Governing through the Prevention of Extremism. The Security Council's P/CVE as a *dispositif* of liberal government

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Abstract: This article analyses the UN Security Council's Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (P/CVE) as a Foucauldian *dispositif* of liberal government. Centred on early-detection, P/CVE tasks civil society with the prevention of extremism at a social level. In this sense, as the article illustrates, P/CVE displays features of liberal governmentality as it relies on civil society's liberty and self-regulation mechanisms. Furthermore, as the article shows, P/CVE also works as a liberal mechanism of subjectification as it sketches the '(undesirable) extremists' and the '(desirable) moderates'. These subjectivities emerge at the intersection of various global power structures (re)assembled by the same *dispositif*. Therefore, analysing P/CVE as a Foucauldian *dispositif* of liberal government allows us to grasp how power circulates in society in heterarchical, subtle ways. Moreover, it also uncovers how liberal government works through the (re)production of hierarchical, racialised, and gendered social structures in its differentiations of the (governed) freedom produced.

Keywords: P/CVE; security *dispositif*; global liberal governmentality; UN Security Council

Introduction

This article analyses the UN Security Council's Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (P/CVE) as a Foucauldian *dispositif* of liberal government[1]. While counter-terrorism is mostly centred on the terrorist's violent act, P/CVE focuses on the ideological processes that may lead individuals to embrace extremist ideologies, and tries to prevent these processes from happening. Therefore, P/CVE works through the 'early-detection and prevention of extremism', a concept vaguely defined as the beliefs that may 'radicalise' individuals and lead them to perpetrate terrorist violence (Faure Walker 2022). These ideological processes are better spotted in social and private spheres and, thus, detecting and preventing them exceeds the possibility of state oversight. Therefore, P/CVE tasks social actors with the identification and prevention of 'extremism'. In this sense, civil society is left free to self-regulate and self-control – that is to say, to spot extremism and prevent it without state intervention. It is specifically because it relies on society's liberty and self-regulation mechanisms that, as this article argues, P/CVE works as a *dispositif* of liberal government.

Unlike counter-terrorism, P/CVE does not work through violent oppression and state military or police intervention but, as mentioned above, relies on civil society's self-regulation. Consequently, P/CVE has been described as 'soft counter-terrorism' (Kundnani and Hayes 2018) because it is understood that its programmes do not interfere with, oppress or repress the population's autonomy by leaving society free to self-regulate. This article shows that P/CVE does indeed work through the creation of freedom, but it is exactly through this process that power circulates in society in heterarchical ways. As Foucault argued, liberalism governs by circumventing the need for direct oppression and by letting individuals be free (2007) and analysing P/CVE

allows us to grasp some of these rationalities. Furthermore, P/CVE works as a liberal mechanism of subjectification as it sketches the '(undesirable) extremists' and the '(desirable) moderates'. These subjectivities emerge at the intersection of various global power orders that are (re)assembled by the same *dispositif* such as hierarchical, racialised, and gendered social structures. In this sense, the article also uncovers how liberal government works through the (re)production of these hierarchies and how the freedom it produces (re)assembles these power orders.

With this very specific analysis of how P/CVE works as a *dispositif* of liberal government, the article aims to contribute to the existing literature in Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) and Critical Security Studies by building on and bringing together various strands of this literature. On the one hand, it builds on existing literature illustrating the emergence of earlier *dispositifs* of (counter-)terrorism in previous historical eras (Ditrych 2014; Erlenbusch-Anderson 2018) or the standardisation of a global *dispositif* as a response to the 9/11 attacks (Kertcher 2021; Martini 2021; Ahmad 2019; Ditrych 2014). On the other hand, it builds on works analysing the governmentalities processes involved in the production of risk (Aradau and Van Munster 2007; then, also discussed in Managhan 2020) and risky subjectivities in prevention strategies (Cuadro 2020a; Martin 2019; Heath-Kelly 2013).

Through bringing together these strands of the literature, this article aims to fill in the gap in understanding how P/CVE works as a *dispositif* of liberal government – for example, through the mobilisation of civil society and in its (re)assembling of liberal subjectivities. By doing so, it aims to contribute to the literature some reflections on how power circulates through P/CVE and counter-terrorism more broadly. Specifically

focused on the re-emergence of the sovereign state in the War on Terror (Jackson 2005), many works in the sub-fields mentioned above have illustrated how counter-terrorism or, more recently, prevention strategies have furthered state/executive forms of power and authority – such as policing or surveillance (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). In contrast, this article emphasises how these programmes work as liberal rationalities of government that allow the circulation of power in societies. Thus, exceeding state power and circumventing direct oppression as mentioned above. Overall, these different forms of power occur concurrently and work together. For example, enlisting societal agency and expertise reveals not only the limits of state oversight but also the reliance of centralised authority on these liberal ways of governing[2].

Finally, the literature has widely criticised and unpacked from the point of view of power relations such as race or gender, various P/CVE programmes such as the UK Prevent strategy (Ali 2020; Abu-Bakare 2020; Heath-Kelly 2013), P/CVE programmes in Belgium and the Netherlands (Fadil, Koning, and Ragazzi 2019), in Spain (Fernández de Mosteyrín and Limón López 2017), in the EU (Martini and Fernández de Mosteyrín 2023; Russo and Selenica 2021; Marrero and Trujillo 2019), Middle East (Daniel 2024; Simoncini 2024) and Eastern European countries (Russo and Selenica 2022). These are examples of the nation-state manifestations of the global P/CVE *dispositif*. However, how these processes take place at a global level in ways that further the production of liberal subjectivities is an understudied topic in the literature. As a result, this article focuses on the UNSC's approach to P/CVE and its correlated organs, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED).

The article proceeds as follows: it first details how *dispositifs* and liberal government work. Then, after some methodological remarks, it turns to P/CVE and dissects its emergence and consolidation as a *dispositif*, the liberal practices it entails, and lastly, its (re)assembling of liberal subjectivities.

Security *dispositifs* and liberal government[3]

Foucault argued that the power over life, or biopower, may take two different forms. On the one hand it takes the form of the anatomopolitics of the body, meaning the disciplinary training of bodies that takes place mostly in institutions such as prisons, schools and armies. On the other hand, it takes the form of biopolitical regulations based on the understanding of individuals as members of a population (Jaeger 2010, 54–55; Foucault 1975; 1977; 1981). Biopower thus focuses on social problems such as reproduction, longevity, welfare, public health, migration (Jaeger 2010, 54–55), and, as this article argues, also manifests in counter-terrorism and P/CVE.

Understood as objects of knowledge constructed through discourses but also as fields of intervention in *Society must be Defended* and in *Security, Territory, Population,* the social problems mentioned above started being comprehended as matters of security (Foucault 1975; 2007; Jaeger 2010, 54–55). The meaning of security, here, exceeds that of military logics and of 'hard security' and becomes a 'pervasive form of regulation which enfolds in itself the lives of each and all' (Defert 1991, 232; see also, Jaeger 2010). Security exists and works in societies by taking the shape of a *dispositif*. Though the definition predates some of Foucault's theorisations of security, for the sake of the present

analysis, a *dispositif* is defined as 'the "heterogeneous ensemble" consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid' (Foucault 1980, 194). Importantly, the *dispositif* is not so much about the single elements, but about the 'system of relations' among all of these elements (Ahmad 2019, 416) and it can be understood as a strategically orientated social ensemble that links together a broad range of heterogeneous discursive and non-discursive phenomena (Ahmad 2019, 413). This system of relations emerges in response to an '*urgent need*' to fulfil an important political or social purpose (Foucault as in Ahmad 2019, 416, italics in the original) and works, somewhat inadvertently, to the advantage of some elements and actors.

Focusing on how power circulates, 'Foucault viewed the *dispositif* as a method for analysing relations of power that explicitly avoided simplistic hierarchies of control and dominance, viewing them instead as a series of interactions between a complex range of individuals, ideologies and institutions' (Ahmad 2019, 416, italics in the original). Foucault understood that actors possess agency, and they can appropriate discourses to further their own interests, but only in limited ways (Ahmad 2019, 417). They can therefore appropriate themselves of parts of the *dispositif* but the broad social ensemble is beyond their control, as their identities and modes of subjectivities also emerge in relation to the system of relations (Ahmad 2019, 413).

The CTS literature mentioned above details how the 9/11 attacks created an urgent need to respond to 'international terrorism' that started the process of emergence and consolidation of a global '(counter-)terrorism' *dispositif*. This system of relations, pointed

towards '(counter-)terrorism', consisted of a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of meanings and discourses such as the knowledge that constructs 'terrorism' and 'counter-terrorism' and their characteristics: agents such as the 'terrorists' and the 'counter-terrorist' actors; discursive practices such as pre-emption, rendition and biometric surveillance; architectural forms, such as urban counter-terrorism structures (Ahmad 2019, 416). All of the elements in this system of relations govern '(counter-)terrorism' and, in doing so, they engender 'new forms of knowledge, power, identity and subjectivity' (Ahmad 2019, 416). Importantly, the literature has also described how the *dispositif* has been appropriated in some ways by specific actors - above all, policy-makers legitimising counter-terrorism actions (Jackson 2005). But it has also demonstrated that the *dispositif* brings together discursive and non-discursive phenomena that go beyond actors' direct control, as they are embedded within and constituted by these phenomena[1]. Nonetheless, even in this latter case, the *dispositif* inadvertently worked to reify global hierarchies, such as those between the sovereign state vs non-state actors, or racialised and gendered international politics (Martini, 2021).

This article argues that the Council's P/CVE can be analysed through the prism of a security *dispositif* of liberal government that emerged in relation to a certain 'urgent need' (Foucault as in Ahmad 2019, 416) to respond to new dynamics in (counter-)terrorism. P/CVE (re)assembles a system of relations that encompasses the production of knowledge on 'radicalisation' and 'extremism'; the identification of the 'extremist' agents and 'P/CVE actors'; spaces of implementation of P/CVE and P/CVE discursive practices. These phenomena are gathered by their orientation towards a common goal.

[1] For example, Orientalist discourses.

They govern ‘extremism’ and produce effects that, as the article illustrates, reify the racialised and gendered structuring of society.

P/CVE creates freedom for circulation in society, with liberty being a basic feature of liberalism (Foucault 2007, 48). Freedom is an important element because Foucault’s theorising of security *dispositifs* is inspired by liberal understandings of the market such as the principles of *laissez-faire,* the self-regulation of the market through the free movement of forces and natural laws of supply-demand balance, and the unrestricted pursuit of individuals’ self-interests understood as resulting in social benefits (Burchell 1991, 127). Foucault argues in the same way, to make government more efficient and less costly in terms of resources, liberal governing produces a state-civil society distinction—a public and private division (Jaeger 2007, 259). It then focuses on civil society which, understood as a sphere of natural forces and mechanisms of self-regulation, is governed through the same principles of *laissez-faire* (Burchell 1991, 127). As Burchell puts it, government by *laissez-faire* is ‘a government of interests … a government which depends upon the conduct of individuals who are parts of a population and subjects of particular, personal interests’ (Burchell 1991, 127).

To become more efficient, the governing takes place not only through ‘parliaments, public bureaucracies, judiciaries and the like’ but also ‘the different spheres and agencies of civil society, and the knowledge of them’ (Dean 2002, 42). Liberalism models its intervention by gaining knowledge and focusing on ‘the agencies, regulations, expectations, values and obligations embedded in the processes of society’ (Dean 2002, 45) with all of these ‘external to the institutions of formal political authority’ (Dean 2002,

42). A first implication of this way of governing is that liberalism governs through intervention on the conditions of freedom. In other words, by *laissez-faire* and by ‘conducting conduct’. It produces knowledge about civil society to be able to model its interventions. Therefore, civil society emerges ‘as an object’, the sphere towards which mechanisms are directed in order to have a particular effect—that is, the milieu on which power is exerted (Foucault 2007, 42). It also appears as a subject that is called to conduct itself (Foucault 2007, 42). Furthermore, liberal government sets the parameters of the desirable political subjectivity. In this sense, it is productive of a new social and political subjectivity, the ‘economic man’ (*homo economicus)* who conducts himself and becomes a key ‘correlate and instrument’ of this kind of governing (Burchell 1991, 127). As Burchell put it, the ‘individual subject of interest is at once the object or target of government and, so to speak, its 'partner'‘ (Burchell 1991, 127).

A second implication is that liberalism may result in the depoliticisation of what is governed (Jaeger 2007, 260). Through this shift towards civil society, liberal government displaces law and force as the main governmental instruments—thus rendering governing less costly and more efficient (Jaeger 2007, 260). It transforms political issues into technical and managerial problems to be handled by civil society outside of the governmental sphere of decision-making and political claims. Therefore, it depoliticises them by removing them from the political sphere (Jaeger 2007, 260). On this, Jaeger further argues that governmentalities may have different tendencies and civil society may be involved in practices that may range from ‘the disciplinary reinforcement of hierarchies and social control to ‘liberal’ processes of self-regulation’ (Jaeger 2007, 260). All of these different governmentalities, however, will understand individuals as

'civil' partners of government and will thus involve them in 'techniques of the self' – self-improvement, and responsibility – rather than addressing them as political subjects (Jaeger 2007, 261). In this sense, individuals' activities are removed from the sphere of political decision-making and partisan conflict (Jaeger 2007, 261). The UN's P/CVE also reflects these liberal government's features, as this article illustrates after some methodological remarks.

Approaching the Council's P/CVE discursively

The article examines how the UNSC's P/CVE can be approached from the point of view of a Foucauldian *dispositif* reproducing liberal government. As Jaeger argues, the UN, in its current shape and functioning, constitutes a liberal project of managing and regulating the global population 'through a variety of governmental rationalities and techniques' (Jaeger 2010, pp. 52, 80–81). Within the UN, the article focuses specifically on the Council—and its counter-terrorism satellite organs—because of its global powers and the role these were assigned in 2001 in shaping global counter-terrorism, and, in turn, P/CVE (Martini 2023, 2021; Ditrych, 2014). In the last decades, the UNSC has become the leading body in the formulation and consolidation of the global counter-terrorism architecture, starting its action in 1998 in response to the bin Laden's attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (Martini 2021; Kundnani and Hayes 2018). More recently, its counter-terrorist action has been based both on 'hard security approaches'—

that is, military and police actions—and 'soft security approaches' such as P/CVE (Martini 2023; Martini et al. 2020), the latter being the focus of this article.

P/CVE is discussed in the organ's meetings belonging to the focus area that is 'threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts'[4]. The analysed corpus consisted of all the documents published in this focus area in the timeframe 1998–2022. The meetings analysed were joined by more than one hundred and eighty different actors—one hundred and forty-six member states, and forty-six invited speakers including the Secretary-General, the Chairs of various UN Committees, representatives of international and regional organisations, and civil society. From a Foucauldian point of view, all these actors reproduce but also produce the *dispositif*.

Overall, the corpus comprised more than two hundred and forty different documents including the Council's political debates, fifty-four Presidential Statements and fifty-eight UNSC Resolutions, where new counter-terrorism committees and global legal practices were instituted (see Table 1 below). These documents also contained global counter-terrorism frameworks and strategies—usually published in the Resolutions—and committees' reports and briefs included in the Resolutions and presented by the various committees' chairpersons during the UNSC's meetings. All in all, these documents represent the coming together of the global, legal regime on P/CVE—and, in this article, these are representative of the 'material' part of the Council's *dispositif*.



Table 1. The UNSC's meetings and official documents (Resolutions and Presidential Statements)

The corpus was coded entirely in NVivo 11 through a grounded approach where no hypothesis was formulated before data collection and the concepts were identified and coded while doing the analysis and were not defined beforehand (Corbin and Holt 2004). This allowed me to approach the corpus without a pre-established idea of the discursive features that the UN's counter-terrorism would display. The coding was thus able to evolve and follow the internal dynamics of the discourse. This allowed me to, for example, capture the emergence of P/CVE and its consolidation, and to map its discursive features. Words, phrases, or units of texts were tagged into different categories (or codes/nodes) that emerged during the reading phase of the texts. They were then grouped per themes reflected in the sub-headings below. This process allowed me to track and map

the discursive formation of what I would later identify theoretically as a *dispositif* and the assembling of its specific features.

The results were then analysed through poststructuralist discourse analysis (Dixit and Stump 2016, 110–12). In line with poststructuralist understandings of discourses, I examined the discursive patterns identified as sources and sites for the (re)production of knowledge and as discursive practices involved in the process of (re)assembling identity and subjectivities (Cuadro 2020a, 57). Overall, the research was driven by the questions of 'how does P/CVE emerge as a discursive practice, that is, based on what characteristics, methods, practices, technologies?' and 'what kind of subjectivities does it assemble?'. Scrutinised from this perspective, I realised the results could be analysed from the theoretical frame of the security *dispositif* and liberal government. The following pages illustrate a part of the 'system of relations' that P/CVE establishes. The analysis focuses primarily on the discursive aspects of the *dispositif*. Whenever possible, the more material aspects of the P/CVE dispositive such as practices, methods, devices and technologies are emphasised.

The UN Security Council's P/CVE as a security *dispositif*

This section describes how P/CVE can be approached as a Foucauldian security *dispositif* of liberal government. It will first describe its emergence and consolidation; secondly, the practices it entails and the way it works through society; and, lastly, it will discuss its (re)assembling of subjectivity.

The emergence and consolidation of P/CVE

Extremism as a specific problem to be addressed through P/CVE strategies became a core area of counter-terrorism action in the early 2010s, as illustrated in Table 2. It was then that Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) radicalisation strategies and the large number of individuals joining the group shifted the UNSC's concerns towards 'the evils of radicalization and violent extremism'[5]. Consequently, members were called to take all the 'concrete means and measures need(ed) to be updated and adapted'[6], especially to counter 'ISIL and other extremist organizations'[7]. So, it was in response to the Council's 'urgent need' (Foucault as in Ahmad 2019, 416) to address the flows of foreign fighters that the P/CVE *dispositif* started taking shape.

Initially, the *dispositif* constructed 'extremism' by (re)assembling existing discursive resources belonging to 'counter-terrorism'. Before the 2010s, extremism had not received specific attention but some scattered mentions can be observed. For example, in the first decade of its counter-terrorism action, the organ focused on 'dealing with all forms of extremism, including terrorism'[8], based on the understanding that 'to be effective in fighting terrorism, (it had to) to fight extremism'[9]. Also, in 2001, Resolution 1373 (2001) encouraged states to counter 'acts of terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism'[10].

However, it was in the early-2010s that part of this knowledge was reoriented towards 'extremism'. 'Extremism' was now mentioned systematically, and it was linked discursively to terrorism in a more regular way – thus becoming a key concept of

(counter-)terrorism. For example, 'Acts of terrorism and violent extremism'[11] were discursively constructed as 'twin cancers'[12] or the 'scourge afflicting modern times … [such as] violent extremism and its corollary, terrorism'[13]. States were encouraged to fight and prevent 'Any manifestation of violent extremism or terrorism'[14] because 'Terrorism and violent extremism are unquestionably one of the worst scourges of our time'[15]. Discursively these quotes show how extremism and terrorism were constructed as two sides of the same phenomenon. Linking the two concepts, the discursive construction of terrorism as an exceptional threat encompassed extremism and led to the emergence of the 'system of relations' now (also) pointed towards 'extremism'.



Table 2. Mentions of 'extremism/extremist' in the UNSC's counter-terrorism action

Non-discursive aspects of the *dispositif* also played a role in this reorientation process. In 2015, P/CVE became a focus area of the Counter-Terrorism Committee[16]. The Council also revisited Resolution 1624 (2005), a Resolution focused on the glorification of terrorism that added a condemnation of 'incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism'[17]. Moreover, portrayed as a 'natural extension'[18] of Resolution 1624 (2005), Resolution 2178 (2014) was approved. Here, the UNSC condemned, under Chapter VII, 'violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism'[19] and dedicated a part of the document to 'Countering Violent Extremism in Order to Prevent Terrorism'[20]—thus embedding P/CVE within counter-terrorism. Many of its Resolutions and Presidential Statements were furthering the reorientation process by emphasising, for example, the importance of 'countering violent extremism in order to prevent terrorism'[21], 'developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism'[22] and 'counter(ing) violent extremist ideologies that underpin the terrorist narrative'[23].

Other Council's practices reinforced the institutionalisation of the new *dispositif*. Several meetings were held to analyse the topic[24]. For example, meeting 7316 was dedicated to 'International Cooperation on Combating Terrorism and Violent Extremism'—thus reifying the *dispositif*'s reorientation process and its consolidation. A further manifestation of the 'non-discursive' infrastructure through practices, the CTC conducted various Global Implementation Surveys of Member States' implementation of UNSC resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2178 (2014) through the 'electronic Detailed Implementation Survey' and the 'Overview of Implementation Assessment'[25]. The ones

conducted since the early 2010s, systematically included states' assessment focused on 'countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism'[26].

Other more 'material' aspects also played a role in this process. Apart from various UN webpages on P/CVE[27], in 2015, the CTC published 'The Madrid Guiding Principles: A practical tool for Member States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters' (CTC, 2015). Here, it published thirty-six principles to guide governments in countering terrorism and eight specifically on P/CVE. The CTC also published various factsheets on themes related to P/CVE[28], including one on 'Foreign Terrorist Fighters' where graphs and 'snapshots' focus on the need to 'countering of violent extremism'[29]; and one on 'Countering violent extremism and terrorist narratives'. These products are examples of the 'tangible' manifestation of the *dispositif* and are symbolic of its standardisation through the production of 'technologies' centred on P/CVE.

These practices were not self-standing within the Council, and they were (re)producing a turn towards P/CVE that involved the whole UN. Considered a milestone in P/CVE, as mentioned in various UNSC meetings, the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Extremism[30] reified this turn too, identifying areas of collaboration for the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and other UN bodies. All of these may be important elements in the *dispositif* and reveal the 'system of relations' that was emerging and consolidating--gradually and increasingly oriented towards extremism and radicalisation—concepts further discussed below.

P/CVE as discursive formation

As a theoretical tool, *dispositif*s allow us to grasp what Foucault defined as the power-knowledge nexus—that is, how power produces, shapes and reassembles knowledge in (and about) society (Foucault 1980). *Dispositifs* (re)assemble new forms of knowledge, power and subjectivity, as demonstrated by the UNSC's *dispositif*. Moreover, as mentioned above, the sense of immediacy that allows the formation of *dispositifs* implies the bringing together of a wide variety of elements in a fragile way. P/CVE emerged in relation to the 'dominant strategic function' (Foucault as in Ahmad 2019, 416) of urgently addressing ISIL's global dynamics of the radicalisation of individuals. And it was in this process of emerging and consolidating P/CVE that new categories of knowledge were created or reassembled and the social ensemble emerged—even though in a fragile way, as explained below.

Highlighting how central authority relies on liberal rationalities in P/CVE, the Council highlighted that 'violent extremism cannot be prevented or countered through repressive measures alone' and emphasised 'the need for comprehensive, whole-of-society … approaches'[31]. In a similar line, it was stated that 'While we recognize the importance of security measures and the strengthening of the security of air, land and sea borders, attention must be paid to intellectual counter-efforts against extremist ideas and cross-border ideologies'[32]. The focus was placed on the 'motivations that lead an individual towards radicalization to violence','The narratives and discourses used by terrorist groups to attract supporters' and what can render 'individuals and communities vulnerable'[33]. The UNSC agreed that it had to be 'unrelenting in the fight against ideological indoctrination'[34] and 'against ideas'[35], against 'ideological radicalization'[36] and

'developing techniques for countering the misguided extremist ideas'[37]. It was highlighted how 'Addressing the radicalization process that leads individuals to accept terrorist violence as an action of choice is key to preventing new terrorists from emerging'. It was understood that 'Communities, traditional and religious leaders, women, and surviving victims of terrorism, education, community policing and mobilization can … push back the terrorist narratives and provide positive alternatives to their (terrorists') schemes'[38].

Consequently, the *dispositif* focused on society to grasp the 'natural' processes of its functioning and reassembled this knowledge through the (re)production of specific categories that form P/CVE. In other words, the *dispositif* focused on what were interpreted as 'natural' processes taking place in society and at an individual level. It then (re)produced various categories to address these processes. For example, 'extremism' represents a category whose meaning was (re)assembled by the *dispositif* to identify a 'natural', individual process of embracing 'an ideology of hatred'[39]. The focus was thus placed on producing 'countering and preventing violent extremist ideologies that underpin the terrorist narrative'[40] and on producing a 'counter-narrative that rejects the language of radicalization'[41] because the fight had to be 'won in the realm of ideas'.

The process of embracing radical ideas, also characterised by a category of knowledge, was named 'radicalisation', also understood as 'a social phenomenon'[42]. Nonetheless, the *dispositif* was not just producing knowledge about these processes but also specific interpretations and significations. For example, it was claimed that 'Radicalization is the essential precursor to individuals becoming foreign terrorist fighters'[43]. In other words, the *dispositif* constructed the understanding that 'extremism'

was the result of 'radicalisation' and not of political grievances against specific international politics. Extremists were considered 'the product of a process of ideological radicalization'[44]. This understanding was silencing the fact that individuals may be led to terrorist violence by political grievances, and it constructed 'extremism' as a 'natural process' that may happen to certain individuals. It then created specific 'scientific' knowledge and categories as 'radicalisation' to identify it and 'technical' solutions to address it—thus depoliticising 'extremism'. For example, it was claimed that an effort had to be made to 'prevent and combat violent extremism that can lead to radicalization and terrorism. This element is part of the struggle in the field of ideas'[45]. Intervention towards these individuals was also envisaged as, for example, States were encouraged to engage with 'those who could be susceptible to terrorist recruitment and to radicalization leading to violence'[46], thus identifying specific depoliticising solutions.

Similarly, radicalisation was not linked to the embracing of specific political positions within society or discussed in relation to political claims. Rather, it was understood as a 'natural' process that may take place because of, for example, the 'so-called push factors'[47], or 'drivers fuelling radicalization'[48]. The focus on individuals and society was observable in, for example, the calls to members to 'address the specific drivers of radicalization for individuals and communities'[49] or to tackle specific social 'situations (acting) as its drivers (of radicalisation)'[50]. The 'complexities of the push and pull factors involved'[51] rendered it difficult to implement clear 'mechanisms aimed at safeguarding vulnerable individuals, targeting in particular those at risk of radicalization'[52]. Here, the *dispositif* reassembled these categories to grasp a process interpreted as 'a social phenomenon'[53]. It then produced these 'technical' and 'scientific'

categories—drivers, models, etc.—and focused P/CVE on this knowledge, thus dismissing the possibility of individuals' use of terrorism in response to political grievances. Moreover, efforts had to be focused on 'break(ing) the life cycle of radicalization'[54], 'from the first steps on the road towards terrorism, where radicalization manifests itself, all the way through to the final stages of the cycle'[55]. Similarly to the process mentioned above, the *dispositif* was creating knowledge about 'natural' 'cycles' 'manifesting themselves' in society and, by doing so, depoliticising the political issues behind 'extremism'.

Furthermore, the Council emphasised that to 'anticipate the risks (of radicalization)'[56], 'conceptual models of radicalization'[57] and 'effective deradicalization programmes'[58] had to be created and implemented. The *dispositif* was, thus, transforming political postures into scientific problems to be handled through 'technical' categories - e.g., specific models of radicalisation – and 'scientific' procedures – e.g., deradicalization strategies focused on the individual. New rationalities also emerged and formed P/CVE with the UNSC, for example, calling on members to focus on 'Early intervention in pre-criminal spaces … as a tool for redirecting potential violent extremists'[59]. The 'early detection'[60] of 'anyone at risk of radicalization'[61] led to highlighting the importance of 'pre-emptive and preventive security measures at the international and national levels'[62]. These new rationalities were also included in legal texts such as Presidential Statements and Resolutions. The UNSC's official documents emphasised the 'importance of countering radicalization'[63], elaborating 'comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies that encompass countering violent radicalization'[64] and 'preventing radicalization to terrorism'[65].

Here, the material part of the *dispositif* is also observable as the CTC and the CTED produced various P/CVE 'technologies'. For example, the CTED's Analytical Brief 'Countering terrorist narratives online and offline'[66] presents various graphs on the distribution of efforts to counter terrorist narratives as delineated by the target audience's phase of involvement. In this document, a further element and relation can be grasped: the link with the academic field of Terrorism Studies. Here, it is explained how the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Working Group on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism—defining itself as 'the largest UN counter-terrorism coordination framework'[67]—contracted an expert academic analyst to conduct a review of states' counter-narrative initiatives, being his survey and the preliminary findings also technologies elements belonging to 'social ensemble'.

Nonetheless, the *dispositif*'s fragility is also observable. For example, there exists no UN's agreed definition of 'extremism' or 'radicalisation'. And, despite the creation of the 'scientific' and 'technical' knowledge mentioned, a universally agreed upon description of the relation between all these categories—above all, 'extremism' and 'radicalisation'—does not exist. In other words, fixing the boundaries of these categories and pinpointing their specific relation is difficult and they mostly acquire their meaning through their embeddedness within the 'system of relations'. In this sense, P/CVE displays *dispositif*s' 'inherent mobility and instability' (Aradau as in Ahmad 2019, 416), as the categories' meanings are engendered within its discursive structures (Ahmad 2019, 416).

Returning to the *dispositif*'s depoliticisation of 'extremism', this can also be observed in the Council's emphasis on the countering of 'distorted narratives that are

based on the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of religion to justify violence'[68]. Here, the *dispositif*'s focus shifts P/CVE towards 'narratives' circulating in society, rather than on possible political claims and partisan postures behind 'extremism'. It is worth mentioning that 'narratives' became a key theme in the *dispositif*'s material infrastructure. In terms of practices, the UNSC held several meetings on 'Countering the narratives and ideologies of terrorism'[69] and in 2017, the body approved the 'Comprehensive International Framework to Counter Terrorist Narratives (CIFCTN)'[70] and instructed Members on its implementation in Resolution 2254 (2017)[71]. The CIFCTN included various guidelines and good practices to counter terrorist narratives. Additionally, the CTED published the Analytical Brief 'Countering terrorist narratives online and offline'[72] and the 'Technical Guide to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and other relevant resolutions' (S/2019/998), including a list of P/CVE requirements for states in the form of a checklist—all of these products being examples of the technologies produced by the *dispositif*.

Lastly, the categories mentioned represent the process of (re)assembling knowledge to govern society by focusing on social actors. These dynamics are (re)produced by the need to 'recognize(ing) and prevent(ing) radicalization'[73]—a rationality that implies tasking civil society with its own governing of conduct, as discussed below.

P/CVE and its (re)production through society

P/CVE emerged as a liberal *dispositif* also in its reassembling of preventive practices and its identification (and production) of P/CVE actors and spaces. P/CVE is based on the logics of early identification and prevention of extremism understood as 'a social phenomenon'[74]. Social and private processes exceed state oversight and, in this case, P/CVE is an example of how central authority may also rely on liberal modes of governmentality. Put differently, society is interpreted as the best place to grasp and counter these phenomena. Consequently, P/CVE understands that it needs the collaboration of 'civil society, including women, young people and religious leaders'[75] among others because they are the 'the ones on the front lines, facing and standing up to violent extremists'[76]. Reflecting liberal government's principles, P/CVE was thus not restricting circulation or implementing costly repressive (and oppressive) governmental practices to control individuals. Rather, it reproduced strategies in line with the creation of freedom and *laissez-faire* (Cuadro 2020b; Foucault 2007) and society was tasked with governing 'extremism'.

The liberal government rationality reproduced by P/CVE resulted in a discursive differentiation of state-civil society; and also, a public-political vs a private-social depoliticised sphere. Focusing on the latter, P/CVE identified 'health, social, welfare and education sectors'[77] but also families and religious communities as the spaces where 'extremism' could be prevented. Leaving state responses aside, the Council envisaged P/CVE as 'a true whole-of-society approach'[78] to be implemented from 'grassroots-level local communities'[79]—therefore leaving society to self-regulate itself. In its legal texts, the Council focused on the role of 'religious authorities and community leaders'[80] and on cooperation with the 'private sector, civil society, religious, educational and cultural

institutions'[81]. It also envisaged the implementation of P/CVE 'through programs at schools and in prisons'[82], spaces identified as 'potential incubators for radicalization to terrorism'[83]. Further reproducing the 'retreat' of the state to make government more efficient, in Resolution 2194 (2014), the UNSC called for P/CVE to be based on a 'community-oriented policing'[84]—thus assigning governmental tasks such as police regulations to civil society. In this sense, the *dispositif* was identifying social and private spheres as spaces for the implementation of P/CVE – thus removing extremism from the public-political sphere of policy-making, political responses and more costly state interventions.

In terms of the *dispositif*'s 'material' infrastructure, various public-private and private-social partnerships focused on P/CVE. For example, the CTED and the Switzerland-based non-governmental organisation ICT4Peace worked together to identify 'emerging norms of voluntary self-regulation by the private sector in its responses to terrorist abuse of their products and services'[85].For instance, *Tech Against Terrorism (TaT),* a CTED-initiated public-private partnership focused on tackling the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. The TaT launched the Terrorist Content Analytics Platform (TCAP) designed to assist companies in addressing terrorist use of their platforms, another example of a specific P/CVE technology. The CTED also reports on *The Strong Cities Network* (SCN), a global network of mayors, policymakers, and practitioners, which aims to support city governments and their communities in P/CVE.

Lastly, the *dispositif*'s focus on civil society reproduced the depoliticisation of P/CVE, as dealing with extremism was removed from the sphere of policy-making and

assigned to these social and private actors. This process was also rendering the liberal government more efficient, as P/CVE was relying on social actors that would act according to their initiatives and self-interest and follow the 'natural' processes of society. Moreover, the depoliticisation of 'extremism' and of the responses to this threat was furthered by the *dispositif*'s responsabilisation of civil society in its own self-regulation and self-improvement. For example, the Council emphasised the need of 'educating our people about the evils of radicalization and violent extremism'[86] so as to be 'empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society'[87]. These social actors were responsible for enhancing 'the role of local communities'[88] and 'sustaining the resilience of communities'[89]. In this sense, the *dispositif* was reproducing a liberal logic of tasking civil society with P/CVE but also making it responsible for its self-improvement through empowerment and building its resilience. Resilience and empowerment here represent categories of knowledge that shift the focus away from political grievances depoliticising extremism (Joseph 2013). Furthermore, they are illustrative of liberal government because they rendered resilience and empowerment processes that would represent civil society's improvement, however, had to be implemented by civil society itself. Overall, civil society thus emerged as a self-governing actor and it was tasked with its own self-improvement. However, the liberal *dispositif* did not produce the same freedom for all individuals, as the following section describes.

Structuring society and governing freedom through P/CVE

Liberal government is also productive of subjectivity and subjectification processes. The 'economic man' becomes a key subjectivity to (re)assemble as this individual – that self-regulates itself and follows its self-interest – is a figure for its functioning in an efficient – and economic – way (Burchell 1991, 127). Consequently, P/CVE is also productive of processes that (re)assemble desirable subjectivities while governing individuals and social groups differently, as this section describes.

The racialisation of the 'extremist'

Replicating Neo-orientalist and racialised discourses that were rearticulated after 9/11 that linked terrorism with Islam, P/CVE also reproduced processes of racialisation and 'Islamisation' of the 'extremist'—thus centring social interventions towards these sub-groups of the population. For example, the discourse depicted 'Muslim communities'[90] as the 'communities most vulnerable to recruitment by extremists or to self-radicalization'[91]. It also highlighted that religious and community leaders have an important role to play in combating terrorism (and extremism)'[92] especially because of the 'increased recruitment by terrorist organizations of young people from Muslim minorities in Western countries'[93]. Therefore, the *dispositif* identified 'religious (Muslim) minorities and racialized communities'[94] as the sub-groups within society where the 'natural' process of 'radicalisation' was taking place. At the same time, the subjectivity of the 'extremist' was also emerging as that of a Muslim and racialised subject who became the focus of societal interventions. Revealing how liberal governmentality

reassembles racialised and hierarchical social structures, the governing of these individuals was thus based on the production of limits to their freedom.

The *dispositif* was not just sketching the subjectivity of the 'extremist' but it was also discursively identifying the features of the desired liberal subjectivity through the (re)production of an 'extremist-moderate' binary. For example, it was understood that 'Peace-loving Muslims and moderates from the Muslim world'[95] were central figures in 'Promoting the true face of moderate Islam'[96] and providing the 'right narrative to the 'vulnerable and disenchanted youth'[97]. It was considered that 'Persons of moderate faith must fight against the (extremist) message'[98] and 'Imams must preach the true Islam of tolerance and coexistence with moderate views'[99]. In this sense, the *dispositif* (re)assembled the knowledge category of 'moderation' to sketch the desirable liberal subjectivity in opposition to 'extremism'. This category identifies moderate, 'non-partisan' positions as the desired liberal subjectivity. In other words, it was sketching the desirable subjectivity for the 'economic man' as that of a non-political, or at least non-partisan, position in society. Again, this highlights how this process resulted in different kinds of freedom—in this case, 'non -extremists'/moderates were free but also tasked with governing 'extremism'.

Along these lines, P/CVE liberal governing focused on the need to 'empower moderates'[100], reflecting the liberal understanding that the 'economic man' was tasked with the responsibility of his own self-improvement. Similarly, it was argued that moderate Muslims had to 'be more vocal in promoting moderate ideas against violent extremism'[101] and in 'preserving our common values, amplifying moderate voices'[102].

The freedom of these subjects thus followed the rationality of moderation and individuals' self-improvement and self-governing. At the same time, reflecting the liberal government rationality of activating civil society, P/CVE assigned the task of 'Promoting a moderate and authentic Islam … (as) a tangible response to extremism'[103] to the 'active efforts of moderate religious institutions'[104]—again, producing freedom for these subjects but also linking this freedom to the compliance with these specific tasks.

Overall, the *dispositif* was reproducing a depoliticised way of dealing with extremism, assigning liberal governing to civil society. The *dispositif* focused specifically on its 'religious/Muslim' and 'racialised' individuals and communities, thus also reproducing the 'Islamisation' and 'racialisation' processes mentioned above. Furthermore, these communities were understood as the ones in charge both of spotting 'extremism' but also of enacting processes of preventive depoliticisation. In other words, they had to enforce moderation and non-partisan political positions as the desirable (Muslim) subjectivity before 'extremism' happened. They were thus left free to self-regulate but also tasked with the responsibility to identify and govern 'extremists'. The latter process was conducted through 'empowerment' strategies—that is, happening before 'extremism' and incentivising individuals to freely embrace '(non-political) moderate' positions and not '(partisan/political) extremist' postures. Importantly, empowerment as a liberal governing strategy also emerged in relation to other sectors of the population, as discussed below.

The male extremist and the woman gate-keeper

Overall, P/CVE's understanding that 'the overwhelming proportion of foreign fighters … (are) males'[105] reproduced the figure of the 'extremist' as a male individual. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that in recent years, the Council dedicated efforts to including a gender perspective in countering terrorism and violent extremism[106], as explained in the CTED's factsheet about integrating gender into counter-terrorism[107]. Nonetheless, despite brief mentions, women were not broadly discussed as possible 'extremists', not even in the material produced to discuss their involvement in terrorism.

An example of this could be the CTED's snapshot 'Understanding Foreign Terrorist Fighters demographics: women and girls'. The snapshot focuses specifically on the 'women foreign terrorist fighters demographics. However, the text in the image only mentions the 'rising number of women foreign terrorist fighters'. It then turns to the discussion of es how 'more emphasis should be placed on strategies to counter-terrorism, and promote women's participation and empowerment'. Furthermore, the same snapshot mentions Presidential Statement 21 (2014) where the UNSC noted that 'violent extremism is frequently targeting women and girls ….' and highlighted the importance for States to 'engage with women and women's organizations in developing CVE strategies'[108].

In this sense, women were not emerging as possible 'extremists', rather they were mostly understood either as possible victims to be protected or, in a progressive effort to leave behind gender stereotypes, as 'agents for conflict prevention'[109]. Focusing on the latter dynamic, in 2015 the Council approved Resolution 2245 (2015) on the role of women in P/CVE[110]. Here, it emphasised the importance 'to ensure the participation and

leadership of women and women's organisation in developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism'[111]. However, constructing women as P/CVE actors resulted in a depoliticisation of their possible political agency. This depended on the fact that considering that women were key P/CVE actors was reproducing the understanding that women cannot be 'extremists'—that is, take partisan positions or have political claims and express them violently.

Moreover, displaying its liberal features of mobilisation of civil society, P/CVE's rationality was that of 'promoting the role of women in society'[112]. It was understood that to effectively implement P/CVE, 'We must also involve women and girls …[in] helping build community resilience.'[113]. Similarly, Resolution 2396 (2017) encouraged 'States and international, regional, and subregional entities to ensure the participation and leadership of women in those efforts'[114]. Therefore, P/CVE was mobilising women as an agency of civil society responsible for governing 'extremism' through depoliticising strategies of 'empowerment' and the creation of 'resilience'.

Nonetheless, the gendered understandings of women as belonging to the private sphere were inscribing their P/CVE actions mostly in the private sphere of the family. Thus, once more the freedom produced for these subjects was limited and stratified by gendered power structures. It was claimed, for example, that 'The role of family and women is important in educating individuals and assimilating them into the communities.'[115]. In a similar line, it was claimed that 'One possible way to prevent violent extremism is … supporting women and girls to make societies more resilient. By empowering women, we can empower other members of their families and

communities'[116]. Therefore, despite the efforts to embrace progressive postures on women, the *dispositif*'s mobilisation of women and girls was reproducing gendered and paternalistic views of (Muslim) women in society and, overall, gendered limitations of their freedom and agency. While they were tasked with the prevention of extremism, they were inscribed within the domestic realm.

Lastly, further reflecting liberal understandings of self-improvement, the Council also emphasised the importance of 'the promotion of education for girls and women … which will enable them to play a more active role in the actions that States and societies take in countering terrorism and violent extremism'[117]. In other words, it was through self-improvement and incentivisation that girls and women would be able to play a more active role in liberal governing—that is to say, they would access broader freedom by becoming the *homo economicus*. Here, the inclusion of 'girls' in the sub-group of (Muslim) women acting as gatekeepers of their families reveals a gendered approach to young individuals too.The liberal governing of male youngsters isthe topic of the following section.

Youth as a key concern for P/CVE

Youth are also governed distinctly in P/CVE. Here too, governmentality displays paternalistic features of protection. For example,thus, limitations of freedom, but also liberal governance focused on empowerment are discussed – thus, producing a kind of freedom pointing towards the realisation of the *homo economicus*. Concerning the former,

the UNSC, for example, expressed its 'legitimate concern about young people falling prey to terrorist narratives and ideologies'[118] and about the fact that 'youths may be vulnerable to the lure of terrorists who offer them a sense of belonging, a salary and a promise of glory'[119]. Discussing youth in the passive way of 'falling prey' or being 'vulnerable' to extremism resulted in a dismissal of youth's agency and the neglect of possible political claims behind their 'radicalisation'. Moreover, it was understood that 'Social exclusion and youth unemployment have been increasing the vulnerability of youth to violent extremist narratives that are conducive to terrorism'[120] and that 'poverty, illiteracy and the high rate of unemployment among young people and the general population render them vulnerable to the manipulative messages of terrorist groups'[121]. Overall, the focus on issues such as poverty and unemployment resulted in a depoliticisation of youth's political grievances by constructing non-political causes as reasons for their 'radicalisation'.

This implied that the responses to youth's radicalisation envisaged by P/CVE were also focused on addressing non-political causes of radicalisation and on 'engaging youth in our societies, most basically by generating jobs'[122]. For example, it was claimed that 'We must focus on the role of young people, support them and integrate them in the economy and politics of different societies by offering them job opportunities and protecting them from extremist ideologies' [123]. P/CVE measures thus emphasised the importance of 'providing education and job opportunities, (and) promoting development'[124] because it was understood that 'ensuring job opportunities for youth and poverty eradication will help curtail the recruitment of new individuals to terrorist networks'[125]. In this sense, P/CVE was also displaying features of educational and

professional incentivisation. On the one hand, this was furthering depoliticising 'radicalisation' as it was focusing on the creation of educational and professional opportunities as P/CVE strategies—rather than discussing political grievances or political claims as elements behind 'extremism'. On the other hand, it was also reproducing the subjectivity of the economic man— that is, individuals that govern themselves also through processes of self-improvement and are awarded access to less limited freedom.

Nonetheless, P/CVE was also implementing liberal government rationalities towards youth. This is observable in the understanding that P/CVE actors had to 'work closely with civil society, including with young people ….'[126]. In 2015, the Council approved Resolution 2250 (2015) on the role of youth in P/CVE, emphasising the need 'to increase inclusive representation of youth in decision-making at all levels …, including institutions and mechanisms to counter violent extremism'[127]. Youth empowerment and resilience became key rationalities to be implemented 'at home, in schools … and places of worship'[128] and educators, religious leaders and even other youths were understood as the key actors in these processes of empowering youngsters. In this sense, the liberal government was reproducing dynamics of leaving youth free to implement self-government strategies.

Along these lines, young people were governed through the production of liberal freedom as it was understood that 'the vast majority of young people are naturally inclined towards building a good life for themselves and others. I am confident that they are eager to make contributions to peaceful and thriving societies for all'[129]. In this sense, it was understood that 'youth' was a sphere of natural mechanisms of self-regulation. These

mechanisms would lead youth away from extremism and towards a 'good life'. Rather than directly govern society to improve it, liberal government relied on the youth's 'natural inclination' to contribute to society. In other words, 'youth' was interpreted through the prism of the 'economic man' that, free to follow society's natural processes, will be able to improve society and himself – that is, reproducing but also actively producing liberal government through (governed) freedom.

Conclusion[130]

The present article has analysed the UN Security Council's program of Prevention and Countering of Extremism as a Foucauldian security *dispositif* of liberal government. It has illustrated how P/CVE can be considered a security *dispositif* that displays liberal government rationalities. These rationalities reside in the liberal depoliticisation of 'extremism' through its removal from the political sphere and the tasking of civil society and individuals with their own governing, conducting of conduct and self-improvement. In this sense, P/CVE as liberal security also tasks civil society with the governing of 'extremism' through its own governing and 'techniques of the self'.

Overall, the rationality of liberal government is that of making governing less costly, in terms of governmental (repressive) resources' mobilisation, and more efficient by relying on civil society's 'natural' capacity to self-regulate and self-improvement—thus giving civil society's freedom to pursue its autonomy but also self-interest because this will result in social improvement. The same logic gave rise to P/CVE in counter-

terrorism. P/CVE is based on the understanding that the best way to counter terrorism is by preventing extremism and countering radicalisation—that is, acting on the individual and society before the terrorist act is committed. In this sense, P/CVE as a liberal *dispositif* focuses on society and the individual to govern 'extremism' through processes of individual responsibilisation, liberal incentivisation and self-improvement. Therefore, P/CVE is considered a less costly strategy than counter-terrorism, as it will not mobilise the state's repressive resources such as police regulations. It is also considered more efficient because it is understood that civil society is the privileged actor to govern 'extremism', before 'terrorism' is committed. Civil society is understood as the best actor to grasp all the processes happening in society. Among these, there is 'extremism', a 'natural', individual process, but also processes to prevent it. All of this is understood to make civil society a more efficient and effective actor in counter-terrorism.

P/CVE was interpreted as a less repressive, oppressive and intrusive way of countering terrorism because it relied on civil society's freedom. The understanding was that, let free to circulate and to self-regulate itself, civil society and individuals would be able to govern 'extremism' in a more 'horizontal' way by reconducting other individuals' conducts or by having individuals directly acting on themselves. Nonetheless, this article has illustrated that P/CVE circumvents the need for direct oppression, but it still (re)produces and (re)assembles hierarchical social structures through its subjectivisation processes and also through its implementation of (different) dynamics creating 'freedom'.

Even though it is usually presented as a more progressive and innocuous strategy than countering terrorism because more in line with society's values, P/CVE still

(re)produces and (re)assembles hierarchical, racialised and gendered social structures. Sometimes considered as 'illiberal' practices contradicting liberal principles, this article has illustrated through the study of P/CVE that these are instead 'liberal' practices of government. Liberal government (re)assembles—and to some extent, relies on—these hierarchical, racialised and gendered social structures, and so does P/CVE. It is only by uncovering how these processes operate in discursive practices such as the ones linked to (global) security that their legitimacy can start being questioned. And, more importantly, that they can start to be deconstructed to be transformed.

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