André García, Francisco Javier

Profile Picture
First Name
Francisco Javier
Last Name
André García
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Faculty / Institute
Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Análisis Económico y economía cuantitativa
Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
UCM identifierORCIDScopus Author IDWeb of Science ResearcherIDDialnet IDGoogle Scholar ID

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication
    Auctioning versus grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information
    (2015) Álvarez González, Francisco; André García, Francisco Javier
    We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction. At the auction, each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market, either as a leader or a follower. This role affects each firms’ valuation of the permits (which are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it occurs in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough.
  • Publication
    Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?
    (Springer, 2019-01-01) André García, Francisco Javier; Mazón Calpena, Cristina; Álvarez González, Francisco
    We study the efficiency of the uniform auction as an allocation mechanism for emission permits among polluting firms. In our model, firms have private information about their abatement costs, which differ across firms and across units, and bidders’ demands are linear. We show that there is a continuum of interior Bayesian Nash equilibria, and only one is efficient, minimizing abatement costs. We find that the existence of many bidders is not a sufficient condition to guarantee an efficient equilibrium in the uniform auction. Additionally, bidders’ types have to be uncorrelated.