Person:
André García, Francisco Javier

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First Name
Francisco Javier
Last Name
André García
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/74831
Affiliation
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Faculty / Institute
Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Department
Análisis Económico y economía cuantitativa
Area
Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
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Subject: Q58 ×

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    Societal Awareness of Environmental Certifications in Costa Rica
    (Journal of Cleaner Production, 2021) Valenciano Salazar, Jorge A.; André García, Francisco Javier; Soliño, Mario
    The effectiveness of voluntary environmental programs and certifications to render social and private benefits depends on how aware consumers are, so that they can consider such initiatives when making their decisions. Consumers’ awareness has been mostly addressed in developed countries, although the benefits of companies’ environmental actions also take place in developing countries. This study is conducted in a developing country, such as Costa Rica. Using a large sample (n = 1191), consumers’ awareness of environmental certifications is studied at a general level (being able to name some environmental certification or program) and at a specific level (ability to name certified firms). The results show that consumers who are younger, with higher household income, with a university or technical degree and those participating in environmental or community groups are more likely to be aware of environmental certifications on both levels. Moreover, aware consumers tend to be more willing to pay for a certified coffee or a coffee produced by a certified company.
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    Auctioning versus grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information
    (Environmental and Resource Economics, 2015) Álvarez González, Francisco; André García, Francisco Javier
    We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction. At the auction, each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market, either as a leader or a follower. This role affects each firms’ valuation of the permits (which are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it occurs in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough.
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    Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool
    (Resource and Energy Economics, 2015) André García, Francisco Javier; Alonso-Paulí, Eduard
    In a principal-agent model we analyze the firm’s decision to adopt an informal or a standardized Environmental Management System (EMS). Our results are consistent with empirical evidence in several respects. A standardized EMS increases the internal control at the cost of introducing some degree of rigidity that entails an endogenous setup cost. Standardized systems are more prone to be adopted by big and well established firms and under tougher environmental policies. Firms with standardized EMS tend to devote more effort to abatement although this effort results in lower pollution only if public incentives are strong enough, suggesting a complementarity relationship between standardized EMS and public policies. Emission charges have both a marginal effect on abatement and a qualitative effect on the adoption decision that may induce a conflict between private and public interests. As a result of the combination of these two effects it can be optimal for the government to distort the tax in a specific way in order to push the firm to choose the socially optimal EMS. The introduction of standardized systems can result in win-win situations where firms, society and the environment get better off.