese influence was expressed by Giulia Pompili and Valerio Valentini, two journalists of the newspaper Il Foglio, in their book ‘At the Heart of Italy. How Russia and China are trying to conquer the country’ (Al cuore dell’Italia. Come Russia e Cina stanno cercando di conquistare il paese). Illustrating the events which led to the Italian mission of Chinese President Xi Jimping, Pompili and Valentini (2022) focused on the role of the above-mentioned former Undersecretary at the Ministry for Economic Development, making him appear as an agent of influence, without explicitly stating it. According to them, the approach to Beijing began in 2018, with the first Conte’s Government101, when the Ministry for Economic Development established a ‘China 101 See: https://www.governo.it/it/i-governi-dal-1943-ad-oggi/xviii-legislatura-dal-23-marzo-2018/gover- no-conte/9468 (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 182 Task Force’ to strengthen the economic and trade relations with China, on the impulse of the Deputy Prime Minister Di Maio, and the Undersecretary Geraci102. In their book, Pompili and Valentini dedicated an entire paragraph of the second chapter to Professor Geraci, highlighting the lack of scientific publications despite his previous role as assistant professor of Finance at the Business School of the Nottingham University of Ningbo103, followed by the assignments as adjunct professor at the New York University of Shanghai104, and the Zhejiang University of Hangzhou105 (PRC). Indeed, it seems that his first publication dates to 2020106, two years after he was appointed Undersecretary, on which, to this day, there is still an aura of mystery. Between September and November 2018, Deputy Prime Minister Di Maio, and Undersecretary Geraci went two times in China, respectively for the Western China International Fair of Chengdu, and the China International Import Expo of Shanghai, giving the starting signal to the activities aimed at Italy’s participation in the BRI. Later, Italian politicians split between those for and against it (Pucci, 2019). At least two concerns emerged: China’s possible intention to buy some infrastructure of the country, and the risk that BRI would cause economic damage to the EU (Panorama, 2019). The comment of the White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman, Garrett Marquis (Rai News, 2019; Ghiglione et al., 2019), sounded like a warning: We view BRI as a ‘made by China, for China’ initiative. We are sceptical that the Italian government’s endorsement will bring any sustained economic 102 See: https://ambpechino.esteri.it/it/news/dall_ambasciata/2018/08/il-mise-lancia-la-task-force-cina (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 103 See: https://research.nottingham.edu.cn/en/persons/michele-geraci (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 104 See: https://research.shanghai.nyu.edu/centers-and-institutes/ber/people/michele-geraci (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 105 See: https://www.zju.edu.cn/_web/_search/api/search/new.rst?locale=en_US&request_locale=en_US- &_p=YXM9MzU4JnQ9Mjk0OSZkPTEzODk1JnA9MiZmPTE5NTczJm09TiY_&keyword=michele%25 20geraci (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 106 See: https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57215189177 (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 183 benefits to the Italian people, and it may end up harming Italy’s global reputation in the long run. The Twitter message published through the then account of the NSC107 was more explicit (Figure 17) and attracted the reply of Chen Weihua, columnist and chief of the China Daily EU Bureau (Figure 18). In this respect, Pompili and Valentini (2022) pointed out that, a few days before the visit of Xi Jinping, Italy was at the heart of a battle between Washington and Beijing. Figure 17 – Tweet of the National Security Council about Italy's participation in the BRI. Source: Twitter, https://twitter.com Figure 18 – Chen Weihua's reply to the tweet of the NSC about Italy's participation in the BRI. Source: Twitter, https://twitter.com 107 See: https://twitter.com/WHNSC45/status/1104402719568203776 (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 184 In the same days, the BRI case brought out some divisions within the Government: while at the Ministry for Economic Development, some were working on the Italy- China agreement, at the Prime Minister's Office others were working on the strengthening of the Golden Power, the set of special powers exercisable by the Government in the fields of defence and national security, as well as in some areas deemed strategic like energy, transport and communications (La Mattina and Magri, 2019). It was approved close to Xi Jinping’s arrival. On the 13 of March, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte gave an exclusive interview to the newspaper Corriere della Sera, intending to explain that the Italy-China agreement was not a trojan horse, but a clear economic choice, compatible with the Atlantic Alliance (Fontana and Franco, 2019). On the 21 of March, Xi Jinping arrived in Italy, accompanied by a delegation of about 500 people. Among them, about 120 journalists (Huffington Post, 2019). In the next two days moved between Rome and Palermo – the birthplace of Professor Geraci – for the signature of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ with Italy108 – whose contents, until that time, had not been made public – and other institutional meetings (Agi, 2019). In this regard, just before the meeting with the President of the Republic, the chief of the press office of the Chinese Embassy, Yang Han, gave notice to the Italian journalist, Giulia Pompili, to not say anything bad about China, and not use her mobile phone during the meeting. On the 23 of March, the newspaper Il Foglio (2019a) published an article entitled ‘This is not Beijing’ (Non siamo a Pechino) narrating what happened in the hallways of the Presidency of the Republic. This unpleasant episode immediately became a media case (Il Foglio, 2019b; Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2019; Carbutti, 2019;), as well as a political case (Senato della Repubblica, 2019). 108 See: https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Memorandum_Italia-Cina_IT.pdf (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 185 As previously mentioned, the contents of the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and China were revealed at the last moment. From it have arisen ten economic agreements, nineteen institutional arrangements, and one between the news agencies Ansa and Xinhua (Ansa, 2019). After the event, some insights on the BRI have been published. The Italian Institute for International Studies, for example, released a fact-checking on its website explaining that BRI is part of the Chinese strategy to increase Beijing’s influence and weight in the world, both economically and militarily. Through the BRI projects, China constructed in the Gulf of Tadjoura, 5 km west of Djibouti City, the so-called Doraleh Multi- Purpose Port. Moreover, it allowed the PLA Navy to establish a presence in the Red Sea. Moreover, within the Sino-Pakistani Economic Corridor, which was one of the flagship projects of the BIS, a special economic zone for the joint production of fighter planes, navigation systems and military hardware was established (Amighini and Sciorati, 2019). Two years later, Natali (2021) took stock of the Italian storytelling about the BRI. According to him, the supporters of joining the BRI relied on the fact that Italy’s participation was the first of a G7 country, evoking the relationship with China since Marco Polo’s travels. Conversely, Rome had to practice some diplomatic balancing exercises to continue attracting Chinese funding, without questioning its membership of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, both politically and militarily. This issue appeared so thorny that delayed the first official meeting between the new Italian Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America (Marroni, 2023), to accurately assess whether to renew the participation in the BRI (Ansa, 2023a). Another profile of deepening concern is Chinese investments in Italy. In this regard, Gallotti (2023) argues that, from an economic point of view, BRI agreements have not 186 had a great impact. However, Beijing was and probably is still interested in logistics, especially at the ports of Trieste and Genova, where intended to invest through the state giant China Communications Construction Company. In any case, having regard to the statements of the Italian Minister of Defence, the current government seems intent on not renewing the BRI agreements (Treccarichi, 2023), also because BRI is publicly considered as a Chinese imperialist plan (Carboni, 2023). 3.2 Operation ‘From Russia With Love’. On 22 March 2020, during the pandemic, 13 Ilyushin II-76 aircraft landed at Pratica di Mare airport with 104 Russian military, vehicles, and equipment (Picture 11). The name of the operation recalled the famous Ian Fleming novel From Russia With Love and was inscribed everywhere, from military planes to cardboard boxes containing medical supplies for Italy. Officially it was a Kremlin’s support initiative against the spread of COVID-19, after a few days, it was arisen the suspicion that it was an espionage activity with effective propaganda coverage. To turn the spotlight on the case was the newspaper La Stampa, with an inquiry by Jacopo Iacoboni. If the title of the first article – “The mystery of Russian aid in Italy during the lockdown” – was quite clear about what might be the Italian perception of the concerned operation, the content was even more explicit because of the reference to propaganda and intelligence activities (Iacoboni, 2020c). Equally clear were the words of General Jeff Harrigian, commander of the U.S Air Forces in Europe, who on Russian military arrival declared as follows: (U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Italy, 2020): 187 The COVID-19 pandemic requires that we work with our Allies and partners to meet the challenges together. […] We are working closely with our Italian friends, the Department of State, and U.S. European Command to ensure we provide the right equipment in a safe and timely manner. It’s our privilege to support the Italian response, and our continued commitment reflects the values of the American people to provide assistance whenever and wherever it is needed. Picture 11 – Russian military truck landing from an II-76 aircraft at Pratica di Mare airport. Source: online newspaper 7giorni, https://www.7giorni.info Equally clear were the words of General Jeff Harrigian, commander of the U.S Air Forces in Europe, who on Russian military arrival declared as follows: (U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Italy, 2020): The COVID-19 pandemic requires that we work with our Allies and partners to meet the challenges together. […] We are working closely with our Italian friends, the Department of State, and U.S. European Command to ensure we provide the right equipment in a safe and timely manner. It’s our privilege to support the Italian response, and our continued commitment reflects the 188 values of the American people to provide assistance whenever and wherever it is needed. Later, La Stampa published an article entitled “The Coronavirus and the Last Operation of Russia’s Influence on Italy” (Iacoboni, 2020b), in which it highlighted that several specialists in bacteriological war, sent from Moscow, were moving to the country using a military convoy (Picture 12) with the excuse of sanitizing some areas of the red zone (Picture 13). Moreover, this activity was touted on Facebook. Picture 12 – Russian military convoy in Italy. Source: online newspaper Firenze Post, https://www.firenzepost.it The publication of the article about the inadequacy of the medical supplies sent by Moscow, and the conversation between the Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, and the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin (Iacoboni, 2020a), pushed diplomacy to intervene. The Russian ambassador to Italy, Sergey Razov (2020), stated as follows: Italian Prime Minister, G. Conte, in a telephone conversation on March 21, thanked the President of Russia, V.V. Putin, for the timely and impressive aid offered to Italy in this difficult situation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, 189 L. Di Maio, considered it appropriate to go personally to the military airport of Pratica di Mare to welcome the planes which transported Russian specialists, vehicles, and equipment, expressing his gratitude to the Russian Federation. Picture 13 – Russian specialists in bacteriological warfare. Source: online newspaper La Stampa, https://www.lastampa.it Despite the assurances given by Razov to other media outlets (e.g., Allevato, 2020), the newspaper La Stampa reported that, according to some Russian military sources, an intelligence gathering was underway. Moreover, according to Hamish De Bretton- Gordon, chemical weapons expert and former British Army Colonel, among the military sent to Italy, there were GRU officers (Iacoboni, Antelava and Butini, 2020). The above article was interpreted as the drop that broke the pot because the official spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Gen. Igor Konashenkov, accused the newspaper La Stampa of “Russophobia” and “fake news”. Furthermore, by addressing unknown outsourcers of the alleged media campaign against Russia, reminded them – in different languages – the old saying “Qui fodit foveam, incidet in eam” or “Bad penny always comes back”. This adage has been published in several newspapers and 190 interpreted as an intimidation against La Stampa and the journalist Jacopo Iacoboni (La Stampa, 2020; Corriere della Sera, 2020). The controversial operation From Russia With Love might be considered a school case, because it is an example of hybrid competition during a pandemic which, at the same time, caused troubles for the Government of the target country. In this respect, for instance, Santarelli (2022) argues that Russia exploits the health emergency to study the spread of COVID-19, also to create its vaccine, named Sputnik V. This interpretation is supported by the presence, in Italy, of Natalia Y. Pshenichnaya and Aleksandr V. Semenov, the two most authoritative Russian epidemiologists. Among the above-mentioned troubles, there was a political controversy about the cost of this operation for the State. As a result of the parliamentary question tabled on the 1st of April 2020 by Deputy Riccardo Magi, it was found that the fuel for the Ilyushin II-76 aircraft cost about one and a half million euro (€1.500.000), while accommodation and food expenses for Russian contingent cost about four hundred thousand euro (€400.000). For the Italian staff who joined the delegation, however, the State spent about one million euros (€1.000.000). Against this, Russians delivered to Italy: 521.800 masks; 30 lung ventilators; 1.000 protective suits; 2 swab analysis machines; 10.000 quick swabs; and 100.000 normal swabs. Overall, all these medical supplies were not enough to meet the needs of half a day (Sarzanini, 2022). Finally, must be considered the institutional short-circuit which arises from the interview with the then Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, made by the journalist Danilo Procaccianti (2022) for the public television program Rai Report. Below one will find an excerpt from the above interview, translated into English: D. Procaccianti: [off-screen] The mission was perfected during a phone call between the then Premier Giuseppe Conte and Vladimir Putin. D. Procaccianti: What did you say to Putin on 21 March 2020? What were the agreements? 191 G. Conte, Prime Minister (2018-2021): Several times there was his willingness to provide help at a time of great difficulty for Italy. We were in the most acute phase of the pandemic. In particular, it would have sent specialised staff, since they had gained a great deal of experience in combating pandemics, like SARS. D. Procaccianti: So you and Putin didn’t make a firm deal. G. Conte, Prime Minister (2018-2021): Look, obviously I couldn’t take care of the implementation aspects of this mission. In the course of the conversation, I remember I was struck by the extreme precision on sanitization. D. Procaccianti: The army generals say that Russian military wanted to clear everything, they wanted to go near the NATO bases of Ghedi and Amendola, in Puglia, and we banned it. Do you know this? G. Conte, Prime Minister (2018-2021): No, I would not. If that had been their intention, it would have been forbidden, and it would be right that they should have been directed where we wanted them, where we could have needed them, and they should have done what we asked them to do. D. Procaccianti: But the Russians told to the generals that, at that time, they want to do this by virtue of higher agreements. Were there such agreements between you and Putin? G. Conte, Prime Minister (2018-2021): Look, absolutely not. Are you kidding? According to you, I would have told Putin “We will send your units to our bases"? Absolutely not. One doesn’t mess with these things. D. Procaccianti: You know what strikes me? The army generals say: "the Russians wanted to go near the NATO bases". You say: "I do not know this". On such a subject, is it possible that the Chief of Staff of the Defense might not alert the Prime Minister? G. Conte, Prime Minister (2018-2021): I have not been warned at all. I confirm this. And I am also surprised that came this request from the Russians. D. Procaccianti: Experts in bacteriological warfare and chemical weapons. There were those who trained Russian soldiers for the war in Chechnya, those who denied the use of chemical weapons in Syria, those who ran laboratories sanctioned by the United States. I mean, I wouldn’t let these in my house. G. Conte, Prime Minister (2018-2021): I didn’t get a list. What you’re telling me didn’t go through my hands and, again, the whole implementation wasn’t taken care of by me. D. Procaccianti: Was there an initial underestimation? G. Conte, Prime Minister (2018-2021): I would say no, to the extent that no one opened the country to missions of foreign governments indiscriminately. The important fact is that COPASIR also addressed this issue and, in the end, in the report sent to the Parliament, it concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that this mission was critical and took place outside the health sector. On the same television service, among others, there is the interview with the then Chief of Staff of the Defense, Geneneral Enzo Vecciarelli, according to whom, at that 192 time, the Italian army proposed for carrying out the activities then formally entrusted to the Russians. However, the Ministry of Health would have advised against their intervention because of the risk of polluting the groundwater aquifers. All interviews, their transcripts, and the clarifications by the Ministry of Defence are available on the Rai website for immediate follow-up109. 3.3 The Prison Riots Affair of 2020. During the lockdown, the public discourse in Italy was moved from the fear of contagion to the economy of fear, related to the Mafia’s way of communicating and its investments in the real economy (Johnson, 2020). Moreover, because of the prison riots affair, during which about four hundred mobsters were released, Italy appeared as a country under attack from OCGs and came close to a government crisis (Rai News, 2020; Custodero and Mari, 2020). The Italian press reported that on March 7th and 8th, 2020, around 6.000 riots erupted in twenty-seven prisons across the country (Picture 14), causing thirteen deaths, more than forty injured officers (Bianconi, 2020), and damages to structures and infrastructures for thirty-five million euros (Marietti, 2020). Coronavirus and the restrictions to the interviews with detainees were, allegedly, the reasons for all this (TgCom24, 2020). However, according to other reports in the media, this was an inaccurate overview. For instance, on Il Sole 24 Ore, Roberto Galullo (2020) argued that the prison crisis was directed by OCGs for their interest: the release of the most important detainees, showing everybody who was really in charge, in and out of prisons. There were also 109 See: https://www.rai.it/programmi/report/inchieste/Dalla-Russia-con-amore-9cb1688a-5bf2-4161- 8972-0bb1a5ec3f19.html (accessed on: 15 November 2023). 193 concerns about the numbers, as Sergio Nazzaro (2020) affirmed on the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime: “Hundreds of prison officers were injured. The property damage amounted to tens of millions of euros and reduced the prison system’s capacity by 2,000”. In any case, whatever numbers the Government was dealing with, the main press agencies announced the allocation of five million euros for the house detention (Ansa, 2020b), and twenty million euros to repair the damages caused by riots (Agi, 2020a). Picture 14 – Poggioreale prison during the riot of March 2020. Source: online magazine Internazionale, https://www.internazionale.it In other words, Italian public opinion received at least two worrying messages. The first came from the mafia and sounded like this: “We get what we want, at the taxpayer's expense”. The second one, rather, came from the Government that initially stated that “these are criminal acts, the State doesn't back down” (Milella, 2020), but a few days later derogated the rules on house detention with the decree-law no. 18 of 2020 (Bico and Corinaldesi, 2020), named Heal Italy (Cura Italia). In this respect, it 194 should be noted that the National Antimafia Prosecutor, Federico Cafiero de Raho, confirmed the role of the OCGs in the prison riots affair (Foschini and Tonacci, 2020). By monitoring the above prison crisis, and studying the subsequent events, it was possible to highlight the spread of inaccurate information about the reasons for the riots, the number of detainees involved, the costs to the State, and the statements of the former Minister of Justice. In detail, the facts investigated can be traced back to three phases. In period no. 1 (March-April) there were tens of prison riots (Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2020), some conflicting statements about the Government’s stance, a stock market crash, an exemption of the rules on house detention, and the release of 376 ‘mafia bosses’ (Palazzolo, 2020). Phase no. 2 (May-June) was characterized by: unceasing political polemics; the resignation of the head of the Department of Penitentiary Administration (Agi, 2020b) and the one of the Ministry of Justice Chief of Staff (Piccolillo, 2020); two motions of no-confidence against the Minister of Justice (Scuto, 2020); and the collapse of some economic indicators (Istat, 2020). During the phase no. 3 (since July), however, the press brought the spotlight back on the above-mentioned events, pointing out some true or alleged discrepancies. Among them are the numbers of the prison riots, those of the detainees involved, and people injured; the cost to the State; the number of detainees released; and the Minister’s statements. As shown in Table 5, according to a classified report mentioned by the newspaper La Repubblica, the true number of prison riots was 49 instead of 27, while the detainees involved were 10.311 instead of 6.000. The number of injured passed from 40 officers to 196, plus 99 detainees. Moreover, the costs to the state varied from 40 million euros to 12 million (Tonacci and Foschini, 2020). The reasons for the riots illustrated by the press changed too (TgCom24, 2020; Galullo, 2020; Vitiello, 2020), as well as the number of detainees released (Trocchia, 2020). Regarding the posture of the then 195 Minister of Justice, three types of statements have been widespread. They can be summarized as follows: “The State doesn’t back down” (Milella, 2020b); “Soon, a decree-law to bring back the bosses to prison” (Ansa, 2020); and “The Minister does not decide who must return to prison” (Milella, 2020a). Table 5 – False or inaccurate information spread during the prison riots affair of 2020. TOPICS PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 Prison riots 27 - 49 Detainees involved 6.000 - 10.311 Reasons of the riots “Fear of Covid-19” “Prison overcrowding” “Prison overcrowding” “Mafia gets what it wants” “Mafia gets what it wants” Deaths 13 detainees - 13 detainees Injured 40 officers 99 detainees 136 officers Costs to the State €35 million + €5 million - €12 million Detainees released 376 mafia bosses 373 gregarious + 3 bosses 498 mafia bosses Minister's statements “The State doesn’t back down” “Soon, a decree-law to bring back the bosses to prison” “The Minister does not decide who must return to prison” Source: Own elaboration based on press articles. Thanks to the abstentions and the support of former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who voted in favour of the then Minister of Justice while recognising his political failure, the government crisis was avoided (Picture 15). However, this unpleasant episode will hardly be forgotten by the Italian citizens. 196 Picture 15 – Result of the vote on the motion of no-confidence against the then Minister of Justice. Source: press agency Askanews, https://askanews.it 3.4 Vulnerability factors and signals in the last decade. The previous chapters illustrated the vulnerability factors and signals considered useful to recognize an emotional and material condition of fragility linked to economic hardship or to a possible loss of well-being. The above condition may be caused by or related to certain factors such as corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, or distrust in institutions. Each of them could correspond to a specific signal. Unlike the periods dealt with in Chapter 2, about the last decade, there is more available data to analyse. Among them, the CPI, calculated using a scale from 0 to 100 measures how corrupt each country’s public sector is perceived to be, according to experts and businesspeople. In this scale, 100 means “very clean”, while 0 means "highly corrupt”. As shown in Chart 36, in the period 2013-2022 there was an increase in the CPI, which corresponded to a diminishing of the perceived corruption. 197 Among the cases described in paragraphs nos. 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 did not emerge any of the crimes against the public administration listed in Figure 8, at the subparagraph no. 1.4.1. The phenomenon of false perceptions is not measurable and analysable through AGCOM’s survey about the disinformation supply distribution because of the limited availability of data in the period considered, as well as those about social apathy. In this respect, please refer to Subparagraph no. 1.4.2, Figure 9. Similarly, regarding people’s negative opinion about Italy’s economic trend for the years 2016- 2022, please refer to Subparagraph no. 1.4.4, Figure 13. Chart 36 – Corruption Perception Index in Italy, years 2013-2022. Source: Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org In Subparagraph 1.4.5, Chart 7 shows the number of intimidating acts against journalists that occurred in the years 2018-2022, and their distinction between organized crime, sociopolitical and other origin. That data highlights an increase in the period 2020-2021. Regarding the vulnerability signals, consider first the SMEI. Even if there was a reduction of the perceived corruption (Chart 36), as shown in the subparagraph 1.8.1, 43 43 44 47 50 52 53 53 56 56 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Corruption Perception Index in Italy 198 Figure 15, in the period 2017-2022 the SMEI had a negative trend, with a negative peak in 2020, almost certainly attributable to the pandemic. Referring to the cost of living in the concerned period, Chart 37 shows a progressive contraction of increases in consumer prices until 2020, followed by a significant increase caused by the high cost of the energy supply. The latter grew by 14,1% in 2021, and by 50,9% in 2022 (Ansa, 2023c). Chart 37 – Percentage changes in Italian indices of consumer prices, years 2013-2022. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT data (2023), http://dati.istat.it In Subparagraph no. 1.8.3, Chart 9 illustrates the trends in the incidence of poverty in Italy for the years 2013-2021. Overall, data on the risk of poverty or social exclusion, relative poverty, and absolute poverty in the concerned period, did not fluctuate. Thus, they did not provide useful indications in terms of potential social instability. It is known that a high cost of living results in a lower individual availability of money, increasing concerns about the satisfaction of their own needs. The negative trend of the natural population growth rate in the period 2013-2022 (Chart 38) could 1,1 0,2 -0,1 -0,1 1,2 1,1 0,5 -0,2 1,9 7,9 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 FOI NIC 199 reflect this kind of dynamic. In other words, it could be read both as a demographic decline and a signal of uncertainty about the future. Data about unemployment highlight a positive trend between 2013 and 2012 when the rate passed from 12,4% to 8,1% (Chart 39). It may reflect a diminishing in the socioeconomic malaise for those who have emerged from the spiral of unemployment, even temporarily, but not for everyone else. Chart 38 – Natural population growth rate in Italy (%), years 2013-2022. Source: own elaboration based on ISTAT data, https://dati.istat.it Chart 39 – Unemployment rate in Italy (%), years 2013-2022. Source: Own elaboration based on ISTAT data (2023), http://dati.istat.it -1,4 -1,6 -2,7 -2,4 -3,2 -3,2 -3,6 -5,6 -5,1 -5,4 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Natural population growth rate per year 12,4 12,9 12 11,7 11,3 10,6 9,9 9,3 9,5 8,1 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Unemployment rate per year 200 As shown in the Subparagraph no. 1.8.4, Chart 10, during the period considered there has been a significant increase both in the overall number of expatriates and in the number of expatriates with a university degree. Moreover, as shown in Chart 11, in the same period the number of NEETs in Italy was about six times higher than the number of young Italians seeking employment. Both phenomena can be interpreted as signals of uncertainty about the future. As stated in Subparagraph no. 1.8.4, the confidence that people are willing to give to their fellow citizens is one of the main indicators of social cohesion. The so-called generalized trust plays a fundamental role in the construction of a productive, efficient, cooperative, and cohesive society, with a reduced propensity for opportunistic behaviours and corruption. However, Italy seems to go in the opposite direction, because the level of distrust in others, shown in Chart 12, is very high. Even if data about labour disputes are not available, those on turnout seem to confirm the emotional and material condition of fragility of Italian people in the period concerned. It is probably linked to the constant decrease of the natural population growth rate; the significant increase in consumer prices since 2020; as well as that of the overall number of expatriates, and the number of expatriates with a university degree. Indeed, as shown in Chart 40, in 2013 the number of voters for the renewal of the Italian Parliament was about 75%. In 2018, it decreased by almost 2%, then dropped by ten more points, being below the 64%. 201 Chart 40 – Turnout for the renewal of the Italian Parliament (%), years 2013, 2018, 2022. Source: Own elaboration based on Italian Ministry of the Interior data, https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it 3.5 An inductive illustration of the result achieved. The above controversial political events occurred in a period characterized by socioeconomic vulnerability, intended as an emotional and material condition of the fragility of the citizens, linked to economic hardship or a possible loss of well-being, caused by or related to certain factors such as corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, or distrust in institutions. 2020 was the year of COVID-19, but some of the statistical information illustrated in Paragraph no. 3.4 shows a trend started before the pandemic, in whose context took place the alleged cases of Chinese influence, Russian espionage, and the OGCs’ coordination of the prison riots. Among them are the demographic decline, the collapse of the SMEI, the migration of Italians with and without a university degree, the apathy of the NEETs, and the level of distrust in others. Socioeconomic vulnerability in the concerned period was linked to GZA. Other data, indeed, show the intensification of certain phenomena just in 2020, like the 75,2 72,4 63,91 75,11 73,01 63,81 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 2013 2018 2022 Chamber of Deputies Senate of the Republic 202 increase in consumer prices caused by the high cost of the energy supply, which sometimes can be used as a weapon against a target state, as shown in Subparagraph no. 2.3.1. The intimidating acts against journalists, such as those illustrated in the Paragraphs no. 3.1 and 3.3, are attempts to undermine press freedom, and thus political stability. And, of course, an act of intimidation can determine in the victim an emotional condition of fragility. Moreover, the decrease of approximately 10 percentage points in the turnout for the renewal of the Italian Parliament, between 2018 and 2022, can be interpreted as a clear signal of distrust in the political class. The same political class that, during the lockdown, at least suffered the prison riots and witnessed the release of some notorious criminals, while the Italian people were obliged to stay at home. The GZA are political and economic actions, or other influence activities, carried out by state and non-state actors to undermine the socioeconomic and political stability of the target country, through an ambiguous but effective use of force, without meeting the standard of a military attack and its legal implications. China and Russia are important State actors, while OCGs are powerful non-state actors. According to the information available, their actions and those of the people who supported them had the potential to undermine the political stability of Italy. The participation in the BRI, for instance, highlighted the contradictions of the ruling parties and questioned the international alliances. Operation ‘From Russia With Love’ was a military action with the purposes of espionage and propaganda, without legal implications. Moreover, it brought out an institutional short-circuit which involved the then Prime Minister, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Health. The prison riots affair was perceived as an attack on the State which almost caused a government crisis. Furthermore, the analysis of the press coverage revealed a case of 203 misinformation about the reasons for the riots, the number of detainees involved, the costs to the State, and the statements of the former Minister of Justice. Therefore, this result has been achieved by inductive inference, a rule of logical reasoning by which, following Peirce’s sequence Case – Result – Rule, one proceeds from the observation of certain facts, thanks to which it is possible to reach some general observations (Table 6). Table 6 – Deductive illustration of the result achieved in Chapter 3. Case: Italy’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, operation ‘From Russia With Love’, and the Prison riots affair occurred in a period characterized by socioeconomic vulnerability. Result: Socioeconomic vulnerability is linked to GZA. Rule: Italy’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, operation ‘From Russia With Love’, and the Prison riots affair are example of GZA. Source: Own elaboration. 3.6 Una ilustración inductiva del resultado obtenido (ES). Los controvertidos acontecimientos políticos tratados en este capítulo ocurrieron en un período caracterizado por la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, entendida como una condición emocional y material de fragilidad de los ciudadanos de un país, relacionada a las dificultades económicas o a una posible pérdida de bienestar, causada o relacionada con ciertos factores como la corrupción, las falsas percepciones, las divisiones sociales, la incertidumbre económica o la desconfianza en las instituciones. El 2020 fue el año de la Covid-19, pero parte de la información estadística ilustrada en el párrafo 3.4 muestra una tendencia iniciada antes de la pandemia, en cuyo contexto tuvieron lugar los supuestos casos de influencia de China, espionaje ruso y la 204 coordinación de las revuelas carcelaria por parte de los OGCs’. Entre ellos: el declive demográfico, el colapso del SMEI, la migración de italianos con y sin título universitario, la apatía de los NEETs, y el nivel de desconfianza en otros. La vulnerabilidad socioeconómica en el período en cuestión estaba relacionada con las GZA. Otros datos, de hecho, muestran la intensificación de ciertos fenómenos solo en 2020, como el aumento de los precios al consumidor causado por el alto coste del suministro de energía, que a veces puede utilizarse como arma contra un Estado, como se muestra en el epígrafe no. 2.3.1. Los actos de intimidación contra periodistas, como los que se ilustran en los epígrafes no. 3.1 y 3.3, son intentos de socavar la libertad de prensa y, por ende, la estabilidad política. Y, por supuesto, un acto de intimidación puede determinar en la víctima una condición emocional de fragilidad. Además, la disminución de aproximadamente 10 puntos porcentuales en la participación a las elecciones generales, entre 2018 y 2022, puede interpretarse como una clara señal de desconfianza en la clase política. La misma clase política que, durante el cierre, al menos aparentemente sufrió las revueltas carcelarias y fue testigo de la liberación de algunos criminales notorios, mientras que el pueblo italiano se vio obligado a quedarse en casa. Las GZA son acciones políticas y económicas, u otras actividades de influencia, realizadas por actores estatales y no estatales con el objetivo de socavar la estabilidad socioeconómica y política del país objetivo, a través de un uso ambiguo pero efectivo de la fuerza, sin cumplir el estándar de un ataque militar y sus implicaciones legales y cuya atribución es difícil. China y Rusia son actores estatales importantes, mientras que los OCGs son actores no estatales poderosos. Según la información disponible, sus acciones y las de las personas que las apoyan pueden socavar la estabilidad política de Italia. La 205 participación en el BRI, por ejemplo, destacó las contradicciones de los partidos gobernantes y cuestionó las alianzas internacionales. La operación 'Desde Rusia con amor' fue una acción militar con fines de espionaje y propaganda, sin implicaciones legales. Además, provocó un cortocircuito institucional que involucró el Primer Ministro, el Ministro de Defensa y el Ministro de Salud. El asunto de las revueltas carcelarias fue percibido como un ataque al Estado que casi causó una crisis gubernamental. Además, el análisis de la cobertura de la prensa reveló un caso de información errónea sobre las razones de las revueltas, el número de detenidos involucrados, los costes para el Estado y las declaraciones del ex Ministro de Justicia. Por lo tanto, el resultado alcanzado lo ha sido por la inferencia inductiva, una regla de razonamiento lógico por la cual, siguiendo la secuencia de Peirce “Caso - Resultado – Regla”, se procede de la observación de ciertos hechos, gracias a la cual es posible llegar a algunas observaciones generales (Tabla 7, Table 7). Table 7 – Ilustración inductiva del resultado obtenido en el capítulo 3 (ES). Caso: La participación de Italia en la BRI, la operación ‘Desde Rusia Con Amor’, y las revueltas carcelarias ocurrieron en un periodo caracterizado por vulnerabilidad socioeconómica. Resultado: La vulnerabilidad socioeconómica está relacionada con las GZA. Regla: La participación de Italia en la BRI, la operación ‘Desde Rusia Con Amor’, y las revueltas carcelarias son ejemplos de las GZA. Fuente: elaboración propia. 206 CHAPTER 4 – A STRUCTURED ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE. As with the previous, this chapter aims to provide an answer to the general question no. 2 (To study the relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability, is it possible to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, not based on the use of classified information, algorithms, or other sophisticated paid- form tools?). The question above is linked to the specific research question no. 2.3 ( Is there any condition to perceive Italy as a grey area, based on the evidence gathered?). The latter is based on the hypothesis that Italy could be perceived as a grey area. The reference is both to the darkest events that occurred between the years 1962 and 1992, analysed in Chapter 2, and the controversial political events that occurred in the period 2019-2020, analysed in Chapter 3, identified as examples of GZA. In this regard, one should be reminded of what was highlighted in Subparagraph no. 1.1: for grey area one means a situation that is not clear or where the rules are not known or a part of something existing between two extremes and having mixed characteristics of both. The concerned two extremes are peace and war and have considerable importance for the definition provided by Lyle J. Morris et al. (2019: 8): The gray zone is an operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attribution for events. Here, the grey area is intended as a geographical and political context which hosts GZA, that is, political and economic actions, or other influence activities, carried out by state and non-state actors to undermine the socioeconomic and political stability of the 207 target country, through an ambiguous but effective use of force, without meeting the standard of a military attack and its legal implications. To reach an objective conclusion, information previously gathered, organized, and evaluated have been considered as ‘evidence’ to be used for the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), which is a technique for testing hypotheses developed by Richard Heuer, former senior CIA analyst, specifically for use in intelligence analysis. Heuer and Pherson, authors of the book Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, argued as follows (2015: 169): In broad terms, a hypothesis is a potential explanation or conclusion that is to be tested by collecting and presenting evidence. It is a declarative statement that has not been established as true – an “educated guess” based on observation that needs to be supported or refuted by more observation or through experimentation. They believe that the information with which analysts must work is typically incomplete, ambiguous, and potentially deceptive, but the integration between the analytical process and some of the elements of scientific reasoning may yield significant results. In this respect, they pointed out the following (Heuer and Pherson, 2015: 165): The scientific process involves observing, categorizing, formulating hypotheses, and then testing those hypotheses. Generating and testing hypotheses is a core function of structured analysis. A possible explanation of the past or a judgement about the future is a hypothesis that needs to be tested by collecting and presenting evidence. Considering the objective of this stage of the research, the press articles related to the events described in the previous two chapters have been used as evidence of GZA. Afterwards, the hypotheses to deal with were generated with the technique named Quadrant Hypothesis Generation. After this, these alternative explanations of the 208 possible perceptions of the country were tested against the available evidence through the ACH, conducted employing a specific free tool. This kind of approach permits to “identify and eliminate a wide range of cognitive biases and other shortfalls intuitive judgment” (Heuer Jr. and Pherson, 2015: 3). About it, in Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Heuer Jr. (1999: 111) pointed out that cognitive biases are like optical illusions, in the sense that the mistake remains compelling even when one is fully aware of it: Cognitive biases are mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies. It is important to distinguish cognitive biases from other forms of bias, such as cultural bias, organizational bias, or bias that results from one’s own self-interest. In other words, a cognitive bias does not result from any emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment, but rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing information. A cognitive bias is a mental error that is consistent and predictable. At the end of the chapter, the result achieved at this stage was illustrated with the abductive logic, which is from the two better-known forms of reasoning, deduction, and induction, used in Chapter 2 and Chapter. In detail, according to Heuer Jr. and Pherson (2015: 166), one should keep in mind as follows: Abductive reasoning starts with a set of facts. One then develops hypotheses that, if true, would provide the best explanation for these facts. Because of the uncertainties inherent to intelligence analysis, conclusive proof or refutation of hypotheses is the exception rather than the rule. 4.1 The evidence gathered. The press articles about the treated case studies were used as evidence for a methodological choice, although the narration of the facts by journalists has always 209 contributed to shaping public opinion. Moreover, the media constitutes the easiest field to study because the contents are published daily, and one can compare the versions that follow each other. There is a great deal of evidence about what is being altered or not (Chomsky, 2014). For this research, the 75 articles and press releases mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3 were used, whose distribution among the case studies is represented in Chart 41. In detail, evidence about Enrico Mattei’s strategic assassination (7), Aldo Moro’s kidnapping and killing (5), the Mafia slaughters of 1992 (9), the Chinese influence on Italy’s participation in the BRI (16), the Russian influence during the operation ‘From Russia With Love’ (13), the Prison riots affair of 2020 (21), and Economics (4) in the four periods in which the events took place were gathered. Chart 41 – Distribution of evidence related to treated case studies. Source: own elaboration. The above-mentioned evidence comes from 34 media sources, with high and medium levels of credibility and relevance, divided as follows: online newspapers (20), magazines (5), news agencies (3), newscasts (2), research centres (2), television 7 5 9 16 13 21 4 Mattei’s assassination Moro’s assassination Mafia slaughters Chinese influence Russian influence Prison riots 210 broadcasts (1), embassy and consulates (1). For each of them, Table 8 summarises the sources and the number of articles or press releases taken into consideration. The online newspapers are la Repubblica (9), La Stampa (7), Corriere della Sera (5), il Fatto Quotidiano (4), Il Foglio (4), Il Sole 24 Ore (3), Huffington Post (2), Il Giornale (2), Quotidiano Nazionale (2), Agenda Digitale (1), Bloomberg (1), Financial Times (1), Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno (1), Il Secolo XIX (1), Il Tempo (1), Internazionale (1), il Riformista (1), The Post Internazionale (1), Today (1), Varese Press (1). The magazines are L’Espresso (4), Storica National Geographic (2), Forbes (1), Panorama (1), Treccani (1). The news agencies are Ansa (6), Agi (4) and Adnkronos (1). The newscasts are Rai News (1) and TgCom24 (1). The research centres are Global Initiative (1) and ISPI - Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (1). The television broadcast is Rai Report (1), while the embassy is the American one (1). Table 8 – Distribution of evidence for media sources and articles/press releases. MEDIA SOURCES NO. OF ARTICLES OR PRESS RELEASES Online newspapers 49 La Repubblica 9 La Stampa 7 Corriere della Sera 5 Il Fatto Quotidiano 4 Il Foglio 4 Il Sole 24 Ore 3 Huffington Post 2 Il Giornale 2 Quotidiano Nazionale 2 Agenda Digitale 1 Bloomberg 1 Financial Times 1 Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno 1 Il Secolo XIX 1 Il Tempo 1 Internazionale 1 Il Riformista 1 The Post Internazionale 1 Today 1 Varese Press 1 Magazines 9 L’Espresso 4 211 Storica National Geographic 2 Forbes 1 Panorama 1 Treccani 1 News agencies 11 Ansa 6 Agi 4 Adnkronos 1 Newscasts 2 Rai News 1 TgCom24 1 Research centres 2 Global Initiative 1 ISPI 1 Television broadcasts 1 Rai Report 1 Embassy and consulates 1 U.S. Embassy 1 Source: own elaboration. To proceed with the evaluation of evidence, all articles and press releases were organized in a specific matrix (Table 9), showing for each one the date of publication, the title in the original language, the web link, the number of evidence and a short description in English. Table 9 – Matrix of the evidence gathered. DATE NEWS TITLE AND WEB LINK EVIDENCE 03/08/2000 “Mattei l'uomo mistero”. https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2 000/08/03/mattei-uomo-mistero.html E1 Mattei’s assassination: The journalist Giorgio Bocca enhances his figure. 14/01/2017 “Ascesa e declino, dal miracolo economico alla stagnazione”. https://www.ilfoglio.it/economia/2017/01/14/news/economia- italiana-ascesa-e-declino-dal-miracolo-economico-alla- stagnazione-114827 E2 Economics: After the 1975, the Italian economy decelerate to the point of not growing. 12/12/2017 “Commissione Moro: ‘Ciò che abbiamo saputo finora è una verità dicibile: servì a chiudere la stagione del terrorismo’”. https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/12/12/commissione- moro-cio-che-abbiamo-saputo-finora-e-una-verita-dicibile- servi-chiudere-la-stagione-del-terrorismo/4033574 E3 Moro’s assassination: Commission of Inquiry confirmed forty years of investigations done badly and several misdirection. https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2000/08/03/mattei-uomo-mistero.html https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2000/08/03/mattei-uomo-mistero.html https://www.ilfoglio.it/economia/2017/01/14/news/economia-italiana-ascesa-e-declino-dal-miracolo-economico-alla-stagnazione-114827 https://www.ilfoglio.it/economia/2017/01/14/news/economia-italiana-ascesa-e-declino-dal-miracolo-economico-alla-stagnazione-114827 https://www.ilfoglio.it/economia/2017/01/14/news/economia-italiana-ascesa-e-declino-dal-miracolo-economico-alla-stagnazione-114827 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/12/12/commissione-moro-cio-che-abbiamo-saputo-finora-e-una-verita-dicibile-servi-chiudere-la-stagione-del-terrorismo/4033574 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/12/12/commissione-moro-cio-che-abbiamo-saputo-finora-e-una-verita-dicibile-servi-chiudere-la-stagione-del-terrorismo/4033574 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/12/12/commissione-moro-cio-che-abbiamo-saputo-finora-e-una-verita-dicibile-servi-chiudere-la-stagione-del-terrorismo/4033574 212 12/03/2019 “Via della Seta, Conte: «Italia-Cina, intesa limpida: l’obiettivo è crescere»”. https://www.corriere.it/politica/19_marzo_13/via-seta-conte- italia-cina-intesa-limpida-nostro-obiettivo-crescere- 0b5a29ac-450d-11e9-b3b0-2162e8762643.shtml E4 Chinese influence: Italian Prime Minister Conte states that BRI is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance. 13/03/2019 “Via della Seta, cos'è, chi la vuole, chi no”. https://www.panorama.it/economia/via-della-seta-guida- politica-cina-italia E5 Chinese influence: BRI does not please everyone. 14/03/2019 “Frenata sulla Cina, Giorgetti al lavoro per rafforzare il ‘golden power’”. https://www.lastampa.it/politica/2019/03/14/news/frenata- sulla-cina-giorgetti-al-lavoro-per-rafforzare-il-golden- power-1.33687755 E6 Chinese influence: Italy strengthens the golden power. 21/03/2019 “La Cina risponde ai dubbi italiani sulla nuova Via della Seta”. https://www.agi.it/estero/via_seta_cina_italia_xi_jinping- 5171207/news/2019-03-21 E7 Chinese influence: The Deputy Foreign Minister highlights the advantages of the BRI. 21/03/2019 “Xi Jinping è arrivato in Italia: al seguito del presidente cinese una delegazione di 500 persone”. https://www.huffingtonpost.it/politica/2019/03/21/news/xi_jin ping_e_arrivato_in_italia_al_seguito_del_presidente_cinese _una_delegazione_di_500_persone-5255546 E8 Chinese influence: Xi Jinping arrived in Italy with a delegation of 500 people. 23/03/2019 “Italia-Cina, dalla Via della Seta agli accordi commerciali: ecco le intese”. https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2019/03/23/italia- cina-dalla-via-della-seta-agli-accordi-commerciali-ecco-le- intese_06b0c29a-f25d-477f-97e7-e18bacf35580.html E9 China influence: Made public the agreements between Italy and China. 23/03/2019 “Non siamo a Pechino”. https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2019/03/23/news/non-siamo- a-pechino-244900 E10 Chinese influence: Il Foglio complaint threats to its reporter. 23/03/2019 “La solidarietà della politica sulle minacce cinesi alla giornalista del Foglio. Il silenzio di Lega e M5s”. https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2019/03/23/news/la- solidarieta-della-politica-sulle-minacce-cinesi-alla- giornalista-del-foglio-il-silenzio-di-lega-e-m5s-245020 E11 Chinese influence: solidarity of the politicians to the reporter of Il Foglio. 24/03/2019 “Pressioni cinesi sulla giornalista: ‘Smetti di parlare male di noi’”. https://www.quotidiano.net/politica/minacce-giornalista- pompili-1.4505958 E12 Chinese influence: Italian journalist intimidated at the Quirinale. 24/03/2019 “’Dal funzionario cinese minacce alla cronista’, scrive Il Foglio” https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in- edicola/articoli/2019/03/24/dal-funzionario-cinese-minacce- alla-cronista-scrive-il-foglio/5058804 E13 Chinese influence: threats to a reporter of the newspaper Il Foglio. 19/08/2019 “Fact Checking: BRI, la nuova via della seta”. https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/fact-checking-bri- la-nuova-della-seta-23784 E14 Chinese influence: ISPI highlights the aims of Beijing. https://www.corriere.it/politica/19_marzo_13/via-seta-conte-italia-cina-intesa-limpida-nostro-obiettivo-crescere-0b5a29ac-450d-11e9-b3b0-2162e8762643.shtml https://www.corriere.it/politica/19_marzo_13/via-seta-conte-italia-cina-intesa-limpida-nostro-obiettivo-crescere-0b5a29ac-450d-11e9-b3b0-2162e8762643.shtml https://www.corriere.it/politica/19_marzo_13/via-seta-conte-italia-cina-intesa-limpida-nostro-obiettivo-crescere-0b5a29ac-450d-11e9-b3b0-2162e8762643.shtml https://www.panorama.it/economia/via-della-seta-guida-politica-cina-italia https://www.panorama.it/economia/via-della-seta-guida-politica-cina-italia https://www.lastampa.it/politica/2019/03/14/news/frenata-sulla-cina-giorgetti-al-lavoro-per-rafforzare-il-golden-power-1.33687755 https://www.lastampa.it/politica/2019/03/14/news/frenata-sulla-cina-giorgetti-al-lavoro-per-rafforzare-il-golden-power-1.33687755 https://www.lastampa.it/politica/2019/03/14/news/frenata-sulla-cina-giorgetti-al-lavoro-per-rafforzare-il-golden-power-1.33687755 https://www.agi.it/estero/via_seta_cina_italia_xi_jinping-5171207/news/2019-03-21 https://www.agi.it/estero/via_seta_cina_italia_xi_jinping-5171207/news/2019-03-21 https://www.huffingtonpost.it/politica/2019/03/21/news/xi_jinping_e_arrivato_in_italia_al_seguito_del_presidente_cinese_una_delegazione_di_500_persone-5255546 https://www.huffingtonpost.it/politica/2019/03/21/news/xi_jinping_e_arrivato_in_italia_al_seguito_del_presidente_cinese_una_delegazione_di_500_persone-5255546 https://www.huffingtonpost.it/politica/2019/03/21/news/xi_jinping_e_arrivato_in_italia_al_seguito_del_presidente_cinese_una_delegazione_di_500_persone-5255546 https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2019/03/23/italia-cina-dalla-via-della-seta-agli-accordi-commerciali-ecco-le-intese_06b0c29a-f25d-477f-97e7-e18bacf35580.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2019/03/23/italia-cina-dalla-via-della-seta-agli-accordi-commerciali-ecco-le-intese_06b0c29a-f25d-477f-97e7-e18bacf35580.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2019/03/23/italia-cina-dalla-via-della-seta-agli-accordi-commerciali-ecco-le-intese_06b0c29a-f25d-477f-97e7-e18bacf35580.html https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2019/03/23/news/non-siamo-a-pechino-244900 https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2019/03/23/news/non-siamo-a-pechino-244900 https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2019/03/23/news/la-solidarieta-della-politica-sulle-minacce-cinesi-alla-giornalista-del-foglio-il-silenzio-di-lega-e-m5s-245020 https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2019/03/23/news/la-solidarieta-della-politica-sulle-minacce-cinesi-alla-giornalista-del-foglio-il-silenzio-di-lega-e-m5s-245020 https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2019/03/23/news/la-solidarieta-della-politica-sulle-minacce-cinesi-alla-giornalista-del-foglio-il-silenzio-di-lega-e-m5s-245020 https://www.quotidiano.net/politica/minacce-giornalista-pompili-1.4505958 https://www.quotidiano.net/politica/minacce-giornalista-pompili-1.4505958 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in-edicola/articoli/2019/03/24/dal-funzionario-cinese-minacce-alla-cronista-scrive-il-foglio/5058804 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in-edicola/articoli/2019/03/24/dal-funzionario-cinese-minacce-alla-cronista-scrive-il-foglio/5058804 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in-edicola/articoli/2019/03/24/dal-funzionario-cinese-minacce-alla-cronista-scrive-il-foglio/5058804 https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/fact-checking-bri-la-nuova-della-seta-23784 https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/fact-checking-bri-la-nuova-della-seta-23784 213 29/09/2019 “Mafia: Salvo Andò, 'Falcone era isolato, sia dalla politica che dai giudici”. https://www.iltempo.it/news-adn- kronos/2019/09/28/news/mafia-salvo-ando-falcone-era- isolato-sia-dalla-politica-che-dai-giudici-1216683 E15 Mafia slaughters: The former Minister of Defence declares that Falcone was isolated both from politicians and judges. 09/03/2020 “Rivolta e morti nelle carceri, i veri motivi e l’attenta regia”. https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/rivolta-e-morti-carceri-veri- motivi-e-l-attenta-regia-ADBxHyB E16 Prison riots: there is a careful direction. 09/03/2020 “Coronavirus, proteste in 27 carceri: assaltate infermerie”. https://www.tgcom24.mediaset.it/cronaca/coronavirus- proteste-in-27-carceri-assaltate-infermerie_15901707- 202002a.shtml E17 Prison riots: protests in 27 penitentiary institutions. 11/03/2020 “Il carcere è questo: un luogo di poveracci e disperati. Ora, dopo le rivolte, abbiamo un’emergenza da tamponare”. https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2020/03/11/il-carcere-e- questo-un-luogo-di-poveracci-e-disperati-ora-dopo-le- rivolte-abbiamo-unemergenza-da-tamponare/5733367 E18 Prison riots: The Minister of Justice reports to Parliament the data of the riots. 11/03/2020 “Rivolta carceri, Bonafede: ‘Atti criminali, lo Stato non arretra’. Ma Iv e Leu chiedono le dimissioni del capo del Dap”. https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/03/11/news/rivolta_c arceri_bonafede_relazione_parlamento-250921236 E19 Prison riots: The Minister of Justice states that the State doesn’t back down. 19/03/2020 “Decreto ‘Cura Italia’ e emergenza coronavirus nelle carceri: deroghe alla disciplina della detenzione domiciliare ex legge 199/2010”. https://varesepress.info/decreto-cura-italia-e-emergenza- coronavirus-nelle-carceri-deroghe-alla-disciplina-della- detenzione-domiciliare-ex-legge-199-2010 E20 Prison riots: The Government derogates from the rule on house detention. 20/03/2020 “Coronavirus, rivolta nelle carceri: sotto accusa il responsabile dei penitenziari”. https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_marzo_11/coronavirus- rivolta-carceri-sotto-accusa-responsabile-penitenziari- d7543b36-63c7-11ea-9cf4-1c175ff3bb7c.shtml E21 Prison riots: The head of the Department of Penitentiary Administration accused of being responsible. 20/03/2020 “Il mistero degli aiuti russi nell’Italia in pieno lockdown”. https://www.lastampa.it/esteri/2022/03/20/news/il_mistero_d egli_aiuti_russi_nell_italia_in_pieno_lockdown-2877428 E22 Russian influence: La Stampa complaint the mystery of Moscow’s aid. https://www.iltempo.it/news-adn-kronos/2019/09/28/news/mafia-salvo-ando-falcone-era-isolato-sia-dalla-politica-che-dai-giudici-1216683 https://www.iltempo.it/news-adn-kronos/2019/09/28/news/mafia-salvo-ando-falcone-era-isolato-sia-dalla-politica-che-dai-giudici-1216683 https://www.iltempo.it/news-adn-kronos/2019/09/28/news/mafia-salvo-ando-falcone-era-isolato-sia-dalla-politica-che-dai-giudici-1216683 https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/rivolta-e-morti-carceri-veri-motivi-e-l-attenta-regia-ADBxHyB https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/rivolta-e-morti-carceri-veri-motivi-e-l-attenta-regia-ADBxHyB https://www.tgcom24.mediaset.it/cronaca/coronavirus-proteste-in-27-carceri-assaltate-infermerie_15901707-202002a.shtml https://www.tgcom24.mediaset.it/cronaca/coronavirus-proteste-in-27-carceri-assaltate-infermerie_15901707-202002a.shtml https://www.tgcom24.mediaset.it/cronaca/coronavirus-proteste-in-27-carceri-assaltate-infermerie_15901707-202002a.shtml https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2020/03/11/il-carcere-e-questo-un-luogo-di-poveracci-e-disperati-ora-dopo-le-rivolte-abbiamo-unemergenza-da-tamponare/5733367 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2020/03/11/il-carcere-e-questo-un-luogo-di-poveracci-e-disperati-ora-dopo-le-rivolte-abbiamo-unemergenza-da-tamponare/5733367 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2020/03/11/il-carcere-e-questo-un-luogo-di-poveracci-e-disperati-ora-dopo-le-rivolte-abbiamo-unemergenza-da-tamponare/5733367 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/03/11/news/rivolta_carceri_bonafede_relazione_parlamento-250921236 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/03/11/news/rivolta_carceri_bonafede_relazione_parlamento-250921236 https://varesepress.info/decreto-cura-italia-e-emergenza-coronavirus-nelle-carceri-deroghe-alla-disciplina-della-detenzione-domiciliare-ex-legge-199-2010 https://varesepress.info/decreto-cura-italia-e-emergenza-coronavirus-nelle-carceri-deroghe-alla-disciplina-della-detenzione-domiciliare-ex-legge-199-2010 https://varesepress.info/decreto-cura-italia-e-emergenza-coronavirus-nelle-carceri-deroghe-alla-disciplina-della-detenzione-domiciliare-ex-legge-199-2010 https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_marzo_11/coronavirus-rivolta-carceri-sotto-accusa-responsabile-penitenziari-d7543b36-63c7-11ea-9cf4-1c175ff3bb7c.shtml https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_marzo_11/coronavirus-rivolta-carceri-sotto-accusa-responsabile-penitenziari-d7543b36-63c7-11ea-9cf4-1c175ff3bb7c.shtml https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_marzo_11/coronavirus-rivolta-carceri-sotto-accusa-responsabile-penitenziari-d7543b36-63c7-11ea-9cf4-1c175ff3bb7c.shtml https://www.lastampa.it/esteri/2022/03/20/news/il_mistero_degli_aiuti_russi_nell_italia_in_pieno_lockdown-2877428 https://www.lastampa.it/esteri/2022/03/20/news/il_mistero_degli_aiuti_russi_nell_italia_in_pieno_lockdown-2877428 214 22/03/2020 “USAFE supports Italy COVID-19 response”. https://it.usembassy.gov/usafe-supports-italy-covid-19- response-march-22-2020 E23 Russian influence: US Embassy reminds that they work with allies to meet the challenges together. 23/03/2020 “Il Coronavirus e l’ultima operazione di influenza della Russia sull’Italia”. https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo- piano/2020/03/23/news/il-coronavirus-e-l-ultima-operazione- di-influenza-della-russia-sull-italia-1.38627687 E24 Russian influence: La Stampa complaint the Moscow's aims. 24/03/2020 “La solidarietà russa all'Italia è senza secondi fini. Parola di Mosca”. https://www.agi.it/estero/news/2020-03-24/coronavirus-aiuti- russi-italia-propaganda-7817813 E25 Russian influence: Moscow ambassador highlights the solidarity of his country. 24/03/2020 “Coronavirus, la telefonata Conte-Putin agita il governo: ‘Più che aiuti arrivano militari russi in Italia’”. https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo- piano/2020/03/25/news/coronavirus-la-telefonata-conte- putin-agita-il-governo-piu-che-aiuti-arrivano-militari-russi- in-italia-1.38633327 E26 Russian influence: La Stampa complaint the inadequacy of the medical supplies sent by Moscow. 26/03/2020 “La lettera dell’ambasciatore russo Razov a ‘La Stampa’”. https://www.lastampa.it/2020/03/26/news/la-lettera-dell- ambasciatore-russo-razov-a-la-stampa-1.38642247 E27 Russian influence: Ambassador Razov states that Conte thanked Putin for aids. 01/04/2020 “Gli aiuti russi in Italia sul Coronavirus, il generale Kikot e i timori sull’intelligence militare in azione”. https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo- piano/2020/04/01/news/gli-aiuti-russi-in-italia-sul- coronavirus-il-generale-che-li-guida-e-i-timori-sull- intelligence-militare-in-azione-1.38664749 E28 Russian influence: La Stampa complaint the presence of Moscow’s military intelligence. 03/04/2020 “Le accuse di Mosca e la nostra risposta”. https://www.lastampa.it/lettere/2020/04/03/news/le-accuse- di-mosca-e-la-nostra-risposta-1.38672825 E29 Russian influence: La Stampa replies to Moscow’s accusation of Russophobia. 04/04/2020 “Scontro Italia-Russia: «Grazie per gli aiuti, ma la libertà di stampa non si tocca»”. https://www.corriere.it/politica/20_aprile_04/scontro-italia- russia-grazie-gli-aiuti-ma-liberta-stampa-non-si-tocca- e4b1e884-7653-11ea-b3b8-a2cb021df0f0.shtml E30 Russian influence: verbal intimidation against the newspaper La Stampa. 09/04/2020 “Carceri: stanziati 5 mln per la detenzione domiciliare”. https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/04/09/carceri- stanziati-5-mln-per-la-detenzione-domiciliare_dbdb036c- 4c77-4ebe-801c-a6dba782c8a5.html E31 Prison riots: Five million euro for the house detention. https://it.usembassy.gov/usafe-supports-italy-covid-19-response-march-22-2020 https://it.usembassy.gov/usafe-supports-italy-covid-19-response-march-22-2020 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/03/23/news/il-coronavirus-e-l-ultima-operazione-di-influenza-della-russia-sull-italia-1.38627687 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/03/23/news/il-coronavirus-e-l-ultima-operazione-di-influenza-della-russia-sull-italia-1.38627687 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/03/23/news/il-coronavirus-e-l-ultima-operazione-di-influenza-della-russia-sull-italia-1.38627687 https://www.agi.it/estero/news/2020-03-24/coronavirus-aiuti-russi-italia-propaganda-7817813 https://www.agi.it/estero/news/2020-03-24/coronavirus-aiuti-russi-italia-propaganda-7817813 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/03/25/news/coronavirus-la-telefonata-conte-putin-agita-il-governo-piu-che-aiuti-arrivano-militari-russi-in-italia-1.38633327 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/03/25/news/coronavirus-la-telefonata-conte-putin-agita-il-governo-piu-che-aiuti-arrivano-militari-russi-in-italia-1.38633327 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/03/25/news/coronavirus-la-telefonata-conte-putin-agita-il-governo-piu-che-aiuti-arrivano-militari-russi-in-italia-1.38633327 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/03/25/news/coronavirus-la-telefonata-conte-putin-agita-il-governo-piu-che-aiuti-arrivano-militari-russi-in-italia-1.38633327 https://www.lastampa.it/2020/03/26/news/la-lettera-dell-ambasciatore-russo-razov-a-la-stampa-1.38642247 https://www.lastampa.it/2020/03/26/news/la-lettera-dell-ambasciatore-russo-razov-a-la-stampa-1.38642247 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/04/01/news/gli-aiuti-russi-in-italia-sul-coronavirus-il-generale-che-li-guida-e-i-timori-sull-intelligence-militare-in-azione-1.38664749 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/04/01/news/gli-aiuti-russi-in-italia-sul-coronavirus-il-generale-che-li-guida-e-i-timori-sull-intelligence-militare-in-azione-1.38664749 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/04/01/news/gli-aiuti-russi-in-italia-sul-coronavirus-il-generale-che-li-guida-e-i-timori-sull-intelligence-militare-in-azione-1.38664749 https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2020/04/01/news/gli-aiuti-russi-in-italia-sul-coronavirus-il-generale-che-li-guida-e-i-timori-sull-intelligence-militare-in-azione-1.38664749 https://www.lastampa.it/lettere/2020/04/03/news/le-accuse-di-mosca-e-la-nostra-risposta-1.38672825 https://www.lastampa.it/lettere/2020/04/03/news/le-accuse-di-mosca-e-la-nostra-risposta-1.38672825 https://www.corriere.it/politica/20_aprile_04/scontro-italia-russia-grazie-gli-aiuti-ma-liberta-stampa-non-si-tocca-e4b1e884-7653-11ea-b3b8-a2cb021df0f0.shtml https://www.corriere.it/politica/20_aprile_04/scontro-italia-russia-grazie-gli-aiuti-ma-liberta-stampa-non-si-tocca-e4b1e884-7653-11ea-b3b8-a2cb021df0f0.shtml https://www.corriere.it/politica/20_aprile_04/scontro-italia-russia-grazie-gli-aiuti-ma-liberta-stampa-non-si-tocca-e4b1e884-7653-11ea-b3b8-a2cb021df0f0.shtml https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/04/09/carceri-stanziati-5-mln-per-la-detenzione-domiciliare_dbdb036c-4c77-4ebe-801c-a6dba782c8a5.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/04/09/carceri-stanziati-5-mln-per-la-detenzione-domiciliare_dbdb036c-4c77-4ebe-801c-a6dba782c8a5.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/04/09/carceri-stanziati-5-mln-per-la-detenzione-domiciliare_dbdb036c-4c77-4ebe-801c-a6dba782c8a5.html 215 25/04/2020 “Tutte le misure contenute nel Cura Italia”. https://www.agi.it/economia/news/2020-04-25/cura-italia- misure-8431736 E32 Prison riots: Twenty million euro for the damage. 01/05/2020 “Carceri: bufera sul Dap, Basentini si dimette. L'opposizione: ‘Via anche Bonafede’”. https://www.agi.it/politica/news/2020-05-01/coronavirus- carceri-dap-basentini-8492884 E33 Prison riots: The head of the Department of Penitentiary Administration resigns. 05/05/2020 “I 376 boss scarcerati. Ecco la lista riservata che allarma le procure”. https://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/05/05/news/i_376 _boss_scarcerati_ecco_la_lista_riservata_che_allarma_le_p rocure-300899894 E34 Prison riots: 376 mafia bosses released from prison. 07/05/2020 “Bonafede, un decreto per far tornare i boss in carcere” https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/05/06/bonafede _8f9a53b4-baf6-46ea-83fa-7957d62c7c06.html E35 Prison riots: The Minister of Justice announces a decree to bring back the mobster to jail. 08/05/2020 “I boss scarcerati dal 41bis non sono 376. Sono 3”. https://www.ilfoglio.it/il-bi-e-il-ba/2020/05/08/news/i-boss- scarcerati-dal-41bis-non-sono-376-sono-3-317076 E36 Prison riots: mafia bosses released are not 376, but 3. 09/05/2020 “Esclusivo TPI: i boss scarcerati sono 498. C’è anche un imprenditore dei Casalesi uscito col Cura Italia”. https://www.tpi.it/cronaca/boss-scarcerati-498-numeri-veri- esclusivo-tpi-20200509599373 E37 Prison riots: mafia bosses released from prison are 498. 15/05/2020 “Bonafede, si dimette il capo di gabinetto intercettato assieme a Palamara”. https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_maggio_15/bonafede-si- dimette-capo-gabinetto-intercettato-assieme-palamara- 8a5a8d3a-9680-11ea-a66c-1f6181297d24.shtml E38 Prison riots: The Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Justice resigns. 19/05/2020 “Giustizia, Crimi: ‘Chi vota contro il ministro Bonafede sfiducia l'intero governo’”. http://www.rainews.it/archivio-rainews/articoli/ministro- bonafede-giustizia-mozione-sfiducia-parlamento-governo- 0c347182-2b63-4f01-a002-dcf96934d061.html E39 Prison riots: two motions of no- confidence against the Minister of Justice. 19/05/2020 “Le ragioni delle mozioni di sfiducia contro il ministro Bonafede”. https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/le-ragioni-mozioni-sfiducia- contro-bonafede-ADoxGgR E40 Prison riots: Valid reasons behind the motions of no- confidence against the Minister of Justice. 20/05/2020 “Giustizia, Senato respinge le mozioni di sfiducia a Bonafede. Il ministro: ‘Sono soddisfatto’”. https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/05/20/news/giorno_sf iducia_bonafede-257126918 E41 Prison riots: The Senate rejects the motions of no- confidence against the Minister of Justice. https://www.agi.it/economia/news/2020-04-25/cura-italia-misure-8431736 https://www.agi.it/economia/news/2020-04-25/cura-italia-misure-8431736 https://www.agi.it/politica/news/2020-05-01/coronavirus-carceri-dap-basentini-8492884 https://www.agi.it/politica/news/2020-05-01/coronavirus-carceri-dap-basentini-8492884 https://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/05/05/news/i_376_boss_scarcerati_ecco_la_lista_riservata_che_allarma_le_procure-300899894 https://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/05/05/news/i_376_boss_scarcerati_ecco_la_lista_riservata_che_allarma_le_procure-300899894 https://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/05/05/news/i_376_boss_scarcerati_ecco_la_lista_riservata_che_allarma_le_procure-300899894 https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/05/06/bonafede_8f9a53b4-baf6-46ea-83fa-7957d62c7c06.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/05/06/bonafede_8f9a53b4-baf6-46ea-83fa-7957d62c7c06.html https://www.ilfoglio.it/il-bi-e-il-ba/2020/05/08/news/i-boss-scarcerati-dal-41bis-non-sono-376-sono-3-317076 https://www.ilfoglio.it/il-bi-e-il-ba/2020/05/08/news/i-boss-scarcerati-dal-41bis-non-sono-376-sono-3-317076 https://www.tpi.it/cronaca/boss-scarcerati-498-numeri-veri-esclusivo-tpi-20200509599373 https://www.tpi.it/cronaca/boss-scarcerati-498-numeri-veri-esclusivo-tpi-20200509599373 https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_maggio_15/bonafede-si-dimette-capo-gabinetto-intercettato-assieme-palamara-8a5a8d3a-9680-11ea-a66c-1f6181297d24.shtml https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_maggio_15/bonafede-si-dimette-capo-gabinetto-intercettato-assieme-palamara-8a5a8d3a-9680-11ea-a66c-1f6181297d24.shtml https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_maggio_15/bonafede-si-dimette-capo-gabinetto-intercettato-assieme-palamara-8a5a8d3a-9680-11ea-a66c-1f6181297d24.shtml http://www.rainews.it/archivio-rainews/articoli/ministro-bonafede-giustizia-mozione-sfiducia-parlamento-governo-0c347182-2b63-4f01-a002-dcf96934d061.html http://www.rainews.it/archivio-rainews/articoli/ministro-bonafede-giustizia-mozione-sfiducia-parlamento-governo-0c347182-2b63-4f01-a002-dcf96934d061.html http://www.rainews.it/archivio-rainews/articoli/ministro-bonafede-giustizia-mozione-sfiducia-parlamento-governo-0c347182-2b63-4f01-a002-dcf96934d061.html https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/le-ragioni-mozioni-sfiducia-contro-bonafede-ADoxGgR https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/le-ragioni-mozioni-sfiducia-contro-bonafede-ADoxGgR https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/05/20/news/giorno_sfiducia_bonafede-257126918 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/05/20/news/giorno_sfiducia_bonafede-257126918 216 20/05/2020 “Lockdown in lock-up: Italy's prison system has been plunged into crisis by the pandemic – and by the mafia”. https://globalinitiative.net/italy-prisons-covid E42 Prison riots: For Global Initiative, mafia bosses are free to come and go as they please. 09/07/2020 “How the Mafia infiltrated Italy’s hospitals and laundered the profits globally”. https://www.ft.com/content/8850581c-176e-4c5c-8b38- debb26b35c14 E43 Economics: Mafia infiltrated Italy’s hospitals. 21/07/2020 “Diecimila i ribelli delle carceri. E i pm antimafia indagano sui boss”. https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/07/21/news/diecimil a_i_ribelli_delle_carceri_e_i_pm_antimafia_indagano_sui_b oss-301036079 E44 Prison riots: The rebels are 10,000. 22/07/2020 “Il rapporto con i veri numeri: diecimila detenuti convolti nei disordini di marzo in cui ci furono 13 morti. L’ombra dei capiclan pugliesi e campani”. https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/07/22/news/diecimila _i_ribelli_delle_carceri_e_i_pm_antimafia_indagano_sui_bo ss-262581321 E45 Prison riots: ten thousand detainees involved. 30/09/2020 “Boss scarcerati per l'emergenza Covid, Bonafede: ‘Non decide il ministro chi deve rientrare in cella’”. https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/09/30/news/bonafede _carceri_boss-268966929 E46 Prison riots: The Minister of Justice states that he does not decide who must return to prison. 07/12/2021 “La nuova via della seta cinese: l'Italia a due anni dall'adesione”. https://www.treccani.it/magazine/atlante/geopolitica/Nuova_ Via_Seta_cinese_Italia.html E47 Chinese influence: So much storytelling, few real benefits. 17/01/2022 “Aiuti covid o spionaggio dalla Russia? Cosa c’è dietro la missione dell’esercito russo a Bergamo”. https://www.agendadigitale.eu/cultura-digitale/aiuti-covid-o- spionaggio-dalla-russia-cosa-ce-dietro-la-missione- dellesercito-russo-a-bergamo E48 Russian influence: Military intelligence collection behind the aid for Covid- 19. 22/03/2022 “Quanto è costata la missione Covid dalla Russia all’Italia?”. https://www.corriere.it/economia/lavoro/22_marzo_23/quant o-costata-missione-covid-italia-russia-22eb2db8-aa23-11ec- a7d6-08630d5b986a.shtml E49 Russian influence: Moscow’s operation has cost to Italy about three million euros. 09/05/2022 “Dalla Russia con amore”. https://www.rai.it/programmi/report/inchieste/Dalla-Russia- con-amore-9cb1688a-5bf2-4161-8972-0bb1a5ec3f19.html E50 Russian influence: Report highlights the institutional short-circuit. https://globalinitiative.net/italy-prisons-covid https://www.ft.com/content/8850581c-176e-4c5c-8b38-debb26b35c14 https://www.ft.com/content/8850581c-176e-4c5c-8b38-debb26b35c14 https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/07/21/news/diecimila_i_ribelli_delle_carceri_e_i_pm_antimafia_indagano_sui_boss-301036079 https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/07/21/news/diecimila_i_ribelli_delle_carceri_e_i_pm_antimafia_indagano_sui_boss-301036079 https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/07/21/news/diecimila_i_ribelli_delle_carceri_e_i_pm_antimafia_indagano_sui_boss-301036079 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/07/22/news/diecimila_i_ribelli_delle_carceri_e_i_pm_antimafia_indagano_sui_boss-262581321 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/07/22/news/diecimila_i_ribelli_delle_carceri_e_i_pm_antimafia_indagano_sui_boss-262581321 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/07/22/news/diecimila_i_ribelli_delle_carceri_e_i_pm_antimafia_indagano_sui_boss-262581321 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/09/30/news/bonafede_carceri_boss-268966929 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/09/30/news/bonafede_carceri_boss-268966929 https://www.treccani.it/magazine/atlante/geopolitica/Nuova_Via_Seta_cinese_Italia.html https://www.treccani.it/magazine/atlante/geopolitica/Nuova_Via_Seta_cinese_Italia.html https://www.agendadigitale.eu/cultura-digitale/aiuti-covid-o-spionaggio-dalla-russia-cosa-ce-dietro-la-missione-dellesercito-russo-a-bergamo https://www.agendadigitale.eu/cultura-digitale/aiuti-covid-o-spionaggio-dalla-russia-cosa-ce-dietro-la-missione-dellesercito-russo-a-bergamo https://www.agendadigitale.eu/cultura-digitale/aiuti-covid-o-spionaggio-dalla-russia-cosa-ce-dietro-la-missione-dellesercito-russo-a-bergamo https://www.corriere.it/economia/lavoro/22_marzo_23/quanto-costata-missione-covid-italia-russia-22eb2db8-aa23-11ec-a7d6-08630d5b986a.shtml https://www.corriere.it/economia/lavoro/22_marzo_23/quanto-costata-missione-covid-italia-russia-22eb2db8-aa23-11ec-a7d6-08630d5b986a.shtml https://www.corriere.it/economia/lavoro/22_marzo_23/quanto-costata-missione-covid-italia-russia-22eb2db8-aa23-11ec-a7d6-08630d5b986a.shtml https://www.rai.it/programmi/report/inchieste/Dalla-Russia-con-amore-9cb1688a-5bf2-4161-8972-0bb1a5ec3f19.html https://www.rai.it/programmi/report/inchieste/Dalla-Russia-con-amore-9cb1688a-5bf2-4161-8972-0bb1a5ec3f19.html 217 23/05/2022 “Giovanni Falcone, tutto quello che non torna sulla strage di Capaci 30 anni dopo. L’esplosivo, i buchi neri e i mandanti esterni (mai trovati)”. https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2022/05/23/giovanni- falcone-tutto-quello-che-non-torna-sulla-strage-di-capaci- 30-anni-dopo-lesplosivo-i-buchi-neri-e-i-mandanti-esterni- mai-trovati/6598086 E51 Mafia slaughters: The masterminds of Falcone’s assassination are still unknown. 24/06/2022 “Fiammetta Borsellino: «Non partecipo agli anniversari di via D’Amelio. Mio padre fu lasciato solo e tradito»”. https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2022/6/23/fiammetta- borsellino-non-partecipo-agli-anniversari-di-via-damelio- mio-padre-fu-lasciato-solo-e-tradito/12702 E52 Mafia slaughters: Borsellino’s daughter declares that his father was betrayed. 19/07/2022 “Trent'anni dopo la strage di via D'Amelio”. https://www.storicang.it/a/trentanni-dopo-strage-di-via- damelio_15690 E53 Mafia slaughters: The one on Borsellino’s assassination was the biggest misdirection in the history of Italy. 08/10/2022 “Il sovranismo energetico di Enrico Mattei causa della sua morte: nuovi documenti in un libro accusano la Francia”. https://www.huffingtonpost.it/cultura/2022/10/08/news/il_sov ranismo_energetico_di_enrico_mattei_causa_della_sua_mor te_nuovi_documenti_in_un_libro_accusano_la_francia- 10368644 E54 Mattei’s assassination: New documents in a book accuse France. 24/10/2022 “Dall’omicidio Mattei a Eugenio Cefis: così l’Italia ha perso la corsa al gas e petrolio”. https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2022/10/23/dallomicidio- mattei-a-eugenio-cefis-cosi-litalia-ha-perso-la-corsa-al-gas- e-petrolio/12908 E55 Mattei’s assassination: An unpunished massacre and the vanished dream of energy independence. 27/10/2022 “Una pista per il caso Mattei”. https://www.internazionale.it/essenziale/notizie/paolo- morando/2022/10/27/pista-caso-enrico-mattei E56 Mattei’s assassination: New documents in a book accuse France. 15/11/2022 “Dal caso Mattei a Ustica, quella mano francese dietro i misteri d’Italia”. https://lespresso.it/c/mondo/2022/11/14/dal-caso-mattei-a- ustica-quella-mano-francese-dietro-i-misteri-ditalia/25187 E57 Mattei’s assassination: France involved in some Italian mysteries. 17/12/2022 “La Cia riscrive il caso Mattei: ‘Era fascista: pagò la Dc per fingersi partigiano’”. https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/12/17/news/enrico_m attei_fascista_documenti_cia-379393929 E58 Mattei’s assassination: The CIA criticizes the figure of Mattei. 19/12/2022 “La Cia e il caso Mattei. L’allarme nei dossier ‘I petrolieri italiani ora sono contro di noi’”. https://www.quotidiano.net/cronaca/la-cia-e-il-caso-mattei- lallarme-nei-dossier-i-petrolieri-italiani-ora-sono-contro-di- noi-1.8400480 E59 Mattei’s assassination: Revelations about the silent war between Eni and the American oil tankers. https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2022/05/23/giovanni-falcone-tutto-quello-che-non-torna-sulla-strage-di-capaci-30-anni-dopo-lesplosivo-i-buchi-neri-e-i-mandanti-esterni-mai-trovati/6598086 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2022/05/23/giovanni-falcone-tutto-quello-che-non-torna-sulla-strage-di-capaci-30-anni-dopo-lesplosivo-i-buchi-neri-e-i-mandanti-esterni-mai-trovati/6598086 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2022/05/23/giovanni-falcone-tutto-quello-che-non-torna-sulla-strage-di-capaci-30-anni-dopo-lesplosivo-i-buchi-neri-e-i-mandanti-esterni-mai-trovati/6598086 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2022/05/23/giovanni-falcone-tutto-quello-che-non-torna-sulla-strage-di-capaci-30-anni-dopo-lesplosivo-i-buchi-neri-e-i-mandanti-esterni-mai-trovati/6598086 https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2022/6/23/fiammetta-borsellino-non-partecipo-agli-anniversari-di-via-damelio-mio-padre-fu-lasciato-solo-e-tradito/12702 https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2022/6/23/fiammetta-borsellino-non-partecipo-agli-anniversari-di-via-damelio-mio-padre-fu-lasciato-solo-e-tradito/12702 https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2022/6/23/fiammetta-borsellino-non-partecipo-agli-anniversari-di-via-damelio-mio-padre-fu-lasciato-solo-e-tradito/12702 https://www.storicang.it/a/trentanni-dopo-strage-di-via-damelio_15690 https://www.storicang.it/a/trentanni-dopo-strage-di-via-damelio_15690 https://www.huffingtonpost.it/cultura/2022/10/08/news/il_sovranismo_energetico_di_enrico_mattei_causa_della_sua_morte_nuovi_documenti_in_un_libro_accusano_la_francia-10368644 https://www.huffingtonpost.it/cultura/2022/10/08/news/il_sovranismo_energetico_di_enrico_mattei_causa_della_sua_morte_nuovi_documenti_in_un_libro_accusano_la_francia-10368644 https://www.huffingtonpost.it/cultura/2022/10/08/news/il_sovranismo_energetico_di_enrico_mattei_causa_della_sua_morte_nuovi_documenti_in_un_libro_accusano_la_francia-10368644 https://www.huffingtonpost.it/cultura/2022/10/08/news/il_sovranismo_energetico_di_enrico_mattei_causa_della_sua_morte_nuovi_documenti_in_un_libro_accusano_la_francia-10368644 https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2022/10/23/dallomicidio-mattei-a-eugenio-cefis-cosi-litalia-ha-perso-la-corsa-al-gas-e-petrolio/12908 https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2022/10/23/dallomicidio-mattei-a-eugenio-cefis-cosi-litalia-ha-perso-la-corsa-al-gas-e-petrolio/12908 https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2022/10/23/dallomicidio-mattei-a-eugenio-cefis-cosi-litalia-ha-perso-la-corsa-al-gas-e-petrolio/12908 https://www.internazionale.it/essenziale/notizie/paolo-morando/2022/10/27/pista-caso-enrico-mattei https://www.internazionale.it/essenziale/notizie/paolo-morando/2022/10/27/pista-caso-enrico-mattei https://lespresso.it/c/mondo/2022/11/14/dal-caso-mattei-a-ustica-quella-mano-francese-dietro-i-misteri-ditalia/25187 https://lespresso.it/c/mondo/2022/11/14/dal-caso-mattei-a-ustica-quella-mano-francese-dietro-i-misteri-ditalia/25187 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/12/17/news/enrico_mattei_fascista_documenti_cia-379393929 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/12/17/news/enrico_mattei_fascista_documenti_cia-379393929 https://www.quotidiano.net/cronaca/la-cia-e-il-caso-mattei-lallarme-nei-dossier-i-petrolieri-italiani-ora-sono-contro-di-noi-1.8400480 https://www.quotidiano.net/cronaca/la-cia-e-il-caso-mattei-lallarme-nei-dossier-i-petrolieri-italiani-ora-sono-contro-di-noi-1.8400480 https://www.quotidiano.net/cronaca/la-cia-e-il-caso-mattei-lallarme-nei-dossier-i-petrolieri-italiani-ora-sono-contro-di-noi-1.8400480 218 08/01/2023 “Caso Moro, le carte segrete: ‘La Cia aveva le mani legate’”. https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/caso-moro-carte- segrete-cia-aveva-mani-legate-2102853.html E60 Moro’s assassination: former CIA Director admitted he could not help to save him. 17/01/2023 “Istat: inflazione all'8,1% nel 2022, la più alta in Italia dal 1985”. https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/economia/2023/01/17/istat- inflazione-all81-nel-2022-la-piu-alta-in-italia-dal- 1985_dc863676-9e9e-4bcb-a58a-75766ce2e426.html E61 Economics: Inflation at 8.1% due to energy supply costs. 25/03/2023 “Il caso Moro e l'avvio del declino dell'informazione in Italia”. https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/letteratura/caso-moro-ha- avviato-declino-dellinformazione-italia-2130702.html E62 Moro’s assassination: First case of infodemic in Italy, then the decline of information. 07/04/2023 “Omicidio Borsellino, il depistaggio di Stato organizzato prima della morte del magistrato: la terribile verità”. https://www.ilriformista.it/omicidio-borsellino-il- depistaggio-di-stato-organizzato-prima-della-morte-del- magistrato-la-terribile-verita-351562 E63 Mafia slaughters: The misdirection on Borsellino’s assassination was promoted by the State. 09/05/2023 “Caso Moro, ora gli inquirenti completino il lavoro iniziato dalla commissione d’inchiesta”. https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/editoriali/139 7648/caso-moro-ora-gli-inquirenti-completino-il-lavoro- iniziato-dalla-commissione-dinchiesta.html E64 Moro’s assassination: Forty-five years after the 1972, the truth is still unknown. 12/05/2023 “L'omicidio di Aldo Moro” https://www.storicang.it/a/lomicidio-di-aldo-moro_15532 E65 Moro’s assassination: it still causes speculation and suspicion. 15/05/2023 “Italy's Exports to China Are Booming and It's Not Clear Why”. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-15/italy- s-exports-to-china-are-booming-and-it-s-not-clear-why E66 Economics: Some Italy's exports to China are curiously booming. 19/05/2023 "Italia-Cina, l'incognita della 'Via della Seta': il dossier scottante sul tavolo di Giorgia Meloni" https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/italia-cina-incognita-via- seta-dossier-scottante-tavolo-giorgia-meloni-AESm9TVD E67 Chinese influence: Italian Prime Minister delays her first official visit in Washington. 23/05/2023 “Giovanni Falcone, 31 anni per una mezza verità. E la strage di Capaci resta intrappolata tra memoria e retorica”. https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2023/5/22/giovanni-falcone-31- anni-per-una-mezza-verita-e-la-strage-di-capaci-resta- intrappolata-tra-memoria-e-retorica/2985 E68 Mafia slaughters: Thirty-one years after the 1992, the truth is still unknown. https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/caso-moro-carte-segrete-cia-aveva-mani-legate-2102853.html https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/caso-moro-carte-segrete-cia-aveva-mani-legate-2102853.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/economia/2023/01/17/istat-inflazione-all81-nel-2022-la-piu-alta-in-italia-dal-1985_dc863676-9e9e-4bcb-a58a-75766ce2e426.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/economia/2023/01/17/istat-inflazione-all81-nel-2022-la-piu-alta-in-italia-dal-1985_dc863676-9e9e-4bcb-a58a-75766ce2e426.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/economia/2023/01/17/istat-inflazione-all81-nel-2022-la-piu-alta-in-italia-dal-1985_dc863676-9e9e-4bcb-a58a-75766ce2e426.html https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/letteratura/caso-moro-ha-avviato-declino-dellinformazione-italia-2130702.html https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/letteratura/caso-moro-ha-avviato-declino-dellinformazione-italia-2130702.html https://www.ilriformista.it/omicidio-borsellino-il-depistaggio-di-stato-organizzato-prima-della-morte-del-magistrato-la-terribile-verita-351562 https://www.ilriformista.it/omicidio-borsellino-il-depistaggio-di-stato-organizzato-prima-della-morte-del-magistrato-la-terribile-verita-351562 https://www.ilriformista.it/omicidio-borsellino-il-depistaggio-di-stato-organizzato-prima-della-morte-del-magistrato-la-terribile-verita-351562 https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/editoriali/1397648/caso-moro-ora-gli-inquirenti-completino-il-lavoro-iniziato-dalla-commissione-dinchiesta.html https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/editoriali/1397648/caso-moro-ora-gli-inquirenti-completino-il-lavoro-iniziato-dalla-commissione-dinchiesta.html https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/editoriali/1397648/caso-moro-ora-gli-inquirenti-completino-il-lavoro-iniziato-dalla-commissione-dinchiesta.html https://www.storicang.it/a/lomicidio-di-aldo-moro_15532 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-15/italy-s-exports-to-china-are-booming-and-it-s-not-clear-why https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-15/italy-s-exports-to-china-are-booming-and-it-s-not-clear-why https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/italia-cina-incognita-via-seta-dossier-scottante-tavolo-giorgia-meloni-AESm9TVD https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/italia-cina-incognita-via-seta-dossier-scottante-tavolo-giorgia-meloni-AESm9TVD https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2023/5/22/giovanni-falcone-31-anni-per-una-mezza-verita-e-la-strage-di-capaci-resta-intrappolata-tra-memoria-e-retorica/2985 https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2023/5/22/giovanni-falcone-31-anni-per-una-mezza-verita-e-la-strage-di-capaci-resta-intrappolata-tra-memoria-e-retorica/2985 https://lespresso.it/c/attualita/2023/5/22/giovanni-falcone-31-anni-per-una-mezza-verita-e-la-strage-di-capaci-resta-intrappolata-tra-memoria-e-retorica/2985 219 07/06/2023 “Mafia: confermato in Cassazione il risarcimento per Contrada”. https://www.ansa.it/sicilia/notizie/2023/06/07/mafia- confermato-in-cassazione-il-risarcimento-per- contrada_9e222968-306c-416b-9393- 07920c9f39fd.html#:~:text=La%20Corte%20di%20Cassazio ne%2C%20rigettando,per%20concorso%20esterno%20in%2 0associazione E69 Mafia slaughters: Italy must compensate a former SISDE senior officer. 25/07/2023 "Via della Seta, flop degli investimenti in Italia. Ma i cinesi puntano ancora sulla logistica". https://www.ilsecoloxix.it/economia/2023/07/25/news/via_set a_flop_investimenti_italia-12963939 E70 Chinese influence: Few investments, but Chinese still rely on logistics. 27/07/2023 “Prima trasferta americana per la premier Meloni, la Casa Bianca avverte sugli accordi con la Cina”. https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2023/07/27/prima- trasferta-americana-per-la-premier-meloni-la-casa-bianca- avverte-sugli_bab83cfc-793b-4d43-ad18-d9589381055b.html E71 Chinese influence: The White House highlights the risks of the BRI. 30/07/2023 “L'Italia verso l'uscita dalla via della Seta cinese, Crosetto: 'Scellerato aderirvi'”. https://www.today.it/politica/via-della-seta-italia-uscita- accordo-cina-import-export-quanto.html E72 Chinese influence: Towards the exit of BRI, the Minister of Defence criticizes the choice to join it. 11/10/2023 "Come la nuova Via della Seta si è trasformata in un piano imperialistico cinese". https://forbes.it/2023/10/11/via-seta-diventata-piano- imperialistico-cinese E73 Chinese influence: BRI is publicly considered an imperialist plan. 30/10/2023 “Depistaggio Borsellino, al via processo appello”. https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/breaking- news/1443000/depistaggio-borsellino-al-via-processo- appello.html E74 Mafia slaughters: Misdirection on the slaughter of via D’Amelio. 17/11/2023 “La scomparsa dell’agenda rossa, l’accusa di Fiammetta Borsellino: ‘Qualcuno nelle istituzioni sa e non parla. Omertà di Stato sulla morte di mio padre’”. https://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/11/17/news/agen da_rossa_scomparsa_fiammetta_borsellino_accusa- 420590781 E75 Mafia slaughters: Borsellino’s daughter declares that the State hides the truth. https://www.ansa.it/sicilia/notizie/2023/06/07/mafia-confermato-in-cassazione-il-risarcimento-per-contrada_9e222968-306c-416b-9393-07920c9f39fd.html#:~:text=La%20Corte%20di%20Cassazione%2C%20rigettando,per%20concorso%20esterno%20in%20associazione https://www.ansa.it/sicilia/notizie/2023/06/07/mafia-confermato-in-cassazione-il-risarcimento-per-contrada_9e222968-306c-416b-9393-07920c9f39fd.html#:~:text=La%20Corte%20di%20Cassazione%2C%20rigettando,per%20concorso%20esterno%20in%20associazione https://www.ansa.it/sicilia/notizie/2023/06/07/mafia-confermato-in-cassazione-il-risarcimento-per-contrada_9e222968-306c-416b-9393-07920c9f39fd.html#:~:text=La%20Corte%20di%20Cassazione%2C%20rigettando,per%20concorso%20esterno%20in%20associazione https://www.ansa.it/sicilia/notizie/2023/06/07/mafia-confermato-in-cassazione-il-risarcimento-per-contrada_9e222968-306c-416b-9393-07920c9f39fd.html#:~:text=La%20Corte%20di%20Cassazione%2C%20rigettando,per%20concorso%20esterno%20in%20associazione https://www.ansa.it/sicilia/notizie/2023/06/07/mafia-confermato-in-cassazione-il-risarcimento-per-contrada_9e222968-306c-416b-9393-07920c9f39fd.html#:~:text=La%20Corte%20di%20Cassazione%2C%20rigettando,per%20concorso%20esterno%20in%20associazione https://www.ansa.it/sicilia/notizie/2023/06/07/mafia-confermato-in-cassazione-il-risarcimento-per-contrada_9e222968-306c-416b-9393-07920c9f39fd.html#:~:text=La%20Corte%20di%20Cassazione%2C%20rigettando,per%20concorso%20esterno%20in%20associazione https://www.ilsecoloxix.it/economia/2023/07/25/news/via_seta_flop_investimenti_italia-12963939 https://www.ilsecoloxix.it/economia/2023/07/25/news/via_seta_flop_investimenti_italia-12963939 https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2023/07/27/prima-trasferta-americana-per-la-premier-meloni-la-casa-bianca-avverte-sugli_bab83cfc-793b-4d43-ad18-d9589381055b.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2023/07/27/prima-trasferta-americana-per-la-premier-meloni-la-casa-bianca-avverte-sugli_bab83cfc-793b-4d43-ad18-d9589381055b.html https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2023/07/27/prima-trasferta-americana-per-la-premier-meloni-la-casa-bianca-avverte-sugli_bab83cfc-793b-4d43-ad18-d9589381055b.html https://www.today.it/politica/via-della-seta-italia-uscita-accordo-cina-import-export-quanto.html https://www.today.it/politica/via-della-seta-italia-uscita-accordo-cina-import-export-quanto.html https://forbes.it/2023/10/11/via-seta-diventata-piano-imperialistico-cinese https://forbes.it/2023/10/11/via-seta-diventata-piano-imperialistico-cinese https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/breaking-news/1443000/depistaggio-borsellino-al-via-processo-appello.html https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/breaking-news/1443000/depistaggio-borsellino-al-via-processo-appello.html https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/breaking-news/1443000/depistaggio-borsellino-al-via-processo-appello.html https://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/11/17/news/agenda_rossa_scomparsa_fiammetta_borsellino_accusa-420590781 https://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/11/17/news/agenda_rossa_scomparsa_fiammetta_borsellino_accusa-420590781 https://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/11/17/news/agenda_rossa_scomparsa_fiammetta_borsellino_accusa-420590781 220 4.2 The Quadrant Hypothesis Generation. In the field of Intelligence analysis, the generation and testing of hypotheses is also a key element of scientific reasoning. With this in mind, the “Quadrant Hypothesis Generation is used to identify a set of hypotheses when the outcome is likely to be determined by just two driving forces” (Heuer Jr. and Pherson, 2015: 167). Here, the two driving forces are the use of military or non-military means, and the condition of socioeconomic vulnerability or invulnerability of the country, namely the two pivotal themes of the research. These were used to construct a 2 x 2 matrix, thinking to each driver as a continuum from one extreme to the other. The extremes of each driver were used to identify the vertical and horizontal axes of the chart. To each quadrant corresponds a specific hypothesis, each of which represents a hypothetical perception of Italy (Figure 19). Figure 19 – Quadrant Hypothesis Generation of Italy's perception. Source: own elaboration. 221 The four hypotheses derived from the above chart can be described as follows: 1. Peace Zone (H1) identifies a context in which there are non-military actions carried out by State or non-state actors, and – at least apparently – there are no signals of socioeconomic vulnerability. 2. War Zone (H2) identifies a context in which there are military actions carried out by State or non-state actors, regardless of whether there are signals of socioeconomic vulnerability. 3. Hybrid Area (H3) identifies a context in which there are both military actions carried out by State or non-state actors, and signals of socioeconomic vulnerability. 4. Grey Area (H4) identifies a context in which there are non-military actions carried out by State or non-state actors – or military actions perceived as non-military – and there are signals of socioeconomic vulnerability. These hypothetical scenarios are based on the analysis with the ACH technique, as well as the evidence provided in Paragraph no. 4.1. About the evaluation of these last, it should be noted what was pointed out by Heuer Jr. (1999: 115): Evaluation of evidence is a crucial step in analysis, but what evidence people rely on and how they interpret it are influenced by a variety of extraneous factors. Information presented in vivid and concrete detail often has unwarranted impact, and people tend to disregard abstract or statistical information that may have greater evidential value. We seldom take the absence of evidence into account. The human mind is also oversensitive to the consistency of the evidence, and insufficiently sensitive to the reliability of the evidence. Finally, impressions often remain even after the evidence on which they are based has been totally discredited. It should be also noted that, during the periods when the case studies occurred, there were signals of socioeconomic vulnerability. This was considered evaluating the 222 consistency of each piece of evidence, about the hypothetical scenario no. 1. For scenario no. 2 it was not necessary. 4.3 The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. The ACH technique was developed in the 1980s, at the CIA, by Richards Heuer Jr., as part of a methodology for analysing the presence or absence of Soviet deception. Later, it was used and probably is still used, to analyse a range of hypotheses to determine which is most consistent with the evidence gathered. According to Heuer Jr. and Pherson (2015: 181), “ACH is appropriate for almost any analysis where there are alternative explanations for what has happened, is happening, or is likely to happen”, but especially in the following situations: Use it when the judgment or decision is so important that you cannot afford to be wrong. Use it when your gut feelings are not good enough, and when you need a systematic approach to prevent being surprised by an unforeseen outcome. Use it on controversial issues when it is desirable to identify precise areas of disagreement and to leave an audit trail to show what relevant information was considered and how different analysts arrived at their different judgments. They also believe that ACH “structures and facilitates the exchange of information and ideas with colleagues in other offices or agencies” and “helps analysts produce a better analytic product” (Heuer Jr. and Pherson 2015: 183) by: Maintaining a record of the relevant information and tracking how that information relates to each hypothesis. […] Enabling analysts to present conclusions in a way that is better organized and more transparent as to how these conclusions were reached than would otherwise be possible. 223 Providing a foundation for identifying indicators that can then be monitored and validated to determine the direction in which events are heading. Indeed, they point out that ACH can be accomplished with a nine-step process based on: the identification of hypotheses to deal with; the organization of evidence in a grid or a list; the creation of a matrix with all hypotheses across the top, and all evidence down the left side; the review of the assessments provided by different analysts, in cases of teamwork; the modification of the matrix, when two or more hypotheses are merge; the evaluation of the consistency of each evidence, about each hypothesis; the interpretation of the test results obtained; the report of the conclusions; the identification of indicators or milestones for future observation. Referring to this research, the first and the second steps were illustrated, respectively, in paragraph nos. 4.2 and 4.1. The fourth and the fifth steps did not relate to this analysis, while the third and the other steps will be illustrated below. In this regard, it should be noted that the analysis was carried out with the ACH software created in 2005 by the Palo Alto Research Center with US government funds, and the assistance of Heuer Jr. and Pherson. Version 2.0 is available for public use at no cost, and it may be downloaded from several websites. In the matrix created with the above-mentioned software, the evidence appears in reverse chronological order, from the seventy-fifth (E75) to the first (E1). Moreover, the date of each of them has the US format (mm/dd/yy). During the analysis, for each evidence gathered from the selected articles and press releases one had to assign a level of credibility and relevance to choose from “Low”, “Medium”, and “High”. The consistency of each evidence for the above-mentioned hypothesis, however, had to be assessed using a set of objective parameters, provided 224 by the software: Very Consistent (CC), Consistent (C), Neutral (N), Not Applicable (NA), Inconsistent (I), and Very Inconsistent (II). With these assessments, based on the analyst’s initial impressions, the software calculates the “Weighted Inconsistency Score” for each hypothesis, helping him to reach an estimative but well-reasoned judgment about them. Among those analysed, the most credible should result from the hypothesis with the lowest Inconsistency Score. The conditional is mandatory because the analyst should approach an issue with a relatively open mind, that is, by taking nothing for granted. In other words, the analyst shall be objective in his judgment. In this analysis, impartiality is guaranteed by the careful research of evidence, and the rigorous definition of the hypothesis to deal with, through a specific analytical technique: the Quadrant Hypothesis Generation (QHG). In addition, the assessment of consistency with the evidence gathered followed scrupulously the characteristics of the two pivotal themes of the research, that emerged from the literature review and were considered as the driving forces of the QHG: the use of military or non-military means, and the presence or absence of socioeconomic vulnerability signals. The latter was conventionally defined as ‘invulnerability’. For each evidence, in the column “Type” were briefly specified the type of activity (Military or Non-military) and the reference context (Vulnerability or Invulnerability). Moreover, was assigned a level of credibility to the news source, and another to the relevance of the information conveyed. In detail, the level assigned to the leading newspapers and newscasts (i.eg., Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, Il Sole 24 Ore) was “High”, while for most of the others, the value was “Medium”. All levels are shown in the dedicated columns (Figure 19). For the assessment of the consistency of each piece of evidence (E1, E2, …, E75) 225 with the hypothetical scenarios (H1, H2, H3, H4), two factors were considered: the combination between type of activity and reference context, summarized in the column “Type”; and the capacity of the latter to corroborate the perception of each scenario. Consider, for example, the statement of Paolo Borsellino’s daughter (E75), according to whom the Italian State would hide the truth about the Slaughter of Via D’Amelio, in which she lost her father. The press article comes from the newspaper La Repubblica, which has a high level of credibility and contains relevant statements. These last are not comparable to and do not concern a military action. In addition, it refers to a context of socioeconomic vulnerability (Non-military/Vulnerability). Therefore, this evidence was deemed: a) Consistent (C) with the hypothetical scenario H1 (Peace Zone), because the state secrets also exist in the peace zones. b) Inconsistent (I) with the hypothetical scenario H2 (War Zone), because it is not comparable to, and does not concern a military action. c) Consistent (C) with the hypothetical scenario H3 (Hybrid Area), because it refers to a context of socioeconomic vulnerability, and the state secrets also exist in the hybrid areas. d) Very Consistent (CC) with the hypothetical scenario H4 (Grey Area), because it is not comparable to, and does not concern a military action. Moreover, it refers to a context of socioeconomic vulnerability. ACH is shown in the following Table 10. 226 Table 10 – ACH, assessment of evidence E75-E1. 227 228 229 Source: own elaboration with ACH 2.0.5. Based on the assessments made, the software calculated the following Weighted Inconsistency Scores: Peace Zone (H1), -99,006; War Zone (H2), -131,611; Hybrid Area (H3), -73,866; Grey Area (H4), -15,363. As shown in Figure 20, considering the lowest number of inconsistencies, the hypothetical scenario no. 4 (Yellow column) results the most credible. In other words, because of the GZA and its socioeconomic vulnerability, Italy can be perceived as a grey area. Plausible may be a perception of the country as a hybrid area (Green column). On the contrary, Italy does not seem perceivable as a peace zone (Red column), nor as a war zone (Purple column). 230 Figure 20 – Result of the ACH. Source: own elaboration with ACH 2.0.5. 4.4 An abductive illustration of the result achieved. As a consequence of the careful research of evidence about the GZA – carried out in the country between 1962 and 1992 – the rigorous definition of the hypothesis concerning the interpretative scenarios, and the use of a famous CIA’s structured analytic technique to achieve an estimative but well-reasoned judgment, it can be stated that Italy is perceivable as a grey area. In detail, were gathered and analysed seventy-five pieces of evidence concerning the six case studies treated in chapters 2 and 3, from Enrico Mattei’s strategic assassination in 1962 to the Mafia slaughters of 1992, in which the judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, Falcone’s wife, and their security agents lost their lives. As previously argued, a grey area is a geographical and political context which hosts GZA, and in which there are signals of socioeconomic vulnerability, which is an emotional and material condition of fragility of the citizens. Among the above signals, 231 there are, for instance, the unemployment rate increase, as well as the number of expatriates with a university degree, the significant increase in consumer prices, and the constant decrease of the turnout for the renewal of the Parliament. This last data is usually associated with the lack of confidence in the Establishment, in some ways considered to be ineffective in facing the difficulties of its time. As described above, among them there are the GZA, defined as political and economic actions, or other influence activities, carried out by state and non-state actors to undermine the socioeconomic and political stability of the target country, through an ambiguous but effective use of force, without meeting the standard of a military attack and its legal implications. Since the 1960s, in Italy, there were examples of GZA, during which there were signals of socioeconomic vulnerability. The six case studies treated in chapters 2 and 3 prove it. Enrico Mattei, for instance, was assassinated putting a low-charge bomb on his private plane so that Italy never achieved the dream of energy independence. The Mafia slaughters of 1992 occurred to eliminate the prosecutors who were investigating the relationships between mafia bosses and politicians. Italy’s participation in the BRI and the operation ‘From Russia With Love’ were probably the result of masterful foreign influence activities with serious implications in terms of national security and international alliances. Therefore, the consideration of departure has been endorsed by the abductive inference, a rule of logical reasoning by which, following Peirce’s sequence Result – Rule – Case, from a set of observations, proceeds to the likeliest scenario, that is, the most credible explanation for the above set (Table 11). 232 Table 11 – Abductive illustration of the result achieved in Chapter 4. Result: Italy can be perceived as a grey area. Rule: A grey area is a geographical and political context which hosts GZA, and in which there are signals of socioeconomic vulnerability. Case: Since the 1960s, in Italy there were example of GZA, during which there were signals of socioeconomic vulnerability. Source: own elaboration. 4.5 Una ilustración inductiva del resultado obtenido (ES). Como consecuencia de la investigación de la evidencia sobre las GZA – llevada a cabo en el país entre 1962-1992 – de la rigurosa definición de los escenarios interpretativos, y del uso de una prestigiosa técnica analítica estructurada de la CIA para lograr un juicio estimativo, pero bien razonado, se puede apreciar que Italia es considerada como un área gris. En detalle, fueron recogidos y se analizaron setenta y cinco indicios relativos a los seis estudios de caso tratados en los capítulos 2 y 3, desde el asesinato estratégico de Enrico Mattei en 1962 hasta las matanzas de la mafia de 1992, en la que los jueces Giovanni Falcone y Paolo Borsellino, la esposa de Falcone, y sus agentes de seguridad perdieron la vida. Como se ha argumentado anteriormente, una zona gris es un contexto geográfico y político que albergan GZA, y en el que hay señales de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, que es una condición emocional y material de fragilidad de los ciudadanos. Entre las señales anteriores se encuentran, por ejemplo, el aumento del desempleo, así como del número de expatriados con título universitario, el aumento significativo de los precios al 233 consumidor y la disminución constante de la participación a las elecciones para la renovación del Parlamento. Estos últimos datos suelen estar asociados a la falta de confianza en la clase política, acusada de ser ineficaz para hacer frente a las dificultades de su tiempo. Como se describió anteriormente, entre dichas dificultades se encuentran las GZA, definidas como acciones políticas y económicas, u otras actividades de influencia, realizadas por actores estatales y no estatales con el objetivo de socavar la estabilidad socioeconómica y política del país objetivo, a través de un uso ambiguo pero efectivo de la fuerza, sin cumplir el estándar de un ataque militar y sus implicaciones legales. Desde la década de 1960, en Italia hubo ejemplos de GZA, durante los cuales hubo también señales de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica. Los seis estudios de casos tratados en los capítulos 2 y 3 lo demuestran. Enrico Mattei, por ejemplo, fue asesinado poniendo una bomba de baja carga en su avión privado, para que Italia no cumpliera el sueño de la independencia energética. Las masacres de la mafia de 1992 ocurrieron para eliminar a los procuradores que investigaban las relaciones entre los jefes de la Mafia y los políticos. Mientras que la participación de Italia en la BRI y la operación 'Desde Rusia Con Amor' fueron probablemente el resultado de actividades de influencia extranjera magistral, con graves implicaciones en términos de seguridad nacional y alianzas internacionales. Por lo tanto, la consideración de partida ha sido avalada por la inferencia abductiva, una regla de razonamiento lógico por la cual, siguiendo la secuencia de Peirce “Resultado - Regla – Caso”, de un conjunto de observaciones se procede al escenario más probable, es decir, a la explicación más creíble (Tabla 12). 234 Table 12 – Ilustración abductiva del resultado obtenido en el capítulo 4 (ES). Resultado: Italia es considerada como un área gris. Regla: Un área gris es un contexto geográfico y político que albergan GZA, y en el que hay señales de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica. Caso: Desde la década de 1960, en Italia hubo ejemplos de GZA, durante las cuales hubo también señales de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica. Fuente: elaboración propia. 235 Findings. This research had two objectives: first, defining the relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy, after having clarified their meanings; second, developing an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis, based on a combination of historical research, media content study, and data analysis with free access tools. These objectives were linked to two general hypotheses, and each of them was linked to some specific hypotheses. The research was organized into four stages, for each of which a chapter was developed. Chapter 1 refers to the General hypothesis no. 1, and the Specific hypotheses nos. 1.1-1.8. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 refer to the General hypothesis n. 2, and the Specific hypotheses nos. 2.1-2.3. All of them were confirmed or partially confirmed, as explained in the following pages. General Hypothesis No. 1 To confirm or refute General Hypothesis no. 1 (There is a relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy) all the others were examined and schematized in Chart 42. The starting point was the Specific hypothesis no. 1.1 (There is no single definition of grey zone activities), which was confirmed both from the definitions contained in the main English language dictionaries and by the main Anglo-American and European authors referred to in Paragraph no. 1.1. Consequently, new definitions of GZA and GA were coined, and are available in the Glossary too: GZA are political and economic actions, or other influence activities, carried out by state and non-state actors to undermine the socioeconomic and political stability of the target country, through an ambiguous but effective use of force, without meeting the standard of a military attack and its legal implications. 236 GA is a geographical and political space that hosts GZA. It is often defined as an unclear situation between peace and war, in which there are challenges to face, conflicts to deal with, or unconventional demonstrations of power. The Specific Hypothesis no. 1.2 (There are other concepts like grey zone activities, linked to national security) was confirmed thanks to the literature review referred to in Paragraph no. 1.2, where the definition of the forerunner concept of political warfare and the conceptualizations which have followed each other since the 1940s were illustrated, with special reference to the manipulation of perceptions. Among them, are similar concepts of cognitive warfare, hybrid warfare, unrestricted, non-linear, and virtual societal warfare, which are used both in Western, Russian, and Chinese literature. In addition, the role of organised crime groups as non-state actors was illustrated. Chart 42 – General hypothesis no. 1 and specific hypotheses nos. 1.1-1.8. Source: own elaboration. To confirm the Specific Hypothesis no. 1.3 (Grey zone activities belong to the field of Intelligence studies), as shown in Paragraph no. 1.3, the research was developed in • 1 There is a relationship between grey zone activities and socioeconomic vulnerability in Italy. • 1.1 There is no single definition of grey zone activities. • 1.2 There are other concepts like grey zone activities, linked to national security. • 1.3 Grey zone activities belongs to the field of Intelligence studies. • 1.4 Some characteristics of the grey zone activities are related to some indicators of the vulnerability of a country. • 1.5 There is no single definition of socioeconomic vulnerability. • 1.6 There are other concepts like socioeconomic vulnerability, linked to potential instability. • 1.7 Socioeconomic vulnerability belongs to the field of Intelligence studies. • 1.8 Some indicators of the socioeconomic vulnerability are related to some characteristics of the grey zone activities. 237 two directions. On the one hand, the analysts’ perspective on professional and academic commitment, from the view expressed by Professor Sherman Kent to the most recent American authors. On the other hand, the so-called university-security nexus, that is, the spread of Intelligence studies in the West. Several academic contributions were considered, from the first British book, edited by Professors Cristofer Andrew and Jeremy Noakes, to the Italian experience of Professors Umberto Gori and Mario Caligiuri. Among the Spanish academics, particularly significant was the contribution of Professor Gustavo Díaz Matey, who identified four different approaches to this field of study: historical-military, journalistic, economic, and International Relations and Political science approach. In this respect, it should be noted that the above-mentioned breakdown inspired the development of the present doctoral thesis. Therefore, this hypothesis has also been confirmed. The economic approach, for instance, was used to look for a confirmation of the Specific Hypothesis no. 1.4 (Some characteristics of the grey zone activities are related to some indicators of the vulnerability of a country) and the next. In Paragraph no. 1.4 how the vulnerability factors constitute the natural targets of the grey zone campaigns was highlighted. Among them, for example, there are corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, and distrust in institutions, which often result in low turnout. Therefore, this hypothesis has also been confirmed. Symmetrically, the Specific Hypothesis no. 1.5 (There is no single definition of socioeconomic vulnerability) was confirmed in Paragraph no. 1.5, where was illustrated that there is a concept of vulnerability in every field of study linked to risk perception, Geography, Sociology, Public health, and Disaster management. Consequently, the new one which follows was coined, and is available in the Glossary too: 238 The socioeconomic vulnerability of a country results from the emotional and material condition of fragility of its citizens. It is linked to economic hardship or a possible loss of well-being, caused by or related to certain factors such as corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, or distrust in institutions. Each of them could correspond to a specific signal. The Specific Hypothesis no. 1.6 (There are other concepts like socioeconomic vulnerability, linked to potential instability) was partially confirmed in Paragraph 1.6, where was explained that in literature were not detected explicit references to similar concepts. However, it should be considered that the term ‘instability’ is conceptually linked to fragility, lack of attractiveness, and lack of competitiveness of a country. Therefore, the above concepts take shape as conditions of potential instability. To confirm the Specific hypothesis no. 1.7 (Socioeconomic vulnerability belongs to the field of Intelligence studies), as shown in Paragraph no. 1.7, the research was oriented to the subfields of Economic Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Nevertheless, in academia, the latter is not as widespread as the first. Several academic contributions were considered, beginning with the French tradition, represented by Professors Christian Harbulot and Nicolas Moinet. Among the Spanish academics, were mentioned the contributions of Antonio Fonfría Mesa. In short, socioeconomic vulnerability is a matter of national security, which belongs to the field of Intelligence studies. Therefore, this hypothesis has also been confirmed. As previously, the economic approach was also used to confirm the Specific Hypothesis no. 1.8 (Some indicators of socioeconomic vulnerability are related to some characteristics of the grey zone activities). In Paragraph no. 1.8 the link between the vulnerability signals of a socioeconomic context and some ‘sources of problems’ like corruption, false perceptions, social divisions, economic uncertainty, and distrust in institutions were highlighted. Among the above signals, there are significant changes in 239 the social mood of the economy, the cost of leaving, poverty and labour disputes, expatriations, and distrust in others. Therefore, this hypothesis has also been confirmed. As a whole, all specific hypotheses were confirmed. Therefore, it can be stated that General Hypothesis no. 1 is confirmed, both theoretically and practically. The research allowed us to define a theoretical framework and identify a set of economic indicators by which to assess any context of interest, both past and present. In addition, with a SWOT analysis were made explicit the Strengths, Weaknesses Opportunities, and Threats of the above framework. In detail, the high profile of the cited authors, the reliability of the mentioned data, and the applicability of the framework to other countries, using local surveys and statistical indicators, were considered Strengths. The lack of declassified information that can be accessed and the choice of not looking for a mathematical correlation between data were considered Weaknesses. The possibility to improve the framework over time, and its widening to other types of data, such as the consumption level of antidepressants, which could be used about clear actions of cognitive warfare, were considered Opportunities. Finally, the possible undervaluation of the research due to the qualitative use of the mentioned data was considered a threat. In this regard, however, it should be noted that, in the application phase, some structured analytic techniques for Intelligence analysis will be used. General Hypothesis no. 2 To confirm or refute the General Hypothesis no. 2 (It is possible to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis studying historical examples, media contents, and open-source data with free access tools) were examined all the others, schematized in Chart 43. 240 Chart 43 – General hypothesis no. 2 and specific hypotheses nos. 2.1-2.3. Source: own elaboration. The Specific Hypothesis no. 2.1 (In the history of the Italian Republic there is at least one case of grey zone activity which can be analyzed) was confirmed by combining the literature review referred to in Chapter 2, with the Italian Prime Minister’s Directives of 8 April 2008, 22 April 2014, and 2 August 2021. With these last, the documents about some historical cases were partially declassified to encourage the reconstruction of the darkest events that occurred in the period 1969-1980. In detail, the thirty darkest events that occurred between 1947 and 1994 were listed. Among them, the most important cases were deepened: Enrico Mattei’s strategic assassination of 1962, Aldo Moro’s kidnapping and killing of 1978, and the two mafia slaughters of 1992. All three events matched the characteristics of GZA laid down in the above definition. Moreover, the vulnerability factors and signals of the reference periods, which prove the existence of an emotional and material condition of the fragility of the citizens, were analysed and complied with the characteristics of socioeconomic vulnerability laid down in the above definition. Similarly, Specific Hypothesis no. 2.2 (Recently, in Italy, there has been at least an example of grey zone activity) was confirmed by reviewing the journalistic investigations, and the other articles and press releases referred to in Chapter 3. In • 2. It is possible to develop an appropriate and replicable scheme of analysis studying historical examples, media contents and open-source data with free access tools. • 2.1 In the history of Italian Republic there is at least one case of grey zone activity which can be analysed. • 2.2 Recently, in Italy, there has been at least an example of grey zone activity. • 2.3 Analysing the evidence gathered to understand if Italy could be perceived as a grey area. 241 detail, three textbook cases of influence activity that occurred in the years 2019-2020 were deepened: Italy’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, the operation ‘From Russia With Love’, and the Prison riots affair. All three cases matched the characteristics of GZA laid down in the above definition. Moreover, the vulnerability factors and signals of the reference period, which prove the existence of an emotional and material condition of the fragility of the citizens, were analysed and complied with the characteristics of socioeconomic vulnerability laid down in the above definition. The Specific Hypothesis no. 2.3 (Italy could be perceived as a grey area) was confirmed with the structured analysis of the evidence gathered referred to in Chapter 4. In detail, with the QHG technique were identified four hypothetical scenarios: Peace Zone, War Zone, Hybrid Area, and Grey Area. Each of them was assessed with each one of the seventy-five articles and press releases concerning the darkest events that occurred between the years 1962 and 1992, analyzed in Chapter 2, and the controversial political events that occurred in the period 2019-2020, analyzed in Chapter 3. The above assessment was carried out using the ACH, a famous CIA’s structured analytic technique to achieve an estimative but well-reasoned judgment. The result was clear and verifiable: Italy is perceivable as a grey area. As shown, all specific hypotheses were confirmed. Therefore, it can be stated that General Hypothesis no. 2 is confirmed. This research allowed the development of a scheme of analysis, based on a clear conceptual definition of one or more phenomena; the verification of the correspondence between the examined events and the definition of the investigated phenomenon; the identification of a set of economic indicators, by which assessing the reference contexts; the collection of open-source information and data about the case studies to deepen; the schematization of all information gathered, and their assessment and exploitation. In this scheme there are at least three stages: the definition of the investigated phenomenon, the search for similarities between past and 242 present, and the analysis of the data gathered through one or more structured analytic techniques for Intelligence analysis. The structure and contents of this thesis are a practical application of the above scheme. 243 Conclusiones (ES). Esta investigación tenía dos objetivos: primero, definir la relación entre las actividades en la zona gris y la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica en Italia, después de haber aclarado los significados de estas expresiones; y, segundo, desarrollar un esquema de análisis adecuado y reproducible, basado en una combinación de investigación histórica, estudio de contenidos periodísticos, uso cualitativo de indicadores estadísticos y análisis de datos con herramientas de acceso libre. Estos objetivos se vincularon a dos hipótesis generales, y a cada una de ellas se vincularon algunas hipótesis específicas. La investigación se organizó en cuatro etapas, para cada una de las cuales se desarrolló un capítulo. El Capítulo 1 se refiere a la Hipótesis general no. 1, y las Hipótesis específicas nos. 1.1-1.8. Los Capítulos 2, 3 y 4 se refieren a la Hipótesis general no. 2 y a las Hipótesis específicas nos. 2.1-2.3. Todas han sido confirmadas o parcialmente confirmadas, como se explica a continuación. Hipótesis general no. 1 Para confirmar o refutar la Hipótesis general no. 1 (Existe una relación entre las actividades de la zona gris y la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica en Italia) se examinaron todas las demás, esquematizadas en el Gráfico 44 (Chart 44). El punto de partida fue la Hipótesis específica no. 1.1 (No hay una definición única de actividades en la zona gris), que fue confirmada tanto por las definiciones contenidas en los principales diccionarios de lengua inglesa, como por los principales autores angloamericanos y europeos mencionados en el epígrafe no. 1.1. En consecuencia, se acuñaron nuevas definiciones de GZA y GA que también están disponibles en el Glosario (Glossary): Las GZA son acciones políticas y económicas, u otras actividades de influencia, realizadas por actores estatales y no estatales con el objetivo de socavar la estabilidad socioeconómica y política del país objetivo, a través 244 de un uso ambiguo pero efectivo de la fuerza, sin cumplir el estándar de un ataque militar y sus implicaciones legales. La GA es un espacio geográfico y político donde hay GZA. A menudo se define como una situación poco clara entre la paz y la guerra, en la que hay desafíos que enfrentar, conflictos que enfrentar o demostraciones de poder no convencionales. La Hipótesis específica no. 1.2 (Existen otros conceptos como el de actividades en la zona gris, relacionados con la seguridad nacional) fue confirmada gracias a la revisión bibliográfica mencionada en el epígrafe no. 1.2, donde se ilustraron la definición del concepto precursor de guerra política (political warfare) y las conceptualizaciones que se han seguido desde la década de 1940, con especial referencia a la manipulación de las percepciones. Entre ellos, los conceptos similares de guerra cognitiva (cognitive warfare), guerra híbrida (hybrid warfare), guerra sin restricciones (unrestricted warfare), guerra no lineal (non-linear warfare) y guerra social virtual (virtual societal warfare), utilizados en la literatura occidental, rusa y china. Además, se ilustró el papel de los grupos del crimen organizados como actores no estatales. Para confirmar la Hipótesis específica no. 1.3 (Las actividades en la zona gris pertenecen al campo de los estudios de Inteligencia), como se muestra en el epígrafe no. 1.3, la investigación se desarrolló en dos direcciones. Por un lado, la perspectiva de los analistas sobre el compromiso profesional y académico, desde la visión expresada por el Profesor Sherman Kent hasta los autores estadounidenses más recientes. Por otro lado, el llamado nexo universidad-seguridad, es decir, la difusión de los estudios de Inteligencia en Occidente. Se consideraron varias contribuciones académicas, desde el primer libro británico, editado por los Profesores Cristofer Andrew y Jeremy Noakes, hasta la experiencia italiana de los Profesores Umberto Gori y Mario Caligiuri. Entre los académicos españoles, destaca la contribución del Profesor Gustavo Díaz Matey, quien 245 identificó cuatro enfoques diferentes para este campo de estudio: histórico-militar, periodístico, económico, y los enfoques de Relaciones Internacionales y las Ciencias Políticas. A este respecto, cabe señalar que la subdivisión mencionada inspiró el desarrollo de la presente tesis doctoral. Por tanto, esta hipótesis también ha sido confirmada. Chart 44 – Hipótesis general no. 1 e hipótesis específicas nos. 1.1-1.8 (ES). Fuente: elaboración propia. El enfoque económico, por ejemplo, se utilizó para verificar la Hipótesis específica no. 1.4 (Algunas características de las actividades en la zona gris están relacionadas con algunos indicadores de la vulnerabilidad de un país) y los siguientes. En el epígrafe no. 1.4 se explicó que los factores de vulnerabilidad constituyen los objetivos naturales de las campañas en la zona gris. Entre ellos, por ejemplo, hay corrupción, falsas percepciones, divisiones sociales, incertidumbre económica y desconfianza en las instituciones, que a menudo dan como resultado la baja participación en las elecciones, por lo que la hipótesis fue confirmada. • 1 Existe una relación entre las actividades de la zona gris y la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica en Italia. • 1.1 No existe una definición única de actividades en zona gris. • 1.2 Existen otros conceptos como el de actividades en la zona gris, relacionados con la seguridad nacional. • 1.3 Las actividades en la zona gris pertenecen al campo de los estudios de Inteligencia. • 1.4 Algunas características de las actividades en la zona gris están relacionadas con algunos indicadores de la vulnerabilidad de un país. • 1.5 No existe una definición única de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica. • 1.6 Existen otros conceptos como el de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, relacionados con la inestabilidad potencial. • 1.7 La vulnerabilidad socioeconómica pertenece al campo de los estudios de Inteligencia. • 1.8 Algunos indicadores de la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica están relacionados con algunas características de las actividades en la zona gris. 246 Simétricamente, la Hipótesis específica no. 1.5 (No existe una definición única de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica) fue confirmada en el epígrafe no. 1.5, donde se ilustra que existe un concepto de vulnerabilidad en cada campo de estudio relacionado con la percepción de riesgo, la Geografía, la Sociología, la Salud Pública y la Gestión de Desastres. En consecuencia, se acuñó una nueva definición de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, que también está disponible en el Glosario (Glossary): La vulnerabilidad socioeconómica de un país es el resultado de una condición emocional y material de fragilidad de sus ciudadanos. Está relacionada a las dificultades económicas o a una posible pérdida de bienestar, causada o relacionada con ciertos factores como la corrupción, las falsas percepciones, las divisiones sociales, la incertidumbre económica o la desconfianza en las instituciones. A cada uno de ellos podría corresponder una señal específica. La Hipótesis específica no. 1.6 (Existen otros conceptos como el de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, relacionados con la inestabilidad potencial) fue parcialmente confirmada en el epígrafe no. 1.6, donde se explicó que en la literatura no se detectaron referencias explícitas a conceptos similares. Sin embargo, debe considerarse que el término 'inestabilidad' está relacionado conceptualmente con la fragilidad, la falta de atractivo y la falta de competitividad de un país. Por lo tanto, los conceptos anteriores toman forma como condiciones de inestabilidad potencial. Para confirmar la Hipótesis específica no. 1.7 (La vulnerabilidad socioeconómica pertenece al campo de los estudios de Inteligencia), como se muestra en el epígrafe no. 1.7, la investigación se orientó a los subcampos de Inteligencia Económica y Contrainteligencia. Sin embargo, en la academia, esta última no está tan extendida como la primera. Se consideraron varias contribuciones académicas, comenzando con la tradición francesa, representada por los Profesores Christian Harbulot y Nicolas Moinet. Entre los académicos españoles, se mencionaron las contribuciones de Antonio Fonfría 247 Mesa. En definitiva, la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica es una cuestión de seguridad nacional, que pertenece al ámbito de los estudios de Inteligencia, con lo que queda confirmada la hipótesis. Como anteriormente, también se utilizó el enfoque económico para confirmar la Hipótesis específica no. 1.8 (Algunos indicadores de la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica están relacionados con algunas características de las actividades en la zona gris). En el epígrafe no. 1.8 se destacó la relación entre las señales de vulnerabilidad de un contexto socioeconómico y algunas 'fuentes de problemas' como la corrupción, las falsas percepciones, las divisiones sociales, la incertidumbre económica y la desconfianza en las instituciones. Entre las señales anteriores se encuentran el estado de ánimo social sobre la economía, el costo de la salida, la pobreza y los conflictos laborales, las expatriaciones y la desconfianza en otros. Por tanto, esta hipótesis también ha sido confirmada. En general, se confirmaron todas las hipótesis específicas. Por lo tanto, se puede afirmar que la Hipótesis general no. 1 está confirmada, tanto en teoría como en la práctica. La investigación, de hecho, permitió definir un marco teórico e identificar un conjunto de indicadores económicos mediante los cuales evaluar cualquier contexto de interés, tanto pasado como presente. Además, con un análisis DAFO se han explicitado las debilidades, las amenazas, las fortalezas y las oportunidades del dicho marco teórico. En detalle, se han considerado como Debilidades la falta de información desclasificada a la que se puede acceder, y la decisión de no buscar una correlación matemática entre los datos. Se ha considerado como Amenaza la posible infravaloración de la investigación, debido al uso cualitativo de los datos mencionados. A este respecto, sin embargo, cabe señalar que, en la fase de aplicación, se han utilizado algunas técnicas analíticas estructuradas para el análisis de inteligencia. Se han considerado Fortalezas el alto perfil de los autores citados, la fiabilidad de los datos mencionados, y la 248 aplicabilidad del marco teórico a otros países, utilizando encuestas locales e indicadores estadísticos. Además, se consideraron como Oportunidades la posibilidad de mejorar el marco teórico con el tiempo y su ampliación a otros tipos de datos, como el nivel de consumo de antidepresivos, que podría utilizarse en referencia a acciones claras de guerra cognitiva. Hipótesis general no. 2 Para confirmar o refutar la Hipótesis general no. 2 (Es posible desarrollar un esquema de análisis apropiado y replicable, basado en el estudio de casos históricos, contenidos periodísticos y datos de fuente abierta mediante herramientas de libre acceso) se examinaron todos los demás, esquematizados en el Gráfico 45 (Chart 45). Chart 45 – Hipótesis general no. 2 e hipótesis específicas nos. 2.1-2.3 (ES). Fuente: elaboración propia. Se confirmó la Hipótesis específica no. 2.1 (En la historia de la República Italiana hay al menos un caso de actividad en la zona gris que puede analizarse) combinando la revisión de la literatura con arreglo al Capítulo 2, con las Directivas del Primer Ministro italiano de 8 de abril de 2008, 22 de abril de 2014 y 2 de agosto de 2021. Con estos últimos, los documentos sobre algunos casos históricos fueron parcialmente • 2. Es posible desarrollar un esquema de análisis apropiado y replicable, basado en el estudio de casos históricos, contenidos periodísticos y datos de fuente abierta mediante herramientas de libre acceso. • 2.1 En la historia de la República Italiana hay al menos un caso de actividad en la zona gris que puede analizarse. • 2.2 Recientemente, en Italia, ha habido al menos un caso de actividad en la zona gris. • 2.3 Analizando los indicios, Italia podría ser percibida como una zona gris. 249 desclasificados para fomentar la reconstrucción de los eventos más oscuros ocurridos en el período 1969-1980. En detalle, se enumeraron treinta eventos más oscuros que ocurrieron entre el 1947 y el 1994. Entre ellos, se profundizaron los casos más importantes: el asesinato estratégico de Enrico Mattei en 1962, el secuestro y asesinato de Aldo Moro en 1978, y las dos masacres de la mafia en 1992. Los tres eventos coincidían con las características de GZA establecidas en la definición anterior. Además, se analizaron los factores y las señales de vulnerabilidad de los períodos de referencia, que prueban la existencia de una condición emocional y material de fragilidad de los ciudadanos, que cumplen con las características de vulnerabilidad socioeconómica establecidas en la definición anterior. Del mismo modo, se confirmó la Hipótesis específica no. 2.2 (Recientemente, en Italia, ha habido al menos un caso de actividad en la zona gris) revisando las investigaciones periodísticas, y los otros artículos y comunicados de prensa referidos al Capítulo 3. En detalle, se analizaron tres casos de manual sobre las actividades de influencia que se produjeron en los años 2019-2020: la participación de Italia en la Iniciativa Cinturón y Ruta de China, la operación 'Desde Rusia con amor', y las revueltas en las cárceles. La Hipótesis específica no. 2.3 (Analizando los indicios, Italia podría ser percibida como una zona gris) fue confirmada con el análisis estructurado de los indicios recogidos con arreglo al Capítulo 4. Con la técnica QHG se identificaron cuatro escenarios hipotéticos: Zona de Paz, Zona de Guerra, Área Híbrida y Área Gris. Cada uno de ellos fue evaluado en relación con cada uno de los setenta y cinco artículos y comunicados de prensa sobre los eventos más oscuros ocurridos entre los años 1962 y 1992, analizados en el Capítulo 2, y los controvertidos eventos políticos ocurridos en el período 2019-2020, analizado en el Capítulo 3. La evaluación anterior se llevó a cabo utilizando la ACH, una prestigiosa técnica analítica estructurada de la CIA para lograr 250 un juicio estimativo, pero bien razonado. El resultado fue claro y verificable: Italia es perceptible como una zona gris. Como se ha explicado, se confirmaron todas las hipótesis específicas. Por lo tanto, se puede afirmar que la Hipótesis general núm. 2 está confirmada. Esta investigación permitió desarrollar un esquema de análisis, basado en la definición conceptual clara de uno o más fenómenos; la comprobación de la correspondencia entre eventos examinados y definición del fenómeno investigado; la identificación de un conjunto de indicadores económicos, mediante los cuales evaluar los contextos de referencia; la recopilación de fuentes de información y datos sobre los estudios de caso a profundizar; la esquematización de toda la información recogida, su evaluación y explotación. En dicho esquema, hay por lo menos tres etapas: la definición del fenómeno investigado, la búsqueda de similitudes entre el pasado y el presente, y el análisis de los datos a través de una o más técnicas analíticas estructuradas para el análisis de Inteligencia. La estructura y el contenido de esta tesis son una aplicación práctica de dicho esquema. 251 References. Books and Book chapters. 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PORTADA INDEX Abbreviations and acronyms Glossary List of charts List of figures List of pictures List of tables Abstract Resumen INTRODUCTION: WILL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS CH. 1 - GREY ZONE ACTIVITIES AND SOCIOECONOMIC VULNERABILITY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK CH. 2 – THE DARKEST EVENTS IN THE ITALIAN FIRST REPUBLIC (1948-1993) CH. 3 – THE CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL EVENTS IN RECENT YEARS CH. 4 – A STRUCTURED ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE Findings Conclusiones References Articles and Press releases