

**UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA
DEPARTAMENTO DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA Y DE LA
ADMINISTRACIÓN III**



TESIS DOCTORAL

**Human rights as performance: a discourse analysis of the
Western-led intervention in Libya (2011)**

MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR

PRESENTADA POR

Matthew Robson

DIRECTOR

Heriberto Cairo Carou

Madrid, 2018

PHD THESIS

**HUMAN RIGHTS AS PERFORMANCE: A
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE
WESTERN-LED INTERVENTION IN
LIBYA (2011)**

Matthew Robson

Director de tesis: Heriberto Cairo Carou

Departamento de Ciencia Política y de la Administración III (Teorías y
Formas Políticas y Geografía Humana)

Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Dedicated to Mum and Dad.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	6
Transliteration	7
Abstract	8
Summary	9
Resúmen	13
INTRODUCTION	20
Objectives and elaboration of research questions	22
Literature review on the military intervention in Libya	26
-Concerning the legality of the NATO mission	28
-Ethical considerations	30
-The politics of Western intervention in Libya	33
Summary of Sections	48
PART 1 METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	40
CHAPTER 1 METHODOLOGY / RESEARCH DESIGN	41
1. 1 Making choices in post-structural discourse analysis	41
1. 2 Research design for the Western-led intervention in Libya	44
CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	53
2.1 The 'critical geopolitics' research project and 'imperiality'	53
2. 2 Questions of ontology and epistemology	62

2.3	Discourse, power and knowledge	69
2.4	Identity, performativity and intertextuality in foreign policy discourse	77
PART 2 LIBYA IN THE WESTERN GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION		97
CHAPTER 3 US AND UK RELATIONS WITH LIBYA DURING THE COLD WAR		99
3.1	Libya and the Anglo-powers after the ‘green revolution’	99
3.2	Terrorism, Subversion and Hostility	111
CHAPTER 4 PUNISHING THE ‘ROGUE’		118
CHAPTER 5 COMING IN FROM THE COLD AND THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’		124
5.1	On the road to ‘rehabilitation’	124
5.2	Libya and Gaddafi: Recalcitrant to change?	136
PART 3 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA		148
CHAPTER 6 CONSTRUCTION OF THE BASIC DISCOURSES		149
5.1	The basic ‘human rights’ discourse	149
5.2	The basic ‘civil war’ discourse	155

CHAPTER 7	PERFORMING HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY IN FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE	162
7.1	Human rights as an ideological weapon	163
7.2	Human rights in an ‘interconnected’ world	177
7.3	Human rights in the Cameron and Obama administrations	187
CHAPTER 8	OFFICIAL UK POLICY DISCOURSE: BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND REGIME CHANGE	207
8.1	Continuity with basic ‘human rights’ discourse	208
8.2	Political opposition to official UK discourse	214
8.3	Media opposition and the onset of ‘stalemate’	219
8.4	How the UK government maintained discursive stability	223
CHAPTER 9	OFFICIAL US POLICY DISCOURSE: FROM CAUTION TO CONVERGENCE	233
9.1	Political opposition and the ‘War Powers Act’	243
9.2	US media discourse and the identity of the ‘rebels’	247
9.3	Maintaining discursive stability: convergence with official UK discourse and the ‘destiny’ of the Libyan people	251
CONCLUSIONS		260
APPENDIX		274
BIBLIOGRAPHY		275

Acknowledgements

First of all to my family and friends, I must say thanks for all of the support and interest they have shown in this project. They have also had the undoubtedly arduous task of listening to me sigh, complain, and go on about this thesis for the last four and a bit years. All of the conversations which have I have been a part of have helped either in exploring new ideas, or in testing ones already thought. To Mum, Elaine and Sarah, especially, it is humbling to have such a great family with me and I'm sure I wouldn't have got to this stage without you.

I must express my gratitude to the Complutense University for such an amazing opportunity to try and achieve something in an area of knowledge which has become, and will remain, a true passion. I honestly do not know what I would have done, or where I would have ended up, without the chance to work towards something as meaningful and worthwhile as political research. My Supervisor Heriberto has assisted me throughout, and his guidance, patience and understanding during this time we've been working together is something I'll always remember. I sincerely hope I have learned from his critical approach to politics and that the end product is something he will be satisfied with. As a side note, I believe that the public education system in Spain- of which the Complutense is an integral part- should be defended against efforts to dismantle it. This would be a tragedy, especially in the field of politics, where it is imperative to give students from all socio-economic backgrounds a fair opportunity to reach higher levels of knowledge.

Finally, recognition should be given to all of the critical Geopolitics and International Relations scholars, who have, and continue to be a great inspiration. There are obviously too many to mention but one could highlight the work of Gearóid Ó Tuathail, David Campbell, and Lene Hansen, all of whom have had a profound impact on this work. The struggle against power and the pursuit of justice, I think, are perhaps the only universal values. I reserve a final thanks to an anonymous reviewer, who with very little notice was so accommodating in helping out with a last-minute evaluation.

Transliteration

It is widely known that the transliteration of Arabic names and places to the English language throws up certain difficulties for authors. For research on Libya this is no different. For simplicity this thesis will resort to conventional spellings which are to be found in a wide variety of English language media such as the BBC: E.G ‘Gaddafi’. It is acknowledged that this may differ from academic figures who take Libya as a central interest. For instance: Dirk Vandewalle uses ‘Qadhafi’, Ronald Bruce St John has opted for ‘Qaddafi’, while Lisa Anderson has oscillated between ‘Qaddafi’ and ‘Qadhdhafi’. There are also many other variations to be found. When citing directly from a particular source in this thesis, the author’s original spelling will be used, unless where meaning is obscured and identification of the individual made difficult.

Abstract

Abstract for ‘Human rights as performance: a discourse analysis of the Western-led intervention in Libya’.

The persistent violence, instability and widespread human rights abuses which have plagued Libya since the Western-led military intervention, have all called into question the West’s decisive role in bringing about the fall of the previous Libyan government. While previous work has shown a tendency to confirm or repudiate the humanitarian intentions of the Western state, this thesis offers up a more nuanced understanding. In considering the state to be 'performatively' constituted by a range of re-iterative discursive practices, it becomes possible to view the Western intervention in Libya as the *materialization* of a ‘human rights’ discourse which exudes both a moral component- spreading the 'universal' values of 'freedom' and 'democracy'- and a geopolitical component- the security objectives advanced through the liberalisation and democratisation of Libya and the wider region-. Nevertheless, it is put forward here that in the case of Libya, the 'human rights' discourse deployed by Western governments is pernicious in that its internal logics work to dismiss and disparage too easily the merits of other interpretations of events- such as a hegemonic ‘civil war’ discourse to be found in Western media-, foreclosing in the process more peaceful and potentially more stable solutions to the violence taking place. This suggests that appeals to ‘human rights’ have shown a capacity to undermine and betray the very humanitarian and strategic objectives strived for by Western policy makers in the first place.

Summary

Summary of the PhD thesis ‘Human rights as performance: a discourse analysis of the Western-led intervention in Libya’

The Western-led military intervention in Libya of 2011 was carried out in response to the violent uprisings taking place, and on the basis that the Libyan government was denying the Libyan people their basic human rights. Nevertheless, the continued violence, instability and widespread human rights abuses which has followed the toppling of ex-leader Gaddafi has raised questions about the legitimacy and the wisdom of Western actions.

This thesis has sought to investigate the military intervention, with primary focus on the discourses used to give meaning to the events in Libya and the actions carried out by Western governments. This involves an analysis of how the key identities were constituted, and also, crucially, an assessment of the consequences of using one particular discourse-identity-policy cluster as opposed to another. One of the key theoretical premises assumed is that it is ‘performativity’ which best explains how the state constitutes its own identity, and thus the concrete actions taken by it. Finally, in analysing these facets of the intervention, it will become possible to reach conclusions as to what extent Western actions correspond with what David Slater has called the ‘imperiality of power’ (Slater, 2013).

The findings show that the Western debate and intervention in Libya (2011) revolved around two basic discourses, which constructed the identities of those involved in radically different ways, and hence pointed to divergent foreign policy options. The ‘human rights’ discourse, which was deployed by the US and UK governments, constructed a dual-Libyan Other comprising an ‘illegitimate’ leader, Moammar Gaddafi, and a ‘Libyan people’ who were aspiring to realize their human rights of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. This representation of events led to the imposition of a no-fly zone, Western air-strikes, and ultimately the toppling of Gaddafi and the Libyan government. In opposition to this, a ‘civil war’ discourse would emerge from media and opposition voices to challenge the very precepts of the ‘human rights’ discourse. Depicting a much more complex, yet balanced situation, Gaddafi and government ‘loyalists’ were pitted against a multifarious, and somewhat ambiguous group of ‘rebels’. The foreign policy options inferred from this were that of caution, dialogue and negotiations. Discourse

analysis has shown that while opposition voices presented a significant challenge to the US and UK governments this was not enough to derail their policy that Gaddafi ‘must go’.

Theorizing the state as ‘performative’ makes it possible to explain the Western military intervention in Libya as the *materialization* of a range of re-iterative discursive practices which have constituted the state throughout time. Indeed, the deployment of the ‘human rights’ discourse in the case at hand, with its emphasis on ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’, can be traced and seen already in past performances of ‘human rights’, demonstrating a continuity with a long list of governments both in the US and the UK. At the same time, one can discern how the ‘human rights’ discourse has been consistently deployed in relation to, or indeed subordinate to, wider security concerns and geopolitical strategies. The advancement of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ becomes a moral act- both considered fundamental human rights- and a geopolitical act at one and the same time. A discourse analysis of the military intervention in Libya shows this latest performance to be no different. A purportedly moral action on the one hand since its stated aim is the defence of the ‘Libyan people’ and their ‘human rights’ from a barbaric and illegitimate regime. Yet at the same time, it is an action which harnesses strategic objectives such as the liberalisation and democratisation of Libya and the Middle Eastern region-bringing it further under Western influence-, in accordance with a wider security strategy of ‘integration’.

An analysis of how Libya has featured in the Western geopolitical imagination shows precisely how it had become susceptible to the ‘human rights’ discourse in the first place. While a certain rapprochement had taken place in the years prior to 2011, the ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘re-integration’ of Libya was never actually completed. Cooperation on issues related to international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would ultimately not be enough as several things cast doubt on Libya’s ontological capacity for change: stalled political liberalisation and democratisation, lack of progress on human rights, and a range of high profile diplomatic aberrations, amongst other things. In fact, as the uprisings in Libya brought these issues to the fore in 2011, it would now be the figure of Gaddafi himself who was seen as the obstacle to Libya’s ‘rehabilitation’- and by association, the wider security interests of the West-. The Libyan leader becomes once more the radical Other, a threat

to both the aspirations of the 'Libyan people,' and the identity of the privileged Western Self. It is for these reasons that he 'must go'.

Thus, the deployment of the 'human rights' discourse can be said to respond to both a moral imperative, and also the security interests of the West. Moreover, in as far as the US and UK governments have made appeals to 'universal' values, values which nevertheless turn out to be Western liberal democratic values, it is possible to draw correlations with what Slater has referred to as the 'imperiality of power'. However, it is the main conclusion of this thesis that once set in motion, the very *internal logics* of the 'human rights' discourse have the capacity to betray and undermine the moral and security objectives aimed for by ruling out *a priori* alternate ways of looking at the violence in Libya. This, in turn, forecloses the possibility of seeking more peaceful solutions to the crisis and a more stable political transition. Discourse theory illuminates the ways in which these internal logics buttress, shield and immunize the 'human rights' discourse, enabling it to absorb and repel elements of what would become a hegemonic 'civil war' discourse. Firstly, since the human rights being championed -principally freedom and democracy- are by their very 'nature' applicable to *all* the Libyan people, it follows that Western actions, which have the ultimate aim of toppling Gaddafi, must also be understood to be in the interests of *all* Libyans. Questions raised by the civil war discourse about the identity of the belligerents, or indeed how much support the 'rebels' actually enjoyed amongst the Libyan population, become almost inconsequential. Western officials can brush off these concerns as the objective remains the same; Gaddafi 'must go' as he is the obstacle to the 'Libyan people' realizing their 'universal' human rights.

Secondly, and in relation to the first point, the 'human rights' discourse is governed by a teleology which posits 'freedom' and 'democracy' as the 'destiny' of the Libyan people. This is indeed logical if such values are considered to be transcendental in the first place. It is of course paradoxical that this teleology should need to be supplemented by raw Western military power; to achieve their objective Western governments must deny Libyans by force the very 'human right' to choose the existing leader and government should they so wish. Yet it is determined that for the Libyan Other to correct its backward and deficient state -placing itself on a par with the privileged Western Self- Gaddafi must be eliminated. What is more, since Libya is being understood as part of a wider 'Arab Spring' phenomenon, its fate is tied in a

crucial way to the uprisings taking place in other parts of the Arab world. An *anti-*‘domino’ logic is triggered, whereby the survival of Gaddafi and the Libyan ‘regime’ in any shape or form will stifle the democratic murmurings elsewhere.

Thus, the ‘human rights’ discourse is characterised by abstraction, transcendence and teleology, which work together to demand the exit of Gaddafi, and also fend off any discursive challenges, such as that which came from the ‘civil war’ discourse. In so doing, other foreign policy options which may have brought about a more peaceful solution are foreclosed. The emphasis placed on the ‘human rights’ of a seemingly homogeneous ‘Libyan people’ cloaks and leads to an underestimation of the ethnic, regional, tribal, religious and ideological cleavages in Libya. Historicity is all but suspended whereby warnings over the glaring institutional gaps, the lack of a functional civil society, and the absence of a democratic tradition- at least in the Western liberal sense- are either ignored or are not heeded. More acute attention to these facets of Libyan political culture and society would have surely aroused greater caution amongst policy makers when faced with toppling Gaddafi and the Libyan government, and crushing the security forces in the process. The ensuing violence, chaos and instability which has plagued Libya since then would suggest that other solutions may have helped to avoid the exacerbation of an already critical situation. It is put forward here, therefore, that the ‘human rights’ discourse works out to be pernicious in that its internal logics can blind decision makers to crucial aspects of a conflict, undermining and betraying the very objectives that they are supposedly defending.

Extending the conclusions reached to a more general level, this thesis calls into question the appropriateness of a ‘human rights’ discourse for understanding and giving meaning to complex geopolitical phenomena. The foreign policy determinism which springs from its deployment means that it becomes extremely difficult -if not impossible- for policy makers to change course. Thus, this thesis represents a call for a return to the particularities of each individual case, paying due attention to the multiple facets in evidence. Instead of privileging the global level- on the basis of ‘transcendental’ or ‘universal’ values-, policy makers should be more attentive to the full range of geographical scales, including those such as the local or regional. This is moreover a call for a return to historicity, an understanding of how a particular geographical space has taken shape over time, the complexities of the political system and institutions in place, and the full range of identities in play. This may also involve

an appreciation of the disparities between a particular political, social, and economic culture on the one hand, and the idealized values of Western ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ on the other.

Resumen de la tesis doctoral ‘Los derechos humanos como *performance*: un análisis de discurso sobre la intervención occidental en Libia’

La intervención militar liderada por Occidente en Libia (2011), que acaba en el derrocamiento del ex-líder Gaddafi y su gobierno, se lleva a cabo como respuesta a las revueltas violentas producidas en el país, y en base a que el gobierno negaba al pueblo libio sus derechos humanos básicos. No obstante, la posterior violencia e inestabilidad, así como las amplias violaciones de los derechos humanos, plantean dudas sobre la legitimidad y la prudencia de las acciones occidentales.

Esta tesis ha aspirado a analizar la intervención militar, a partir de un enfoque en los discursos utilizados para dar sentido a los sucesos y las acciones llevadas a cabo por los gobiernos occidentales. Esto involucra un análisis de cómo se constituyeron las identidades claves, y también, de manera crucial, una evaluación de las consecuencias de usar una constelación en particular de discurso-identidad-política exterior-, y no otra. Los recursos teóricos usados para abordar este fenómeno complejo se enmarcan en la teoría de discurso posestructuralista, del mismo modo en que se han utilizado con gran efecto en el campo de la geopolítica crítica. Una de las premisas claves de esta tesis es que la *performativity* es lo que mejor explica la manera en que el estado constituye su propia identidad, y por lo tanto las acciones concretas realizadas por él. Finalmente, al analizar estas facetas de la intervención, será posible llegar a conclusiones sobre la medida en que las acciones de Occidente corresponden con lo que David Slater ha llamado la '*imperiality of power*'.

Los resultados muestran que el debate occidental sobre la intervención giró en torno a dos discursos básicos, los cuales construyeron las identidades de los involucrados de maneras radicalmente diferentes, planteando dos opciones políticas divergentes. El discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ desplegado por los gobiernos de Estados Unidos y Reino Unido construyó un Otro libio dual que consiste en un líder ‘ilegítimo’, Moammar Gaddafi, y un ‘pueblo libio,’ que aspira a realizar sus derechos

humanos de ‘libertad’ y ‘democracia’. Esta representación de los acontecimientos condujo a la imposición de una zona de exclusión aérea para los bombardeos, y el derrocamiento de Gaddafi y el gobierno libio. En oposición a ello, emerge un discurso de ‘guerra civil’ en los medios Occidentales que desafía los propios preceptos del discurso de ‘derechos humanos’, trazando una situación mucho más compleja, pero equilibrada, Gaddafi y los ‘lealistas’ del gobierno enfrentados a un grupo de ‘rebeldes’ multifario y ambiguo. Las opciones de política que se pueden inferir de ella son las de cautela, diálogo y negociación. La teoría de discurso ha mostrado que, si bien el discurso de ‘guerra civil’ alcanza el estatus hegemónico en los medios occidentales, en última instancia fracasa en cambiar la postura de los gobiernos de EEUU y GB, en cuanto a que ‘debe irse’ Gaddafi.

Si se teoriza que el estado es *‘performative,’* se hace posible explicar la intervención militar en Libia como la materialización de una rama de prácticas discursivas reiterativas, las cuales han ido constituyéndolo a lo largo del tiempo. De hecho, el despliegue del discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ en el presente caso, con su énfasis en ‘libertad’ y ‘democracia’, puede verse ya en pasadas *‘performances’* de ‘derechos humanos’, demostrando su continuidad en una larga lista de gobiernos tanto en EEUU como en GB. Al mismo tiempo, uno puede discernir cómo el discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ se ha desplegado una y otra vez en relación con, o más bien subordinado a, las preocupaciones de seguridad y las estrategias geopolíticas más amplias. La defensa de ‘libertad’ y ‘democracia’ se convierte en un acto moral- ambos conceptos son considerados ‘derechos humanos’- y un acto geopolítico a la vez. Un análisis de discurso de la intervención militar en Libia muestra que la última *performance* no es diferente; por un lado, una acción supuestamente moral, ya que el objetivo declarado es la defensa del pueblo libio y sus derechos humanos; pero por otro lado, una acción que pretende cumplir con los objetivos estratégicos de Occidente tales como la liberalización y la democratización de Libia y la región de Oriente Medio- sometiéndose a la esfera de influencia Occidental-.

Un análisis de cómo se situaba Libia en la imaginación geopolítica occidental muestra precisamente cómo había llegado a ser susceptible al discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ En función a este se produjo un cierto acercamiento entre Libia y EEUU/GB en los años anteriores a 2011, pero la ‘rehabilitación’ o ‘re-integración’ de Libia no fue completa. La cooperación en temas relacionados con el terrorismo internacional y las

armas de destrucción masiva (WMD en inglés) no sería suficiente, en última instancia, ya que una serie de cuestiones pone en entredicho la capacidad ontológica de Libia para el cambio: un proceso estancado de liberalización y democratización política, la falta de progreso sobre los derechos humanos, un cúmulo de aberraciones diplomáticas de notoriedad. De hecho, en la medida en que las revueltas de 2011 tuvieron el efecto de situar en primer plano estos temas, la figura del mismo Gaddafi pasó a ser visto como obstáculo al cambio y a la ‘rehabilitación’ de Libia -y por asociación, a los intereses de seguridad más amplios de Occidente-. Por lo tanto, el ex-líder de Libia se convierte una vez más en el ‘Otro’ radical, una amenaza tanto a las aspiraciones del ‘pueblo libio’ como a la identidad del ‘Self’ Occidental privilegiado. Es por estas razones que Gaddafi ‘debe irse’.

Así pues, el despliegue del discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ responde a un imperativo moral, y también a las necesidades de seguridad de Occidente. Además, en la medida en que los gobiernos de Estados Unidos y Reino Unido hacen un llamamiento a los valores ‘universales’, valores que resultan ser valores occidentales -democráticos y liberales-, es posible hacer correlaciones con lo que Slater ha denominado la *‘imperiality of power’*. Sin embargo, la conclusión principal de esta tesis es que una vez que se pone en marcha, las lógicas internas del discurso tienen la capacidad de traicionar y socavar estos objetivos por excluir *a priori* otras maneras de ver la violencia en Libia. Esto, a su vez, cierra la posibilidad de buscar soluciones más pacíficas a la violencia que se producía y una transición política más estable. La teoría de discurso ilumina las maneras en que estas lógicas funcionan para apuntalar, escudar e inmunizar el discurso, posibilitando absorber y repeler los elementos de lo que llegaría a ser un discurso hegemónico de ‘guerra civil’. En primer lugar, ya que los derechos humanos que se defienden -principalmente la ‘libertad’ y la ‘democracia’- son por su ‘naturaleza’ aplicables a todo el pueblo libio, se deduce que las acciones occidentales, las que tienen el objetivo último de derrocar a Gaddafi, deben entenderse en favor de los intereses de todos los libios. Las dudas planteadas por el discurso de ‘guerra civil’ sobre las identidades de los beligerantes -en qué consiste los ‘rebeldes’-, o incluso el nivel de apoyo de que disfrutaba los ‘rebeldes’ entre la población libia, llegan a ser casi irrelevantes. Los oficiales occidentales pueden desatender estas preocupaciones porque el objetivo es el mismo; Gaddafi ‘debe irse’ ya que es el obstáculo para que el ‘pueblo libio’ disfrute de sus derechos humanos ‘universales’.

En segundo lugar, y en relación con el primer punto, el discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ es gobernado por una teleología, la cual presupone que el ‘destino’ del pueblo libio consta de la ‘libertad’ y la ‘democracia’. Si es que tales valores son considerados transcendentales, resulta ser, en efecto, una premisa lógica. Desde luego es paradójico que esta teleología habrá de alcanzarse con el puro poder militar de occidente; para conseguir sus objetivos los gobiernos occidentales deben negar a los libios por la fuerza el mismo ‘derecho humano’ de poder elegir el líder y gobierno existente si es que lo deseen. Ahora bien, para que el ‘Otro’ libio corrija el estado atrasado y deficiente en que se encuentra- levantándose al nivel del ‘Self’ Occidental privilegiado- Gaddafi debe ser eliminado. Además,, el hecho de que el conflicto en Libia se entienda como parte de un fenómeno más amplio –la ‘Primavera Árabe’- vincula el ‘destino’ de Libia estrechamente a los demás levantamientos producidos en otros países árabes, en los que se desencadena una lógica anti- ‘domino’, a través de la cual la sobrevivencia de Gaddafi y el ‘régimen’ libio impiden el despertar democrático en otras partes.

Así pues, el discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ se caracteriza por la abstracción, la transcendencia y la teleología, unos elementos que funcionan para exigir la salida de Gaddafi, y también para evitar cualquier desafío discursivo, como el del discurso de ‘guerra civil’. Al hacerlo, se cierran otras opciones de política exterior que podrían haber ocasionado una solución más pacífica. El énfasis puesto en los ‘derechos humanos’ de un ‘pueblo libio’ aparentemente homogéneo, oculta y conduce a una subestimación de las divisiones étnicas, regionales, tribales, religiosas e ideológicas en Libia. La historicidad está casi suspendida, por lo que se ignoran, o no se tienen en cuenta adecuadamente, las advertencias sobre los huecos institucionales, la falta de una sociedad civil funcional, y la ausencia de una tradición democrática en Libia -por lo menos en el sentido liberal occidental-. Prestar más atención a estas facetas de la cultura política y la sociedad libia habría suscitado, seguramente, una mayor cautela entre los responsables políticos a la hora de derrumbar a Gaddafi y su gobierno. Que se machacan las fuerzas de seguridad en el proceso no hace nada más que aumentar la falta de autoridad y control sobre el territorio. La situación de violencia, caos e inestabilidad que vive Libia desde entonces sugiere que otra solución -basada en el diálogo, las negociaciones y la reconciliación nacional- podría haber ayudado a evitar la exacerbación de la ya de por sí crítica situación.

De esta manera, en esta tesis se concluye que el discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ resulta ser pernicioso, en la medida en que sus lógicas internas llevan la capacidad de socavar y traicionar los mismos objetivos morales y de seguridad que supuestamente se defiende.

En definitiva, esta tesis pone en tela de juicio lo adecuado que resulta el discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ para entender y dar sentido a los fenómenos geopolíticos complejos. El determinismo de la política exterior que emerge de su despliegue significa que se hace extremadamente difícil- si no imposible- que los responsables políticos puedan cambiar de rumbo. Así, esta tesis representa un llamamiento a volver a las particularidades de cada caso, prestando debida atención a las múltiples facetas en evidencia. En vez de privilegiar el nivel global- en base a los valores globales ‘transcendentales’ y ‘universales’-, los líderes políticos deben estar más atentos a la serie completa de escalas geográficas, incluyendo lo local y lo regional. De manera parecida, se formula un llamamiento a la historicidad, lo cual consta de la comprensión de: cómo se ha formado a lo largo del tiempo un espacio geográfico, las complejidades del sistema político y las instituciones vigentes, y también la gama completa de identidades en juego. Esto puede también implicar una estimación de las disparidades entre una cultura política, social y económica, por un lado, y los valores idealizados occidentales de ‘libertad’ y ‘democracia’ por otro.

'It's pure abstraction. Human rights, after all, what does that mean? It's pure abstraction, it's empty' Gilles Deleuze.

'To admit a belief merely because it is a custom – but that means to be dishonest, cowardly, lazy! – And so could dishonesty, cowardice and laziness be the preconditions for morality?' Friedrich Nietzsche.



Map 1: Libya

INTRODUCTION

The political violence which erupted in Libya (2011) was widely contextualized within the temporal and geographical parameters of a phenomenon conceived as the ‘Arab spring’. Heralded as ‘momentous’ and ‘historic’ by Western media and politicians, this encapsulated a seemingly universal movement in the Middle East that had as its principal objectives the achievement of greater liberty, democracy and an end to corruption. Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was the first to succumb to the popular demands for change, being quickly followed by his Egyptian counterpart Hosni Mubarak. Yet the optimism with which this phenomenon was greeted by the West would not take long in subsiding. Egypt, the largest country in the Middle East and at the very heart of Western media coverage, was hauled back into military dictatorship two years later as part of a *Coup d’État*. Syria would become embroiled in a brutal and bloody civil war, the scale of which horrifying even the most apathetic observers. While other uprisings in Bahrain, Yemen and so forth, were violently put down by state security forces. Only in Tunisia, if truth be told, has any meaningful and propitious advances been made.

The case of Libya itself enters into the geopolitical sphere of interest primarily due to the fact that the United States, the United Kingdom and France became directly engaged militarily in the country. Moreover, the chaos and chronic instability which has ensued since the Western military intervention¹ has meant that it has remained of great interest for Libyans, politicians, academics, political commentators, the media, and many others around the World. Persistent conflict amongst rival armed militias; the presence of radical Islamic groups such as ISIS; widespread human rights’ abuses; under-production in the all-important petrochemical industry; and the concomitant diminution in economic life, have all conspired to produce a climate of hardship for significant parts of the Libyan population². All of these factors have together called into question the West’s decisive role in bringing about the fall of previous leader Muammar

1 ‘Intervention’ can be placed in quotation marks to challenge the euphemistic nature of the term- also noted by Megoran (2008)-. A military intervention implies the use of sophisticated high powered weaponry, the breaching of sovereign borders, loss of life and human injury. It can thus be seen in the same light as other terms such as ‘precision’, in ‘precision bombing,’ or ‘collateral damage,’ which together contribute to make modern warfare more palatable to Western audiences.

Gaddafi³ and his government. This has provoked questions about why, how, and on what basis the Western powers came to intervene in Libya.

At a more general level, Western actions in Libya represent the latest in a catalogue of military interventions which have violated a recognized nation-state's sovereignty, and been carried out through appeals to 'humanitarian' or 'universal' values. Interventions such as those in Somalia and Kosovo, and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, have all made their mark in one way or another on the Western psyche. As have cases like Bosnia and Rwanda, where the political will for taking decisive action was either in short supply or lacking altogether. Widely considered to be human tragedies, these cases have left a considerable stain on the collective Western conscience. This means that the Libyan case is also of primary concern for those interested in how liberal governments exercise power as part of a wider humanitarian geopolitics. Furthermore, the very inconsistency of response shown by the West, as briefly touched on here, has been enough to arouse suspicion and scepticism in the very humanitarian motives stated by Western governments.

Viewing Libya alongside these past cases has often led to simplistic conclusions, which merely confirm the humanitarian motivations of Western powers or conversely cry foul play, alluding to subterfuge and 'real' motivations such as the pursuit of Libyan oil. An uncritical conception of the Western state, one which views it as a fixed, coherent and unambiguous entity, will be rejected in this thesis. As will the type of cause-effect reasoning and conclusions that can result from a theoretical positivist stance. The suitability of positivism for the study of the social and political world is surely more in doubt than ever before. The aim of this thesis is thus not to determine whether or not the Western intervention in Libya can be considered 'humanitarian' or an example of its offshoot the 'Right to Protect' norm. In fact, it will display a resistance to these types of logics which often amount to a futile quest for an original cause or motivation. As will be shown in the literature review section, much of the work carried out on the intervention in Libya ultimately resorts to this type of reasoning. The objectives here will be to answer a quite different set of questions.

2 Widely held assessments including by a foreign affairs committee set up in the UK (2016) to report on the policy pursued by David Cameron and his conservative government.

3 It has been repeatedly denied that 'regime change' was the aim of the military intervention by Western governments. The actions by the US, UK, and France do not give much credence to these denials, and as will be argued later, there are concrete reasons for rejecting this interpretation.

OBJECTIVES AND ELABORATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

What is missing from much of the work written on the intervention in Libya is any account of how the question of ‘human rights’ has come to be meaningful to Western states in the first place, and why it took on particular resonance in the case of Libya in 2011. Moreover, the consequences of the deployment of a ‘human rights’ discourse have not been fully explored. From these three principle concerns a set of primary and a secondary research question emerges. In terms of the primary research questions, this thesis will seek to investigate:

- 1) What were the main discourses used by Western governments and oppositional voices to give meaning to the events taking place in Libya in 2011? From this primary focus one can then ask:
- 2) How did these discourses constitute the identities of those involved?
- 3) What logics and mechanisms were triggered and which foreign policy options were suggested and pursued as a result of the deployment of these discourses?
- 4) How did official US and UK discourse maintain stability faced with political and media opposition?

In answering these primary questions, it will be possible to approach a secondary question and assess to what extent the intervention in Libya can be situated within what David Slater (2013) has called the ‘Imperiality of power’. That is to ask:

- 1) How can the Western discourses used be related with historical discourses emphasizing the universality of Western values? And in so doing:
 - (i) Did this lead to an underestimation of the levels of resistance they would receive in Libya?

- (ii) Did western governments overestimate the capacity of those whom they had intervened to support?
- (iii) What were the consequences of using the discourses and understanding the Libyan conflict in these particular ways?

In answering these sets of crucial questions it will be possible to reach a full understanding of why, and more importantly *how* the US and UK governments came to intervene militarily in Libya. It will also become possible to shine light on the way in which both governments were able to mitigate the quite significant opposition to their policies that existed in both countries. In so doing, one can start to appreciate how alternative solutions to the crisis in Libya were marginalised. Finally, a response to the aforementioned questions holds the promise of explaining if and how, as the UK Foreign Affairs committee report (2016) has concluded, the intervention could lead to: ‘political and economic collapse, inter-militia and inter-tribal warfare, humanitarian and migrant crises, widespread human rights violations, the spread of Gaddafi regime weapons across the region and the growth of ISIL (Islamic State in North Africa)’.

In order to answer these questions, this thesis will turn to the continued promise of post-structuralism, which has been used to such great effect in ‘critical geopolitics’ scholarship. In particular, it has been deemed necessary to carry out a rigorous ‘history of the present,’ in a Foucauldian spirit, paying meticulous attention to context and detail, whilst analysing the vast web of discourse. This amounts to a thorough mapping and exploration of the discursive terrain, before and during the military intervention, drawing out how crucial objects such as ‘Libya,’ ‘Gaddafi,’ and the ‘Libyan people’ have been shaped and reshaped. At the same time, it will be necessary to make a genealogical inquiry into how ‘human rights’ has come to occupy a privileged place within Western foreign and security policy. Only in this way does it become possible to disavow hegemonic power structures, those which invariably reveal and expose themselves in the very contingency of the objects which they aspire to fix. Included will be an interrogation of any taken for granted, ‘self-evident’ assumptions, which, if left unquestioned, do little but assist and perpetuate certain interests to the detriment of others. Rather than the simple affirmation or refutation of pre-conceived ideas surrounding geopolitical ‘realities,’ the aim will be to pronounce what has yet to be

pronounced, to create by putting ‘out of joint’⁴ paradigmatic ways of understanding geopolitics and the Western military intervention in Libya.

The forthcoming discourse analysis will be carried out under the premise that the issue of identity is crucial to the formulation of foreign policy, and thus the actions which result from it. Yet rather than theorizing state identity as something self-evident, fixed, and pre-discursive- a presumption that realist and liberal accounts of international politics have been all too ready to make- it will be understood as something that is permanently in flux and ontologically relational. This does not mean that identities can be constructed at will, nor that states can assume subject positions irrespective of context or previously articulated expressions of identity. On the contrary, the identity of the sovereign state is understood to be ‘performatively’ constituted throughout time by a plethora of re-iterative state and non-state practices. This theoretical premise can certainly be inferred from the chain of past Western military interventions that have alluded to ‘universal’ values or ‘human rights’ as justification for their actions. Understanding identity and discourse in such a way means that the Western military intervention in Libya can be theorized as a concrete *performance* and the materialization of these historical discursive practices. And since the Western sovereign state can never fully realize the identities which it presumes to possess, it is within this opening that the thesis will situate itself, and where it will aim to make its own political contribution in contestation of Western power.

This thesis offers up the prospect of adding to existing literature in two main areas. Firstly, it will be of interest to those who are concerned with Libya, how this geographical space has been understood historically by the U.S. and U.K. governments, and those interested in the Western military intervention in Libya. For much of the period spanning the overthrow of King Idris in 1969 till the 2011 intervention, Libya, and in particular its ex-leader Muammar Gaddafi, have been represented as something of a nemesis to the West; that is, an enigmatic and threatening Other, one which is to be vilified, punished, and ostracised from the ‘international community’⁵. Yet this has not

4 By putting ‘out of joint’ the logocentric ‘is’, Jacques Derrida aims precisely to challenge taken for granted assumptions about the ‘nature’ of things. As will be touched on later, this has included, amongst many other things, the very notions of ‘writing’ and ‘text’ themselves.

5 The idea that there is an ‘International community’ is a political construct and, moreover, will always refer to a select, specific number of states. It has been used in justification of actions by Western states and those which follow them.

always been the case as evidenced by the period of ‘rapprochement’ between Libya and the West before 2011. A greater understanding of how the identity of Libya has been constructed discursively -in accordance with the particular geopolitical contexts of the time- and how this had a bearing on Western constructions of Libya and Gaddafi in 2011, is surely welcome.

Secondly, this intervention will contribute to previous critical geopolitics and international relations scholarship, which has sought to shine light on a new wave of Western military actions following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. Military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq had as their primary objective the elimination of those who had been recalcitrant to Western power, and remained ‘outside’ the hegemonic neo-liberal order. The removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, however, were also accompanied by a normative narrative which posited the emancipation of the Afghan and Iraqi populations from repressive rulers. In relation to this, critical authors have spoken of a ‘Colonial Present’ (Gregory, 2004); the ‘Duty of the Benevolent Master’ (Cairo, 2006); a ‘Neoimperialism’ (Flusty et al, 2008); or perhaps most importantly, as expressions of an ‘imperial mentality’ or ‘imperiality of power’ (Slater, 2010; 2013). These interventions have in one way or another tried to highlight the main discourses, and unearth the logics, rationalities and mechanisms through which the Western liberal state has exercised power. This thesis on the Western military intervention in Libya represents another opportunity to add to this crucial endeavour.

LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

One of the possible downsides of selecting a recent geopolitical event for study could be the scarcity of investigation and analyses carried out on the subject matter. This, nevertheless, should not be viewed as something necessarily dissuasive. After all, research must inevitably start from some point or another, and will invariably have to make use of the resources one has to hand. In a thesis such as this one, the onus will be on the use of primary resources, whether they be taken from governmental, opposition or media sources. From these documents it is possible to extract meaningful conclusions, ones which can then serve other researchers well in the future. That said, it is important to establish a grounding in what has already been written on the case in question. And in spite of the relative temporal proximity between the time of writing and the NATO-led military intervention in Libya itself, a considerable amount of scholarly work has already been undertaken. It is this work which will provide a starting point for the main body of research to follow in future sections.

The objectives of this part of the thesis are essentially threefold. The first thing is to gain an understanding of what is already known about the case being analysed. As Silverman (2000) has warned, however, this should not only be descriptive, but exude an analytical and critical edge. While it is certainly possible to find previous work praiseworthy, these studies will also invariably contain limitations and weaknesses. A critical assessment of academic work in the field can enable the researcher to express with which texts he/she is more/less in agreement, and in addition, highlight which texts have greater relevance to the particular questions that the researcher is tackling. It is also useful to review existing literature to place the current study in context, and also to establish a gap in which a contribution to existing knowledge can be positioned. In the event that some authors have already approached the case from a similar theoretical perspective, or aimed to answer similar questions, an appreciation of this will be vital so as to later show how the thesis being written has gone beyond them or reached divergent conclusions.

This section has been broken down into three parts:

1. First there will be a review of what has been written on the legality of the military intervention, through recourse to some authors specialized in international law. This will be done under the assumption that an understanding of the legal issues surrounding military intervention can shed light on why and how the US and UK governments used the language they did in their attempts to justify and legitimize their actions.
2. Secondly, it will also be useful to make an approximation to certain scholars concerned with the ethics of the military intervention. These authors often focus on the whether or not the causes for intervention are just – ‘just cause’- or alternatively, if the consequences betray the intentions and actions themselves. Work which treats the latter, for instance, will be relevant to the research question oriented towards tracing the consequences resulting from adopting one particular discourse and not another.
3. Most importantly, though, it will be essential to acquire knowledge of the political contributions which have been made, especially any texts which emerge from within the fields of International Relations and Geopolitics. It is within this discipline and sub-discipline which the thesis will ultimately situate itself. This will make it possible to both build on existing studies, and also compare and contrast the findings arrived at here with the work already done on the event being investigated.

It should be acknowledged that while some texts do indeed take on an overtly legal, ethical or political orientation, many in fact do not. This is, of course, perfectly normal, as authors straddle these generic categories, incorporating elements from each in building their own arguments. That said, it is deemed that this way of structuring the

review will be conducive to drawing out the principle themes and discussions being developed in their respective fields. Since this thesis aims to, first and foremost, make a political intervention, it will be within this area that the greatest amount of attention will be focused.

CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE NATO MISSION

One of the first set of questions to arise from the military intervention in Libya surrounded the legality of the actions vis-à-vis international law. In spite of this, some authors were quick to downplay its significance. Simon Chesterman (2011) rightly points out that this was not the first time that a Security Council resolution had been passed authorizing outside intervention in a sovereign state. This is supported through reference to previous cases, such as Somalia, when this was indeed decided. Jennifer Welsh (2011) has also noted the reticence of Western states to bypass the Security Council on recalling NATO General Director Anders Fogh Rasmussen's requirements of: 'demonstrable need, *clear legal basis*, and strong regional support' (Rasmussen cited in Welsh, 2011:3; Welsh's emphasis).

Most of the work written on the legality of the Western-led intervention in Libya centred on the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) norm (Henderson, 2011; Cronoque, 2012; Jubilut, 2012; Berman and Michaelsen, 2012; Zifcak, 2012; Bernstein, 2012; O'Shea, 2012; Garwood-Gowers, 2013). The doctrine, which was accepted formally by all United Nations member states in 2005 at the UN World Summit, is a clear offshoot of previous notions of 'humanitarian intervention'. R2P tries to incorporate and enshrine in international jurisprudence the 'responsibility' which a government has towards the population over which it presides. In the event that a government is unable or unwilling to 'protect' its population against barbarisms such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, the international community is expected to act in a 'timely and decisive manner' to address the situation (UN General Assembly, 2005). Articulated in this way, obvious challenges are posed to previously accepted notions of nation-state sovereignty, which had offered protection to weaker political systems from larger and at times hegemonic powers.

In relation to the Libyan case, Catherine Powell (2012) saw this as further evidence of a 'normative shift' in international law. It is the latest example of a transformation in the 'traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty', which veers from 'sovereignty as right', towards a conception of sovereignty 'as responsibility'. All the same, Powell does recognize that two of the three 'prongs' which make up R2P, are 'not binding law' and would be best considered 'emerging, influential norms'. This does not prevent her from predicting a further 'process of legalization' in the matter. According to Powell, the Libyan case is important as it 'bolsters earlier Security Council efforts to address civilian protection, even while it leaves open significant questions regarding when and how the international community, acting collectively, can or should intervene, militarily or otherwise, to protect civilians' (Powell, 2012:298-302).

While authors such as Powell are essentially correct in that Western powers did receive authorization for intervention from the Security Council -significantly no veto was lodged from any of the 5 permanent members, unlike in the case of Kosovo- there are of course other important facets to be considered. As others have commented, it is not the same thing to operate in defence of the civilian population, as it is to actively seek the end of the leader and government already in place. It is along these lines that Ulfstein and Christiansen (2013) have argued that the NATO mission in Libya overstepped the boundaries of legality. Dividing the military operations into three separate phases, the authors argue that one must clearly distinguish between actions which protected civilians, and those which aimed to overthrow Gaddafi on the other. While it is acknowledged that the mandate awarded by the UN Security Council (Resolution 1973) was one which authorized 'all necessary measures', it is also recalled that this was for specific purposes, namely 'to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack'. This meant, therefore, that the so-called third phase of the mission, employed to break the 'stalemate' in the conflict, actually went beyond the original mandate in having a direct bearing on the removal of Gaddafi and the success of the rebels. The conclusions reached by the authors raise doubts as to the future viability of the 'R2P' doctrine, given the apparent impartial overreach of the NATO mission.

THE ETHICS OF THE NATO OPERATION IN LIBYA

The Western-led military intervention in Libya has also been tackled from an ethical perspective. While some authors like Michael Walzer (2011) did not believe that the ethical threshold for 'just cause' had been met, since for him it did not constitute one of the 'most extreme cases', many other authors disagreed. Thomas G. Weiss, avid supporter of 'humanitarian intervention' and the 'Right to Protect' norm, concluded before the Western intervention had officially ended that 'RtoP is alive and well after Libya' (Weiss, 2011). This is because for Weiss, the actions taken were justified by the humanitarian causes for that action. In speaking of the events in Libya he refers to the 'murderous harm that Muammar el-Qaddafi inflicted on unarmed civilians...and that he has continued to use against the "cockroaches" who oppose him' (Weiss, 2011:1). The result of following the right course of action in Libya, therefore, is that it becomes possible 'to say no more holocausts, Cambodias and Rwandas- and occasionally mean it' (Weiss, 2011:5).

Another early endorsement of Western policy in Libya came from Robert Pape in his article 'When Duty Calls' (2012). According to Pape, it was the 'mass homicide campaign' being committed by Gaddafi and the Libyan government that provided the ultimate justification for Western intervention. At the same time, however, Pape would like to put Libya forward as a good example of how a 'pragmatic humanitarian intervention' should be conducted, with focus also on 'low-cost' military plans and 'enduring security'. What is more uncertain is how the author can reconcile his concept of 'pragmatic humanitarian intervention,' with economic considerations placed on the would-be interveners, with an ethical obligation which simultaneously establishes a 'duty' on the would-be intervener. All the same, for Pape, the 'successful' intervention in Libya means that the 'pragmatic' standard of humanitarian intervention can 'help guide decision makers on when to intervene to stop governments from targeting their own citizens'.

For James Pattison (2011), the issue is not simply a case of whether or not the intervention was justified, of which he suggests unconvincingly, 'there may have been just cause'. Rather, he is keen to make the distinction between the protection of

civilians- the stated aim of the mission- and the removal of Gaddafi or 'regime change'. In relation to the latter, Pattison shows himself to be unconvinced that the outcomes would outweigh the consequences of such action. As he notes, 'although the Qaddafi regime is brutal and oppressive, forcible regime change can all too often do more harm than good, as the war in Iraq has shown' (Pattison, 2011:272-273). Yet since Pattison judges the intention of regime change to be 'secondary' to that of protecting civilians, he is able to displace this problem onto the notion of 'mission creep'. The main issue is not, therefore, that the real motive was to topple the Libyan leader and government- something problematic in Pattison's eyes- it is that this may become a motive as a consequence of an initial response. The question at stake, essentially, is how a war can be gauged to be just, when sometimes the objectives change throughout its lifespan.

Putting to one side, for the time being, the fact that Western officials had in fact demanded that Gaddafi leave power from the very beginning, the displacement of the issue of regime change allows Pattison to find greater justification on other ethical aspects of the intervention. With regards the outcomes of the military intervention, Pattison is surely unduly optimistic, citing the 'intervention's successful promotion of basic human rights'. Moreover, it is also important to assure of a 'suitable strategy', the 'commitment to stay the course', 'local and global support for the intervention' and the 'intervener's fidelity to the principles of *jus in bello*'. In Pattison's judgement, reflection on these aspects draws the conclusion that the Libyan intervention 'appears sound according to these requirements,' which enables him to reach the perhaps hasty conclusion that it 'can be expected to be successful in the long term.' (Pattison, 2011:275). Finally, in relation to the theme of 'selectivity', or the lack of a consistent response to situations in other countries, Pattison concludes ultimately that 'saving some lives is better than none' (Pattison, 2011: 277).

One of the main issues that one can take with these early articles is that they privilege the causes – 'just'- of the intervention to the detriment of the consequences- or potential consequences which could occur-. In part, this is no doubt due to the timing of the articles, having being written in 2011 not long after the ousting of Gaddafi and the Libyan government. Of course it would have been impossible to predict with any great certainty the political future of Libya at that time. Having said that, Pape does express an awareness of this uncertainty and hints at potential problems on the horizon. He indeed acknowledges that, 'in the power vacuum left by the regime's collapse, militias

have refused to disarm.’ In spite of this, however, he says optimistically ‘the available evidence suggests that the country is not descending into the kind of chaos and violence that would fundamentally undermine the goals of the intervention’ (Pape, 2011:69).

This effectively means though that Pape’s evaluation of the intervention as being a ‘success,’ and a good example of ‘pragmatic humanitarian intervention,’ is dependent on the situation not deteriorating. If it should descent into chronic instability and violence- as is now generally accepted to be the case- Pape’s whole argument would appear to fall into serious difficulty.

Secondly, while the issues surrounding the inconsistency of response by Western countries is rightly brought up, the answers to this question are not conclusive. Pattison rightfully refers to Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and the Ivory Coast, and the lack of intervention or even political will for such action. And while his conclusion may satisfy certain branches of moral philosophy, this would leave too many questions unanswered in a geopolitical investigation. That said, claims that the Western intervention in Libya had ethical intentions are not something which can be dismissed out of hand, as some authors may be tempted to do- these will be explored later-. There was certainly serious violence taking place in Libya around February of 2011, enough for an international consensus to piece together an unprecedented resolution to implement a no-fly zone over Libya. It is just that to brandish Western actions as exclusively, or even first and foremost ethical, with the protection of civilians as the ‘dominant motivation’, can only ever offer a partial response to what is undoubtedly a complex geopolitical event.

The crux of the matter is, the answer to these questions cannot merely be arrived at through a consideration of whether or not a particular intervention can be considered ethical. Several crucial questions remain unanswered, even being alluded to in other parts of Weiss’s short contribution. The author is correct in pointing out the inconsistency of response to international crises by Western states, but at the same time he lays bare perhaps the most pertinent question of all: how can one account for these different responses? It is not enough to say that the action taken in Libya was ethical, but that that very same ethical compass has been missing in other instances. This assertion indeed suggests that there are other factors at work, factors which could explain the reasoning behind the action taken, and possibly also why events unfolded in the way that they did. In short, what is required in each and every case is a historical and political analysis of the case in hand.

THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

The internationalization of the Libyan conflict and the plethora of responses which resulted from it, have logically led to political analysts approaching the military intervention in Libya from various angles. Authors have inquired into the German government's passivity and unexpected abstention vis-à-vis UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (Hansel and Opperman, 2016); others have been interested in the Italian government's response (Croci and Valigi, 2012), having been hitherto considered to be Libya's closest partner in Europe; while Beresford (2015) has tried to understand the seemingly incoherent position of the South African government, passing from perceived tacit support- the South African government may well have executed a decisive abstention at the Security Council vote on Resolution 1973- to outspoken critic of the West as events later unfolded.

Other writers have been more interested in approaching the military intervention from the supranational level. Focussing on the specific role of the NATO Alliance, Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis (2012) were quick to hail 'NATO's Victory in Libya' as the 'right way to run an intervention'. Several reasons are given for this, the crux of which revolve around the 'rapid response' to the crisis, which was in turn facilitated by greater political coordination and unity among member states. Suggestions of some improvements in 'basic infrastructure' notwithstanding, and acknowledgements regarding the relatively small size of the operation in Libya, the authors are undeterred in their optimism about the future of the NATO alliance. Indeed, there is ample evidence for the authors to suggest that 'NATO is uniquely positioned to respond quickly and effectively to international crises' (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012: 3-4).

Luke Glanville (2013) pointed towards the importance of regional organizations in securing the two Security Council Resolutions on Libya and asks whether or not this will be an important part of future interventions. As he correctly acknowledges, 'it is noteworthy that no state chose to vote against the resolution authorizing military intervention in the affairs of a non-consenting sovereign state'. And he continues, 'It would seem that the request for military measures by the LAS (League of Arab States) was crucial in this regard' (Glanville, 2013:335). In this way, it is indeed possible to argue, as Glanville tries to, that 'the existence of regional consent trumped the absence

of sovereign consent' (Glanville, 2013:336). The Western countries leading the intervention were certainly keen to place emphasis on regional support in seeking legitimation for breaching the sovereign borders of Libya. The problem is that the recourse to regional organizations such as the Arab League and the African Union was clearly limited. Glanville actually recognizes this in his article, and raises the potential problems associated with a) Western countries going beyond the mandate afforded them and b) the potential that a would-be intervener merely highlights the regional organization that gives them most support, while marginalizing any other. This would appear to have been the case with the African Union once military intervention had commenced in Libya.

In approaching the Libyan crisis from this particular perspective, Alex de Waal's (2013) contribution has been to highlight how an AU proposal made for a negotiated settlement was marginalized by Western powers. His understanding of the African Union is that of a supranational body devoid of the necessary resources, and replete with divisions and contrasting interests. Nonetheless, it is also one which shared the common interest of ensuring Libya did not descend into chaos, sparking the type of instability which could- and would- spread to other countries sharing a border with it. One example of this would be Mali, where the violence in Tuareg controlled territory was attributed directly to instability in Libya. Therefore, the alternative proposal being made had as its primary objective the return to dialogue, negotiations, and perhaps peace and stability. This was to be achieved through a cease-fire, followed by democratization, which in turn would be achieved through dialogue and political negotiation. And while de Waal is correct in recognizing that the plan did not guarantee a peaceful resolution by any means, it is the fact that the option wasn't seriously pursued which is most of significance.

De Waal's intervention is noteworthy for two particular reasons. Firstly, it works to debunk one of the assumptions underlying many of the texts supporting Western intervention in Libya, even if that be implicitly. The dubious assumption is that Western governments were faced with a zero-sum decision with regards the crisis in Libya. That is to say, to intervene -with the inevitable consequence that Gaddafi must leave or be forced from power- or conversely, to do nothing at all. Even at an intuitive level this would amount to a clear underestimation of the full range of policy options available to Western officials. Secondly, it reinforces the idea that while regional organizations were

indeed appealed to and referenced in attempts to legitimize the military intervention, the driving force behind efforts to force Gaddafi from power was indeed from the Western governments themselves. The African Union peace plan failed not simply due to the limitations of AU organization, resources and diplomacy. It was also that the US, UK and France were simply not interested in negotiations whereby ex-leader Gaddafi could potentially remain in Libya in some capacity. The proposals made by the African Union were duly rejected by both the Western powers and the National Transition Council. If Gaddafi were not to leave immediately, as Western officials had been demanding since the start of the violence, the only viable option would be his removal by force.

In their extremely interesting article 'Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya', Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) have gathered first-hand evidence which highlights the role of the UK and France in securing both Resolutions against the Libyan government at the United Nations Security Council. Having conducted a series of qualitative interviews with officials and diplomats, the authors have tried to lay bare the power of both countries' diplomacy and political nous in acquiring the relevant support for their own positions. The authors have shown how both the UK and France were the driving force behind acquiring the Resolutions, using their influence to bring the US on board, and also garner support from a host of other countries.

In dealing with the intervention itself, certain works should be commented on. While the title of Christopher Chivvis' (2013) book 'Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Interventionism' is itself suggestive of a critical perspective, this does not materialize in any significant way. That said, the author clearly does not want to reiterate Western denials which attempt to elide responsibility for the removal of ex-Libyan leader Gaddafi and his government. In laying bare the significant role played in Gaddafi's demise, the author points to evidence that Western special forces were indeed operating on the ground alongside rebel forces in the later stages of the conflict. However, all in all, that these actions resembled more like a policy of 'regime change' than the mere protection of civilians is not dwelt on too much by the author. Having passed through the problems which can result from such a foreign policy the conclusion reached is that in spite of everything it has been worthwhile. This assessment is partially based on the understanding that the West could not sit back and do nothing in the face of the abuses being committed by Gaddafi and his regime- the ethical argument

earlier deployed by Weiss and others-. There is also motive of supporting the 'Arab Spring' and the democratic murmurings taking place in the region.

There are other, more critical interventions to be found. Perhaps one of the most scathing appraisals of Western policy in Libya is to be found in Cynthia McKinney's edited volume 'The Illegal War on Libya' (2012). As can be inferred from the title of the book, the author-s- are in no doubt about the illegality of the actions taken by the West, and moreover official claims that the 'intervention' could in fact be preceded with the qualifying adjective 'humanitarian'. Stephen Lendman's article is particularly scathing. If his hyperbolic assertion, 'the US-led NATO war on Libya' amounts to 'one of history's greatest crimes,' is not going to far, then perhaps the analogies he draws with the 'Third Reich criminals' could be construed as offensive for some. In spite of these serious shortcomings, however, the book does offer some interesting first-hand testimony from the conflict. Equally caustic in his condemnation of Western actions in Libya is political anthropologist Maximilian Forte. In his book, 'Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO's War on Libya and Africa' (2012), Forte rejects official accounts of the intervention positing human rights as the principle motivation. He does so by firstly setting out to debunk the claims made by Western officials which spoke of state-sponsored crimes of 'systematic rape' and the use of sub-Saharan 'mercenaries'. These, having been in fact echoed by human rights organizations Amnesty and HRW, who have also questioned Western governments' claims.

There are some key issues that one can take with Forte's intervention, and those like it that seek to uncover the real causes or motivations for Western intervention. Firstly, the search often becomes one to uncover the original cause, thus meaning that they ultimately fail to provide a full answer mapping of the event and the issues in play. Forte's argument places most weight for this on a fear of Gaddafi's Pan Africanism and thus US grand strategy in Africa as epitomized by AFRICOM. Yet one detects that it would be possible to make just as good a case for other explanations such as the Western pursuit of Libyan oil. Yet more than anything, such contributions appear to dismiss too early, and too comprehensively, official justifications for intervention. This, it would seem, can be associated with a deep mistrust in Western governments and official accounts of especially actions carried out in foreign lands. Suggesting that Western governments are not concerned with human rights is difficult to do, nevertheless, since a quick browse through security documents is enough to confirm

their presence in official US and UK discourse. The task, therefore, is to explain in what way 'human rights' have featured and how the 'human rights' discourse has been deployed.

Official Western government discourse, moreover, must in some way be coherent with previous articulations and the representations being made must in some way resonate with the objective World. Note that this is not to suggest that the ways in which US and UK officials represented the events in Libya can ever be fully accurate and trustworthy. But to rubbish claims that human rights issues were at stake in Libya out of hand, it almost to say that no Libyans lost their lives at the hands of the Libyan security authorities, or that excessive force was not used to put down original anti-government demonstrations. One would have to explain how two UN Security Council resolutions could have been passed alongside the level of condemnation directed at the Libyan government from such a wide array of individual states and regional organizations.

Other authors have tried to shed light on the internal dynamics of what began as protests in Eastern Libya and then spread throughout the country. In particular, focus has been placed on the identity of the groups involved. Some key texts have, in their analysis, called into question Western claims of a homogeneous 'Libyan people' struggling against a brutal dictator in ex-leader 'Gaddafi'. For instance, in his thorough analysis of the situation in Libya during and after the Western intervention, Bassiouni (2013) has drawn attention to the plethora of armed groups involved in the violence; these could be distinguished from each other in accordance with ethnicity, tribal affiliation, or ideological outlook. Those groups fighting against Gaddafi and the ex-Libyan government, nevertheless, had this as their common objective. Exiled Professor of Tripoli University Mabruk Derbesh in an interview for the program 'The World Today with Tariq Ali (2014) has claimed that the intervention of NATO itself was a key factor in garnering and galvanising support for Gaddafi. Of particular significance would be his claim that the Warfalla, one of the largest tribes in the country, threw their support behind the ex-leader, in response to concerns over the intentions of Western powers.

SUMMARY OF SECTIONS

Part 1 sets out a methodological and theoretical framework through which the subsequent analysis of the Western debate on the Libyan military intervention will be carried out. The subject positions chosen will be predominately the United States and the United Kingdom, with official government documents and four mainstream media sources chosen as the empirical data to be analysed. It will also be important to gain an understanding of how events in Libya were being understood at the supranational level, for instance at the United Nations Security Council. This section will outline as much a scepticism toward realist theories and positivist methodologies, as an endorsement of poststructuralism and the importance of language for understanding the social and political World. To account for historical changes in the relationship between the West and Libya, and also to ensure a robust analysis of the debate of 2011, it will be crucial to formulate at this stage a conception of discourse. In line with other research which has gained prominence in ‘critical international relations’ and ‘critical geopolitics’ scholarship, this present investigation will also place great importance on identity construction and its relationship with foreign policy formulation.

The next task is to understand how ‘Libya’ has featured in the Western geopolitical imagination. Part 2 will therefore undergo an historical analysis of US-Libyan and UK-Libyan relations during the period spanning the ‘Green Revolution’ of 1969 until the onset of Western military action in 2011. This will involve a consideration of key events such as the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1985 and the Lockerbie terrorist attack of 1988. Yet perhaps more importantly, this will entail an examination of how such events were understood and given meaning by the U.S. and UK governments. Crucial here is to analyse how key discourses – ‘terrorism’, ‘rogue state’ and ‘rehabilitation’ - have imbued the geographical space of Libya with meaning along with the identities of ex-leader Gaddafi and the ‘Libyan people’. It is worth pointing out that although this section adopts an historical perspective, this is not one which is oriented towards uncovering some kind of underlying progression, evolution or coherence. Rather, contingency will be the guiding principle, with the objective to

illuminate how context and discourse combine together to shape particular objects in one way or another.

The final and principal section will comprise a discourse analysis of the Western debate on the violent events in Libya of 2011. Two basic discourses have been identified- the 'human rights' discourse and the 'civil war' discourse- and will be used as analytical structuring devices for the purpose of tracing the complexity of UK and US foreign policy discourse. Both basic discourses give meaning to the conflict in very different ways, constructing divergent identities, and therefore pointing to two significantly different foreign policy outcomes. An appreciation of the extent to which UK and US officials borrowed from these basic discourses, and moreover the progression of official discourse in accordance with the events taking place on the ground, will be taken from this analysis. It will also be important to assess the stability of official discourse, how this was challenged by political and media opposition, and whether or not it was able to establish hegemonic status in the overall debate.

Since 'human rights' occupies a central position within US and UK official discourse before, during and after the military intervention, it will be useful to first trace its conceptual history within foreign and security policy. The emphasis will be on developing a performative theory of 'human rights'. While the greatest attention will be paid to official documents, such as for instance the 'Human Rights Report' or 'National Security Strategy', the analysis will also be widened to include non-state performative instances of 'human rights', such as those which are to be found in texts by 'intellectuals of statecraft' or think tanks. In short, it is essential to assess how 'human rights' has become an integral part of US and UK foreign policy, and how this has resulted in the *political constitution* of the Western subject identity. It is worth underlining that this is not meant to be a comprehensive study of the human rights concept. Rather, the focus is on how it has been incorporated into US and UK foreign policy through re-iterative performative articulations.

PART 1 METHODOLOGICAL AND
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

MAKING CHOICES IN POSTSTRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

While methodological concerns have not always been at the forefront of critical analyses of geopolitics and international relations, several authors have argued for a change in approach (Ó'Tuathail, 2002; Antaki et al., 2003; Hansen, 2006; Muller, 2010). This has stemmed from recognition that researchers are faced with a range of choices which will ultimately affect the nature and scope of the study at hand. Tackling these choices at an early stage, and in a logical way, no doubt enhances the research project, making it more responsive to the object of study, the questions to be answered, thus adding rigor to the finished product. Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that greater attention to methodological principles equates with a more rigid and dogmatic approach. The range of choices available to investigators means that flexibility is always assured. These choices should be viewed as general indicators which guide the research, allowing for the application of the theoretical framework in a more systematic way.

Lene Hansen (2006), in particular, has highlighted and developed an important set of methodological principles and questions which can be tackled as part of a successful research design. These can be summarised as the following:

1. LEVELS OF DISCOURSE (see following chapter for theoretical elaboration)

Firstly, in as far as one can distinguish between different types of discourse, a decision should be taken regarding whether or not the focus should be on official discourse, or if it should be extended to political opposition, media discourse, or even that which can be found in popular culture texts. A sole focus on official discourse could be undertaken to investigate a particular case in which there was no or little opposition to

the official position, neither on the political stage, nor in media channels. While this in itself would be rare, such a decision could be taken for a research design which has the aim of investigating solely the changes over time in how official discourse has approached a particular issue. Alternatively, the objective may be to analyse differences of opinion within official discourse. This could be true for a particularly contentious issue whereby different key figures may disagree with each other and be unwilling or unable to reach a common position.

2. SELFS/OTHERS (see following chapter for theoretical elaboration of this dichotomy)

Secondly, it is important to fix from the outset a set number of Selves and Others to structure the analysis around. This may well amount a decision as to which nation-states one would like to focus on. As such, this decision may very well be dependent on the specific case or cases the researcher has chosen to investigate. For instance, in his study of the war in South Ossetia, 'Russia's Kosovo' (2009), Gearoid O'Tuathail's analysis logically incorporated both Russia and Georgia as the competing Selves who were responsible for much of the violence. In other cases, where there are multiple actors involved, it will often necessary to make choices so as to limit the investigation and make it achievable within specific time and space restrictions. Naturally, this should be done with care as the omission of a key Self position may invalidate some of the conclusions reached.

3. TEMPORAL PERIOD AND NUMBER OF EVENTS

Next, one should decide on which temporal period should be taken into

consideration and which events will comprise the main focus of analysis. Again, if the focus is on how a particular Self or nation-state has responded to an issue over time, it might be appropriate to extend the analysis over a period of several years or even decades. If the objective is to understand why there has been different responses to a similar political problem, it may be best to choose two or more examples and undertake a comparison of the different responses.

4. EMPIRICAL MATERIAL

Finally, one will have to make specific choices in terms of what textual material should be studied. Since the empirical data selected will essentially comprise the discursive terrain of the investigation, this will be undertaken both in relation to decisions taken in the first three questions, and also with regards the objectives and research questions formulated. This means that if the investigation will need to take into consideration any oppositional discourses deployed in media sources, it may be a logical decision to ensure that a particular newspaper or newspapers is analysed from the beginning until the end of the event in question. In order to see how officials respond directly to challenges emerging in the media, a particularly useful resource will be interviews, whereby journalists have the option to then question the responses given and/or put pressure on the interviewee for a more substantial answer. On the other hand, if the aim is to analyse *political* opposition and how official discourse responds to that, it will be useful to look at any political debates taking place on the issue under scrutiny. See diagram 1 for outline of main methodological principles for post-structuralist discourse analysis.




Diagram 1: Research design for discourse analysis. Source: Hansen (2006)

RESEARCH DESIGN FOR DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE WESTERN-LED INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

With these methodological principles in mind, the first thing which must be decided for the research design of this investigation is the number of events to be analysed, and the relational temporal period in question. For a case, such as the Western-led military intervention in Libya, this may seem straight forward. Yet it is still important to justify the decisions taken both in terms of the events and time period chosen, and also those rejected. Firstly, it has been decided to place the primary focus on one event, the intervention of itself, spanning what could reasonably be defined as the temporal period of 2011. One of the considerations which had to be made for the present investigation was whether to carry out a comparison of the military intervention in 2011 with Ronald Reagan’s attack on Libya in 1986. While it is acknowledged that a

certain comparison of both events is potentially fruitful- indeed the event will be visited and an analysis of sorts will be carried out-, it has been deemed that the events themselves and the contexts surrounding both events are significantly different so as to render any in depth analysis of marginal import.

For all that, two additional things must be acknowledged at this stage. Firstly, the aim to place the focus on ‘one event’ is somewhat misleading and one could quite reasonably be expected to define what in fact constitutes an ‘event’ and why. In reality, the military intervention of 2011 is made up of multiple events and it should be made clear that the intention is to analyse many of these and also the responses made to them. For this, and as an analytical aid, a ‘key events’ timeline will be used, having been compiled from what are judged to be most significant events in media discourse. Secondly, the focus of the investigation will not be exclusively placed on the period of the year 2011. An historical perspective will be adopted, in accordance with the theoretical framework set out in the following chapter. This will involve two principal parts. Firstly, an analysis of relations between Libyan and both the U.S and U.K. over the period spanning the bloodless coup of 1969 until the year 2011. The temporal period of the analysis will go from the ‘Green Revolution’ and ousting of King Idris in 1969, up to the start of the political violence in 2011. While this obviously points to a significant challenge in terms of the length of period to be studied, this will be facilitated by focussing on some of the key events which have shaped the relations between Libya and both Western powers during this historical period. In doing so, it will be possible to see how key identities such as ‘Gaddafi’ and ‘Libya’ have been constructed. Secondly, since ‘human rights’ has been identified as a key discourse it will also be necessary to trace the conceptual history of how it has featured within U.S and UK foreign policy. The period in question will be from the Carter administration- understood to be significant for when human rights came to the forefront of U.S foreign policy- to the Obama and Cameron administrations.

Since this thesis seeks to understand the main discourses used to give meaning to the events in Libya, and also the consequences of constituting the events in these ways, it has been deemed necessary to focus on two of the main Western powers involved both politically and militarily: The United Kingdom and the United States. It is believed that this decision is a logical one in many respects. Firstly, the UK has been chosen on the basis that the UK position was indicative of a more robust and assertive

Anglo-French position. As well as formulating a joint statement with President Obama, both Cameron and Sarkozy also released a UK-French statement on the 28th March which included stronger language than what had been coming out of Washington. Whereas Obama had been quite categorical in his assurances that ground troops would not be deployed, this joint Anglo-French merely stated that ‘we do not *envisage* any military occupation of Libya’ (my emphasis). The proximity of the Anglo-French position can also be demonstrated by the way in which both countries worked together at the United Nations to draw up the draft resolution that would authorize international military action against Libya (Clinton, 2011). Finally, the visit made by both Cameron and Sarkozy to Benghazi in September 2011 also suggests that it was the British and French governments who had invested at least the most political capital in the actions taken against Gaddafi and the Libyan government.

The choice of the US reflects the fact that it is the *de facto* leader of the NATO alliance, meaning that its participation in military interventions becomes almost crucial both for its own national prestige, and for other members of the organisation. This was indeed the case as the US assumed leadership of the command and control structure at the early implementation stages of the no-fly zone over Libya before NATO formally took over (Cameron, 2011). As was repeated many times by U.S policy makers, this was due to the ‘unique assets’ or ‘capabilities’ that the US could contribute to the mission (Obama, 22/03/2011). At a more general level, the US remains the global hegemonic power, particularly in terms of its continued military and technological dominance. Studies have shown that its vast defence budget still dwarfs that of its nearest rivals (SIPRI, 2015).

Choosing two countries who are important allies- the language, cultural, commercial and historical ties which exist between both Anglo-Saxon states have ensured that they have been, and remain staunch allies, particularly in the area of foreign policy- and yet have shown signs of divergence, offers up the possibility of an interesting comparison through the case at hand. The selection of this dual-Self, therefore, means that it becomes possible to not only understand how both countries worked together in constructing the events in Libya, but also to gauge to what extent they differed, highlighting the lines of divergence.

Furthermore, the choice of a dual-Self is also indicative of an effort to avoid the

pitfalls which come with the presumption of US omnipotence as a global and hegemonic power. As can be clearly ascertained from US foreign policy and security discourse, it cannot simply operate alone in shaping World affairs. On the contrary, it must acquiesce with its closest allies in order to be successful in achieving its objectives. By approaching the military intervention in Libya from the perspective of both the US and UK one can gain an understanding of this. The 'special relationship', as it has come to be known, has seen both entrenched together in military campaigns including the First and Second World Wars; the Balkan Wars; Afghanistan; and even more controversially in Iraq. The nature of the relationship has been enshrined in official documents, such as the UK National Security Strategy of 2010 aptly demonstrates: 'To do so (stand up for the values our country believes in) requires us to project power and to use our unique network of alliances and relationships- principally with the United States of America, but also as a member of the European Union and NATO, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council' (UK National Security Strategy, 2010:4).

Returning to the case at hand, the selection of certain subject positions does however mean that others may not be dealt with in any great detail; the obvious omission here is that of France. While it would in fact be impossible for any study of a complex geopolitical event to analyse all of the relevant subject positions, the omission of France does require further explanation. As has already been mentioned, the proximity of the UK and French governments before during and after the intervention suggests that it is possible to speak of a joint Anglo-French position. As a side issue, there are also language considerations to be made. This means that while an analysis of official French discourse may not have provided too many problems, an in depth analysis of French media discourse, for instance, could have been a somewhat more difficult undertaking, one which could be liable to misinterpretation and thus erroneous conclusions. That said, this does not mean that the French position will be passed over *tout court*. Since major statements by Sarkozy and leading governmental figures are often translated into English, and later reported in UK and US media, these will still be taken into consideration where possible. Furthermore, joint statements made by the US, UK, and French leaders, such as the one made on the 14/04/2011, suggest a considerable coordination and concord in the discourses being used by all three Western governments. In this sense, it is believed that the omission of the French subject

position will not have a detrimental effect on the outcome, and will not jeopardize the conclusions reached to any meaningful extent.

It has also been decided against carrying out an in depth analysis of the discourses emanating from the Libyan 'Other' position, whether that be from Gaddafi himself, the ex-Libyan government, or the National Transition Council. Again, two things could be said to mitigate this apparent shortcoming. In the first place, like in the case of the French position, this does not mean that one has to disregard all pronouncements coming from Libya. The fact that the political violence was quickly internationalized meant that there was considerable onus on both parties to release statements in English, being an essential part of the struggle to gain the upper hand in the public relations sphere, and with the result that these statements would be relayed in Western media. Government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim was important in this respect, as was the designated leader of the oppositional NTC Mahmoud Jibril. The second, and most important reason for the omission of any sustained engagement with Libyan discourses is that it has been deemed superfluous to the objectives and research questions being pursued. Being first and foremost an investigation into Western responses to the Libyan conflict, the objectives do not depend to any great extent on the ways in which Western and Libyan discourses challenged and responded to one another- although perhaps this would be an interesting investigation in itself-. Focussing on the UK and US Self positions will make it possible to examine how Western liberal governments have exercised power, to understand the consequences of the discourses deployed, and to assess what conclusions can be drawn from this.

Having chosen the Selves to structure the analysis around and defined both the event and temporal period, it is now necessary to make a choice regarding which discursive levels to include. For the case at hand, and in relation with the research questions set out in the introduction, it has been deemed suitable to study official discourse, that which is to be found in political opposition, and also media discourse. In the knowledge that both political and media opposition existed to the UK and US governments' foreign policies, it is necessary to extend the analysis so as to capture any of these oppositional discourses and to see how they challenged official representations of the events. Since it is known that Western governments were successful in their attempts to both implement a no-fly zone and ultimately bring down the Libyan government, it will be important to understand how official discourse was able to

stabilize, confront and neutralize the challenges being faced.

Finally, what remains is the crucial task of selecting empirical material. The choices of which material and sources to be used will be made dependent on the section of the thesis, and the objectives to be achieved. Since the main aim of the first part will be to analyse, understand and present how key discursive objects ‘Libya,’ ‘Gaddafi,’ and the ‘Libyan people’ have featured in the Western geopolitical imagination, resources will be chosen for the specific purposes of achieving this. This means that first and foremost a range of secondary literature will be used, texts that have focussed specifically on Libya, taking both ‘Libya’ and ‘Gaddafi’ as their object, and also those which have centred on main issues affecting the relations between Libya and the Anglo-American powers. Here, one could highlight the work done in Dirk Vandewalle’s ‘A History of Modern Libya’ (2006), Ronald Bruce St John’s ‘Libya: from colony to revolution’ (2011), and from the perspective of the US St John’s ‘Libya and the United States: two centuries of strife’ (2002), and Mahmoud Warfally’s ‘Imagery and Ideology in U.S Policy Toward Libya’ (1988). These texts will then be supplemented, where possible, with official governmental material, including declassified national security documents, statements, speeches and interviews.

During this preliminary analysis, it will be useful to trace, link and bring into view how constructions of Libya can be interwoven with wider geopolitical themes and discourses. One example of this would be able to show how Western constructions of, and policy toward Libya, was shaped by a wider ‘Cold War’ context. Perhaps more importantly could be to highlight any links between the West’s ‘rapprochement’ with Libya in the lead up to the military intervention, and the wider ‘War on Terror’ context of which Gaddafi and the Libyan authorities were seemingly happy to be a part of. This means that as well as textual material dealing specifically with Libya, and the foreign policy stances being adopted by the US and UK governments, a more general appreciation of some main geopolitical and geostrategic themes will come into play. And while the purpose of this thesis is not to understand in any great depth the links between the relationships of the three countries and wider geopolitical discourses, an appreciation of context can serve in two inter-related ways; it helps to evade the type of analysis which suggests linear historical progression; secondly, the onus switches onto disjuncture, contingency, and how power has worked to form and reform the objects within wider discursive structures.

Finally, to supplement the other resources in this section, foreign policy files made available by *Wikileaks* will also be analysed. The utility of such resources cannot be overestimated. In past times, direct access to the communications between those involved in the foreign policy process remained by and large out of reach to investigators. This was especially so when researching periods in temporal proximity to the present, when it was extremely difficult, or indeed impossible, to access documents which remain classified to the public. In the case of Libya, the diplomatic cables released under the name ‘cablegate,’ consisting of correspondence between the American embassy in Libya and other important U.S government bureaus, is one such resource available now. Each one of the 433 cables released will be studied, taken from the period spanning the 26th October, 2007 until the 25th February, 2010. This time-frame is of critical importance and the cables offer unique insights into the ‘rapprochement’ period leading up to the military intervention. Not only does it become possible to corroborate positions put forward in public by officials, but it is also possible to obtain a broader perspective of how relations between Libya and other Western countries stood at the time.

In the second and main part of the thesis, that which undertakes an analysis of Western responses to the Libyan crisis itself, a broader range of empirical data will be needed. This is primarily to satisfy the demands of tracing official US and UK government discourse, and moreover to analyse any oppositional discourses used to give meaning to the events. That is to say, how US and UK foreign policy was formulated and later contested, and also the intricacies of the discursive struggle. To trace official US and UK discourse, it will firstly be necessary to analyse a broad range of speeches, statements, interviews and press conferences given by both leaders Obama and Cameron throughout 2011. To analyse President Obama’s discourse the whitehouse.archive.gov website has been used, uncovering speeches, statements and remarks have been analysed. For Cameron, the comprehensive GOV.uk website was accessed. A search using the keyword ‘Libya’, and using the parameters ‘speeches’, ‘all policy areas’ and ‘Prime Minister’s Office’ returned 45 hits from the period 01/01/2011 to 01/01/2012.

In order to detect variations within official discourse, this preliminary analysis will be extended to incorporate some of the key figures within both administrations. This is particularly appropriate for the US subject position if one takes into account the

reports of divisions between the more hawkish position adopted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the one hand, and a more cautious one taken by Defence Secretary Robert Gates (New York Times, 18/03/2011). Therefore, an analysis of the statements made by Clinton and Gates in the same period spanning the year 2011 has also been carried out. In relation to the former, the US Department of State Archives were accessed and 20 speeches, statements and interviews were analysed. For the latter, 22 files were accessed documenting statements made by the Defence Secretary stored at the archives at the US Department of Defence. In the case of the UK similarly, the key posts of Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary were viewed to be crucial in gauging the internal stability of official UK discourse during the year of 2011. Again, the website GOV.uk was accessed, changing the parameters of the search, and this time uncovering 24 documents for William Hague and 32 for Dr Liam Fox.

Since one of the objectives of this thesis is to uncover oppositional discourses and to assess how these attempt to construct the main identities in a different way and point to alternative foreign policy options, the analysis must be extended to the wider political debate. One of the ways of doing this is to review the debates that took place in the main political institutional settings. As for as the UK is concerned, the debate in the House of Commons on the 21/03/2011 is clearly an important event, even though it took place after UN Resolution 1973 had been passed authorizing the no-fly zone above Libya. In the US, key debates which took place in the House of Representatives on the 03/06/2011 and on the 24/06/2011, along with an earlier one in the Senate on the 30/03/2011 will also be covered. The debates which took place on the 24th June are of particular importance since the President was defeated in the first Resolution - retrospectively 'authorizing limited use of armed forces in Libya'-, but then prevailed in the second which had the objective of 'limiting use of funds for armed forces in Libya'. Both the debates and votes are indicative of the level of political opposition faced by Obama at that time.

In addition, it will be necessary to examine mainstream media sources both in the US and the UK. As well as offering support to the official governmental positions, the media will offer a broader panorama of the debate involving traces of any oppositional discourses which were working to destabilize the official position. In doing so, it will also be possible to gauge the extent to which 'media reporting of international events helps constitute and legitimate geopolitical agendas such as foreign

policies (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000:10; cited in McFarlane and Hay, 2003).

So as to gain a more balanced overview of media responses, it has been decided to analyse two daily newspapers in the US –the New York Times and the Washington Post- and two in the UK- the Guardian and the Telegraph. These choices have been made consciously with the view to gaining a greater ideological spread, with the newspapers in each country occupying different positions on the ideological scale. Logically the circulation of these newspapers has also been taken into consideration. In choosing the four national newspapers referred to, not only can it be argued that they are widely read, but one can also allude to the prestige of such publications. This adds to their capacity as agenda-setters in their own right since smaller publications will inevitably use them as a source of news. The potential for certain political discourses and stances to be re-iterated is without doubt high in these particular cases.

The period of analysis will be for the full year of 2011. This will be sufficient to catch the first reports of protests in Libya, and will also cover the period extending beyond the death of Libyan leader Gaddafi and the fall of the remaining ‘loyalist strongholds’ of Sirte and Bani-Walid. ProQuest has been chosen as the best tool to search for the media resources of all four newspapers. To limit the amount of data, it has been deemed prudent to search for any articles published with the keyword ‘Libya’ found in the headline of the newspaper in question. The search returned the following results: The Guardian- 376 documents, The Telegraph- 358 documents, The New York Times- 374 documents, and the Washington Post- 500 documents. Once the data has been acquired, it will be analysed using the qualitative data analysis program *QDA*. Particular programmes such as these can facilitate the analysis by allowing to extract certain results from a large quantity of empirical data. This is useful in as far as one can focus on certain events, which will be used to structure the analysis, and also certain discourses. By imputing, for instance, ‘human rights’, one can quickly see with what frequency this was used in articles referring to the Libyan crisis. One can therefore deduce quicker, and with more accuracy, which basic discourses were being used, and how they evolved over the year in question. See diagram 2 for summary of research design for the Western-led intervention in Libya.




Diagram 2: Research design for the Western-led intervention in Libya. Source: Own elaboration.

CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

THE ‘CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS’ RESEARCH PROJECT

The continued utility and relevance of critical geopolitics resides in the ongoing and perpetual need to challenge dominant modes of geopolitical power/knowledge. These power/knowledge relationships, in their most dramatic and violent expressions, harness the potential for armed conflict and war -such as, one would therefore presume, has been the case with Libya-. And while it may be possible to suggest a steady decrease in political violence since the horrors of two World Wars (Dalby, 2011), violent unrest and conflict raging in diverse places such as Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Iraq and Libya, appear to pour scorn on such assertions. The need for

critical tools to unpick the complexities of political violence is therefore, one could say, as pressing as ever. Since this violence is often underpinned by paradigmatic ways of 'sighting' (Ó Tuathail, 2005) international politics, critical geopolitics offers the promise of exposing these taken for granted assumptions, contesting the methods and theories which produce and are produced by them, and ultimately challenging the knowledge claims about our geopolitical 'realities'.

On speaking of critical geopolitics⁶, one must be careful not to homogenize what is in fact a diverse body of scholarship (Campbell and Power, 2010). Rather than a particular theory, it is best considered as an approach, a 'general gathering place for various critiques of the multiple geopolitical discourses and practices that characterize modernity' (Ó Tuathail, 2009). Since its fairly recent emergence in the late 1980s/early 1990s, critical geopolitics has branched out in several directions in attempts to capture the full extent of geopolitical power relations. A perusal through this growing literature will show that some authors have been interested in developing a 'feminist geopolitics' (Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2007). Others have studied the effects of 'popular geopolitics,' such as that to be found in media like film (Power and Crampton, 2005; Shapiro, 2008), cartoon strips (Dittmer, 2007) and video games (Power, 2007). Indeed 'popular geopolitics' can be viewed as a distinct site in the production of geopolitical knowledge, differing from 'practical' sites- eg political institutions- and 'formal' sources -eg think tanks (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 2007; see diagram 3)-.

6 Critical geopolitics should also strictly speaking go in quotation marks in allusion to the contingency of the term as per (Ó Tuathail, 1994).




Diagram 3 A critical theory of geopolitics as a set of representational practices. Source: Ó Tuathail and Dalby (2007).

Valuable as this work has been, the analysis of devastating geopolitical events such as war naturally remains a crucial part of critical geopolitics scholarship. Important studies have already been carried out on Western involvement in previous conflicts such as Bosnia (Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006; Ó Tuathail, 2011). And while it is of course true that the focus cannot solely be put on Western governments, the military intervention in Libya does present once more an opportunity to study their actions.

In approaching the complexity of such events, it is important to bear in mind what has been referred to as the ‘modern geopolitical imagination’ (Agnew, 2004). Comprising a range of geopolitical assumptions which informs policy makers and ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ alike, the ‘modern geopolitical imagination’ is pernicious in as far as it cloaks contingent, historically specific articulations of concepts and identities. Instead, they are assumed to be part of an objective reality. First, Agnew outlines specific traits which are part of a tendency to ‘visualize global space’. Two things are important here; firstly, there is a clear separation between the onlooker and

the World itself, or the 'world-as-a picture', meaning that 'representation and world are as one'; secondly, borders are used to separate a peaceful, civilized 'inside' from a chaotic or dangerous 'outside', which lies beyond what are supposed to be natural borders. This means that local differences are explained in terms of 'worldwide distinctions', the meta-binaries which structure thought, and thus 'the local has meaning *only* in relation to the global' (Agnew, 2004:15-16).

Secondly, the 'modern geopolitical imagination' reveals a tendency to hypostasize and privilege the 'nation-state'. The markings of this trait can be seen laced through paradigmatic theories of International Relations such as Realism and Liberalism, and also in the way in which Western governments approach World politics. One of the main problems of a state-centric approach is that: 'it territorializes power at the national-state scale and thus denies it to other spatial configurations involving place-making and spatial interaction' (Agnew, 2010:779). The cogency of the 'territorial trap' is surely as evident as it ever has been. This, indeed, appears to be at work in the US led assault on Iraq, whereby the post-war reconstruction plans were bedevilled by the 'assumption that the population of Iraq was a coherent one that could be 'rebuilt' after the war' (Reid-Henry, 2010: 754). Subsequent violence between regional, religious and ethnic groups in Iraq has severely called this into question. Similarly, since Western politicians were inclined to construct the violence in Libya in terms of a beleaguered 'Libyan people', one can immediately detect the neglect or depreciation of not only other spatial scales such as the regional or local, but also the historical processes which have given rise to the volatile situation.

Agnew highlights two other features which have characterized Western experiences of geopolitics. One of these is a tendency to turn 'space into time'. The example given here is the 'three Worlds' topology, in which the 'second' and 'third world' are judged to be backward and thus inferior to the 'first world' (Agnew, 2004). Agnew notes that these judgements are made on the basis of technological and economic criteria, and yet there are many other ways of assessing a particular country, region or continent. The mere fact that such diverse countries are grouped together within a particular catch-all category is evidence enough to suggest that such reasoning will lead to aleatory conclusions. The other facet of the 'modern geopolitical imagination' is the unbridled pursuit and desire for 'primacy' in the World. This has undoubtedly led to catastrophic consequences through hegemonic and imperialistic

foreign policies and expansionism. Agnew's main point is that these taken for granted assumptions can often be shown to be anything but that, and can be exposed as contingent historical constructions. When they are not understood as such, they can consequently lead to undesired consequences.

The 'imperiality of power' and the '(in) justice' of Western intervention

The terrorist attacks of 2001 on the World Trade Centre and other sites are without doubt one of the most significant geopolitical events of recent times. The 'lonely superpower,' as Samuel Huntington had famously referred to the United States, had received a devastating blow to its seemingly impregnable home borders. The fact that the blow had been dealt to one of the most symbolic spaces of global capitalism attached added significance to the attack. What followed was a declared 'war on terror' by the George Bush's Republican administration, which would lead to military campaigns in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The de-territorialised nature of the attacks by al-Qaeda and the subsequent emergence of terrorism as the undisputed principal threat to Western societies appeared to suggest that the geopolitical climate had fundamentally changed.

On the other hand, it would be perhaps premature to view the interminably destructive military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq exclusively in relation to the events of September 11th, 2001. What can be detected in many critical works that have tried to make sense of the new military campaigns is not simply a reaction to the new times or the modern terrorist threat; it is that these actions are indicative of a trend of greater longevity which extends well beyond the events in question. The 'Colonial present' (Gregory, 2004), 'neo-imperialism' (Flusty et al, 2008) or 'imperiality of power' (Slater, 2013), all suggest that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq can be understood in accordance with a wider trend, which brings back into focus a history of military intervention, domination, and the subjugation of foreign peoples by the United States, and Western countries more generally. Since the military intervention in Libya has taken place in relative temporal proximity to the other military deployments just mentioned, questions are raised as to whether or not it too can be understood in relation to the same imperial discourses and logics.

Of all the critical contributions made in the period since the 'end' of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is perhaps the work of David Slater and his concepts 'imperial mentality' and 'imperiality' which are of most relevance to the present study. In two key articles, written in 2010 and in 2013, Slater's contention is precisely that we are not living in 'post-imperial' times, but that the 'terrain has been 're-imperialized'. Both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars just mentioned, therefore, turn out to be part of a renewed and reinvigorated 'Western desire to control key regions of the world'. As such, past imperial parameters 'are still in place' and the 'imperial mentality', which has guided incursions and actions of domination in previous epochs, 'has not been superceded' (Slater, 2010: 191). If this is indeed to be the case, then it can be deduced that the continuities of which Slater speaks would also be significant for the case of the military intervention in Libya itself. For that, a more in depth exploration of Slater's ideas can be assumed to be fruitful for the investigation which will follow.

For Slater, these military interventions have to be understood in accordance with what he has defined as an 'imperial mentality'. There are three crucial 'dimensions' of the 'imperial mentality' which must be unpacked here. The first thing is that this is congruent with an 'invasiveness', which, in paraphrasing Cairo (2010) and Klare (2002), he argues is 'expressed through strategies of appropriating resources and raw materials' (Slater, 2010: 198). This is not to say that 'invasiveness' is a purely political economy affair; it must be understood as at once 'cultural, political and psychological' (Slater, 2010: 197). The 'imperial relation' established in such cases is always rooted in a 'power-over' conception which privileges the Western Self to the detriment of the subordinated Other. That said, the relationality of power is such that these types of geopolitical incursions cannot but generate resistance in the territories targeted. This is why in Iraq, in spite of claims that Western actions were being taken to 'liberate' the Iraqi population, the situation quickly escaped out of the hands of the 'liberators' and the country descended into civil war and chaos. The 'invasiveness' in this case, carried out at least in part for the appropriation of Iraq's vast natural resources, would always generate antagonistic relations and anti-imperialist resistance, with potentially disastrous consequences for both the invader and the invaded.

Secondly, the 'imperial mentality' is characterised by the imposition of 'dominant values, modes of thinking and institutional practices' (Slater, 2010: 199). It would surely seem trivial to remind that the complexity of the world renders it impossible that

each nation, people or culture around the globe should respect the very same values in the very same way as any other. And yet it is partially on the basis of 'universal' values that the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq took place, and as will be seen, almost entirely in reference to 'universal human rights' in the case of Libya. As Slater recognizes, this would appear to reflect 'a clear belief in the superiority of the imperial culture of institutionalization' (Slater, 2010: 199). Along with the general values which are being imposed come 'rules, codifications and institutional practices' (Slater, 2010: 199) such as those related with free-market economics. It would be somewhat counter intuitive and illogical for Western governments to intervene in other countries in support of 'universal' values of 'freedom' and 'democracy', if it wasn't there very own understandings of these concepts which were being promoted. One pertinent example could be the case of Egypt, once Mubarak had been deposed. Western governments were supportive of free elections in the country and the right of the Egyptian people to choose their leaders, yet that was tempered somewhat when it resulted in the ascendancy to power of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The third component which is inherent in the 'imperial mentality' and 'imperial' relations established is what Slater calls a 'lack of respect and recognition for the imperialised society' (Slater, 2010: 199). If, as has been put forward in the second point, the 'dominant values' of the imperial power are considered to be 'universal', or 'inalienable human rights', it follows that actions carried out by Western countries must be considered to be inherently good or advantageous for the people subject to the impositions. And yet, as one could quickly infer from past colonial discourses, 'this is not a new narrative' (Slater, 2010: 200). Western countries, concurrently, are viewed in a favourable light, as civilised and the example to be followed. It is perhaps interesting to note how key figures such as Tony Blair continue to justify the actions taken by his government for the attack on Iraq. The resultant chaos has happened not necessarily as a result of Western actions. Nor is it the case that the values being spread - 'freedom' and 'democracy'- are not inherently good, or that these values are being imposed on others. Rather, it is the case that the enterprise itself becomes a struggle 'not between civilizations,' but 'about civilizations' (Blair, 2006). That is to say, the ones who are resisting in Iraq are doing so on the basis that they are not civilized, like the Western Self.

The 'imperial mentality', together with these three defining components, is

therefore also co-extensive with a 'continuing quest for global hegemony' (Slater, 2010: 200). 'Invasiveness' and the appropriation of resources, diffusion of 'universal' values, which turn out to contain essentially Western elements, and the lack of respect for the Other, are all carried out not for the good of the people being brought under the Western sphere of influence. As in the case of colonial times gone past, the 'imperial mentality' is oriented towards increasing Western power in accordance with wider hegemonic aspirations. For Slater, it is notions of 'promoting and sustaining a model of democratic politics' which provides the key justification for the establishment of the 'imperial relation' (Slater, 2010: 202).

In his article of 2013, Slater moves on to consider questions of international justice, or indeed injustice, and the 'imperiality of power'. His primary concern again is Western, and in particular US, intervention in countries of the 'global south', how these interventions come about and are justified by the transgressors, and whether or not these can ever correspond with a sense of international justice. The main argument being made is that popular self-determination is the 'the right of a people by their own efforts to become free, to foster a democratic politics and to question the injustices that continue to be present.' This therefore means that the overthrow of 'injustice and oppression cannot be achieved through outside intervention; it has to be realized independently' (Slater, 2013: 3).

In order to bolster his argument, Slater returns to the idea of the 'imperial relation', of which the 'Euro-Americanist veil' (Slater, 2013: 3), as he puts it, is an important part. Rather than assuming the Western Self to be superior, 'internally independent', and the possessor of 'universal' values, and placed in opposition to an inferior non-Western Other, this is precisely what has to be overcome. To achieve this, one can use notions of the 'post-colonial' to highlight 'the primary significance of colonial/imperial encounters' and the 'durability of particular ways of framing or representing the meaning of the colonial/imperial encounter' (Slater, 2013: 5). In doing so, it becomes possible to gain an appreciation of how the diffusion of purportedly 'universal' Western values and practices are in fact one of the most 'deeply rooted' facets of the imperial.

In what Slater has referred to as the 'imperiality of power', a willingness and desire to intervene in other countries, and to spread what are considered to be 'universal'

values, is fuelled by a sense of self-awarded privilege. That is to say, the 'desire, will, capacity and justification to intervene in the affairs of other countries' is an important 'pillar' or the 'imperiality of power'. It is not possible, however, to understand this without adopting a historical perspective. To illustrate this point Slater refers to the primary example of this 'imperiality of power', which is, and continues to be, the United States itself. To explain this, he argues, one must go back to the inception of the country and the movement which saw it gain independence from Great Britain. One is then able to see that 'America's geopolitical interventionism is more historically rooted- than vietnam- and takes us back to the dawn of the republic'. The United States, as 'a global sovereign', has shown a consistent tendency to award 'itself the power, whenever deemed necessary, to act above the law' (Slater, 2013: 27).

There is a conflict at the heart of the US identity, however. Since the US can also be considered to an extent 'post-colonial', and indeed the only post-colonial nation in the West, its history is one in which self-determination plays an important part. This is problematic since on the one hand, it can't but stand for self-determination, to do otherwise would be to negate its very own history of struggle; yet on the other, the US is also characterised by imperial notions of supremacy and national exceptionalism. The interesting thing here is how the US seeks to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory components of its identity. According to Slater, it tries to manage this through recourse to notions of benevolence, or 'universal' values. Thus, it is possible to maintain its privileged status as would-be intervener.

Ideas of benevolence notwithstanding, the 'imperiality of power' often leads to devastating consequences, as was the case with Vietnam, and more recently Iraq; it can be plagued by a 'depth of misunderstanding, misjudgement and prejudice'. A desire to do good, coupled with a 'myth of innocence', which 'is deeply rooted in US geopolitical history,' protects America from 'the onerous burdens of historical responsibility for war or anarchy or injustice or conquest' (Slater, 2013: 25). In short, the US does not seem to be able to learn from its many mistakes in relation to its continual intervention in the affairs of other countries.

Slater quite rightly highlights some of the false assumptions which accompanied the tragic Vietnam experience, issues which can be identified in other cases also. Paraphrasing Cooper (2004), and ex-Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara before

him, four chronic misjudgements are highlighted: firstly, there was an exaggeration of the dangers to the US of Vietnamese actions and their 'geopolitical intentions'. Secondly, there was the tendency 'to view the 'people of South Vietnam in relation to our own experience'. Ethnocentric visions of the World, or a desire to shape the World in the image of the privileged Self identity is again something which can be instantly recognizable in Western geopolitical discourses. Also, it is suggested that there was an underestimation of the power of nationalism to motivate people to fight against the US in Vietnam. In more general terms, this point could be extended to include any resistance. In the case of Libya, Western leaders were very careful to emphasize that it was the 'Libyan people' themselves who were overthrowing Gaddafi and the Libyan leader, no easy task as their assurances were being accompanied by a gradual escalation in air-attacks. Finally, in Vietnam, there was, as Slater puts it, a 'profound ignorance of the history, culture and politics of the people in the territory' (Slater, 2013: 25-26).

QUESTIONS OF ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN POSTSTRUCTURAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

It could be argued that discourse theory has a tendency to privilege the epistemological over the ontological, as some have done (Neumann, 2001). A lot of the time, research questions revolve around the 'how?', instead of the 'what is?'. All the same, the first thing that will surely stand out to anyone taking an interest in post-structural discourse theory is the ontological primacy afforded to language itself. This is primarily due to the fact that language is understood to be in a constitutive relationship with all that there is in the material World; that is to say, objects, people, physical space etc. To be in a constitutive relationship means that language effectively brings its objects and their identities into being and not the other way around. Take for example the 'Middle East' region. It would be relatively easy to show how certain political groups and media channels still favour specific language to constitute this region as 'Muslim', 'violent', 'chaotic', and perhaps 'mysterious'- this is indeed what Edward Said achieved as part of his landmark work *Orientalism* (1977) all those years ago-. This, in spite of the fact that the Middle East region and its peoples can be constituted in many, sometimes radically different ways.

The primacy of language in post-structuralist discourse analysis certainly does not amount to a denial of any external reality, an approach which would be situated within a strictly speaking *idealist* ontology. What is asserted is that this external reality would not be accessible without some kind of pre-existing language structures. The outside World cannot exist independently of language, as if it were simply out there waiting to be discovered by a sovereign subject fully in control of their faculties. To understand what an object 'is', one must first possess the language which informs us what 'its' properties are; where 'it' comes from; what 'it' is used for. This need not be through commonly-held understandings of what a language is, such as English, Spanish or French. Rather, any system of signs which enable signification would suffice, allowing for the differentiation of one thing from another. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have succinctly explained how post-structuralism can bridge the idealist-materialist void, insisting: 'the fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has *nothing to do* with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism-idealism opposition..what is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence' (1985:102).

Post-structuralist discourse analysis also typically adheres to a relational ontology of language. This understanding of how language works can already be seen in Ferdinand de Saussure's 'structuralist' theory of language (1959). The principle linguistic unit is the 'sign', which is made up of two distinct parts; Saussure makes a clear distinction between the 'signifier', that which refers to a particular word or the sound that this may create in our minds, and the 'signified', which is understood to be the concept or the mental impression of that 'signifier'. The relationship between 'signifier' and 'signified' is arbitrary since there can be no logical connection established between the two. Evidence of this can simply be taken from the multitude of languages which are in use around the World. Each of these has by-and-large their own 'signifiers', and yet these may point to essentially the same 'signified'. A relational ontology of language puts forward the rather extraordinary claim that meaning is not simply derived from the relationship between language and an external reality as such, but rather from the relationships between signs within language itself. That is to say, the meaning of a particular sign can only be understood by and through its relationship with other signs in chains of signification.

Where post-structuralist theory departs from Saussure's structural linguistics is in its belief that the structure itself is not fixed and stable, but on the contrary highly unstable and in permanent flux. Signs can find themselves in different conceptual chains depending on the context in which they are used. 'Cat' and 'gato' purportedly refer to the same animal in English and Spanish, and yet cultural differences may yet prevent the establishment of a definitive correlation in meaning between the two signifiers. If, for example, the signifier 'cat' takes on a meaning that is culturally specific to the English language, or indeed a place which uses the English language, then a difference has been established between it and its Spanish 'equivalent'. Taking this to be indeed the case, then the whole binary opposition of signifier-signified, which sustains the 'sign', is critically wounded. Moreover, this will consequently lead to a rejection of ontologies which assume that phenomena, such as concepts or identities, have fixed, singular and stable meanings. Since concepts and identities are always inserted into different chains of signification, chains which are, in turn, permanently undergoing changes, one can deduce that stability of meaning is something that is ultimately unachievable.

The anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist stance characteristic of post-structuralist theory in general, and which perhaps finds its foremost expression in the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, can be traced back to the *oeuvre* of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche displayed a profound scepticism of definitions and essences, the idea that meaning can be attained through some kind of abstract and universal over-arching signification. One of the problems which can arise from these assumptions, he argues, is that they are conducive to a lack of historical awareness and understanding of how things change over time; they tacitly infer a permanence, one whereby concepts can be assumed to be timeless. Nietzsche viewed this as a 'hatred of the idea of becoming' or a type of 'Egyptianism'. The purveyors of this way of understanding the World:

'think they are doing a thing an honour when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeterni (from the viewpoint of eternity) – when they make a mummy of it. All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies, nothing actual has escaped from their hands alive. They kill, they stuff, they worship, these conceptual idolaters – they become a mortal danger to everything when they worship' (Nietzsche, Cited from Aitken et al. 2014:135).

Adopting a critical posture with regards the supposed essences or foundations of concepts will also entail a profound scepticism towards the ‘grand narratives’ or ‘meta-narratives’ that have shaped, and continue to shape our social and political realities. In as far as Marxism and Liberalism, for instance, comprise a host of concepts, which as a whole make up a system or totality, post-structuralism cannot accept blindly the stability of such systems⁷. They must be viewed as susceptible to the vicissitudes of time like anything else. Returning to the Neorealist theory of international politics and one can start to see how a blind reliance on objective, taken-for-granted assumptions can be problematic. The belief that the nation-state is the corner-stone of international politics, and that it exists within a fixed anarchical structure in which states naturally struggle for power, is more in doubt than ever before. Developments over the past decades including but not confined to an increasingly inter-connected World, expanding global financial markets, more widespread and better organized international social movements, have all worked to undermine the credibility of the presumptions underpinning neo-realist assumptions about World politics, and give credence to those who seek alternative geopolitical arrangements.

Indeed, questioning of this sort can even expose the rigidity of such meta-theories in as far as they give rise to teleological and reductive reasoning. One example of this would be that in assuming a Marxist meta-narrative, one is lead to theories which merely reaffirm and reduce explanations of complex phenomena to that of the economy or class conflict. Another would be, as Derrida has argued, that blind faith in the ‘promised land’ of liberal democracy and free market economics can lead authors to disregard empirical evidence which would suggest quite the opposite. In relation to Derrida’s critique of Francis Fukuyama’s now infamous text ‘the End of History and the Last Man’, John D. Caputo writes:

'whenever the hideous injustices of the Free Market are pointed out, so that it looks as though, perhaps the End has not yet quite arrived, these are treated as empirical shortcomings, contingent blights on the Idea's relentless progress. The End has arrived; it is here; it has already come about...the end has not arrived, millions of people are starving, homeless, persecuted, not only under the Stars and Stripes, but all over the

7 Of course this also means that even ‘poststructuralism’ itself could, strictly speaking, be questioned and placed within quotation marks. The crucial difference here again is that like ‘critical geopolitics’ poststructuralist authors are fully aware and freely recognize that they are not professing objective, and thus incontestable truths.

globe, but that is but a contingent blip on the Idea's relentless realization of its infinite task. Fukuyama follows an unfalsifiable logic which, in the best Hegelian spirit, assimilates and consumes every counter-evidence' (Caputo, 1997: 128).

This is not to argue, however, that one could or should not adopt a 'Marxist' or 'Liberal' theoretical position, for instance. One may well want to do this for either strategic reasons, whereby the contingency of its elements should be acknowledged, or for research analytical purposes, which would effectively mean putting it 'under erasure'⁸.

Also problematic from an anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist stand-point is what can often amount to an often unflinching, unwitting, or unapologetic belief in universal transcendental values. Since no concept can be defined exhaustively and succinctly in terms of its inherent characteristics or elements, it follows that there can be nothing which is universal or transcendental⁹. The work of Michel Foucault has strived to not simply refute the idea of universals, but to show their historical contingency through meticulous analyses of taken-for-granted assumptions. Instead, it is a question of historicizing, bring forth the plurality of ways in which a particular universal has functioned historically, and at the same time show the political consequences of this. Throughout his work, Foucault has been able to expose the enlightenment universal belief in 'continuity' or 'progress', both in an intellectual and in a material sense, by bringing into focus the discontinuities in discourse. Even appeals to 'rationalism' are not immune from historicism and Foucault has been able to trace the various guises of what to some may appear as a quite natural human capacity.

A pertinent example of universal values in current political and geopolitical discourse is the recourse which is often made to a set of inalienable 'human rights'-this is of course key to this thesis and will be dealt with in greater length further on-

8 Derrida has spoken of 'under erasure' *sous rapture*, which has been borrowed and developed from Heidegger, to refer to a technique whereby a particular word or concept is used acknowledging its contingency beforehand and/or with the intention of transforming it.

9 One should note here that while Foucault was quite clear about his rejection of universal values, Derrida's position would differ slightly in that he believed in 'justice'. On this question Foucault has stated, 'it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power' (Foucault, 1974; cited in McGilvray, 2017)).

'Human rights' are defined as a range of principles which are fundamental in the sense that they belong to every human being, and transcendental in as far as they exist independently from human interaction. Moreover, they are understood to be timeless since they apply over space and time without restrictions. In a certain way, the edification of this range of human principles could be considered typical of the endeavour of Western political philosophy; it demonstrates a desire for abstract, universal and utopian principles from which to judge human behaviour. Yet as Foucault has pointed out in other cases, such enterprises are pernicious in as far as they can effectively conceal the functioning of power in society. An anti-essentialist position has the advantage of assuming the historical contingency of such concepts, allowing for a greater critical engagement with them.

Derrida has referred to the tendency in Western thought to privilege essential forms in concepts and identities as the 'metaphysics of presence'. Closely related to this is his critique of 'logocentrism'- that which privileges speech in the Western philosophical tradition¹⁰- and 'phallogocentrism' – the patriarchal significance of the aforementioned-. In 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' (1978), Derrida has argued convincingly that the history of Western philosophy has comprised the replacing of one centre for another in the quest for full presence, whether that centre be occupied by 'God', 'man', or anything else. A 'rupture,' nevertheless, occurred when the 'structurality of structure had to begin to be thought,' and 'language invaded the universal problematic.' Crucially, the idea that such a thing as full presence can exist, whether that be in the thing itself, or the 'transcendental signifier' -the unquestioned centre point which is presumed to be exterior to signification-, is a fallacy since there can be no centre which is simultaneously inside a structure and outside it.

Derrida seeks to go beyond the shortcomings of the 'metaphysics of presence,' 'logocentrism,' 'truth' values and the 'transcendental signifier,' through a *de-centring* of the subject. By opening up any inquiry to the 'play' of signification, it becomes possible to avoid the seductive pull of fixed essences, and the naïve faith in full presence. For Derrida, there is only '*différance*', which points not only to a relational ontology of differences between signs, but also to a temporal deferral of meaning,

10 Derrida has identified this privileging of the spoken word in philosophers ranging from Plato through to Rousseau and later de Saussure. It is based on a desire, he argues, for full presence, whereby writing, in the narrow sense, is exemplary of absence.

opening up the possibility of difference *within* signs. Elaborated this way, the ‘metaphysics of presence’ and ‘logocentric’ thought can be challenged and one can start to see how ‘*différance*’ shapes and has shaped that which is supposed to be fully present and contain essential elements.

As Derrida himself has of course recognized, for language to be understood by somebody in the first place it must contain at least the structural possibility of being repeatable. At the very moment that an utterance is made, there must be a ‘trace,’ which helps one make sense of a particular experience. This ‘trace’ can be understood as the mark of otherness itself as it is characterized by non-presence or exteriority, meaning that the present itself, or the language which is used to understand the present, must also be constituted by what is exterior to the present moment. On this notion Derrida argues that ‘in the most universal sense,’ the ‘trace’ ‘is a possibility that must not only inhabit the pure actuality of the now, but must also constitute it by means of the very movement of the ‘*différance*’ that the possibility inserts into the pure actuality of the now.. the presence of the present is thought beginning from the fold of the return, beginning from the movement of repetition and not the reverse’ (Derrida, 1973: 58).

Finally, and of crucial import for this thesis, one must outline how language comes to be ‘performative’; that is to say, it *does* something as opposed to merely *saying* something. The multifarious way in which ‘performativity’ has been utilized in the social sciences can be traced back to the work of J.L. Austin and his ‘speech-act theory’ (Austin, 1962). Originally articulated as a theory of language in general -one could say a *facet* of a general theory- Austin exposed the insufficiencies in *purely* constative understandings of language. Refuting claims that utterances merely describe, denote or assert, he was able to show that language has a somewhat curious nature in that a ‘speech act’ has the capacity to say and *do* something at one and the same time. ‘Performative utterances’ are often most clear when enacted by verbs like ‘pronounce’ ‘promise’, ‘declare’, ‘demand,’ and so forth. For instance, the utterance, ‘I pronounce you man and woman,’ does not merely describe a situation, it actually does something too; it alters a prior status, it brings something new into being.

Austin’s pioneering work on performative language was later developed by Jacques Derrida in his now famous text ‘Signature, Event, Context’ (1988), and later in its follow up ‘Limited Inc. a b c...’ (1988). In his customary style, Derrida’s

contribution stems from his desire to go to the ‘margins’ of previous theoretical work, arguing convincingly that Austin was wrong to dismiss the possibility that performative ‘speech acts’ can function in any context. This means that a performative speech act is not dependent on a specific authority or agent for their functioning. Rather, the performativity of an utterance is dependent on the same re-iterative capacity of language as a whole. That is to say, any performative speech-act, such as ‘I pronounce you man and wife,’ acquires its performative force not from the agent who is delivering it, but precisely from the fact that it is repeatable. This is indeed necessary for it to be understood in the first place.

DISCOURSE, POWER AND KNOWLEDGE

The refutation of essentialist and foundationalist understandings of signs and language lead to certain crucial implications for how the social world can be understood and given meaning. If it can be shown that meaning is contingent, then it follows that the social world ‘is not pre-given or determined by external conditions, and that people do not possess a set of fixed and authentic characteristics or essences.’ This position also suggests that ‘the ways in which we understand and represent the world are historically and culturally specific and *contingent*.’ That is to say, ‘our world-views and our identities could have been different, and they can change over time’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:5). It is thus the task of post-structuralist discourse theory to show how attempts are made to attach, contest, discredit or even occlude meaning, all the while bearing in mind that these attempts can never be fully realized: ‘it is impossible to fix a sign’s meaning, it is *contingent*, possible, however not *necessary*.’ (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:25).

A post-structuralist theoretical position asserts that it is through language that attempts are made to fix meaning in the social and political world. The primary unit of analysis is ‘discourse,’ and this concept is one which can be found in many of the principle authors used in this thesis. It is to Michel Foucault that this part of the

theoretical framework will turn first. This is not without its challenges, however, as some Foucauldian scholars have even reached the conclusion that ‘discourse’ is in fact a ‘slippery notion’ in the oeuvre of Foucault (O’Farrell, 2007). Undeterred, there are actually certain specific publications to which one can turn so as to make a preliminary approximation to this crucial concept, casting light on how the theorist himself approached the question. Writing in the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) it is defined thus: ‘We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly repeatable, whose appearance or use in history might be indicated (and, if necessary, explained)’ (Foucault, 1972:117).

This citation points to the importance of other important concepts from what has been understood as Foucault’s ‘archeological’ period, such as ‘discursive formation’, and ‘statement’. A ‘discursive formation’ is the ‘general enunciative system that governs a group of verbal performances’. Foucault’s ‘systems’ of thought correspond roughly with a particular area of knowledge at a particular- albeit perhaps lengthy- period of time. These ‘discursive formations’ are governed by principles which cannot be reduced to grammar or propositions, and that determine, to a certain extent, the conceptual and enunciative possibilities. By dividing the ‘discursive formation’ into individual ‘statements’, - the relationship between a ‘statement’ and a ‘discursive formation’ is compared to that of a sentence and a text- the particular focus of any analysis was to see how objects, subjective positions, concepts and strategic choices are formed (Foucault, 1972). The ‘Archaeological’ method used by Foucault, therefore, allowed him to analyse how different types of knowledge have been produced in different fields and at different times of history, in accordance with the underlying rules of the ‘discursive formation’ in question.

Crucial to the analysis of ‘discursive formations’, for Foucault, are individual ‘statements’, which he understands to be ‘the elementary unit of discourse,’ or the ‘atom of discourse’ (Foucault, 1972:80). What is being dealt with here is not a linguistic concept of the traditional variety, it is in fact an ‘enunciative function,’ one which can *take on* the appearance of different units, such as sentences or propositions. Foucault refers to this somewhat enigmatic character of the statement as a ‘quasi-invisibility’, since that which is offered up does not reveal its essence entirely. This is due to the fact that language ‘always refers back to something else...language always seems to be

inhabited by the other, the elsewhere, the distant; it is hollowed by absence'. The analysis of statements will therefore be quite different from the analysis of other linguistic units. It will be a case of 'defining the conditions in which the function that gave a series of signs (a series that is not necessarily grammatical or logically structured) an existence, and a specific existence, can operate' (Foucault, 1972:108).

Likewise, it will be different from other historical analyses, as Foucault is at pains to emphasize, highlighting the fact that this should not be an interpretative exercise which seeks to uncover a hidden meaning. Unlike the 'history of thought,' the aim is not to discover 'beyond the statements themselves the intention of the speaking subject,' or even to 'search for the 'unconscious activity that took place.' On the contrary, the task is to be *non*-interpretative and: 'grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it excludes' (Foucault, 1972:28). It is by necessity a historical analysis that seeks to answer questions such as what it means for them 'to have appeared when and where they did- and not others' (Foucault, 1972:109).

An important part of carrying out any archaeological inquiry is to understand the 'rules of formation' of objects and concepts. By identifying the 'surfaces of emergence,' firstly, it will be possible to determine where an object or concept first appears within a 'discursive formation'. One must also, concurrently, take into account the concomitant 'authorities of delimitation'. That would be to determine and focus on those who are authorized to speak, write and opine in the 'discursive formation,' and on the specific discursive objects in question. When scanning the 'surfaces of emergence' it may also be necessary to consider the 'grids of specification'. This is conceptualized in terms of the way objects are broken down, specified, categorized and so forth. An example of this would be Matthew Hannah's 'archaeology' of the object 'Foucault' (Hannah, 2007). Hannah pays close attention to how this object has been assigned genre, political orientation, and also how he has been given status as a 'grand theorist'.

Returning to the present object of study, it is possible to demonstrate briefly how these three elements might be used as part of an interpretative framework¹¹ when

11 As Matthew Hannah (2007) has noted, this is somewhat of an *informal* interpretative framework. Foucault does not often mention these in his work, preferring to concentrate on the discursive material itself and not to import anything from outside. All the same these provide some loose guidelines on which to focus the analysis.

analysing the formation of relevant discursive objects. For instance, the formation in the Western geopolitical imagination of the key object 'Gaddafi' is clearly of great significance. It will therefore be fruitful to map the events from which Gaddafi first came to the attention of US and UK officials following the coup which deposed King Idris. This itself places added emphasis on the context in which these officials found themselves – the Cold War- and the challenges which they were facing at that time. Due to the fact that Gaddafi erupted on to the scene, those who had the authority to define the object were relatively restricted at the beginning to high level officials within the US and UK administrations. As far as specification goes, it will of course be useful to consider what possible consequences there were of 'Gaddafi' being understood as 'inexperienced,' an 'Arab nationalist' and 'mercurial'.

In as far as meaning is contingent and constituted by discourse, the formation of objects, concepts and identities must always in flux. Thus, it becomes immediately apparent that changes taking place in the aforementioned are of great significance and should logically be accounted for in any rigorous analysis. In short, it is the temporal dimension which is of interest here, the transformation of objects and concepts. Foucault will seek in his later work to understand precisely how change takes place through a 'genealogical' method, which has its quite obvious precursor Nietzsche. In what he has referred to as a 'descent' into history, the aim is to illuminate aspects of a 'trait or a concept' through analysis of the 'myriad events through which-thanks to which, against which-they were formed' (Foucault, 1971:81).

This is definitely *not* the search for any beginning, or the origin of a particular object or concept, which often goes hand-in-hand with futile attempts 'to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities' (Foucault, 1971:78). Rather, it is done with a complete respect for contingency and will ultimately show that things have not, and indeed do not have to 'be' the way they may seem in the present. Similarly, it is not a question of trying to find some underlying continuity, progress or evolution¹². Teleological theories of history such as those which may take Hegel and/or Marx as a reference are dismissed. Instead, one will have to recognize and acknowledge the ruptures and accidents which mark the very fields in

12 The rejection of great universals such as evolution or progress should be carried out also on the basis that these are bourgeois concepts, Foucault adds.

question. A 'genealogical' inquiry 'will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning' (Foucault, 1971:80). This premise allows for the reappearance of chance: 'The world of effective history knows only one kingdom, without providence or final cause, where there is only "the iron hand of necessity shaking the dice-box of chance"' (Foucault, 1971:88-89).

What 'genealogy' *does* try to do is strive to uncover the underlying power relationships which have conditioned the emergence of a particular object, concept, or even statement. In this regard it 'seeks to re-establish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations' (Foucault, 1971:83). This is done on the basis that 'emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces' (Foucault, 1971:83). Foucault famously conceptualizes this struggle in terms of 'power/knowledge' relationships, the imposition of which ultimately leading to the consolidation of or the setting up of new forms of domination. This exercise of power can be viewed as an attempt to tame chance, to repress it without ever reaching mastery over it. Even the rule of law is not enough to secure a particular relation of domination: 'The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who has used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them' (Foucault, 1971: 86).

A 'genealogical' study will be at once an exposure of history in all its complexity, and implicitly a critique of traditional forms of telling history. It will be an 'effective history,' which at once unashamedly affirms perspective while denouncing the 'demagoguery' of the traditional historian. That is, the avoidance of the 'masks', 'truths,' 'essences' and 'eternal necessities' (Foucault, 1971:91). In short, a genealogical study would entail an effacement of the impartial subject and metaphysics of objectivity. A rejection of the 'subject of knowledge,' in favour of a pursuit of how knowledge has been constructed historically, shining light on the injustices which this 'will to knowledge' has left behind.

The discourse theory developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), borrows significantly from the work of Foucault, among others -notably Jacques Derrida and Antonio Gramsci-, striving for a type of synthesis of different approaches to discourse. This, one could say, is precisely the value of their particular approach to

discourse analysis. As is indicative of the post-structuralist tradition, the articulation of a rejection of absolute truth and meaning is a guiding principle, the authors being instead concerned with the *processes* involved in the fixation of meaning. Therefore, it is not a question of definitions, a search for objectivity, which is considered to be purely ideological. But rather an examination of how meaning is assigned to all manner of social phenomena, and not just language, through the exercise of discourse.

Although the work is unmistakably indebted to the authors mentioned previously, Laclau and Mouffe introduce a whole range of new concepts. 'Discourse,' thus understood, is structured around key signs, denominated 'nodal points.' As Jorgensen and Phillips (2002:28) have noted, these 'nodal points' reflect the 'point of crystallization within a specific discourse,' and to which all other signs will then be related (all signs are in fact referred to as 'moments'). 'Nodal points' represent a useful starting point for any analysis in as far as they reveal what signs are being privileged over a range of other potential possibilities. From there it is possible to deduce which discourse is in fact being deployed. These signs become 'floating signifiers' when more than one discourse strives to define them, of course in diverging ways. By identifying both the 'floating signifier' and the discourses being used it becomes possible to approximate the political struggle taking place in any particular social field. When violence broke out in Libya in 2011, it was the violence itself which can be identified as the 'floating signifier', since competing discourses were used to give meaning to it. Western officials were quick to define the trouble in terms of 'human rights', while some political opposition and media deployed a 'civil war' discourse.

It is on the basis of a particular grouping of signs, whereby differences exist between signs, which allows for the establishment of meaning. That is to say, 'elements' are placed alongside each other in 'articulations', pointing to particular meanings and discourses. Concurrently, one should be aware of what meaning potentials are excluded from any particular 'articulation'. Discourses attempt to fix meaning, grouping signs together and constituting meaning on the basis of equivalence or exclusion, but this can only ever be in relation to the signs which have been omitted from the discourse. As such, no 'transcendental signifier' or centre can fix meaning permanently. An illustrative example could be the articulation 'body and soul,' whereby 'body' is positioned within a religious discourse (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). One can start to see how under this particular articulation of 'body,' is assigned certain

meanings, while others are excluded. It would be just as possible to speak of the body in terms of its vital organs, placing it within a contemporary ‘medical’ discourse. In both cases, the meaning established is never fixed, and must necessarily remain *contingent*.

One of the analytical consequences of taking contingency as a starting point is that one must incorporate that which is effectively excluded from any particular discourse. For discourse theory what lies outside, all that which has been effectively excluded, exists as a realm of possibilities and potentialities and falls under the term, ‘field of discourse.’ It is here where competing formulations, or ‘articulations,’ can emerge to challenge the unity of a dominant discourse. Taking for example Ernesto Laclau’s own example, the sign ‘democracy’ (Laclau, 1989), one can see how it can feature as both a ‘nodal point’ or as a ‘floating signifier’ within a politics discourse. This is due to the fact that it is an undeniably ambiguous term, which has been interpreted in many ways. In the United States, and indeed most states considered to be ‘Western’, ‘democracy’ has by and large been shaped by a *liberal* discourse, almost to the extent that both ideas have become fused together. The very possibility of a *socialist* democracy is often dismissed, discredited, or excluded from discussions in relation with viable forms of governance. A current example of this could be the way in which the UK Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn has been almost universally branded ‘unelectable’ by the media, and even members of his own party. Corbyn’s stances on many issues do not sit easily with dominant liberal political and economic formations in the country.

One of the things which becomes clear when assessing Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is that it is one which remains true to a philosophical and political tradition emphasizing conflict and the pursuit of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, chapter 1). Social antagonisms are understood to be inevitable, and this means that they will invariably find their outward expression in discourse. This is not to suggest that any and every relation will be one of conflict. It’s just that the possibility will be there, and that antagonistic relations, translated through discourse, will inevitably characterize the social and political world. Again this can be traced back to the contingency of signification itself. It therefore follows that there can be no utopian peace, or the elimination of conflict, or even the eradication of the different forms of repression or resistance. Bearing this in mind, the struggle for ‘hegemony’ becomes a crucial

component of discourse theory. In fact, Ernest Laclau has considered the development of a theory of hegemony to be the ‘central piece of the discourse analytical approach to politics’ (2003). Intimately related to the struggle over concepts and identities, and emerging as a result of the political interaction of groups, it is through a *process* of ‘hegemony’ which dominant understandings come to be understood as embodying the *real* meanings and not temporary fixations. Since ‘hegemony’ is conceptualized as a process, it is not something which one group may or may not possess, or impose on another group at any given time. It is something which is strived for and must be maintained- or challenged- once a hegemonic relationship is in place. On this point Laclau and Mouffe state, ‘the relation, by which a certain particularity, assumes the representation of a totality entirely incommensurable with it is what, in discourse theory, is called a *hegemonic* relation’ (2001:xiii).

One of the main reasons why ‘hegemony’ is such a pivotal part of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is because their work is part of a wider political project. ‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’, is to be found in the title of their famous book, and discourse theory itself can be viewed as a fundamental part of this wider strategy in pursuit of hegemony. Finally, it is perhaps useful to tie in some of the previous concepts outlined with this central theme. Already mentioned has been the struggle over ‘floating signifiers’, such as ‘democracy’, and one can see clearly now how this is crucial to the establishment of any hegemonic relationship. In turn, hegemony, and the installation of a socialist ‘social imaginary,’ will only be possible through recourse to the ‘logic of equivalence’ mentioned earlier. In practical terms, this is to say that a successful socialist strategy will most likely not arise from concentrating solely on class struggle and the mobilization of certain working class groups. For socialism to become the hegemonic discourse which constitutes the meaning of democracy it will be necessary to go beyond this, drawing greater numbers of people and groups into the political project in contestation of the pervasive forces of capital.

IDENTITY, PERFORMATIVITY AND INTERTEXTUALITY IN FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE

In recent times, the role of identity has occupied a central position in studies

seeking to understand actions carried out by the state and foreign policy. Concurrently, paradigmatic ways of conceptualizing state identity as fixed, self-identical and pre-discursive, have been increasingly challenged and exposed as mere effects of power and-or the remnants of a 'metaphysics of presence'. There are several key problems with these ways of understanding identity. At a general level, one is liable to lose sight of how in fact state identity-or identities- are formed in the first place. In making the ontological assumption that identity is fixed and pre-discursive, the possibilities of accounting for historical change become severely compromised, if not entirely impossible. Secondly, one can become less sensitive to the ambiguities of identity and the 'Self' identity in particular. It is important to recognize that 'any social field will harbor more than one type of politically relevant collective identities' (Neumann, 1999:36).

Thus, it has been the work of critical geopolitics and international relations scholars which has been of most relevance in this complex field during the contemporary period (Ashley, 1988; Campbell, 1992, 1998; Weber 1995, 1998; Agnew, 1999; Connolly, 2002; Hansen, 2006). Drawing on the work of post-structuralist authors like Foucault, Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe, and Butler, it has been possible to demonstrate the historical contingency of identity, as determined by and through discourse. In addition, one can expose its ambiguity, relationality and performativity, and in doing so, shine light on how power relations are tied up with particular articulations of identity.

The omnipotence of discourse in the social and political world, and the way in which it constitutes its objects in terms of difference, has inevitably crucial implications for the formation of identities. For one thing, individuals are constantly forced into taking up 'subject positions' within discursive structures (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). In this regard, discourses define social roles, which in turn can trigger specific actions and behaviours in relation to those positions. This also means that individuals or groups can be spoken of as 'fragmented' subjects. It would be perfectly feasible, for instance, for an individual to assume the 'subject positions' of being an 'adult'; 'heterosexual'; 'male'; 'socialist'; 'Glasgow Rangers' supporter, at one and the same time. It is worth highlighting, at this stage, an important distinction which can be made between 'subject position' and 'political subjectivity' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). In contrast to the former, the latter is used to theorize *agency* within discursive and social structures, and

can be viewed as an attempt to avoid the kind of structural determinism inherent in the work of Althusser (Howarth et al, 2000). Should there be no scope for individuals to assert their own will, develop their own political project, or indeed challenge identity, then there would effectively be no way to explain how resistance emerges from within repressed groups and in contestation of hegemonic discourses.

The complexity of identity is such that it is not possible to view all spatial, political and cultural identities in the same way. People will invariably feel stronger about certain identities than others. With this in mind, Connolly (2002) has sought to make a distinction between those identities which exude less ontological permanence, making them more readily questioned, and those which are more resistant to change, more 'obdurate', and which he refers to as 'entrenched contingencies'. National identity may be a good example of an 'entrenched contingency' due to the emotive power it often generates in subjects, and yet it remains contingent nonetheless. This does not mean, of course, that an individual can select their identities as and when one pleases. It is just that the possibility always exists, or has existed, that the identity in question could have been different. In this way, Connolly disavows essences and transcendental principles, while at the same time appreciating how identity becomes entrenched in 'corporeal habits, feelings, and dispositions' (Connolly, 2002: xvi). It is precisely due to this entrenchment that a particular identity may *seem* timeless, unchangeable, and unambiguous to those who assume it to be part of their own being, or in alternatively attributing it to another person or group.

Critical authors have, moreover, concentrated their efforts on showing that rather than being unequivocal and self-sufficient, identity is *relational*, inextricably linked with difference, on which it is dependent. Here, the creation of boundaries between Self and Other is a necessary part of identity formation. Without this coexistence, the very possibility of identity would be impossible since it 'would not exist in its distinctness and solidity' (Connolly, 2002:64). This is not, however, a relationship of passive coexistence. Identities are invariably infused by the 'constitutive force' of the Other. Put another way, 'Otherness' is inseparable from and constitutive of any differential relation. As Neumann (1996) noted so many years ago now, this has been and without doubt continues to be a crucial part of the 'pervasive theme' of identity in critical international relations literature. Part of this enterprise has been to show the ways in which 'the self is inextricably intertwined with that of its others, and that a

failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the formation of the self' (Neumann,1999: 35). The key questions for Neumann, therefore, revolve around not what a particular identity *is*, with all of the potential consequences that can result from these efforts. But rather, 'how these boundaries come into existence and are maintained' (Neumann,1999: 35).

It is through attention to the relationality of identity that Lene Hansen (2006) has been able to analyse the complexity of the Bosnian war and Western responses to it. She has argued that by using a 'Balkan' discourse, along with all the constructions of identity which this implied- spatially Bosnia is not situated in Europe; temporally Bosnia is ontologically backward, meaning that the war can be defined in terms of 'barbarism' or 'ancient hatreds'- the West was freed from any ethical responsibility to intervene and stop the violence being shed. This, in turn, had the effect of prolonging the war further than what may conceivably have been the case otherwise. It was only after a 'genocide' discourse was mobilized and reached hegemonic status in the United States, Hansen claims, that a corresponding Western ethical responsibility was generated and a more robust response to the violence materialized. The 'genocide' discourse constructed a multicultural Balkan Self who was at the same time a victim, and placed it in opposition to a genocidal Serbian leadership. The Serbian leadership, in turn, were placed in opposition to an innocent Serbian people as part of a split Serbian subject. See Diagrams 4 and 5.




Diagram 4: The Balkan discourse. Source: Hansen (2006)




Diagram 5: The Genocide discourse. Source: Hansen (2006)

There are further crucial implications of understanding identity as being relational. Firstly, the potential for conflict can never be fully eradicated. The reason antagonisms arise is that the possibility of fully realizing one's identity is obstructed by the presence of the Other. As Laclau and Mouffe put it, 'the presence of an 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution' (1985: 125). Secondly, from this alternative account of the ontology of identity, a paradox can be discerned. The privileging of the 'Self' identity, which translates into a 'pursuit' of that same identity since it can never be fully fixed or realized, necessarily implies a 'drive to diminish difference to complete itself'. This is most problematically achieved by 'marginalizing, demeaning, or excluding the differences on which it depends to specify itself' (Connolly, 2002: xv).

The crystallization of antagonistic relations in the political and social world can be understood by way of 'logics of equivalence' and 'difference'. It is a 'logic of equivalence' which allows for the formation of identities which *cannot* be incorporated

into the same discursive system. Paraphrasing Laclau and Mouffe, Howarth et al explain that this logic functions by ‘splitting a system of differences and instituting a political frontier between two opposed camps’ (Howarth et al, 2000:11). An example here could be the debate on Scottish independence, which resulted in the polarization of an otherwise fairly homogeneous population into two camps; the ‘yes’ camp and the ‘no’ camp. This was achieved on the basis of strong appeals to either a unitary ‘Scottish’ identity or alternatively a hybrid ‘Scottish/British’ identity. The ‘logic of difference’ works in the opposite way. Attempts are made to dissolve sharp differences between two sides, ‘dissolving existing chains of equivalence and incorporating those disarticulated elements into an expanding order’. In relation to the above example, the ‘logic of difference’ may well suggest that a ‘Scottish’ identity cannot account for the differences held within the population in Scotland as a whole. It’s worth mentioning here that neither the ‘logic of equivalence’ or ‘logic of difference’ can ‘*a priori* be designated the more progressive way to go’. And, at any rate, both should not be treated in isolation from each other as it is always the case that ‘there is a complex interaction between the two’ (Howarth et al). 2000:12).

Closely connected to the ‘logic of equivalence’ is Laclau’s conception of ‘myth’. The condition of possibility of ‘myth’ is the very dislocated structure which enables meaning to be contested through discourse. ‘Myth,’ however, seeks to bring about closure to the dislocated structure, to constitute a totality by englobing various identities, interests and demands within a broad nexus (Laclau, 1989). This is achieved through ‘galvanising the imaginary of the masses,’ and thus potentially ‘launching them into collective action’ (Howarth, 2015:91). As opposed to the ‘logic of difference’, the key is to make boundaries between groups and interests wither away. As Jorgensen and Philips (2002:39) have noted, this is often done through appeals to ‘the country’ or the ‘people’, which attempt to produce society ‘*as if* it were a totality’. There is, of course, nothing of the sort, and these are mere examples of ‘articulations’, or efforts to achieve such a thing. In this way ‘myths’ function in a hegemonic way, and when they reach an almost taken-for-granted status, in as far as they *appear* to have dissolved the dislocated structure, then they can then be thought of as a ‘social imaginary’.

It is worth mentioning that analyses of the complex relationship between discourse and identity need not be restricted to textual traces. While this is certainly most common when one is analysing for instance official discourse, media sources are

more inclined to supplement their textual representations with visual material. For overall coherence, it can be assumed that the photos or images on view would correspond with the meanings being generated in the article and yet the use of visual material is often clearer and more to the point. In this way, it can give the researcher clues as to the general direction the author is going. What is of critical concern is how the subject positions are being depicted in the photos displayed. It is of course not the same thing to depict Muslims carrying weapons, praying in the Mosque, or alternatively working in a Western style office environment. And yet certain Western media sources are well known for depicting this particular religious group in a threatening way. See Image 2.




Image 2: This cartoon by Stanley 'Mac' McMurty was published in 'the Daily Mail' on the 17th of November 2015. It shows a multitude of the immigrant 'Other' crossing the European 'Self' border. As well as the sensation of invasion which is aroused- the immigrants are accompanied by a plague of rats- several of the figures have Islamic appearance and one is carrying a weapon.

A useful analytical tool that one can use for the study of how discourse-identity constellations are formed and develop throughout a political debate and/or event is the construction of 'basic discourses' (Hansen, 2006). As analytical constructions, basic discourses are assembled from a general and abstract level of the overall debate, meaning that they cannot be considered as given. Rather, they provide a way in which government policy discourses can be analysed, since they will inevitably borrow elements from one or more than one of the basic discourses laid out. Since the basic discourses of any political debate are formed at an abstract level, this operation should be done by using a large number and wide range of texts, where possible.

In building the basic discourses certain key principles must be kept in mind. Firstly, both should attempt to construct the identities of those involved in divergent ways. That is to say, the Self/Other identity relationship will be necessarily different, thus meaning that a different foreign policy is also implied. It is often the case that the traces of one basic discourse start to form before another emerges in contestation, even if this is soon after. It is one of the assumptions of this current thesis that it is not the same to define the Libyan crisis of 2011 in terms of 'human rights', with all that this entails, as it is to argue that there is actually a 'civil war' taking place. Not only are the implied identities divergent, but in the former an ethical responsibility is generated on the Self which is not the same in the latter.

Since in the case at hand, it is the basic 'human rights' discourse which has been by and large deployed by both the U.K and the U.S government, the concept of 'human rights' becomes crucial to any understanding of the Western intervention in Libya. This means that it will be crucial to then carry out a conceptual history of how 'human rights' has featured within wider U.K and U.S foreign policy discourse. What is more, understanding that the identity of the Western state is constituted performatively, it will also be important to see how the 'human rights' discourse has been deployed and what can be learnt from that for an analysis of the performance in Libya of 2011.

Returning to how identity is used to generate meaning in conflict situations, David Campbell (2007) has investigated the use of media photography in representations of Darfur. In attempting to critically address the taken-for-granted assumptions which link an image with its external referent, Campbell instead seeks to uncover the ‘various economies and technologies’ involved in their construction. In the case of Darfur, it has been noted that a significant amount of the photojournalism surrounding the tragic events there show either refugees, invoking themes of humanitarianism, or genocide whereby the conflict is split unambiguously between victims and murderers. By questioning the knowledge claims made by such visual material, Campbell does not aspire to completely dismiss the veracity of the images *per se*. There could be no doubt that huge numbers of people were being displaced and killed. Rather, it is to pursue a different line in ascertaining how the photos were imbued with performative force, affecting their audience, and pointing to specific policy outcomes. One is moreover drawn to consider the possible implications of representing the conflict in terms of Arabs vs Africans, whether or not these ways of framing the conflict do justice to the fluidity of the Sudanese anthropology and identity, and if they work to re-fuel the conflict at the same time.

Using the work of Connolly and others, Lene Hansen (2006) has developed an analytical framework for studies which try to approach the complexity and importance of identity in the formulation of foreign policy. Clustered around the pivotal Self-Other binary, three general proposals are made:

- 1) Firstly, that any analysis of identity should not limit itself to a concern with locating a *radical* Other in opposition to the Self. This is essentially a call to a more nuanced approach to identity construction, one that takes into consideration the possibility of degrees of Otherness, and also the instances when one would not be dealing with Others constructed as unambiguous, coherent wholes. In the first place, Hansen outlines cases where the Other is imbued with more positive values, such as was the case with the Russian ‘Westernizers,’ who held up an ideal of the West as something to be pursued and embraced (Neumann, 1996a; Hansen, 2006). Secondly, the potential for a ‘split’ Other becomes a very real analytical potentiality. This indeed appears to be an important aspect for the study of Libya, as it can be shown in the past that the U.S.

government tried to distinguish between a ‘tyrant’ Gaddafi and an innocent ‘Libyan people’. The development of the Self-Other theoretical starting point is done so as to ‘adopt an ontology of identity that is flexible as to the forms of identity construction that one might encounter in concrete foreign policies’ (Hansen, 2006:40).

2) The Self and Other’s do not find themselves situated in isolation from other signs. On the contrary, they are invariably positioned within a wider web of textuality which presupposes the existence of other signs. The relationships between the Self-Other binary, and other signs, is to be theorized according to processes of linking. As an example, Hansen draws attention to the two main discourses which defined the Spanish encounter with the indigenous peoples of the Americas. While both discourses used the sign ‘savage’ to construct the identity of local inhabitants, this was accompanied with other signs which were crucial in leading to divergent policies to be pursued by the Spanish authorities. One cluster of signs supposed that the annihilation of such ‘savages’ was the correct course of action to take while the other advocated *conversion* to the dominant value systems prevalent in Spanish political, religious and societal life of the time. A sensitivity to the different ways that signs are linked together can therefore be crucial for an understanding of why one particular policy is favoured over another.

3) The third axis of the analytical framework seeks to delve deeper into the specific components of a particular identity. For this task, four further dimensions of identity are plotted.

(i) The first of these corresponds with the spatial element of identity, naturally being of crucial concern for studies of geopolitics and political geography. It is often useful to think in terms of scale and ascertain if the identities being studied correspond with local, regional, national, or supranational geographical scales. A comprehensive analysis will be sensitive to how these spatial identities are operationalized, and moreover which ones are omitted or excluded in doing so.

(ii) The second adheres to the ways in which identity is imbued with temporal attributes. Is the identity in question construed as ‘backward’, or is it ‘developed’? As Hansen and many others have noticed, Western civilization discourses have often portrayed foreign peoples as ‘backward,’ constructions which can later be used as justifications for imperialist or colonialist actions. These actions are undertaken to aid

the temporally 'backward' people in their 'natural' development towards the more 'advanced' temporal status of the Self identity itself. The paths laid out for such identities are often embellished with teleological ontologies which assign purpose to history and speak of historical 'progress'. Great ideological systems such as Marxism and Liberalism are constructed in accordance with dialectical logics positing either an endpoint of a 'classless' society or 'freedom' as the ultimate and final endpoint of political development. It is therefore a key geopolitical consideration to understand the links between ideology- understood as a series of linked signs- and temporal identity in understanding policies and the material consequences of such policies.

(iii) Finally, Hansen wants to inquire as to how an ethical responsibility is created by and through certain articulation of identity. For instance, constructing a people as the victims of genocide necessarily points to a situation whereby the Self would be expected to help in some way to ease the suffering of the group of people in question. This dimension will be of particular significance for the present study due to the humanitarian claims made about Libya by Western governments.

(iv) The fourth and final dimension of the analytical framework is the identification of basic discourses.

One of the possible limitations which can be detected in Hansen's excellent study on Western responses to the Bosnian war, is that it does not quite manage to completely dispense with the notion of the pre-discursive sovereign state. Her thesis, that a foreign policy of Western intervention was only adopted after a 'genocide' discourse was deployed, suggests one of two things: either Western officials *wilfully* deployed the discourse- meaning that they construct reality as a sovereign subject- or that agency is simply displaced on to discourse itself- establishing a cause-effect relationship between discourse and the materiality of the actions taken by Western governments. What Hansen's account does not do is explain how a 'genocide' discourse- that is to say a humanitarian discourse- should come to be meaningful and trigger Western actions in the first place. While this may seem like a trivial point, the concepts 'genocide' and 'humanitarian intervention' clearly possess a history, like all concepts, meaning that a genealogy of that history should uncover how they have become infused in Western foreign policy discourse.

Significant as it may be for a full understanding of the Western intervention in Bosnia, this point is arguably even more resonant for the Libyan case at hand. While in both cases a humanitarian discourse was prevalent, the appeals to ‘human rights’ abuses as justification for military intervention in Libya -and the consequential toppling of ex-leader Gaddafi- appear to be more ambiguous and therefore contentious. This renders it even more important to avoid the temptation of stopping at ‘human rights,’ assuming this is reason enough to explain Western actions either as an unambiguous moral action, or alternatively as a mere excuse for intervention. This would be to fall once more into the trap of assigning full agency to the governments who wield and deploy the discourse, or to attribute transcendental causative power to ‘human rights’ itself. For that, the challenge will be to trace the historical trajectory of the ‘human rights’ concept showing how it has been inculcated in official Western foreign policy discourse. At the same time, it will be important to understand how ‘human rights’ as discourse has constituted the *moral* identity of both the US and UK states. This means that it will be necessary to supplement the theoretical framework already elaborated to this point.

One useful way of doing this is to understand the identity of the state as not only being relational, and fundamentally discursive, but also as being *performative*- as will be shown this means that its identity is constituted by and through the practices which are said to be its result¹³. Earlier work by Austin and Derrida on the performative nature of language was radically put to work later by Judith Butler in developing her theory of gender identity. In her seminal work ‘Gender Trouble’ (1990) Butler aims to refute paradigmatic understandings of gender as essentialized identity, fixed, and natural; in short, its *facticity*. Butler makes the quite contrary claim that such identities are forged socially as a result of hegemonic gendered discourses, which privilege certain forms of masculinity and femininity. Naturalized gender ontologies turn out to be no more than fictitious appearances as they become cemented over time. The subject cannot come before the social structures and discourses which shape her, and yet neither does she pre-exist the performative acts which constitute her gendered identity. As Butler puts it, ‘gender proves to be performance—that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by the

13 It should be noted that Hansen does in fact acknowledge and put to use ‘performativity’ in her book on the Bosnian War. Nevertheless, it is put forward here that she does not fully exhaust the implications of this for the Western policy pursued in that particular case.

subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed' (Butler, 1990:25)¹⁴. There is nothing deliberate about an 'act', rather performativity presupposes that they must be understood through the 'reiterative and citational practices by which discourse produces the effects that it names' (Butler, 1993:2).

If it is indeed possible to theorize the constitution of gender identities as a *doing*, or as something which is performed, then this opens up the possibility that other identities can also be understood in this way. It is even possible to extrapolate Butler's work into more overtly political realms such as the practices and identity-ies associated with the state itself (Campbell, 1992, 1998; Weber, 1998; Bialasiewicz et al, 2007). This is not, as David Campbell has made clear, to conflate individual identities with collective identities. Rather, it is to make the quite different argument that the way gender identities are brought into being is similar to the way in which those attributable to the state are. In short, 'the performative constitution of gender and the body is analogous to the performative constitution of the state'. This means that like gender identities, any *appearance* of essential state identity is merely the 'ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted' (Weber, 1998:78). In this way, the identity of the state itself can be understood as a subject in process, or perhaps better, in a state of becoming. It is brought into being and maintained by discourse, which itself is made possible by the *iterability* of citational processes which work to performatively constitute the state as subject. Such expressions and acts are not the product of a sovereign state subject. Rather, 'the identity of the state is performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its result' (Weber, 1998:90).

This appears to be entirely logical since for pronouncements to be meaningful in the present, the state cannot simply make things up as it goes along. It must refer itself back to previously articulated discourses, repeating in certain measure what has come before. That said, the repetition can never be achieved in a complete sense, as recitation and resignification are always susceptible to new formations and possibilities (Bialasiewicz, 2007). It is for this reason that a theory of performativity can offer so much towards uncovering patterns and explanations for social and political change. By focussing on the re-iterative and citational practices associated with the 'human rights' discourse in Western foreign policy, one should theoretically be able to shed light on

14 Butler is following Nietzsche here.

how it has retained a certain continuity while incurring changes throughout time. This, in turn, will permit a greater understanding of how this particular discourse was meaningful to Western governments before and after the onset of intra-state violence in Libya.

It is useful at this stage to clarify and establish the ontological link between identity and foreign policy. Identities, it turns out, are 'produced, and reproduced, through foreign policy discourse, and there is thus no identity existing prior to and independently of foreign policy' (Hansen, 2006:26). Post-structuralists, Hansen continues, 'conceptualize identity and policy as ontologically inseparable' (2006:26), which means that 'representations and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively linked' (2006:28).

This is not to suggest, it should be made clear, that performativity privileges exclusively the linguistic to the detriment of the material world. On the contrary, it makes room for agency by bridging the idealism/materialism divide, acknowledging both that discourse structures the social and political World, and that agents can, and do, take material decisions (Bialasiewicz, 2007). To understand this point better it is useful to establish the distinction between 'performance' and 'performativity'. Whereas performativity can be said to be a 'discursive mode', one which calls into question the sovereign subject, performance actually 'presumes a subject'. The subjects that are understood to carry out these performances, however, are always restricted by the 'conditions of possibility brought into being through the infrastructure of performativity' (Bialasiewicz, 2007). Relating these ideas back to the task at hand, this would mean that an individual performance of 'human rights' by the US or UK government would be at least partially conditioned by how the discourse had hitherto performatively constituted the identity of the US and UK states.

One of the more intriguing aspects of a performative understanding of the state is that its reliance on previously articulated expressions of identity is not simply a matter of coherence. Having said that, it is through previously articulated expressions of identity which the state functions in its attempts to *re-stabilize* its identity. One of the key aspects to a performative theory of the state is the chasm which appears between perceived notions of fixed identity on the one hand, and the ontological impossibility of ever actually realizing them on the other. States, therefore, are on a permanent mission

to stabilize identities, in ‘permanent need of reproduction,’ and ‘always in a state of becoming.’ And yet crucially, this impulse toward the stabilization of the identity will, ultimately, prove futile and doomed to failure. Any prospects of closure will prove ontologically illusive as ‘for a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of pre-discursive foundations: stasis would be death’ (Campbell, 1992: 11).

The implications of a performative theory of identity for the security practices which are carried out in the name of the modern state are indeed profound. Being since the days of Thomas Hobbes the central tenet of the state, the capacity to provide security for its subjects has been paradigmatically viewed as *the* indispensable feature of its sovereignty. Such conceptions of the state posit that security practices logically flow from its very being. Performativity, on the other hand, suggests that the opposite is in fact true; it is through security practices that the state in fact constitutes itself, even if it is actually impossible to fully achieve. After all, a state of pure security would mean that the state would effectively cease all its security operations since they would no longer be needed (Campbell, 1992). There would be no more challenges to its key identity of security guarantor, essentially negating its very being. To prevent this from happening a continuous stream of dangers and threats must be forthcoming. And while the objects of these discourses of danger have changed, as have the responses to them, all can be said to fit within ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ discursive constellations (Campbell, 1992: 11). It is these very dangers which are the ‘conditions of possibility’ of the state identity itself.

‘Security’ is indeed a fertile area for the study of how the state has been constituted performatively. For these types of investigations, it is also important to remember that security strategies and the imaginative geographies which accompany them imply: ‘an assemblage of practices – state policy, ‘non-state scribes’ and the representational technologies of popular geopolitics – which together produce the effect they name, stabilizing over time to produce a series of spatial formations through the performance of security’ (Bialasiewicz et al, 2007:419). By studying these textual resources, Bialasiewicz et al have been able to discern the emergence of a post-Cold War geopolitical strategy at the heart of US security discourse. Rather than articulate

identity exclusively in terms of Self /Other constellations, that is based merely or predominately on exclusion, this variant has taken as its organising principle 'integration'. Attempts are made to draw states into the US sphere of influence, and in doing so, satisfy both military security concerns and accomplish economic security goals. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th this strategy has become more pronounced as 'integration' is viewed more necessary than ever.

While Bialasiewicz et al. seem to be correct in discerning a new strategy of 'integration' from the range of security practices analysed, there does appear to be something missing from their analysis. In addition to the more overt 'security' discourses that were deployed in the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, a 'human rights' discourse was also concurrently used by US and UK officials. There may be a temptation to dismiss this as mere posturing, a way of justifying the death and destruction brought to these countries, and a useful smokescreen to occult more nefarious objectives such as geostrategic goals of dominating the region or controlling oil supplies. Yet this dismissal what be premature. For one thing, performativity itself suggests that discourse functions on the basis of re-citation and re-iteration, meaning that policy makers cannot just make things up as they go along. Said in a different way, the 'human rights' discourse has a history within foreign policy and that history is decipherable. Secondly, the rejection of any 'human rights' rationale can amount to a rejection of *any* Western moral identity. Again, it is put forward here, that this position is hard to sustain. In the modern period when events over the world are broadcast in real time, it becomes more possible than ever to mobilize Western public opinion behind global moral issues. It should be made clear here that what is not being suggested is that Western governments act unambiguously in the interests of others. The point is that since 'human rights' has been identified as the main discourse used by Western governments for the intervention in Libya, it becomes crucial to understand how this discourse has constituted the US and UK states as moral. The study of this history can uncover important facets of how 'human rights' has interacted with other discourses such as that of 'security,' which may subsequently be used to understand present actions. This will be explored in the following chapter.

Before moving on, it is possible to make one final comment on the implications of a performative theory of the state and state identity. An appeal to the performativity of the sovereign state, for all that, does not necessarily amount to solely an effort to

understand how embodied actions are carried out and on what basis. Returning to Judith Butler, one of the crucial elements of her original formulation was that in challenging supposedly fixed, natural boundaries- defined by hegemonic gender discourses- she was able to open up a space for transgression at the same time. It becomes possible to subvert existing notions, structures, and identities from the inside, unleashing important emancipatory possibilities. Likewise, by recognizing that the state constitutes its identity through performative actions, it becomes possible to not only call them into question, but also to challenge and alter the very discursive practices which constitute and have constituted the state. As Glass and Rose-Redwood (2014) remind, scrutiny of the 'practice of enacting the state' is infused with 'the much broader effort to *repoliticize* the performative acts that sovereign authorities, and their intellectual apologists, have long employed to naturalize the contingency of social and political norms'. In short, 'the performative practices which make up the state are open to re-articulations and new becomings' (Glass and Rose-Redwood, 2014: xiv).

Having made the case for the performative constitution of the state by and through discursive practices, one must also recognise that foreign policy discourses do not exist independently in the social and political world. On the contrary, discourses are inextricable tied up with other textual traces within wider discursive structured. It follows, therefore, that foreign policy formulation must take this into account and present stable, coherent identity-policy formulations. The 'goal', therefore, of policy makers is 'to present a foreign policy that appears legitimate and enforceable to its relevant audience' (Hansen, 2006:28). And yet the fact that this takes place within wider discursive structures makes this an almost futile enterprise, as discursive stability can never be fully achieved. In the event that discourses are subject to external criticism – something which is inevitable itself-, and the link between identity and policy is destabilized, then one can expect there to be attempts to adjust and 'recreate stability through modification of either the construction of identity or the proposed policy' (Hansen, 2006:29).

Another way in which foreign policy discourses function within wider discursive structures is discernible from the connections which can be drawn between different types of text. That is to say, an understanding of how discourses are deployed within policy documents on the one hand, and for example those texts which can be found in media and academic sources as part of a wider intertextual web (Hansen, 2006). It will

be useful to outline how this can be theorized and later used as a starting point for the discourse analysis of the Western-led intervention in Libya. First though, some remarks will be made concerning the concept of 'intertextuality'.

Julia Kristeva's work on 'intertextuality' was heavily influenced itself by Ferdinand de Saussure's structural linguistics and Mikhail Bakhtin's work on literary theory and semiotics. Like Jacques Derrida, however, Kristeva was not happy to accept that meaning was generated through fixed linguistic structures, making it possible to analyse language in a similar way through the interrelationships between signs. Rather, for Kristeva, signifiers have multiple meanings which are formed historically and therefore lack stability. They can be taken out of one context by human subjects and placed within another, changing in the process the meaning of the original usage. In this way, a text is always, already in a state of production, and not merely something which can be understood objectively. Moreover, an author does not merely create a text from his/her own mind, the author invariably assembles the texts from existing discursive and ideological structures. In one of her most widely cited definitions of the context 'intertextuality,' Kristeva points out that 'any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another' (Kristeva, 1980: 66). When conducting foreign policy analysis, thus, it is important to consider how quotes, references, facts and concepts are borrowed from one text and inserted into another. As different textual traces are appropriated, this almost certainly will entail a change of meaning as the new discursive context establishes different relationships and juxtapositions. For that reason, foreign policy analysis should not simply be concerned with highlighting continuities in the ways certain textual traces appear, but also on drawing out the differences in one usage compared to another. An understanding of how the original text has been 'read' or interpreted becomes crucial.

It is also important to recognize that different types of text exhibit differing types of knowledge and claims to authority. For instance, a policy speech made by the President of the United States is done so on the basis that he/she has the authority to take political decisions. The same policy formulation expressed in a newspaper editorial, on the other hand, lacks the same authority and readers could be expected to give less credence to the views put forward. That said, newspapers are also expected to be knowledgeable about events taking place both at a national and international level and therefore the views expressed will carry a certain degree of authority. As will be

shown later, an interesting aspect of early media coverage on the Libyan crisis was that Human Rights' agencies were often cited in order to give authoritative accounts of the violence taking place and for instance, the number of people who had been killed.

Hansen (2006) has elaborated three intertextual models for the study of foreign policy. The first intertextual model that Hansen defines for the study of foreign policy is that of 'official discourse'. In many ways, this is crucial for any study of actions carried out by the state in so far as it is understood to entail a political legitimacy that is unsurpassed in other levels of discourse. As the primary political actors, both in internal and external affairs, high level government officials are the ones who not only have the capacity to take decisions, but do so on the basis that they represent a political party which has been elected democratically. This means that for the study of any foreign policy, it is crucial to analyse the pronouncements made by political leaders- the President or Prime Minister in the case of the UK-, the foreign secretary- in the case at hand Hillary Clinton and William Hague-, and also the defence secretary. While it is usually the case that all three of these political actors will defend the foreign policy being advocated by the government, it is not necessarily the case that all of these will maintain a strict adherence to what one can consider to be official policy discourse. For instance, the defence secretary can quite reasonably be expected to have different considerations to make, such as those related with the defence budget and a more acute sensitivity to the safety of military personnel. The leader, alternatively, could take a more global and strategic perspective on the issue in question.

The second thing which should be taken into consideration for any discourse analysis of foreign policy is how, and in what way, opposition discourses emerge to contest 'official discourse'. As will be argued in the theoretical framework, it is simply impossible that a particular foreign policy is formulated without opposition and this will invariably emerge either in opposition political parties or in media channels. Even in the cases where a seemingly indisputable foreign policy is articulated, gaining support in both the political party in power and those in opposition, different views will be detectable and these will challenge the premises and basis for the construction of the policy. In the case at hand, for instance, it will be shown that there was considerable acquiescence in the UK between the Conservative-led government and the Labour party opposition with regards the need to intervene in Libya. However, a closer inspection uncovers that much of the support coming from opposition figures was given on the

basis that protection of the Libyan people was the priority, and also the prudent policy to follow, not the removal of the Libyan government *per se*.

In order to extend the analysis even further, it is also possible to take into consideration texts which have been written within more cultural genres, or texts which exhibit more marginal discourses. In relation to the former, one could seek to understand the textual relationships between official discourses and those detectable in films or computer games. This is indeed a burgeoning subfield of ‘critical geopolitics’ as many scholars have used these cultural artefacts as their starting point in order to see how geopolitical codes and ideological references are filtered down and through a ‘popular geopolitics’. In relation to the latter and the influence that marginal discourses might have, it is necessary to establish links with publications that would perhaps not be considered mainstream. Other examples of sites where these discourses could be detected would be satirical radio and television programs.

PART 2 LIBYA IN THE WESTERN
GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION

Key events of relations between Libya and the US and UK since 1969

The next part of this thesis will explore the historical relations between Libya and both the US and UK. The purpose of this section is to trace how these relations have evolved, with a particular emphasis on the period leading up to the Western-led military intervention of 2011. It is assumed that this will provide an excellent preliminary approximation to the case at hand, and uncover some insights as to why Libya had become susceptible to Western intervention in the first place. For analytical purposes, a list of some of the key events which have shaped relations between Libya and the Anglo-powers will be used. In line with the methodological principles outlined in chapter 1, the purpose of this is to narrow the focus in what is a considerable temporal period. It will be possible to pay greater attention to the most controversial moments in what has often been a turbulent relationship since Gaddafi rose to power in 1969. To mark this trajectory, some main secondary texts and well-known academics on Libya have been used, as outlined in Chapter 1. From these guiding points of reference, a wide range of texts will be used, such as primary documents, to explore further the details of these events.

Key events from 1969-2011

Military Coup and overthrow of King Idris	September, 1969
British leave Al-Adem Airbase	March, 1970
US military evacuates Wheelus Airbase	June, 1970
First major laws passed on the nationalization of the oil industry	July, 1970
British Petroleum nationalized	December, 1971
Gaddafi claims sovereignty over the Gulf of Sirt	November, 1972
US accused of infringing 'restricted zone' off the Mediterranean Coast	June, 1973
Libyan government nationalizes 51% of Occidental Petroleum	August, 1973
Three U.S oil companies are nationalized: Texaco, the Libyan	February, 1974

American Oil Company, and California Asiatic.

US government issues restrictions on military and strategic equipment purchased by Libyan government	September, 1975
Libya is placed on the State Department's 'Sponsors of terrorism' List	September, 1979
Two Libyan aircraft shot down by the United States	August, 1981
British police officer Yvonne Fletcher is shot outside Libyan Embassy in London	April, 1984
Terrorist attack in Berlin disco	April, 1986
US air-attack on Libya	April, 1986
Lockerbie bombing	December, 1988
Two more Libyan aircraft shot down by US	January, 1989
United Nations Security Council passes resolution requiring Libya to hand over suspects	March, 1992
Libya agrees to allow trial of Lockerbie bombing suspects UN Security Council votes to lift sanctions against Libya	April, 1998
Libyan government states it will abandon pursuit of weapons of mass destruction	December, 2003
Blair and Gaddafi sign oil 'deal in the desert'	March, 2004
A number of US sanctions are lifted US trade embargo lifted	April, 2004
Plot uncovered to kill Saudi King	June, 2004
Lockerbie bomber released from Scottish prison on Compassionate grounds	August, 2009
Diplomatic stand-off between Libya and Switzerland resolved	June, 2010

CHAPTER 3 US AND UK RELATIONS WITH LIBYA DURING THE COLD WAR

LIBYA AND THE ANGLO-POWERS AFTER THE 'GREEN REVOLUTION'

The overthrow of the Libyan King Idris in 1969 by way of a military coup is perhaps an obvious starting place for an historical study of US and UK relations with Libya. This major event represents a crucial disjuncture, the threshold between one system of governance, which was essentially allied with Western countries¹⁵, and another which would adopt quite contrary positions to the major issues in the region. It is during this early period when many of the most virulent antagonisms between a Gaddafi-led Libya and the West first emerge, and which would go on to strain relations for many years to come. These antagonisms crystallise around certain key issues such as: security and territorial boundaries, Israel/Palestine, oil nationalisation and terrorism. It is also important to recognise that the overarching context which informed and gave meaning to these disputes at this stage was that of the Cold War. Recalling the work of Michel Foucault in chapter 2, the removal of King Idris is also meaningful in as far as it marks the 'surface of emergence' of 'Gaddafi' as a discursive geopolitical object, assuming for the first time a significant space within Western foreign policy and security sites. Starting the investigation at this point will thus allow for a complete analysis of how this figure has been constructed by Western officials, and how it has undergone transformations in accordance with the geopolitical contexts of the time.

In the aftermath of the coup of September 1st 1969, it quickly became evident that the changes taking place in Libya would pose particular challenges to existing relations with Western countries and Israel. Gaddafi and the newly installed

15 St John (2015) has suggested that relations between King Idris and the West were never as close as some believed. Nevertheless, cooperation in the realm of security demonstrates a certain level of proximity, especially considering the Cold War geopolitical climate of the time.

Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) set out several objectives to be pursued by the new government, among which three in general could be highlighted here as important geopolitically: 'freedom, socialism, and unity' (El Warfally, 1988:44). These three guidelines translated into concrete foreign policies. Firstly, there was a pledge of neutrality with regards the Cold War taking place between the two ideological blocs headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Closely related to this desire for neutrality, which was also an attempt to free Libya from the shackles of subservience to one of the blocks, was an explicitly staunch rejection of any forms of colonialism and imperialism. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there was also a strong call towards Arab unity and an unambiguous opposition to the state of Israel, which had not long before emerged victorious in the Six-Day War against Arab powers in the region. This also entailed a desire to boost the military power of Libya and embark on the acquisition of more advanced weaponry (El Warfally, 1988:47).

The official US and UK foreign policy responses to the dramatic changes taking place in Libya were essentially ones of passivity and of reluctant acceptance. Official US documents from the time show how the particular context in which President Nixon and his government were operating was an important factor in this. In response to concerns shown by 'moderate Arab states' – included here are Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Lebanon- a State Department telegram outlined the general position: 'Intervention to support or preserve a specific regime unable to help itself is serious and unpopular matter in modern context and may raise international legal questions. Even French, who have specific commitments with regard to certain African states, carry out their responsibilities with greatest discretion. US experience further has suggested that even when foreign government might be sympathetic to intervention, internal political factors within its own borders might seriously limit support it is able to give in this regard'. While the telegram also demonstrates a natural concern for the 'survival of friendly regimes,' direct military assistance was to be made available only 'in event of external aggression' (US Department of State, 1969)¹⁶.

16 This does not, of course, rule out more covert operations aimed at undermining unfriendly regimes -as one may possibly detect from the allusion in the previous quote to the French and their 'discretion'-. It is widely known that the US was involved in covert operations throughout the 70s and 80s and in a range of countries, such as those in Central America.

The comments made by Secretary of State Rogers allude to the 'modern context,' this being one in which the US was embroiled in a debilitating conflict in Vietnam. The massive casualties being suffered in the war, coupled with the negligible progress being made, combined to make this not only a deeply unpopular war amongst the American people, but also pointed to the limitations of US military power. The 'quagmire' of Vietnam had also contributed to a recognition that such conflicts were in fact damaging to the US and there was the realization that it could not make a stand against any perceived threat wherever it be pin-pointed throughout the globe. Speaking principally about Asia- although this can also be extended to developments in Libya- President Nixon warned, 'we must avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam'. Questions of 'treaty commitments' and external threats to allied nations notwithstanding, Nixon states that 'the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem (military defence) will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves' (Nixon, 1969)¹⁷.

The refusal by the U.S. government to intervene more obtrusively in Libyan internal affairs, thus, can be seen to correlate with the geopolitical context of the time. The policy of direct intervention in foreign lands had now taken on an added element of danger in as far as it could entrap the superpower, while steps were also being taken to bridge differences with the Soviet Union through several treaties. The policy followed by the US government at this time would come to be known as part of the 'Guam doctrine' or the 'Nixon doctrine'. This did not mean, of course, that the 'Cold War' discourse had disappeared; it had merely been reconfigured. On the whole, countries would still be determined through a dichotomy which graded them as either 'friendly,' or as part of the 'enemy'. The fact that Libya had just changed from being a 'friendly' regime, to one with signs of recalcitrance was certainly a worry for Western policy makers. Always present would be the concern that Libya could fall under the Soviet sphere of influence and this is something which, as will be seen, can be taken from official documents of the time both in the United States and the United Kingdom.

17 This period also coincided with a 'thawing' of relations with the Soviet Union. The 'détente', as it would be known, consisted of several initiatives aimed at easing the pressures generated by the bi-polar geopolitical struggle; high on the agenda was the issue of arms control and several important treaties would be signed during the 1960s and 1970s.

One of the first, most pressing concerns, of the new Revolutionary government, was the status of foreign military installations, which had been in operation in Libya before the coup (Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2002). For the Nixon administration it was the status of the Wheeler airbase that was placed in jeopardy immediately following the fall of King Idris. The existence of such military facilities on Libyan soil were quite clearly at odds with the RCC's anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stance. The Wheeler airbase, along with British facilities in Tobruk and el-Adem, would therefore have to be closed, and this is what indeed would happen. In spite of hopes that Libya would not fall under the Soviet sphere of influence, the U.S government still showed concern over the strategic and military loss: 'Because we recognize the legitimate concerns regarding the use to which the Base might be put once we withdraw, we are asking Ambassador Palmer to express these concerns to Captain Jaluud, the RCC member who leads the Libyan negotiating team. Hopefully, Jaluud will indicate to the Ambassador that the Base will not be transferred to the control of any third country after the US forces leave' (US Department of State, 1969).

As far as the British were concerned. Military bases at Tobruk and el-Adem were relatively small and yet still valued as important strategic outposts by the U.K political and military establishment. Their closure in 1970 was, similar to the case with the Wheeler airbase, cause for concern as it was also seen to weaken the British strategic position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. It is known from Foreign and Commonwealth Office documents that the Soviet threat was very much on the minds of British officials in the lead up to the overthrow of King Idris. Since in the Middle East, the Soviet Union was seen to be working 'towards the replacement of the present non-revolutionary regimes by governments more sympathetic to the Soviet Union,' the British military presence in Libya was given importance. Moreover, the 'increased Soviet naval threat in the Mediterranean threat' led officials to believe that it was 'overwhelmingly in our interest to maintain our support for the treaty until its first possible expiry date of December 1973' (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (39/121), 25th March 1968; Cited in Straw, 2011).

Another issue that was brought to the fore following the ascension to power of the RCC was that of arms sales. Deals between Libya and both the U.S. – 'F-5' fighter jets and 'C-130 Hercules' cargo planes- and the U.K. – 'Chieftain' tanks and an air

defence system¹⁸- which had been sealed prior to the revolution had now become troublesome diplomatic issues. Officials on both sides of the Atlantic found themselves in a seemingly no-win situation. Selling the weapons to a Libyan government was predicted to be an unpopular move with public opinion¹⁹. The Libyan government was openly belligerent towards Israel, a position that was understood to have possible repercussions in terms of an exacerbation of tensions and instability in the Middle East- the sale of the F-5's to Libya was expected to arouse interest from the Israeli government in buying 'Phantom' aircraft (Department of State, 1970)-. Whereas on the other hand, the denial of the orders already concluded could drive a wedge between the Western powers and Libya, jeopardising economic interests in Libya, with the result of potentially driving Libya into the arms of the Soviet Union for its defence needs.

While one delivery of eight C-130 Hercules aircraft was in fact completed, under the rubric of 'commercial agreement', a second order for 5 more was not, and neither was an order for more F-5's. The Nixon government's preferred course of action was one of stalling tactics, being justified through appeals to arms legislation and the need for export licenses. These tactics can be understood as ways of buying time and/or avoiding any provocative or inflammatory gestures. Ultimately, however, the orders for the C-130 Hercules and the F-5 aircraft would not be completed. Another such deal for an air defence system – to be carried out by Northrop-Page- likewise faltered at an advanced stage. This was the result of direct US government intervention, leading the Libyan government to protest at what it viewed as one sided efforts at improving the bilateral relations. This was to prove a source of irritant on the Libyan side. The fact that the U.S. was not as reticent in its dealings with the Israeli Government was of course not lost on any of the parties concerned. In response to Ambassador Shaaban's consternation at the Northrop-Page reversal, Chargé Stein was candid in setting out the limitations of U.S. – Libyan cooperation. While emphasizing the U.S. desire for cultural and economic relations, Stein states that 'it was only in the military sphere that

18 The air defence system was a particularly troublesome issue as the RCC believed the British to have coaxed Libya into accepting it under King Idris. The result was the loss of the £32 million, which *British Aircraft Corporation* BAC refused to return (FCO-39 636 in Ali, 2014).

19 A 'military-economic' assistance program between the French and Libyans had recently agreed the sale of 110 'Mirage' aircraft. While the economic logic behind this deal was undisputed, U.S and U.K officials tended to view this as a politically dubious move by the French.

we felt we could not cooperate, as a result of Libya's active opposition to our Mideast peace process' (US Embassy in Libya, 1975).

The British were facing similar problems in their attempts to stall on the completion of the deals for the technologically advanced Chieftain tanks. In judging that the delivery of the tanks was working out sensitive politically, one of the tactics used was to offer the Libyans older models the Centurion and the Vickers. These offers would be declined in the end by the Libyan administration. It is interesting to note that consultations between the British and Americans had resulted in American approval of the original deal. This is indicative of the value which was placed on Libya; since the United States was relatively hindered in concluding arms deals with Libya, the delivery of the Chieftain tanks was viewed as one way of keeping the RCC within a Western sphere of influence.

It is worth noting that although Libya was being understood in relation to a wider Cold War discourse, this does not mean that Gaddafi and the new Libyan government were being viewed as naturally inclined towards any kind of reciprocal ideological relationship with the Soviet Union. Commenting on the possibility of such a rapprochement, the CIA reported shortly after the coup that 'the junta has kept the USSR at arm's length. The Soviets offered military assistance in the first few days of the coup, but were quickly rejected. As far as we know, subsequent approaches have also been rebuffed' (Central Intelligence Agency, 1970). The RCC's policy of non-alignment was generally accepted, as can be seen from Ambassador Palmer's comments (The State Department, 1971) to Gaddafi: 'the U.S admires LARG'S -Libyan Government-policy of non-alignment which, noted, has been reflected both in words and deeds'. Yet was the *possibility* that Libya should slip away from Western influence, which was seen as concerning. British Ambassador Hannam notes that, 'while at the same time they seem set on resisting Soviet blandishments I cannot help but feel disquiet at the long term prospects on that direction'. Moreover, he states elsewhere that 'we must resign ourselves to watching Russian influence spread over the Libyan army' (Hannam, 1970; cited in Straw, 2011).

Yet even as relations between the US, UK, and Libya deteriorated further, and the prospect of a diplomatic, economic and military vacuum was becoming a more and more distinct possibility, indications from Gaddafi and the RCC would continue to give

solstice leading US officials to conclude that an alliance between Libya and the Soviet Union was unlikely. An Interdepartmental Group report underlines this reasoning clearly: ‘Libya’s hostility towards the United States is formidable,’ the report notes, yet ‘its hostility towards the Soviet Union is equally so’ (US Department of State, 1973). This reticence is deduced from Gaddafi’s suspicion of the ‘atheistic Soviets’ and their imperialist intentions in the Middle East. Speaking in Algiers at a conference of non-aligned nations, Gaddafi articulated this sentiment, such as can be detected in his attack on Cuba and its President Fidel Castro: ‘we have no objections to what Castro does in his own country, but Cuba is a Communist country, and we object to its membership of the nonaligned movement’ (Gaddafi, 1973; cited in Pick, 2015).

Meanwhile, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the new Libyan government’s anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist discourse was manifesting itself in different material ways. Not only were steps being taken to eject both US and UK military personnel and facilities from its territory, but the revolutionary government was trying to assert itself through greater territorial demands. Full control over Libyan territorial land boundaries, yet also claims over and beyond its 12 nautical mile sea frontier, which had been the customary international maritime boundary up until that point. The so-called ‘restricted area,’ as designated by the Libyan government, stretched up to 100 miles from Libya’s shores. As far as the US was concerned, this was completely unacceptable; the Libyan coast situated in the Mediterranean Sea was an important strategic interest due to its sheer length and geographical location, potentially providing a launching pad for attacks against its European allies. The US government would go on to vigorously challenge these claims and make the water in question the scene of several reconnaissance flights and ‘freedom of navigation’ exercises. These were designed to exercise what the US believed to be its right of access to international waters. Persistent military confrontations between both countries would ensue, nevertheless, constituting an impasse to improvements in relations for many years to come (St John, 2002).

If political, military and strategic interests were crucial to the US and UK governments at this time, the economic interests both countries had in Libya were certainly of no lesser importance. of great concern following the installation of the RCC. This appraisal can indeed be understood from communications which express that ‘US concern with Libya stems basically from the importance of Libyan oil’ (US

Department of State, 1973). The vast quantities of oil which had been discovered relatively shortly before the coup had meant that Libya was now an important player in the worldwide petroleum industry. As far as the U.S. government was concerned, though, it was not its own reliance on Libyan oil which was most at stake. It was above all its Western European allies who were importing considerably greater amounts. Again the importance of the 'Cold War' discourse can be detected from the U.S. preoccupation for its European allies. As noted by an official U.S. government interdepartmental report, 'a prolonged cut-off of Libyan oil production... would severely strain European supplies and necessitate a drawdown of European oil stocks' (US Department of State, 1973). The closure of the Suez Canal had to a certain extent created a European reliance on the short haul supply lying across the Mediterranean in their search for a stable and cheap oil supply. Furthermore, the quality of the Libyan crude oil, being low in sulphur, made this a particularly attractive option for Western governments, both since refineries had become orientated towards this and also as pollution regulations were gradually becoming more of an issue.

Yet the US and UK governments also had a more direct relationship with the oil in Libya; companies from both countries held considerable investments in the Libyan petroleum sector at the time of the coup, which were now placed in jeopardy as King Idris had been dethroned. As far as the US was concerned, this was estimated to be approximately \$1 billion-net book value-, which was making a considerable contribution to the US balance of payments – \$400-500 million in 1972-(US Department of State, 1973). The new Libyan government's policy of incremental nationalization of the sector, thus, was a direct economic threat to the US and UK governments, and of course the multinational oil firms operating in Libya. The nationalization of BP's Libyan subsidiary in 1971 would not have come as too much of a surprise to the UK government, and yet it would enrage them all the same as it was seen to have political motivations (US Department of State, 1971). Appeals to the US government would gain tacit support, but would ultimately be in vain as the US would also become subject to the RCC's nationalization policies. As of September, 1973, the measures taken by Gaddafi and the RCC had resulted in a reduction of around half the value of US assets in Libya compared with beforehand. Among the steps taken in what was considered to be a policy of 'resource nationalism,' was the nationalization of 51

percent of most of the important U.S. oil companies including Occidental and Oasis (US Department of State, 1973).

Friction in relations between the US, UK and Libya, as a result of territorial concerns, unsuccessful arms deals and oil bartering, cannot be viewed in isolation from not only the wider context of the Cold War, but also the Israel/Palestine question. In reality, it is impossible to understand Libya's relationship with the West at this stage without an appreciation of how Gaddafi and the Revolutionary Government viewed the wider Arab World and Israel. Libya, like other Arab countries, had inherited a legacy with the remnants of a colonial past and a history of subjugation at the hands of European powers. The creation of Israel, moreover, was understood by the Libyan government within these wider colonialist and imperialist parameters (El Warfally, 1988). Thus, as far as the Libyan government was concerned, the 'Palestinian cause' and the ensuing conflict between Arab countries and Israel was considered to be *the* major issue in the Middle East region (El Warfally, 1988). What's more, the RCC had been candid about their position on the matter. They took up what was considered by the U.S. to be a 'radical' position, one which refused to recognize Israel, called for its destruction, by military means if necessary, and demanded the return of all Palestinians to land they had hitherto occupied. Only this itself, could bring about the return of Arab dignity. Closely tied to these aspirations of Gaddafi and the RCC was the notion of Arab unity, or aspirations toward Pan-Arabism. This movement had been fostered by the Egyptian revolutionary leader Nasser, who had been a great influence not only on Gaddafi but on the Libyan revolution itself. On seizing control of Libya, Gaddafi was quick to reciprocate Nasser's revolutionary nationalist Arab zeal by assuring: 'Tell Nasser that this is his revolution, we are his men, and all Libya's capabilities are under his disposal for the battle' (Gaddafi, 1969; cited in El Warfally, 1988).

The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, were defenders of Israel's right to exist and were pursuing a political process to arrive at a peaceful two-state settlement. The wide gap in the stances adopted meant that the Israel-Palestine question would represent a major obstacle to the potential for better relations. All the while, peace and stability in the region were of critical national interest to both the US and the UK. An escalation of the conflict could have an immediate impact on Western economic interests in the region, and potentially lead to intervention by both super powers and the onset of a third, possibly even more catastrophic World War. This

seemingly irreconcilable difference in foreign policy was naturally a significant barrier to better relations between the countries, as was articulated in official documents of the time:

‘Libya’s primary objective under Qadhafi’s leadership has been the mobilization of the Arabs to bring about the elimination of Israel as an independent Jewish state and the restoration of their homeland to the Palestinian Arabs. He judges the leadership of his brother Arabs, as he does that of the United States, chiefly in terms of their attitude toward Israel. Inasmuch as the United States is seen as the chief guarantor of Israel’s existence, normal US-Libyan government relations in any field becomes virtually impossible, including technical cooperation’ (State Department, 1973).

This assessment of the state of US - Libyan relations is noteworthy for two principal reasons. First and foremost, it conveys a sense of acute pessimism with regards the prospects for normal relations, downplaying the likelihood of any improvements in the foreseeable future. Secondly, it is possible to detect how the figure of Gaddafi was being viewed as critical in terms of his leadership of Libya and the foreign policy it was pursuing. In fact, at around this stage it is possible to detect a conflation of Libya, or the Libyan Government, with the Libyan leader Gaddafi. That is to say, the Libyan problem, the problems emanating from that state, become the Gaddafi problem; both identities are almost merged into one. This conflation would become a recurring theme in official documents of the time and in future constructions of ‘Libya’. In a CIA memorandum from 1973, Director Schlesinger addressed National Security Advisor Kissinger about the ‘problem of Qadhafi’. This problem is seemingly exacerbated by the strong position which the Libyan leader is believed to be in. Schlesinger assesses that Gaddafi is ‘well entrenched in Libya’ and with ‘no successor in sight’. Gaddafi is also seen to be the main power broker since ‘he dominates the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which makes all important decisions’.

The threat being posed by Gaddafi to American interests was beginning to be understood as considerable. Schlesinger breaks this threat down into certain key facets: his power to nationalize the oil industry, his ‘advocacy of acts of terrorism outside of Palestine and to the subversion of regimes which do not agree with him,’ and his ability to ‘invoke and manipulate ideas with strong emotional appeal to most Arabs...including those in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula’ (Central Intelligence Agency, 1973). Understood in this way, moreover, the conflation of Libya with Gaddafi translates into

certain foreign policy options. These revolve around efforts to undermine the Libyan leader, if not take measures to bring about his removal. There is indeed evidence to suggest that at least part of the US policy at the time was dedicated to 'covert' operations involving the CIA. One such proposal had the objective of conveying 'moderate influences' to some members of the Revolutionary Command Council so as to maintain 'normal friendly diplomatic and commercial relations with Libya, including the protection of US oil interests'. (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974). At any rate, the document in question shows that this particular covert action was 'rescinded' due to changes in the then 'current political realities' (Schlesinger, 1973). What is unclear is the extent of these operations; that is to say, whether or not claims made by Gaddafi about US involvement in unsuccessful coup attempts were indeed accurate.

Gaddafi was also increasingly becoming a notorious figure within British foreign policy circles. Comments made by the Libyan leader in support of Irish paramilitary organization the IRA were treated with a mixture of consternation and anger by British officials. In March 1973 a vessel was intercepted by the Irish authorities which contained several tons of arms and explosives. At a Cabinet Meeting, Prime Minister Edward Heath was informed that the arms were 'intended for the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army,' and also that there was 'reason to believe that they had been loaded in Libya' (CAB 128-51-20). What followed was a period of diplomacy in which the British government sought to receive assurances from Libyan leader Gaddafi that there would be no support given to Irish paramilitary organizations. Somewhat controversially, these efforts were framed within the context of outstanding financial claims- weapons deliveries, missile defence system, expropriation of British oil interests- leading to charges much later by the British media that this in fact amounted to appeasement and-or bribery in the face of terrorism (Verkaik, 2009). As well as the direct security threat the IRA posed to the United Kingdom, the UK government at the time was also concerned about economic interests in Libya. The policy seemed to be bearing fruit as Gaddafi made a public statement affirming that Libya was not providing material support to the IRA, being followed later by a period in which Libya seemed to withdraw its support (FCO 87 948; cited in Ali, 2014).

The aspiration of Arab unity held by Gaddafi and the RCC would never materialize, much to Gaddafi's own frustration. In fact, one could say that the opposite

would come to pass. Significant differences in opinion between Libya and other Arab states over how to solve the Israel-Palestine question, among other things, would mean that the issue was not only troublesome for Libyan-US relations, nor solely relations between Libya and Israel, but also relations between Libya and other Arab states (St John, 2002). Continuous accusations of Libyan subversion and terrorist activities surfaced, both within the Middle East region and also in Sub-Saharan Africa. Often these activities would take place within states which had been previously criticized by the Libyan government for having too weak a position on the Palestinian cause (Cooper and Grandolini, 2015).

In particular, one could highlight relations with Libya's neighbour Egypt, which after the assassination of Nasser would become extremely strained. Differences of opinion regarding the best way to fight the Palestinian cause, along with tit-for-tat accusations about siding with one or another of the Cold War superpowers were never far from the animosity between both governments. As far as the latter was concerned, Libya was thought to be in favour with the Soviet Union, while Egypt was often chastised by Libya for what it believed to be its proximity to the United States. As diplomatic relations became increasingly untenable, the Egyptian government was moved to withdraw its troops from Libyan territory and actively oppose U.S. arms sales to Libya. Such deals were only viewed to be strengthening Libya, something that may well make Egypt more vulnerable as a result. What's more, these acts turned out to be mere precursors of an even more ruthless foreign policy aimed at subversive activities within Libya and the removal/assassination of the Libyan leader. This can be seen in specific U.S diplomatic cables, which speak of an approach made by the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Ismail Fahmy who had requested assistance from the U.S in 'getting rid of' Gaddafi (State Department, 1975).

At this stage, it is also possible to detect an increased sense of anxiety amongst U.S officials regarding the nature of and the potential threats posed by increased Libyan-Soviet cooperation. This appears to have been articulated for the first time -at least in terms of the gravity of the potential threat- in a memo from National Security Council Staff Robert B. Oakley (1975). While Oakley grades any alliance as 'unnatural', the conclusion reached is that this potentiality 'must be taken seriously as a threat to the objectives of the United States in the Middle East and to moderate Arab Governments'. Commenting on the conclusion of a recent billion dollar arms deal

between both countries, one which is described as a ‘major expansion of the military relationship,’ the allusion is also made to a ‘broader’ issue of ‘whether Moscow will gain a new strategic foothold along the Mediterranean. This new articulation of Libya within a wider ‘cold war’ discourse points to a change in foreign policy direction for Oakley. Acknowledging that the United States policy approach had been up until that time ‘essentially passive’, it is suggested that it may be time to switch to a more ‘active’ response to the threats that are being posed to U.S. national security and strategic interests in the Middle East.

TERRORISM, SUBVERSION AND HOSTILITY

Under the premiership of Ronald Reagan, relations between the United States and Libya would deteriorate even further than what they had done under Carter. One of the more immediate hostilities that manifested itself during this period was in disputes over territorial boundaries, something that had become somewhat of a recurring theme by now. This would ultimately lead to several skirmishes involving navy and aircraft in the waters adjacent to the Libyan coast. One such incident took place following a U.S. military exercise in the Gulf of Sidra, which had the dual purpose of asserting ‘freedom of navigation in the Libyan-claimed waters in the Gulf of Sidra’ and ‘to conduct an open ocean missile exercise’ (US National Security Council, 1981). In spite of the seemingly provocative nature of the U.S. military’s plans, Reagan showed himself to be bullish and uncompromising should the actions result in some form of Libyan retaliation. Reflecting on this hypothetical eventuality, Reagan analogizes recalling an anecdote whereby a group of ‘Benedictine monks’ would usually ‘treat visitors with open arms’ except should they ‘get unruly,’ in which case they would be ‘taken out back by some hefty monks and shown the error of their ways’ (National Security Council, 1981).

This particular intervention by Reagan is interesting for certain reasons. Firstly, it shows a President who is not afraid to carry out actions which could have been construed as provocative gestures, placing U.S. military service personnel in direct danger- and perhaps also the estimated 2,500 U.S. citizens within Libya-. Secondly, it

gives some clues as to how the U.S. government viewed its military presence in the region and also its relationship with Libya. From his anecdote, it is the *Libyans* who are considered to be the ‘visitors’, regardless of the fact that the military exercise is to take place within 50 miles of the Libyan coast. What is more, the Americans are portrayed as essentially ‘the good guys’, the righteous ‘monks,’ who although generally peaceful, when stirred are capable of punishing those who do not follow the rules. The reason why this particular stretch of water was viewed as so important was because of its strategic import. This provided access to northern Africa, but more importantly, the Mediterranean Sea led directly onto Western Europe and so could possibly come to represent a spot of vulnerability taking into consideration the Cold War context.

All the same, the flashpoints taking place during the U.S. naval drills must be understood as something of a sideshow; there were much greater issues now dividing both nations. For one thing, Libya was now being perceived by many in the U.S. government to be a ‘proxy’ or ‘client’ of the Soviet Union (Warfally, 2009). Later in 1984 the neoconservative Heritage Foundation, so influential in assisting Reagan in formulating policy, was speaking of ‘Moscow’s Thriving Libya Connection’ (Phillips, 1984). For Phillips it was not a wholly natural alliance, but more of a ‘marriage of convenience’; for instance, Libya’s insatiable desire for Soviet weaponry, Libyan oil for ‘oil hungry’ Soviet satellites, and the shared interest of undermining U.S. influence in the region. Since the Reagan administration was determined to set the U.S. on a different foreign policy path away from détente towards a more assertive role vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, any incline of cooperation between both adversaries would naturally be awarded significant attention and concern in policy making.

From a Libyan perspective, it was the United States and her allies who were guilty of subversive acts and subterfuge. Libyan leader Gaddafi was himself the target of assassination plots and failed coup attempts, the presumed source of which being directly traced back to the U.S. government and agencies such as the CIA (Warfally, 2009). These accusations were greeted unsurprisingly with regular denials on the part of the Reagan administration²⁰. It should be noted, nonetheless, that during this particular period considerable evidence has come to light which shows that covert operations were

20 One of the many examples of this can be found in Secretary of State Haig’s presentation to the media on terrorist activity. On being asked about CIA involvement in attempts to overthrow the Gaddafi government, the Secretary categorically states ‘we reject Qadhafi’s charge of US involvement in last month’s fighting in Libya’.

in fact an important part of Reagan's foreign policy. These were used in particular to undermine governments deemed to pose a threat to the security of the United States by existing out with its sphere of influence and understood to be aligned with the Soviet Union. The Iran-Contra scandal was one particular example and the testimonies taken from key military and secret service personnel suggest that the Libyan government claims may not have been as far-fetched as what U.S. officials claimed them to be.

Meanwhile, relations between Libya and the United Kingdom were also becoming increasingly strained. In 1984, a diplomatic crisis ensued as a result of an incident outside the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in London, in which a British police officer Yvonne Fletcher was shot dead from automatic weapon fire coming from inside the embassy. Along with the British policewoman, a group of anti-Gaddafi protesters were also shot following the tense stand-off outside between pro and anti-Gaddafi protesters. The ensuing siege would last for a further 10 days from the fatal shooting, during which the embassy remained surrounded by British army units amid a period of high tension both in London and in Tripoli where British embassy personnel were also stationed. The siege only came to an end once the British government allowed for the Libyans to leave the embassy, under the banner of diplomatic immunity and in exchange for reciprocal measures in Tripoli facilitating the safe return to the U.K of British staff there. The agreement reached was not the end of the matter, however, as the British government took measures subsequently to break off diplomatic relations with Libya.

Perhaps unsurprisingly both the Libyan and British governments would go on to blame each other for the tragic outcome. The Libyan authorities criticized the British for allowing the Libyan dissidents to stage the demonstration in the first place. On the other hand, for the British government, this was further evidence of terrorist activity perpetrated by Libya. Such actions were understood to be wholly unjustifiable and were condemned as a 'barbaric outrage' due to the excessive and indiscriminate use of deadly force used by the Libyans inside the embassy. Speaking on the 25th April 1984, some days after the shooting, the British Home Secretary Leon Brittan outlined the conditions for severing diplomatic ties with Libya, referring not only to the exchange of diplomatic staff between London and Tripoli. Brittan was also keen to add that the British government should 'be satisfied that all weapons and explosives were removed from the Libyan People's Bureau, and that their buildings in the United Kingdom were no longer capable of being used as a base for terrorist acts' (Hansard, 1984).

Across the Atlantic it was becoming clear that the Reagan administration was looking for a more robust response to Libyan terrorist actions. Even before the bombing of the *La Belle* Berlin discotheque- which was given as the primary reason for the US assault on Tripoli in 1986- plans were being made amongst security officials for a military response which would serve to deter future terrorist actions against US and Western targets. In 1985 National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane outlines the rationale for ‘decisive action in Libya,’ which moreover, ‘would send a signal’ to other countries plotting against Western interests. Libya was deemed to be not only ‘the weightiest leg of the terrorist tripod,’ having the ‘longest record in support of terrorism,’ but also a target which would be ‘less likely to encounter a ‘more serious Soviet challenge’ (National Security Council, 1985). It is clear that while US officials were contemplating a range of measures at this stage, in the last instance the ultimate objective would be none other than the overthrow of Gaddafi himself.

The seemingly inexorable deterioration in relations between the US and Libya would give rise to a further range of economic sanctions, as set out in the National Security Decision Directive 205, which was drafted in January 1986. Making passing reference to previous terrorist actions in Rome and Vienna, the directive documents a ‘widening and accelerating’ of the ‘scope and tempo of Libyan-supported-terrorist activity,’ which was being directed at Western states including the U.S, its allies in Western Europe and Israel. The breadth of the sanctions to be implemented was seen to be reflective of this ‘unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States’. Firstly, the directive outlines a unilateral blanket ban in trade and economic transactions between the US and Libya, both in terms of exports and imports, including within its remit the provision of services. This development built on an already strict set of measures previously agreed to limit credit facilities made available for investment in Libya. Secondly, the directive also aimed at travel connections between both countries, would be severely curtailed and restricted to emergency cases, those which involved individuals fleeing Libya, or alternatively those which were undertaking journalistic tasks. The document explicitly states that the primary objectives of these measures, and the concomitant diplomatic and public affairs campaigns, was the isolation of Libya and the restriction of Libyan activities subversive of Western interests.

At the end of March 1986 another 'freedom of navigation' exercise conducted by the U.S military would lead to further altercations with Libyan aircraft and sea vessels. The objective of the mission was clearly set out by national security advisor John Poindexter as being a challenge 'in the Gulf of Sidra to demonstrate that we do not accept Qadhafi's claim to the Gulf' (National Security Council, 1986). This time the Libyan armed forces fulfilled earlier threats of retaliation made by the Libyan government and confronted the perceived breaches of Libyan territorial waters. After firing several missiles at US aircraft, all of which failing to inflict any damage, the U.S response left one of the Libyan marine vessels destroyed and the other severely damaged (Clift and Gerstenzang, 1986). The U.S aircraft proceeded to attack a Libyan missile launching site in Sirte rendering out of action the radar system which controlled the SA-5 (surface to air missile) defence system. While the Libyans suffered casualties from the sunken patrol boat- normal crew being estimated at 27-, no American losses were reported.

This would not be the last military confrontation between Libya and the United States taking place in the year 1986. In fact, around two weeks later US aircraft would again be attacking mainland Libya, this time as part of a much larger operation aimed at a range of targets including Gaddafi's own compound. As had been the case for practically all of Reagan's presidency, the main discourse used to construct Libya during the attack was that of 'terrorism'. As justification for the US bombings in Libya, Reagan points to the terrorist attack on a Berlin discotheque which was frequented by US armed forces. The carnage accounted for the life of one American Sergeant, one Turkish woman, with scores more being injured. Attributing a direct link between this particular attack and the US retaliation in Libya, President Reagan assures that 'the evidence is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of La Belle discotheque was planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime.' The American response, although violent, is portrayed as a measured act of self-defence: 'We Americans are slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the use of force – and we did. We tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic sanctions, and demonstrations of military force. None succeeded' (Reagan, 1986).

The objectives of the decision to use force through air-strikes were also set-out by Reagan and his government. First and foremost, although the mission was clearly limited in scale and scope, the US government wanted to punish Libya for what it

deemed to be an accumulation of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests and citizens. By attacking Libya directly, the US was sending a clear message that it was willing to use its military to achieve its foreign policy aims. 'We believe that this pre-emptive action against his terrorist installations will not only diminish Colonel Qadhafi's capacity to export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior (Reagan, 1986)'. This last comment is interesting in as far as it demonstrates a belief that the figure of Gaddafi can still be influenced, albeit by coercive means.

As far as the identity of Libya is concerned, what can be ascertained from Reagan's speech is the construction of a dual Libyan Other. On the one hand, the terrorist actions are attributed almost exclusively to Libyan leader Gaddafi, barring a few mentions of the Libyan 'regime'. In addition to references of Gaddafi's 'reign of terror', also mentioned are 'Qadhafi's subversive activities', and Gaddafi's reckless 'policy of intimidation'. On the other hand, Reagan is at pains to draw a clear line between the figure of Gaddafi and the 'Libyan people'. These were a 'decent people caught in the grip of a tyrant,' who 'had been friends of the United States' prior to the military coup of 1969. And in a move to establish a clear difference in ethical identity between the 'Libyan people' and Gaddafi Reagan opines: 'I'm sure that today most Libyans are ashamed and disgusted that this man has made their country a synonym for barbarism around the world'. This particular construction of a dual Libyan Other is significant in as far as it is one that would be returned to much later in the future during the military intervention of 2011.

The UK government was also constructing the US attacks on Libya through a 'terrorism' discourse. In explaining U.K. support for the attacks – support which manifested itself through the provision of bases to U.S. aircraft involved in the bombings- Thatcher refers to the dangers involved in appeasement of such crimes: 'Terrorism attacks free societies and plays on those fears. If those tactics succeed, terrorism saps the will of free people to resist.' For that and other reasons, thus, 'Terrorism has to be defeated; it cannot be tolerated or side-stepped'. One difference to be noted from both Thatcher's and Reagan's speeches is the construction of the Libyan Other. Unlike Reagan's speech, Thatcher does not make any effort to separate the Libyan Other into two parts. In fact, almost all the references point to 'Libyan terrorism,' 'Libyan terrorist attacks,' 'Libyan involvement,' or the 'Libyan government'. In any case there is little doubt in Thatcher's understanding of the 'growing threat of

terrorism,' of which Libya was a main player. 'The time had come for action,' she argues, 'the United States took it. Its decision was justified, and, as friends and allies, we support it' (Thatcher, 1986).

All the same, it would soon seem that US bombs would not be enough to dissuade Gaddafi and the Libyan government from attacks on US and UK interests. On December 21, 1988, Libyan terrorist activity reached new destructive heights; the now infamous Lockerbie bombing would see Pan Am flight 103 blow up over Lockerbie, Scotland, resulting in the deaths of all 259 passengers on board, and also 11 innocents in the Scottish village engulfed by the fireballs and pounded by the shrapnel falling from the sky. In the years ahead Western accusations of Libyan involvement would focus on two suspected Libyan intelligence officers, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Kalifa Fhimah, although the ultimate responsibility for the atrocity would be attributed to Libyan leader Gaddafi and his government. Strenuous denials of Libyan involvement notwithstanding, the intelligence gathered by Western agencies was enough to convince the George H. W. Bush government in Washington and the John Major government in London that Libya had blood on its hands.

Such was the perception of non-compliance by Libya in the high profile inquiry which followed, and its refusal to extradite the two Libyan suspects for trial, the United Nations Security Council was moved to impose sanctions for the first time on a particular nation-state (De Jonge Oudraat, 2000). These sanctions to be applied multilaterally would accompany those which the US was imposing unilaterally to go on to have a significant impact on Libyan economic development and its political relations with Western states. Ten years would pass before the UN sanctions were lifted and only after the Libyan government had given up the suspects for trial in The Hague under Scots law. Libya also assumed responsibility for its officials' involvement in the case; agreed financial compensation with the victims' families; renounced terrorism categorically and agreed to cooperate with any further inquiries into both the Lockerbie bombing and that of the French airliner exploded over Niger.

CHAPTER 4 PUNISHING THE 'ROGUE'

During large swathes of the 1990s, the principle US geopolitical discourse deployed to construct states deemed to be a threat was that of the ‘rogue state’ discourse²¹²². Libya, having been hitherto part of a tumultuous and conflictual relationship with the West, was naturally a prime object for this particular way of viewing the new post-Cold War context. This chapter seeks to first of all to trace the meanings associated with the ‘rogue state’ concept. It will then illuminate the implications of these ways of framing Libya; the relationship between identity construction and the Western foreign policies executed during this period; and a review of the key events and tensions which helped shape the relationship between Libya and the U.S.

The use of the trope ‘rogue’ in contemporary Western geopolitical discourse can be traced back to the Clinton administration. That said, there are some clear antecedents, having been preceded by the use of terms such as ‘renegade,’ which was used by President George H. W. Bush, and before that ‘outlaw,’ which had been used by the Reagan administration (Litwak, 2000). The term ‘rogue’ functions in a similar way. Etymologically ‘rogue’ can be traced back to the 16th century Latin verb *rogare*, taking on the English meaning ‘to beg’, and which would thus refer to an ‘idle vagrant’. In what concerns us here, the contemporary usage of the word ‘rogue’ now points semantically to a different range of significations. Most benignly speaking, one could speak of a person with unsatisfactory behavior, but who nevertheless possesses likeable attributes. Due to the exclusively pejorative sense in which ‘rogue’ has been used with the object ‘Libya,’ the use of this particular referent would be imprecise. More accurate, it seems, would be the definition of ‘a dishonest or unprincipled man,’ or perhaps better still, a ‘person or thing that behaves in an aberrant or unpredictable way, typically with damaging or dangerous effects’ (Oxford dictionaries online).

In what concerns US geopolitical discourse, the concept ‘rogue state’ has been constituted along lines not too dissimilar; states which are placed in the category are considered to be dangerous or a threat. In a variation of this same theme, Anthony Lake (1994) had previously offered his own account of what he called ‘backlash states’.

21 During this period the most pronounced ‘rogue’ states were said to be Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya.

22 It has been argued by Klare (2000) and elsewhere that the ‘rogue state’ discourse was used as a means of maintaining U.S. military expenditure at high levels, following the dissipation of the Soviet threat at the end of the 1980s.

Writing in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, President Clinton's National Security Advisor spoke of the 'recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family of nations (now committed to the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the promotion of collective security) but also assault its basic values'. Lake also argues that such states seem 'incapable of adapting' to the 'international society' of states.

This is succinctly articulated by then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: 'those (rogue states) that not only do not have a part to play in the international system, but whose very being involves being outside of it and throwing, literally, hand grenades inside in order to destroy it' (Albright, 1998; cited in Litwak, 2000: 238).

Albright and Lake's declarations are noteworthy for reasons above and beyond the construction of a security threat. Both politicians delineate a concept which is fully present to their experiences of the world, seemingly unambiguous, essentialist, and one which reflects an objective and imminently decipherable reality. These states are unambiguously threatening. In spite of the fact that 'rogue state' is a highly abstract concept, which could and would be applied to certain cases and not others, at the whim and mercy of power structures in Washington. The identity of the 'rogue', or 'backlash state,' is ascribed here as being ontologically fixed; for Albright, the dangers emanate from their very being; while for Lake, the states seem 'incapable' of changing. This is a move which passes over the complexity of what are very different states –Libya, Iraq, Iran, North Korea- and one which is negligent to the complex historical and political processes, not to mention antagonisms, which have shaped their relationships with the West. It will now be necessary to see how 'Libya' in particular has been constituted by the 'rogue state' discourse.

There were several elements to the designation of Libya as a 'rogue state'. Firstly, there were the past and continued charges of the country being involved in international terrorism. Speaking in 1993 President Clinton highlighted the Lockerbie bombing as the major issue defining the US-Libya relationship: 'we have one huge barrier that overrides everything else right now, and that is the determination of the United States to see that the people who have been charged with the Pan Am 103 disaster are released from Libya and subject to a legitimate trial'. Another of the criteria which helped to designate Libya as a 'rogue state' was the 'weapons of mass

destruction' issue. Speaking in 1994 at a conference in Brussels, President Clinton referred to the 'clear and present' danger coming from 'rogue states such as Iran and Libya' due to 'growing missile capabilities'. Not only that, but also 'there are disturbing reports of efforts to smuggle nuclear materials into and out of Eastern Europe.' The references Clinton makes here to international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are significant in that they represent two of the main security threats in the post-Cold War period. As has been noted previously, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bi-polar international system marked a change in how dangers were being perceived with greater emphasis placed on de-territorialised threats.

And yet the emphasis on de-territorialised threats does not annul completely the threats emanating from territorial entities such as 'rogue states;' it is just that a link is now being established between the two. In terms of foreign policy, the implications which emerge from the 'rogue state' discourse are significant; the identity of the Other is constructed in such a way that this leads almost inevitably to *exclusionary* policies. Since these states do not play by the rules of 'international society,' the 'international community,' nor the 'family of nations,' they cannot be considered legitimate members and therefore have no place within their boundaries. The 'rogue state' constituted in this way is to be punished accordingly by way of being shunned and ostracised from the 'community' itself. Quite obvious difficulties would arise for any Western government looking to engage with a 'rogue state' government. Any possibilities for dialogue and diplomacy are curtailed, not least because, as Robert Litwak astutely deduces: 'when a negotiation involves a "rogue", even a reciprocated concession can be cast as an appeasement' (Litwak, 2000).

Returning to the specific case at hand, it is possible to trace the discursive effects of the 'rogue state' discourse on US foreign policy towards Libya. The identity of Libya constructed in this way had some very clear implications for US foreign policy toward Libya. Since, as was mentioned earlier, official US discourse constructed Libya as being 'incapable' of change, that is to say its identity is fixed or frozen, Lake was opting for a policy of 'containment'. According to Lake the US. has 'to contain the influence of these states, sometimes by isolation, sometimes through pressure, sometimes by diplomatic and economic measures' (Lake, 1994).

One of the ways in which Libya was to be contained was through the continued

and extended use of unilateral economic sanctions against the country which began in 1986. The Clinton administration aimed to increase the pressure on Libya -and the US's European allies for that matter-, through the 'Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)' of 1996. The purpose of the Act was ultimately to deprive both countries of foreign investment, the deduction being that this investment would otherwise be used to bolster the regimes in power and potentially contribute towards the acquirement of WMD or the financing of terrorist organizations. According to President Clinton, 'The Iran and Libya sanctions bill I sign today will help to deny those countries the money they need to finance international terrorism. It will limit the flow of resources necessary to obtain weapons of mass destruction. It will heighten pressure on Libya to extradite the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103' (Clinton, 1996). Moreover, various sanctions could be imposed on companies operating out with the territorial boundaries of the United States, thus adding an important twist to the type of unilateral sanctions often imposed by governments.

As far as the UK government was concerned, the 'extraterritorial' nature of the ILSA was quite unacceptable –a position in line with its European Union partners-. The vehement EU response declared: 'The European Union (...) is opposed to the use of extraterritorial legislation, both on legal and policy grounds. (...) Such laws represent an unwarranted interference by the U.S. with the sovereign right of the EU to legislate over its citizens and companies, and are, in the opinion of the EU, contrary to international law' (Official EU response, 1997; cited in Ryngaert, 2008). The culmination of EU efforts to challenge ILSA would be Regulation 2271/96 which aimed to mitigate the potentially damaging effects that ILSA could have on European companies. Both the EU regulation and the UK response to the extraterritorial claims of the US –being essentially one and the same thing- drew heavily on a 'Protection of Trading Interests' order passed by the UK government in 1980 (Layton and Parry, 2004). From the original document it is possible to detect parallels with the more recent response both in content and tone: 'Finally, and most important, the U.S. courts claim subject matter jurisdiction over activities of non-US persons outside the U.S.A. to an extent which is quite unacceptable to the UK and many other nations' (UK Protection of Interests Order, 1980: cited from Layton and Parry, 2004).

The UK government's posture in opposition to the extraterritorial legislation passed by the US government is indicative of a somewhat softer overall foreign policy

approach towards Libya. That is not to say that John Major's Conservative government was not anxious to see a resolution to the case of the extradition of the Lockerbie bombing suspects; alongside both the US and France, the UK was certainly pushing for a successful outcome to this issue. Yet the efforts being made by the British government were on the whole restricted to joint incentives within a multilateral framework. For instance, attempts were made, by and large successful attempts, to bring the European Council on board, as Major stressed in a speech in 1991: 'The European Council has endorsed the demands which we, France and the United States have made to the Libyan Government requiring them to abandon their support of international terrorism and to hand over the alleged perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing' (Major, 1991).

There is also evidence to suggest that the British government was more open to dialogue with Libya than their US counterparts; that is to say, in reference to the three main issues; the proliferation of weapons, the successful conclusion of the Lockerbie question and ensuring the end of Libyan terrorist activity. In terms of weapons, John Major showed himself to be in favour of pursuing proliferation issues 'through the treaty (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons treaty)' and also 'bilaterally' (Major, 1994). Speaking in November of 1992, Major reported limited success in terms of Libyan terrorist activity, reporting that the Libyan authorities had 'closed, and in some cases dismantled, many of the camps previously used to house or train terrorists. They have also given us information on their links with the Provisional Irish Republican Army which we believe may prove useful'. The Prime Minister goes on to state that it is the issue of the Lockerbie suspects which was still a stumbling block for improved relations between the two countries, highlighting that there was no 'hidden agenda' and that his government was 'not seeking to undermine the regime in Libya' (Major, 1992).

It is also quite clear that this was being pursued without doing undue damage to British economic interests in Libya. This of course had to be achieved with the greatest of care nevertheless, being sensitive not to incur negative press, the wrath of the Lockerbie victims' families, and the public at large. This delicate position was indeed difficult to maintain, what with the incessant questioning at House of Commons debates regarding British business interests in Libya. One way this was to be dealt with was through the appearance of ambivalence. In response to a question regarding any assistance the British government were giving to British firms operating in Libya to

secure contracts the Secretary of State for Trade replied: ‘We have neither encouraged not discouraged British companies which wish to trade in Libya. This has been a matter for their commercial judgement alone’ (Lilley, 1991).

It is also interesting to note that the term ‘rogue state’ never became part of British geopolitical lexicon in the same way as it did across the Atlantic. Politicians in both the Major and Blair governments were careful to avoid the term. The performative nature of the ‘rogue state’ discourse has already been touched upon; it not only attempts to describe an external reality, but it *does* something since it constitutes Libya in such a way as to make it difficult to subsequently pursue certain foreign policy options. This difference between US. and UK official discourse therefore appears to be significant and can perhaps explain the different foreign policy approaches pursued at this time.

CHAPTER 5 COMING IN FROM THE COLD AND THE WAR ON TERROR

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH LIBYA: ON THE ROAD TO ‘REHABILITATION’

The Libyan government’s decision to hand over the two suspected Lockerbie bombers in 1999 must be considered as a decisive event in the history of its relations with the US and UK. Guilt, in this high profile case of terrorism, had all but been assigned to Libya publicly and through Western media, if not judicially in a court of law. This meant that any tangible concessions by the US or UK governments on this matter would have surely amounted to political suicide. From a Libyan perspective, years of damaging sanctions had perhaps taken their toll, leading them to accept the negotiated agreement mediated by Nelson Mandela, and leading to judicial proceedings in the Netherlands under Scottish law. The conviction of one of the suspects, Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi, would nevertheless render Libya liable for considerable

compensatory payments to the victims' families²³, and pressure for an official statement recognizing Libyan culpability²⁴. Justice, it would appear, had been carried out, even if the terrorist atrocity would live on in the collective memories of all countries involved. At this stage, however, a significant obstacle had been removed to improved relations between the Libyan government and the West.

What followed was an unprecedented reversal in relations between a once 'rogue state,' one which had been diplomatically ostracised from the 'international community,' and the two countries which had hitherto been its chief denouncers. A foreign policy of 'rapprochement' would lead to increased cooperation in a number of fields. Chief among these were: security and intelligence sharing, closer economic relationships – in particular in the oil and gas sector with the return of US and UK multinationals-, and also developments in the cultural and educational spheres. 'Libya' would now be constructed in the US and UK as a country harnessing the *potential* to change its past ways and to follow a path set out for its return to the international fold. Meaning was given to these events principally through the deployment of a 'rehabilitation' discourse, which would also be spread in foreign policy circles and media channels. If Libya was now being understood in terms of change, reformation, and/or reintegration, the US and UK were concurrently being positioned as the reformer, the one with an ethical *responsibility* to assist Libya on its path to 'redemption' (Takeyh, 2001), as it were.

This chapter will trace this rapprochement, linking it not only to key developments in the foreign policy sphere, but also to the new ways in which the geopolitical world was being understood in the West. No one event can define any relationship, however important it may be. Rather, developments such as that witnessed in the Lockerbie case are just one strand in a complex myriad of factors, understood and given meaning through higher geopolitical and geostrategic discourses and logics, of which the 'war on terror' can be viewed as an important case in point. Ultimately, it can

23 Families of the victims of French commercial flight -UTA 77-would also seek and successfully obtain compensation from the Libyan government for the downing of the aircraft in question, act which killed all passengers on board.

24 The letter presented by the Libyan government to the UN Security Council in 2003 states that 'Libya as a sovereign state has facilitated the bringing to justice of the two suspects charged with the bombing and accepts responsibility for the actions of its officials' cited from BBC. This apparent acceptance of culpability would later be qualified by top Libyan officials who suggest that this was done to facilitate the lifting of sanctions. See 'The Conspiracy Files: Lockerbie programme Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi interview' BBC (2006).

be shown that the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse used by the West failed and the policy of rapprochement pursued by the US and UK governments was never actually fulfilled. As will be detailed further ahead, this can be understood as a symptom of a perceived lack of progress in the political sphere, and also more generally in terms of human rights. The Libyan government failed to bring about the structural changes necessary so as to re-insert itself without contradictions within the neo-liberal paradigm, and the figure of Gaddafi would once again become the source of tension between Libya and the West. The consequences of this incomplete ‘rehabilitation’ will be crucial for how Western leaders construct ‘Libya’ and ‘Gaddafi’ during the Western military intervention of 2011.

While the developments in the Lockerbie case mentioned above can certainly be considered a crucial step towards the normalization of relations between Libya and both the US and UK, it would be premature to deduce a rigid cause-effect relationship. A post-structuralist theoretical framework should be able to shed light on how such developments are also informed by wider changes taking place at a structural level within the broader Western geopolitical ‘discursive formation’. That is to say, how changes at the geopolitical or geostrategic level have informed the US and UK subject positions, provoking and facilitating changes in their posture towards Libya. Western governments do not simply formulate policies in a rational way, fully present to themselves, and in response to the policies of foreign governments – much as this is also important-. Rather, the policy of rapprochement with Libya should also be viewed in terms of the wider context in which policy makers found themselves at the time, the power/knowledge relationships, and the most prevalent discourses being used to imbue that context with meaning.

It becomes apparent when one sets out to analyse relations between Libya and the West during this period that certain shifts in the geopolitical context were indeed underway even before progress in the Lockerbie case took place. For one thing, the viability of policies such as the containment of ‘rogue states,’ and the punitive sanctions regimes which accompanied it, were being increasingly questioned. Foreign policy and security ‘experts’ had already in the second half of the 1990s begun to question the wisdom of securing against the new global threats, through policies which were leading to the isolation of certain states -this scepticism would later find perhaps its maximum expression in the period after the attacks of September 11th-. Moreover, in certain cases

this also meant forfeiting economic interests and/or access to vital natural resources. The implications of this for UK, and in particular, US foreign policy towards Libya, was that previous policies of ‘containment’ would increasingly be viewed as untenable and even counterproductive.

In relation to sanctions policies, and writing in the influential *Foreign Affairs* magazine, Richard N Haas spoke of ‘Sanctioning Madness,’ which he would go on to denounce in the strongest possible terms: ‘with few exceptions, the growing use of economic sanctions to promote foreign policy objectives is deplorable’ (1997:75). Equally critical of the US foreign policy at the time were Zbigniew Brzezinski- former National Security Advisor of President Carter- and Brent Scowcroft -National Security Advisor under Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush-. Both of these establishment figures declared themselves in opposition to policies based on ‘hostile fanaticism,’ calling instead for what they saw as a ‘nuanced containment’ (1997)²⁵. This is indicative of what could be understood as a more flexible approach to what were understood to be problematic states- of which Libya could clearly be included at this time-. Meanwhile, focussing on the disastrous *human* consequences stemming from the imposition of sanctions regimes, Mueller and Mueller denounced what in their opinion amounted to the ‘Sanctions of Mass Destruction.’ The claim made by both authors being that sanctions ‘may have contributed to more deaths during the post-Cold War era than all weapons of mass destruction throughout history’ (1999:43).

If the resort to punitive sanctions and geopolitical strategies of ‘containment’ had now begun to be questioned, related discourses such as the ‘rogue state’ were also being reappraised. Having been generally speaking shunned by U.K. politicians, criticism of the recourse to ‘rogue state’ rhetoric was now becoming more widespread among influential authors on the other side of the Atlantic. Aside from a caustic repudiation by Noam Chomski (1998), critical works by Klare (2000), O’Sullivan (2000), Litwak (2000) and Henriksen (2001), all called into question the use of the ‘rogue state’ concept in foreign policy. Of particular concern was the foreign policy *determinism* often triggered by such ‘rogue’ designations, leading moreover to one-size-fits-all solutions. Litwak (2000) believes that more ‘differentiated’ strategies can be elaborated.

25 While Brzezinski and Scowcroft’s article only deals explicitly with Iran and Iraq, their thesis can be extended to Libya, also viewed at the time as a problematic state.

It soon seemed to be the case that these developments at the formal geopolitical/geostrategic level were beginning to encroach on practical foreign policy formulation. Shortly after the court judgement declaring an end to UN sanctions against Libya -those imposed unilaterally by the US would remain for some years to come- a substantive shift on 'rogue states' can be detected in official US governmental discourse. Responding to a question about one of those, North Korea, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright affirmed: 'First of all, we are now calling these states 'states of concern' (Cited in Marquis, 2000). Recalling the meanings associated with the 'rogue state' concept, this is quite a notable change in terminology. It points to an important discursive break, one which separates a before and after. Not only does it mark a considerable softening of official US language, the suggestion being that such states do not represent the same threat, but it also signals a change in foreign policy direction.

In response to these declarations by the Clinton administration, O'Sullivan (2000) of the Brookings Institute is sure that 'replacing the rogue rhetoric' is the 'way to a better policy'. Gone are the ontological certainties imposed by the 'rogue' label, whereby the object in question was defined definitively. The temporal identity of these states is opened up, unleashing the potential for change and a new range of foreign policy options. It is no longer circumscribed and restricted by past behaviour. Consequently, it becomes possible to think of alternative foreign policies and work towards a 'Politics of Dismantling Containment' (O'Sullivan, 2001). The underlying theme of interventions such as these is one of 'rehabilitation,' or 'reintegration'²⁶. As O'Sullivan now sees it, 'the goal is rehabilitation, not isolation'. Moreover, as far as Libya is concerned, this means that if it 'were to give full cooperation to the ongoing trial of those suspected of bombing Pan Am 103, it could become a candidate for measured rehabilitation'.

Other authors were also interested in the implications that this could have for the relationship between Libya and the West. For Alison Pargeter (2002), Libya was now a 'pariah no more'. A particularly pertinent example was provided by Ray Takeyh (2001) writing in *Foreign Policy* magazine, who leads his article with 'The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold'. Libya, according to Takeyh, has shown a desire to 'mend its ways,'

26 As previously mentioned, Bialasiewicz et al. (2007) trace back similar notions of 'integration' in a 'new' US 'imaginative geography' to the end of the Cold War. In the case of Libya, however, this quite clearly takes place later.

which itself can lead to ‘the road to redemption’. The key question is not whether or not Libya is capable of change- in the past this was implicitly deduced to not be the case- but rather the onus is placed on how Washington and the West manage the situation. For Takeyh the next moves to be made by the US government are thus crucial, and a ‘test of Washington’s ability to reintegrate a reforming “rogue” into the community of nations’ (Takeyh, 2001: 62). The conclusion reached is that the ‘United States should not waste the opportunity’ (Takeyh, 2001:72).

The biblical narrative of ‘redemption’ being enacted by Takeyh should not be lost to any analysis of how ‘Libya’ now appears in the Western geopolitical imagination. It is not only that Libya is now being given an opportunity to ‘mend its ways,’ but that the subject position of the West is concurrently being constituted as the one who must assist; the redeemer as it were. The idea of ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘redemption’ entails an element of forgiveness for past acts, whether this be in relation to the Western penal code or Christian values. In either of the two cases, this is not merely a choice, but an obligation. An ethical responsibility is generated, which is entirely consistent with Christian theology and liberal judicial practice, in as far as the repentant offender or criminal can find forgiveness and a path to redemption. Takeyh’s discourse imbues the Western Self with the responsibility to oversee this change for not only the good of Libya, but for the West, and the greater good of the ‘international community’; ‘Libya—and the World – will be watching’ (Takeyh, 2001: 72). Given the past entanglements of Libya, the US and the UK around the issue of terrorism, and the impact that had on US and UK populations, this point is not without importance. If Libya had become the *to be redeemed*, then the Western Self is concurrently constituted as the *redeemer*²⁷.

What followed would be tangible progress between Libya and the West on a number of issues. An indication of this could be found in the State of the Union address of 2002 in which George W. Bush conspicuously omitted Libya from his ‘axis of evil’- included were Iraq, Iran and North Korea-. One of the ways in which rapprochement materialised was in the realm of international terrorism. Following the decision to hand over the Lockerbie bombing suspects, Libya’s renouncement of its support for terrorist

27 British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw would allude to this very notion in a speech made before the House of Commons: ‘For our part, we have recognised that we now have corresponding responsibilities to enable Libya to come fully into the mainstream of the international community’ (Straw, 2004).

groups was another crucial step. Having said that, this was not as big a step for the Libyan government as it once might have been. Radical Islamic groups had been operating in Libya for some time while certain others, such as the Libyan Martyrs Movement and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, had emerged more recently in the 1990s. Both groups, like those extremist groups which had gone before them, directly opposed Gaddafi and the government of which he was the leader (Bruce St John, 2008). This meant that Libya and the West had a strategic security objective in common, one which would take on great significance after the events of September 11th.

As for as the US government was concerned, Libya's renouncement of any support for international terrorist groups would eventually culminate in what was deemed as 'the most significant step,' which was the announcement of the 'intent to rescind Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism' (Welch, 2006). This was due to Libya's 'excellent cooperation...in response to common global threats faced by the civilized world since September 11, 2001' (Rice, 2006). The answers given by Ambassador Welch are also interesting for the way that he justifies the decisions taken, or to be taken by the US government, and the emphasis put on security matters above all else. When questioned whether or not the measures taken had been influenced by the economic possibilities in Libya, including potential oil contracts, the ambassador responds: 'This decision is not undertaken because Libya has oil; this decision is undertaken because they've addressed our national security concerns' (Welch, 2006).

Nevertheless, the issue of international terrorism was not the only thing which the US government was concerned about. Also high up on the security agenda was the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), meaning that progress with Libya on this issue had become an extremely important part of any negotiations and rapprochement between the countries²⁸. Such dialogue was widely considered to be a resounding success for the West as Libya followed up its cooperation in the Lockerbie case and its renunciation of terrorist activity, with a willingness to reach agreement on this issue. Official statements were made on December 19th 2003 which confirmed Libya's abandonment of its programmes, affirmed the readiness to disclose information of past WMD activity, and accepted unconditionally the presence of weapons inspectors

28 Saif Gaddafi claimed in an article 'Libya-American Relations' (2003) that the United States had 'raised the bar' to include the issue of WMD programs, when the original UN Resolution governing the lifting of sanctions had in fact only stipulated the renunciation of future terrorist activity.

on Libyan soil with the aim of destroying all equipment related to the WMD programs. These commitments would be duly adhered to as an overwhelmingly non-confrontational three phase process (Bowen, 2006) was carried out leading to the dismantlement of decades old programs.

The significance of this outcome was not restricted to security concerns vis-à-vis the relation between Libya and the US; it was also being viewed within a wider geopolitical context and in relation to more global security concerns held by Western countries. Firstly, there was the suggestion that Libya's compliance with US demands was a direct consequence of military action in Iraq, with President Bush stating: 'for diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America' (Bush, 2004). Secondly, and linked to this first point, there was the casting of Libya as an example for other states to follow. Focussing specifically on Libya's decision to renounce its WMD, George W. Bush stated: 'and another message should be equally clear: leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, will find an open path to better relations with the United States and other free nations' (Bush, 2003)²⁹. This idea would be reiterated by officials in the years ahead such as can be seen from Ambassador Welch: 'Libya serves as an important model as we push for changes in policy by other countries such as Iran and North Korea' (Welch, 2006) and Assistant Secretary Desutter: 'from the perspective of Iran and North Korea, Libya and its people have obtained already tremendous benefits from having made that decision. And those are benefits that are available to the people of countries that make a similar one' (Desutter, 2006; cited in Welsh, 2006).

The way in which US policy makers were inclined to offer up progress made with Libya on these issues as an example for other countries such as Iran and North Korea to follow is suggestive of Thomas Barnett's security priority of 'shrinking the gap' (2005). First and foremost, these countries, like Libya had WMD weapons programs and moreover both countries existed in relative international isolation. This meant that like Libya both countries were considered to be a threat. It was clearly desirable for Western governments to secure similar agreements with Iran and North Korea for the dismantlement of their own programs and to achieve greater transparency;

²⁹ Libyan leader Gaddafi was also keen to highlight this aspect of the WMD deals concluded by affirming that 'Libya has become an example to be followed' (Gaddafi, 2004; cited from Bowen, 2006).

in short, to bring both countries out of the 'gap'. Securing Libya's weapons programmes was a crucial concern of the West; the problem of WMD could only be resolved by bringing Libya out of the 'gap' in some way. In terms of a wider strategy, thus, it can be argued that a Western policy of 'rapprochement' with Libya was not only understandable, but entirely logical.

In any case, as far as the US was concerned, developments vis-à-vis WMD programs was considered to be a crucial part of Libya's 'rehabilitation'. In reference to this progress, President Bush commented that 'old hostilities do not need to go on forever,' that the 'prize' for Libya is clearly marked out for it, and it is to 'regain a secure and respected place among the nations' (Bush, 2003). In other words, steps taken to satisfy the security concerns of the US government would be rewarded and met with a willingness on the part of the US to accept Libya back into the international community of states. Condoleezza Rice would go on to refer to the year 2003 as 'historic,' due to the 'change in direction' taken by the Libyan government. As can also be detected from Secretary Rice's comments, however, these steps were not being viewed as definitive. Placing the emphasis once more on the temporal identity of 'Libya', Rice also states that there 'is a long way to go', but it is now 'possible to really see a different future' and a way forward (Rice, 2008)

Meanwhile the United Kingdom government was positioning itself alongside its staunch ally in the 'War against terror'. British Prime Minister Tony Blair's commitment 'to stand shoulder to shoulder with America' (Blair, 2001; cited in White and Wintour, 2001) would mean that the UK would play a significant role in both wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would also mean that Libya would be viewed by the Blair government as an important ally in the struggle against terrorism. Speaking in 2004 following a meeting with Gaddafi in Tripoli, Blair states in reference to the terrorist threat: 'the World is changing and we have got to do everything we possibly can to tackle the security threat that faces us'. Moreover, in Gaddafi, Blair saw a potential partner in this challenge due to his 'common cause with us against al-Qaeda, extremists and terrorism'. According to Blair, 'security' is the 'future prize' of improved relations between the UK and Libya, 'not just of this region but the wider world - indeed our own country' (Blair, 2004; cited in Marr). Andrew Marr from the BBC was hailing this visit as 'an important moment in the world fight against terrorism' (Marr, 2004). The cooperation between the UK and Libya through their 'common cause' would, if

anything, become more important still as a result of the 2005 terrorist attack in London killing 52 people and injuring scores more.

The British government's own rapprochement with Gaddafi and Libya had a particularly prominent place in wider British security discourse. This can be deduced from the Foreign Affairs Committee's 'Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism,' which was elaborated for presentation before the House of Commons. Having concluded on: 'the primacy of the need to counter the threats from international terrorism and arms proliferation (2005:3),' the report continues: 'the Maghreb is of strategic importance to the United Kingdom and that Algeria, Morocco and Libya are of great significance to the international war against terrorism (2005:7)'. The response provided by the Foreign Secretary in the same report mirrors these conclusions: 'The Government agrees that terrorism, proliferation and other foreign policy priorities are closely inter-connected...the need to counter the threats from international terrorism and arms proliferation is at the top of the Government's international agenda' (2005:3). Moreover, 'The Government agrees that North Africa is of strategic importance to the United Kingdom. As well as North Africa's significance in the war against terrorism, the countries of the region are also important in the context of UK energy strategy and the European Neighbourhood Policy' (2005:16).

The security interests shared by the US, UK, and Libyan governments would manifest themselves in greater cooperation between security and intelligence agencies. Records show that this cooperation developed into becoming a crucial part of the 'War on Terror' strategy. This strategy was, of course, a multi-faceted operation which did not confine itself to information sharing between agencies. As Human Rights Watch has documented, during this period terrorist suspects were shared through the now infamous 'rendition' programs. Most of the suspects transferred to Libya were seemingly part of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and thus would most likely have faced imprisonment and torture on arrival. As it happens, these practices were not uncommon at the US end either, as the investigations into torture at Guantanamo Bay have demonstrated. This has led Laura Pitter from Human Rights Watch to conclude: 'not only did the U.S. deliver Gaddafi his enemies on a silver platter but it seems the CIA tortured many of them first' (Pitter, 2012).

Significant controversy has also been generated about the extent of cooperation

between British secret services and their Libyan counterparts. In one high profile case, the rendition of Abdel-Hakim Belhaj -then leader of the LIFG and sworn enemy of Gaddafi- from the UK to Libya, was undertaken most likely under the knowledge that the aforementioned suspect would be exposed to torture upon arrival into the custody of the Libyan authorities. The rendition procedure, and the intelligence that this was supposed to generate, were justified by British intelligence services through its correspondence with Libyan officials: 'The intelligence about Abu 'Abd Allah (alternative name of Abdel-Hakim Belhaj) was British. I know I did not pay for the air cargo (Mr Belhaj). But I feel I have the right to deal with you direct on this and am very grateful to you for the help you are giving us.' Commenting on the joint intelligence operations, the fruits of which the British were hoping to reap, the British intelligence officer continues: 'This was the least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the remarkable relationship we have built over recent years...I was grateful to you for helping the officer we sent out last week. Abu 'Abd Allah's information on the situation in this country is of urgent importance to us' (Identity unknown; cited in Sengupta et al, 2011).

If the resolution of security concerns represented the cornerstone of the new Libyan-American and Libyan-British relationships, the policy of 'rapprochement' would also bring with it economic benefits. Libya, of course, had long been an attractive investment opportunity for Western governments and companies, yet the sanctions and previous policy of 'containment' had put paid to any serious exploitation of this potentiality. Now that security issues had been resolved, it would not take long before economic ties were strengthened, and the resumption of business would begin in earnest³⁰. As US and UK governments knew only too well, the huge quantities of oil and gas in Libya offered the tantalising prospect of lucrative contracts and a steady, convenient supply. As has already been mentioned, it is not simply the quantity of oil residing beneath its territory which is attractive for Western governments –estimated 48.36 billion barrels (OPEC, 2017)-, but that it is of a unique quality, being low in sulphur, and is relatively easy to transport due to its geographical location. What followed were deals made with US based Petroleum giants such as Exxon-Mobil and

30 The then UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw would later recognize that the strengthening of economic ties and trade was an 'important part of the overall normalisation,' stating his belief that 'you can't have a normal set of relations with a country unless you have trade' (Straw, 2009; cited in Moreton, 2009).

Occidental Petroleum (Chorin, 2012). BP was also keen to get in on the action and in 2007, following a meeting between Blair and Gaddafi in what was later dubbed the 'deal in the desert,' an agreement was reached between the British based multinational and the Libyan government for further oil exploration in Libya. According to the Telegraph newspaper the initial investment of 450 million pounds would be used to drill 17 oil wells, but that the future worth of the agreement could reach as much as 13 billion (Blair, 2007).

And yet the economic opportunities in Libya were not only consigned to petroleum deals. All manner of contracts was being signed, including a multi-million-dollar spare parts contract with the US Company Oshkosh Trucks, along with infrastructure deals worth \$2.0 to 3.0 billion involving AECOM and the Tennessee Overseas Construction Company (TOCC). US embassy cables from Tripoli suggest that these particular contracts, without ruling out any others signed, were awarded in conjunction with political considerations and to 'symbolize the fact that U.S. – Libyan ties have moved beyond strictly security (i.e., WMD and counter-terrorism) concerns' (Stevens, 2007).

All the while, the mainstream media and cultural publications were making sense of the improvement in relations through the 'rehabilitation' discourse. While some alluded to this as a process, mirroring official discourse, others spoke as if this was a foregone conclusion. The *Financial Times*, for instance, proclaimed on the 27th April 2004, 'Libya rejoins the international mainstream'. Even in *Time* magazine the 'rehabilitation' discourse was activated to explain 'why Gaddafi's Now a Good Guy (MacLeod, 2006)'. In the article MacLeod repeats typical themes which explain that Libya and Gaddafi have 'come in from the cold' and that 'Gaddafi is a pariah no more'.

It certainly seems to be the case that there was a concerted effort to re-construct the identity of 'Libya' and 'Gaddafi'. It is known that efforts were being made by the Libyan government, hiring firms such as *The Livingston Group* to lobby on its behalf in Washington. It has also come to light that Gaddafi's government had been working with organizations in the West for public relations purposes among other things (Rozen, 2011). The Libyan government contracted *Monitor Group*, a consultancy firm based in Boston, USA, through which an 'action plan' would be drawn up and implemented 'as part of the Project to Enhance the Profile of Libya and Muammar Qadhafi (Monitor

memo, 2007; cited from Rozen, 2011)'. What is particularly of note here is not that the Libyan government should contract Western firms for the purposes of public relations or lobbying, it is that these projects were being undertaken through prominent neoconservatives such as Richard Perle- ex Republican Party official with close ties to the White House-. Quoting from *Monitor Group's* 2007 Phase 1 Libya project summary, Linda Rozen relay's that 'Richard Perle...is an American Political advisor and Lobbyist,' and she continues, 'Perle made two visits to Libya (22-24 March and 23-25 July 2006) and met with Qadhafi on both occasions. He briefed Vice President Dick Cheney on his visits to Libya (Rozen, 2011).'

One of the tactics employed in this overall strategy to boost the image of Libya and its leader was to invite distinguished guests over for meetings. Seemingly, this had the aim of demonstrating a new Libya, one which was not only open to business, but perhaps more crucially a country and leader open to new ideas. A 'regular flow of high quality visitors' was promised by *Monitor Group*, who also made assurances as to 'the strength of their influence in guiding US foreign policy'. In one high profile meeting, distinguished British sociologist Anthony Giddens travelled to Libya along with a reporter from the *Guardian* and as a guest of *Monitor Group*. Both Giddens and Gaddafi were to engage each other in dialogue over the state of social democracy and the 'third way,' a concept which both at some stage had lay claim to. Writing about the experience Giddens once again refers to Libya as 'coming in from the cold' (Giddens, 2006).

LIBYA AND GADDAFI, RECALCITRANT TO CHANGE?

It has been shown thus far how a policy of 'rapprochement' was followed by the US and UK governments leading to cooperation with Libya on a number of issues. Substantive measures had undoubtedly been taken by the Libyan government in terms of its weapons programmes and through cooperation on the problem of international terrorism. Western governments had to give meaning to what was taking place, especially since Libya and its leader Gaddafi had been attributed the blame for past terrorist atrocities committed against the US and UK civilian populations. The primary

discourse used to achieve this and legitimize the Western policy of ‘rapprochement’ was that of ‘rehabilitation’. It has been put forward that the function of this discourse was essentially twofold: in the first place, the temporal identity of Libya was opened up beyond fixed ontological assumptions, such as those implied by the ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ state discourse, offering up the possibility that Libya could be re-integrated into the ‘international community’; secondly, that there was now a responsibility, even an ethical responsibility, on Western countries including the US and UK to oversee this.

Nevertheless, for all the references we find in Western geopolitical discourse to ‘change,’ ‘reform’, ‘rapprochement’, ‘re-engagement’ or ‘rehabilitation’, it was quite clear that in official US and UK discourse, particularly, this was being viewed as a process which would have to run its course. Concessions made by Libya in terms of WMD and cooperation on terrorist based security concerns would not be enough to satisfy both the US and UK governments, and this is something which would become increasingly clear in the period leading up to the military intervention of 2011. Alongside increased cooperation, doubts about the nature of the ‘Libyan regime’ and Gaddafi were persistent and can be identified quite clearly in official discourse, and also in academic/media circles. There are several events during this period which called into question the premise set out by the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse; namely, that ‘Libya’ and its leader ‘Gaddafi’ were actually reformable. The aim of this part is to highlight some of these, trace how they cast doubt on Libya’s re-integration into the ‘international community’ of states, and show how US and UK government officials responded to these challenges to their policy of rapprochement with Libya. Ultimately, it can be argued, it is a perceived lack of progress on political reform- with direct consequences in the economic sphere- along with concomitant concerns over human rights, which would prevent Libya from realizing the ‘rehabilitation’ path which had been set out for it in the West.

In 2004, for instance, as significant progress was being made in terms of WMD and terrorism related concerns, US Secretary of State Colin Powell showed himself to be wary and commenting on a possible timescale for Libya’s ‘rehabilitation’ he urges caution: ‘I wouldn’t put a timeline on it at this point...I think it’s in our interest to receive Libya back into the international community. Let’s not forget, though, the basic nature of their regime. It is not exactly a representative democracy. It is still what it is. That hasn’t changed. So I think it’s the time to be forthcoming, but at the same time to

be cautious'. Powell's emphasis on the 'nature' of Libya's government is evident and is candid in his assessment: 'we have no illusions about Col. Gadhafi or the nature of his regime--it's nondemocratic, totalitarian nature, and we will approach it in that light' (Powell, 2004). It was reported that the Libyan response was equally as candid in expressing their displeasure at Powell's criticism. Libyan Foreign Minister Abdel-Rahman Shalqam was quoted as saying: 'Minister Colin Powell's comments are unacceptable and an insult to the Libyan people'. And he continued, 'the Minister Colin Powell humiliated the people of Libya and therefore...we will file a lawsuit against him' (Haaretz, 2004).

One of the things which was of concern to the US administration at this stage was Libya's human rights record. Even as Secretary of State Rice was announcing the removal of Libya from the 'list of state sponsors of terrorism' in 2006, she was clear that there were 'other issues of importance' to be discussed: 'those issues include protection of universal human rights, promotion of freedom and expression, and expansion of economic and political reform consistent with President Bush's freedom agenda' (Rice, 2006). One of the higher profile cases was that of Fatih el-Jahmi who was imprisoned for criticism of Gaddafi and his government. El-Jahmi's case was perhaps more salient to the US government, the media, and human rights groups due to his precarious health conditions. Even so, the fact that him and others like him were being detained for exercising freedom of speech was something that called into question Western governments rapprochement with Libya (Chorin, 2011).

While this only often amounted to tentative public criticism during the 'rehabilitation' period, evidence can still be found to suggest that this was an issue for US officials. Having saw Libya elected to chair of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer graded it a 'rather odd choice', speaking openly of the 'repression and its human rights violations' in Libya. Amounting to a 'dismal record on human rights', Fleischer spells out President Bush's position that 'there would have been far better choices' for the position, meaning that the appointment of Libya was 'regrettable' (Fleischer, 2003)³¹.

31 This would not be the only time that the White House spokesman was critical of Libya in this regard. In 2008 Fleischer lamented the United States being voted off the same Human Rights Commission, stating that 'it's hard to be committed to the cause of human rights when you've put Sudan and Libya on a panel that's dedicated to fighting for the cause of human rights' (Fleischer, 2008; cited in Burns, 2008).

Yet generally speaking, US officials would either steer clear of direct criticism of Libya in issues of human rights, or resort to no more than tentative criticism. Criticism of the human rights situation in Libya can, however, be found in reports produced by the U.S. State Department. Here it is worth noting a divergence from the UK position³². In any case, the United States was not as placid. In a typically direct condemnation- for such reports-, the 2009 report criticized the ‘authoritarian regime,’ stating that during the year the ‘government’s human rights record remained poor’. Of the many issues listed one could highlight those of a political nature, which, it is implied, stems from the monopolization of political power by Gaddafi and his inner circle. Amongst other things there is a failure to respect the ‘integrity of the person,’ which suggests torture, disappearances and arbitrary detention; a lack of civil liberties including freedom of speech, assembly and association; corruption; and a failure to protect the rights of women, ethnic minorities, migrants and refugees (State Department, 2009).

Nevertheless, the type of direct criticism like that which is to be found in the Human Rights reports was, generally speaking, not reciprocated by high ranking officials, who were inclined towards more veiled criticisms. Take once again the example of the case of Libyan dissident Fatih al-Jahmi. While being the subject of behind the scenes diplomatic efforts to secure his release from incarceration and to assure his well-being, he was not generally mentioned in public pronouncements. Upon news of his death in 2009, US officials once again did not engage in direct criticism of the treatment received by al-Jahmi. Instead, more general comments were made such as those by State Department spokesman Ian Kelly who assured that the two countries would ‘continue to engage’ on the issue of human rights, and Hillary Clinton who would do no more in confirming that human rights issues had been discussed with Libya including the specific case of el -Jahmi (Human Rights Voices, 2009). In a similar way, US officials were reluctant to openly criticise the election of Libya to the UN Human Rights Council. Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, preferred to speak in general terms when asked about Libya’s recent appointment:

‘I think it’s fair to say that this year, there is a small number of countries whose human rights records is problematic that are likely to be elected and we regret that. I’m

32 The UK Human rights report from 2009 omits Libya from the ‘states of concern’ section, only to appear in the following year's report. This is entirely in line with official foreign policy and high ranking officials’ reluctance to criticise the Libyan authorities.

not going to sit here and name names. I don't think it's particularly constructive at this point. But it's obvious which countries that are on the ballot have more problematic human rights records than others...there will always be countries whose orientations and perspectives we don't agree with, and yet we have to work with them. And that's what we will do in this context as well' (Rice, 2010; cited in Mission of the U.S in Geneva, 2010).

For Western governments, the type of obstacle which called into question the ongoing Libyan 'rehabilitation' were incidents such as the widely reported news of an assassination plot to murder the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in 2004. *CNN* informed at the time: 'Alleged Libyan plot to kill Saudi ruler investigated'. The problem this would present for Libya is then clearly spelt out: 'A Libyan terrorist plot, if verified by American, British and Saudi governments who are working in close coordination to investigate it, would undermine Colonel Qaddafi's public pledges that his government has abandoned terrorism' (Ensor, 2004). It is not merely that the alleged plot harboured the potential of undermining the 'rehabilitation' discourse, but also that the target was one of the US government's staunchest allies in the region. Indeed, this close relationship had in fact been the source of latent tension between Gaddafi and King Abdullah in past Arab League meetings³³, which of course added some traction to the accusations now being made against Libya.

The cogency of the reports would force both the Libyan and US governments into official responses. As one would perhaps expect, the Libyan government released a statement denying any knowledge of the plot: 'we were surprised by this (report) and we deny it completely and categorically' (Shalqam, 2004). The US government, for its part, sought to respond in two main ways. The first, echoing Libyan denials, was to pour doubt on the truthfulness of the allegations. At the time, President Bush stated, 'we're going to make sure we fully understand the veracity of the plotline. And so, we're looking into it...' In terms of the policy of 'rapprochement' being pursued with Libya, Bush reiterates that this is in fact a process, and one which has not yet reached its conclusion: 'I have sent a message to him (Gaddafi), that if he honours his commitments to resist terror and to fully disclose and disarm his weapons programs, we

33 In an Arab league meeting of 2003 Gaddafi is reported to have accused King Abdullah of having made a 'deal with the devil'. The angry response by the Saudi leader protested that 'Saudi Arabia has never worked for US interests', before directing to Gaddafi: 'You are a liar and your grave awaits you' (The Telegraph, 2003).

will begin a process of normalization, which we have done. We have begun that process. And now we will make sure he honours his commitment' (Bush, 2004). As the issue lingered on in the weeks ahead³⁴, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher reaffirmed the US role as watchful supervisor by assuring that 'we are monitoring Libya's behaviour carefully' (Boucher; cited in Langan, 2004). The implications for Libya's 'rehabilitation' were also made clear: 'the reports and the information has already impacted the speed at which we can move forward with Libya and will continue to until it's cleared up' (Boucher, 2004).

During this period of 'rehabilitation' there were several other diplomatic aberrations between Libya and Western liberal states. One which attracted considerable attention from media channels, as well as the foreign policy community, was the crisis in relations which developed between Libyan leader Gaddafi and the Swiss government. Following the arrest of Gaddafi's son Hannibal in Switzerland on charges of assault³⁵, the Libyan government embarked on a range of retaliatory measures against the Swiss government. These entailed, among other things, the expulsion of Swiss diplomats and public officials; the closure of Swiss business premises and operations in Libya; the cessation of oil supplies to Switzerland; and the withdrawal of several billion dollars in assets from Swiss banks (Chorin, 2012). In addition, the arrest of two Swiss businessmen, understood to be carried out in response to the detention of Hannibal Gaddafi, would add a more sinister, tit-for-tat edge to the diplomatic dispute. By all accounts the pressure being exerted on the Swiss government paid off in the end as president Hans-Rudolf Merz was forced into what was considered to be an embarrassing apology for the 'unjust arrest of Libyan diplomats by Geneva police' (Merz, 2009). It would be several months later before the second businessman Max Goeldi was released and returned home, amounting to a period of two years stranded in Libya from the start of the crisis.

Further evidence that Gaddafi had not been rehabilitated would emerge from his first and only United Nations General Assembly speech in 2009. This intervention was widely criticized in Western media as some of the old characterizations of the Libyan

34 Evidencing the seriousness of the accusations, Saudi Arabia would actually withdraw its ambassador from Libya, an action which would force Libya to express further denials of any involvement in the plot (Chorin, 2012).

35 The alleged crime took place against hotel staff and would result in both Hannibal Gaddafi and his pregnant wife being arrested by Swiss authorities (Chorin, 2012).

leader appeared once again. 'Qaddafi's First UN Speech Is a Rambling Diatribe' was the headline of the *New York Times* (24/09/2009), while the *Guardian* (23/09/2009) wrote: 'Eccentric Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi lives up to his reputation during his first visit to America'. The article goes on to ridicule Gaddafi for his albeit unorthodox wish to sleep in a tent while in New York. References to the speech as 'rambling,' 'long' and 'incoherent,' quite clearly borrow from past constructions of Gaddafi as 'crazy,' something which is in fact acknowledged in the *Guardian* article by reference to him 'living up to his reputation'. In speaking of Gaddafi's 'big chance to cement Libya's re-entry into the bosom of the international community after 20 years in the wilderness,' the suggestion is quite clearly that this is something he indeed failed to do. His efforts to 'woo' his peers, it continues, was 'to blatantly insult his audience' having 'abused and alienated the world's top diplomats'. US officials, likewise, were clearly not impressed by Gaddafi's speech, with State Department spokesman Crowley saying on record that it involved 'lots of words and lots of papers flying all over the place, not necessarily a lot of sense'. It would appear that Crowley had later been forced into a public apology to smooth over any possible tensions: 'I understand that my personal comments were perceived as a personal attack,' he explained, however, 'these comments do not reflect US policy and were not intended to offend. I apologize if they were taken that way' (Crowley, 2009).

By this stage diplomatic relations between Libya and the United Kingdom were also being placed under stress. Critical language from UK officials was directed at Libya and the conduct of its leadership following the release of Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi from a Scottish prison on compassionate grounds-Megrahi was diagnosed with terminal cancer. The reception that he received on his arrival back in Tripoli was reported to be that of a 'hero's welcome'. Echoing criticism coming from the United States and President Obama, UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband opined: 'obviously the sight of a mass murderer getting a hero's welcome in Tripoli is deeply upsetting, deeply distressing'. On the understanding that the British Prime Minister had expressly asked for sensitivity and discretion upon Megrahi's return to Libya, he goes on to spell out the implications of what were viewed as Libyan government actions. 'It's very important that Libya knows that how the Libyan government handles itself in the next few days will be very significant in the way the world views Libya's re-entry into the civilised community of nations' (Miliband, 2009). The issue of Megrahi's

release was turning out to be a real problem for British-Libyan relations in particular. With a view to his funeral in 2010, Philippa Saunders, North Africa Director for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, made clear her concerns about how the Libyans would handle it. She is quoted by the US ambassador of the time as saying that there was ‘very little political appetite’ for engaging with Libya and that relations between both countries were ‘in limbo’ cited from (Saunders, 2010; cited in The Telegraph, 2010). Although the decision was taken by the Scottish Parliament, future Prime Minister David Cameron would not hide his opposition to the decision stating on numerous occasions that it was ‘completely wrong’ (Cameron, 2010).

In terms of economic liberalization, it seems that progress in this area was also being viewed as limited. It has been documented previously how Libya, having been released from the restrictions of international and unilateral sanctions, began to seek external investment, for instance in its petroleum sector, and to conclude significant infrastructure contracts with foreign companies. Many of the large contracts being agreed were widely spoken of in the media and news outlets, perhaps suggesting that the liberalization processes were more extensive and profound than was actually the case. At any rate, it is possible to arrive at a somewhat different conclusion through a careful reading of some of the US diplomatic cables on Libya which have been released on *Wikileaks*. These express an acute frustration with the pace of change, and also the perceived impact that this was having on U.S. interests.

In particular, frustrations were tangible with regards negotiations and contractual agreements in the petrochemical industry. From as early as 2004 difficulties were filtering through into the business press as some such as *Energy Compass* were moved to conclude that in Libya, ‘old habits die hard’. The article goes on to warn, ominously, of the potential impact this could have on foreign companies operating in the country: ‘US firms would be well advised to expect the unexpected’ (Dinesh & Junnola, 2004). Uncertainty in the petrochemical industry is one thing which investors and multinational companies are averse too. US Ambassador Stevens had noticed a wider, more worrying trend; negotiations at the time were characterized by a ‘resource nationalism,’ of the like seen before in its dealings with Western companies. Ambassador Stevens opined that, ‘although an alluring market for the oil and gas industry, Libya is an exceptionally difficult place in which to operate’ (Stevens, 2007).

It was understood that the principle objective of Libyan ‘resource nationalism’ was ‘to increase the GOL’s -Government of Libya- control over and share of revenue from hydrocarbon resources’ (my clarification). An example of this was the renegotiation of oil contracts such as that witnessed with the Italian company ENI. While this particular contract signalled a 25-year extension, the deal would also include significant negatives, crucially in terms of financial incentives. According to the ambassador, this was generating fear amongst other international oil companies that the Libyan government may extend the practice ‘in an effort to extract more favourable terms’. These concerns expressed by the US ambassador would appear to become reality in the years ahead as further re-negotiations took place with oil giants such as Petro-Canada, Repsol, and Total. In such cases, the foreign partner’s share of produced oil was reduced by half (Saleh, 2009).

There were other things also contributing to what the US ambassador had described as a ‘difficult environment’ (Stevens, 2007). For instance, a range of measures were being imposed on foreign companies by the Libyan government which was understood as efforts to ‘Libyanize’ the economy. These impacted directly on the workforce of such companies, operating in the petrochemical as well as other industries. Demands made by Libyan governmental agencies on introducing quotas for Libyan workers in key positions were unwelcome interferences in the workings of multinational companies, particularly in the case that this supposed the hiring of lesser qualified individuals. The US ambassador highlights once more the petrochemical sector, understandable since it is the largest industry in Libya, informing that ‘IOCs are now being forced to hire untrained Libyan employees.’ And he continues, ‘The Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) has recently begun insisting that deputy general managers, finance managers and human resource managers in local offices of IOC’s be Libyan’ (Stevens, 2007).

For all that, perhaps the greatest concern for the US government, and other Western liberal governments for that matter, was the possibility that Gaddafi and the Libyan government could take steps to re-nationalize the petrochemical industry. This idea was actually proposed openly by Gaddafi in the midst of a slump in crude oil prices. In reference to the ‘unbearable’ situation, Gaddafi speculates: ‘Oil exporting countries may move toward nationalization because of the rapidly declining prices. This is put on the table and is being discussed seriously.’ And in relation to Libya’s

quota obligations to OPEC he reflects, 'Oil maybe should be owned by national companies or the public sector at this point, in order to control oil prices, the oil production or maybe to stop it' (Gaddafi, 2009; cited in Fleming, 2009). The dependency on oil revenues to which Libya had grown accustomed, coupled with the extensive range of infrastructure projects being undertaken, meant that understandably this was of significant concern for the Libyan government.

Naturally, concerns of Western governments and multinationals revolved around their stakes in Libyan oil and how that would be effected by any Libyan nationalization projects. That said, US ambassador Cretz (30-01-2009) was confident enough to grade these latest pronouncements by Gaddafi as a 'feint', concluding that nationalization would be 'unlikely'. This aroused speculation as to what the real motivations, objectives and strategy were. While still not categorically ruling out the possibility of nationalization, Cretz puts forward several other possible manoeuvres aimed at seeking advantage or gaining concessions in other areas: firstly, the possibility that Gaddafi is looking to gain 'leverage' in the re-negotiation of existing contracts with multinationals; secondly, that the threat of nationalization is a mere tactic to coerce international oil companies (IOC's) to pay money into the US-Libyan 'claims compensation fund' – see below-; thirdly, is the idea that the Libyan leader wants to 'establish a context' for the subsequent reduction in oil production to below that stipulated by OPEC; and finally, to 'prepare the Libyan people' for inevitable cuts which would have to be made to the national budget, thus reneging on certain promises already made.

Issues arising from the question of the US – Libyan 'claims compensation fund' appear to have been of particular concern to the US government during this period. The claims settlement agreement had been set up to address financial claims being made in relation to previous terrorist acts- on the part of Libya- and military action- carried out by the United States. Nevertheless, the Libyan government had been vehemently opposed to what was essentially a US judicially imposed operation, in order to force the Libyan government to make compensatory payments to the victims of past terrorist actions. Text in the original agreement stating that 'contributions' could be made by 'private parties' was seemingly enough for the Libyan government to put pressure on the IOC's operating in Libya to pay into the fund. As ambassador Cretz (04-02-2009) documents: 'The GOL (Government of Libya) told international oil companies (IOCs)

operating in Libya that they “must” contribute to the U.S. -Libya comprehensive claims fund by February 28th or suffer serious (but otherwise ill-defined) consequences’. As has already been mentioned, it is for these reasons that Libyan threats to nationalize the petroleum industry were being viewed in relation to this issue. At any rate, the pressure being applied to IOCs was, unsurprisingly, being viewed as unacceptable by the U.S. government, leading Ambassador Cretz to reaffirm his advocacy of a ‘no pressure red line’ (Not put pressure on the IOCs to pay into the fund).

In terms of identity construction, a different picture emerges from the previous analysis of the obstinate, obtrusive business practices of the Libyan government and foreign policy analysis. The representations being made by the U.S. government and U.K government officials were ones that showed serious strains with the relations between the countries and the fault for those were being attributed directly to Gaddafi and the Libyan government. In fact, it would appear that the policy of rapprochement with Libya, along with the objective of ‘rehabilitation’, was being obstructed and hindered by a group within the Libyan government. Ambassador Stevens refers to them as the ‘old guard’, who were recalcitrant to change and perhaps to renounce the privileges or spoils of a political system devoid of transparency or public/civil society accountability. Thus it is possible to discern a dichotomy differentiating on the one hand, an ‘old guard’, who are composed of more conservative elements in the government; while on the other, the ‘reformists’ are positioned. In relation to the aforementioned perception of ‘resource nationalism’, it is understood that the ‘Reformist elements in the Libyan government’ are against this, understanding the ‘reality’ in which Libya ‘requires extensive foreign investment and participation by credible IOCs’ (Stevens, 2007).

The issues that were driving a wedge between the relations of Libya and the West were also noted by commentators and analysts. If the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse was constructing the identities of ‘Libya’ and ‘Gaddafi’ as being ontologically and temporally changeable, these interventions cast doubt, even foreclosed, the possibility of Libya being reintegrated, *in its current form*, back into the ‘International Society’ of states. Writing in the Middle East Quarterly, Libyan dissident Mohammed el-Jahmi is unsurprisingly scathing in his assessment of the U.S. policy of rapprochement with the Libyan government. He places issues of human rights and democratization within a security discourse, arguing that ‘real security for both Libya and the United States will

require democratic reform in Libya.’ However, he laments, ‘there is no indication...that Qadhafi is willing to loosen his grip on all levers of power, regardless of his pursuit of rapprochement with the West’. Acknowledging the Western discourse of ‘rehabilitation’ which has given meaning to the steps taken by the U.S. among others, el-Jahmi argues, in spite of this, that the ‘Libyan leader remains resistant to reform and intolerant of dissent.’ Indeed, it is the construction of the identity of Gaddafi which is of interest in el-Jahmi’s article. The Libyan leader ‘is impervious to change,’ he argues, ‘his assurances are fleeting,’ and any signs of reform are in fact illusory, being only the ‘*image* of reform’ which Gaddafi is interested in (El-Jahmi, 2006; my emphasis added).

Elsewhere, Pargeter believed that it was now a case of ‘reforming the impossible’ (Pargeter, 2006). While later, nearer the Western intervention, Dana Moss condemns the Western foreign policy with Libya up until that point. Writing in the influential think tank *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Dana Moss (2010) encapsulates the idea of a failed ‘rapprochement’ or ‘rehabilitation’. According to her ‘Key Findings’, ‘History repeats itself in various forms’. Emphasis is thus taken away from the future, as was prominent in the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse, and we are back again in the region of historical determinism. Citing, ‘Qadhafi’s backtracking on key provisions of the arrangement and the persistence of Libyan foreign policy in direct opposition to U.S. interests,’ Moss is able to conclude that ‘engagement does not create behaviour change’. On the contrary, it is ‘effective multilateral sanctions’ –in other words punishment of the ‘rogue’- which encourage behaviour change, and even then, ‘change will be limited when there is no regime change’ (Moss, 2010: 48).

PART 3 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE
WESTERN-LED MILITARY INTERVENTION
IN LIBYA

CHAPTER 6 CONSTRUCTION OF THE BASIC DISCOURSES

Through an analysis of a broad range of texts and empirical data, it can be shown that the debate on the political violence in Libya of 2011 revolved around two basic discourses. Before tracing these, it should be recalled that the purpose of identifying basic discourses is to give structure to the analysis (Hansen, 2005). As abstract, analytical constructions, they are not to be understood as pure, objective forms; rather, they should be used as ‘ideal-type’ discourses which can be used as a starting point from which to analyse the complexity and temporal progression of policy discourses deployed as responses to political events like war and armed conflict. Moreover, the basic discourses should be assembled from the greatest possible number of sources. As has been highlighted in the methodological section, this will be achieved through analysis of two discursive levels: official discourse, as exemplified by political leaders and high-ranking officials, and opposition discourse, which is to be found in national political debates and media sources. The basic discourses, once identified, allow for a further examination of how both the Self and Other identities are given meaning, and how these identity constructions point to different foreign policy options.

The basic ‘human rights’ discourse

In the case at hand, the first thing to be detected is that the violence in Libya of 2011 was being situated ethically, and a prevalence of references to ‘human rights’ is to be found throughout the debate. This translates into a basic ‘human rights’ discourse in as far as it is used in attempts to fix the identities of those involved in the violence along ethical lines. This can be seen articulated clearly throughout early coverage of the events in Western media discourse. One of the ways that this is achieved is through recourse to human rights groups for their assessment of events. As such, these agencies function as ‘authorities of delimitation,’ in the Foucauldian sense outlined in Chapter 2,

in that they are considered the legitimate agents to define and speak about the situation unfolding and indeed that there are in fact human rights abuses taking place. Human Rights Watch, the Human Rights Council, and Amnesty, amongst others, are all cited frequently to offer authoritative accounts of what was happening and how many people had died. One such example can be found in the Guardian as it states that, ‘the International Federation of Human Rights estimated the death toll at 300 to 400’ (Meikle and Black, 22/02/2011).

It is not even necessary to refer specifically to ‘human rights’, as at other times this can be inferred from the humanitarian language being used. Turning to the human rights abuses themselves, these are reported in the media in different ways. At times the language used resorts to that which has become commonplace within the humanitarian lexicon. Take for example the headline ‘Atrocities in Libya’, to be found in an editorial in the Washington Post on the 21st February. Such headlines leave us in no doubt that the events in Libya are characterised by an extreme level of violence, of which human rights abuses can be assumed to be a significant part. In the same article the author continues: ‘the beleaguered dictatorship of Moammar Gaddafi was waging war against its own people and committing atrocities that demand not just condemnation but action by the outside world’ (Washington Post; Moammar Gaddafi must pay, 2011)³⁶.

There were also media reports which drew attention to more concrete instances of human rights abuses. Examples of this were reports that the Libyan security services were shooting unarmed protesters or attacking them from the air with military aircraft. One example of this can be found in the Washington Post: ‘They have opened fire with heavy weapons against unarmed protesters. They have trained sniper fire on peaceful funeral processions. They have terrorized urban neighbourhoods with random gunfire designed to make people cower in their homes rather than join the uprising’ (Robinson, 2011). Another aspect of these claims was that foreign mercenaries were being used to carry out the attacks. This was reported in all of the newspapers analysed. For instance, on the 21st February the Guardian ran with the headline ‘mercenary attacks fail to deter anti-Gaddafi protests’ (Chirisafis, 2011). Along similar lines, the Washington Post wrote, ‘Mr Gaddafi has unleashed an orgy of bloodshed in the capital, Tripoli, using

³⁶The International Crisis Group (2011) criticized at the time the ‘one-sided view of the logic of events’ presented by much of Western media coverage. This portrayed ‘the protest movement as entirely peaceful,’ and suggested that ‘the regime’s security forces were unaccountably massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no security challenge’.

foreign mercenaries and aircraft to attack his own people' (Why was, 2011). Rumour and heresy were also being used to express the idea of human rights abuses as one example from the Guardian suggests: 'it is like an apocalyptic Hollywood film. There are even rumours of systematic male rape in this elegant city of jacaranda trees and Italianate buildings' Reporter Ian Birrell does, however, express caution on stating 'who knows what is true and what is false' (Birrell, 2011).

Reports of violence and human rights abuses taking place in Libya were, generally speaking, placed within the confines of a wider 'Arab Spring' phenomenon. The 'Arab Spring' context ensured that the geographical scripting of Libya, and the political violence taking place, was understood within a wider *regional* setting. Examples of this can be found in all four newspapers analysed: 'Middle East unrest: From Tripoli to Tehran, Arab Spring sprouts new wave of fury' (Middle East, the Guardian, 17/02/2011); The New York Times reported, 'the protests sweeping the Middle East reached Libya on Wednesday (Cowell, 2011); 'Middle East Crisis' in the Telegraph, (Spencer, 2011); and, '..with the Middle East protest movement widening to Libya..' in the Washington Post, (Mufson, 2011). Attempts to distinguish between Libya and the other countries in the region are mostly restricted to economic factors – references are made to Libya's oil deposits- and demographic factors–the relatively sparse population density in Libya compared with neighbouring countries-. Generally speaking, though, the protests in Libya and human rights abuses taking place were being constructed in relation to events in the region such as those in Tunisia and Egypt.

This means that the identity of those involved was often constructed as 'protesters', 'demonstrators', or generally speaking 'civilians'. One instance of this is in the Guardian: 'Some protesters armed with stones and petrol bombs had set fire to vehicles and fought with police in the city's Shaiara Square' in what was to be a pre-planned 'day of rage' and 'Libya became the latest Arab country to experience mass protests yesterday with violent clashes in Benghazi and a crackdown on protesters and media' (Middle East Unrest, 2011). Another way that one can infer a 'civilian' identity is by the way in which the political turmoil was constructed as 'popular', such as in 'popular uprising' or 'popular revolt'. Examples of this can be taken from both of the newspapers of the United States. The New York Times makes explicit references to a 'popular uprising' (Haberman, 2011), and similarly, the Washington Post also makes early references to the 'popular' nature of the uprising, such as can be seen in a piece on

the town of Misurata: ‘Misurata lies on the coast between Gaddafi’s home town of Sirte and the capital, Tripoli, where he still appears to command enough support to hold at bay the popular uprising that has engulfed other parts of Libya’ (Fadel and Sly, 2011).

In opposition, it is the Libyan leader Gaddafi himself, and often accompanied by his ‘Libyan regime’, who is assigned responsibility for the violence and human rights abuses taking place, and often accompanied by his ‘Libyan regime’. When using the ‘human rights’ discourse, all of the newspapers analysed often attribute Libyan military actions to him, as can be seen from the following examples in first the Telegraph and then the Guardian: ‘Gaddafi’s bloody onslaught begins’ (Blomfield, 2011); ‘Gaddafi relied on brute force to crush what began last week as peaceful protests but now threaten his regime’ (Black, 2011). The New York Times refers to him as ‘Libya’s butcher’ (Libya’s Butcher, 2011), while the Washington Post also appeared to be in no doubt as to who was the aggressor: ‘Once again, an Arab dictator is employing criminal violence in a desperate effort to remain in power...This time, the tyrant is one of the Middle East’s most evil men – Moammar Gaddafi’ (Why was, 2011). Later in a New York Times editorial a good example of how the ‘Arab Spring’ geographical script is used alongside the demonization of Gaddafi: ‘The courageous protesters who overthrew Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia have inspired the world...It would be a disaster if Colonel Qaddafi managed to cling to power by butchering his own people’ (Washington’s Options, 2011).

In addition, the character of Gaddafi is often depicted in ways which clearly borrow from historical constructions of him, some of which take aim at his mental stability or somewhat un-Western manner. On the 22nd of February, the Telegraph wrote that, ‘A WILD and desperate-looking Colonel Muammar Gaddafi staged a dramatic defence of his collapsing 42-year rule last night’ (Spencer, 2011). Another piece in the Guardian continues this theme as Gaddafi is depicted as crazy. Written under the headline, ‘The king of king’s speech: Wild words from a ruler who hasn’t learned anything’, Jon Henley continues: ‘Muammar Gaddafi’s television appearance on Monday night was cogent, coherent and, most important, brief. Still pretty weird, certainly, but with hindsight - and the explanations of more knowledgeable colleagues - it kind of made sense. But then, sadly, the Brother Leader and King of Kings blew it. Yesterday saw the Libyan leader back at his barking best. It was wild, bombastic, foaming-at-the-mouth, mad-as-a-hatter stuff; all, sadly, that we’ve come to expect of the

self-styled Figurehead of a Thousand African Nations' (Henley, 2011).

Thus, the basic 'human rights' discourse constructs 'Gaddafi' as the radical Other, along with his Libyan 'regime,' while the victims were most often depicted as 'civilians', in one way or another. This means that the basic 'human rights discourse is composed of a split Libyan Other, and one which displays traces of previous historical discourses identified in Part 2. The basic 'human rights' discourse borrows elements from the 'terrorist' and 'rogue state' discourses, previously delineated, and by-passes mostly the 'rehabilitation' discourse. From the 'terrorist' and the 'rogue state' discourses come the idea of a violent crazed 'tyrant' and his illegitimate 'regime'. To a large extent, the stability of the 'human rights abuses' discourse relies on this very distinction, which clearly demarcates who the victims and who the belligerents are. Once this is clouded or starts to dissolve, it is no longer entirely clear which side the Western countries should be on.

The construction of events in Libya in these ways generates an ethical responsibility on the part of Western countries, and the international community as a whole. It is one which points to a policy of humanitarian intervention and the protection of the civilian population. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine would be invoked throughout the debate, as can be found in the debate in the House of Commons which took place on the 21st of March. Leader of the opposition in the UK, Edward Miliband, was convinced that such an ethical responsibility was to be derived from the R2P doctrine. As he put it, 'a debate is often conducted about rights to intervene, but this debate is about not rights but responsibilities. The decade-long debate about the "responsibility to protect" speaks precisely to this question'. And in relation to the events themselves, Miliband is in no doubt why decisive action is needed by the UK government. He continues, 'our intentions are right: we are acting to protect the Libyan people, to save lives, and to prevent the Gaddafi regime from committing serious crimes against humanity' (Miliband, 2011).

To demonstrate that the basic 'human rights' discourse had dispersion throughout the general debate on the events in Libya, one need only point to the UN resolutions that were passed. Both Resolutions 1970 and 1973 themselves insisted on the 'protection' of the 'civilian population'. Resolution 1970 expressed severe criticism: 'deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful

demonstrators' while Resolution 1973 approved a no-fly zone in order to 'protect civilians' (UN Security Council, 2011). And while in these cases the figure of Gaddafi was not cited directly, the failure of the Libyan authorities to protect civilians was quite clearly the main concern and reason enough for both resolutions to receive the required level of support with no vetoes by the five permanent members.

In addition, turning the attention to academic articles written during the Western-led intervention, it is also possible to see evidence of the basic 'human rights' discourse. Several articles written take for granted that the situation in Libya was characterised by human rights abuses, thus allowing them to speak uncritically about what would appear to be a Western policy of protection of the Libyan people. For instance, Alex Bellamy (2011) wonders whether Western actions in Libya could spark, 'a new politics of protection?' Thomas G. Weiss (2011: 291) is sure that the 'dominant motivation for using military force was to protect civilians', and that this 'was due to the kind of murderous harm that Muammar el-Qaddafi inflicted on unarmed civilians early in March 2011'. For Jennifer Welsh (2011), it was all about 'civilian protection,' while for Simon Chesterman (2011: 283), the speed of the response can be explained by 'the unusual clarity of the situation in Libya' and that 'impending massacres are rarely so easy to foresee'. What will be seen is that Chesterman's 'clarity' about the situation in Libya was certainly not shared by others who were witness to a much more complex set of events. (See Diagram 6 below)




Diagram 6: Basic 'human rights' discourse. Source: Own elaboration

The basic 'civil war' discourse

Not long after the first media reports of serious unrest and human rights abuses in Libya, a counter-discourse appeared in the media. This discourse would challenge and de-stabilize the 'human rights' discourse by constructing the events in terms of a 'civil war'. In such cases, it is perfectly logical that a counter-discourse should emerge in a temporally different period from the first, even if this should be only a matter of days or weeks (Hansen, 2006). As violence spreads and increases in scale, events can start to take on a different shape and may consequently be explained discursively along different lines. In the media coverage analysed, many of the first mentions of 'civil war' are suggestive of this as a future possibility, rather than a distinct reality, yet not long after though, the 'civil war' discourse would transpose to the present tense. In the Telegraph this was reported as: 'Civil war breaks out as Gaddafi begins his fight to the

death' (Spencer, 2011), and 'Libya's descent into civil war' (Ambrose, 2011). In his 'warning to would-be interventionists in Libya', David Ignatius writes in the Washington Post that 'the United States will be injecting itself into a Muslim nation's civil war' (Ignatius, 2011).

The basic 'civil war' discourse is a direct challenge to the 'human rights' discourse principally due to the fact that it constructs the identity of the Libyan Other in different ways. Gone are the references to 'protesters', 'demonstrators' or 'civilians', in opposition to 'Gaddafi'. Instead, a new opposition is erected between 'loyalists' on the one hand, and 'rebels' on the other. This can be seen in media reports which inform that: 'Gaddafi loyalists were engaged in fierce fighting with rebels who had hoped to march on Sirte, Gaddafi's home town and a strategically vital city still under tight government control,' (Hendrix et al, 2011); 'Muammar el-Qaddafi's loyalists clashed with rebels,' (Cowell, 2011); and, 'On the western border with Tunisia, rebels and loyalists fought all day Thursday for control of a strategic crossing that the rebels seized in a surprise move last week' (Chivers, 2011).

The first thing of note about the use of the term 'rebels,' is that it is not suggestive of the same innocence when compared with 'civilians'. Clearly it is one thing to speak of civilians protesting, and another to position a group –or groups- of 'rebels' against 'loyalists'. Indeed, as can be deduced from the previous newspaper references, it is now impossible to maintain that those people involved in the fighting were peaceful. The New York Times makes this connection between the identity of the 'rebels' and their readiness to use arms: '..but witnesses said that the rebels seemed to use every weapon at their disposal, including Katyusha rockets, multiple grenade launchers and anti-aircraft guns as they tried to dislodge the loyalists' (Fahim, 2011).

Earlier media reports on the 'rebels' actions underline this. Take for example Guardian reporter Peter Beaumont's early account of the scene in 'rebel-held' Zawiyah- it is worth quoting at length here-: 'In the distance a crowd and flags were visible. Men waved us forward. A short walk brought into view a tank flying the rebels' tricolour and an anti-aircraft gun mounted on a pick-up. Some of the crowd had shotguns and hunting rifles. Others had AK-47s.' And in another moment, 'A man in a mix of military and civilian clothing pulled me up on to a tank pointing towards abandoned government positions. On top was Youssef Al-Araby, a middle-aged protester. . "Don't

believe what the army and government tells you. Zawiyah is under our control. We answer to the interim government in Benghazi," he said' (Beaumont, 2011).

Constructing the political violence in Libya through a 'civil war' discourse has important implications for the geographical scripting of the country. Since this diverges significantly from the events which had transpired in Tunisia and Egypt, references to the 'Arab spring', the 'Arab World' or 'Middle Eastern' region are rendered somewhat incongruent or redundant. This signals a palpable shift in that the geographical lens through which the 'civil war' must now be understood is predominantly a *national* one. This is in evidence by the way reports either make national-regional distinctions, or focus specifically on battles taking place for supremacy in Libya's cities and towns. The New York Times provides a good example of this on the 10th March: 'In the western half of the country, elite government troops continued to pound the besieged rebel-held city of Zawiyah, only 30 miles from Tripoli, the capital and Colonel Qaddafi's stronghold. Across the country from each other, in fights of vastly different complexions, Ras Lanuf and Zawiyah have become proving grounds in Libya's emerging civil war' (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, 2011)'.

A regional emphasis was also particularly prevalent in reports utilizing the 'civil war' discourse. In particular, 'west' and 'east' divisions are evident, a spatial demarcation which is able to differentiate between the two principal regional blocks- Tripolitania in western Libya, and Cyrenaica in the eastern part-. 'If the status quo of Gaddafi holding the west and the rebels holding the east is going to change, something has to give in the coming days,' suggested the Guardian (Chulov, 2011). On the 8th March the Washington Post also opts for precisely this spatiality: 'but with neither side able to muster overwhelming force, the result appeared to be a bloody stalemate, with the death tolls rising in both east and west from the burgeoning civil war over Moammar Gaddafi's 41-year-long rule' (Hendrix and Faiola, 2011). There is also a tendency at this stage to focus on Benghazi, Cyrenaica and eastern Libya as the base of the 'rebels'. 'Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton travels to the region Monday for meetings with representatives of the rebels' provisional government, the National Transitional Council, based in the eastern city of Benghazi' (Leiby and Wilson, 2011). While speculating about possibly, 'the opening battle of a civil war,' Martin Chulov from the Guardian reports: 'To the rebels of eastern Libya, it was always a matter of

when. On Wednesday morning, sooner than many had expected, Gaddafi's men came for them' (Chulov, 2011).

A national-regional spatialisation of the conflict was also used by Libyan scholar Dirk Vandewalle when writing in *Foreign Policy* magazine around the beginning of the violence. Vandewalle's article took the form of a warning to US policy makers, both about recognising the National Transitional Council, and underestimating the complexity of the political situation in Libya. In his opinion, 'The United States should resist recognizing any regional body – such as the recently created Libyan National Council in Cyrenaica, which France has just recognized'. The reason for this, is that 'the resentment within Tripolitania and Fezzan would be enormous'. As can be seen, there is a clear national-regional focus in Vandewalle's reasoning. And he continues, 'though the rebels may claim they represent Libya, they clearly do not at this point; they are a collection of Cyrenaica-based tribal leaders, notables, and former military personnel that leaves Tripolitania in the cold' (Vandewalle, 2011).

This does not mean, it must be said, that Libya is always extracted from its wider Middle Eastern spatial setting. It's just that when this is referred to, it is no longer to position Libya as part of a wider regional phenomenon or movement. Libya is extracted from the temporal context of the present and transported back to other historical reference points. While the basic 'human rights' discourse, with its opposition between 'Gaddafi' and 'Civilians,' had found its natural temporal and spatial precedents in the 'Arab spring' uprisings of Tunisia and Egypt, the basic 'civil war' shows a tendency to bypass this. Instead, analogies would often be anchored in conflicts such as that of Iraq or Afghanistan, examples of previous Western interventions which are widely viewed to have gone awry. Significantly, these countries are also indicative of civil conflict situations. In this way, references to Iraq and Afghanistan would often be used to warn of the perils of intervention in Libya. Writing in the *Guardian* on the 3rd of March, Seamus Milne writes: 'It's as if the bloodbaths of Iraq and Afghanistan had been a bad dream. The liberal interventionists are back. As insurrection and repression has split Libya in two and the death toll has mounted, the old Bush-and-Blair battlecries have returned to haunt us' (Milne, 2011). Meanwhile, Ross Douthat of the *New York Times* is even more concise, headlining his piece with simply, 'Iraq Then, Libya Now.' Having denounced the whole spectrum of U.S policy makers for their previous mistakes, he

goes onto to warn that now 'a similar chorus is arguing that the United States should intervene directly in Libya's civil war' (Douthat, 2011).

Another way of constructing a 'civil war' or civil conflict situation was to speak of the different tribes in Libya. Once more, this takes Libya further away from more general 'Arab' or 'Middle East' spatial categories, towards situating Libya within a national geographical frame. Since the tribes were often characterised in terms of rivalries, or again in relation with national-regional boundaries, the homogeneity of Libya as spatial entity is severely undermined. A good example of this can be found in an article by Lisa Anderson, who has written extensively on the Middle East and Libya. In her attempts at 'demystifying the Arab Spring', she wants to highlight the differences between what was happening in Libya, and what was happening elsewhere in Egypt and Tunisia. Although Gaddafi is named as the principle problem, the distrust that Libyans have in their government has meant that 'they took refuge in the solace of tribe and family'. The result of this is that 'Libyan society has been fractured', and the 'ragtag bands of armed rebels in the eastern provinces', can be viewed in relation to the 'tribal and regional cleavages that have beset the country for decades' (Anderson, 2011: 2 and 6).

The basic 'civil war' discourse, without eradicating entirely the ethical responsibility that Western countries had for the Libyan people, points to a different set of policy options. It suggests that it is no longer possible to solve the problems in Libya by enforcing a no-fly zone alone -both sides are evenly matched and one may not gain the upper hand any time soon-, and even the assisted removal of Gaddafi would most likely not heal the fractures and divisions in Libya implied from a civil war type situation. Most logical under these circumstances would be a policy aimed at bringing about a political solution to the crisis. This was indeed what UN special envoy for Libya Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib was making clear after visiting 'both sides' in the conflict: 'I think every crisis and conflict needs to be solved in a political manner. We need to solve it politically and I do not believe that at the end of the day the military confrontation can provide the solution that people aspire to. In the end it has to be a political solution' (Al-Khatib, 2011).

This was also the assessment of the African Union. Speaking on behalf of the African Union Ad Hoc Committee at a meeting with the UN Security Council on June 15, Ugandan permanent representative uses the 'civil war' discourse to condemn the

actions of NATO in taking sides in an internal conflict. As he puts it, 'the UN or anybody acting on behalf of the UN must be neutral in relation to the internal affairs of states. Certainly, that should be the case with respect to the African countries. The UN should not take sides in a civil war, for instance, in an African country. The UN should promote dialogue, reconciliation, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and help in enforcing agreements arrived at after negotiations such as the agreement on the Sudan.' And he continues, 'The crisis in Libya requires a political solution and not a military one; and the AU Road Map is the most viable option' (Rugunda, 2011).

Thus, as analytical constructions, put forward is a basic 'human rights' discourse, and in opposition to that there is a basic 'civil war' discourse. Both discourses construct the identities of those involved in a markedly different way, pointing thus to alternative foreign policy options for Western governments. Yet it is the 'human rights' discourse which is judged to be of critical importance here. This is the dominant discourse used by Western governments to give meaning to the events in Libya, and it is also the question of human rights that the 'civil war' discourse is ultimately concerned with. Should there be no peaceful solution to the conflict, or even an exacerbation of the conflict through imprudent external actions, the possibility of further, even more widespread abuses, would be a distinct possibility. For these reasons, it becomes important to trace at this stage the history of the 'human rights' concept. Guided by one of the main theoretical premises of this thesis, namely that the Western state is performatively constituted throughout time by a range of discursive practices, the challenge now is to see how the concept 'human rights' has featured in US and UK foreign policy discourse, and to see how it has been mobilized in different performances. This should allow for a greater understanding of the Western performance of 'human rights' in Libya in 2011. (See Diagram 7 below)




Diagram 7: The basic 'civil war' discourse. Source: Own elaboration

CHAPTER 7 PERFORMING HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS, SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

As was argued in Chapter 2, one of the ways in which the Western state has constituted its identity is through security practices which establish an inside from a dangerous outside. By studying how these practices bring the Western state into being, it became possible for Bialasiewicz et al (2007) to uncover a change in US geopolitical strategy, moving towards one of 'integration' after the end of the Cold War. Yet the identity of the US state is not simply that of sovereign protector; the US state is also *moral*. Taking this assertion to be the starting point for this chapter, the task to be undertaken is twofold: firstly, to inquire into how the moral identity of the US and UK has been constituted through a 'human rights' discourse; secondly, to understand how the 'human rights' discourse has coexisted with the 'security' discourse, teasing out the complexities of this uneasy, ambiguous and often contradictory relationship. Thus, it will be important to understand how performances of 'human rights' are made in accordance with context, specific geopolitical imaginaries, and the security strategies which result from them.

This section aims to show how different performances of 'human rights' are the work of re-citation, re-iteration and at the same time re-formulation. Since discourses and the identities produced are performatively constituted throughout time, the different articulations of 'human rights' to be found in US and UK foreign policy must exhibit certain continuities. It will be shown how these performances of 'human rights' have consistently constituted the Western moral identity by privileging the values of freedom and democracy, even if action in promoting these values has been unmistakably uneven. This, in itself, is not unusual, since it would be impossible for Western governments to act or respond in the same way to every incidence considered to be an abuse of human rights. The Western state is subject to a range of different discourses – such as 'security' discourses- and therefore cannot be expected to act in the same way on every occasion. It will be through the re-iteration of key themes like 'freedom' and 'democracy' within performances of 'human rights' that the effects of performativity can be discerned. Particular attention will be paid to the post-Cold War period, in which it will be argued that 'human rights' has become a crucial cog in a wider geopolitical

strategy of 'integration'. In short, this will be an inquiry into how the projection of 'universal' values has been achieved alongside the pursuit of more narrow national interests.

Human rights as an ideological weapon

Since the end of the Cold War, 'human rights' has occupied a significant place within U.S. and U.K. foreign policy and security discourse. Yet it is possible to go back even further. In particular, the presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) stands out for the emphasis that his administration placed on human rights and the advocacy of a moral approach to U.S. engagements with the outside World. That Carter should place so much emphasis on promoting a moral foreign policy should not have come as too much of a surprise, taking into account his religious upbringing and staunch beliefs in protestant Christianity. Yet one must also recognize the specific context in which Carter was victorious. This came at a time when the war in Vietnam had already sapped U.S. political, military, and perhaps more importantly, moral strength. The failure of brute force in stalling what was perceived to be the Communist threat in the South-East Asian country was evidence that a change in approach was needed. 'Our people have learned,' Carter assured, 'the folly of our trying to inject our power into the internal affairs of other nations' (Carter, 1976; cited in Kirkpatrick, 1981).

Yet Carter was not merely criticizing the previous administration for committing the mistake of projecting its military power into other sovereign states. Carter was a firm believer in that a set of universal principles could provide the international framework, which in turn, could ultimately bring about lasting peace. Thus for him, 'peace is the unceasing effort to preserve human rights' (Carter, 1976). The cornerstone of these universal values had to be that of 'freedom'. Speaking after being inaugurated, he declared: 'because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights' (Carter, 1977). Finally, the U.S is understood to be the country to bring about the changes required. In what would borrow from past ideas of 'American exceptionalism', Carter showed his satisfaction

that 'we have once again become a beacon light for peace and hope, for disarmament, for human rights' (Carter, 1977).

The way in which the Carter administration was constituting the US identity through these performances is certainly noteworthy. In seeking to draw a line between the previous administration and his own, he is concurrently suggesting that it was not the *real* US which had undertaken the controversial foreign policy actions under his predecessors. It had been led astray from its values, pursuing the 'flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries' (Carter, 1977). In this way, Carter's ostentatiously 'new American foreign policy', with human rights as a 'fundamental tenet', can almost be understood as a return to the past, a re-affirmation of its core principles and values, a return to the true identity of the United States. What is being advocated is a 'foreign policy that is 'democratic' and based on 'fundamental values', but one that also remains true to the US's 'essential character as a nation' (Carter, 1977).

This final point is significant in as far as it is illustrative of the performativity of the 'human rights' discourse itself. Carter's pronouncements are dependent on the re-iteration of past articulations of human rights, and in particular 'freedom' and 'democracy'. For the Democrat leader, however, the reference points are clearly not just the Universal Declaration of Human Rights drawn up by the United Nations in 1945. The pronouncements being made are anchored in the historical constitution of the United States nation itself and the idea of American exceptionalism which emerges with it. As Carter put it, 'our policy is based on an historical vision of America's role' (Carter, 1977). The 'exceptional appeal' of the United States comes from the fact that the US was 'the first society openly to define itself in terms of both spirituality and freedom'. And from these unique origins comes a 'special obligation,' obliging its subjects to 'take on those moral duties which, when assumed, seem invariably to be in our own best interests' (Carter, 1977). Two further things are of note here. 'Human rights' becomes almost synonymous with the very values that are said to be America's own, and that adherence to these values -both inherently American and of the human race- will be in America's own interests.

That said, Carter's performance also represents a new historically contingent articulation of the human rights discourse. These pronouncements diverge from previous articulations in two main ways. The first thing is related with the ontological

status of the concept itself, which would have important implications for the way in which the human rights discourse is to be applied. This was grounded in the insistence that 'our commitment to human rights must be *absolute*' (Carter, 1977: my emphasis added). The very fact that human rights are supposed to be universal and inalienable would seem to render this a somewhat banal assertion or even tautology. Yet this represented a marked difference in outlook from the belligerence of the realist conceptions to be found in both the previous and future administrations. For the Carter administration this is an affirmation of the transcendence of human rights. On the importance of the 'human rights condition,' National Security Advisor Brzezinski commented: 'ultimately the human being in whatever the social, economic, or cultural conditions, yearns for something transcendental, yearns for some self-definition with respect to his uniqueness, yearns for something which dignifies him as a spiritual being' (Brzezinski, 1978; cited from Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980).

Another aspect of Carter's conception of human rights which shows a diversion from past and future accounts is the inclusion of socio-economic rights. As Forsythe has noted, with the exception of the Great Depression and the New Deal, tangible policies in the US which emphasise these as rights are sparse. The emphasis often placed on individual responsibility in political and economic life means that talk of socio-economic rights can be viewed as something of an 'aberration from the norm' (Forsythe, 2002:502). Carter's project was somewhat different, however. Not only did he call for greater equality and help for the poor, but that he was attempting to construct a universal framework of values- based on human rights- which could appeal to different peoples from varied cultural, religious and ideological persuasions. By including socio-economic rights as part of his human rights conception, therefore, Carter is both satisfying his own personal moral outlook, and moreover reaching out to the demands which were likely to arise from other corners of the globe too.

The inclusion of socio-economic rights formed part of what would be three main pillars of human rights set out by Secretary of State Vance, and which would make up the general foundations of Carter's human rights policy. Firstly, under what is known as 'integrity of the person,' individuals are understood to have the right to be free from government violations such as those related to torture, inhuman treatment, and arbitrary arrest. Secondly, Vance calls for the 'fulfilment of such vital needs,' citing things like

food, shelter, health care and education. And finally, there is the right to civil and political liberties; amongst others, one could highlight freedom of thought, assembly, speech, the press, and freedom to take part in government (Vance, 1977). Having traced these three poles, questions surrounding which one would take precedence became an immediate issue to be dealt with. This can be seen in a memo sent by Jessica Tuchman to NSC advisor Brzezinski raising precisely this point. Her personal assessment was that it is the first of these three which should receive most focus, a judgement which seems to have been taken on board by Carter (Tuchman, 1977). There is certainly significant evidence of this, perhaps most notable in Latin America and amongst states essentially allied to the U.S.

The centrality of human rights in the Carter administration's foreign policy materialised in certain important ways. Firstly, the appointment of Patricia Murphy Derian as Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs – title later changed to Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor- was one which appeared to correspond with previously articulated intentions. Derian was a known civil rights and human rights activist, and would go on to make her presence felt by her outspoken criticism of certain countries, and her clashes with those officials harbouring more overt security concerns. Secondly, the expansion of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was felt both in terms of the number of Foreign Service officers working on human rights issues, and also the competences which they were assigned to deal with. The bureau would be involved with asylum, refugee and migration affairs, and also the formulation of annual country reports used to assess human rights abuses. These reports were to assist decisions on whether or not to withhold economic and military aid to those countries that were not fulfilling their obligations. Furthermore, and in order to give credibility to the administrations focus on human rights, Carter signed five international human rights treaties³⁷.

³⁷These were: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the American Convention on Human Rights. The United States has only ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.

The conception of human rights as absolute, universal, and as part of an international framework, found its greatest expression in public criticism of enemies and friends alike, and in how the administration used the provision of aid to coax offending governments to change their ways. This points to a struggle for universal values which was not being undertaken merely on the basis of a bipolar ideological World; there is recognition that countries under the US sphere of influence also do not reach the required standards. Several authoritarian regimes which had aligned themselves with the United States were subject to penalties, such as the withdrawal of aid, and-or received forthright criticism from the highest echelons of US political power (Carleton and Stohl, 1985). One such example of this was the case of Chile, and this can be seen quite clearly from comments made by President Carter in a press conference after a meeting with Chilean Leader General Agustin Pinochet. In what can only be understood as candid criticism of an allied country, Carter affirmed that ‘the reputation of their (Pinochet and Chilean leaders) country has been very poor in the field of human rights’. In response to a question regarding relations between the U.S and Chile, and concretely the appropriateness of relations with ‘dictators’, Carter insists on the productive nature of having dialogue with such countries and stresses the potential for future improvements in political freedoms.

For all that, this does not mean that strategic concerns in relation to the Cold War had been completely discarded. This period is not only significant for the way in which human rights became a ‘fundamental tenet’ of U.S. foreign policy, it also stands out for the way in which human rights began to be used as a ‘major political weapon’. On the one hand, the Carter administration was looking to avoid direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, but on the other, the appeals to universal values allowed them to challenge Communism ideologically. As Brzezinski (1997) has since acknowledged: ‘I will not hide the fact that I also thought that there was some instrumental utility in our pursuit of human rights vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, because at the time the Soviet Union was putting us ideologically on the defensive’. Part of the problem, as understood by Brzezinski, was that the communist doctrine was accompanied by teleological claims positing the ‘historical inevitability of class revolution’. To directly counter this very notion, Brzezinski used, ‘very deliberately’, the phrase ‘human rights has become the genuine *historical inevitability* of our times’ (Brzezinski, 1995; his emphasis). In this way, the deployment of the ‘human rights’ discourse was used to turn Soviet claims on

their head and constitute the Other as morally and ideologically inferior to the Western Self.

Indeed, human rights were a crucial component of a wider strategy built around the concept of ‘reciprocal accommodation’ or ‘détente’. It is possible to see in documents from this period how the strategy was being set out and the situation of human rights within it. ‘Reciprocal accommodation-détente-,’ as it was summarized by Brzezinski, had four key components: ‘containment,’ ‘resistance to indirect expansion,’ ‘ideological competition,’ and what he considers ‘most important and above all,’ the ‘creation of a framework *within which* the Soviet Union can accommodate with us, or face the prospect of isolating itself globally’ (Brzezinski, 1978; his emphasis). One of the main objectives during Carter’s presidency was the reduction of weapons and this was being pursued via the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). The ‘framework’ that Brzezinski refers to, of which human rights would be an important part, can be understood as a mechanism through which to try and pressure or coax the Soviet Union into accepting U.S. proposals. Along more general lines, Brzezinski is also keen to assert that affirming human rights ‘greatly increases the moral appeal of the United States’, at a time when the temporal context was seen to be characterised by a ‘global yearning for human rights’, which was ‘ready to be tapped’ (Brzezinski, 1978).

There can be no doubt that during the Carter presidency, ‘human rights’ was an important facet of the U.S – Soviet relationship. From the very first year of his mandate, Carter raised the issue directly with top Soviet officials including Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. In what appears to be an expression of ‘reciprocal accommodation-détente-,’ Carter assured his interlocutor: ‘the concern you expressed about human rights in our country, as well as our public concern over this question in the Soviet Union, could lead to a broadening of human rights in both countries’ (Carter, 1977; cited from Petersen, 2014). Part of the focus being put on human rights was translated into support for Soviet dissidents and dissident groups- this support was in fact pledged by Carter during his Presidential campaign before reaching the White House-. One of the higher profile cases was that of Soviet scientist and dissident Andrei Sakharov, who had written a private letter to Carter at the time of his inauguration. The decision taken to respond publicly to Sakharov was a significant step, and confirmation enough that the Democrat administration was willing to use the theme of human rights even at risk of upsetting the Soviets (Brzezinski, 1995).

Thus, it is possible to conclude that the centrality of human rights in the foreign policy of the Carter administration fulfilled two main purposes; firstly, it allowed the US government to re-constitute its moral identity following a period in which this had taken a significant blow- E.G the Vietnam War-; secondly, human rights could be mobilized to assist in a wider ideological struggle against the Soviet Union.

The use of human rights as a key part of US foreign policy was not without its difficulties, however. One of the more immediate concerns which arose from the insistence on the universal and absolute application of human rights was the friction that this generated with Soviet officials. This is something that Carter would later allude to in this candid admission: 'I did not fully grasp all the ramifications of our new (human rights) policy. It became clear in the early days (and increasingly so later on) that the promotion of human rights was to cut clear across our relations with the Soviet Union and other totalitarian states' (Carter, 1982; cited in Heaps, 1984: 25). Progress on a range of issues, including agreements on strategic arms controls, was being affected by the perception that the US was directly involving itself in the internal affairs of the USSR. Moreover, Soviet officials had become deeply suspicious that the emphasis on human rights was part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the Soviet Union. In order to allay these fears, Carter was at times moved to re-iterate the *universality* of his government's conception of human rights, and that their human rights policy 'is based on principle and that our concerns are applicable to all nations' (Carter, ; cited in Petersen, 2012:50). In fact, Carter would go on to make it clear that the U.S government did not wish to single out their ideological adversary both in correspondence and public statements. Seemingly, these assurances did not appease Soviet leaders and the friction caused was such that Carter's administration would be pressured into toning down its criticism before the threat that Leonid Brezhnev would pull out of SALT negotiations.

However much Carter was to stress the primacy of human rights in U.S foreign policy, and no matter how dedicated was his pursuit of this throughout the World, it was to prove decidedly more difficult in practice. Some of the main difficulties facing the administration had already been highlighted by NSC official Jessica Tuchman in a memo to Brzezinski as early as July 1977. Under the headline 'Priority of Human Rights vis-à-vis other Foreign Policy Interests', the potential for incoherence or inconsistencies to become apparent in the policy is raised as a real concern. If, as

Tuchman understands, the U.S approach to human rights is to be done on a ‘case-by-case’ basis, then this could cause resentment among the countries singled out for criticism. The NSC official makes the comparison between U.S allies Argentina and Iran, whereby it’s suggested that the latter is less likely to incur the same type of criticism as the former. This was indeed to play out closely along the lines as Tuchman had foreseen. Carter’s unwavering public support for the Shah before he succumbed to the revolutionary forces engulfing the country in 1980 was perhaps the quintessential case of human rights being trumped by other more overtly strategic objectives. While on the one hand, the brutality of the Shah’s rule had been known for some time; both the presence of oil and its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union made Iran just too important for any recriminatory measures.

One of the main criticisms of the Carter administration’s policy on human rights was that in being supposedly ‘absolute’, it was not able to distinguish between friendly autocracies and enemy totalitarian regimes (Kirkpatrick, 1979). From a strictly speaking realist vision of the Cold War ideological struggle, this was a crucial distinction to make. By not supporting its allies in the best way possible, however authoritarian they may be, the U.S. was weakening these regimes, and as a consequence eroding its own power. Understood in this way, Carter’s human rights policy worked directly against US interests, while at the same time assisting the march of communism. These strategic calculations were indeed compounded by the perception that there had in fact been a growing reluctance on the part of Carter to criticize the Soviet Union and its client states. Events in Afghanistan- the Soviet invasion of 1979- along with the Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis, without doubt had an impact on Carter losing out on re-election to Republican leader Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Ronald Reagan and human rights

The influence of Jeane Kirkpatrick’s critique of Carter on Ronald Reagan was such that she would later be appointed as the United States’ permanent representative to the United Nations and become an important figure in foreign policy making. Since at this stage it would have been almost unthinkable to abandon human rights in its entirety, Kirkpatrick was faced with the need to reconceptualise the concept to fit in with her

inclinations towards the centrality of the continued struggle against communism and the defeat of the Soviet Union. Human rights could no longer be understood as absolute; rather, it must be viewed relatively, in relation with other US interests, and ultimately in conjunction with the overarching geopolitical strategy being pursued. That meant that in a return to 'reality' and 'real life', distinctions would have to be made between 'rights and goals', 'intentions and consequences', and 'personal and political morality' (Kirkpatrick, 1981).

It is indeed possible to detect the influence of Kirkpatrick's thinking on the Reagan administration's initial policy on human rights. When Reagan swept to power in 1981, this was partially on the strength of promises made surrounding a change of direction in foreign policy, and by extension, a new way of approaching the question of human rights. Like Kirkpatrick, the Republican administration viewed human rights sceptically as having the potential to damage US interests. In early articulations of foreign policy, the question of human rights is clearly downplayed. As shown by National Security Advisor Richard Allen, the administration 'would not place as much emphasis on human rights (Allen; cited in Peterson, 2012:108)'. Moreover, Reagan's preferred choice to the post of Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Human Rights Ernest Lefever had also previously voiced his concerns: 'making human rights the chief, or even major, foreign policy determinant carries dangers: (it) subordinates, blurs, or distorts all other relevant considerations' (Lefever; cited in Heaps, 1984:32).

Even if the Reagan administration was inclined to mirror Kirkpatrick's critique of the previous human rights policy, it would not be possible to dispense completely with the concept. Rather, it would have to undergo a re-formulation in order to fit in with the new geopolitical and geostrategic plan being pursued. One of the first ways in which this was to be carried out was through linking human rights to 'international terrorism'. Secretary of State Alexander Haig wasted no time in articulating this in a press conference shortly after the inauguration of Carter: 'international terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern, because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights' (Haig, 1981; cited in Petersen, 2012:108). The fact that this declaration came shortly after the Iranian hostage crisis and at a time when terrorist incidents appeared to be on the rise is without doubt significant. Yet in a secondary move, Haig attributes international terrorism to the work of the Soviet Union itself, since it was said to be responsible for the 'training, funding and equipping' of the perpetrators. As Carleton

and Stohl astutely noticed, in one fell swoop ‘it was possible to bundle human rights, national security, and international terrorism into a single package that fit neatly (and subtly) into the broader United States fight against global communism’ (1985:208).

This substantive change in direction on human rights appeared to be necessary so as to fit in with a new overarching strategy being put forward vis-a-vis the USSR. Reagan, and his realist ideologues, were keen to return to older notions of power politics, increased military spending, and to face head on the Soviet challenge which was being viewed with significant degrees of alarm. This new strategy, which signalled a move away from *détente*, had as its ultimate objective the erosion of Soviet influence, or what has been conceptualised as ‘rollback’ (Bodenheimer and Gould, 1989). In relation to past strategies Reagan assured that ‘the West won’t contain communism, it will transcend communism’. The main points of this strategy to ‘transcend’ it were set out in the NSC National Security Decision Directive 75 of 1983, which stated that US foreign policy must be to ‘contain and over time *reverse* Soviet expansionism’ (my emphasis added). In what was to become known as the ‘Reagan doctrine’, the crucial battleground was to be the Third World. The U.S government was compelled to ‘support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy’.

It is possible to trace the strands of Reagan’s foreign policy strategy back to a select group of neoconservative think-tanks. For instance, the proposals to increase military spending were a key element of both the Council on the Present Danger and the Heritage Foundation, amongst others. The Heritage Foundation was a particularly important influence on Reagan, as both he and authors writing for the organisation have openly acknowledged (Blasko, 2004). As Bodenheimer and Gould (1989) have also noted, this think-tank was responsible for pinpointing the countries which would later comprise the front line in ‘World War III’: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Libya, Nicaragua, and Vietnam.

Influential neoconservative think-tank The Council for Inter-American Security (CIS) was another which provided the new Republican administration with a set of guidelines, and which dovetailed nicely with the aforementioned organisations. Paramount for policy makers was the global struggle against Communism and the

defence of freedom and democracy, whatever it may take. In the influential 'Santa Fe Document',³⁸ it is stated in no uncertain terms that the U.S. was engaged in 'World War III,' whereby the 'very survival of this republic is at stake'. The foreign policy of 'containment,' which had gone before them, is considered to be 'not enough,' instead they look forward to a 'Pax Sovietica or worldwide counter-projection of American power'. Central America, as far as it is concerned, is geographically positioned as crucial since it represents the 'soft underbelly of the United States'. This lays the ground for insisting on assistance to any country fighting and resisting what is deemed to be Soviet expansionism in the region. And like Kirkpatrick, the extent of the influence wielded by the CIS can be inferred from the appointment of some of their key figures into high profile positions within the administration³⁹.

In line with the new strategy, immediate changes could be discerned in the way concrete foreign policy was being conducted. For one thing, foreign aid, whether it be in the shape of economic or military assistance, was no longer being used publicly as a 'carrot' and dependent on changes in human rights behaviour. In actual fact, the administration wasted no time in reinstating economic and military aid to countries that had seen this side of their support withdrawn during Carter's Presidency. These included the authoritarian regimes in: Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay (Jacoby, 1986). Unsurprisingly, along with this more assertive approach was the insistence on a need for 'quiet diplomacy' when faced with public criticism.

Direct military and economic aid would also be awarded to groups fighting in armed conflicts, whether that be in places where the Soviet Union was being directly challenged, or where US interests were being threatened. One example of this was the widely known support given to the *Mujahedeen* who were resisting the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. There would also be a series of now infamous covert operations involving the CIA and US Special Forces. One of the more controversial examples was the support and funding given to the Nicaraguan Contras. The covert CIA led operation famously exploded into the public domain as part of the Iran-Contras scandal, forcing Reagan on the defensive and into an apology before the American people. Both of these

38More formally known as the 'A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties' report.

39Patrick Buchanan would become Reagan's communications director; Lewis Tambs a consultant to the NSC and later ambassador to Colombia and then Costa Rica; Gordon Sumner who would work as a special consultant to the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American affairs; and Roger Fontaine who also worked at the NSC as a specialist on Latin America.

cases are certainly interesting in their own right, but one must also view them as part of the wider strategy to directly challenge the Soviet Union and 'rollback' its influence. It is not difficult to draw close parallels between these concrete foreign policy actions, and the foreign policy assistance being given to the administration from the neoconservative theorists and think-tanks already mentioned.

Interestingly, while the notion of human rights had been downplayed early on in Reagan's administration, this stance would shortly undergo something of a transformation. Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Tamar Jacoby referred to this as the 'Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights', which was achieved by 'picking up the pieces of a human rights policy he tried very hard to dismantle in his first days as president' (Jacoby, 1986:1066). Jacoby is convincing in her argument that it was external pressures which were at least partially responsible for the change in approach. The rejection of Ernest Lefever as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs⁴⁰ was one thing, criticism from the 'human rights community' another, and yet perhaps it was the resistance the administration was receiving from both houses of Congress which forced the change in course. Certain amount of acquiesce with the Congress would be needed for the release of military aid to human rights offending regimes, meaning that unwanted restrictions could be placed on the wider objectives of Reagan and his team. As Jacoby has argued, it would now be prudent for the administration to 'appropriate the banner of human rights for itself- to use it in battle not only against communist regimes but also, in a more defensive way, against domestic opponents of its human rights policy' (Jacoby, 1986:1071).

In a memo leaked to the *New York Times* shortly before the belated appointment of Elliot Abrams to the position of Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian Assistance and Human Rights, some of the bases of the human rights policy were being put in place. The memo assures that 'Human rights is at the core of our foreign policy,' and this is so since 'our ability to resist the Soviets around the world depends on our ability to draw this distinction (moral) and to persuade others of it'. There is also express acknowledgement of the difficulties involved in transferring an explicit commitment to human rights into practice. 'A human rights policy means trouble,' the memo warns, since in order to be credible it will inevitably involve 'hard choices which

⁴⁰The Foreign Relations Select Committee's concern with the nomination was that he had not shown the requisite desire to tackle human rights abuses as a fundamental part of U.S foreign policy.

may adversely affect certain bilateral relations.’ The advice given is that ‘we will have to speak honestly about our friends’ human rights violations and justify any decisions wherein other considerations (economic, military, etc.) are determinative.’ Yet significantly, the memo also states that ‘human rights is not advanced by replacing a bad regime with a worse one, or a corrupt dictator with a zealous Communist politburo’ (Clark and Kennedy, 1981; cited in Willaim, 1981).

In comparison to Carter’s conception of human rights, there are certain important differences to highlight now in how the Reagan administration is tracing and deploying human rights. Firstly, the presence of socio-economic provisions, which had been noteworthy in Carter’s conception, is omitted entirely. This perhaps did not come as too much of a surprise bearing in mind the ideological orientation of the conservative Republican Party. Neither is the greatest emphasis placed on the protection of the individual from the arbitrary force of the state. Even when criticism is made of a particular friendly regime, as increasingly became the case in the ‘country reports’ elaborated at the State Department, this did not usually impact in a significant way the level of support given to the offending regimes concerned (Forsythe, 1988). Rather, human rights are being almost exclusively understood in terms of liberal democratic values; that is to say, freedom and democracy. As Secretary of State Haig (1981) put it, ‘we do not intend, in this administration, to develop our foreign policy and then to add on to it a few concerns about liberty...On the contrary, the future of liberty is at the centre of our policy. Our concern for individual rights and political freedom is the core, and the goal, of our foreign policy.’

These comments by Haig are echoed and embellished by Reagan in a now famous speech given in 1982 before the British parliament. Reagan is pondering how the U.S can best ‘contribute as a nation to the global campaign for democracy now gathering force’. Freedom, he assures, ‘is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings’. And with this declaration about the universality of freedom, Reagan makes the call for the spread of liberal democracy, which he believes to be inseparable. His objective, he insists, is ‘to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means’. One can immediately see that Reagan’s endeavour is closely linked to US security concerns and ideas of a ‘democratic

peace'. What 'we have to consider', he assures, 'is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries'.

Conceived in this way, human rights or 'individual rights,' as Haig refers to them, are not incompatible with the overarching geopolitical imaginary of Reagan and his security chiefs. It is just that they become subordinate to it. It is precisely because the Soviet Union denies its people freedom and democracy that it must be defeated, whether this means supporting some unpleasant regimes to bring this about or not. It is a strategy based somewhat crudely on the old maxim, 'the ends justify the means'. The true defence of human rights will only be achieved with the defeat of communism, and by linking human rights inextricably with freedom and democracy, the battle taking place becomes at the same time both ideological and moral. Prevailing in the ideological struggle taking place was viewed to be not only essential for the security of the United States, but also *the* moral responsibility since it was a prerequisite for the spread of freedom and democracy. Questions of security become questions of morality, and vice-versa. Moreover, this also means that in deploying the human rights discourse, the United States is at one and the same time constituting its identity as both sovereign protector and moral agent.

Until the fall of the USSR, one can see time and again how 'human rights' was used either in direct ideological confrontation with the Soviets, or to justify other more morally questionable foreign policy decisions. Nowhere would this appear to be more evident than by the way in which the United States became involved in Central America. Incursions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cuba, Guatemala, all illustrative of the geopolitical strategy being followed by the US government, and how a 'human rights' discourse could be used to justify their actions. The Nicaraguan Contras are classed as 'freedom fighters' or the 'moral equal of our Founding Fathers' (Reagan, 1985), while aid and assistance given to friendly, yet questionable governments in El Salvador or Guatemala, is justified on the basis that there has been signs of 'progress' on issues of human rights. One can also see evidence of the geopolitical 'domino' theories in relation to the region and the wider Cold War context. If there is no effective response by the United States, 'El Salvador will join Cuba and Nicaragua in spreading fresh violence to Guatemala, Honduras, and even Costa Rica. The killing will increase and so will the threat to Panama, the Canal, and ultimately Mexico' (Reagan, 1983).

Table 1: Human Rights and Security in US Foreign Policy

Government	Conception of Human Rights	Identity of Soviet Other	Strategy	Foreign Policy
CARTER	Absolute	Ontologically changeable	Mutual Accommodation- Détente	Criticism of adversaries and allies. Withhold of aid to offending regimes.
REAGAN	Relative to geopolitical strategy	Ontologically fixed	Direct challenge to Soviets- degradation of Soviet power	Criticism of Soviet Union and muted criticism of allies. Full assistance to allies.

Table 1: Source: Own elaboration

Human rights in an 'interconnected' world

The election of Tony Blair and a Labour government in 1997 signalled an end to Conservative Party dominance in the UK, and moreover marked a change in British foreign policy discourse. In what could have seemed like the echo of President Carter's Democrat administration, this was proclaimed as the era of a new 'ethical foreign policy' with human rights at its core (Cook, 1997).

The formulation of an 'ethical foreign policy' based on human rights can be understood at least in part as a response to the context of the time. As well as being temporally on the cusp of a new century, there was also more importantly the perception that the World had fundamentally changed in the years leading up to the Labour Party's crushing victory. This new context had already been starting to make its mark on international affairs and International Relations theory with the rise to prominence of 'globalization' as the principle geographical and temporal phenomenon. The self-

evident nature of the 'new' state of affairs is exemplified by Blair's insistence that 'we are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not' (Blair, 1999). British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook had previously outlined some of these changes in setting the scene for what he was positioning as a 'new' direction in British foreign policy. To him, interconnection would be felt in all areas; these were economical in the emergence of a truly 'global economy'; technological, as was being witnessed in the 'information revolution'; and moral, in that the compression of space and time brought us closer to human tragedies in other parts of the World⁴¹ (Cook, 1997).

One of the consequences of viewing the World in terms of interconnection or 'interdependence' (Cook, 1997) is that it becomes possible to discern a merging, a blurring, or a withering away of the 'natural' boundaries between the 'inside' and the 'outside'. This means that national interest is 'to a significant extent governed by international collaboration,' and that 'partnership and co-operation are essential to advance self-interest' (Blair, 1999). For Blair the new reality of 'inter-connectedness', meant not only that nation-states had become ever more dependent on each other economically, technologically and morally, but that there was a requirement for a 'new framework' to govern this 'international community'. According to Blair, this 'new framework' could be shaped to coincide with 'mutual self-interest' and 'moral purpose', by establishing and spreading 'the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights, and an open society'. Interests and shared moral values become inextricably linked, and it is perhaps for this reason that Robin Cook was eager to declare that 'the Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy' (Cook, 1997).

It is within this context of inter-connectedness, which in turn had provoked a merging of interests and values, that wider security concerns must now be situated. First and foremost, the very fact that states are viewed to be more connected than ever before suggests a heightened sense of anxiety about security threats *per se*. In this way, the establishment of a universal framework does not only serve economic and political aspirations, but that the 'principles of international society apply also to international security'-the 'principles of international society' referred to here, those which are taken to be universal, are essentially Western liberal democratic values-. This is in fact acknowledged by Blair on stating to an audience in Chicago that the 'spread of our

⁴¹Under this banner would also be placed concern for the planet and climate change.

values makes us safer' (Blair, 1999). The conflation of 'our values' with 'universal values' in the context of security is not in itself surprising. It is entirely logical to presume that if every country functioned in accordance with 'our values' there would be greater security. At the same time, to give legitimacy to this project, and for other countries to accept 'our values', it is necessary for them to be universal or universally applicable in some way.

Human rights, democracy and security, a grouping made all the more pressing by the new state of inter-connectedness, and brought about by processes of 'globalization'. In this regard, Blair is also able to lay the ground for a new era of liberal interventionism, or otherwise known as humanitarian interventionism. This is precisely because events in one part of the World can have effects on other parts of the World; security in the West can be affected by a lack of security in another corner of the globe. This makes it increasingly difficult to 'turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we still want to be secure' (Blair, 1999). The timing of Blair's speech in Chicago was, of course, not insignificant with a military intervention in Kosovo underway. And Blair is at pains to frame it in line with his thesis that in this new 'inter-connected' World values and interests can merge. On the one hand, the intervention is justified along humanitarian lines through reference to the 'appalling crimes' which have taken place there. Yet it is also in the interests of the intervening states since 'this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe' (Blair, 1999) - amongst other things Blair has in mind here the flows of refugees and the potential threat this can pose to international peace and security-.

Yet it is the attempt to universalise this doctrine of interventionism which is perhaps most noteworthy about his speech. Indeed, the speech Blair made in Chicago would go on to be known as the 'Blair doctrine'. Acknowledging the fact that 'there are many regimes that are undemocratic and engaged in barbarous acts,' (Blair, 1999) Blair is also conscious that Western countries do not have the means or capabilities to intervene in every case where human rights abuses may be taking place. For this reason, he outlines his doctrine of which things policy makers should take into consideration through identifying the 'circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts'. The first thing, Blair says rather ambiguously, is to be 'sure of the case'. In stating that 'war is an imperfect instrument in dealing with humanitarian distress' (Blair, 1999), it seems he is suggesting that the case must be of a

certain severity to warrant intervention. Secondly and thirdly, it is deemed necessary to explore all peaceful options first and make sure that it is an operation which can be feasibly carried out militarily. One would also have to make a commitment to the long term and make an assessment of whether or not national interests were at stake.

The link Blair makes between the spread of human rights, liberty and democracy on the one hand, and security on the other, is certainly not an arbitrary one. For one thing, this is something that had already been seen in previous performances of human rights articulated by the Carter, Reagan and Thatcher administrations. In these cases, the promotion of human rights was made within the Cold War context, and in accordance with the specific security strategies being pursued at the time -whether that be in search of 'détente' or a more aggressive degradation of Soviet power-. In this regard, the pronouncements made by Blair and Cook are to a certain extent *re-iterations* of past deployments of a 'human rights' discourse, which continues to privilege the 'universal' values of 'freedom' and 'democracy'. The fundamental difference here is that the context has now changed with the implosion of the bi-polar geopolitical system; the threatening Other is no longer the Soviet Union. Be that as it may, it is not the case that the new context is devoid of other threats and dangers. Indeed, the events in Kosovo had highlighted one of these - the threat posed by tyrant leaders-, something which Blair refers to in his speech in Chicago, speaking of 'two dangerous and ruthless men- Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic' (Blair, 1999).

Human rights and the 'War on Terror'

However, the new threats world not solely be perceived from individuals, or even 'rogue' states. A newfound sense of anxiety would be perceptible, one which was heightened, at least in part, by the as-yet only partially chartered post-Cold War terrain 'outside', and the 'new' threats which could materialize in it (Ó'Tuathail, 1998). In contrast to the triumphalism displayed by those who proclaimed an 'End to History' (Fukuyama, 1992) others spoke of a 'New World Disorder' (Jowitt, 1992)⁴² –or a 'Coming Anarchy' (Kaplan, 1994). According to Gearóid Ó'Tuathail (1998), the fall of the Soviet Union produced a 'crisis of meaning in World Politics', a 'geopolitical

⁴²This is of course a word play on George H.W. Bush's famous 'New World Order' speech.

vertigo', of which various strategists and intellectuals of statecraft would seek to address. The old certainties of the now defunct bi-polar interpretative framework, of which the 'balance of power' was an integral part, had suddenly dissipated and left a gaping hole in the conceptual geopolitical landscape. At stake here was no less than the entire US security apparatus; that is, the military, the intelligence agencies such as the CIA, the whole research and development structures which fed off the old Soviet threat, not to mention the power/knowledge relationships which gave meaning to these very institutions. As Ó'Tuathail notes, the re-legitimation of the aforementioned would come from quasi-realist conceptions of a new international system plagued by a new 'uncertainty,' 'unpredictability' and 'instability'" (Ó'Tuathail, 1998:104).

The last decade of the 20th Century was characterized by the emergence of a diverse range of de-territorialized threats and dangers⁴³. The greatest dangers now were ones which transcended national borders: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction- particularly nuclear material-, the threat posed by international terrorist groups, international organized crime networks, and transnational health epidemics, for instance. Moreover, these global threats were often given greater impetus and salience through discourses which pronounced an increasing globalization and a somewhat pernicious inter-connectedness. The greater the proximity of states, and the more fluid the borders which separate them, the more heightened and immediate specific threats will manifestly become. The significance of the new geopolitical climate was two-fold; firstly, in this chaotic new world security threats were more likely to arise where there was a void in terms of human rights, freedom and democracy; secondly, the spreading of shared universal values such as human rights, liberty and democracy would logically have the effect of mitigating the security threats.

43A plethora of articles and publications appeared in the 1990s which spoke of: 'Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy' (Alison et al, 1996), 'The New Threat of Mass Destruction'(Betts, 1998), 'America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism' (Falkenrath et al, 1998), 'Postmodern Terrorism'(Laqueur et al, 1996), 'The Changing Proliferation Threat' (Sopko, 1996) etc.

In light of the new de-territorialised dangers previously mentioned, it is perhaps unsurprising that democracy and human rights should be awarded such a privileged place within the US National Security Strategy of the year 2000. Under what is deemed to be the ‘three core objectives’, the promotion of human rights and democracy is listed alongside bolstering U.S economic prosperity and a more general enhancement of America’s security. Yet it is the promotion of human rights and democracy that stands out as the key objective since it is believed that these efforts will help advance and realize the other two goals. ‘Our security,’ the report states, ‘depends upon the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide’. This is deemed to be the case due to the fact that ‘democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats, encourage free trade, promote sustainable economic development, uphold the rule of law, and protect the rights of their people’.

In this document human rights and democracy are intrinsically linked, mutually reinforcing one another. As the reasoning goes, the expansion of democracy means that there will be less non-democratic regimes, which consequently points to less repression, corruption and human rights abuses. These factors are understood to exist in a causal relationship with the potential for stability in the countries or region in which they are found. The promotion of human rights, for its part, is conducive to building or strengthening democratic forms of government, as they are understood to be more inclusive, thus being a requirement for ‘genuine, lasting democracy’. The human rights highlighted in the document are predominantly liberal democratic rights; the right to ‘political dissent’; ‘freedom of religion and belief’; freedom of the press including an ‘independent media’; a ‘robust civil society’; legal pillars such as the rule of law and an independent judiciary; along with free and competitive economic structures.⁴⁴ The promotion of these values is understood to be not only ‘practical,’ in security terms, but also ‘just’, in a moral sense.

⁴⁴Also mentioned is the protection of the rights of minorities, workers and women, and also ‘civilian control of the army’.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in the United States would appear to give credence to these previous warnings. The attack was not perpetrated by what had previously been understood as a conventional enemy, an adversarial state. Moreover, the ‘interconnected’ or ‘interdependent’ nature of an ever-increasing globalized World was seemingly laid bare. The apparent ease with which al-Qaeda was able to strike at the heart of the United States, using international transport networks, demonstrated for Blair and others the dangers that this new state of interdependence brings with it. Commenting in the wake of the attacks Blair warned: ‘we are realizing how fragile are our frontiers⁴⁵ in the face of the world’s new challenges. Today conflicts rarely stay within national boundaries...this interdependence defines the new world we live in’ (Blair, 2001).

In this dangerous and threatening climate, the need for universal values would be more necessary than ever. The subsequent ‘war on terror’ which was initiated by George W. Bush, and supported by Blair, would lead both to Afghanistan and then Iraq in order to spread ‘freedom’ and eliminate the security threats emanating from these two countries. In Afghanistan, the principle stated aim was to go after al-Qaeda who were said to have set up various training camps in the territory. Yet this was also accompanied with a ‘human rights’ discourse, with the objective of freeing the Afghan people from tyranny. In Iraq one can detect the same combination of security threats and the spread of human rights. On the one hand, Blair made the controversial claim in the report ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’ -what would become known as the ‘dodgy dossier’- that ‘(Saddam’s) military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them’. On the other hand, like in the case of Afghanistan, though, the sub-narrative was one which posited the liberation of the Iraqi population from the grip of a brutal dictator and his regime. As the then British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw put it, refusal to overthrow Saddam Hussein ‘would not only be a betrayal of British national interests, but of our internationalist values and beliefs too’ (Straw, 2003; cited in Gilmore, 2014).

As the post-Saddam violence in Iraq continued and started to spiral out of

⁴⁵The use of ‘frontiers’ here is noteworthy in that the more common word to be used here in the English language would be ‘borders’. ‘Frontier’ can arouse a sense of danger or trepidation in English, being used in contexts such as the United States land exploration -separating the white colonist from the dangerous Indian Other-. In this way, Blair reinforces the idea of a secure ‘inside’ from a dangerous ‘outside’.

control, this was not deemed to be a problem with the military campaign and the removal of the Iraqi government *per se*. Neither was it the results of trying to install a liberal democratic system of government in a country which had previously never experienced anything of the sort. Rather, the problems were portrayed as a ‘conflict between the progressive forces of liberalism and those of extremism’ Gilmore (2014). This move is made possible by understanding liberal democracy as universal, immunizing the promotion and pursuit of these political values in Iraq, since these values ‘do not belong to any race, religion or nation, but are universal’ (Blair, 2006).

The link between human rights, democracy and security –or indeed lack of– would become even more salient in the years ahead. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre confirmed for many that earlier warnings of de-territorialized threats were in fact very real, vindicating the geostrategic and geopolitical analysts who had hitherto formulated them. As it was put in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002: ‘Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank’. What’s more, in a globalized, inter-connected World, these threats could emerge from any corner and strike at the very heart of Western civilization. The fact that the attacks were carried out through international transport connections, themselves an important symbol of globalization, was perhaps another interesting caveat.

Yet moreover, the terrorist attacks also highlighted to Western officials and security analysts the dangers of adversarial *states* who exist out with Western influence, and who do not adhere to Western values of freedom, democracy and human rights. The potential for these states actively supporting anti-Western terrorist activity had become a very real danger. For the Bush administration, the attacks on the World Trade Center were confirmation enough that previous foreign policies aimed at ‘containment’ had become outdated and that it was now necessary to go on the offensive. As terrorism moved to the forefront of US security discourse, through the declaration of a ‘War on Terror,’ this meant that the US and its allies would not only go after the terrorist groups who threatened them, but also anyone who was judged to support them either on foreign

soil or within home borders. This would mark a return to Manichean binaries of ‘good’ versus ‘evil,’ as Bush warned that ‘you are either with us, or with the terrorists’. Security documents of the period, from both the U.S. and the U.K, demonstrate quite clearly how the dangers of terrorism had become inscribed in official geopolitical and security discourse to become *the* greatest threat to the security of both.

The danger perceived from states existing out with the Western sphere of influence, and their links with de-territorial threats, would soon materialize in the shape of two U.S. led wars. When the war against Afghanistan was being mobilized by official and media sources, the primary discourse being used to give meaning to the impending conflict was that of ‘security’. This was about going after the terrorist threat that had come to wreak havoc within the very borders of U.S. territory. Following what was an unsuccessful ultimatum made to the Afghan government the Taliban- amongst other things it was demanded that they hand over alleged terrorist suspects, especially Osama Bin Laden- the allied war planes and ships moved in for direct conflict with the impoverished Asian country. Addressing the US and the World, President Bush stated that ‘these carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations’, meaning that it will be ‘more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans’.

Alongside what was essentially a primary ‘security’ discourse, a secondary ‘human rights’ discourse was also operationalized. The stated aim in this case was the ‘liberation’ of a repressed people, who had been living at the mercy of a barbaric regime in the Taliban, and been denied their basic human rights. In short, a two-pronged action with both a security component and a moral component. As such, it would seem that the military action was being undertaken for the good of the United States and the good of the Afghan population.

One of the ways in which the ‘human rights’ discourse was deployed was to highlight the plight of women in Afghan society under the Taliban. As President Bush stated in 2002, ‘women were given no rights. Young girls did not go to school’. The responsibility for which was placed on the Taliban, a ‘barbaric regime’ (Bush, cited in Hancock, 2007). In addition to public pronouncements and condemnations, ‘The Taliban’s War Against Women’ (2001) was also released by the U.S. State Department. Meanwhile, President Bush signed the ‘Afghan Women and Children Relief Act’, as

part of a 'new era of human rights and human dignity in that country' (Bush, 2001). As Bush makes clear during the signing ceremony, a link is established between 'the terrorists' and the 'brutal oppression of women,' meaning that this is not just about the security of the United States, it is about 'the values we hold dear'.

For the war in Iraq, the same appeals to security and human rights were being made by the U.S. and the U.K. governments. That said, with the links to terrorist organizations being decidedly more tenuous than in the case of Afghanistan, it was the threat from weapons of mass destruction which was being pronounced as the most significant danger emanating from Saddam Hussein's regime. Before the initial assault on Iraq, with the Bush administration in full throws to make the case for war, the issue of WMD was one of the recurring themes. As Bush said, 'Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons', while Colin Powell was sure that 'Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more'.

What can be seen from these performances of human rights by Blair and Bush is how they are deployed in relation to the geopolitical imaginary of the War on Terror. They are used alongside what has been identified as a wider security strategy of 'integration' (Bialasiewicz, 2007). Whereas under the 'Blair doctrine' spreading shared and universal values such as human rights, freedom and democracy is advantageous for all- both in terms of national interests and morally as in the interests of the Other- now things have changed somewhat. The threats lurking out with national borders are such that the spreading of universal values is now *necessary* for the security of the nation. What is needed now is a more aggressive, offensive integration strategy. Security and human rights thus come together in a discursive alliance. Afghanistan and Iraq are not only threatening, but they are also morally inferior. As the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated, the pursuit of 'integration' could never simply by a case of diplomacy, a choice, whereby all states existing outside the Western sphere of influence would be willing to subordinate themselves to Western power. Where states or governments display resistance or recalcitrance, force is necessary to bring them into line. As Bush put it in 2003, 'the doctrine of containment just doesn't hold any water'.

As Bialasiewicz et al (2007) have noted, this aggressive integration strategy is also to be found in an influential book *The Pentagon's New Map* (2005) by Thomas

P.M. Barnett. Offering up a Manichean division of the World, divided into what he calls an 'integrated core'- where globalization has taken hold and interactions are governed by a shared 'rule-set'- and the 'gap,' which is characterized by 'disconnectedness', the task now is to 'shrink the gap'. It is within the 'gap' where dangers to the U.S. and the West arise for the very reason that they are not programmed and functioning according to the same 'rule-set' as the West. In short, it is the very fact that some states are isolated from globalization and the Western 'rule-set' which makes them threats to the West. The 'rule set' of which he speaks of is the grouping together of Western values, democracy and free markets, meaning that it becomes necessary to propagate them. And while Barnett's work can indeed be viewed as a retrospective justification for ongoing military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, there would always be clear limits to this belligerent approach. The strategy of 'shrinking the gap', and bringing more states within the 'rule-set' under-girding globalization must also allow for the integration of countries by their own accord, through milder coercion or incentives. As will be seen later, this was indeed the case with Libya during the 'rehabilitation' period.

Human rights in the Cameron and Obama administrations

David Cameron, Human Rights and 'Liberal conservatism'

As Gilmore (2014) has noted, the difference in approach to human rights adopted by David Cameron's Conservative-led coalition government in 2009 was marginal in comparison to the previous Labour government's 'ethical' foreign policy. This *did* appear to mark, however, a considerable change from traditional Conservative realism (Dodds and Elden, 2010), pragmatism, and the cold pursuit of national interests. The indicators of such a convergence between Conservative Party foreign policy and the previous Labour government can be found in the pronouncements of key Tory figures both from the period in which the party was in opposition, and from when it reached power in 2009. Since these individuals have played a key role in both these periods, including the Western military intervention in Libya itself, the primary focus will be on David Cameron, William Hague and Dr Liam Fox.

The first thing which is immediately of note from an analysis of David Cameron's 'British' foreign policy is that it is a self-disclosed 'liberal Conservative' one. As Cameron wants to make clear: 'I'm not a neo-conservative. I'm a liberal Conservative' (Cameron, 2006). Taking into account the timing of Cameron's speech given at the Conservative Party conference, - August of 2006, while in opposition-, this is not altogether surprising. With Britain and the United States mired in an increasingly troublesome and ill-conceived war in Iraq, the neo-conservative impulses which propelled the Bush administration into the war in the first place were also placed in doubt. For Cameron, therefore, the 'liberal' refers to his belief 'in spreading freedom and democracy, and supporting humanitarian intervention'. The 'conservative', stems from a recognition of the 'complexities of human nature' and scepticism 'of grand schemes to remake the world'. In this way, the doctrine of 'liberal Conservatism is more suggestive of continuity with Tony Blair's Labour government and his openness to 'liberal interventionism'.

The future Foreign Secretary William Hague has also been accredited with playing a major part in this policy reformulation and evidence of his own turn to human rights is certainly not difficult to find. William Hague's speech on 'Britain's values in a networked world' does appear to bear a striking resemblance to New Labour's human rights in an 'inter-connected world', especially if the link is made between British/Western values on the one hand, and 'universal' human rights on the other, as it certainly seems to be. This is a vision, like New Labour's, where values and interests merge in an ambiguous relationship (Gilmore, 2014). It is a vision of a moral Britain, but one in which there is no clear separation of the 'inside' and 'outside', Britain from the 'networked' world at large. 'Foreign Policy is domestic policy written large' (Hague, 2010), where the values we live by at home become the values of people everywhere. The moral imperative which Hague identifies in the British nation- and by deduction the British State- is to be found in its 'character', which is predisposed to 'help others' being founded on 'real goodwill, generosity and compassion'. This, claims Hague, is something 'fundamental', meaning that: 'it is not in our character as a nation to stand by while others are in need, or to be unmoved when they are denied the hard-won freedoms and protections that we enjoy in Britain as a result of centuries of striving for individual rights within a democratic society'. With human rights being an 'indivisible' part of foreign policy, this is foreign policy with a conscience, but it is not

just our 'common humanity' which is at stake, it is our security too. 'Where there is lawlessness, human rights abuses inevitably follow, affecting our security in the UK as well as affronting our common humanity' (Hague, 2010).

A 'new' and 'potentially immensely destabilizing force', says Hague, is the spread of material related with nuclear science. This is not simply a problem when in the hands of problematic and threatening states, as would be the case with Iran, but perhaps more worrying still, if this material and weapons finds its way into the hands of terrorist groups. The threat of nuclear material proliferation, along with the other major concern, that of climate change, is compounded by the understanding that 'they are almost certainly not reversible once they have happened'. These two risks, together with those related to 'energy security' and the decline in 'relative economic power' of Western nations paints a 'troubling scenario' and 'grimness' for Hague. One of the problems of the cumulative economic decline of Western countries, in relation to China and India for instance, is that it 'will have a major impact on the ability of Western nations to achieve their foreign policy goals'. Of these, Hague highlights 'the calling for economic sanctions against nations whose human rights records we find unacceptable' (Hague, 2009).

In relation to the wider outlook for Britain, Hague wants to reiterate that the new approach to foreign affairs is being based on 'liberal conservatism'. An important component of this is what he calls 'enlightened national interest', which is an attempt, like was seen previously in Blair's foreign policy, to fuse interests and values. A belief in the values of freedom, human rights, and democracy, and their active promotion around the World is logical in so far as it is tied to national interests. In particular, he assures, 'Britain will be safer if our values are strongly upheld and widely respected in the world' (Hague, 2009). For this to happen, it will be first and foremost essential 'for Britain to uphold our own values'. This appears to be a subtle reference to the past 'rendition' of prisoners involving the Labour government, where prisoners would then be tortured in third countries. Moreover, to achievement the objective of spreading values to secure interests – E.G 'enlightened national interest'- it is necessary to have an 'active engagement in world affairs'. And while it is acknowledged that 'liberal interventionism', presumably of the type advocated by Blair, has 'generated much debate', Hague is certainly able to see how this can be warranted. 'To varying degrees,' he states, 'all of us have subscribed to it' (Hague, 2009).

Hague is also keen to point out that the type of engagement he is advocating is a 'realistic' one, in the sense that he is under no illusions as to 'how rapidly nations can be built or democracy entrenched'- a reference, perhaps, to the nation-building mission in Iraq-. Hague is also 'sceptical', like Cameron, of 'grand utopian schemes to re-make the world'. This means that 'foreign policy idealism must always be tempered with realism,' as it is understood that democratic reforms- particularly in Gulf states- 'will do so at varying paces and sometimes over an extended period' (Hague, 2009). This degree of measure and relativity in how democracy and human rights should be promoted is in many ways necessary to explain the inconsistencies inherent in how the British government has, and indeed *is* expecting to deal with this issue. To criticize Iran for lack of freedom and democracy, while by and large passing over the Gulf States demonstrates an acute incoherence which needs dealt with in some way. This realism will also be in evidence when it comes to other larger and more powerful nations such as Russia and China, where considerable challenges are said to remain between balancing concerns over values and interests.

If, as has been shown, both David Cameron and William Hague were embracing human rights as part of a new 'liberal Conservative' foreign policy orientation, this can likewise be said to be the case with Dr Liam Fox, Defence Secretary during the Libyan intervention of 2011. In acknowledging that human rights have not occupied a central place in the 'Conservative agenda', Fox's speech is in many ways about arguing for a reassessment of this. Since 'freedom is a fragile concept,' Fox continues, 'respect for the inextinguishable dignity of each and every human being must be paramount' (Fox, 2005). And it is with these three things in mind that future UK defence secretary announces a 'Human Rights Group' within the Conservative Party, to carry out an 'Annual Audit' of 'various Governments' records' for the purposes of developing foreign policy and engaging in debate in an 'informed and transparent manner'. This is essentially Fox's 'blueprint' for the objective of pursuing a 'freedom' or 'democratic agenda'. Again, as was seen with Tony Blair, the idea that a successful foreign policy can be formulated by strict adherence to pragmatism and national interests is renounced. Values or 'human rights'- principally liberal democratic rights- are also deemed to be crucial, meaning that 'the spine of our foreign policy should have democratic principles attached to it'.

In arguing that the ultimate goal is a 'democratic agenda', which is synonymous for the spread of what Fox would consider to be functioning democracies, it is posited that three 'basic pillars' are needed- the 'freedom agenda'-, which 'underpin a stable and prosperous society', and on which 'stability is built' (Fox, 2005). The first thing is the power of the 'free market'. This is due to the fact that free market societies 'are far more able to unleash the creative potential of their own population,' with the twin forces of 'individual' and 'economic liberty' being a 'hugely empowering force in any society'. The second aspect of the 'freedom agenda' re-affirms a commitment to the 'rule of law' as a framework for supporting and allowing democracy to flourish. This is important to ensure that procedures and principles are followed, and constraints abided by. The rule of law, Fox argues, 'pertains to all', being 'equally applied to government and citizen, consumer and business'. Finally, it is 'human rights' that comprises the third component, and this is so since 'freedom' is what enables democracy to function and endure.

Having outlined his vision for a 'freedom' or 'democratic agenda', Fox's speech is at the same time laced with warnings about imposing certain systems of governance on others, and/or not taking into account the history and culture of a particular country. These warnings are based, at one point, on recognition of 'our own history' and 'how long it took us to progress from a free market philosophy to universal suffrage'. 'The differences between this process,' he asserts, 'and having democracy imposed by the developed world, can be great' (Fox, 2005). Yet Fox's discourse is somewhat contradictory in this respect. On the one hand he assures that it is definitely not about 'having a single model which is applicable globally', while on the other he speaks of 'natural rights' or of 'certain principles' which enable 'individuals to take control of their own destiny'.

What can be detected here is a belief in 'destiny', the predetermined future, one which is attainable by way of essentially greater 'freedom' and 'democracy'. One must deduce that in the absence of these two values, the 'destiny' of individuals would on the contrary remain out of reach. It is not so much, then, that the endpoint of political and social progress is in question- this is the attainment of 'freedom' and 'democracy'- nor is it that history is not, generally speaking, moving in a linear direction towards this endpoint. It is just that this endpoint is not guaranteed, precisely due to the 'complexities of human development'. It is that 'mankind is as capable of backward steps as it is of moving forward'. It is also possible to detect, 'on an even larger scale', the

'stalling of many Islamic states'. 'Progress towards liberty,' therefore, is not inexorable or inevitable. This means that the 'freedom agenda' is 'a battle that must be fought and re-fought every step of the way' (Fox, 2005). This, one can gather, is where it will be necessary for pro-active measures from government to pursue the 'freedom agenda', instead of passively waiting for these changes to come about on their own. And like William Hague, Fox believes that 'humanitarian intervention' will be one way of achieving this.

The dual significance of human rights and security to be found in the words of these high level Conservative officials can be found within official security documents produced by the coalition government once in power. In analysing documents such as the UK National Security Strategy (2010), together with the Foreign and Commonwealth reports on Human Rights and Democracy (2010) and Building Stability Overseas (2011), certain observations can be made with regards human rights. Firstly, the spread of human rights throughout the World is understood to go hand-in-hand with the promotion of freedom and democracy. In fact, what can be seen is almost a merger whereby the ambiguous terms freedom and democracy become universal values and take their place within the collective 'human rights'. The 'stability' which will come from promoting human rights in problem states will benefit Western countries as it will be less likely that they are drawn into any conflicts and will have to deal with massive flows of refugees.

But not only that, the economic, as highlighted by Hague's discourse, to this endeavour too. First and foremost, once human rights is consumed within a wider security discourse, it becomes relational to all aspects of that -economic considerations are crucial to the security of the state since they represent strength, vitality, and also the procurement of natural resources which maintains the state functioning-. In this sense, the 'stability' which is understood to exude from democratic, human rights based political systems, is clearly desirable for trade and U.K interests. Recalling the context of 'inter-connectivity', this desire for stability becomes even more pronounced as events in one part of the World can impact on countries in another. This idea was indeed one already articulated by Tony Blair (1999): 'Financial instability in Asia destroys jobs in Chicago and in my own constituency in County Durham. Poverty in the Caribbean means more drugs on the streets in Washington and London'. Like Blair, the Cameron

government believes that it is through the advancement of shared values and principles that these threats are to be mitigated.

As is to be expected from a performative understanding of ‘human rights’ as the moral constitution of the Western state identity, performances of this discourse are not only to be found in official sources. One could, for instance, point to the British think-tank ‘the Henry Jackson Society’. Launched in March, 2005, the Henry Jackson Society has since then been accredited with wielding considerable influence over Conservative Party foreign policy (Dodds and Elden, 2010). To demonstrate this point one could highlight a number of prominent Tory politicians who are signatories of the Henry Jackson Society ‘Statement of Principles’. In particular, one could highlight Michael Gove- former Secretary of State for Education and Secretary of State for Justice-, and Ed Vaizey- former Minister for Culture and member of Cameron’s campaign team (Dodds and Elden, 2010)-, as two figures who enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the Prime Minister at the time of the military intervention in Libya.⁴⁶

Yet, it is not only possible to make connections between the Henry Jackson Society and the Conservative Party by way of the personnel. A closer look at the aims and objectives of the organisation themselves and it becomes possible to trace a range of similar themes as to those articulated previously. For one thing, there is the same, clear, commitment to the diffusion of democracy throughout the world, and to be supported by the defence of human rights. This, in fact, is the primary goal: ‘liberal democracy should be spread across the world,’ a task to be carried out by ‘the world’s most powerful democracies’, but ‘under British leadership’ (Henry Jackson Society, 2006). One can also even detect traces of Cameron’s formulation of ‘liberal conservatism’ in the heading ‘a principled policy of democratic realism’.

The organization is also noteworthy for the clarity with which they view British foreign policy and the strategy which should be implemented to bring about the key

⁴⁶In fact, the think tank is actually noteworthy for its cross-party support, boasting an Advisory Board Comprising Members of Parliament from the three main Parliamentary Parties. The list of signatories, moreover, shown an even more impressive list of well-known past and present political figures. As for as human right is concerned, one can see that like official policy, it becomes almost dissociable from freedom and democracy.

objectives. Essentially speaking, this is not to be one of passivity, but on the contrary, one of assertiveness. Again, this reminds of William Hague's call for the British to set an example and for engagement with the world, in spite of its relatively diminutive size and population. For the Henry Jackson Society, likewise, foreign policy should be pursued 'more actively by intervention and example,' something which will require 'political will, a commitment to universal human rights and the maintenance of a strong military with global expeditionary reach'. The manifesto, 'The British Moment: The case for Democratic Geo-Politics in the Twenty-First Century' (2006) echoes this call for a more assertive position, stating that: 'it is time for Britain, and indeed, the rest of Europe, to reclaim the noble tradition of liberal interventionism and pursue an active strategy across the globe'. As Dodds and Elden (2010) have noted, it is here where it is useful to recall the identity of Henry 'Scoop' Jackson, prominent U.S politician during the Cold War. Jackson was advocate of a strong foreign policy, based on human rights, and one that 'should not be reluctant to use military and economic levers to change the internal behaviour of other states including superpowers'.

For the Henry Jackson Society, as was the case with the Conservative government under Cameron, foreign policy must be undertaken in accordance with 'clear universal principles'. Since the primary aim is to spread democratic political systems around the globe, it is perhaps not surprising to see values related to this enterprise dominating the 'Statement of Principles'. Cited here, are the 'global promotion of the rule of law, liberal democracy, civil rights, environmental responsibility and the market economy' (Henry Jackson Society, 2005). It is of course highly unlikely that principles such as 'liberal democracy' and the 'market economy,' in particular, could be considered 'universal'. Yet for many, including traditional 'liberal interventionists' and seemingly 'liberal conservatives', the eulogization of 'freedom' as perhaps *the* universal value or 'human right' makes it possible to understand both 'liberal democracy' and 'market economy' in this light. In any case, the x of universals is in many ways a necessity so as to facilitate their active promotion around the world. In short, it is not enough that these are 'our' values, they must belong to '*them*' also. It is interesting to note her that for the Henry Jackson Society, it was a combination of 'strength and human rights' that was most influential in bringing about the 'collapse of the Soviet dictatorship' (Dodds and Elden, 2010).

‘American values’ are ‘Human rights’

If we are to compare how the ‘human rights’ concept features in UK foreign policy with where it is situated in Obama’s Democrat administration in the US, it is possible to detect a great degree of congruence. First of all, there is to be found the same pronouncements from top level officials professing the centrality of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Secondly, in line with Cameron’s government in Westminster, and Blair’s Labour government, one can draw parallels by the way in which human rights are viewed in terms of liberal democratic values. This link is certainly established by Obama in his now famous speech given at Cairo University in 2009. In his remarks about democracy promotion around the World, the U.S. President reasserts his commitment to: ‘the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose’. These values, Obama is quick to add, ‘are not just American ideas; they are human rights’.

Speaking in the State Department Human Rights report of 2008, Secretary Hillary Clinton insisted that the promotion of human rights is an ‘essential piece of our foreign policy. In doing so there are certain claims being made regarding the moral identity of the US nation and, by extension, the US State. This is constituted by claiming that their ‘commitment to human rights is driven by faith in our moral values’. Elsewhere, in the National Security Strategy of 2010, the link between human rights, the U.S’s ‘essential’ character and its global outlook is reinforced. The U. S’s ‘moral leadership’ is grounded in the ‘human rights which America has stood for since our founding’, providing a ‘source for inspiration around the World’. What is displayed here is perhaps the quintessential example of ‘American exceptionalism’, driven by the ‘belief in the U.S as a special nation with a moral right to exercise broad power in the world, to lift up the inferior ‘other’’ (Forsythe, 2011).

That human rights, once more, becomes almost synonymous with freedom and democracy means that the Democrat administration is able to couple values -U.S. *and* universal- with interests. This is because the advancement of freedom and democracy fulfils specific security goals. Firstly, ‘governments that respect these values are more

just, peaceful and legitimate,’ and moreover they preside over political systems that are ‘more stable, successful and secure.’ This means that the United States can ‘more effectively forge consensus to tackle shared challenges when working with governments that reflect the will and respect the rights of their people’ (National Security Strategy, 2010).

One more the advancement of human rights is linked to the context in which specific security threats and dangers emerge from. Being a ‘global age,’ the threats being faced ‘have shifted dramatically in the last 20 years’ and are ‘more consequential’. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, climate change, pandemic diseases, global crime networks, are all said to threaten the ‘security of different regions *and* the health and safety of the American people’ (my emphasis added). As put forward by British Foreign Secretary Hague and ex-Prime Minister, the defining characteristic of this ‘global age’ is that of ‘interconnection’, whereby the boundaries between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ have become blurred. ‘Our security,’ the report assures, ‘can be directly challenged by events across an ocean’. And in a ‘World of greater interconnection,’ power is ‘not a zero-sum game’, making it essential that the U.S. tries to reach out to different peoples (National Security Strategy, 2010). One of the ways this is to be done is through example, from within the borders of the U.S; another, is through the active support of human rights, freedom and democracy around the World.

Since it can be shown, therefore, that the advancement of human rights is linked closely to wider security concerns, this also means that performances of human rights do not only serve to constitute the moral identity of Obama’s administration. But in essence, a fusion between U.S values and ‘human rights’ makes it possible, but that they will also entail. In this way, it becomes possible to remain true to the U.S’s essential’ character -understood as universal values- and confront security concerns at one and the same time. Yet this complex relationship between universal human rights, freedom, democracy, and security also means that the pursuit of the former will not always be realizable. Like the governments that had gone before them, on both sides of the Atlantic, the old problem of interests and values resurfaces. Concern for human rights -understood as freedom and democracy- is constrained by what are understood to be geopolitical ‘realities’ and wider security concerns. One of these- and to recall this is also found in the Conservative government of the United Kingdom- is an element of caution in relation to efforts of promotion and diffusion of human rights and democracy.

With what has been widely considered to be the foreign policy debacle of regime change in Iraq on his mind, Obama articulates the dangers of blindly and violently following this objective: ‘so let me be clear: No system of government can or should be imposed on one nation by any other’ (Obama, 2009). It is acknowledged that this is something that must be done strategically, insisting that ‘we will not seek to impose these values by force’.

This is not to say that Obama, or other high profile members of his government, were necessarily against the idea of military intervention, in whatever guise it may appear. Speaking in Oslo during the acceptance of his Nobel peace prize (2009), the U.S President speaks of the ‘hard truth,’ being that ‘we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes’. One of the consequences of this, for him, is that ‘there will be times when nations- acting individually or in concert- will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified’. The allusion being made here is to the doctrine of ‘humanitarian intervention’. And he continues, ‘inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That’s why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.’

Yet it is not only the President who has shown himself in favour of liberal or ‘humanitarian intervention’. Susan Rice, U.S Ambassador to the United Nations- - and later National Security Advisor- is another who has spoken about this and its offshoot ‘Responsibility to Protect.’ One need only point to her work on ‘The Evolution of Humanitarian Intervention and the Right to Protect’ (2007) in which Rice laments the failure of the West to respond to humanitarian disasters. There is also Samantha Power, National Security Council senior aide during the intervention in Libya, and future U.S Ambassador to the United Nations. Power’s commitment to human rights is well known, as is her Pulitzer prize winning book ‘A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide’ (2002) which also clearly demonstrates her advocacy of U.S humanitarian intervention. Both Rice and Power, along with Secretary of State Clinton, are all widely thought to have influenced Obama in taking the decision to back the military intervention in Libya (The Nation, 2011).

Yet undoubtedly what is more problematic for Obama’s administration is the continuous issue with reconciling the promotion of what are presumed to be universal values with what are a plethora of security interests. That is to say, how to further the

advancement of human rights- freedom and democracy- when this would clash with other security and economic interests⁴⁷. This is an impasse seen already in the Carter administration when the President's undoubted commitment to human rights was compromised by the geostrategic 'need' to remain in favourable terms with the brutal regime of the Shah in Iran and the behaviour by external actors -E.G. the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan-. The Obama administration approaches this difficulty principally through a rejection that there is indeed any conflict of interests. The National Security Document of 2010 states that the 'United States rejects the false choice between the narrow pursuit of our interests and an endless campaign to impose our values'. The document then provides room for manoeuvre for the administration on the global pursuit of human rights. While alluding to their universality on the one hand, referring to them as being applicable both inside and outside the U.S. and being 'timeless', a clause is also inserted which insists that the U.S. must 'not rely on a single approach to overcome tyranny and subjugation'. Thus, it is 'dialogue' with 'repressive regimes,' which will sometimes be the correct course of action.

In what Forsythe has referred to as 'muddling through', or 'inconsistency' (2011), it is possible to see how the uneasy relationship between values- human rights as freedom and democracy- and national interests plays out in practical foreign policy decision making. It's worth recalling that this is something which all governments in the U.S. and U.K have been charged with. The Obama administration is certainly no different. Forsythe has projected three loosely defined areas of foreign policy where this inconsistency is to be found: terrorism, multilateralism and bilateralism. With regards terrorism, many of the issues to be dealt with were products of the Bush administration and the 'War of Terror'. Having vowed to close Guantanamo detention facility, Obama found that institutional constraints would thwart his efforts once in government. Yet Obama would also decide not to pursue prosecutions amongst CIA figures and high level officials related with charges of torture. Moreover, and perhaps most controversially, Obama has continued the U.S. policy of targeted drone strikes, in spite of conceding that these have the potential to kill innocent by-standers.

⁴⁷As has been touched on throughout this section, this has been a problem that has continually plagued the deployment of the human rights discourse. Brzezinski (1995) has also specifically grappled with this in his article in 'The New Dimensions of Human Rights'.

In terms of multilateral issues, human rights issues at the United Nations also, at times, would expose the incongruence of universal values and other security/economic concerns. In particular, the Israel-Palestine conflict once more provoked criticism of the U.S for 'siding with Israel,' (Forsythe, 2011) in the wake of the Goldstone report into the Israeli offensive in Gaza in 2009. Being an investigation into war crimes by both the Israeli army and Hamas, the report was understood by many supporters of the Israeli government as to be overly critical of Israel. The Obama administration subsequently worked to play down the importance of the report at the United Nations, a move which was given more traction due to the fact that the U.S. had been standing for election to the UN Human Rights Council.

Finally, in terms of bi-lateral issues, the Obama administration appeared to be involved in a delicate balancing act with regards human rights and national interests. For instance, although China would still not be compliant with the U. S's liberal conceptions of human rights, freedom and democracy, economic interests would shape to a large extent the willingness of the Obama administration to engage in direct criticism of the Asian giant (Forsythe, 2011). Of course, one could point to many other instances such as bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia. The reliance of the West on Saudi oil, coupled with the security role that the Saudi monarchy play in the Middle East, mean that any concerns over human rights will be generally raised privately along the lines of previous notions of 'quiet diplomacy'.

KEY EVENTS OF THE WESTERN-LED MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

For analytical purposes, a timeline will be used to plot some of the key events which have defined both the Libyan conflict and the U.S. and U.K. responses to it. These have been selected from official discourse and also the media discourse analysed in accordance with the level of importance which has been attached to them. Not only does this indicate heightened media attention and therefore greater scrutiny of official policy, but it also makes it more likely that official responses from government will be warranted. It should be noted that this is not intended to be an all-encompassing list, which means that certain things will necessarily be left out. Nevertheless, as has been shown in previous work by Campbell (1998) and Hansen (2005), the use of such an analytical aid can be fruitful in as far as: firstly, it helps to narrow the analytical lens in the midst of the vast myriad of events which make up the Libyan conflict and help to focus the researchers attention on aspects of the conflict *considered* to be of importance; secondly, one can better take note of any variations in how these key events are represented.

The political violence that engulfed Libya in February of 2011 was contextualised as the latest in a series of countries showing severe civil unrest in the Middle East and North African region as a whole. For that reason, the events in Libya, like in other countries in the region, would be understood as part of an ‘Arab Spring’, and become synonymous with a seemingly uniform, universal and overtly political movement. The phenomenon became quickly understood as a pro-democracy movement, charging against the authoritarian systems of governance in place across the Arab World. Thus, the principle demands were said to be greater political freedoms such as freedom of speech, a more pluralistic electoral system, but also an end to corruption and cronyism which were viewed to be an endemic part of the regimes under attack. Preceding events in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt had already shown great political upheaval, becoming almost characterised by their tragic heroes and nefarious comic-book villains: on the one side were people such as Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian stall owner who set himself on fire in protest at the perceived injustices faced in the country; and on the other, ex-Tunisian and Egyptian Presidents Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. Both leaders were heavily criticised by Western media and the same Western officials who had hitherto been their allies. Their subsequent fall was

hailed by some in the West as great victories for 'freedom' and evidence of the inexorable march towards liberal democracy.

An intensification of the violence in Libya was clearly discernible after the pre-planned 'day of rage' in Libya on the 17th of February. The anti-government protests, which the Libyan authorities had tried to put a stop to by arresting a group of 14 activists beforehand, nevertheless went ahead in several of Libya's towns and cities, including the second largest Benghazi. New technologies were taken advantage of, like social media sites, meaning that significant numbers were still able to turn out with the aim of directing their anger against the Libyan government and the security forces who were charged with maintaining order. The clashes between protesters and security forces resulted in several deaths and dozens of injured (Al Jazeera, 17/02/2011).

The response to the violence taking place in Libya by Western governments was one of instant condemnation, fuelled perhaps, by criticism received over more passive reactions to the events in Tunisia and Egypt. In particular, David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy and Barack Obama were quick to denounce not only the violence taking place, but the ways by which the Libyan authorities responded to it. As protests spread to other parts of Libya, gathering force and momentum, and as more injured and killed were reported by the media and human rights groups, the rhetoric from Western officials concurrently began to harden. The British and the French, in particular, set out their joint plans to take the case to the supranational level and work on two separate Security Council Resolutions, condemning Gaddafi and the Libyan government's failure to protect the population (Clinton, 08/03/2011).

The first Resolution (1970) passed by the U.N Security Council was principally aimed at both condemning the violence taking place, and also the Libyan government for its complicity in the events. In the document released the Security Council denounced: '(deploring) the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government'. At the same time, calls were made for the Libyan authorities to 'respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly and of expression, including freedom of the media'. While the human rights abuses were not entirely attributed to the Libyan government, clear reference was made

to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm by 'recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population'.

Meanwhile, as events were unfolding on the ground, efforts were also being made behind the scenes by the U.K and France to draft a second United Nations resolution in support of their policy of introducing a 'no-fly zone'. This was ultimately successful and was passed on the 17th March through a vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions. In a similar vein to the previous one, Resolution 1973 once more condemned 'the gross and systematic violation of human rights,' of which 'systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity.' The resolution reiterates that it is the 'responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population'. In light of this, a demand was made for an immediate ceasefire and an end to the violence and attacks against civilians. A no-fly zone was to be implemented along with a continuation of the arms embargo put in place under Resolution 1970. Member States were duly authorized to 'take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country,' while expressly excluded from these measures was a 'foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory' (United Nations, 17/03/2011).

The response to UN Resolution 1973 by the Libyan government was to pledge its support and offer up an immediate ceasefire, as announced by Libyan foreign minister Musa Kusa (18/03/2011). This would not, however, be enough to bring the violence to an end and in any case, U.S, British and French forces had already swung into action. Following the decisive vote at the Security Council and the passing of Resolution 1973, the United States took a lead role in the military operation under the code name Operation Odyssey Dawn'. The first air attacks being carried out on the 19th March, and barely a day later, the primary goal of eliminating Libyan air defences and setting up a no-fly zone over Libya was said to have been accomplished (Mullen, 20/03/2011). The air attacks would continue, nevertheless, and even intensify as U.S and European forces began to seek targets above and beyond the Libyan air-defences (New York Times, 21/03/2011). On the 31st March, command and control of the mission was passed over to NATO and was now to be known as Operation Unified Protector. In total, 26, 000 sorties were made, more than 9, 600 of which were designated strike missions (NATO, 2011). On the 28th of October, NATO Secretary

General Anders Fogh Rasmussen made an official statement to signal the end of the mission, with all objectives seemingly accomplished.

One of the most significant initiatives formulated to implement a ceasefire and reach a political solution to the Libyan crisis came from the African Union (AU). Only in its embryonic stage at an AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting on the 23rd February of 2011, the subsequent formation of an Ad Hoc Committee was designed to push the proposals forward and engage with both the warring parties in Libya and the predominately Western governments keen on strong measures against the Libyan government. On the 10th / 11th of April, with the U.N backed no-fly zone already in place, the resultant roadmap was put to both the government of Libya and the National Transition Council. The key proposals made were for an immediate cessation of hostilities, a halt in the NATO bombings, a demand for the Libyan authorities to facilitate the access and delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population, the protection of foreign nationals, and the implementation of the required political reforms which had caused the violence. The ‘roadmap’ was accepted by the Libyan government, but rejected by the NTC on the basis that it did not include guarantees of Gaddafi’s immediate departure (Jabril, cited in al-Jazeera, 12/04/2011).

As media reports and military assessments of a ‘stalemate’ were reaching policy makers in London, Paris and Washington, this would lead to an intensification of the air campaign over Libya. Some of the attacks, one particular raid, it was suppo targeting Gaddafi seemed to confirm that the Libyan leader was indeed in the sights of NATO commanders and the political leaders guiding them. The attack resulted in the deaths of Seif Al-Arab Gaddafi and three of Gaddafi’s grandchildren. Despite being present at the time, Gaddafi himself was unhurt (Telegraph, 01/05/2011). In response, NATO was quick to play down the attack stating that ‘we do not target individuals’, while confirming that the attacks the night in question had struck a ‘known command and control building in the Bab al-Aziziya neighbourhood shortly after 1800 GMT Saturday evening’ (NATO, 01/05/2011).

All the while, the military campaign continuing apace, developments had seen the rules of engagement widened to incorporate other objectives. Having started out targeting tanks and military vehicles that could theoretically threaten the civilian population, it would later be considered ‘legitimate’ to go after what were the command

and control and intelligence networks' (Fox, 2011) of the Libyan government. This was a move of which not all NATO countries took the 'same view'. Be that as it may, further proposals to extend this to include Libyan infrastructure signalled a gradual escalation and widening of the air-strikes being carried out. This was clearly meant, as military chiefs recognised, to ensure that Gaddafi did not remain in power and that he would get the message that he should vacate power immediately (Richards, 15/05/2011). Finally, this strategy would culminate in attacks on the Libyan government's communications capabilities as state TV transmitters were also targeted. The justification for which being to eliminate any remaining possibility that Gaddafi and the Libyan government had left 'to incite violence against fellow Libyans' (Ministry of Defence spokesman cited in the Guardian, 01/08/2011).

As the rebel forces were gaining more and more ground, in particular in the West of the country, reports also began to emerge of human rights abuses perpetrated in the captured towns. One such case was in relation to a group of four towns in the Nafusa Mountains- al-Awaniya, Rayayinah, Zawiyat al-Bagul and al-Qawalish- where the crimes taking place were the destruction of property -including the burning of homes-, the looting of hospitals and shops, and beatings of those considered to be loyal to Gaddafi and the Libyan government (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

The advances being now made by the 'rebels' on the ground were at this stage palpable, as all media channels started to signal what would appear to be the beginning of the end for Gaddafi and the Libyan government. The final push, as it would appear, was being assisted by U.K, French, and Qatari special forces on the ground (Guardian, 24/08/2011), with 'SAS troopers' being deployed to provide directions for air-strikes, to communicate with NATO operational commanders, and for 'advising rebels on tactics'. Reports came in claiming that the 'rebels' had taken Zawiya (Guardian, 15/08/2011), Zlitan (22/08/2011); Tripoli (Guardian, 25/08/2011)⁴⁸- albeit with continued resistance-; Sabha (BBC, 22/09/2011); Bani Walid (Reuters, 17/10/2011); and Sirte (21/10/2011). News of the fall of Sirte into 'rebel' hands emerged also with reports that the Libyan leader Gaddafi himself had been captured and killed by opposition fighters. Calls by Western leaders for Gaddafi to stand trial were not heeded as he met his brutal end

⁴⁸It was reported that in 'Operation Mermaid Dawn', British, French and Qatari forces participated on the ground, assisting 'rebel' forces in taking the Libyan capital (The Guardian, 24/08/2011).

being beaten, sodomized and later killed. Gaddafi's son Saif was caught and imprisoned, and has since been sentenced to death.

TIMELINE OF THE MAIN EVENTS

16 th February	Reports of protests and unrest in Benghazi.
17 th February	Protests and violence take place in pre-planned 'Day of rage'.
22 nd February	United Nations Security Council issues statement which 'condemned the violence and use of force against civilians'.
17 th March	United Nations Security Council passes resolution to impose no-fly zone over Libya.
18 th March	Libyan government announces ceasefire.
31 st March	Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa defects and arrives in London.
31 st March	NATO takes sole control and command of mission.
3 rd April	US House of Representatives blocks additional funding.
11 th April	Rebels reject African Union ceasefire proposals.
19 th April	UK government recognizes National Transition Council as 'legitimate political interlocutor' of Libyan people.
16 th June	Rebels dismiss Libyan government offer of elections.
27 th June	International Criminal Court issues arrest warrant for Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and others.

16 th July	U.S. government recognizes NTC as the 'legitimate governing authority for Libya'.
28 th July	UK government recognizes NTC as 'sole governmental authority' in Libya.
28 th July	Assassination of rebel army general Abdul Fatah Younis
19 th August	Reports that rebel forces have taken back the town of Zawiyah.
21 st August	Reports that rebels have control of much of Tripoli.
25 th October	Rebels accused of massacre.

CHAPTER 8 OFFICIAL UK POLICY DISCOURSE: BETWEEN 'RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT' AND REGIME CHANGE

UK official policy towards the crisis in Libya consists, essentially, of two central and interconnected components. Firstly, not long after the outbreak of violence, Cameron makes the demand that Gaddafi 'must go'. While it will subsequently become difficult for the UK government to express this policy candidly, for reasons which will be touched on later, there can be no doubt that this in fact was the objective from the outset. In addressing the House of Commons with noticeably strong rhetoric, referring to Gaddafi's 'murderous' and 'illegitimate regime', Cameron is quite clear in stating: 'for the future of Libya and its people, Colonel Qadhafi's regime must end and he must leave'. After summarizing measures being taken against the Libyan government, Cameron reiterates his and the UK position: 'My message to Colonel Qadhafi is simple: Go now' (Cameron, 28/02/2011). Secondly, and in relation to the first political objective, the UK government articulates around the same time the desire to implement a no-fly zone above the skies of Libya. Both policy objectives are inter-related in as far as the second will be regarded as a way to bring about the first.

Understood principally by way of the basic 'human rights' discourse, which positions the figure of Gaddafi against a uniform 'Libyan people', it follows that the implementation of the no-fly zone and the protection of the 'Libyan people' would be enough to enable them to overthrow Gaddafi. The first part of this section aims to establish the links between official UK discourse, the basic 'human rights' discourse constructed in Chapter 6, and also the past historical articulations of 'human rights' which have been detailed in UK foreign policy discourse in Chapter 7. Since UK official policy discourse maintains a remarkable level of stability from the start of the Libyan crisis until the end of NATO operations, it will then be necessary to show how this was in fact achieved, via an assessment of the political and media opposition faced by British policy makers.

Continuity with the basic 'human rights' discourse

Responses to the events in Libya from UK officials appeared shortly after the first media reports had filtered through and bear many of the hallmarks of the basic 'human rights' discourse. Having said that, official UK discourse diverges from this in some interesting ways. Before looking at these variations, the objective will be to first trace how official UK discourse reproduces elements of the basic 'human rights' discourse. The first thing that one can point out is that Libya is likewise situated geographically within the Middle Eastern/North African region, being understood as part of the wider 'Arab Spring' phenomenon. Speaking to the House of Commons about UK policy towards Libya- that Gaddafi 'go now'- on the 28th February, 2011, Cameron immediately positions the events alongside those taking place in the wider region: 'Mr Speaker, North Africa and the wider Middle East are now at the epicentre of momentous events...In many parts of the Arab world, hopes and aspirations which have been smothered for decades are stirring. People, especially young people, are seeking their rights, and in the vast majority of cases they are doing so peacefully and bravely.'

Like with the basic 'human rights' discourse, it is the figure of Gaddafi who is held directly responsible for the abuses taking place. It is perhaps interesting to note, however, that in formulating his very first responses to the Libyan violence, Cameron avoids any direct references to Libyan leader Gaddafi. This can be perhaps understood as a natural discursive omission in light of the policy of 'rapprochement' which had been hitherto transpiring between the UK and Gaddafi. Be that as it may, this would change very soon after, and the responsibility for the violence in Libya would be attributed firmly to Gaddafi. The figure of Gaddafi goes on to become quite clearly the radical 'Other' of the Western 'Self'; 'murderous' (Cameron, 27/02/2011) 'brutal' (Cameron, 25/03/2011), and 'dictatorial' (Hague, 02/10/2011). In short, the antithesis of the rational, moral and democratic UK identity. As Cameron assessed Gaddafi's response to the perceived aspirations of the Libyan people, he stated: 'Colonel Gaddafi has responded by attacking his own people. He has brought the full might of armed forces to bear on them, backed up by mercenaries. The world has watched as he has brutally crushed his own people'. Concomitantly, and replacing the 'Libyan government', found in the earlier speech, Gaddafi is now presiding over a 'Libyan

regime', already prevalent in media sources and used undoubtedly to attribute a sense of illegitimacy (Cameron, 28/02/2011).

In order to justify the haste with which the no-fly zone was agreed at the UN Security Council and later implemented, UK government officials were keen to make reference to the apparent critical threat that Gaddafi and the Libyan armed forces posed to Benghazi. This would become a recurring theme used by officials to express the desperate plight of the Libyan people, and to justify the need for urgent Western intervention. Benghazi was portrayed time and again to be on the verge of a 'massacre' (Cameron, 13/04/2011), or to delegitimize the figure of Gaddafi himself: 'we should remember that this is the man who told the world that he would show the people of Benghazi no mercy' (21/03/2011). In his triumphant speech in Benghazi on the 15th September, Cameron also recalls to the cheering crowd, 'Colonel Gaddafi said he would hunt you down like rats'. Benghazi was also used in response to questions on whether or not diplomatic efforts had been exhausted before the no-fly zone was passed. Diverging from previous conflicts where past atrocities such as Srebrenica were used to garner support for a more robust Western response, in Libya the emphasis was more on the potential threat which Gaddafi and the Libyan regime was said to pose Benghazi. To this question, Cameron was clear to point out: 'we were in a race against time to avoid the slaughter of civilians in Benghazi' (21/03/2011).⁴⁹

Nonetheless, these past cases were mobilised as historical pretexts for action in Libya. With NATO's mission having all but finished in Libya, Cameron establishes this link in his speech at the UN General Assembly (22/09/2011): 'And on this occasion a coalition of nations across the Western and Arab world had the will to act. In so doing, they stopped Benghazi from joining Srebrenica and Rwanda in history's painful roll call of massacres the world failed to prevent'.

One of the key differences between official governmental discourse in the U.K on the one hand, and the basic 'human rights' discourse on the other, is that governmental officials are at pains to emphasize and construct the events in terms of a 'Libyan people' in opposition to 'Gaddafi'. In essence what this means is that 'protesters,' 'demonstrators,' or 'civilians', become constituted as an unambiguous

⁴⁹The UK Foreign Affairs committee report (2016) into the Government's handling of the Libyan crisis concluded that the government has 'failed to identify that the threat to civilians was overstated' and that moreover it 'selectively took elements of Gaddafi's rhetoric at face value'.

'Libyan people' as they are conflated to mean one and the same thing. At first glance this may not seem like such a notable discursive move and yet a closer inspection reveals that something quite significant is at work here. First and foremost, by referring to a seemingly uniform 'Libyan people', the construction of their identity becomes simpler, unambiguous, and thus perhaps easier to grasp for Western audiences or even Western officials themselves. This operation establishes a clear-cut division of the dual Libyan Other; whereas the basic 'human rights' discourse leaves room for possible support of Gaddafi amongst the Libyan population, UK official discourse elides this potentiality by placing a universal and aspiring democratic 'Libyan people' in opposition to Gaddafi and his 'barbaric' and 'illegitimate' regime (Cameron, 28/02/2011). Speaking later at the London Conference on Libya on the 29th March, 2011, Cameron explained: 'Just as we continue to act to help protect the Libyan people from the brutality of Qadhafi's regime... so we will support and stand by them as they seek to take control of their own destiny.'

Moreover, and in perhaps the most significant discursive move, the 'Libyan people' are then politicized with the liberal democratic rights of 'freedom' and 'democracy'. It has been shown in Chapter 7 how in UK foreign policy discourse the twin-liberal democratic values of freedom and democracy have come to represent the most significant 'human rights'. This could be detected in Cameron, Hague and Fox's discourse, along with a willingness to extend these values throughout the World. Here, it is quite clear, the Libyan people are being viewed as embodying these very values, even if they are being prevented from realizing them by the radical Other Gaddafi. Thus, it can be said that while the spatial identity of the 'Libyan people' is being anchored to the Middle East/North African region –in a similar way to the basic 'human rights' discourse- UK officials are also at pains to emphasize the *temporality* of their identity. This is done in two principle ways. Firstly, with regards that actual events taking place in the 'Arab Spring', the temporal context is understood to be highly significant in that it represents a 'momentous' shift in the historical trajectory of the region (Cameron, 28/02/2011). According to Foreign Secretary William Hague, on the dramatic changes taking place in the region, he claims that 'they may already constitute the most important event of the 21st century -even more important than 9/11 or the 2008 financial crisis- in terms of their possible consequences' (21/03/2011). Cameron also declares that 'history is sweeping through the Middle East,' and on a separate occasion

he assures that 'this is a precious moment of opportunity for the region' (Cameron, 22/02/2011).

Secondly, and in accordance with the temporality of the events, the identity of the Libyan Other is itself also constituted along temporal lines. The temporal identity of the 'Libyan people' deviates from that of the Western Self in as far as it is viewed as backward and thus different from the civilized, developed Western Self. Ontologically speaking, however, they are both essentially the same. It is just that the 'Libyan people' are also aspiring to complete their temporal development, which will be achieved once they realize their universal human rights- at once universal and liberal democratic rights-. Therefore, the 'Libyan people' are imbued with the *potential* to realize their 'human rights' and politicised with what are predominately Western liberal democratic rights such as freedom of speech and the democratic right to choose their government. This means, as Cameron wanted to make clear, that people in the Middle East and North Africa were as amenable to liberal democracy as Westerners. He makes a call, therefore, to 'dispense once and for all with the outdated notion that democracy has no place in the Arab world' (Cameron, 28/02/2011). Elsewhere in what he refers to as the 'so-called Arab exception', he states: 'For me that's a prejudice that borders on racism. It's offensive and wrong, and it's simply not true' (Cameron, 26/02/2011). With the identity of the 'Libyan people' now so close to that of the West, the responsibility weighing on the West to take decisive action is heightened. The 'Libyan people' will be lead, with the help of the West, to realize its legitimate aspirations of rectifying its backward state, so as to become like the Western Self itself.

Moreover, it is not simply that the 'Libyan people' find themselves in a backward state of development- in comparison to the privileged Western Self-, it is that the realization of the key human rights of freedom and democracy becomes the natural endpoint of their development. That it is to say, a teleology governs official UK discourse in as far as the events in Libya and the wider region are judged to be part of a linear change towards freedom and democracy, and moreover that these same liberal democratic values become the key to the Libyan people reaching the endpoint of their social and political progress. It is only by achieving their universal rights of freedom and democracy that they will be able to reach their own 'destiny', and yet it is the figure of Gaddafi who is standing in the way of the that. The UK Prime Minister articulates this on the 29th March when he declared: 'Today is about a new beginning for Libya - a

future in which the people of Libya can determine their own destiny, free from violence and oppression.' Constructed as the radical Other and bypassing the 'rehabilitation' phase of U.K-Libyan relations, Gaddafi's ontological identity is once more one that does not allow for change. This means that he cannot remain in power, nor can he be part of any transitional process. This is why, as early as the 27th February, Cameron's message was that 'he should go now', and that 'Libya's future has no future with him at the helm, absolutely none.'

The geographical and temporal significance of the 'Arab Spring' phenomenon can thus be said to have an influence on how events in Libya were being understood, and the identities of those involved. Conversely, however, it is also possible to discern how the outcome of events in Libya could impact on the events in the wider region. One can begin to see the indices of a 'domino' logic at play here, something which will be articulated on several occasions. It is believed that success in Libya, or indeed failure, will ultimately have a knock-on effect in relation to the other countries in the region who were experiencing an important transitional moment. Speaking of events in Libya Cameron states; 'we have seen the uprising of a people against a brutal dictator and it will send a dreadful signal if their legitimate aspirations are crushed, not least to others striving for democracy across the region' (Cameron, 14/03/2011). The consequences of a passive response to the perceived imminent threat to Benghazi are also hypothesised with similar conclusions reached by Foreign Secretary Hague (02/10//2011): 'if Benghazi had fallen it would have been a huge setback for the Arab spring in countries like Egypt and Tunisia. It would have shown that a dictatorial ruler can successfully fight back and entrench himself again. That would have carried a strong message. [Syrian president] Bashar al-Assad now would be feeling in a stronger position and probably getting active assistance from a well-entrenched Gaddafi regime.'

This point leads on to another crucial aspect of the UK's performance of 'human rights' in Libya; it is not only an ethical responsibility to the Libyan people that is generated. If the West was disposed to intervene militarily merely on ethical grounds, it would already have done so in the wide range of cases which have shown similar levels of disorder and human rights abuses. Yet as has been shown chapter 7, 'human rights' has become subsumed within a wider security discourse, meaning that the discourse constitutes the identity of the UK state in such a way that it is also dependent on its own security interests. That is to say, 'human rights' is a question not only of the security

and rights of the Libyan Other, but perhaps even more importantly the Self too. In UK official discourse towards Libya this element is carried forward and articulated at several stages of the operation. Speaking after a special European Council meeting on Libya on 14th March Cameron explains, 'it is in our interests to see the growth of open societies and the building blocks of democracy in North Africa and the Middle East'. Later he will point out, 'it is about the Arab spring. If there is success in Libya, in Tunisia, in Egypt, then we will see a genuine Arab spring and not an Arab winter. That is what I think is in the interests of everyone in Europe, that our neighbourhood is made up of countries that are people, prosperous, have been growing in their democracy, and that will enhance not only our own prosperity, but also our security and our safety as well'.

Furthermore, the 'security' and 'safety' that Cameron refers to can be understood in different ways such as in terms of the migration flows or natural resource procurement. Perhaps most pertinent, however, are the threats which stem from transnational international terrorism. This is indeed one of the main security concerns to be found in UK security documents. Foreign Secretary Hague (21/03/2011) assures that 'if many of the countries of the middle east turn into stable democracies and more open economies, the gains for our security and prosperity will be enormous. If they do not, the potential breeding grounds for terrorism and extremism will prosper. That is why it is so much in our national interest to address these issues'. Re-iterating the links between the spread of human rights, freedom and democracy on the one hand, and the dual concerns of security and terrorism on the other, is something that Cameron (04/05/2011) makes clear during a press conference with the Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu. As he explains, 'we think, though, now there is a real opportunity with the end of Bin Laden, with the Arab Spring, with all that's happening in the world, we think this is a moment of opportunity to continue the work to defeat terrorism in our world, to continue the expansion of democracy, civil rights and freedom across the Middle East and North Africa'.




Diagram 8: Official UK discourse. Source: Own elaboration

Political opposition to official UK discourse

Political opposition to the U.K governments policies of both implementing a no-fly zone, and that Gaddafi 'must go', can be found in a debate on Libya which was held on the 21st March. On the face of it, a completely one-sided vote, the House of Commons decided by a huge majority-557 MPs in favour and 13 against-, to 'support the government, working with others, in the taking of all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya and to enforce the no-fly zone' (Hansard, 2011). Yet this result, convincing as it may seem, must be tempered by the fact that the United Nations Security Council had already passed Resolution 1973 and the vote was effectively carried out to garner further national legitimacy for the governments' actions. In the event that that had not been the case, it is reasonable to expect that more members would have been reluctant to support the

motion. As Labour MP Bob Ainsworth stated, 'I would not give my support tonight for the resolution if it were not for the fact that the United Nations had given its support, and that there was a breadth of support, including from the Arab League, for this intervention.' In any case, analysis of the debate shows that concerns, reservations and opposition were still voiced, including amongst those who voted in favour or abstained from the motion. The primary discourse being used to articulate the broad range of challenges to the U.K government's position was that which understood the situation as being a 'civil war'.

Moreover, and in line with this first point, many MPs of all parties voiced concerns that regime change would become the de facto objective of the NATO intervention. It was stressed on several occasions that the mission, and the mandate provided by the UN Resolution, should be understood strictly according to the humanitarian principles of protecting the civilian population. Conservative MP Edward Leigh was one of those, urging that 'we should state firmly that our operation is simply and only a humanitarian exercise to save people in Benghazi and that there is absolutely no intention of our trying to achieve regime change'. MP Diane Abbott was also concerned that the UN Resolution should be used to oust Gaddafi from power. As she put it, 'the Government would be wrong to take this evening's vote as some sort of blank cheque'. As leader of the opposition and supporter of Resolution 1973 Edward Miliband put it, 'None of us, however, should be under any illusions or in any doubt about the terms of what was agreed. The resolution is about our responsibility to protect the Libyan people—no more, no less.' With this came demands for assurances that any escalation in the military operations above and beyond the humanitarian mission that should be subject to further consultation with the House of Commons and the elected representatives (Goldsmith, 2011; Leigh, 2011).

Questions over the motivations of the government, or what would be the perceived motivations of the decision to intervene in Libya, were also articulated during the debate. These were generally made in relation to the inconsistencies in Western responses to similar crises, such as were being witnessed concurrently in Bahrain, Yemen, and other countries in the Middle East. This posed a challenge to UK official discourse in as far as it called into question government claims that this was solely about defending *universal* human rights. If such values were really universal, then why was the government not using its political and military power to put a stop to, or defend

these values, wherever they were being threatened. As such, this had the potential to undermine the very foundations of the justification for military action against Gaddafi, and the demands made that the Libyan leader relinquish power.

Perhaps the most significant challenge made to the Conservative-led government's policy toward Libya emerged from the apparent discrepancy and incongruence between the two stated aims; on the one hand, the military objective of implementing a no-fly zone to protect the 'Libyan people'; yet on the other, the political objective and policy that Gaddafi 'must go'. That is to say, there was an evident void between what the UN Resolution 1973 had authorized, and the aims which UK officials were stating publicly; there was nothing in the redacted document which made demands that Gaddafi or the Libyan government 'must go'. In a similar way, there was no guarantee that the success of the stated military objective would be enough to bring about the fall of the Libyan leader and his Libyan government. In practical terms, this very incongruence raised important questions about what in fact the objectives of the no-fly zone were, what a successful mission would be, and moreover what would actually signal the end of the mission. If the ultimate aim was to depose Gaddafi, the no-fly zone policy could only realistically be a success if the 'human rights' discourse was accurate in its representation of the dual-Libyan Other as Gaddafi-Libyan people. If, alternatively, the situation was more of a civil war, as many understood the events, the imposition of a no-fly zone would most likely not be enough to bring about the fall of Gaddafi and his government.

Thus, one of the key questions which informed many of the doubters in the House of Commons debate was that which pointed towards the 'exit strategy' of the coalition's no-fly zone policy. This raises the danger, as some like MP Angus Robertson expressed, that 'mission creep' could become a factor and the UK would be dragged further and further into a convoluted conflict situation. With this in mind, Robertson asks; 'will the Prime Minister acknowledge the importance of a broad consensus on this issue, and in doing that, the need to stick to the terms of the UN resolution and to address concerns about an open-ended commitment and the potential for mission creep?' Along similar lines, Conservative MP Mark Lancaster cautioned: 'One of the best pieces of advice I was ever given was never go into a room until you know where the exit is.' John Redwood also raises this issue by asking, 'Can he (the leader of the opposition) tell us how much intervention he thinks it reasonable for the west to make in

what is really a civil war in which the rebel side is experiencing considerable difficulties?’

Using the 'civil war' discourse did not only raise questions about 'mission creep' and what would constitute a successful mission in Libya. For those who questioned the reasoning behind imposing a no-fly zone, and the demands for a ceasefire made on the Libyan government, the continuation of violence was being viewed as the logical continuation in a conflict where one side is being forced to cease military activity, while the other is not placed under the same restrictions. Reflecting along these lines, MP Barry Gardiner considers the policy of a 'no-fly zone' to be inherently flawed since: 'it is naive to think that we can stop one side fighting in a civil war and not expect the other to take advantage. In a civil war, the tragedy is precisely that civilians are killed, if not by one side then by the other. I do not believe that the international coalition will be even-handed in stopping rebel forces advancing in the same way' (Gardner, 22/03/2011). MP James Arbuthnot pondered on 'the difficult question of whether the ceasefire applies to the rebels,' and he asks: 'if the rebels try, in response to breaches of the ceasefire by Gaddafi, to retake areas that he has taken, should we use military force to stop them?' (Arbuthnot, 22/03/2011).

During the debate it is also possible to detect traces of the 'civil war' discourse in issues relating to the geographical scripting of the conflict and the belligerents involved. MP Jeremy Corbyn traced the prospects of an east-west division of Libya, which feasibly could be the result of no successful resolution or political settlement. This, he suggests, would be an unwelcome situation since it would result in 'a client state in the east around Benghazi; and a pariah state in the west around Tripoli, led by Gaddafi, and a source of constant conflict, disturbance and danger in the region.' Moreover, since the stability of official UK discourse and policy was also dependent on an unambiguous split-Libyan Other composed of an aspiring democratic 'Libyan people' on the one hand, and a 'barbaric' dictator Gaddafi on the other, this means that British MPs could de-stabilise official discourse by calling into question the identity of the Libyan opposition or 'rebels'. Several MP's urged caution in this regard, such as Corbyn, who confessed: 'I do not know the politics, aims, ambitions or anything else of the people in Benghazi...we should be cautious about going to war on behalf of a group of people whom we do not know or understand and of whose aims we are not aware.'

Many were Ministers in the Gaddafi Government, again, only three weeks ago. It is a very short time' (21/03/2011).

By questioning the identity of the groups who had risen up to challenge Gaddafi and the Libyan government, the government's faith in a seamless transition to a liberal democratic system was also placed in jeopardy. MP Barry Gardiner was concerned about the democratic credentials of the 'rebels', lamenting that 'no one in government has sought to explain the policy of the rebels, on whose side we now find ourselves. We know that they are against Gaddafi, and that is a good start, but we certainly have no knowledge that they intend to replace him with an open, tolerant, liberal democracy.' Yasmin Qureshi concurred in that there was an evident uncertainty surrounding the identity of the groups that the UK government had committed itself to supporting. She opined that: 'We talk about the rebels in Libya. Who are these rebels, when did they come about and how many are there? How deep is the resistance and the rebellion? Why is this not just seen as a civil insurrection that is going on in a country? Do we know what we will get in place of the regime?' In relation to this perceived ignorance over the situation transpiring in Libya, and most likely in allusion to Iraq, she concludes: 'we have all learned to fear a vacuum in the Arab world.'

Concerns over the identity of the 'rebels' were just one aspect of the things that emerged in the debate by those deploying partially or fully the 'civil war' discourse. Adopting a more global perspective, it was clear to some that there was a real risk of the UK government's actions making things worse. This is in many ways a logical conclusion if one were to presume that the government would not only implement the no-fly zone, but would back the 'rebels' to the extent that the Libyan leader and government were toppled. Therefore, this would also be enough to suggest that the consequences of intervention may not be the ones desired by those purportedly aiming to bring about freedom and democracy to Libya. In reference to the Prime Minister's own claims and the stated ambition that 'we get rid of this regime', Green Party MP Caroline Lucas warned of the 'real risk of our making matters worse'. The prospect of civil war, she states, could lead to 'a partitioned Libya and even a potential breeding ground for al-Qaeda'.

What most of these interventions demonstrate, in one way or another, is a sense of caution, which stems from a humble sense of ignorance of the situation and the part

of the World that MP's were dealing with. This can be understood as a warning against misjudgement based on ethnocentric understandings of the events. With regards this general idea, Yasmin Qureshi warns: 'I always urge people to understand—even in the case of Iraq, although I was not in the House at the time—that we in this country and this House do not really understand the middle east and north Africa. We are meddling in things that we should not meddle in, because there are so many uncertainties'. And directly referencing the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, she states that we have 'spent trillions of dollars on being involved in conflicts in the middle east, and what have we left? We have not resolved any of the situations involved or made countries any better than when we went into them'. Somewhat more concisely Richard Drax resumes: 'there is not going to be a brave new world in Libya where western democracy rules, and we would fool ourselves if we thought that'.

Media opposition and the onset of 'stalemate'

Informed by the 'civil war' discourse, the idea of an ensuing 'stalemate' would begin to become a recurrent and dominant theme in the UK newspapers analysed in the weeks and months following the implementation of the no-fly zone. First reports of this speak of it as more of a distinct possibility resulting from the measures being taken, rather than a reality. For those in the media using the 'civil war' discourse, this was a logically conclusion to draw in that the situation on the ground was already understood as being more balanced. 'The conflict could degenerate into a prolonged stalemate,' the Guardian (19/03/2011) warned, while the Telegraph opined that 'stalemate in Libya is the greatest danger' (25/03/2011). This would entail some unwanted consequences. One of these is the possibility that Libya remains divided between a 'rebel' held east and a Gaddafi controlled West. More reports focus directly on the possibility that Gaddafi would remain in power, with the Guardian suggesting that, 'the dictator could remain in place, ruling over part of a divided Libya for a long time to come' (23/03/2011). A prolonged conflict not only threatened to be a test of the coalition's unity, but also the public's patience. A lengthy military campaign would be accompanied by an inevitable rise in casualties, and moreover the cost of such an operation could spiral. In what the

Guardian calls, 'yet another foreign foray at a time of austerity at home', public approval, it suggests, 'is sure to be tested if the total costs reached its own estimates of 1 billion pounds'.

By borrowing the 'rebels' - 'loyalists' dichotomy from the 'civil war' discourse, the media was also able to question, as many MP's had done, the objectives of the mission and the outcome of a no-fly zone. The protection of innocent life, as sanctioned by UN Resolution 1973, is a much simpler affair if one understands the violence through the 'human rights' discourse and the unambiguous separation of a 'Libyan people' on the one hand, and Gaddafi or the 'regime' on the other. Yet the ambiguity of the 'civil war' discourse introduced doubts for some UK journalists in terms of the policy being pursued and the perceived situation on the ground. One Guardian editorial (20/03/2011), 'shifting sands', poses the question: 'How does a responsibility to protect civilian life work in the circumstances where Gaddafi loyalists are defending their patch and the rebels are standing outside at the gates?' (Guardian, 21/03/2011). According to the article, 'the rationale of the resolution would then be to enforce a ceasefire, but that would be keeping Gaddafi in power'.

Perhaps more significant for the coalition and proponents of the 'human rights' discourse, the type of drawn-out conflict being predicted would have the effect of magnifying further the apparent incoherence in UK official discourse. Firstly, the more balanced situation on the ground implied by 'stalemate' would simultaneously be suggestive of a 'civil war' situation, undermining and destabilizing the UK government's 'human rights' discourse which had been used to justify involvement in the first place. Secondly, this illuminates the chiasm between the repeated claim that the coalition's role was to enforce the no-fly zone and protect the Libyan people, while also stating that Gaddafi 'must go'. A 'stalemate' on the ground implies that Gaddafi will not be deposed if the UK adheres strictly to UN Resolution 1973 and concentrates solely on protecting the Libyan people. This would become increasingly clear as events transpired.

It would not be long before the 'civil war' discourse progressed to what could be said to be its natural conclusion; the first reports of human rights abuses by the 'rebels' started to surface. The very logic of a civil war, suggestive of a more balanced conflict, rules out the possibility that crimes taking place will be attributable to one side -this

does not, of course, mean that one side, or all sides, are as ruthless as each other-. This development would appear to strike at the very heart of the UK government's 'human rights' discourse; namely, that Gaddafi and his 'regime' were brutally repressing an innocent, unified, and democratic 'Libyan people'. By constructing the identities of those involved, albeit loosely, as 'rebels' versus 'loyalists', the 'civil war' discourse must take account of civilian life in 'loyalist' areas, particularly once 'rebel' forces advance into these spaces. Ruth Sherlock, writing in the Telegraph (21/07/2011), reported on a 'mass grave' of what appeared to be Gaddafi loyalists, prompting 'awkward questions for Libya's rebels'. Such reports had the effect of questioning the democratic and human rights credentials of the 'rebels', and moreover what the outcome would be once the inevitable happened and the Libyan government was finally brought down. As such, the UK government's 'human rights' discourse and stated policy aim could be undermined fatally.

The onset of 'stalemate' as informed by the 'civil war' discourse leads certain journalists to favour a negotiated settlement to bring an end to the violence. Writing on the 27/07/2011 in the Guardian, Jonathan Steele believes this to be the most 'logical' solution. It has been one of the assumptions of this thesis, and that which was constructed in the basic 'civil war' discourse, that this is indeed the most logical foreign policy option which emerges from the 'civil war' discourse and the identities which it attempts to constitute. Since through this discourse, Gaddafi and his government are understood to have significant support within Libya, meaning that unlike Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia, the conflict may not be resolved easily by removing the leader. This was the view of the African Union, the UN Special Envoy to Libya, and Steele too: 'it is better to resolve these issues through negotiations than to break Libya's military stalemate with yet more war'.

The assassination of 'rebel' commander General Younis in September of 2011, having defected at the start of the troubles from the government side to the National Transition Council, was one incident which called into question the unity of the rebels, destabilizing further the 'human rights' discourse's representation of a homogenous 'Libyan people' in opposition to Gaddafi. After the death of the general was announced, reports in the Guardian spoke of a chaotic press conference which had 'ended in gunfire from enraged members of Younis' tribe, the Obeidi'. And the piece continues, 'one of the largest tribes in eastern Libya -the Obeidi- its members now believe the rebel

leadership had some role in the general's death'. For the author this is 'ominous' in as far as 'it raises the spectre of a democratic movement degenerating into tribal conflict (The Guardian, 30/07/2011).'

The construction of the conflict as a 'stalemate,' alongside reports of heavy bombardment by NATO, leads the Guardian newspaper into some heavy criticism of British foreign policy thus far (03/08/2011). In a 1,000-word diatribe, Simon Jenkins lambasts David Cameron's policy as having 'done no more than impose stalemate on a distant civil war at a cost of hundreds of millions of pounds'. Libya is portrayed as 'careering onward from reckless gesture to full-scale fiasco' whereby the 'Libyan rebels, portrayed by Whitehall propagandists as plucky little democrats, are hardly more sympathetic than Gaddafi's supporters -to each other and to those in the West'. Here, Jenkins utilises some of the main aspects of the 'civil war', and in doing so attempts to destabilise official U.K discourse and criticise government policy. The 'stalemate' in the 'civil war' has been caused by an indecisive foreign policy which has swung unconvincingly between claims to protect the Libyan people and those which state the aim of removing the Libyan government. Finally, in this quote Jenkins lays bare his understanding that the 'rebels', those being backed by the UK government, are not as democratic as was being suggested, thus putting in doubt the ultimate stated aim of bringing about a democratic transition in Libya.

Shortly after this there were more reports coming through of which factions made up the Libyan 'rebels'. In an article in the Guardian on the 23/08/2011, Martin Chulov whittles this down to three main groups: firstly, the 'Benghazi rebels', those who are accredited as being the 'founding fathers of the revolution,' and which would later develop into the National Transitional Council (NTC); secondly, the 'Misrata rebels', who endured what were considered to be the 'toughest and longest engagements of the war'; and finally, the 'western rebels,' who coming from the western mountains were able to reach Tripoli before the other two main groups. Questions had already been raised about the cohesion of the group. Chris Stephen reported that the NTC's claim to represent the whole of Libya had been 'all but rejected by Misrata...whose inhabitants are scathing of Jalil's rule and of the poor performance of NTC army units' (Stephen, Guardian 22/08/2011). Chulov was keen to highlight the 'disparate identities and different tribal roots' of the three factions, suggesting that this had perhaps

contributed to the NTC being 'slow to win the support of many who fight under its banner'.

How the UK government maintained discursive stability

Perhaps the most immediate challenge which the UK government faced was from charges of double standards and an inconsistent past record of both condemning human rights abuses, and intervening militarily to put a stop to those taking place. This was something UK officials had to deal with in relation to violence in the Middle East as a whole, and as their condemnation of Gaddafi and the Libyan government became more pronounced. One of the first tactics used to usurp this particular criticism was to deny straight up that past British foreign policy could be defined in such terms. While on a visit to Kuwait as violence in Libya was flaring up, Cameron insisted: 'we have condemned violence and repression against people wherever it has happened. I would not accept the contention that somehow we have been inconsistent between different countries or different situations' (Cameron, 22/02/2011). Once increased pressure began to be put on Gaddafi, the inadequacy of this response was clearly apparent and Cameron would be obliged to offer up a more nuanced and forthright response: 'just because you can't do the right thing everywhere, doesn't mean you shouldn't do the right thing somewhere' (Cameron, 18/03/2011). Two things stand out here. In the first place, Cameron alludes to the limitations of Western power, but secondly, he manages to evade perceptions of pure self-interest by claiming it to be the 'right thing' to do.

Drawing attention to the UK's inconsistent history of human rights denunciations was a clear attack on the notion that this action against the Libyan government was inherently humanitarian and undertaken to defend the human rights of the Libyan people. Yet more problematic still, was the difference between the stated political aims- that Gaddafi 'must go'- and the military mandate authorised by the U.N. This was complicated further by the fact that the U.K governments construction of events in terms of a 'Libyan people' against the Libyan leader Gaddafi would become harder and harder to sustain. For all that, if UK officials were to pursue their central policy of not

only implementing a no-fly zone, but also bringing about the fall of Libyan leader Gaddafi, it was crucial for them to maintain discursive stability of the 'human rights' discourse being deployed. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to adopt two discursive strategies:

First and foremost, it was imperative that they did not actually recognize that their policy was regime change and the toppling of Gaddafi. It was not simply the case that this objective had not been authorised by the UN Security Council, and would almost certainly have received severe criticism from various political actors and the general public at large. Accepting that the removal of Gaddafi was the ultimate aim would have destabilized the 'human rights' discourse being deployed since it would have undermined the dual-Libyan Other constructed by UK officials. If it was recognised that Western power was being used and was necessary to remove Gaddafi from power, then this suggests that the level of support for the opposition in Libya was not as high as indicated, and at any rate, would certainly not encompass the whole of the Libyan population. Moreover, this would critically endanger the idea that this was a home-grown movement through which the Libyan people were rising up to claim their universal rights of freedom and democracy. In short, the natural endpoint of freedom and democracy would be exposed as a myth. Rather, it would seem more like Western imperialism or opportunism in intervening to get rid of a recalcitrant leader Gaddafi. This would run the added risk of solidifying and galvanising support for Gaddafi himself.

Secondly, it was important that UK officials dealt effectively with the challenges being posed from those employing variations of the 'civil war' discourse, as was being articulated in political and media opposition. As has been argued previously, a civil war situation does not imply the same ethical responsibility as generated by the 'human rights' discourse, and moreover does not imply a successful resolution in the event that Gaddafi is toppled. Rather, it suggests a much more complex situation on the ground, where possibly multiple interests are in play, and the risk of exacerbating the conflict and instability is a real possibility. Yet perhaps more than anything, in recognizing that a civil war situation was ongoing in Libya, UK officials would also have to admit that Western force was necessary to bring down Gaddafi. As such, the first discursive strategy outlined would have failed. It was therefore important that Cameron, Hague and Fox, amongst others, negotiate attempts to destabilize their discourse and counter

constructions such as 'rebels' - 'loyalists', and the reports of a 'stalemate' on the ground. It can be shown that it is the 'human rights' discourse itself that provides the resources to overcome the challenges, meaning that UK policy is able to remain more or less constant until Gaddafi's forces are defeated and the Libyan leader captured by opposition forces.

In order to satisfy these two discursive requirements for stability of the 'human rights' discourse, the first way that this was dealt with was by denying outright that regime change was in fact an objective in the first place. As the Prime Minister put it during the House of Commons debate on Libya on the 21st of March: 'this is different from Iraq. This is not going into a country and knocking over its Government, and then owning and being responsible for everything that happens subsequently.' Secondly, UK officials would repeatedly insist on their intentions to adhere stringently to the letter of UN Resolution 1973, meaning that the mission was just about protecting the Libyan people. Thus, for instance, when questions were asked over the extent of UK involvement in Libya, what the plans were to depose Gaddafi, or when the job would be considered done, Cameron, Hague and Fox all showed a tendency to reaffirm their commitment to stick to the Resolution and to 'take all necessary measures to protect civilians'. In garnering support for his policy in the House of Commons, Cameron (21/03/2011) wanted to assure members: 'the action will be limited by what the UN Security Council resolution says...I urge all hon. Members to read the resolution in full, because it gives a pretty clear explanation of what we can do, and we must act within both the letter and the spirit of that'.

Since there was an evident gap between the political aims and military aims in that the military aims would quite feasibly not be enough to get rid of Gaddafi, a quite natural question to arise was that of how long the mission was going to take. This would be dealt with by first of all claiming that this was unknown. 'Of course, no one can be certain of what the future can hold,' Cameron (21/03/2011) was happy to acknowledge. Having said that, this then enables the Prime Minister to use the UK government's modified 'human rights' discourse and construct the identity of the 'Libyan people' as essentially democratic. 'But as we stand here today, the people of Libya have a much better chance of determining their destiny and, in taking this action, we should be proud that we are not only acting in British interests but being true to our values as a nation. I commend the motion to the House'. On the one hand, he confesses that the

future is to a certain extent uncertain, yet on the other, there is only one future imaginable and that is the 'people of Libya' being able to determine 'their own destiny' -realize their human rights of freedom and democracy-.

Yet this position, as set out by Cameron in the House of Commons, would become more and more difficult to sustain as events on the ground were increasingly understood as a 'stalemate'. It has been argued in the previous section, that this posed a dual problem to British policy makers in that it destabilised the construction of the 'Libyan people'-Gaddafi identity dichotomy, and that it magnified the incongruence in the stated political and military aims of the mission. One of the ways in which officials attempted to neutralise this challenge was to simply deny this was in fact the case. In spite of widespread acceptance of this in the media and amongst US officials-including Obama (15/04/2011)- Defence secretary Liam Fox opined: 'I don't think we're in a position of stalemate', and instead cited 'substantial progress being made in some areas in recent days'. This effectively allows Fox to resort to the basic 'human rights' discourse and the protection of the 'Libyan people': 'All that we want is that men, women and children can sleep safe in their own homes knowing that they will not be attacked by their own government'. The focus would then be shifted to the job at hand, issuing a steadfast warning and assuring: 'its resolve (international community) will not falter until we have achieved militarily and politically what it has set out to do' (Fox, 27/04/2011).

At other times, UK officials would emphasise the inevitability of Gaddafi being forced from power and the 'intensification' of the measures being taken. This was of course a delicate balancing act; pressure had to be increased on the Gaddafi and the Libyan government, but the UK government could not be seen to be forcing them out. In fact, it was almost impossible to resolve this tension and at times UK policy makers could not but expose themselves. 'Time is not on Gaddafi's side,' Hague (27/04/2011) assured, 'because the diplomatic, economic and military pressure on him will only intensify in the coming weeks'. That intensification would take on different facets. On questions of whether Gaddafi himself was a target of the airstrikes, UK officials were coy, without specifically ruling the action out. Speaking shortly after the imposition of the 'no-fly zone' Fox said: 'There is a difference between someone being a legitimate target and whether we go ahead and target him. You would have to take into account what would happen to civilians in the area, what might happen in terms of collateral

damage. We don't simply with a gung-ho attitude start firing off missiles' (Fox, cited in the Guardian, 21/03/2011). Later on the Foreign Secretary Hague would also be reticent to discard the possibility, pointing out: 'People are targets depending on the way they behave. It depends on their behaviour not on who they are. It depends whether providing all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya requires them to be a target' (Hague, 27/04/2011). On whether or not 'ground forces' would be deployed, earlier guarantees had only been given that it would not happen 'at the moment' (Hague, 20/03/2011). Nevertheless, Hague also wants to make conceptual clarifications in stressing that for him: 'There can't be an occupation force. But I don't think that means you can't have a ground invasion of Libya'. And he continues, 'it doesn't exclude every possible type of operation' (Hague, 21/03/2011).

However much UK officials aimed to maintain stability of the 'human rights' discourse being deployed, this is something that cannot be attained entirely and contradictions become apparent. The *aporia* that UK officials cannot ultimately overcome is that on the one hand, they are stating that it is about protecting the 'Libyan people' in order to give them the opportunity to determine their own 'destiny'. In short, it is a question of self-determination. Yet the intensification of the military campaign to remove the Libyan leader and government would betray this very notion. Said in another way, the UK government's discourse professes to be aimed at allowing the Libyan people the chance to choose their own government, and not to impose something on them externally. But, at the same time, they are not being permitted to choose Gaddafi and the current Libyan government should they so wish.

This was something that William Hague displayed significant difficulty in negotiating, and at times he tried to assure that an intensification of pressure on Gaddafi was not actually an indication that the mission had changed in any way. As he put it, 'we will continue in that way, intensifying what we're doing, the Apache helicopters are an example of that but that's different from mission creep, this is not mission creep changing the nature of the thing, this is intensifying what we are doing in order to make this mission a success..'. The message here is clear: 'this is not mission creep', neither has the mission changed in any way, nor this is about regime change. As UK officials would repeat time and again, this was about giving the Libyan people the opportunity to determine their own 'destiny'.

As it was becoming increasingly clear that Gaddafi still held considerable support within Libya, and that real doubts concerning the aftermath of the conflict were being raised, the UK government would resort to putting greater emphasis on the National Transitional Council and the Libyan people themselves. They would even hint at the need for a 'political' solution, whilst maintaining its refusal to accept that Gaddafi should play any part in that process. As it was put, 'our military actions can protect the people from attack; and our humanitarian actions can help the people recover. But neither are sufficient to provide the path to greater freedom. Ultimately, the solution must be a political one - and it must be for the Libyan people themselves to determine their own destiny. That means reinforcing the UN sanctions to exert the greatest possible pressure on the Qadhafi regime.'

Part of the concerns over the path to democracy stemmed from ambiguity that reports of a 'stalemate' had been generating about the identity of the 'rebels'; it was becoming less and less credible to claim that Libyan opposition forces were those of a homogenous 'Libyan people', nor that they were all democratic. When asked if he was clear about who in fact the UK was supporting, Foreign Secretary Hague's response demonstrates a double strategy: the first thing is to admit his partial ignorance- 'well a fairly clear sense. We've got to know some of them quite well'. And he continues, 'there's also a great mixture who support them; there are representatives of all areas of Libya, there are representatives of many shades of opinion'. The second thing is to place the emphasis on the NTC and to re-assert his faith that they are essentially democratically orientated: 'I think it is important to say that these people at the top of this organisation are genuine believers in democracy, in the rule of law. It is quite inspiring as I, as I said earlier this morning to see their real hope for the future of their country.' And perhaps rather less convincingly, he states: 'I think they are genuine in wanting a democratic Libya and in their hopes for a free country.'

Prime Minister Cameron also preferred at this stage to focus on the democratic credentials of the Libyan opposition. 'If we are patient and persistent', he assures, 'we will see the steady growth of the National Transitional Council which is an organisation that wants to make sure Libya is one country, is a democracy, is not extremist Islamist, is not tribalist but is actually joining the mainstream of the world as a successful democracy'. At other times though, he too resorts to confessing his partial ignorance over the Libyan opposition: 'Inevitably, information about the Libyan opposition is not

complete, but the evidence suggests that it consists predominantly of ordinary Libyans from all walks of life who want freedom, justice and democracy'. On the one hand Cameron admits that he doesn't know who exactly the opposition forces are composed of, and yet on the other, he assumes them to be motivated by a desire for 'freedom' and 'democracy'.

The killing of General Younis was a notable development in as far as it raised further questions about the identity of those groups that the U.K was supposed to be supporting. First and foremost, this raised doubts about how democratic and moderate they actually were. Secondly, the killing could serve to refute any ideas of 'unity' which had hitherto been suggested of the Libyan opposition. The U.K. Defence Secretary would thus have to deal with these questions, which he did using tactics to essentially buy time. Dr Fox first of all tried to make appeals to the ambiguity surrounding the events, saying that 'it's not yet clear who carried out the killing', and that 'there are claims and counter-claims.' Secondly, in relation to the lack of unity in the ranks of the opposition forces, Dr Fox is now obliged to acknowledge this stating that 'there has always been a mixture of people who make up the opposition forces.' This is 'hardly surprising given the country's history,' and yet it will be for the 'Libyans themselves to sort out exactly how and what power structure develops post-Gaddafi' (Fox, cited in the Guardian, 31/07/2011).

The emphasis now being placed on the NTC and the Libyan people was in tandem with the fact that it was becoming more and more likely that the Libyan opposition prevailed and toppled Gaddafi and the Libyan government. As a quite significant side issue, this allowed the UK government to avoid committing itself to any major responsibility for the aftermath and reconstruction. On the question of whether or not British troops would be deployed after the fall of Gaddafi to maintain stability, Cameron stated that this was a 'Libyan-owned, Libyan-led process' and dismissed the idea that British or other troops would be deployed there on a grand scale. 'I don't believe that the Libyans want to see, as it were, large numbers of international forces or foreign forces on their soil and that is not what Britain's role has been or will be,' he said. NATO had 'protected civilian life by hitting very hard the Gadhafi war machine', he said, which had allowed the Libyan people to 'choose their own future' through their 'incredibly brave action' (Cameron, cited in CNN, 01/09/2011).

Nevertheless, clearly this point was not of marginal import. As the homogeneity of Libyan opposition forces had all but been dismissed, arousing concerns about potential instability after the fall of Gaddafi, the aftermath of a Libya in which Gaddafi had been ousted was plagued with uncertainty. In response to questions of this nature from BBC correspondent Andrew Marr, William Hague is only able to deflect responsibility for that on to the National Transition Council itself as can be seen from this quote: 'Andrew Mitchell and I went to talk to them -National Transitional Council- about yesterday because there needs to be such a plan and it's only in an embryonic stage...we're also encouraging the National Transitional Council to put more flesh on their proposed transition, to lay out in more detail this coming week what would happen on the day that Gaddafi went; who would be running what? How would a new Government ...'.

Yet the intensification of the air campaign and continuous threats were being directed at Gaddafi and the Libyan leadership. This meant that the U.K government *did* have a responsibility for what happened afterwards and that this responsibility could not simply be shifted on to the Libyans as Hague was trying to do. Moreover, Hague's negative with regards 'peace keeping forces' or any kind of 'boots on the ground' – Hague claims that 'Britain does not normally these days play a huge part in peace keeping forces' -, leaves him exposed to charges of negligence or abandonment of duty. 'Our moral responsibility is different,' Marr suggests, 'I mean we will have helped to bring this regime down, we will have broken the Government as it were, so in terms of the pieces afterwards, we have an obligation presumably as a country to ensure that, you know, that there isn't chaos.'

Hague's response is to fall back on the what he envisages to be the promise of liberal democracy. Avoiding 'chaos' is about a 'stabilisation response,' which for Hague is the establishment of liberal democratic institutions and relations between Europe and Libya characterised as such: 'That is making sure that we have a whole new partnership with the Arab world, between the European Union and the Arab world, the way Europe acts as a magnet for positive change, encouraging really open market economies, the rule of law, an independent judiciary so that these things flourish in North Africa'. And again, not only will the emergence of a liberal democratic system in Libya benefit the Libyans, but that 'once this fighting is over,' this is 'the immense contribution that Britain and Europe again can make to the, to the wider prosperity and stability of the

world.' In other words, it is the spread of liberal democracy, whether that be done by force or not, that will provide greater prosperity and stability in the world.

On receiving news of Gaddafi's demise, British foreign minister William Hague was quick to reiterate this point: 'there is a lesson here for others in the world that once a critical mass of people of a country set out to achieve change or bring democracy to their country, then attempts to repress that by violence will not permanently succeed' (Hague, cited in the Independent, 23/08/2011). This is another example of how U.K officials are able to maintain stability of the 'human rights' discourse being deployed since the start of the conflict. It is not the U.K government, or the U.S or French for that matter, which has brought about the toppling of Libyan leader Gaddafi. Rather, it is the Libyan people who have done it, fuelled by an inexorable democratic force that will inevitably succeed. As Hague puts it, 'attempts to repress' those democratic forces 'will not permanently succeed'.

Coming towards the end of NATO involvement, one can see again how the U.K government is unable to accept prime responsibility with its allies in bringing about the fall of Gaddafi and the Libyan government. It is somewhat paradoxical that the 'destiny' of the Libyan people can only be reached in concordance with Western military power, which provides another reason why Cameron is reticent to accept any credit for the fall of Gaddafi and the Libyan government. As Cameron was keen to point out at a joint press conference with President Sarkozy in Paris on the 2 September 2011: 'I am proud of what British forces did together with our allies..But let us be clear, it is the Libyan people who have liberated Libya. The citizens of Misrata who stood out against a murderous siege; the people of Zawiyah who faced overwhelming odds but came back to rid their city of Qadhafi's forces; the fighters of the Jabal Nafusa who took shelter from Qadhafi's rockets in their ancestors' caves but then who fought back to liberate Tripoli; and, of course, the people of Benghazi who threw off oppression in their city'.

The violence in Libya, however, would not cease there and as more reports of 'human rights' abuses came in, more questions would arise surrounding what the new Libya would be like. The challenge presented by these reports was one which would not rest easily with the 'human rights' discourse, nor its proponents. After all, the legitimacy for Western intervention derived from the need to prevent these abuses from taking place in the first place. If the 'rebels' who had been backed by the U.S. and U.K.

were seen to be doing the same, the credibility of the intervention would be placed in jeopardy. UK officials would respond in certain distinct ways. First, these abuses would be referred to as 'reprisals' or 'revenge' attacks. In response to a question about the plight of black Africans in Libya, Foreign Secretary Hague (31/08/2011) assures that the NTC is 'urging forces not to engage in reprisals and revenge attacks, and we've made it clear human rights abuses should not occur'. For sure this does not absolve the perpetrators of their crimes, yet it does mitigate them to an extent; both words point to an original wrongdoing which is the cause of the present actions of opposition forces. Another way in which officials reacted to these claims was by a double move: firstly, questions were deflected onto the shoulders of the National Transitional Council, thereby absolving the coalition of substantive responsibility; and secondly, it was stressed that the NTC was a different type of interlocutor from the 'Gaddafi regime'. William Hague claimed that: 'Where there are reports of abuses, they do take action and people are arrested...this is very, very different from the old regime of Libya, which itself perpetrated terrible human rights violations' (Hague, 17/10/2011).

CHAPTER 9 OFFICIAL U.S POLICY DISCOURSE: 'RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT'

It has been shown in the previous section that UK official discourse remained remarkably stable for the duration of the government's discursive and military engagement with the crisis and violence in Libya. Part of the reason for this was the lack of significant political opposition. In many ways, the decision to hold a House of Commons debate after UN Resolution 1973 was passed served to provide the Conservative-led government with national legitimacy for their Libyan policy, even if the subsequent escalation in military activity would go beyond the stated aim at that time of protecting civilians. Another reason for the stability of official UK discourse was that media opposition was successfully dealt with through resources inherent in the 'human rights' discourse itself. In particular, the temporal identity of the 'Libyan people' was highlighted, the democratic 'destiny', which lay before them, and the need to remove Gaddafi for that 'destiny' to be realized.

In the U.S, a significantly more complex discursive panorama can be witnessed. What's more, the Obama administration's discourse and policy came up against considerably more political opposition than Cameron received. While, as will be shown, much of this seemed to centre on constitutional matters and in particular the War Powers Act- itself suggestive of party politics point scoring as some Representatives indeed claimed (Lee, 24/06/2011)- a closer inspection reveals that much of this criticism was made borrowing from the basic 'civil war' discourse, thus throwing up other issues related with national interests, costs, and feelings that European allies should accept a greater share of the burden -in relation with military interventions-. This also allowed for other discourses to emerge in opposition to the governments stated position, making for more complex constructions, such as a terrorism discourse which was used to question the identity and objectives of some of the rebel groups, and moreover the likelihood of a post-Gaddafi democratic transition.

For the most part, official U.S policy towards Libya remained in close acquiesces with the one being advocated by the Conservative-led government in London. The U.S government voted alongside its European allies the U.K and France

in both UN Resolutions 1970 and 1973, and would then take leadership of the implementation phase of the no-fly zone before handing over to NATO. What is more, like their British and French counterparts, U.S officials had already decided that there was no future for Gaddafi in Libya. Clear demands are made on Gaddafi and the Libyan 'regime'. Speaking on the 26th February, Hillary Clinton states that Gaddafi 'needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now.' Continuing, 'Qadhafi has lost the confidence of his people and he should go without further bloodshed and violence.' If there were any doubt, speaking in Santiago on March 22nd Obama underlines U.S intentions: 'It is US policy that Gaddafi needs to go'.

Yet, generally speaking, U.S official policy demonstrated an inclination towards a more passive and cautious approach when compared to official U.K discourse. For instance, while Cameron and Hague were openly talking about the possibility of a no-fly zone over Libya, US Defence Secretary Gates was showing himself to be more wary. With regards to the 'loose talk' that he had been hearing regarding the no-fly zone, Gates wanted to add a touch of realism to the discussion. Before the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, the U.S Defence Secretary endeavoured to spell out what in fact a no-fly zone would entail: 'let's just call a spade a spade..a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defences. That's the way you do a no-fly zone. And then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down. But that's the way it starts' (Gates, 02/03/2011). This can be understood as a warning that first and foremost, a no-fly zone would not simply imply patrolling the skies above Libya, and secondly that this is 'the way it starts,' an ominous reference to what may come afterwards and the size of the operation which may be needed to implement a measure of this kind.

There are also further divergences to be found between the U.S and U.K governments policy positions. Specifically, both appear to adopt a different view on the future possibility of deploying ground troops. While, as has been seen, the U.K. government would not rule the option out, President Obama was quite categorical about this particular issue, perhaps reflecting growing criticism at home: 'I also want to be clear about what we will not be doing. The United States is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal -- specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya' (18/03/2011). Defence Secretary

Gates is also very clear about this, assuring that there would be no ground troops 'as long as I am in this job' (Gates, 31/03/2011).

What this effectively amounts to is a policy position that Gaddafi 'needs to go', indicative of regime change, but without any suggestion to increase the US's own military engagement with Libya. This is in line with Obama's repeated claim that the U.S had undertaken a 'limited' (28/03/2011) role in the operation, whereby the onus is on the Libyan people to bring down Gaddafi. The U.K government, for all the rhetoric about aims 'to protect the Libyan people' (21/03/2011), had been careful not to discard any of the military options and indeed would speak openly about ratcheting up the military pressure on Gaddafi as the mission progressed. This, in itself, was evidence that the U.K and French governments were in fact the main pursuants of forcible regime change in Libya, and the U.S government was more of a reluctant partner.

As could be perhaps deduced from the hesitation evident in the Democrat administration's policy formulation, U.S policy discourse portrays a more confused picture of the Libyan crisis. That said, there are still considerable convergences to be found with both the basic 'human rights' discourse, and the amended one deployed by U.K officials. For instance, one can see immediately that the U.S government and the President Obama also frame the country within the Middle East geographical setting: 'Now, throughout this period of unrest and upheaval across the region the United States has maintained a set of core principles which guide our approach. These principles apply to the situation in Libya' (Obama, 23/02/2011). An analysis of Obama's discourse can also show how this 'upheaval across the region' was being conceptualised in Official U.S discourse. This first thing is that it is understood to be a uniform phenomenon -in spite of the fact that Obama is quick elsewhere to highlight the specificities of each case, especially when the question of US inconsistency emerges (Obama, 29/03/2011)-. Secondly, it is implied that the phenomenon is heading in a particular direction, where a particular endpoint is implicitly assumed -the achievement of freedom and democracy-. In relation to the crisis in Libya, Obama opines that 'this is just one more chapter in the change that is unfolding across the region'. Here, Libya is a 'chapter' in a metaphoric story, or unity -the region as a whole-, with presumably a beginning and a concrete end.

The U.S, like the U.K. government, deploys a 'human rights' discourse which constructs the 'Libyan people' as victims and in need of protection. Many of the human

rights abuses which are said to be taking place have been picked up from claims which had hitherto appeared in the media. For instance, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton showed herself to be 'deeply concerned' about 'Gaddafi's security forces' using 'violence against women and rape as tools of war'. This practice, she claimed, was 'widespread'. Moreover, there was also the assertion that foreign mercenaries were being used from parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The potency of this claim was twofold: firstly, it purportedly demonstrated the ruthlessness of a government who were attacking and killing its own people, and one who was prepared to pay foreign fighters to solve its internal problems and the heightening conflict for them. Secondly, this claim was also coherent with the basic 'human rights' discourse in as far as it points to a lack of support for the government within Libya. Recalling that the basic 'human rights' discourse places in opposition to one another Gaddafi, or the Libyan 'regime,' and a uniform 'Libyan people', consistency would therefore be maintained if there was a need to enlist forces from out with Libya's borders, suggesting that the ones doing the killing were not actually Libyan at all.

Moreover, the U.S government was at pains to express the same sense of urgency in taking military action. Again, the focus is placed on Benghazi, the apparent de facto heart of the uprisings. As Obama put it, 'if we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world' (Obama, 2011). This is a crucial part of both official discourse in the U.S and in the U.K. As has been seen, the U.K government used what was described as an impending 'massacre' in Benghazi to account for the speed with which the U.N Resolution authorizing the no-fly zone was passed, and also to add national legitimacy to the policy being pursued. The quote from Obama shows that this was being replicated in Washington and while there can be no way of ascertaining whether or not this massacre would have taken place, it is also reasonable to assume that genuine concerns were being felt over the possibility of morally unacceptable violence in Benghazi.

In addition to concerns over the physical well-being of the Libyan population, U.S government discourse also mirrors U.K discourse in politicizing the 'Libyan people'. As Hillary Clinton put it on the 22nd of February, 'it is the responsibility of the

Libyan government to respect the universal rights of their own people, including their right to free expression and assembly.' It is being argued in this thesis that this is in fact the crucial discursive move being carried out by both the U.S and U.K governments. By imbuing the 'Libyan people' with liberal democratic 'human rights', their temporal identity is opened up and a path laid out for them which leads to a realization of these values, and the attainment of the position of the privileged Western Self. On March 3rd Obama demands that 'the aspirations of the Libyan people for freedom, democracy and dignity must be met'. What is more, like in the case of official U.K discourse, the 'human rights' discourse is being performed here in accordance with a linear view of history and governed by a teleology which has the 'human rights' of 'freedom' and 'democracy' positioned as the endpoint of the social and political development of the 'Libyan people'. In supporting 'the universal rights of the Libyan people,' Obama states, including the 'rights of peaceful assembly' and 'free speech', this will also entail helping the 'Libyan people to determine their own destiny.' 'Destiny' here is understood as the still to come, but suggestive of a future which has been pre-determined.

That the U.S should follow the U.K government in emphasizing the 'universal rights' of 'freedom' and 'democracy' is hardly surprising, bearing in mind that this was also shown to be the case when tracing the conceptual history of 'human rights' within U.S and U.K foreign policy discourse. There it was shown how 'human rights', 'freedom' and 'democracy' were grouped within a wider 'security' discourse so as to create a fusion between 'values' and 'interests'. In the case of Libya, a similar thing happens. The deployment, or performance of 'human rights' in Libya shows precisely a fusion of these two components: interests and values. In reference to the difficult decision that a President may have to take when faced with the possibility 'to use force to solve the world's many challenges', Obama concludes that there is a responsibility to act 'when our interests and values are at stake' (28/03/2011).

This raises questions about what were the 'interests' that Obama and the U.S. administration held in the outcome of the Libyan crisis. Indeed, Obama's Defence Secretary had quite openly spoken about the lack of a 'vital' national interest in Libya. Yet this did not mean that other interests were not in play. In particular, and in relation with U.S 'security' discourse, the spread of 'freedom' and 'democracy' is understood to entail greater stability in the countries in consideration. This means that the turmoil and violence seen in the Middle East and Libya could be understood as a direct consequence

of not having liberal democratic political systems and institutions. And since stability in the region was considered to be a 'vital' national interest, this meant that 'it's in America's interest for the Middle East and North Africa to be more democratic, more free..!'

Like in the case of official UK discourse, the idea of a region and Libya revolting due to repressive regimes and striving for, progressing towards more liberal and democratic systems of government, allow for the emergence of logics which link quite different countries, with quite different cultural forms, and divergent historical trajectories. This makes it possible to reach the conclusion that events in one country may have an effect on the others. As U.S officials were keen to point out, the exacerbation of the Libyan conflict could de-stabilize the democratic transitions taking place both in Egypt and Tunisia. What is more, as was seen from U.K officials, an 'anti-domino' logic is made possible, whereby the failure to overthrow Gaddafi in Libya could affect the prospects for democratic transitions in other countries such as Syria. Understood in this way, the defence of 'freedom' and 'democracy' becomes both a question of 'values' and 'interests'. As Obama put it, 'the United States has an important strategic interest in preventing Qaddafi from overrunning those who oppose him...the democratic impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling to power' (28/03/2011).

However, whereas in the U.K the British government demonstrated a remarkably strict adherence to the basic 'human rights' discourse, as mentioned at the outset of this section, this cannot be said for U.S officials. What can be shown is that while officials did indeed show a tendency to deploy the modified 'human rights' discourse used by the U.K government, emphasizing the transient temporal identity of a 'Libyan people' aiming for 'freedom' and 'democracy', this picture was complicated by oscillations toward constructions of the violence which borrowed elements from the basic 'civil war' discourse. If, as was argued in the construction of the basic discourses, that the basic 'civil war' discourse implied a lesser degree of ethical responsibility, and emphasizes greater dangers to outside intervention, this is highly significant discursively. The somewhat ambiguous use of both the basic 'human rights' and 'civil war' discourses can be seen in early statements made by Hillary Clinton with regards to events in Libya. On the one hand, Clinton opts for, at times, a modified version of the basic 'human rights'

discourse where she omits the figure of Gaddafi in favour of a more neutral 'Libyan government,' and erects it in direct opposition to the 'Libyan people.' In these pronouncements, there is no doubt as to who is the violent and radical Other, who are the innocents, and moreover that there is a clear responsibility on the West to take action. On the 26th of February, Clinton mobilizes precisely this construction of events: 'The United States strongly condemns the ongoing violence and human rights violations committed by the government of Libya against its own people. As President Obama said, these actions violate international norms and every standard of common decency. They must stop.'

On other occasions, however, she leans towards and borrows elements from the basic 'civil war' discourse. For instance, while responding to a question about lifting the arms embargo and 'supporting the rebels', Clinton is keen to express the difficulties involved in such actions and the complexity of what she sees transpiring on the ground: 'well, I think everything is being looked at, but it is difficult in the midst of this civil conflict that is going on now to even know how you would do that, because right now, it's not clear what part of the country is actually under rebel control. We know the east is, but how much in the middle, and then we've got Qadhafi' (09/03/2011). Two things are apparent from this assessment of events. In referencing the 'rebels' and also the east-west spatialisation of the 'civil conflict', Clinton veers away from a simplistic 'Libyan people' - 'Gaddafi' opposition, and the ambiguity that this entails means that 'it is difficult...to even know how you would do that' (support the rebels with arms). In addition, U.S officials appear to adopt a marginally different view of the temporal identity of both the context- 'Arab Spring'- and the 'Libyan people', when compared with their U.K counterparts. As has been noted previously, there is evidence that Libya was being understood in relation with wider changes taking place in the region, and that these changes were being conceptualised in a linear way, as a movement of 'progress' and towards greater 'freedom' and 'democracy'. Nevertheless, at other times it is possible to see that this picture is blurred somewhat, whereby the outcomes are not so clear and this linear development is complicated. In an interview, Obama makes the case for prudence, dismissing what he views as the clamour for an 'Obama doctrine,' and making a call to take into account the particularities of each country (29/03/2011). Secretary of Defence Gates is another who, while essentially endorsing the 'administration's approach,' that which is made up of 'core principles' such as 'universal

values', he also recognizes that 'each country in the region faces a unique set of circumstances' (29/03/2011). On the one hand, thus, Gates re-affirms his belief in 'universal values,' but on the other, he suggests that these are not necessarily achievable in the same way or through U.S intervention.

What can be seen here is a wider appreciation of the limitations of U.S military power, and the concomitant uncertainties involved in the quest for the promotion and spread of 'universal values'. As such, while Gates seemingly accepts that the 'Libyan people' are the holders of 'universal values', their temporal identity is confused in that there is still uncertainty over whether or not they will be able to realize them. This leads Gates to what appears to be an unequivocal rejection of the policy of 'regime change' in Libya. The historical antecedent for his position, it is clear, is Iraq. On stating his insistence that the 'military mission does not include regime change', he continues: 'sometimes it has worked and sometimes it has taken ten years. And it does, as has been the case in Iraq, sometimes involve both enormous human and fiscal cost' (29/03/2011). The deduction being made is that the removal of Gaddafi by force may not lead to the attainment of 'freedom' and 'democracy, in the same way that this was not achieved in Iraq. For him, therefore, the idea 'was basically to establish the no-fly zone and protect the Libyan people'.

Part of the problem for U.S officials was that the identity of the 'rebels', as called into question by the basic 'civil war' discourse, remained unclear. Defence Secretary Gates does not accept the simplicity of the strict dual-Libyan Other imposed by the basic 'human rights' discourse- 'Libyan people' vs Gaddafi-. Answering questions surrounding the identity of the 'rebels' at the House Armed Services Committee, Gates dispels any notion of homogeneity in referring to them as 'disparate' and 'scattered'. Gates is also not averse to showing his ignorance with regards the identity of the groups themselves. The U.S does not 'have much visibility into those who have risen against Gadhafi' and furthermore that there were in fact 'multiple agendas' at work. As events progressed, it seemed like Gates would not become any more knowledgeable about who in fact was being backed by NATO and the U.S government. When asked, 'who are these rebels in Libya?' on the (12/05/2011), the Defence Secretary responds with perhaps his most candid response -it is worth quoting at length here-:

'Well, I think that the honest answer to your question is that with the exception of some of the people at the top of the opposition or the rebels in Libya, we don't know who they are. And I think this is one of the reasons why there has been such reluctance, at least on our part, to provide any kind of lethal assistance to the opposition....We deal with a handful of people in Benghazi, but we forget about those who led the uprisings in cities all over Libya when this whole thing started. And who are they? And are they genuinely anti-Gadhafi? Are they tribal representatives? Are they --kind of who are they? And we have no idea who those people are, but they were the ones that led the major uprisings in Tripoli and a variety of other cities'.

This is quite a significant admission from Secretary Gates in as far as it naturally calls into question a foreign policy which has unambiguously committed itself to supporting the opposition groups against the present Libyan leader and government. This does not mean, it must be said, that Secretary Gates was necessarily against the intervention in Libya. In spite of his candid lack of knowledge about the 'opposition' or the 'rebels' in Libya, Gates is sure that 'we know a lot about Gaddafi'. Citing 'clandestine reports' which pointed towards an assassination plot against Ronald Reagan and the Berlin disco terrorist attack, Gates believes the reason why the U.N and NATO has taken action is because 'they know a lot about Gadhafi. They know what Gadhafi was not only going to do to his people, but his potential for disrupting everything going on in the Middle East right now.' This means that Gates' understanding of the Libyan Other deviates from both the basic 'human rights' discourse and the modified 'human rights' discourse deployed by U.K officials. He still feels that the removal of Gaddafi would be in US interests, but that the ambiguity surrounding the identity of the 'rebels' and the lack of a 'vital' national interest means that for him a 'supporting role' is what most 'comports with our interest'.

It was not only Defence Secretary Gates who was reluctant to get too heavily involved in Libya. The same kind of caution can be detected from President Obama's pronouncements, displaying an awareness that regime change is not something to be undertaken lightly, what with the potential for unleashing forces and reaching the type of unintended consequences seen in Iraq. The uncertainty, even anxiety, which President Obama was feeling about engaging once again militarily in a Muslim country was palpable in a television interview with Brian Williams (29/03/2011). One can

detect traces of the basic 'civil war' discourse as he references Iraq and the perils of military intervention-in particular regime change-. Asking himself in soliloquy, 'why can't we simply impose our will (on the other countries by force)?', he responds, 'it's my job as president to make those decisions based on all the consequences, understanding that we have some experience here in trying to impose our will in places like Iraq, and I think the American people understand the cost of that'. It is interesting to recall here that U.K leader Cameron had been adamant that this was completely different from Iraq. Obama, though, establishes a tacit connection between the desire to change a regime by force in Iraq, and that same approach towards the 'Arab Spring'. This translates into concern for the U.S armed forces as he speaks of their deployment being the hardest decision a President has to take.

Therefore, what can be discerned from a global perspective on the different strands of official U.S discourse is a much more complex picture than what was seen in the U.K. U.S officials are willing to accept the main principles of both the basic 'human rights' discourse and also the official U.K discourse -most significantly that the 'Libyan people' possess a transient temporal identity and are aspiring to reach their 'destiny' of the 'human rights' of 'freedom' and 'democracy'-, but this is complicated by the incorporation of some of the elements of the basic 'civil war' discourse. Key elements like 'civil conflict' and 'rebels' are enough to cast doubt on assumptions that the 'Libyan people' are heading in one direction towards political emancipation. The difficulties involved in the Iraq war, and the ongoing operation in Afghanistan, are quite clearly still in the minds of Secretary Gates and President Obama. The result is that while both official UK and US discourse has erected Gaddafi as the obstacle to the forces of social and political progress in Libya, thus signalling that he has no future in Libya, official U.S discourse is more aware of the potential for exacerbating an already critical situation. Not only would this negate the 'human rights' issues at stake - in the sense of 'values' and 'interests'-, but it would leave the U.S government with a responsibility to the country and another potentially costly reconstruction effort.

Political opposition and the 'War Powers Act'

The main political opposition against the Obama administration's policy towards Libya had an important constitutional edge to it. Since the President had only engaged in consultation with senior congressional figures before summoning US forces to implement the no-fly zone, a cross-party mixture of representatives and senators were in agreement that the President had transgressed the War Powers Act. According to the White House, Libya did not constitute a war or conflict situation strictly speaking, and should be considered as a 'limited action' (Obama, 2011) of humanitarian dimensions. While, as Defence Secretary Gates was willing to recognise, the Act had been subject to an ongoing debate between the White House and Congress for some time (Gates, 2011), many were of the view that it was the President's duty to garner Congressional approval before engaging in any military operation. This opposition culminated in the formulation of two resolutions to be presented before the Republican-controlled House of Representatives on the 24th of June: the first was aimed at providing post hoc Congressional authorisation for the military mission already under way; the second, and more substantial resolution, called on Congress to cut off funding for the mission. Representatives voted 295-123 against authorising the President's actions in Libya, while also voting against what would have been a highly controversial privation of funds to the White House- the Resolution failed by 238-180-. What both votes demonstrate quite clearly is a significant amount of political opposition to Obama's policy in Libya.

The number of votes cast against the President in both resolutions can not simply be understood as party-political point scoring -many Democrats voted with Republicans on both resolutions-, nor should it be understood as a matter of purely constitutional import. Of course, many representatives had legitimate concerns about protecting the constitution and moreover denying the White House the mandate to begin future wars as and when it sees fit. As Republican Congressman Tom Rooney (24/06/2011) put it, 'the last thing that we want as Americans is for some president, whether it's this president or some future president, to be able to pick fights around the world without any debate from another branch of government'. All the same, a closer inspection of the debates does not merely show concerns over the constitutional legitimacy of official US policy,

it also unearths opposition to the President's Libya policy in itself. Already around three months into combat operations, some key problems were becoming increasingly evident: the seemingly irreconcilable gap between the political aims and military aims of the mission, the possibility for backing groups of 'rebels' who were unknown or potentially antipodal to US and Western interests, the potential for exacerbation of the conflict, and moreover the lack of a 'vital' US interest (Gates, 2011) along with the spiraling cost of the operation. It is to an analysis of how these issues were articulated in opposition to Obama's policy that the analysis will now turn.

Not long after the passing of Resolution 1973 at the Security Council and initiation of US air-strikes on Libyan defences, some of the first criticisms of Obama's policy surfaced from a debate in the Senate on 30th March, 2011. According to Republican Senator Rand Paul, the President's actions constitute 'a very serious breach of our constitution' and 'it is something that we should not let happen lightly'. Referencing the founding fathers, Paul states that history has shown that 'the executive is the branch most interested in war,' and it is for that reason 'the congress has with studied care invested the power to declare war in the congress,' It is 'a real problem,' he believes, to allow 'a president to continue to act or to initiate war- or to initiate war without the representatives of the people having a say.' What is clear from Senator Paul's speech and his recourse to the War Powers Act is that the lack of debate is not the only issue at stake in the case of Libya; the lack of consultation has the effect of concealing other concerns that were being felt about the mission.

There were two immediate issues apparent through claims over a breach of the War Powers Act. Firstly, this had the inevitable result of highlighting that Libya and the Libyan government did not actually pose a threat or imminent threat to the United States. This is precisely one of the mechanisms through which the President *is* authorised to unilaterally launch a military attack and therefore it is the very absence of this threat that the War Powers Act becomes an issue in the first place. Moreover, it would be pointed out during a later debate in the House (03/06/2011) that not only did Obama's foreign policy in Libya contravene the original text of the Act, but that Obama himself had even recognised the role of Congress in authorising military action. Mr Scott makes precisely this point in recalling the then Senator Obama's exact words when setting out the constitutional procedure for taking the country to war: 'The President does not have power under the constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in

a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation' (Obama, 2007; cited by Scott, 2011). The second thing that contravention of the War Powers Act supposed at this stage was that the mission had gone on for longer than sixty days. Being the period in which the President is given to seek authorisation from Congress for military action, the fact that by the 3rd of June this period had expired was itself significant in that it suggested the mission was not as simple as what was perhaps imagined at first.

What can also be detected from the debate is that there was considerable concern that the US administration had not articulated well what the objectives or 'end game' of the mission was. As has been noted in the previous section, the US government, while erecting a dual-Libyan Other (Gaddafi- 'Libyan people'), were also cautious about using force to bring about their stated aim of forcing Gaddafi out. This, it has been argued, was in part due to elements of the basic 'civil war' discourse being incorporated into official discourse. In any case, the hesitation and reluctance to even hint at further more belligerent measures was damaging in that it supposed an even greater void between the stated political aims of the government- to depose Gaddafi- and the military means committed to in order to bring that about. This was something which both Senators and Representatives seized upon as evidence of a poorly formulated policy. On precisely this point, Mr Scott (2011) states; 'the President has not outlined the purpose or the scope of our action in Libya.' During the same debate, Mr Duncan concurred in that 'we did not go into Libya with a clear, attainable objective. The risks and costs do not appear to be fully analysed.' Moreover, 'we don't know whether we have a viable end game'. Three weeks later during the debate on the 24th of June and some Representative were still not clear about what in fact the government's objectives were. Mr Waxman (2011) stated, 'we need a clear definition of the mission and our objectives'.

While several Representatives and Senators had been expressing their bemusement over what in fact the objectives were, at the same time, deductions were being made that it was the removal of Gaddafi. Indeed, as has already been documented, this conclusion was not difficult to reach since it was the stated policy from early on. Yet if this were indeed the case, and moreover the objective was to bring about a democratic transition in Libya, the issue over who in fact the government was backing in Libya would become a crucial one. And the fact that high ranking US officials had expressed their own ignorance over this question was cause for concern for

many Senators and Representatives. Borrowing from the 'civil war' discourse, Rand Paul (2011) asks, 'Do we know who the rebels are?' He then goes on to speculate by way of reports in the media suggesting possible ties between al-Qaeda and the rebels: 'a former leader of Libya's al-Qaeda affiliate says he thinks freelance jihadists have joined the rebel forces. NATO commander says some of the forces are fighting Qadhafi forces. 1, 000 jihadists in Libya are estimated. These are the rebels. We have to ask ourselves when Qadhafi is gone, who will take his place?..will we now have an al-Qaeda-supported government in Libya?'. Representative Scott is another who believed that it was the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of intervention which was troubling. Concurring with Paul that Gaddafi is reprehensible, using even stronger language to assert that he 'is one of the most notorious terrorists of our time,' Scott goes on to question what might replace him: 'Who will replace Qadhafi? And what assurances do the American people have that the alternative will be any better than Qadhafi?'

When viewed from a different perspective, using elements of the 'civil war' discourse, the political crisis in Libya starts to take on different meanings for politicians critical of the Democrat government; other considerations start to come into play. For Senator Paul (2011), one of the main conclusions that he is able to reach is that 'Libya is not in our national interest'. Paul's 'national interests' discourse also allows him to consider the practicalities of being 'engaged in a war (Libya) when our country is struggling under enormous debt, at a time when we are engaged in two wars.' The cost of the war so far, he assures, after three days of combat operations, is \$600 million. This also enables him to speak of the responsibility that the Congress has to the 'young men and women' of the US, by putting them 'into harm's way, into another war'. It would be very difficult for Senator Paul to speak so strongly about issues such as Congressional authority, national interests, and the cost of the operation, should he be using the basic 'human rights' discourse. The unambiguous ethical responsibility generated by the 'human rights' discourse would render somewhat redundant these points. If this was simply about Gaddafi massacring the Libyan people and denying them their basic human rights, for instance, it would not be ethical, nor make political sense for that matter, to be speaking about the cost of the mission. And even though Paul is in no doubt that 'Qadhafi is a tyrant, an autocrat, and someone that freedom-loving people would despise,' this is only one facet of a complex situation.

This point can also be highlighted by way of Senator Ensign's discourse. Ensign is another, who in using the 'civil war' discourse, is then able to speak of national interests. This means that he 'did not believe that the President had outlined a vital US interest in our engagement in Libya' and that the 'United States cannot afford to be the police force of the world'. His discourse is complicated further, however, by the fact that he borrows from both the basic 'human rights' discourse and the basic 'civil war' discourse. On the one hand, he understands Gaddafi to be the main belligerent and human rights abuser. Passing through and dismissing some of the key justifications given for US intervention- E.G the potential refugee crisis flooding into Egypt and Tunisia, the aim to carry out the will of the UN Security Council, the limited mission, to send a clear message to other dictators or to save lives- Ensign reached what for him is the crux of the issue; this is an over inflation of 'our interest in Libya's civil war'.

There are two things immediately discernible from Rand Paul and John Ensign's discourse. The first thing that comes across is the complexity of the events taking place in Libya. The basic 'human rights' discourse, and the modified version of this deployed by UK officials, presented a simplified view of events whereby the foreign policy to be pursued emerges with a certain clarity from the ethical obligation generated. However, when the 'Libyan people' component of the dual-Libyan Other is compromised, this ethical obligation begins to yield to other concerns such as 'national interests', the cost of the mission, or the risk posed to US service personnel. Even when Gaddafi remains the radical Libyan Other, as was the case for both Paul and Ensign, the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the identity of the 'rebels' who were fighting against him destabilizes the 'human rights' discourse and mitigates the ethical responsibility for intervention and/or removal of the Libyan government.

US media discourse and the identity of the 'rebels'

All of these issues were being articulated in the media and especially since the situation on the ground was beginning to resemble more and more a 'stalemate'. Similar to the UK newspapers analysed, it can be shown that those in the US would also report that the Libyan conflict was in danger of, or indeed had reached a point of 'stalemate'. With this in mind the New York Times on the 25th March states: 'Mr. Obama has not

made clear what will happen if the international coalition succeeds in establishing control of the skies over Libya, but Colonel Qaddafi's loyalists and rebels continue to attack and counter-attack each other in a bloody, protracted stalemate'. Writing for the Washington Post, Roger Hertog from the Council on Foreign Relations hypothesizes: 'The result (Western airpower) could easily be a drawn-out grinding stalemate.' Making an analogy with Slobodan Milosevic, Hertog asks, 'will Gaddafi stand fast longer? If so, what then? Nothing in the ostensibly new Obama doctrine offers an escape from this underlying issue.' In short, the materialization of a 'stalemate' on the ground would expose the ineffectiveness of a no-fly zone in facilitating the ousting of Gaddafi

One of the main concerns that was being voiced in the media was of Islamic extremist groups operating in Libya, the deduction being that they could be the ones who end up benefiting from any Western support, whether that be political, economic, or military. In the New York Times, Ross Douthat offers one 'disquieting data point,' referencing the Center for a New American Security, which claimed: 'Eastern Libya, the locus of the rebellion, sent more foreign fighters per capita to join the Iraqi insurgency than any other region in the Arab world' (13/03/2011). This was, in fact, the argument that the Libyan government had been making all along, assigning the responsibility for any violence to radical groups such as Al-Qaeda. Such claims had been wilfully dismissed by Western officials and the Libyan opposition. There was no way that this could have been accepted by government figures as it represented simply too much of an incongruence with the 'human rights' discourse being deployed; firstly, these people could not be equated with the unitary 'Libyan people' subject being constructed; and perhaps more importantly, these groups would by no means be representative of the human rights which were said to be in question. The whole coherence of the 'human rights' discourse would thus crumble, leaving any Western policy to support such groups exposed as ludicrous.

It is quite clear that one of the main challenges provoked by the 'civil war' discourse was precisely the ambiguity which it introduced to the situation. Not only did adherents of the 'human rights' discourse have to tackle questions as to the identity of the 'rebels', the flip side of this was that the identity of civilians was now being muddied. According to the U.S. and U.K. government's position, the 'no-fly zone' policy was introduced on the basis of a clear separation between the 'Libyan people' or 'civilians' on the one hand, and 'Gaddafi' or the 'Libyan regime' on the other. Clearly

defined are the victims from the aggressors, whereby there is no doubt as to who the no-fly zone was there to protect. By constructing the identities of the Libyan 'Other' in terms of 'loyalists' and 'rebels', the 'civil war' introduces a significant seed of doubt; that is to say, the unequivocal bifurcation of belligerents and civilians becomes distorted. This is encapsulated by a New York Times piece written on the 1st April under the headline, 'Lines of Battle Blur in Libya, NATO Warns Rebels Not to Attack Civilians': 'The warnings, and intense consultations within the NATO-led coalition over its rules for attacking anyone who endangers innocent civilians, come at a time when the civil war in Libya is becoming ever more chaotic, and the battle lines ever less distinct. They raise a fundamental question that the military is now grappling with: who in Libya is a civilian?' (Shanker and Savage, 01/04/2011). Pondering on the strength of the 'Islamist' groups in her article, 'Islamists rise to the fore' (Washington Post, 15/09/2011), Leila Fadel argues that 'Islamists were at the heart of the fight, many as rebel commanders.' Yet, and quoting 'influential cleric' Ismail Sallabi, the 'secularists don't like islamists'.

At times the New York Times, somewhat confusingly, mixes completely the basic 'human rights' discourse and the basic 'civil war' discourse. Take for example the article written on May 2nd by Fahim and Mazzetti, Commenting on the air-strikes being carried out in Libya, the authors write that these were 'authorized' by the UN to prevent Colonel Qaddafi's military from killing civilians in Libya's two-month-old civil war'. The assessment of the situation is purely focused on NATO air-strikes on Gaddafi and the Libyan government, and also the 'government's bombardment of rebel strongholds'. What is missing is any consideration of attacks being made by the 'rebels', which one would presume was taking place in a 'civil war', or eve. At other times, a 'civil war' can be inferred from references made which are indicative this type of situation. For instance, when a 'rebel' military leader is killed, the New York Times reports that this raises 'fears of tribal conflict'.

What is striking about the articles analysed in the New York Times, is that while they undoubtedly use the 'civil war' discourse to represent events, there is no serious criticism of Obama's policy. Returning to the basic 'civil war' discourse constructed at the outset of Part 3, the ethical justification for foreign military intervention in a 'civil war' type situation is highly questionable and thus significant criticism of the intervention would be all but assured. This would be especially so as it became clearer

and clearer that the policy being pursued was the toppling of the Libyan leader and government. In the case of the New York Times though, any negligible criticism is restricted to questions over whether or not the stated military goals were in synch with the political goals and how to break the stalemate. Speaking of Hillary Clinton's insistence that Gaddafi leave power, Sanger writes 'The statement seemed to underscore the limbo the administration finds itself in, with the rebels unable to achieve regime change on their own, and Washington and its NATO allies hesitant to leap deeper into a civil war'. The result of this, for Sanger, is that Obama is left with 'a vexing choice'; either he lives with a 'civil war that may drag on for weeks, months or years, at a gradually rising human cost,' or he becomes 'more deeply involved, either directly or through NATO, in a third war in a Muslim nation'.

This is in contrast to the Guardian newspaper in the U.K who did offer criticism of the intervention itself, and the actions of NATO and the U.K government themselves. The possibility that the 'civil war' situation could have arisen in Libya as a result of the Western-led NATO intervention in the country is simply not considered. On this point, it is perhaps illuminating to consider the comments of Senator John McCain whose comments were published in the same NYT article: 'if we had declared a no-fly zone early on, three or four weeks ago, Qaddafi would not be in power today.' And he continues, 'so now the Libyan people are paying a very high price in blood because of our failure to act, and because of this overwhelming priority of having to act multilaterally.' Now it must be noted that McCain, enthusiastic and vocal supporter of the intervention, is using the 'human rights' discourse -as he was prone to do-, in contrast to the article written. Yet it does show the power of the 'human rights' discourse in that Western actions are believed to be in the interests of the 'Libyan people', they all naturally should welcome the intervention, and it is almost unimaginable that significant resistance should emerge due to the premise of the intervention.

Maintaining discursive stability: convergence with official U.K discourse and the 'destiny' of the Libyan people

If, as has been seen, official U.K discourse was faced with the challenge of reconciling seemingly incoherent political and military aims- on the one hand stating that Gaddafi 'must go', yet on the other forced to at least accept in principle that the military mission was about protecting the Libyan people- the U.S government found itself in an even more difficult position. Faced with a similar void in the stated political and military aims, Obama had also committed the U.S to a strictly speaking 'limited' role, meaning that it was extremely difficult to put more military pressure on Gaddafi and the Libyan government either in words or in actions. This, as has been shown in the previous section, was a problem that would only become worse as reports of a 'stalemate' became more widespread and accepted amongst top U.S military officials. General Carter Ham (08/04/2011), and later Obama's top military officer Admiral Mike Mullen (22/04/2011), were all in agreement that 'stalemate' had been reached, meaning that President Obama himself would be forced to publicly acknowledge this increasingly widely accepted portrayal, admitting: 'you now have a stalemate on the ground militarily' (15/04/2011).

Acknowledgement of a 'stalemate' situation on the ground posed significant problems for Obama and official U.S discourse. First and foremost, this led directly to questions about the objective of the mission and how the situation could be resolved, indeed if it could be resolved following the President's 'limited' mission of 'protecting' the Libyan people. Secondly, this aroused further questions about the identity of who the 'rebels' were. For instance, in relation to the option of arming directly the 'rebels', more reluctance was called for since the arms could quite easily fall into the wrong hands. Expressing his reservations, General Carter Ham was clearly concerned about who in fact would be the recipients of such lethal support: 'my recommendation would be that we should know more about who they are- the opposition force- before we make any determination to arm them' (08/04/2011; my clarification).

What this meant was that, in effect, the only option available to Obama to bridge this gap between military and political goals, and moreover put pressure on Gaddafi, was by issuing ambiguous, veiled threats. For instance, 'we have got a wide range of

tools in addition to our military efforts to support that policy' (Obama, 22/03/2011). When insisting that the Libyan government 'must be held accountable for its failure to meet those responsibilities (refrain from violence), and face the cost of continued violations of human rights,' the response given by Obama is: 'I've also asked my administration to prepare the full range of options that we have to respond to this crisis.' While the responses given here by Obama seek to show strength, a lack of definition and conviction can be perceived which is in itself indicative of a hesitation or reluctance to use the full might of the U.S armed forces to depose the Libyan leader.

Another way in which U.S officials tried to overcome the challenges made on their perceived passivity was by relinquishing their own responsibility. In many ways, this could be viewed as a natural response, not merely because of the difficulties involved in formulating more belligerent responses to the Libyan situation, but also since it was in fact the British and French governments who had been the main driving force behind the operations against Gaddafi in the first place. By displacing the responsibility on to others, Clinton is able to avoid pressure on the U.S to take political and military leadership of the 'international' efforts. As Hillary Clinton was keen to point out: 'well it's not only the U.S, it's the international community. And your government (to British journalist Kay Burley of Sky News), the Government of the UK, and the Government of France are working on a resolution to try to get authority from the United Nations Security Council'. Elsewhere, on the question of how Gaddafi could be forced to leave, Clinton assures that 'there are many different aspects to the strategy that the international community is pursuing'.

Deflecting the focus on to other international actors, whether it be the U.K, France or Arab League, was also something which was also useful for U.S officials when faced with questions about the relatively negligible place that Libya occupied within U.S national interests. This was indeed a particularly difficult question for policy makers, not least because Secretary Gates had been very open in his views that Libya was 'not a vital interest' and that Libya and Gaddafi did not pose a 'threat or imminent threat to the United States'. Therefore, on the subject of national interests, Clinton wanted to make clear; 'when it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the UK, France, Italy, other of our NATO allies. This was in their vital national interests. The UK and France were the ones who went to the Security Council and said, "We have to act, because otherwise we're seeing a really violent upheaval with a man who has a history

of unpredictable violent acts right on our doorstep.” This means that it was also possible for Clinton to resort once more to the 'domino' logics which had informed U.S policy formation in the first place. 'Did Libya attack us?', Clinton asks, 'No, they did not attack us. Do they have a very critical role in this region and do they neighbour two countries? You just mentioned one, Egypt, the other Tunisia, that are going through these extraordinary transformations and cannot afford to be destabilized by conflict on their borders. Yes.'

That the mission was an 'international' action had been something that U.S and U.K officials had highlighted from the implementation stage of the no-fly zone, generating greater legitimacy for the breach of sovereignty which was implied. Here though one can see this used as a way to devolve, or mitigate responsibility for U.S actions. This tactic was also useful to contest claims that the foreign policy being pursued was misconceived, poorly defined, or lacked a concrete aim or 'endgame'. By stating that this was an 'international effort,' U.S officials were able to firstly return to the claim that their role was 'limited' and that others were taking on a greater share of the burden. And secondly, it was possible to alleviate criticism about the cost of the mission. In response to concerns that 'the rebels become bogged down' or that 'this becomes protracted', Obama assures; 'keep in mind that what we have already done is transition, so that this is now a NATO and international mission, our role was to provide support, intelligence..and so we have been able to spread the burden of maintaining a no-fly zone' (29/03/2011).

A similar discursive tactic was used by Defence Secretary Gates. In his case, however, it was not simply a case of highlighting that it was the British and French who were pushing for a change of regime in Libya. At times, when questioned about the 'endgame' or the likely duration of the mission, Gates draws a line between the stated political aims - Gaddafi 'needs to go'- and the military aims, of which he is ultimately responsible. In response to the question of when the mission will be 'done' (27/03/2011), Gates turns straight to the no-fly zone and assures 'that mission it largely complete'. This allows him to resort back to the humanitarian situation, the threat posed to Benghazi, and the number of lives that have been undoubtedly saved by the no-fly zone. 'I think we have made a lot of progress on the humanitarian side and his ability to move armor, to move toward a Benghazi or a place like that has pretty well been eliminated' and thus 'So I think that we have prevented the large-scale slaughter that was

beginning to take place, has taken place in some places.' Now, he states, it is a question of 'sustainment'. On the other side, Gates is also able to avoid questions or responsibility for what was increasingly being viewed as a policy of regime change. 'As we have seen in the past', he reminds, 'regime change is a very complicated business. It sometimes takes a long time. Sometimes it can happen very fast.' And yet ultimately, for him, 'it was never part of the military mission'. In fact, it seems that Gates is at times willing to accept the possibility that Gaddafi remains, something that was never contemplated by U.K officials. At the House Foreign Relations Committee, Gates concedes that 'you could have a situation where you achieve the military goal and not achieve the political goal (regime change)'.

Alternatively, U.S policy makers display a tendency to switch the discussion from talk of the 'end' or how the mission finishes, to go back to the reason for intervention in the first place. This is a manoeuvre which plays on the ambiguities of moral action; that is to say, whether one should focus on the outcomes -consequentialism- or the causes of the intervention- 'just cause'. Since in the case of the Libyan intervention the outcomes were characterised by uncertainty at this stage, it made sense to place greater emphasis on the moral basis for action. This was something that Obama was always keen to do, as can be seen in an interview (29/03/2011) and in response to the question 'how does it (the intervention) end?'. Obama begins by pointing out, 'what was clear to me was that we had a unique circumstance to save a lot of lives in this Libyan situation'. By taking action, Obama is then able to explain, 'what we've done is accomplish what we set out to do at the outset, which is to make sure that Benghazi was not over-run and that thousands of people, potentially, were not killed'. Hillary Clinton also speaks of the aim to protect civilians, taking the focus of the end point or outcome of U.S action: 'And if you look at the region – can you imagine, David, if we were sitting here and Qadhafi had gotten to Benghazi, and in a city of 700,000 people, had massacred tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands had fled over the border, destabilizing Egypt? Everybody would be saying, “Why didn’t the President do something?”

Nevertheless, the problem of an 'endgame' was one which would not go away and would become even more acute as events progressed and a general acceptance of a 'stalemate' situation became commonplace. In response to these doubts, Obama tried a double move. Rather than dwelling on how this situation may call into question

previous official constructions of the conflict- namely that the mission was to protect the 'Libyan people' from their brutalizing illegitimate leader- Obama was quick to focus on the range of measures being taken to bring about Gaddafi's demise. 'Gaddafi is still getting squeezed in all kinds of other ways. He is running out of money, he is running out of supplies. The noose is tightening and he is becoming more and more isolated' (Obama, 15/04/2011). Obama here is willing to take the idea of 'stalemate' head-on, at the same time showing his faith that the other measures being taken will be decisive in the end. In fact, this apparent dismissal of the situation on the ground suggests that it is in fact of no great consequence whether or not there is a 'stalemate' and what this means. The policy of the U.S remains the same; Gaddafi 'must go'.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would also be forced to respond to questions about the situation on the ground. On one occasion, in response to a question about the 'quagmire-like' situation in Libya, Clinton focusses on the 'organisation and operational capacity' of the opposition- the National Transitional Council-, the 'military efforts on the ground', and the support for the NTC; 'money is flowing, other support is flowing'. Apart from the progress being made on the ground, Clinton aims to restrict criticism of the administration's policy on Libya by falling back on the basic 'human rights' discourse and a strict division between Gaddafi, on the one hand, and the 'Libyan people' on the other. As well as introducing an unambiguous, dichotomous representation of Libya and the events taking place in Libya, this can also be used to present skeptics with an either-or choice. This can be seen in Clinton's response, 'the bottom line is, whose side are you on?' And she continues, spelling that choice out: 'are you on Gadhafi's side, or are you on the side of the aspirations of the Libyan people and the international coalition that has been created to support them?'.

That said, it remained necessary for U.S officials to deny that the foreign policy being pursued was in fact regime change. At times this would be naturally difficult to maintain, as can be seen in an interview between Hillary Clinton and CBS News anchor Katie Couric. In response to the rhetorical question, 'the whole notion of regime change isn't working very well in Libya, is it?', Clinton does not make any attempt to correct her interlocutor. Rather, her response is aimed at correcting the premise of the argument, and to demonstrate to Couric that the mission was in fact working well. 'I disagree', the Secretary of State begins, 'I think we are seeing slow but steady progress'. 'Pressure of the Qadhafi regime has increased,' she continues, while 'at the same time,

the Transitional National Council and their military forces are getting better'. Overall, she appraises, 'we're on the right path'. One month later, however, and Clinton had returned to the official policy. In response to a question suggesting that 'regime change' was now the 'principal interest' Clinton responds: 'I think, Chris, that's a misconception, but I understand it because NATO and Arab States that are flying with NATO are trying to protect civilians'.

More than anything, as the NATO mission continued, it is possible to detect a greater convergence with official U.K policy discourse. Whereas at the beginning of the mission, U.S officials had been keen to point out the dangers of intervention and regime change, their ignorance over the identity of the 'rebels', and later their acceptance that a 'stale mate' situation had occurred on the ground, these issues would be gradually given less and less attention. Instead, Libya's place within a wider 'democratic transition' taking place in the region would be emphasized (Obama, 19/05/2011). As indicated in this speech, this was a moment of 'extraordinary change' where people 'have risen up to demand their basic human rights'. Events are understood teleologically. They have been caused by a 'longing for freedom'. This means that the events in the Middle East and North Africa 'should not have come as a surprise'. Nor should the changes towards greater 'freedom' since 'strategies of repression and strategies of division will not work any more'. In short, 'change cannot be denied'.

In emphasizing once more Libya's place within this wider phenomenon, Obama is able to achieve certain crucial things. In effect, this frees up once more the temporal identity of the 'Libyan people' in as far as the potential obstacles to them realizing their 'human rights', or potential for unintended consequences, is downplayed. And while Obama does speak of the dangers of 'regime change', the NATO mission in Libya can't be considered in this way as the changes taking place are being driven by the people themselves in a spontaneous and natural way. This is one way in which the apparent contradictions inherent in dropping bombs in Libya is dealt with. This is not being done to *force* change towards greater freedom and democracy, it is being done to remove the obstacles that are preventing the natural progression to take place. Thus, it is only when Gaddafi 'inevitably leaves or is forced from power' that 'the transition to a democratic Libya can proceed.'

In eliminating any significant traces of the 'civil war' discourse, Obama is able to re-assert unambiguously the 'human rights' discourse and the twin goals of spreading universal values and securing security interests. The U.S is faced with an 'historic opportunity,' where it will be possible 'to pursue the world as it should be'. Values and interests become one, and the defence of 'universal values' will necessarily promote U.S interests. 'America's interests are not hostile to people's hopes', Obama assures, 'they're essential to them'. There is no longer any suggestion that the removal of Gaddafi could lead to the exacerbation of a civil conflict and/or the rise to power of radical extremist groups. If this were the case, the efforts to spread freedom and democracy would be in vain and the national security interests being pursued in the region would be critically undermined.

This means, the re-affirmation of the 'human rights' discourse by the U.S administration also meant that questions surrounding the identity of the 'rebels', would have to be side-stepped. As has been seen, this is something that the U.K government was forced to respond to also. Yet the difference here was that while U.K officials had strived to avoid the term 'rebels' and did their utmost to deflect any aspect of the 'civil war' discourse itself. Top U.S officials, had already acknowledged the complexity the situation in Libya, openly articulating the term 'rebels', and displaying a certain ignorance of the identity of those who the U.S was effectively backing. At first, one of the ways in which this was being dealt with was to recognize that knowledge was incomplete, but also to suggest that this was a temporary situation and would be remedied in the future. As Clinton put it, 'we don't know as much as we would like to know and as much as we expect we will know' (29/03/2011).

Yet as the conflict progressed and further questions were being raised about the myriad groups fighting on the ground, this was a question which would not go away- as has been seen in the House of Representatives debate- and would pose a significant problem for the stability of U.S official policy discourse. If, as policy makers had been stating since the beginning of U.S involvement, the aim was to bring about a democratic tradition in Libya, this could not be assured if the ones fighting were not doing so with the common objective of establishing a Western style liberal democracy. This challenge was dealt with by taking the focus away from the groups doing the fighting on the ground, and emphasizing more and more the democratic credentials of the National Transition Council. Of course, the NTC had not been elected and thus lacked political

legitimacy both inside and outside, but there was a need to assert that the opposition 'has organized a legitimate and credible Interim Council' (Obama, 19/05/2011). On July 15th, after the latest Libyan Contact Group meeting, a further endorsement would be made Hillary Clinton. In underlining the U.S recognition of the NTC as the 'legitimate governing authority for Libya,' Clinton centres on their plans for 'setting Libya on a path toward security and progress' through 'democratic reform' which is 'inclusive geographically and politically'.

This was a necessary step for many reasons. First and foremost, the U.S has claimed all along that its role was 'limited', with the objective being to protect the Libyan people. As Gaddafi's government was coming to an end, Libyan political representatives would therefore be needed to bring about the actual 'transition' that U.S officials had consistently spoken about. Secondly, since the uprisings were being understood as part of a linear historical process towards greater democracy, it was crucial that the role being played by the U.S was seen as minimal. Yet another important factor at this stage was that a certain realization was also setting in over the magnitude of the task at hand. This was something that Clinton was keen to emphasize in her speech after the Libyan Contact Group meeting, and by putting the focus on the TNC themselves, the U.S was able to absolve themselves for what might happen afterwards. In relation to the 'TNC's own roadmap', Clinton assures that 'we are well aware of how difficult and challenging the road ahead of them is' (15/07/2011). At this stage, Clinton is willing to recognize the difficulties in going from 'one kind of regime to a 'democracy', and even more so in a country like Libya where it was 'Colonel Qadhafi's modus operandi and modus vivendi, actually, to have no institutions.' And even though the Western powers were playing a crucial role in bringing down Gaddafi and the Libyan government, it is clear from Clinton's statement that it is now all about the TNC, who 'have made great strides and are on the right path'.

Thus, what can be seen in official U.S discourse over the duration of the NATO intervention in Libya is a move towards greater convergence with official U.K discourse. It has been argued that this was necessary as previously articulated elements borrowed from the 'civil war' discourse were having the effect of undermining the stability of the 'human rights' discourse being deployed and the foreign policy being pursued. In emphasizing once more the temporal identity of the 'Libyan people,' the intransigence of Gaddafi, and the democratic credentials of the NTC, it becomes

possible to present the vision of a future democratic Libya and one characterized by 'freedom'. In so doing, the U.S government is concurrently able to position itself unambiguously on the side of those fighting against the authoritarian governments in the region. It is also able to resort to a performance of 'human rights' which is true to the promotion of 'universal' values - 'freedom' and 'democracy'- and the securing of national security interests- greater democratization in the Middle East and North Africa region-.

CONCLUSIONS

This research was designed in order to explore Western responses to the political violence which broke out in Libya around the start of the year 2011. The primary focus has been on the Western-led military intervention, and the concrete roles which the United States and the United Kingdom governments played in calling for, and then carrying it out, alongside their ally France. First and foremost, a primary set of research questions were set out from the outset to broaden knowledge of this important geopolitical event.

1) The research sought to identify the main discourses used by the US and UK governments to give meaning to the events taking place in Libya, together with any counter-discourses which emerged in opposition to official discourse. This has meant that the emphasis was put on how these discourses constituted the Self and Other identities, uncovering any internal logics or mechanisms triggered, and understanding what policy options emerged as a result of these discourse-identity constellations. Since both governments strictly pursued a policy that Libyan leader Gaddafi 'must leave' power until he was indeed forcibly removed, it has been important to explain how policy discourses on both sides of the Atlantic maintained stability in the face of political and media opposition.

2) A secondary, and complementary question, was also raised from the outset. This question aimed to assess to what extent Western actions in Libya corresponds with what David Slater has called the 'imperiality of power'. That is to say, whether or not one can attribute longevity to US and UK discourse and actions, and whether they are characterized by imperial notions such as the diffusion of universal values and practices. Also, and in relation to this, it has been important to gauge to what extent preconceived assumptions about Libya, the conflict, and the identities of those involved, have led to an underestimation of the resistance which would be faced, or an overestimation of the capacities of those who were being supported. It will then be necessary to reach conclusions as to the consequences of this both for the West and the people of Libya.

1)

In relation to the first set of questions, it has been shown that the debate on the Libyan crisis of 2011 was structured around two basic discourses: a basic ‘human rights’ discourse, which constructed a dual-Libyan Other in situating ‘civilians’ in opposition to a ‘barbaric’ and ‘violent’ Gaddafi and/or Libyan ‘regime’. Consequently, an ethical responsibility is generated on the part of the West to intervene militarily and protect the Libyan civilian population. At around the same time, however, one can also detect a basic ‘civil war’ discourse, one which would construct the dual-Libyan Other in terms of ‘rebels’ and ‘loyalists’. In contrast to the basic ‘human rights’ discourse, this was suggestive of a more ambiguous, balanced and complex event. As such, the ethical responsibility of the West is significantly diminished. The basic ‘civil war’ discourse pointed instead to a more cautious approach to stop the violence, suggestive of dialogue, negotiations and national reconciliation.

The foreign policy discourses used by the UK and US governments maintained a remarkably strict adherence to the basic ‘human rights’ discourse, with subtle, but highly significant discursive deviations. In place of ‘civilians’, ‘protesters’, or ‘demonstrators’, both governments showed a tendency to speak of a unified ‘Libyan people’. In this particular Self-Other identity constellation, the identity of the ‘Libyan people’ is constructed as ontologically similar to the Western Self, and yet temporally backward since they *lack* their basic, ‘universal’ human rights. And as is so often the case, what is being referred to as ‘universal’ human rights, quickly turns out to be particular both in terms of content and temporal/spatial deployment. The ‘Libyan people’ are being imbued with *liberal* democratic rights, meaning that they are politicized as the holders –or aspiring holders- of the ‘human rights’ of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. In official UK and US discourse, the radical Other ‘Gaddafi’ remains the same, but this time he becomes the one responsible for the stagnation of the temporal identity of the ‘Libyan people’, preventing them from securing their ‘human rights’. Whereas before the violence erupted, ‘Libya’ was understood to be open to reform and in a process of ‘rehabilitation’- as was shown in Chapter 5-, it is now Gaddafi who has become the obstacle to the completion of that very process. The Western powers are concurrently constituted as the defenders of ‘universal’ human rights, morally sound,

and a champion of the repressed. It is for these reasons that UK and US policy was not only to 'protect' the civilian population, but that demands were also made on Gaddafi that he 'must go'.

In spite of the overall continuity and stability which can be seen in official UK and US discourse – US discourse showing a slight adaptation to converge with the UK-, opposition, both political and in the media, *did* emerge to challenge both governments. This was articulated, to a greater or lesser extent, through elements of the basic 'civil war' discourse. Many critical voices used the identity marker 'rebels', when speaking of the groups fighting against the Libyan government, and there was an almost unanimous consensus that a 'stalemate' on the ground had been reached. These ideas posed a challenge in certain key ways. Firstly, questions were raised over an 'endgame', as the gap between military objectives- to protect the 'Libyan people'- and political objectives –Gaddafi 'must go'- became fatally exposed. A 'civil war' situation suggests that by merely implementing a no-fly zone to achieve the former, this would not necessarily bring about the latter. As the conflict wore on, officials would be increasingly forced to respond to questions about the identities of the 'rebels' and to confront what a post-Gaddafi would look like.

Nevertheless, it was shown that these challenges would ultimately not be enough to provoke a change in the course of UK and US policy. On the contrary, the demands grew for Gaddafi to go, coinciding with an escalation of the already incessant NATO bombardments, and public declarations of wide ranging support for the National Transitional Council (NTC). Together these would lead to the fall of Gaddafi and his government. In order to achieve this it was necessary for UK and US officials to maintain a strict adherence to the main discursive themes projected from the implementation of the 'no-fly' zone: E.G. this was about the 'protection of the Libyan people', giving the Libyan people the chance to 'determine their own future', whilst assuring that the mission was sticking rigidly to the terms of Resolution 1973. When doubts were raised about the identity of opposition forces, the response was to re-iterate the democratic credentials of the NTC. Claims of human rights abuses perpetrated by the 'rebels' were depicted as 'reprisals' –one wrong done in response to an *original* one, thus mitigating the severity of the action- or assurances were made that the NTC would deal with it in a much more convincing way than Gaddafi ever would have.

One of the main conclusions reached in this thesis, is that once the ‘human rights’ discourse is invoked, constructing the identities of the Libyan Other in these particular ways, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible for Western governments to change track. An unavoidable ethical responsibility is generated, which is done in relation to the demonization of the Libyan leader, meaning that to leave the radical Other Gaddafi in power would be a betrayal of the West’s own moral identity. This is the case whether events on the ground had transpired into a civil war or not. Moreover, looking a little closer at the ‘universal’ values being eulogized in the ‘human rights’ discourse, it is possible to discern that they are governed by a teleological ontology; that is, they are posited as the natural endpoint of the Libyan people’s political development. An unambiguous present and a transcendental future path which is already ontologically drawn out and which will result in the Libyan people realizing their ‘destiny’. The word ‘destiny’ was used frequently by high level officials on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, the ‘human rights’ of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ are situated as the zenith of human social and political progress and the future for the ‘Libyan people’ - corresponding with what is assumed to characterise the West’s very own identity-. However, while the future has already, in effect, been decided, the path to that future is uncertain- mainly due to the radical Other Gaddafi-. This is why Western intervention is needed to ensure that the Libyan people *are able* to follow the correct path.

Yet for all that, this uncovers a paradox in that Western governments cannot fully adhere to their own ideal of human rights, freedom and democracy. Constituting their very being as a sovereign and moral agent-as is the case in the Libyan intervention-, they simultaneously unearth exclusions which lie 'outside', and which represent a direct threat to the Western Self-identity. These threats cannot be part of any democratic process; they must be punished, banished to the outside, or eliminated. Gaddafi ‘must go’ because he is not only a threat to the 'Libyan people', who are aspiring Westerners, but he is also a threat to the West's *own* moral and democratic identity. Yet, in seeking and achieving the removal of Gaddafi through raw Western military power, the West denies the Libyan people the very ‘universal’ right which they are supposed to possess; namely, the right to choose democratically the existing leader should they so wish. There are appeals to universal values, the ‘right’ to decide, and yet at one and the same time certain options are not permitted. The liberal governments involved in the

bombing campaign, therefore, ultimately resort to the very dictatorial logic that they are actually supposed to be challenging.

In the case of Libya, though, outside intervention and the removal of Gaddafi is necessary not only to safeguard the 'destiny' of the Libyan people. Echoing past geopolitical 'domino' logics, it is repeatedly claimed that a failure to take decisive action in Libya could produce a negative knock-on effect in other countries, which had been showing signs of democratic murmurings. An *anti*-'domino' logic, as it were, whereby the 'domino' logic is inversed to argue that one event could restrict, stifle and stagnate desirable events from taking place in other countries. That is to say, one event in one country, will necessarily cause a similar effect in other countries, due to their geographical proximity, and regardless of how different they may be. This is clearly a consequence of Libya being scripted geographically as part of the 'Middle East' and ethnically as 'Arab', thus concurring with the geographical and ethnic parameters of the 'Arab Spring' phenomenon. For sure, it cannot be disputed that many individuals and groups displayed the commonly held assumptions of the 'Arab Spring' phenomenon, and were demanding greater political and economic freedoms. However, the unity with which the 'Arab Spring' signifier aspires to group together a range of disparate countries is problematic; it becomes possible to make erroneous links which are suggestive of uniform responses. In the case at hand, Gaddafi 'must go', as Ben-Ali and Mubarak did before him, this way the momentum is not stopped and the chain reaction –the spread of 'freedom' and 'democracy'- is not broken.

2.

In terms of the secondary research question(s) raised, concerning the extent to which Western discourses and actions display contiguity with Slater's concept the 'imperiality of power', the following conclusions have been reached. Western actions correspond with an 'imperiality of power' in so far as the appeal to 'universal' values can be traced back to historical performances of a 'human rights' discourse. Moreover, the US and UK governments awarded themselves the power to not only intervene in Libya, but to bring about the fall of the Libyan government. This was done in accordance with the trend Slater has recognized; the military campaign was carried out on the basis that Western countries were defending not only 'universal' values, but values which turn out to be Western liberal values. These are purportedly benevolent

actions, undertaken for the good of the Libyan people, even if many inside the country had taken up arms against the intentions of Western governments.

In terms of the historical constitution of this imperial 'privilege', as Slater has called it, it is possible to go further to understand how this 'privilege' is acted upon. After all, the military intervention in Libya and the removal of Gaddafi was not inevitable, nor is Western intervention inevitable in any cases. Not all authoritarian states are accused of human rights abuses in the same way, nor are their leaders constituted as a threatening 'barbaric' Other, with corresponding attempts to subjugate, banish or eliminate them. This confronts us with an apparent chiasm between Western identity claims- as unambiguously moral and defenders of democracy and human rights- and Western actions- a clearly inconsistent record of doing precisely that. Yet this chiasm cannot simply be bridged by claiming that Western governments are disingenuous, as one may be tempted to do, cloaking pure self interest within claims of humanitarianism. This would be to presuppose a government that is fully in control of its own discourse and its actions, able to construct events as it pleases. As such, the supposition falls once more into the metaphysical trap of the fully present sovereign subject.

Neither can the military intervention and the removal of Gaddafi be simply understood as the causative effect of the 'human rights' discourse. This would be to displace and assign the sovereign subject -Western governments- on to discourse itself. Of course, one must recognize that an ethical responsibility is triggered by the 'human rights' discourse, and that in turn, this discourse resonated in some way with the events taking place in Libya. Otherwise, no credence whatsoever would be given to Western governments' interpretations of events. Yet one must also take into account that 'human rights' has its own genealogical history within Western philosophical thought, and more narrowly within Western foreign and security practices. This means that one can speak of a 'human rights' discourse, which has been historically constituting the Western Self identity as *moral*, but in specific, identifiable ways. Thus, an appreciation of this is vitally important for any rigorous analysis of the geopolitical event in question.

Understanding the Western state as being performatively constituted allows for a more nuanced understanding of the military intervention in Libya. Firstly, the irregular pattern of outside intervention and condemnation of human rights violations becomes an

inevitable occurrence. Since states exist as profoundly complex entities, a battle-ground of competing discourses, they are constantly being forced to take up different subject positions. This will sometimes lead to policies which emphasize human rights-as in the case of Libya-, but not always. Being defined principally by an economic and regional-security-strategic relationship, the US's relationship with Saudi Arabia makes it much more difficult for the West to perform its moral identity in this particular case. For such reasons, the Western Self will necessarily *appear* hypocritical, self-interested and-or morally questionable, but this is precisely due to the fact it *cannot* intervene in every case, nor can it fully constitute its moral identity.

A performative theory of the state also enables a wider historical appreciation of how both the US and the UK states have been constituted as moral agents by the 'human rights' discourse, and, as such, shines light on how both governments came to intervene in Libya. This has comprised a plethora of re-iterative discursive practices involving not only political officials, but also 'intellectuals of statecraft', think-tanks, and human rights organizations. This means that the Western Self has increasingly viewed itself as moral, and thus able to pass judgement on human rights transgressions-even in some limited cases their *own*-. Yet a closer examination of how the Western State has performed 'human rights', especially in the post-September 11th period, shows how this has been consumed within a wider Western security discourse, and has played an important part in the current geopolitical strategy of 'integration'. Interests and values come together, whereby the diffusion of the latter will aid the attainment of the former. In constituting the moral identity of the Western state as defender and promotor of the dual, inter-linked, liberal democratic values of 'freedom' and 'democracy', 'human rights' becomes inextricably bound up with questions of national interests and security. This is something that Slater's conception of the 'imperiality of power' does not give enough emphasis too. In short, values and interests merge into one another in an uneasy, and often contradictory relationship. Integration, whether it be voluntary, through coercion, or military means, is not achieved solely on the basis that it is good for the West *vis-a-vis* its own security. Rather, it must also have a normative component; it is not only 'good' for the West, but for the Other too. Understood this way, the performance of 'human rights' carried out by Western governments in the military intervention in Libya becomes the *materialization* of a

range of re-iterative practices which have constituted the Western state as both moral and sovereign.

In Libya, the security prize for the Western countries was the spread of liberal democracy in accordance with a wider geopolitical strategy of 'integration'. That is to say, the strategic objectives of liberalizing and democratizing Libya so as to bring it further under Western influence. There is a clear belief that liberal democracies are more stable and more sympathetic to Western interests. Gaddafi and his government had become susceptible to such a 'human rights' discourse and the violent actions that sprung from it precisely since they had failed to demonstrate sufficient progress in political and economic liberalization. This means they could not demonstrate to Western governments that they had really changed; they had not completed the 'rehabilitation' that was set out for them; they were not playing in accordance with the neo-liberal 'rule-set', nor had they been integrated fully back into the 'functioning core', as Thomas Barnett (2005) would perhaps put it. Ultimately, one could say, Libya had remained on the 'outside', and the eruption of violence in Libya in 2011 would bring these underlying issues to the fore.

However, if the continued violence and instability which has reigned in Libya since Western intervention is a marker, they objectives have quite clearly failed. In his article of 2015, Slater asks himself how it could be possible that the US, as the quintessential imperial power, does not seem capable of learning from past mistakes intervening in foreign countries. These campaigns appear to be invariable accompanied by a profound misunderstanding of the culture, political or otherwise, and a misjudgement of both friend and foe alike. The military intervention in Libya shows that once more these are charges are applicable to Western powers. Both UK and US discourse made assumptions about the level of opposition that the Libyan government was facing- this was deemed to be almost unanimous- and concurrently an underestimation of the opposition that they would face. It simply did not appear to register with policy makers that once the West had effectively signalled their intentions, and NATO began the military campaign, significant parts of the Libyan population would rally against what was perceived as imperial incursions into their country. The fact that the military intervention took six months of intensifying bombardments to bring down the Gaddafi and the Libyan government is evidence of resistance that was faced.

It is significant to note that the UK government, and especially high level US officials, *did* display caution with regards the dangers of intervention and removing a government by force. However, this was ultimately not enough to detain their efforts to work towards the toppling of Gaddafi. To explain this one must look more closely at the 'human rights' discourse deployed, and moreover the general belief in 'universal' values. In understanding that it is through the 'human rights' discourse that Western countries constitute their moral identity, this means that its deployment becomes *necessary* for this particular side of the identity to come into being. In a similar way to what David Campbell has argued in his seminal work on Western security practices- namely that they are required if the Western state's identity as sovereign protector is to have any meaning- the West *requires* human rights transgressions in order for it to constitute its moral identity. For this reason, one should not expect the 'human rights' discourse to die out any time soon, nor should one necessarily expect the West to learn from its past mistakes intervening in other countries. In a way, the West's moral identity is inextricably dependent on it.

Returning specifically to the Libyan conflict, once it is defined in terms of 'human rights', we are already into the realm of abstraction and transcendence. The emphasis is fixed on the present situation, but this situation is characterized and understood in terms of abstract values such as 'freedom' and 'democracy'. These are eulogized as they are deemed to be 'universal' rights, which at the time were being denied to the 'Libyan people'. It is of course unlikely that Western officials believed at *any* time in a strict opposition between an unambiguous, homogeneous 'Libyan people' on the one hand, and Gaddafi or the 'Libyan regime' on the other. At the beginning of the conflict, especially, US officials expressed with candour their ignorance of which groups were actually fighting on the 'rebels' side. All the while, assurances were being made that everything was being done to increase the pressure on Gaddafi and effectively force him from power. This seemingly reckless endeavour is not altogether surprising. The universality implied in the 'human rights' discourse purports to speak on behalf of *all* Libyans, meaning that by deduction Western intervention and the removal of Gaddafi would be in the interests of all, irrespective of whose side they were actually on. In fact, the question of whether or not the conflict resembled more of a 'civil war' becomes secondary.

This is another reason why Western officials cannot acknowledge that their actions have as their ultimate objective the removal of Gaddafi. Not only does it compromise the UN mandate authorized, but it would undermine the 'human rights' discourse being deployed and the very possibility of a pure 'democratic' Self identity. In the moment that Western governments recognize that they do in fact act in ways which are incongruent with a pure conception of democracy, the very notion of a fully present, stable, democratic and moral identity is undermined. Likewise, the teleological reasoning which positions 'freedom' and 'democracy' as the natural endpoint of their social and political progress- they are 'human rights'- is called into question. For these reasons, the US and UK must consistently stress that it was the 'Libyan people' themselves who were deciding the future of their country.

Ultimately, what the 'human rights' discourse succeeded in doing was to add a degree of abstraction and transcendence to the events, distancing policy makers from the dynamics fuelling the violence in Libya, and insulating their foreign policy from the main force of a counter 'civil war' discourse. The identities of the Self and the Libyan Other are essentialized and fixed, and governed by a teleological ontology which paradoxically requires Western military power to remove Gaddafi, so as to enable the 'Libyan people' to decide their 'destiny'. By constituting the 'Libyan people' with 'universal' rights, the internal complexity of what lies within the signifier is effectively bypassed, occulting the indeterminacy of the term as it masquerades as an unambiguous, objective reality. Such lack of nuance is quite clearly problematic when dealing with any large geographical space; it is particularly dubious in the case of Libya. For one thing, it elides the fact that Libya has in fact a relatively short life span as a territorially bound state- the state of Libya having been essentially created after the Second World War-. These borders were brought together as an autonomous state as recent as 1951 under King Idris, meaning that official borders do not reflect accurately the internal ethnic, regional or tribal fragmentation. The modern day Libya bears the remnants of a coexistence amongst peoples who have been forged together to compose a unified Libyan identity. This is clearly not to suggest that people in Libya do not overwhelmingly associate themselves with a Libyan national identity; it is to be conscious of the fact that this is just one of various political identities to which people feel some kind of belonging.

In Derrida's reading of Fukuyama's thesis, the 'End of History and the Last Man', the liberal *telos* is privileged at the expense of any empirical evidence to the contrary, which may jeopardize the 'promised land' of liberal democracy. The teleological reasoning in place 'locks up, neutralizes, and finally cancels historicity'. In the Western intervention in Libya, a similar thing happens. The idea that it is only through attainment of their 'universal human rights' that the Libyan people can reach their own 'destiny' is privileged over past accounts of Libya as a fragmented territorial space, a present situation which was being increasingly understood as a 'civil war', and a future which is therefore ridden with uncertainty. Indeed, as has been shown, the oppositional 'civil war' discourse failed in its attempts to check Western foreign policy.

It is of course impossible to reach definitive conclusions as to what would have happened in Libya if the West hadn't intervened and brought down the government of Gaddafi. It would also be speculative to suggest that any of the peace deals being spoken of would have come to fruition and led to a more stable political situation in Libya. Having said that, it is possible to offer up an appraisal of Western foreign policy. Taking into consideration the complexity of the country, the various regional, ethnic, tribal, religious and ideological cleavages, the lack of a liberal democratic tradition and civil society, the lucrative economic prize that the Libyan oil reserves represented, it is difficult to understand how a policy of toppling the Libyan government, crushing the army and security services, and arming multi-factional militias in the process, could lead to a more stable Libya and ultimately the emergence of liberal democracy. This means that one can conclude that the most prudent option, if not the only option, to bring back stability to the country, would have been to work towards some kind of negotiated, political solution. As Alex de Waal (2013) suggested, the African Union peace plan may have represented a missed opportunity to achieve this.

It is believed that the findings outlined here have important implications for future Western intervention, and thus are of interest to policy makers. First and foremost, one must make a renewed call for an acute sensibility to the different spatialities of any given conflict. This research has shown that it is extremely risky to neglect local and regional scales, as so often one can pass over crucial facets of complex geopolitical events. While the quick response by the 'international community' in agreeing collective action was regarded as a success for diplomacy, the way in which officials constructed the crisis from an early stage is more contentious. The constitutive

nature of the 'human right' discourse should be taken into consideration, as it can often lead blindly and irreversibly to certain foreign policy outcomes, which may not be desirable. Concurrently, they have the tendency to marginalize and exclude other options which may well offer greater chances of reaching stability.

At a more general level, if it is understood that the Western state attempts to constitute its moral identity through the 'human rights' discourse, then this is something which Western governments should be conscious of. In his seminal work 'Writing Security', David Campbell controversially asserted that the Western state must continually create its own dangers to justify its existence as an entity. The rise to prominence and incorporation of human rights within a wider security discourse is a significant development as the state becomes not only responsible for securing its own borders, but for defending human rights out-with these boundaries. Should the West cease to document human rights abuses and-or make interventions on behalf of those 'universal' values, the West would consequently relinquish its position as their champion and its position of moral privilege. Policy makers should therefore be wary of the effects that are produced from a performative theory of 'human rights'. It should be made clear that this not to reject the pursuit of human rights *per se*, or abandon the search for peace and justice, it is a call for a more nuanced appreciation of the complexity of geopolitical events.

Finally, and returning to Libya, there are certain things which seem imperative at the present time. The chronic instability and violence which Libyans have found themselves embroiled in points to a particularly challenging political environment and an uncertain future. The Libyan population has been critically fractured along ethnic, regional, tribal, religious, and ideological lines. Having said that, and whilst significant challenges clearly lie ahead, the very contingency of identity offers up hope that national reconciliation can still be achieved. This will undoubtedly involve the re-assertion, or possible re-configuration of a shared Libyan identity around which all ethnicities, regions, groups and militias can identify. That is to say, there is a need for a 'hegemonic formation' which will serve to form a new social order from the disperse and disparate subject positions currently in place.

There are some possible objections and limitations of the research which could be mentioned. First and foremost, one may take issue with the fact that this thesis does

not identify or assign a principle cause to explain the Western intervention in Libya. Inspired by this type of ontological and epistemological grounding, other studies have highlighted amongst other things the West's insatiable appetite for Middle Eastern oil, strategic aims of controlling the Middle Eastern geographical space, or indeed humanitarian principles which do not permit the position of standing a-side and doing nothing. Yet it is precisely the type of cause-effect theorizing which this investigation has strived to avoid. It is believed that these accounts of complex social and political phenomena do not stand up to scrutiny and lead ultimately to reductive accounts of complex events. Rather the emphasis has been on how multiple factors have come together to make up the 'reality' of the Libyan crisis and the Western role to be played in it.

One could also possibly point to a lack of explicit ethical engagement with the decision to intervene militarily in Libya. This could involve more direct normative evaluations of either the motives or the consequences of taking direct action, as opposed to allowing the Libyans to resolve the issues on their own. While it is acknowledged that this would undoubtedly add an extra dimension to the analysis, the added complexity which any serious ethical engagement would involve has regrettably rendered it out with the bounds of this particular study. Since this thesis has principally concerned itself with how the Western military intervention in Libya came to pass, the discourses utilized and the internal logics at play, a more sustained ethical intervention has been side-stepped. Having said that, it is recognized that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to avoid this issue completely and at least implicitly, this thesis will present some inclination.

The conclusions reached in this thesis point to certain areas for further research. In terms of the relationship between Libya and Western countries, it would be interesting to carry out an in depth, comparative study of past colonial relationships- for instance Italy-Libya or Great Britain-Libya, and the Western-led intervention of 2011. Assuming the longevity of certain civilization discourses, it would be interesting to trace any discursive continuities between past attempts to control and administer the Libyan geographical space, and present attempts to 'protect' the Libyan people and spread 'universal' values such as 'freedom' and 'democracy'.

Another potentially fruitful area could be through the incorporation of the concepts 'biopower' and 'biopolitics'. In the case of Libya, the deployment of a 'human rights' discourse suggests that the object of power in this case is a biological understanding of the 'human being' itself. That is to say, power is exercised to protect and safeguard particular bodies, considered to be worthy of protection-eg Western populations and the Libyan population-, while on the other hand, other bodies, those considered to be dangerous, must be eliminated- eg Gaddafi-. As Cairo (2006) has noted, 'Biopolitical considerations are also a driving force of current interventions, and biopolitical accounts are also easily understandable: after all, people, bodies and their conduct, are the immediate object of action. Following one after another, the armed and violent Western interventions are legitimized in function by the necessity to eliminate dangerous bodies, which would allow the reform of the conduct of the population through its rebuilding into a "civilized," "developed," or "democratic" polity' (Cairo, 2006:288).

Another potential line of inquiry for future research could be a more profound engagement with what has been called 'chronopolitics'. The military intervention in Libya was carried out in relation to an acute degree of urgency, represented and enhanced by the different media and social network technologies. Indeed, the haste of response to the Libyan case appears to be one of the defining characteristics of the intervention, whereby any delay was viewed as being potentially catastrophic, with the result being a further stain on the Western conscience should no response be forthcoming. The question of time in relation to geopolitical reasoning is one which has been well documented by certain influential writers such as notably Virilio (1986). Moreover, analysing the strategic reasoning which accompanied the US engagement in the Gulf War, Ó'Tuathail concluded that there is 'provocative evidence for the eclipse of place by pace.' Paraphrasing Der Derian and Virilio before him, he stated that: 'whereas strategy in the past was dominated by geopolitics (defined as the control of territory), today it is dominated by chronopolitics, the politics of time and acceleration.' (Ó'Tuathail, 1993: 19). What may be missing is a wider comparative study to inquire into how time has played a role in different interventions, including the most recent Libyan actions.

APPENDIX

Image 1 – Map of Libya	20
Diagram 1 – Research design for poststructuralist discourse analysis	44
Diagram 2 – Research design for the Western-led intervention in Libya	53
Diagram 3 – A critical theory of geopolitics as a set of representational practices	55
Diagram 4 – The ‘Balkan’ discourse	80
Diagram 5 – The ‘Genocide’ discourse	81
Image 2 – Daily Mail Cartoon	83
Diagram 6 – The basic ‘human rights’ discourse	155
Diagram 7 – The basic ‘civil war’ discourse	161
Table 1 – Human Rights and Security in US Foreign Policy	177
Diagram 8 – Official UK discourse	214

BIBLIOGRAPHY

i

- Adler-Nissen, R. & Pouliot, V. (2014) Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya. *European Journal of International Relations*. **20**(4), pp. 889–911.
- Agnew, J. (1999) Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and Movement in World Politics. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*. **28**(3), pp. 499-521.
- Agnew, J. (2004) *Geopolitics: Re-visioning world politics*. 2nd Edition. London and New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis e-Library edition.
- Agnew, J. (2010) Still Trapped in Territory? *Geopolitics*. **15**(4), pp. 779-784.
- Aitken, S. C. & Valentine, G. (2014) *Approaches to human geography: philosophies, theories, people and practices*. 2nd Edition. London: Sage.
- Albert, M. (1998) On Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity: An International Relations Perspective. *Geopolitics*. **3**(1), pp. 53–68.
- Ali, A. A. (2014) *Libya and Britain: A Study of the History of British-Libyan Relations 1969-1979*. Ph.D. Thesis. Nottingham Trent University.
- Ali, T. (2014). *The World Today with Tariq Ali*. Telesur. [Online] 09/12/2014. [Accessed: 10/10/2015] Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NvSi6CsjVDo>.
- Ambrose, E. (2011) Oil could hit \$220 a barrel on Libya and Algeria fears, warns Nomura. *The Daily Telegraph*. [Online]. 24/02/2011. [Accessed 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/8344133/Oil-could-hit-220-a-barrel-on-Libya-and-Algeria-fears-warns-Nomura.html>
- Anderson, L. (2011) Demystifying the Arab Spring Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. *Foreign Affairs*. **90**(3), pp. 2-7.
- Antaki, C., et al. (2003) Discourse analysis means doing analysis: A critique of six analytic shortcomings. *Discourse Analysis Online*. **1**(1), pp. 1–22.
- Ashley, R. K. (1988) Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*. **17**(2), pp. 227–262.
- Austin, J.L. (1962) *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barnett, T. P. M. (2005) *The Pentagon's new map: war and peace in the twenty-first century*. New York: G.P Putnam's Sons.
- Bassiouni, M. C. (2013) *Libya from repression to revolution : a record of armed conflict and international law violations, 2011-2013*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- BBC (2009) Anger at Lockerbie bomber welcome. *BBC News*. [Online] 21/09/2009. [Accessed: 25/08/2015] Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8213352.stm>

- BBC (2011) William Hague 'inspired' by Libyan rebels. *BBC News*. [Online] 05/06/2011. [Accessed: 16/04/2014] Available from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/uk-13659852>
- BBC News (1999) Thatcher stands by Pinochet. *BBC News* [Online] 26/03/1999. [Accessed: 14/01/2015] Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/304516.stm>
- BBC News (2004) Libya indignant over Saudi rebuke. *BBC News* [Online] 22/12/2004. [Accessed: 16/05/2016] Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4119719.stm.
- Beaumont, P. (2011) Zawiyah: 30 miles from Tripoli, the city on the frontline of Libya's revolt. *The Guardian* [Online]. 27/02/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/27/libya-30-miles-from-tripoli>
- Bellamy, A. J. & Williams, P. D. (2011) The New Politics of Protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect. *International Affairs*. **87**(4), pp. 825–850.
- Beresford, A. (2015) A responsibility to protect Africa from the West? South Africa and the NATO Intervention in Libya. *International Politics*. **52**(3), pp. 288–304.
- Berman, D. & Michaelsen, C. (2012) Intervention in Libya: Another Nail in the Coffin for the Responsibility-to-Protect? *International Community Law Review*. **14**(4), pp. 337–358.
- Bernstein, S. (2012) The Responsibility to Protect after Libya: Humanitarian Prevention as Customary International Law. *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*. **38**(1), pp. 305–343.
- Bialasiewicz, L., et al. (2007) Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy. *Political Geography*. **26**(4), pp. 405–422.
- Black, I. (2011) Libya cracks down on protesters after violent clashes in Benghazi. *The Guardian* [Online] 17/02/2011. [Accessed 29/09/2014]. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/16/libya-clashes-benghazi>
- Black, I. (2011) Libya on brink as protests hit Tripoli. *The Guardian* [Online] 21/02/2011. [Accessed 29/09/2014]. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/20/libya-defiant-protesters-feared-dead>
- Blair, D. (2007) Blair, Gaddafi and the BP oil deal. *The Telegraph*. [Online] 30/05/2007 [Accessed: 20/11/2014] Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1553044/-Gaddafi-and-the-BP-oil-deal.html>
- Blair, T. (1999) Speech before the Chicago Economic Club. In: The Blair Doctrine. *PBS Newshour*. [Online] 22/04/1999 [Accessed: 21/10/2014] Available from: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international-jan-june99-blair_doctrine4-23/
- Blair, T. (2001) Speech at Labour Party conference. *The Guardian* [Online] 02/10/2001. [Accessed: 02/02/2014] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour6>
- Blair, T. (2006) Speech to the Foreign Policy Centre. *The Guardian* [Online] 21/03/2006. [Accessed: 02/06/2014] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/mar/21/iraq.iraq1>

- Blanchard, C. M. (2014) Libya: Transition and US Policy. *CRS Report*. [Online] 29/03/2017 [Accessed: 09/09/2015] Available from: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf>
- Blasko, A. (2004) Reagan and Heritage: A Unique Partnership. *The Heritage Foundation*. [Online] 07/06/2004. Accessed: [10/08/2015] Available from: <http://www.heritage.org/conservatism/commentary/reagan-and-heritage-unique-partnership>
- Blomfield, A. (2011) Gaddafi's bloody onslaught begins. *The Telegraph*. [Online] 03/03/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.pressreader.com/uk/the-daily-telegraph/20110303>
- Bodenheimer, T. & Gould, R. (1989) The Reagan Doctrine: Third World Rollback. *Third World Traveller*. [Online] [Accessed: 01/03/2015] Available from: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Ronald_Reagan/ReaganDoctrine_TWRollback.html
- Boucher, R. (2004) State Department Daily Briefing. *US State Department*. [Online] 22/12/2004. [Accessed: 26/11/2015] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/40029.htm>
- Bowen, W. Q. (2006) *Libya and nuclear proliferation : stepping back from the brink*. London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Boyd, G. M. (1985) Reagan Terms Nicaraguan Rebels "Moral Equal of Founding Fathers". *The New York Times*. [Online] 02/03/1985. [Accessed on: 02/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/02/politics/02REAG.html>
- Brzezinski, Z. (1995) The New Dimensions of Human Rights. *The Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs*. [Online] [Accessed: 11/11/2015] Available from: https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/morgenthau/269/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/269_brzezinski.pdf
- Brzezinski, Z. (1997) Episode 17 Good Guys Bad Guys. Interview with Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski. *National Security Archive* [Online] 13/6/1997. [Accessed: 14/05/2015] Available from: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski2.html>
- Brzezinski, Z., Scowcroft, B. & Murphy, R. (1997) Differentiated Containment. *Foreign Affairs*. **76**(3), pp. 20-30.
- Burns, J. (2008) Bush Upset By U.N. Rejections, Says U.S. Should Still Pay Dues. *CNS News*. [Online] 07/07/2008 [Accessed: 10/10/2015] Available from: <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/bush-upset-un-rejections-says-us-should-still-pay-dues>
- Bush, G (2004) Presidential State of the Union Address. *The Washington Post* [Online] 20/01/2004. Washington D.C. [Accessed: 12/05/2015] Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html
- Bush, G. W. (2001) President Signs Afghan Women and Children Relief Act. *The White House Archives: President George W Bush*. [Online] 12/12/2001 [Accessed: 02/05/2014] Available from: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011212-9.html>

- Bush, G. W. (2003) Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs. *US Department of State Archive*. [Online] 19/12/2003. Washington DC. [Accessed: 14/05/2015] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/27459.htm>
- Butler, J. (1990) *Gender Trouble*. New York: Routledge.
- Butler, J. (1993) *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex*. New York: Routledge.
- Butler, J. (1997) *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*. New York: Routledge.
- Cairo, H. (2006) The Duty of the Benevolent Master: From Sovereignty to Suzerainty and the Biopolitics of Intervention. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*. **31**(3), pp. 285-311.
- Cameron, D. (2006) A New Approach to Foreign Affairs – Liberal Conservatism. *The Financial Times*. [Online] 11/09/2006. [Accessed: 01/03/2016] Available from: <https://www.ft.com/content/c0d5ee34-428b-11db-8dc3-0000779e2340>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Joint statement on Libya from the UK, US, and France with the support of Arab States. *Prime Minister's Office*. [Online] 18/03/2011. London [Accessed: 21/02/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-libya-from-the-uk-us-and-france-with-the-support-of-arab-states>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Opening statement with Prime Minister Netanyahu. *Prime Minister's Office*. [Online] 04/05/2011. London. [Accessed: 18/09/2014] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/opening-statement-with-prime-minister-netanyahu>
- Cameron, D. (2011) PM statement on the UN Security Council Resolution on Libya. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 18/03/2011. London. [Accessed: 19/05/2016] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-the-un-security-council-resolution-on-libya>
- Cameron, D. (2011) PM statement to the House on Libya. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 21/03/2011. London. [Accessed: 03/11/2016] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-to-the-house-on-libya>
- Cameron, D. (2011) PM's press conference in Paris. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 02/09/2011. Paris. [Accessed: 08/09/2016] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-press-conference-in-paris--2>
- Cameron, D. (2011) PM's speech at London Conference on Libya. *Prime Minister's Office*. [Online] 29/03/2011. London. [Accessed: 13/07/2016] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-london-conference-on-libya>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Press conference at European Council. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 25/03/2011. Brussels. [Accessed: 04/02/2016] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/press-conference-at-european-council>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Press conference with Prime Minister of Kuwait. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 22/02/2011. London. [Accessed: 08/06/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/press-conference-with-prime-minister-of-kuwait>

- Cameron, D. (2011) Prime Minister's first speech to the UN General Assembly. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 22/09/2011. London. [Accessed:12/08/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-first-speech-to-the-un-general-assembly>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Prime Minister's statement on Libya. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 28/02/2011. London. [Accessed:12/02/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-libya--2>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Statement from the PM on Japan and the Middle East. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 14/03/2011. London. [Accessed:22/09/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-pm-on-japan-and-the-middle-east>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Transcript of press conference in Lagos, Nigeria. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 22/07/2011. London. [Accessed: 02/02/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/transcript-of-press-conference-in-lagos-nigeria>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Transcript of the PM's interview on situation in Libya. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 13/04/2011. London. [Accessed:02/02/2016] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/transcript-of-the-pms-interview-on-situation-in-libya>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Transcript of the PM's interview. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 27/02/2011. London. [Accessed:05/08/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/transcript-of-the-pms-interview-on-libya>
- Cameron, D. (2011) Transcript of the PM's YouTube interview in Oman. *Prime Minister's Office* [Online] 26/02/2011.[Accessed:06/05/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/transcript-of-the-pms-youtube-interview-in-oman>
- Campbell, D. (1992). *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Campbell, D. (1998). *Bosnia National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Campbell, D. (1998). Why Fight? Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-structuralism. *Millenium Journal of International Studies*. 27(3), pp. 497-521
- Campbell, D. (2007) Geopolitics and Visuality: Sighting the Darfur Conflict. *Political Geography*. 26(4), 357-382.
- Campbell, D. & Power, M. (2010) The State of Critical Geopolitics. Guest Editorial. *Political Geography*. 29(5), 243-246.
- Caputo, D. J. (1997) *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Carleton, D. & Stohl, M. (1985) The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan. *Human Rights Quarterly*. 7(2), pp. 205-229.

Carter, J. (1976) Our Nation's Past and Future. *The American Presidential Project*. [Online] 15/07/1976. [Accessed: 10/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25953>

Carter, J. (1977) Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame. In: *The American Presidential Project*. [Online] 22/05/1977. [Accessed: 08/04/2016] Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7552>

Carter, J. (1977) Democratic Congressional Dinner – Remarks at the 14th Annual Dinner. *The American Presidential Project*. [Online] 25/05/1977. [Accessed: 07/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7586>

Carter, J. (1977) Inaugural Address. *ThisNation.com*. [Online] 20/01/1977. [Accessed: 10/02/2016] Available from: <http://www.thisnation.com/library/inaugural/carter.html>

Carter, J. (1977) Meeting with President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte of Chile. *The American Presidential Project*. [Online] 06/09/1977. [Accessed: 11/09/2015] Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6582>

Central Intelligence Agency (1970) Intelligence Memorandum 490/70. Washington. 13/02/1970. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972*.

Central Intelligence Agency (1973) Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Schlesinger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). Washington. 19/04/1973. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976*.

Central Intelligence Agency (1974) Termination of (less than 1 line not declassified) for Covert Action in Libya: Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Nelson) to the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee (Ratliff). Washington. 11/09/1974. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976*.

Chandler, D. (2009) Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The Limits of the Biopolitical Approach. *International Political Sociology*. **3**(1), pp. 53–70.

Chesterman, S. (2011) “Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya. *Ethics & International Affairs*. **25**(3), pp. 279–285.

Chivers, C.J. (2011) Rebels Repel Assaults By Loyalists in Libya. *The New York Times*. [Online]. 28/04/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/29/world/africa/29libya.html>

Chivvis, C. S. (2013) *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. DIGITAL. Cambridge University Press.

Chomski, N. (1998) Rogue States. *Z Magazine*. [Online] April, 1998. [Accessed: 12/11/2015] Available from: https://chomsky.info/199804__/

- Chorin, E. (2012) *Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution*. London: SAQI.
- Chrisafis, A. (2011) Libya protests: 'Now we've seen the blood our fears have gone'. *The Guardian*. [Online] 21/02/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/21/libya-protests-blood-fears-gone>
- Chulov, M. (2011) Battle for Brega could mark start of real war in Libya. *The Guardian*. [Online] 03/03/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/02/libya-civil-war-bregga>
- Clark, K. W. (2011) Gen. Wesley Clark says Libya doesn't meet the test for U.S. military action. *The Washington Post*. [Online] 11/03/2011. [Accessed: 12/05/2015] Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031103244.html>
- Clift, E. & Gerstenzang, J. (1986) U.S. Warplanes Destroy Libya Missile Site, Sink Patrol Craft: Strike After Attack by Kadafi Forces. *LA Times*. [Online] 25/03/1986. [Accessed: 01/09/2016] Available from: http://articles.latimes.com/1986-03-25/news/mn-2_1_patrol-boat
- Clinton, H. (2011) Holding the Qadhafi Government Accountable. *US Department of State*. [Online] 26/02/2011 [Accessed: 12/11/2015] Available from: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/02/157187.htm>
- Clinton, H. (2011) Interview With David Gregory of NBC's Meet the Press. *NBC News*. [Online] 27/03/2011 [Accessed: 02/02/2016] Available from: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/03/159209.htm>
- Clinton, H. (2011) Interview with Kay Burley of Sky News. *Sky News* [Online] 08/03/2011 [Accessed: 11/11/2015] Available from: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/03/157904.htm>
- Clinton, W. J. (1993) The President's News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. *Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, Volume 1: p.410.
- Clinton, W. J. (1996) Remarks on Signing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and an Exchange With Reporters. *The American Presidency Project* [Online] 05/08/1996 [Accessed: 10/10/2015] Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=53160&st=iran&st1>
- Clinton, W.J. (1994) Remarks to Future Leaders of Europe in Brussels, January 9, 1994. *Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, Volume 1: p.11.
- CNN (2011) Cameron: Time for Gadhafi to give himself up. *CNN*. [Online] 01/09/2011. [Accessed: 12/01/2015] Available from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/09/01/uk.cameron/>
- Cockburn, P. (2011) Amnesty questions claim that Gaddafi ordered rape as weapon of war. *The Independent*. [Online] 23/06/2011. [Accessed: 22/12/2015] Available from: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/amnesty-questions-claim-that-gaddafi-ordered-rape-as-weapon-of-war-2302037.html>

- Connolly, W. E (2002) *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Expanded Edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Cook, R. (1997) Robin Cook's speech on the government's ethical foreign policy. *The Guardian* [Online] 12/05/1997 [Accessed on: 12/11/2014] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy>
- Cooper, T., Grandolini, A. & Delalande, A. (2015) *Libyan air wars: Part 1: 1973-1985*. Solihull: Helion and Company.
- Cowell, A. (2011) Protests Take Aim at Leader of Libya. *The New York Times* [online]. 16/02/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/world/middleeast/17libya.html>
- Cowell, A. (2011) Refugee Agency Reports 'Humanitarian Emergency' as Multitudes Flee Libya. *The New York Times* [online] 28/02/2011 [Accessed: 29/09/2014] Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/europe/01refugee.html>
- Cretz, G. A. (2009) GOL Ratchets up Pressure on Oil Companies to Contribute to U.S. -Libya Claims Fund. *Wikileaks* [Online] 04/02/2009 [Accessed: 10/04/2016] Available from: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TRIPOLI99_a.html
- Cretz, G. A. (2011) Al-Qadhafi's Feint: Libyan Oil Nationalization Unlikely. (Wikileaks Files: Wikileaks Cables), in: *The Daily Telegraph*, [Online] 30/01/2009 [Accessed: 10/01/2015] Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/8294923/AL-QADHAFIS-FEINT-LIBYAN-OIL-NATIONALIZATION-UNLIKELY.html>
- Croci, O. & Valigi, M. (2012) Italy and the International Intervention in Libya. *Italian Politics*. **32**(1), pp. 191–206.
- Cronogue, G. (2012) Responsibility to Protect: Syria The Law, Politics, and Future of Humanitarian Intervention Post-Libya. *Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies*. **3**(1), pp. 124–159.
- Daalder, I. H. & Stavridis, J. G. (2012) NATO's Victory in Libya: The right way to run an intervention. *Foreign Affairs*. **91**(2), pp. 2-7.
- Dalby, S. (2011) Peace and Geopolitics: Imagining Peaceful Geographies. Paper for the *University of Newcastle symposium on Peace in Geography and Politics*. [Online] 15/11/2011. [Accessed: 10/10/2015] Available from: http://http-server.carleton.ca/~sdalby/papers/PEACEFUL_GEOGRAPHIES.pdf
- Dalby, S. & Ó Tuathail, G. (2002) *Rethinking Geopolitics*. London: Routledge.
- Davidson, J. W. (2013) France, Britain and the Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. **26**(2), pp. 310-329.
- De Saussure, F. (1959) *Course in General Linguistics*. New York: Philosophical Library.
- De Waal, A. (2007) No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention. *Harvard International Review*. [Online] 21/03/2007 [Accessed; 01/08/2015] Available from: <http://hir.harvard.edu/no-such-thing-as-humanitarian-intervention/>

- De Waal, A. (2013) African Roles in the Libyan conflict of 2011. *International Affairs*. **89** (2), pp. 365-379.
- Deleuze, G. (1996) On Human Rights. *Generation Online*. [Online] [Accessed: 01/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze10.htm>
- Der Derian, J. (2003) Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. *Boundary 2*. **30**(3), pp.19-27
- Derrida, J (2011) *Spectres of Marx* (trans. Peggy Kamuf). New York: Routledge.
- Derrida, J. (1973) *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs* (trans. D. B. Allison). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Derrida, J. (1978) Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences. *Writing and Difference*, 1, pp. 278–293.
- Derrida, J. (1982) Différance. In *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. A. Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Derrida, J. (1988) *Limited Inc*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Derrida, J. (1998) *Of Grammatology* (Trans by Spivak, G. C.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
- Dillon, M. & Neal, A. eds. (2008) *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dinesh, M. & Junnola, J. (2004) Old Habits Die Hard. *Energy Compass*.
- Dittmer, J. (2007) The Tyranny of the Serial: Popular Geopolitics, the Nation, and Comic Book Discourse. *Antipode*. **39**(2), 247-268.
- Dixon, D. & Jones, J.P. III. (2005) Derridean Geographies. *Antipode*. **37**(2), pp. 242-245.
- Dodds, K. & Elden, S. (2008) Thinking Ahead: David Cameron, the Henry Jackson Society and British Neo-conservatism. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. **10**(3), 347-363.
- Dodds, K. et al (2013) *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Douthat, R. (2011) Iraq Then, Libya Now. *The New York Times*. [Online] 13/03/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/20114]. Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14douthat.html>
- Duncan, J. (2011) Providing for consideration of H.Res. 292, regarding deployment of united states armed forces in Libya, and providing consideration of H. Con. Res. 51, Libya war powers resolution. *Congressional Record* 157:79 (June 3, 2011), P. H3990. [Accessed: 23/02/2015] Available from: Congress.gov.
- Dowler, L. & Sharp, J. (2001) A Feminist Geopolitics? *Space and Polity*. **5**(3), pp. 165-176.

- El Warfally, M. G. (1988) *Imagery and Ideology in U.S. policy toward Libya, 1969-1982*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press Digital Editions, c1988. [Accessed: 10/09/2016] Available from: <http://digital.library.pitt.edu/cgi-bin/t/text/text-idx?c=pittpress;cc=pittpress;view=toc;idno=31735057893681>
- El-Jahmi, M. (2006) Libya and the U.S: Qadhafi Unrepentant. *Middle East Quarterly*. **13**(1), pp. 11-20.
- Ensign, J. (2011) Senate Debate on Libya. US Senate. *CSPAN* [Online] 30/03/2011. [Accessed: 02/03/2015] Available from: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?298751-4/senate-debate-libya>
- Ensor, D. (2004) Alleged Libyan plot to kill Saudi ruler investigated. *CNN International* [Online] 11/06/2004 [Accessed: 01/02/2016] Available from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/10/libya.saudi/>
- Fadel, L. & Sly, L. (2011) As Gaddafi holds on, some Libyans seek foreign intervention. *The Washington Post*. [Online] 02/03/2011. [Accessed: 23/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030106963.html>
- Fahim, K. & Kirkpatrick, D. (2011) Loyalists Batter Libyan Rebels Near Strategic Oil Town. *The Washington Post*. [online] 09/03/2011. [Accessed: 23/09/2014]. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/world/africa/10libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
- Farrell, A. & McDermott, P. (2005) Claiming Afghan Women: The Challenge of Human Rights Discourse for Transnational Feminism. In: Hesford W.S. & Kozol, W. eds. *Just Advocacy: Women's Human Rights*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press
- Fleischer, A. (2003) Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer. *The American Presidency Project*. [Online] 23/01/2003 [Accessed: 10/02/2016] Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=61026>
- Flusty, S. et al. (2008) Interventions in banal neoimperialism. *Political Geography*. **27**(6), 617-629.
- Forsythe, D. (1988) *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Forsythe, D. (1995) Human rights and US Foreign Policy: Two Levels, Two Worlds. *Political Studies*. **43**(1), pp.111-130.
- Forsythe, D. (2002) US foreign policy and human rights. *Journal of Human Rights*. **1**(4), pp. 501-521.
- Foucault, M. (1971) Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In: Rabinow, P. ed. (1984) *The Foucault Reader*. London: Penguin.
- Foucault, M. (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1978) *The History of Sexuality Volume I*. New York: Pantheon.

- Foucault, M. (1994) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Fox, L. (2005) Pursuing a Freedom Agenda – A Conservative Blueprint. *BBC News*. [Online] 02/08/2005. [Accessed:02/02/2014] Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4738315.stm
- Fox, L. (2011) Defence Committee- Minutes of Evidence. *House of Commons* [Online] 27/04/2011 [Accessed: 12/02/2015] Available from: <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/950/11042701.htm>
- Freeman, M. (1994) The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. *Human Rights Quarterly*. **16**(3), pp. 491-514
- Fukuyama, F. (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Garwood-Gowers, A. (2013) The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception, Syria as the Norm? *University of New South Wales Law Journal*. **36**(2), pp. 594–618.
- Gates, R. (2011) Testimony on U.S. Military Operations in Libya. Senate Armed Services Committee. *CSPAN* [Online] 31/03/2011 [Accessed: 20/05/2016] Available from: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?298772-1/us-military-operations-libya>
- Giddens, A. (2006) The colonel and his third way. *The New Statesman*. [Online] 28/08/2006. [Accessed: 20/10/2015] Available from: <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2014/04/colonel-and-his-third-way>
- Gilmore, J. (2014) The uncertain merger of values and interests in UK foreign policy. *International Affairs*. **90**(3), pp. 541–557.
- Glanville, L. (2013) Intervention in Libya: From Sovereign Consent to Regional Consent. *International Studies Perspectives*. **14**(3), pp. 325-342.
- Glass, M. & Rose-Redwood, R., eds. (2014), *Performativity, Politics, and the Production of Social Space*. New York: Routledge.
- Gregory, D. (2004) *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Gregory, D. et al. (2011) *The Dictionary of Human Geography*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Guiora, A. N. (2011) Intervention in Libya, Yes; Intervention in Syria, No. *Deciphering Western Reserve Journal of International Law*. **44**(1) pp. 250-276.
- Haaretz (2004) Libya Threatens to Sue Powell for Calling it 'Non-democratic'. *Haaretz*. [Online] 18/07/2004 [Accessed: 12/04/2016] Available from: <http://www.haaretz.com/news/libya-threatens-to-sue-powell-for-calling-it-non-democratic-1.128757>
- Haas R. N. (1997) Sanctioning Madness. *Foreign Affairs*. **76**(6), pp. 74-85.

- Haberman, C. (2011) Viewing Libya Through the Prism of Lockerbie. *The New York Times*. [Online] 03/03/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014] Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/nyregion/04nyc.html>
- Hague, W. (2006) Speech to Conservative Party Human Rights Commission. *Conservative Party Human Rights Commission*. 25/04/2006. [Accessed: 01/02/2015] Available from: http://www.conservativehumanrights.com/news/april06/25.04.06_haguespeech.htm;
- Hague, W. (2006) Speech to the Conservative Party Conference 2006. *Conservative Party Speeches*. 03/10/2006. [Accessed: 20/02/2015] Available from: <http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599980>
- Hague, W. (2007) Thinking ahead: the foreign policy of the next Conservative government. *Conservative Party Speeches*. 31/01/2007. [Accessed: 01/11/2016] Available from: <http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599903>
- Hague, W. (2009) William Hague: The Future of British Foreign Policy. *Conservative Party Speeches*. [Online] 21/07/2009 [Accessed: 01/09/2016] Available from: <http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601323>
- Hague, W. (2010) Human rights are key to our foreign policy. *The Telegraph*. [Online] 31/08/2010. [Accessed: 04/04/2015] Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/7972463/Human-rights-are-key-to-our-foreign-policy.html>
- Hague, W. (2011) Foreign Secretary answers questions on Libya via Twitter. *GOV.uk*. [Online] 31/08/2011 [Accessed: 01/08/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-answers-questions-on-libya-via-twitter>
- Hague, W. (2011) Transcript of William Hague interview. *The Andrew Marr Show*. BBC. [Online] 05/06/2011. [Accessed: 04/05/2016] Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/andrew_marr_show/9505108.stm
- Hallams, E. & Schreer, B. (2012) Toward's a 'post-American' alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya. *International Affairs*. **88**(2), pp. 313–327.
- Hancock, J. (2007) *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge.
- Hannah, M. (2007) Foundations of 'Foucault' in Anglo-American Geography: An Archaeological Sketch. In: Crampton J. W. & Elden, S. eds. *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hansard House of Commons (1984) Libyan People's Bureau (Shooting Incident). *Hansard*. HC Deb 25. Vol 58, cc.739-52, April, 1984. [Online] Available from: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1984/apr/25/libyan-peoples-bureau-shooting-incident>
- Hansel, M. & Oppermann, K. (2016) Counterfactual Reasoning in Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of German Nonparticipation in the Libya Intervention of 2011. *Foreign Policy Analysis*. **12**(2), pp. 109-127.

- Hansen, L. (2006) *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London; Routledge.
- Hawkesworth, M. (1980) Ideological Immunity: The Soviet Response to Human Rights Criticism. *Universal Human Rights*. 2(1), pp. 67-84.
- Heaps, D. (1984) *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: The First Decade 1973-1983*. New York: American Association for the International Commission of Jurists.
- Henderson, C. (2011) International Measures for the Protection of Civilians in Libya and Côte D'Ivoire. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. 60(3), pp. 767–778.
- Hendrix, S. & Faiola, A. (2011) Gaddafi forces attack rebels anew, even as regime appears to seek talks. *The Washington Post*. [Online]. 08/03/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014]. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/07/AR2011030704889.html>
- Hendrix, S. et al. (2011) Gaddafi loyalists besiege Zawiyah; civilian casualties reported. *The Washington Post*. [Online]. 08/03/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/07/AR2011030701703.html>
- Henley, J. (2011) Gaddafi's wild words show he hasn't learned anything. *The Guardian*. [Online] 23/02/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014]. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/gaddafi-speech-television-wild-words>
- Henriksen, T.H. (2001) The Rise and Decline of Rogue States. *Journal of International Affairs*. 54(2), pp 349-373.
- Hesford, W. & Kozol, W. eds. (2005) *Just Advocacy? Women's Human Rights, Transnational Feminisms, and the Politics of Representation*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers.
- Hilsum, L (2012). *Sandstorm: Libya in the Time of Revolution*. New York: Penguin Press.
- HM Government (2010b) *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*. London: HMSO.
- HM Government (2014) *The National Security Strategy*. London: HMSO.
- House of Commons (1998) *Select Committee on Foreign Affairs First Report*. HC Foreign Affairs: London. [Online] 21st December, 1998. [Accessed: 18/04/2015] Available from: <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmcaff/100/10003.htm>
- House of Commons (2006) *Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism. Fourth Report of Session 2005–06*. HC Foreign Affairs Committee. [Accessed: 01/02/2015] Available from: <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmcaff/573/573.pdf>
- House of Commons (2011) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. *Hansard* [online] 21/03/2011 Available from: <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110321/debtext/110321-0001.htm>
- House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2005) *Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Session 2004-2005*. HC: London.

- House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2017) *Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the U.K's future policy options: Third Report of Session 2016-2017*. HC: London. 14/09/2016. [Accessed: 20/11/2016] Available from: <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/119/119.pdf>
- Howarth, D; Norval, A. & Stavrakakis, Y (2000) *Discourse Theory And Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Howarth, D. (2015) *Ernesto Laclau: Post-Marxism, Populism and Critique*. [Google play ebook] London:Routledge.
- Howell, J. M.(1983) The Carter Human Rights Policy as Applied to the Soviet Union. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. **13**(2), pp. 286-295.
- Human Rights Voices (2009) Libya's Most Prominent Dissident Dies Amidst Claims of Poisoning. *Human Rights Voices*. [Online] 22/05/2009 [Accessed: 10/10/2014] Available from: <http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/victims/voices/?p=831>
- Human Rights Watch (2012) US: Torture and Rendition to Gaddafi's Libya. *Human Rights Watch*. [Online] 05/09/2012 [Accessed: 04/08/2016] Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/05/us-torture-and-rendition-gaddafis-libya>
- Huntington S. P. (1999) The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs*. **78**(2), 35-49.
- Hyndman, J. (2007) Feminist Geopolitics Revisited: Body Counts in Iraq. *The Professional Geographer*. **59**(1), pp.35-46.
- Ignatius, D. (2011) Ignatius: A warning to would-be interventionists in Libya. *The Washington Post*. [Online] 03/03/2011. [Accessed: 23/09/2014]. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/a-warning-to-interventionists-in-libya/2011/03/03/ABexUaN_blog.html?utm_term=.3f56c4928eaf
- Jorgensen, M. & Phillips, L. (2002) *Discourse analysis: theory and practice*. London: Sage.
- Jowitt, K. (1991) *The New World Disorder*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jubilut, L. L. (2012) Has the “Responsibility to Protect” Been a Real Change in Humanitarian Intervention? An Analysis from the Crisis in Libya. *International Community Law Review*, **14**(4), pp. 309–335.
- Juppe, A. (2011) Statement by Mr Alain Juppe. *Permanent mission of France to the United Nations in New York*. [Online] 17/03/2011. [Accessed: 12/07/2015] Available from: <http://www.franceonu.org/17-March-2011-Security-Council>
- Kaplan, R. D. (1994) *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Random House/Vintage Books
- Kirkpatrick, J. (1979) Dictatorships Double Standards. *Commentary Magazine*. [Online] 01/11/1979. [Accessed: 02/06/2015] Available from: <https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/dictatorships-double-standards/>
- Kirkpatrick, J. (1981) Establishing a Viable Human Rights Policy. *Third World Traveler*. [Online] [Accessed: 10/02/2015] Available from: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Human%20Rights%20Documents/Kirkpatrick_HRPolicy.html

- Klare, M. (1996) *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*. London: MacMillan.
- Klare, M. (2000) A LOOK AT...Rogue States. *The Washington Post*. [Online] 20/02/2000 [Accessed: 02/02/2015] Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2000/02/20/a-look-at-rogue-states/62a19e42-433d-4915-9bbc-97c5b900603e/?utm_term=.faad46664e45
- Klare, M. (2000) An Anachronistic Policy: The Strategic Obsolescence of the “Rogue Doctrine”. *Harvard International Review*. **22**(2), pp. 46-51.
- Kristeva, J. (1980) Word, Dialogue, and Novel. In: *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*. Roudiez, L.S. ed. (Trans. Gora, T.) New York: Colombia.
- Kuperman, A. J. (2013) Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene. *Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs*. September, 2013.
- Labott, E. (2006) U.S. to restore Diplomatic Relations With Libya. *CNN*. [Online] May 15, 2006 [Accessed: 12/02/2015] Available from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/US/05/15/libya/>
- Laclau, E. (1989) Politics and the Limits of Modernity. *Social Text*. **21**, pp. 63-82.
- Laclau, E. (2003) *Philosophical roots of discourse theory*. Essex: Centre for Theoretical Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London:Verso.
- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (2001) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. Second Edition. London:Verso.
- Lake, A. (1994) Confronting Backlash States. *Foreign Affairs*. **73**(2), pp. 45-55.
- Langan, M. (2004) US probes Libyan plot against Saudi ruler. *Middle East Online*. [Online] 11/06/2011 [Accessed: 12/11/2015] Available from: <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=10261>
- Layton, A. & Parry, A. (2004) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction – European Responses. *Houston Journal of International Law*. **26**(2), pp. 309-326.
- Leiby, R. & Wilson, S. (2011) Arab League’s backing of no-fly zone over Libya ramps up pressure on West. *The Washington Post*. [Online]. 12/03/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014] Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/12/AR2011031200900.html>
- Lilley, P. (1991) Libya (Contracts). *Hansard Commons Debates 21*. Vol. 199. CC270-1w. November, 1991. [Accessed: 02/02/2015] Available from: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1991/nov/21/libya-contracts#S6CV0199P0_19911121_CWA_256
- Litwak, R. S. (2000) *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Lynch, C. (2009) U.S. to Join U.N. Human Rights Council, Reversing Bush Policy. *The Washington Post*. 31/03/2009. [Accessed: 01/05/2015] Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/31/AR2009033102782.html>
- Lynch, T. (2014) *Writing up your PhD (Qualitative Research)*. Independent. Edinburgh: English Language Teaching Centre.
- MacFarquar, N. (2009) Libyan Leader Delivers a Scolding in U.N. Debut. *New York Times*. [Online] 24/09/2009 [Accessed: 12/11/2015] Available from: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9906E1DD1331F937A1575AC0A96F9C8B63>
- Macleod, S. (2006) Why Gaddafi's Now a Good Guy. *Time*. [Online] 16/05/2006 [Accessed: 10/10/2015] Available from: <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1194766,00.html>
- Major, J. (1991) Mr Major's Commons Statement on the 1991 European Council Meeting at Maastricht. *John Major Archives* [Online] 11/12/1991. [Accessed: 01/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page860.html>
- Major, J. (1992) PMQT Written Answers 20th November 1992. *Johnmajor.co.uk*. [Online] [Accessed: 20/10/2015] Available from: <http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1668.html>
- Major, J. (1994) Mr Major's Commons Statement on the 1994 Economic Summit at Naples. *John Major Archives* [Online] 11/07/1994. [Accessed: 02/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1142.html>
- Marquis, C. (2000) U.S. Declares 'Rogue Nations' Are Now 'States of Concern'. *The New York Times*. [Online] 20/06/2000. [Accessed: 01/02/2016] Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/20/world/us-declares-rogue-nations-are-now-states-of-concern.html>
- Marr, A. (2004) Blair hails new Libyan relations. *BBC News*. [Online] 25/03/2004. [Accessed: 01/09/2015] Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3566545.stm
- McFarlane, T. & Hay, I. (2003) The Battle for Seattle: Protest and Popular Geopolitics in The Australian Newspaper. *Political Geography*. **22**(2), pp. 211-232.
- McGilvray, J. (2017) *The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky*. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McKinney, C. & DIGNITY (2012) *The illegal war on Libya*. Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press.
- McMurtry, S. (2015) MAC ON...Europe's open borders. *Mail Online*. [Online] 17/11/2015. [Accessed: 02/04/2016] Available from: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3321431/MAC-Europe-s-open-borders.html>
- Megoran, N. (2008) Militarism, Realism, Just War, or Nonviolence? Critical Geopolitics and the Problem of Normativity. *Geopolitics*. **13**(3), pp. 473-497.
- Meikle, J. & Black, I. (2011) Libya crisis: UN Security Council to meet over Gaddafi crackdown. *The Guardian* [Online] 22nd February. [Accessed 29/09/2014] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/libya-crisis-un-security-council>

- Milliken, J. (1999) The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of Research and methods. *European Journal of International Relations*. 5(2), pp. 225-254.
- Milne, S. (2011) Intervention in Libya would poison the Arab revolution. *The Guardian*. [Online]. 02/03/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014]. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/02/intervention-libya-poison-arab-revolution>
- Mohammed, A. (2010) U.S. Apologizes to Libya for dismissive comments. *Reuters*. [Online] 09/02/2010. [Accessed: 10/04/2016] Available from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-usa-apology-idUSTRE6284DH20100309>
- Moreton, C. (2009) Jack Straw on Gordon Brown's 'difficulties' and the Lockerbie bomber. *Mail Online*. [Online] 19/09/2009. [Accessed: 12/12/2015] Available from: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-1213924/Jack-Straw-Gordon-Browns-difficulties-Lockerbie-bomber.html>
- Moss, D. (2010) Reforming the Rogue: Lessons from the U.S. – Libya Rapprochement. *The Washington Institute*. Policy Focus 105, August, 2010.
- Mueller, J. & Mueller, K. (1999) Sanctions of Mass Destruction. *Foreign Affairs*. 78(3), pp. 43-53.
- Mufson, S. (2011) Crisis in Libya rocks world's financial markets, boosts crude-oil prices. *The Washington Post*. [Online]. 22/02/2011. [Accessed 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/21/AR2011022104291.html>
- Muller, M. (2010) Doing Discourse Analysis in Critical Geopolitics. *Espace Politique*. 12 (2010-3). [Online] [Accessed: 10/02/2015] Available from: <https://espacepolitique.revues.org/1743>
- Neumann, I. (2001) *Mening, materialet, makt: en innføring i diskursanalyse*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Neumann, I. B. (1996) Self and Other in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*. 2(2), 139-174.
- Neumann, I. B. (1999) *Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- New Vision (2011) African leaders oppose NATO over Gaddafi. *New vision*. [Online] 18/06/2011. [Accessed: 20/05/2015]. Available from: http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1009639/african-leaders-oppose-nato-gadaffi
- Nietzsche, F.W. (2006) *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nixon, R. (1969) Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam. *The American Presidency Project*. [Online] 03/09/1969. [Accessed: 23/04/2016] Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303>

- Nixon, R. (1969) Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen. *The American Presidency Project* [Online] 25/07/1969 [Accessed: 25/02/2016] Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140>
- OPEC (2017) Libya facts and figures. *OPEC*. [Online] [Accessed: 10/01/2017] Available from: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/166.htm
- Ó Tuathail, G. (1996). *Critical Geopolitics*. London: Routledge.
- Ó Tuathail, G (2009). Opening remarks. In: Jones, L. & Sage, D. New direction in critical geopolitics: an introduction. *GeoJournal*. **75**(4), pp. 315-325.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (1992) Foreign Policy and the Hyperreal: The Reagan Administration and the Scripting of "South Africa". In: Barnes, T. & Duncan, J. S. eds. *Writing Worlds: discourse, texts, and metaphors in the representation of landscape*. New York: Routledge.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (1992) Putting Mackinder in his place: Material transformations and myth. *Political Geography*. **11**(1), pp. 100-118.
- Ó Tuathail, G (2009). Russia's Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South Ossetia. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*. **49**(6), 670-705.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (2002) Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States' Response to the War in Bosnia. *Political Geography*. **21**(5), pp. 190-204.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (2011) The Arab Spring? *Critical Geopolitics*. [Online] 01/03/2011. [Accessed: 12/10/2014] Available from: <https://toal.org/2011/03/01/the-arab-spring/>
- Ó Tuathail, G. et al. (2006). *The Geopolitics Reader*. New York: Routledge.
- O'Farrell, C (2007) Key Concepts. *Michel-Foucault.com*. [Online] 2007 [Accessed: 20/12/2014] Available from: <http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/index.html>
- O'Reilly, K.P. (2007) Perceiving Rogue States, The Use of the "Rogue State" Concept by U.S. Foreign Policy Elites. *Foreign Policy Analysis*. **3**(4), pp. 295–315
- O'Shea, E. (2012) Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya: Ghosts of the Past Haunting the Future*. *International Human Rights Law Review*. **1**(1), pp. 173-190.
- O'Sullivan, M. L. (2000) Sanctioning "Rogue States": A Strategy in Decline? *Harvard International Review*. **22**(2), pp. 56-60.
- O'Sullivan, M. L. (2001) The politics of dismantling containment. *The Washington Quarterly*, **2**(1), pp.67-76.
- Obama, B. (2009) Speech at Nobel Prize Ceremony. *NDTV*. [Online] 10/10/2009. [Accessed: 14/08/2015] Available from: <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/text-of-obamas-speech-after-winning-nobel-prize-402922>
- Obama, B. (2009) Speech in Cairo. *The White House Archives* [Online] 04/06/2009. [Accessed: 20/11/2014] Available from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/06/04/presidentrsquos-speech-cairo-a-new-beginning>

- Obama, B. (2011) President Obama Answers Questions on Libya. *The White House Archives* [Online] 21/03/2011 [Accessed: 12/02/2015] Available from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/03/21/president-obama-answers-questions-libya-testament-men-and-women-uniform>
- Obama, B. (2011) Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya. *The White House Archives* [Online] 28/03/2011 [Accessed: 12/02/2015] Available from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>
- Obama, B. (2011) Remarks by the President on the situation in Libya. *The White House Archives* [Online] 18/03/2011 [Accessed: 01/10/2016] Available from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya>
- Obama, B. (2011) Remarks by the President on the situation in Libya. *The White House Archives* [Online] 23/02/2011 [Accessed: 23/03/2015] Available from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/23/remarks-president-libya>
- Obama, B. (2011) The President on Libya: “The Violence Must Stop”. *The White House Archives* [Online] 03/03/2011 [Accessed: 15/11/2011] Available from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/03/03/president-libya-violence-must-stop-muammar-gaddafi-has-lost-legitimacy-lead-and-he-m>
- Obama, B., Cameron, D. & Sarkozy, N. (2011) Libya’s pathway to peace. *New York Times*. [Online] 14/04/2011. [Accessed: 01/01/2015] Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html>
- Orford, A. (2003) *Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oudraat, C. D. J. (2000) The United Nations and the Campaign Against Terrorism. *Peacepalace library*. [Online] [Accessed: 10/02/2015] Available from: https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/UNIDIR_pdf-art2017.pdf
- Pape, R. (2012) When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention. *Quarterly Journal: International Security*. **37**(1), pp. 41-80.
- Pargeter, A. (2002) Pariah No More. *World Today*. **58**(6), pp. 25-26.
- Pargeter, A. (2006) Reforming the impossible. *Review of African Political Economy*. **33**(108), pp. 219-235
- Pargeter, A. (2010) Libya. In: Kelly, S. & Breslin, J. eds. *Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Pargeter, A. (2012). *Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Parker, G. (2004) Libya rejoins international mainstream. *The Financial Times*. 27/04/2004 [Accessed: 20/02/2014] Available from: <https://www.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?c=StoryFT&cid=1079420630788&p=1012571727166&pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory>

- Pattison, J. (2011) The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya. *Ethics & International Affairs*. **25**(3), p. 271–277..
- Paul, R. (2011) Senate Debate on Libya. U.S. Senate. *CSPAN* [Online] 30/03/2011. [Accessed: 02/03/2015] Available from: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?298751-4/senate-debate-libya>
- Petersen, C.P. (2014) The Carter Administration and the Promotion of Human Rights in the Soviet Union, 1977-1981. *Diplomatic History*. **38**(3), pp.628-656.
- Peterson, C. (2012) *Globalizing Human Rights: Private Citizens, the Soviet Union, and the West*. New York: Routledge.
- Pfaff, W. (2011) What Lay Behind the Libya Intervention? *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*. **30**(9), pp. 25-36.
- Phillips, J (1984) Moscow's Thriving Libyan Connection. *The Heritage Foundation*, 26/06/1984. [Accessed: 14/10/2014] Available from: <http://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/moscows-thriving-libyan-connection>
- Pick, H. (2015) From the archive, 8 September 1973: Gaddafi and Castro clash over Soviet Union. *The Guardian* [Online] 08/09/2015 [Accessed: 08/08/2014]. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/gaddafi-castro-soviet-union-communism-1973>
- Pilkington, E. (2009) UN general assembly: 100 minutes in the life of Muammar Gaddafi. *The Guardian*. [Online] 23 September 2009. [Accessed:07/07/2015] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/23/gaddafi-un-speech>
- Pleming, S. (2009) Gaddafi says looking at oil firm nationalization. Reuters, [online] 21/01/2009 [accessed: 12/12/2015] Available from: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/businessproind-us-libya-gaddafi-oil-idUKTRE50K61F20090121>
- Powell, C. (2012) Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment? *American Journal of International Law*. **106**(2), pp. 298–315.
- Powell, C. L. (2004) Interview with Mr Mohammed and Mr. Hudson of Reuters. *U.S. Department of State Archive*. 26/04/2004, [Accessed: 14/12/2015] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/31813.htm> .
- Powell, C. L. (2004) Ongoing U.S. Efforts to Assist the People of Iraq. *U.S. Department of State Archive*. 15/07/2004 [Accessed: 25/11/2015] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/34422.htm>
- Power, M. (2007) Digitized virtuosity: Video war games and post-9/11 cyber-deterrence. *Security Dialogue*. **38**(2), 271-288.
- Power, M. and Crampton, A. (2005) Reel Geopolitics: Cinemato-graphing Political Space. *Geopolitics*. **10**(2), 193-203.
- Rabinow, P. ed. (1984) *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*. London: Penguin.

- Reagan, R. (1982) Address to Members of the British Parliament. *The Reagan Library*. [Online] 08/06/1982 [Accessed: 12/10/2015] Available from: <https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm>
- Reagan, R. (1986) Address to Members of the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya. *The Reagan Library*. [Online] April 14, 1986. [Accessed: 05/05/2014] Available from: <https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1986/41486g.htm>
- Reagan, R. (1986) Transcript of address by Reagan on Libya. *The New York Times*. [Online] 15/04/1986 [Accessed: 12/11/2014] Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/15/world/transcript-of-address-by-reagan-on-libya.html>
- Reid-Henry, S. (2010) The Territorial Trap Fifteen Years On. *Geopolitics*. **15**(4), pp752-756.
- Renouard, J. (2016) *Human Rights in American Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Rice, C. (2006) U.S. Diplomatic Relations With Libya. *U.S. Department of State Archive*. [Online] 15/05/2006. [Accessed: 12/08/2015] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/66235.htm>
- Rice, C. (2008) Interview with Erin Burnett of CNBC. *U.S. Department of State Archive*. [Online] 05/09/2008. [Accessed: 12/02/2015] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/09/109266.htm>
- Rice, C. (2008) Interview with Zain Verjee of CNN. *U.S. Department of State Archive*. [Online] 06/09/2008. [Accessed: 12/02/2015] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/09/109223.htm>
- Rice, C. (2008) Remarks En Route Tripoli, Libya with Traveling Press. *U.S. Department of State Archive*. [Online] 05/09/2008. [Accessed: 20/10/2015] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/09/109195.htm>
- Rice, S. (2010) Remarks by Ambassador Susan Rice on Human Rights Council Elections. Mission of the United States, Geneva, Switzerland. [Online] 13/05/2010. [Accessed: 02/02/2016] Available from: <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/05/13/ambassador-n-rice-on-human-rights-council-elections/>
- Ritter, J.R. & Stuckey, M.E. (2007) George Bush, Human Rights, and American Democracy. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. **37**(4), pp. 646-666
- Ritter, L. (2012) US: Torture and Rendition to Gaddafi's Libya. *Human Rights Watch*. [Online] 05/09/2012. [Accessed: 10/11/2015]. Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/05/us-torture-and-rendition-gaddafis-libya>
- Roberts, H. (2011) Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go? *London Review of Books*. **33**(22), pp. 8–18.
- Robinson, E. (2011) It's time to get tough with Libya. *The Washington Post*. [Online] 25/02/2011. [Accessed 29/09/2014] Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/24/AR2011022406481.html>

- Rooney, T. (2011) Limiting use of funds for armed forces in Libya. *Congressional Record* 157:92. 24/06/2011. P. H4551. [Online] [Accessed: 21/02/2015] Available from: Congress.gov.
- Rozen, L. (2011) Among Libya's lobbyists. *Politico*. [Online] 21/02/2011 [Accessed: 01/02/2016] Available from: http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0211/Among_Libyas_lobbyists.html
- Rubin, B. (1999) U.S. Foreign Policy and Rogue States. *Rubin Center Research in International Affairs*. 3(3). [Online] [Accessed: 10/02/2016] Available from: <http://www.rubincenter.org/1999/09/rubin-1999-09-07/>
- Ryngaert, C. (2008) *Jurisdiction in International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Said, E. (1977) *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.
- Saleh, H. (2009) Libya leans towards resource nationalism. *The Financial Times*. [Online] 04/11/2009 [Accessed: 12/02/2014] Available from: <https://www.ft.com/content/27183132-c8d2-11de-8f9d-00144feabdc0>
- Scott, T. (2011) Providing for consideration of H.Res. 292, regarding deployment of united states armed forces in Libya, and providing consideration of H. Con. Res. 51, Libya war powers resolution. *Congressional Record*. 157:79. 03/06/2011. P. H3990. [Accessed: 23/02/2015] Available from: Congress.gov.
- Sengupta, K. et al. (2011) Gaddafi, Britain and US: A secret, special and very cosy relationship. *The Independent* [Online] 03/09/2011. [Accessed: 04/04/2016] Available from: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/gaddafi-britain-and-us-a-secret-special-and-very-cosy-relationship-2349039.html>
- Shapiro, M. (2008) *Cinematic Geopolitics*. London: Routledge.
- Silverman, D. (2000) *Doing Qualitative Research: a practical handbook*. 4th edn. London: Sage.
- Slater, D. (2010) The imperial present and the geopolitics of power. *Geopolita(s)*. 1(2), pp. 191-205.
- Slater, D. (2013) Questions of (in)justice and the imperialism of power. *Coleccion de Estudios Internacionales*. 13. pp. 1-34.
- Smucker, P. (2003) Summit crisis as Gaddafi clashes with Saudi prince over US troops. *The Telegraph*. [Online] 03 March 2003 [Accessed: 22/01/2014]. Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1423615/Summit-crisis-as-Gaddafi-clashes-with-Saudi-prince-over-US-troops.html>
- Spencer, R. (2011) Libya: Col Gaddafi damns the 'rats' as he clings to power. *The Telegraph*. [Online] 22/02/2011. [Accessed 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8341567/Libya-Col-Gaddafi-damns-the-rats-as-he-clings-to-power.html>

- Spencer, R. (2011) Civil war breaks out as Gaddafi begins his fight to the death. *The Telegraph*. [Online] 23/02/2011. [Accessed 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8344034/Libya-civil-war-breaks-out-as-Gaddafi-mounts-rearguard-fight.html>
- Spencer, R. (2011) Middle East crisis: Libyan protests move closer to Tripoli. *The Telegraph*. [Online] 20/02/2011. [Accessed 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8336990/Middle-East-crisis-Libyan-protests-move-closer-to-Tripoli.html>
- St John, B. R. (2008) *Libya: From Colony to Independence*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
- St John, B. R. (2011) *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*. London: Oneworld Publications.
- St John, R. B. (2002) *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- St John, R. B. (2015) *Libya: Continuity and Change*. New York: Routledge.
- Stevens, C. (2007) Growth of Resource Nationalism in Libya. *The Telegraph* (Wikileaks Cables) [Online] 11/15/2007. [Accessed: 05/05/2014]. Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/8294755/GROWTH-OF-RESOURCE-NATIONALISM-IN-LIBYA.html>
- Stevens, C. (2007) U.S. Companies win \$2 Billion Worth of Infrastructure Contracts as Reward for Political Relationship. *The Telegraph* (Wikileaks Cables) [Online] 18/12/2007. [Accessed: 01/11/2014]. Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/8294767/U.S.-COMPANIES-WIN-2-BILLION-WORTH-OF-INFRASTRUCTURE-CONTRACTS-AS-REWARD-FOR-POLITICAL-RELATIONSHIP.html>
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2017) Data for all countries from 1988- 2015 in constant USD. [Data file] *SIPRI: Milex Data 1988-2015*. [Online] [Accessed: 20/02/2014] Available from: http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/research/researchdataman/cite/citation_publicdata.html
- Straw, J. (2004) Libya. *Hansard*. HC Deb 05, Vol. 416, cc21-33. [Online] [Accessed: 01/02/2015] Available from: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/2004/jan/05/libya#S6CV0416P1_20040105_HO_C_141
- Straw, S.W. (2011) *Anglo Libyan relations and the British military facilities 1964-1970*. PhD thesis. University of Nottingham. [Online] [Accessed: 23/03/2014] Available from: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/11983/2/Anglo_Libyan_Relations_1964_1970.pdf
- Takeyh, R. (2001) The Rogue Who Came in from the Cold. *Foreign Affairs*. **80**(3), pp. 62-72.
- Tempest, M. (2006) Blair sees Iraq as 'clash about civilisation'. *The Guardian*. [Online] 21/03/2006 [Accessed: 12/02/2016] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/mar/21/iraq.iraq>
- Thatcher, M. (1977) Speech on Europe ("Europe as I see it"). *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*. [Online] 24/06/1977 [Accessed: 27/09/2015] Available from: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103403>

- Thatcher, M. (1979) Speech at "Youth for Europe" Rally. *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*. [Online] 02/06/1979. [Accessed: 24/03/2016] Available from: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104088>
- Thatcher, M. (1982) Speech at lunch for US President (Ronald Reagan). *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*. [Online] 08/06/1982. [Accessed: 24/01/2016] Available from: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104957>
- Thatcher, M. (1985) Speech at 40th Anniversary Session of UN General Assembly. *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*. [Online] 24/10/1985. [Accessed: 12/08/2015] Available from: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106155>
- Thatcher, M. (1986) House of Commons Speech HC :S (US bombing of Libya). *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*. [Online] 16/04/1986. [Accessed:20/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106363>
- Thatcher, M. (1986) Interview for Sunday Telegraph. *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*. [Online] 19/07/1986. [Accessed: 12/12/2015] Available from: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106269>
- Thatcher, M. (1989) Margaret Thatcher's Speech to the Lord Mayor's Banquet. *Centre for Policy Studies*. [Online] 07/11/1989. [Accessed:21/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.cps.org.uk/about/news/q/date/2014/11/07/margaret-thatcher-s-1989-speech-to-the-lord-mayor-s-ban/>
- The Arab League (2011) The outcome of the Council of the League of Arab States meeting at the Ministerial level in its extraordinary session on "The implications of the current events in Libya and the Arab position. *Arab League Ministerial Level Statement*. Cairo, 12/03/2011.
- The Cabinet Office (1973) Cabinet Meeting: CAB 128-51-20. 09/01/1973. *The National Archives*. [Online] [Accessed: 29/05/2015] Available from: <http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/large/cab-128-51.pdf>
- The Cabinet Office (2010) *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*. London: HMSO.
- The Henry Jackson Society (2006) Statement of Principles. In: *The British Moment: The Case for Democratic Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century*, 2006. London: The Social Affairs Unit.
- The Henry Jackson Society (2006) *The British Moment: The Case for Democratic Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century – A Manifesto of the Henry Jackson Society*. London: The Social Affairs Unit.
- The Independent (2011) Libyan rebels storm Gaddafi compound. *The Independent*. [Online] 23/08/2011. [Accessed: 25/09/2015] Available from: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/libyan-rebels-storm-gaddafi-compound-2342455.html>
- The New York Times (2011) Libya's Butcher. *The New York Times*. [Online] 22/02/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014]. Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/opinion/23wed2.html>

The New York Times (2011) Washington's Options on Libya. *The New York Times*. [Online] 08/03/2011 [Accessed: 29/09/2014] Available from:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/opinion/09wed1.html>

The Telegraph (2010) Swiss businessman Max Goeldi returns home from Libya. *The Telegraph*. [Online] 14/06/2010 [Accessed: 03/03/2014]. Available from:
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/switzerland/7825751/Swiss-businessman-Max-Goeldi-returns-home-from-Libya.html>

The Telegraph (2010) UK -LIBYA RELATIONS - IN LIMBO. WikiLeaks Cable: 10London450. In: *The Telegraph* [online] 25/02/2010. [Accessed: 23/09/2014]. Available from:
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/london-wikileaks/8304918/UK-LIBYA-RELATIONS-IN-LIMBO.html>

The Washington Post (2011) Moammar Gaddafi must pay for atrocities. *The Washington Post*. [Online]. 21/02/2011. [Accessed 29/09/2014]. Available from:
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/21/AR2011022103233.html>

The Washington Post (2011) Why was President Obama last to speak up on Libya? *The Washington Post*. 23/02/2011. [Accessed: 29/09/2014] Available from:
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/23/AR2011022305993.html>

The White House (1983) NSDD 75 on U.S. Relations with USSR. *The White House*. [Online] 17/01/1983. [Accessed: 12/09/2015] Available from: <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf>

The White House (1986) Acting against Libyan Support of International Terrorism. *FAS Federation of American Scientists*. [Online] 08/01/1986 [Accessed: 27/02/2015] Available from:
<https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-205.pdf>

The White House (1986) Aftermath of Libyan Operations. In: *The Reagan Files* [Online] 15/04/1986. [Accessed: 26/06/2015]. Available from:
<http://www.thereaganfiles.com/860415.pdf>

The White House (2001) President signs Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001. *George Bush White House Archives*. [Online] 12/12/2001. [Accessed: 12/11/2014] Available from:
<https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011212-9.html>

The White House (2002) *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* Washington D.C: The White House.

The White House (2010) *National security strategy of the United States*. Washington: The White House.

Thelwell, E. (2010) Cameron tells US Lockerbie release was 'wrong'. *Channel Four News* [Online] 20/07/2010 [accessed: 01/02/2015] Available from:
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/cameronaposs+us+tour+pm+to+discuss+bpaposs+lockerbie+link/3717077.html

Tyler, P. (2004) Two Said to Tell Of Libyan Plot Against Saudi. *The New York Times*. [Online] 10/06/2004 [Accessed: 2/02/2015] Available from:

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/10/world/two-said-to-tell-of-libyan-plot-against-saudi.html?_r=0.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2009) *Annual Report on Human Rights 2009*. The Stationary Office.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2010) *Annual Report on Human Rights 2010*. The Stationary Office.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2011) *Human Rights and Democracy Report 2010*. [Online] 31/03/2011. [Accessed: 01/12/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2010>

UK Ministry of Defence (2011) *Building Stability Overseas strategy* [Online] 01/07/2011. [accessed: 01/11/2015] Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-stability-overseas-strategy>

Ulfstein, G. & Christiansen, H. F. (2013) The Legality of the Nato Bombing in Libya. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. 62(1), pp. 159-171.

UN Security Council (2011) *Resolution 1970*. 26/02/2011. [Online] S/RES/1970(2011), [Accessed: 25/06/2015]. Available from: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/081A9013-B03D-4859-9D61-5D0B0F2F5EFA/0/1970Eng.pdf>

UN Security Council (2011) *Resolution 1973*. 17 March, 2011. [Online] S/RES/1973(2011), [Accessed: 25/06/2015]. Available from: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42.html>

United Nations (2011) Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect. *Outreach programme on the Rwanda genocide*. [Online] [Accessed: 14/10/2015] Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml>

United Nations (2011) In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters. *Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*. SC/10187/REV.1, 26/02/2011. [Accessed: 05/05/2015] Available from: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc.htm>

United Nations (2011) Interview with the Special Envoy for Libya Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib. *UN News Centre* [Online] 14/07/2011. [Accessed: 10/09/2016] Available from: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=37>

United Nations (2011) Security Council Approves ‘No Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions. *Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*. SC/10200. [Online] 17/03/2011. [Accessed: 01/11/2015] Available from: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>

United Nations (2011) Security Council lifts sanctions against Libya imposed after Lockerbie bombing. *UN News Centre*. [Online] 12/09/2003. [Accessed: 12/11/2015] Available from: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=8225&cr=libya#.VtRV8vnhDIU>

United Nations (2014) Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, Islamists. *United Nations Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons*. 19/12/2014.

United Nations General Assembly (2005) *2005 World Summit Outcome*. General Assembly. [Accessed: 12/02/20015] Available from: [http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world summit outcome doc 2005\(1\).pdf](http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%20outcome%20doc%202005(1).pdf)

UPI (2006) U.S. restores full relations with Libya. *UPI*. [Online] May 15, 2006. [Accessed: 12/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.upi.com/US-restores-full-relations-with-Libya/24541147715385/>

US Department of State (1969) 'Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)', Washington, December 23, 1969, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972, Document 49*.

US Department of State (1969) 'Telegram 158075 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco', Washington, September 17, 1969, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972, Document 40*.

US Department of State (1970) 'Memorandum from the Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency through the Deputy Director for Plans (Karamessines) to the Director of Central Intelligence,' Washington, April 16, 1970, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972, Document 56*.

US Department of State (1971) 'Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) to the Acting Secretary of State Irwin', Washington, December 7, 1971, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972, Document 80*.

US Department of State (1973) 'Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),' Washington, September 17, 1973, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 25*.

US Department of State (1973) 'Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Group for Africa'. Washington, July 6, 1973, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 21*.

US Department of State (1977) 'Address by Secretary of State Vance'. Athens, Georgia, April 30, 1977, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy*. Office of the Historian.

US Department of State (2006) 'Issues Related to Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States,' [Online] 15/05/2006 [Accessed: 12/11/2016] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2006/66268.htm>

US Department of State (2006) On-the-Record Briefing: 'Relations With Libya'. Washington, DC. May 15, 2006. U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian. Archive.

US Department of State (2009) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. [Online] [Accessed: 02/12/2015] Available from: <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/>

US Department of State (2009) *Human Rights Report*. [Online] 11/03/2010 [Accessed: 20/08/2015] Available: <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/>

US Embassy in Egypt (1975) 'Backchannel Message 176 From the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts) to Secretary of State Kissinger,' Cairo, May 3, 1975, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 39*.

US Embassy in Libya (1971) 'Telegram 373 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State,' February 24, 1971, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972, Chapter.3. Libya, Document 71*,

US Embassy in Libya (1975) 'Telegram 925 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State,' Tripoli, August 18, 1975, 1208Z, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973-1976 Volume E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 47*.

US National Security Council (1973) Policy Towards Libya. *The Nixon Library*. [Online] 05/06/1973. [Accessed: 01/02/2015] Available from: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_185.pdf

US National Security Council (1975) 'The Libyan Threat': Memorandum From Robert B. Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft). Washington, July, 1975, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976, Document 44*.

US National Security Council (1977) 'Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski),' Washington, July 20, 1977. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Document 69*.

US National Security Council (1981) Gulf of Sidra Exercise: NSC 18. *The Reagan Files*. [Online] 31/07/1981. [Accessed: 10/12/2014] Available from: <http://www.thereaganfiles.com/19810731-nsc-18.pdf>

US National Security Council (1981) Libya and Global Negotiations: NSC29. *The Reagan Files*. [Online] 08/12/1981. [Accessed: 14/11/2016] Available from: <http://www.thereaganfiles.com/19811208-nsc-29.pdf>

US National Security Council (1982) Jan. 21, 1982: NSC 37: Libya. *The Reagan Files* [Online] 21/01/1982. [Accessed: 08/09/2015] Available from: <http://www.thereaganfiles.com/document-collections/national-security-council.html>

US National Security Council (1983) Dec. 2, 1983: NSC 97: Libya and Oil and Gas Export Control Issues. *The Reagan Files* [Online] 02/12/1983. [Accessed: 08/09/2015] Available from: <http://www.thereaganfiles.com/document-collections/national-security-council.html>

US National Security Council (1985) Talking Points for NSC/NSPG Meeting on Libya to decide if the United States should overthrow Qadhafi. *The Reagan Files*. [Online] July, 1985 [Accessed: 01/09/2014] Available from: <http://www.thereaganfiles.com/19850700-libya.pdf>

US National Security Council (1986) Memorandum of Conversation: NSPG 129 on Libya. *The Reagan Files*. [Online] 16/07/1986 [Accessed: 02/12/2015] Available from: <http://www.thereaganfiles.com/19860314-nspg-129-libya.pdf>

US National Security Council (1986) Next Steps re Libya. *The Reagan Files*. [Online] 08/04/1986. [Accessed: 10/10/2015] Available from: <http://www.thereaganfiles.com/19860408-next-steps-re.pdf>

US State Department (1976) Memorandum of Conversation: Kissinger and Libyan Ambassador Mansur Kikhia discussed the status of U.S.-Libyan relations. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973-1976*. Document 57.

US State Department (2001) *Report on the Taliban's War Against Women*. U.S. State Department: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. [Online] 17/11/2001. [Accessed: 29/10/2014]. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/c4804.htm>

Vandewalle, D. (2006) *A History of Modern Libya*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vandewalle, D. (2011) How not to intervene in Libya. *Foreign Policy Magazine*, 10/03/2011.

Verkaik, R. (2009) Britain offered Gaddafi 14m to stop supporting the IRA. *The Independent*. [Online] 04/10/2009 [Accessed: 01/02/2015] Available from: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/britain-offered-gaddafi-16314m-to-stop-supporting-the-ira-1797754.html>

Walzer, M. (2011) The Case Against Our Attack on Libya. *New Republic*. [Online] 19/03/2011. [accessed: 16/12/2014] Available from: <https://newrepublic.com/article/85509/the-case-against-our-attack-libya>

Watt, N. (2011) Libya militants 'constrained' says Liam Fox. *The Guardian*. [Online] 31/07/2011. [Accessed: 02/06/2015] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/31/libya-militants-constrained-liam-fox>

Waxman, H. (2011) Providing for consideration of H.J. Res. 68, authorizing limited use of armed forces in Libya; and providing for consideration of H.R. 2278 limiting use of funds for armed forces in Libya. *Congressional Record*, 157:92. 24/06/2011). P. H4539. [Accessed: 21/04/2015] Available from: Congress.gov.

Weber, C. (1995) *Simulating Sovereignty; Intervention, The State and Symbolic Exchange*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, C. (1998) Performative States. *Millenium Journal of International Studies*. **27**(1), pp. 77-95.

Weinberger, C. W. (1986) Our One and Only Objective Was Freedom of Navigation. *Los Angeles Times* [Online] 30/03/1986. [Accessed: 05/04/2014]. Available from: http://articles.latimes.com/1986-03-30/opinion/op-1965_1_waters

Weiss, T. G. (2011) RtoP Alive and Well after Libya. *Ethics & International Affairs*. **25**(3), pp. 287-292.

- Welch, D. C. (2006) Issues Related to United States Relations With Libya. *U.S. Department of State Archive*. [Online] 15/03/2006. [Accessed: 01/09/2015] Available from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2006/66268.htm>
- Welsh, J. (2011) Civilian protection in Libya: putting coercion and controversy back into RtoP. *Ethics & International Affairs*. **25**(3), pp. 255-262.
- Wertheim, S. (2010) A Solution from Hell: The United States and the Rise of Humanitarian Interventionism. *Journal of Genocide Research*. **12**(3-4), pp. 149-72.
- Wheeler, N. J. (2002) *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- White, M. & Wintour, P. (2001) Blair calls for world fight against terror. *The Guardian* [Online] 12/09/2001 [Accessed: 10/02/2015] Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/sep/12/uk.september11>
- Wicker, T. (1983) In the Nation; 2 Dangerous Doctrines. *The New York Times* [Online] 15/03/1983 [Accessed: 05/08/2015] Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/15/opinion/in-the-nation-2-dangerous-doctrines.html>
- Willaim, (1981) Essay; 'Human rights victory'. *The New York Times* [Online] 05/11/1981. [Accessed: 01/06/2015] Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/05/opinion/essay-human-rights-victory.html>
- Willsher, K. (2009) Swiss government's apology over Hannibal Gaddafi's arrest sparks angry backlash. *The Telegraph* [Online] 22/08/2009 [Accessed: 10/05/2015] Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/6073643/Swiss-governments-apology-over-Hannibal-Gaddafis-arrest-sparks-angry-backlash.html>
- Wilson Center [No date] New Evidence on 1986 US Air Raid on Libya. *Wilson Center History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive*. [Online] 01/04/1986. [Accessed: 14/04/2015] Available from: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112011>
- Wilson Center [No date] Report on the Results of the Visit to the USSR by the Palestine Liberation Organization Delegation,' *Wilson Center History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive*. 27/10/1981. [Accessed: 07/08/2016] Available from: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121070>
- Winnett, R. (2011) Libya: We might try to kill Gaddafi with air strike, says Liam fox. *The Telegraph*. [Online] 21/03/2011. [Accessed: 15/07/2015]. Available from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8394189/Libya-We-might-try-to-kill-Gaddafi-with-air-strike-says-Liam-Fox.html>
- Zifcak, S. (2012) The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria. *Melbourne Journal of International Law*. **13**(1), pp. 59–94.
- Zizek, S (2005) Against Human Rights. *New Left Review*. **34**, July/August, 2005.
- Zoubir, Y. H. (2002) Libya in US foreign policy: From rogue state to good fellow? *Third World Quarterly*. **23**(1), pp. 31-53.

