Person:
André García, Francisco Javier

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First Name
Francisco Javier
Last Name
André García
Affiliation
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Faculty / Institute
Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Department
Análisis Económico y economía cuantitativa
Area
Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
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UCM identifierORCIDScopus Author IDWeb of Science ResearcherIDDialnet IDGoogle Scholar ID

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 12
  • Publication
    Fueling growth when oil peaks: directed technological change and the limits to efficiency
    (2014) André García, Francisco Javier; Smulders, Sjak
    While fossil energy dependency has declined and energy supply has grown in the postwar world economy, future resource scarcity could cast its shadow on world economic growth soon if energy markets are forward looking. We develop an endogenous growth model that reconciles the current aggregate trends in energy use and productivity growth with the intertemporal dynamics of forward looking resource markets. Combining scarcity-rent driven energy supply (in the spirit of Hotelling) with profit-driven Directed Technical Change (in the spirit of Romer/Acemoglu), we generate transitional dynamics that can be qualitatively calibrated to current trends. The long-run properties of the model are studied to examine whether current trends are sustainable. We highlight the role of extraction costs in mining.
  • Publication
    Apuesta por la acreditación institucional de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales tanto nacional (AUDIT) como internacional (AACSB)
    (2019-03-14) Martín López, Sonia; García Greciano, María Begoña; Díez Vial, Isabel; Rivero Rodríguez, Carlos; André García, Francisco Javier; Fossas Olalla, Marta; García Goñi, Manuel; Alonso Guinea, Fernando; Pérez González, Jesús
    El objetivo del presente proyecto es dar continuidad al compromiso de la Facultad con la mejora continua de la calidad mediante la solicitud de la acreditación del diseño del SIGC por AUDIT y de la acreditación internacional AACSB.
  • Publication
    A modified DEA model to estimate the importance of objectives with an application to agricultural economics
    (Pergamon Elsevier Science, 2010) André García, Francisco Javier; Herrero, Inés; Riesgo, Laura
    This paper demonstrates a connection between data envelopment analysis (DEA) and a non-interactive elicitation method to estimate the weights of objectives for decision-makers in a multiple attribute approach. This connection gives rise to a modified DEA model that allows us to estimate not only efficiency measures but also preference weights by radially projecting each unit onto a linear combination of the elements of the payoff matrix (which is obtained by standard multicriteria methods). For users of multiple attribute decision analysis the basic contribution of this paper is a new interpretation in terms of efficiency of the non-interactive methodology employed to estimate weights in a multicriteria approach. We also propose a modified procedure to calculate an efficient payoff matrix and a procedure to estimate weights through a radial projection rather than a distance minimization. For DEA users, we provide a modified DEA procedure to calculate preference weights and efficiency measures that does not depend on any observations in the dataset. This methodology has been applied to an agricultural case study in Spain.
  • Publication
    Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool
    (Elsevier Inc., 2015-05) André García, Francisco Javier; Alonso-Paulí, Eduard
    In a principal-agent model we analyze the firm’s decision to adopt an informal or a standardized Environmental Management System (EMS). Our results are consistent with empirical evidence in several respects. A standardized EMS increases the internal control at the cost of introducing some degree of rigidity that entails an endogenous setup cost. Standardized systems are more prone to be adopted by big and well established firms and under tougher environmental policies. Firms with standardized EMS tend to devote more effort to abatement although this effort results in lower pollution only if public incentives are strong enough, suggesting a complementarity relationship between standardized EMS and public policies. Emission charges have both a marginal effect on abatement and a qualitative effect on the adoption decision that may induce a conflict between private and public interests. As a result of the combination of these two effects it can be optimal for the government to distort the tax in a specific way in order to push the firm to choose the socially optimal EMS. The introduction of standardized systems can result in win-win situations where firms, society and the environment get better off.
  • Publication
    Diseño de un modelo SIGC en el marco del programa AUDIT para la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
    (2017-01) García Greciano, María Begoña; Martín López, Sonia; Fossas Olalla, Marta; Alonso Guinea, Fernando; Rivero Rodríguez, Carlos; García Goñi, Manuel; André García, Francisco Javier; Palafox Parejo, María Manuela; Pérez González, Jesús
    El presente proyecto pone de manifiesto el compromiso de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid con la mejora continua de la calidad en el marco del programa AUDIT. Se pretenden establecer los criterios de calidad, hacer el seguimiento de los procesos definidos para lograrlos y establecer estrategias de mejora continua, así como responder al compromiso de satisfacción de las necesidades y respuesta a las expectativas de los diferentes grupos de interés, y facilitar el seguimiento de las titulaciones implantadas.
  • Publication
    Auctioning versus grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information
    (2015) Álvarez González, Francisco; André García, Francisco Javier
    We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction. At the auction, each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market, either as a leader or a follower. This role affects each firms’ valuation of the permits (which are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it occurs in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough.
  • Publication
    Auctioning emission permits with market power
    (DE GRUYTER, 2016) Álvarez González, Francisco; André García, Francisco Javier
    We analyze emission permit auctions in a framework in which a dominant firm enjoys market power both in the auction and in the secondary market while its competitor behaves in a competitive way. We obtain linear equilibrium bidding strategies for both firms and a unique equilibrium of the auction, which is optimal ex-post for the dominant firm. Under specific distributional assumptions we conclude that the auction always awards less permits to the dominant firm than the cost-effective amount. Our results serve as a warning about the properties of auctioning under market power. Under interior solution the auction allocation is dominated by grandfathering in terms of aggregated cost with probability one. As a policy implication, the specific design of the auction turns out to be crucial for cost-effectiveness. The chances of the auction to outperform grandfathering require that the former is capable of diluting the market power that is present in the secondary market.
  • Publication
    Using a CGE Model to Identify the Policy Trade-Off between Unemployment and Inflation: The Efficient Phillips Curve
    (2012) André García, Francisco Javier; Lima, Carmen M.; Cardenete, M. Alejandro
    This paper provides a new reading of a classical economic relation: the short-run Phillips curve. Our point is that, when dealing with inflation and unemployment, policy-making can be understood as a multicriteria decisionmaking problem. Hence, we use so-called multiobjective programming in connection with a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to determine the combinations of policy instruments that provide efficient combinations of inflation and unemployment. This approach results in an alternative version of the Phillips curve labelled as efficient Phillips curve. Our aim is to present an application of CGE models to a new area of research that can be especially useful when addressing policy exercises with real data. We apply our methodological proposal within a particular regional economy, Andalusia, in the south of Spain. This tool can give some keys for policy advice and policy implementation in the fight against unemployment and inflation.
  • Publication
    Scarcity climate rents under a carbon price with oligopoly competition
    (Oxford University Press, 2017) André García, Francisco Javier; de Castro Lejarriaga, Luis Miguel
    Prior research has shown that environmental policy can create scarcity rents. We analyse this phenomenon in the framework of a duopoly that faces a carbon price, considering both Cournot and Stackelberg competition. We identify the different sources of scarcity rents, which we classify in ‘output’ and ‘grandfathering’ scarcity rents. The former depend on the elasticity of the rivals’ output to the carbon price, while the latter is exogenous. We also determine under which conditions these rents can be large enough to increase firms’ profits and, as a policy implication, to what extent the existence of scarcity rents can make the firms agree on a tougher policy. This event is more likely to happen under Cournot than under Stackelberg competition, and the chances increase if the firms are allowed to pollute a large amount without paying a price.
  • Publication
    Technology Adoption in Emission Trading Programs with Market Power
    (IAEE, 2018-06-01) Arguedas, Carmen; André García, Francisco Javier
    In this paper we study the relationship between market power in emission permit markets and endogenous technology adoption. We find that the initial distribution of permits, in particular, the amount of permits initially given to the dominant firm, is crucial in determining over- or under-investment in relation to the benchmark model without market power. Specifically, if the dominant firm is initially endowed with more permits than the corresponding cost effective allocation, this results in under-investment by the dominant firm and over-investment by the competitive fringe, regardless of the specific amount of permits given to the latter firms. The results are reversed if the dominant firm is initially endowed with relatively few permits. Also, the presence of market power results in a divergence of both abatement and technology adoption levels with respect to the benchmark scenario of perfect competition, as long as technology adoption becomes more effective in reducing abatement costs.