

## Academic integrity at risk. Joan Robinson's interpretation of Marxian Economics and her ethic critique of orthodox Economic Theory

Baruc Jiménez Contreras<sup>1 2</sup>

Recibido: 04/11/2021 / Aceptado: 08/04/2022

**Abstract.** During the twentieth century, Joan Robinson introduced Marx's political economy into academic discussions of economic thought. This article argues that Robinson's work generates a proposal for academic integrity in economic ideas through an ethical vision of Marx's discourse and an epistemic critique of orthodox economic theory. Robinson's research shows that economic theory has been characterized by hiding the interests of the bourgeoisie, consolidating an "unethical behavior". Following Macfarlane's (2009) work on virtue theory, it is possible to identify in Robinson's production virtues that can enhance the academic integrity of economists.

**Keywords:** academic integrity; Joan Robinson; Post-Keynesian economics; Karl Marx; orthodox Economic Theory

[es] Integridad académica en riesgo. La interpretación de Joan Robinson de la economía marxista y su crítica ética de la teoría económica ortodoxa

**Resumen.** Durante el siglo XX, Joan Robinson introdujo la economía política de Marx en las discusiones académicas del pensamiento económico. Este artículo sostiene que el trabajo de Robinson genera una propuesta de integridad académica en la economía a través de una visión ética del discurso de Marx y una crítica epistémica de la teoría económica ortodoxa. La investigación de Robinson muestra que la teoría económica se ha caracterizado por ocultar los intereses de la burguesía, consolidando un "comportamiento poco ético". Siguiendo el trabajo de Macfarlane (2009) sobre la teoría de la virtud, es posible identificar en la producción de Robinson virtudes que pueden mejorar la integridad académica de los economistas.

**Términos clave:** integridad académica; Joan Robinson; economía post-keynesiana; Karl Marx; teoría económica ortodoxa

[pt] Integridade acadêmica em risco. A interpretação de Joan Robinson da economia marxista e sua crítica ética da teoria econômica ortodoxa

**Resumo.** Durante o século 20, Joan Robinson introduziu a economia política de Marx nas discussões acadêmicas do pensamento econômico. Este artigo argumenta que a obra de Robinson gera uma proposta de integridade acadêmica em economia por meio de uma visão ética do discurso de Marx e uma crítica epistêmica da teoria econômica ortodoxa. A pesquisa de Robinson mostra que a teoria econômica tem se caracterizado por esconder os interesses da burguesia, consolidando o "comportamento antiético". Seguindo o trabalho de Macfarlane (2009) sobre a teoria da virtude, é possível identificar virtudes na produção de Robinson que podem melhorar a integridade acadêmica dos economistas.

**Palavras-chave:** integridade acadêmica; Joan Robinson; economia pós-keynesiana; Karl Marx; teoria econômica ortodoxa

**JEL classification:** B10; B14.

**Summary.** 1. Introduction 2. Marx and academic integrity in economic ideas 3. Joan Robinson and virtues 4. Conclusions. References

**Cómo citar:** Jiménez Contreras, B. (2022). Academic integrity at risk. Joan Robinson's interpretation of Marxian Economics and her ethic critique of orthodox Economic Theory, en *Iberian Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 9(1), 13-23.

<sup>1</sup> This article was written as part of the Complutense University of Madrid and the Banco Santander Foundation's predoctoral scholarship program.

<sup>2</sup> <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4854-1175>  
[barucjim@ucm.es](mailto:barucjim@ucm.es)

Faculty of Economics and Business,  
Department of Applied Economics, Structure and History,  
Complutense University of Madrid

## 1. Introduction

Academic integrity relates to a set of values that researchers must follow to ensure their results, which are connected necessarily with ethics. It can evoke “strong emotions in teachers, researchers, and students... because it is usually associated with negative behaviors” (Bretag, 2018). Generally, when issues related to academic integrity are discussed, they tend to be linked with “malpractices” such as “cheating, plagiarism, dishonesty” and “fraud” (Bretag, 2018). However, Tracey Bretag (2018) indicates that a more productive approach to academic integrity focuses on “promoting the positive values of honesty, trust, fairness, respect, responsibility, and courage as the intrinsically motivated drivers for ethical academic practice” (Bretag, 2018).

In a practical context, it has been shown that the existence of codes “have a positive impact on academic integrity”, especially in students who come to perceive the “honor code as an integral part of a culture of integrity” (McCabe et al., 1999, 212, 230). However, in an ethical sense, it is possible to identify a reflection and the formation of a culture of academic integrity, which goes beyond the honor codes. It has been determined that it is necessary to assume a critical position on the scope of research activity, which should be manifested in the exercise of a set of “virtues,” in the Aristotelian meaning, understood as “personal qualities we ought to possess” (Macfarlane, 2009, 1).

Macfarlane (2009) encourages intellectuals to question their research values and develop positive qualities expressed in the unfolding of virtues to be a good researcher. Macfarlane’s approach delves into the individual reflection that each researcher should make when moving towards a particular subject area. It assumes that academic integrity encompasses a broader spectrum than merely following deontological codes.

During the eighteenth century, *virtue theory* was central to the emergence of economic thought. Mandeville’s development of the notion of virtue influenced the debates that led to the formation of economic ideas, principally those arising from Mandeville’s work ([1714] 1998) *The Fable of the Bees: Or Private Vices, Public Benefits*.

Douglass (2020, 5) describes that “Mandeville’s theory rests on a sharp distinction between the idea that we have of real virtue and the widespread practice of counterfeited virtue”<sup>3</sup>. Counterfeited virtue “can only be judged counterfeit if it falls short of some widely endorsed idea of real virtue” (Douglass, 2020, 5). For Mandeville, we could not “claim that we give the name of virtue to every performance”. On the contrary –“to the impulse of nature”–, we need “the benefits of others out of a desire for praise and an aversion to shame” (Douglass, 2020, 5).

Douglass also (2020, 5) explains that, for Mandeville, if we want to live in society, it is necessary to “have an idea of virtue that goes beyond” doing beneficial acts for egocentric motives. However, virtue is usually confused with selfish actions. For Mandeville, virtue exceeds what is “humanly possible” or depends on a distorted picture of human nature (Douglass, 2020, 5). Thus, humans have been exalted above animals to achieve a “standard” suitable for society (Douglass, 2020, 5). Mandeville’s idea of human nature is not based on seeking the benefit of others, even if such acts sporadically occur (Douglass, 2020, 6). Nevertheless, we still maintain “moral standards” in which an action is not virtuous if it is selfishly motivated (Douglass, 2020, 6).

Mandeville’s ideas were a “challenge” to the Scottish Enlightenment (Trincado, 2019, 4). Trincado (2019, 4) explains that Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith faced “Mandeville’s provocative cynicism” because they “needed to discern if sociability, virtue, and justice are natural”. Smith gave an essential role to virtues in his theoretical approach. In 1790, after the publication of *The Wealth of Nations*, he decided to add a section on virtues to the sixth edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Blosser, 2016, 166). Blosser (2016, 166) explains that Smith’s approach to the political economy had led him to worry about “the power of commercial life to corrupt humanity of workers and the wealthy alike”. The increase in goods, commercial life, and individual liberties required a moral structure to reduce the corruption of the economic system (Blosser, 2016, 166).

Adam Smith defines “virtue” as “excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary” (TMS, I.i.6)<sup>4</sup>. Blosser’s (2016, 166) studies of Adam Smith show that “virtue is embedded in a [...] complex moral psychology that relies on how people use their imaginations to develop sympathy and the impartial spectator, which inform moral judgments virtues and laws” (Blosser, 2016, 166).

Smith’s analysis of virtues shows that “commercial life is not built on the [...] self-interest to generate wealth [...] but rather, it is built on sympathy with others to alleviate the suffering of the poor” (Blosser, 2016, 176)<sup>5</sup>. Thus, Smith “uses the virtues to create a moral theory education for becoming responsible, and he shows how responsibility ethics might apply to economics” (Blosser, 2016, 164).

Studies that disassociated Smith from Utilitarianism (Haakonssen, 1981; Vivenza, 2001) have helped to recover Smith’s “conscious struggle” against Hume’s theory of utility (Trincado, 2003, 43). These appraisals have shown that for Smith, the conception of the human being as an “anxious” being who continually acts

<sup>3</sup> Following Mandeville’s ideas, Douglass (2020, 5) explains that human beings “only ever practice ‘counterfeited’ virtue and not ‘real’ virtue”. ‘Real’ virtue consists of ‘actions, as proceed[ing] from a victory over the passions’ and ‘counterfeited virtue’ are “those that are only the result of a conquest which one passion obtains over another” (Douglass, 2020, 5).

<sup>4</sup> Smith’s vision of virtues was in line with “ancient virtues” (like Aristotle’s virtue notion) rather than “enlightened” approaches to virtue (Blosser, 2016, 166).

<sup>5</sup> Blosser (2016, 168) demonstrates that for Smith, “we are morally compelled to become better sympathizers”. The human being’s objective “is not to ignore or eradicate the otherness of the other but to engage in a dialogue that evokes responsibility for one-self and the other” (Blosser, 2016, 168).

“individually in anticipation of future pleasures” reveals an excess of abstraction on the part of Utilitarianism, which results in the “corruption” of the “understanding of things” (Trincado, 2003, 56). In Smith’s work, scientific systems are conceived as a combination of “reason” and “experience” (Trincado, 2004, 171). These “are inventions of the imagination to connect otherwise separate natural phenomena, which are expressed as if there were chains between them. The reality underlies, but the chains are the unreal effect of the system” (Trincado, 2004, 174).

In Smith’s point of view, Utilitarianism in science is detrimental because the system appears to be reduced to principles alien to science itself (Trincado, 2004, 174). Therefore, the reassessments of Smith’s work that deepen his critique of Utilitarianism have converged with the positions of economic thought that criticize the simplification of the human being and reality in neoclassical economic theory.

Through Smith’s reinterpretations that highlight the need to build a solid relationship between ethics and economics, some economists have examined the responsibility of their ideas and their influence on society, as well as the principles and interests underpinning different economic traditions. This analysis has gained importance with the publication *On Ethics and Economics* by Amartya Sen (1987), delving into economists’ ethical conduct. Sen (1987) critiques mainstream economic theory for its distance from ethics. In addition, Martha Nussbaum’s (2001, 13) studies inspired by “the capabilities approach in the Marxian/Aristotelian idea of truly human functioning” have been relevant in proposing alternatives to the precept of utility maximization.

In economic history, the analysis of interests and their binding relationship to economic thought became important with Albert Hirschman’s (1977) *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph*. Hirschman (1977) shows that the rise of capitalism changed social morality. Medieval vices such as “profit” or “usury” were transformed into virtues under the capitalist system.

These authors’ intellectual precedent in common is Joan Robinson’s work. Robinson’s research was characterized by an in-depth critique of the contemporary economic theory’s principles. From her earliest writings, Robinson put forward alternatives to the classical postulates of mainstream economics. Her school of thought was mainly influenced by her mentor John Maynard Keynes. However, in the *Circus* study group at Cambridge University, the incursion of various authors, such as Michal Kalecki, Piero Sraffa, and Maurice Dobb, led to Robinson’s broadening theoretical horizon beyond the limits established by mainstream economics.

After the *General Theory* ([1936] 2018) was published, the *Circus* members became concerned about the Keynesian theory’s general equilibrium interpretation. Historically, the economists in the *Circus* had witnessed mainstream economic theory’s inability to explain capitalist reality. Against this background, Robinson began examining economic theory and proposing theoretical alternatives inspired by Marx, Dobb, Kalecki, and

Sraffa. In 1947, Joan Robinson published *An Essay on Marxian Economics*<sup>6</sup>, in which she recovered Marx’s approaches in the academic world and compared the economic theory’s epistemic basis with Marxist economics.

For Joan Robinson, a key element in Marx’s approaches is the transparency that he expresses in his discourse because he reveals the objectives and interests that he is pursuing in his theory. Robinson’s reappraisal allows us to consider various problems related to economists’ ethical and epistemic procedures. This article seeks to answer the question: should economists enhance the academic integrity of their theories?

In the following section, Robinson’s statements that ethically and epistemically question orthodox economic theory are presented, taking Marx’s work as a reference to improve the academic integrity in economic thought. Interests are defined as the intention in economists’ theoretical formulations to advantage a social class. She demonstrates that there is no “value neutrality” in economic ideas. Therefore, economists must reveal that their theoretical elaborations are linked to a social class’s economic benefit. In the case of neoclassical economics, Robinson details an effort to hide the maintenance of the bourgeoisie’s *statu quo* under the idea of market efficiency. However, in Marxist economics, she detects that the proletariat’s interests and social transformation are explicitly manifested. In addition, this part describes that Robinson’s study constitutes a framework for economists to reflect on their theories’ ethical and epistemic foundations.

In the second section, Robinson’s ideas are extrapolated to the approach developed by Macfarlane (2009) on *virtue theory* in the research cycle. It proposes an analysis that identifies vices and virtues in Joan Robinson’s study, emphasizing the necessity for economic thought to improve its theories’ academic integrity through developing “virtues”.

## 2. Marx and academic integrity in economic ideas

Robinson’s work highlights the secondary role that Marx’s research had played in economics. Marxism had been characterized by its labor movement’s connection at the beginning of the twentieth century. Its production was mainly linked with the Second International debates. The dominant Marxist approach during this period had been consolidated through the work of Bernstein and Kautsky.

However, some notable contributions to economic thought came from Marxism. In 1910, Hilferding published *Finance Capital* which, together with Lenin’s (1916) work, constituted a theory of imperialism (Gaido & Quiroga, 2021, 63). In 1913, Rosa Luxemburg’s *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals* was published; this work attracted Joan Robinson’s attention, who wrote the introduction in 1951 in its English translation. Maurice Dobb (1929), a close member of the *Circus*, criticized

<sup>6</sup> In this book, Joan Robinson analyzed Marx’s ([1867] 1992a, [1894] 1992b) political economy based on a critical review of *Capital* (mainly in volumes I and III).

orthodox economic theory and its notion of equilibrium. Nevertheless, his primary line of research was linked to a Marxist analysis of economics and history.

Marxism had not proposed a critique of mainstream economic theory's ethical and epistemic foundations. Robinson set about the task of reflecting on Marxist economics and presenting a review of orthodox economic theory. Her analysis is pioneering in questioning conventional economic theory from a critical position that opposes its prevalence as a viable social reality appreciation. This criticism was made explicit in *An Essay on Marxian Economics*, in which Robinson contrasts economic theory with Marxian economics epistemically and at the same time generates an ethical background to improve academic integrity in economic thought, which continues to be explored throughout her work. Sometimes, it is implicit in her critique of orthodox economic theory; at other times, it appears as a central part of her theoretical development, as in her book *Economic Philosophy* (1962).

Firstly, Robinson argues that orthodox economists have assumed capitalism as an eternal and natural order (Robinson, [1947] 1982, 1). The economics theory laws are a set of truths always applicable, regardless of the space or time. In this sense, the capitalist system has always existed, negating any other form of production and consumption in human history. For Robinson ([1947] 1982, ix), "it is a great merit of Marx's method that it lends itself to historical interpretation"<sup>7</sup>.

Neoclassical ahistoricity impacts economists' perception of society; human history is presented as a reality that adapts to market laws. Robinson especially highlights the invalidity of economic theory for analyzing contemporary capitalism. Robinson's later works show that history takes a principal place when it is accepted that "the uncertainty of expectations... guide economic behavior" (Robinson, 1974, 202).

Marxian economics has a historical underpinning. For that reason, Robinson (1974, 202) insists that post-Keynesian economists had to resort to it, overcoming many years of theoretical domination by neoclassical economics. The historical perception makes it possible to identify different economic and social development phases in the capitalist system. Capitalism does not have the same reproduction conditions. For that reason, Robinson proposes a dynamic and evolutionary analysis that responds to social reality's theorization. Unlike the neoclassical economists, Robinson finds in Marx a theoretical source whose aim is to adapt to historical facts and not for reality to adapt to his world's conception. Marx's ideas directly impacted Robinson's ([1970] 2018) work, which can be seen in the historical vision presented in her book *Freedom and Necessity: An Introduction to the Study of Society*. In this publication, historical modes of production are distinguished. They can be characterized by the social relationships of production that differ from capitalist society.

Secondly, Joan Robinson ([1947] 1982, 1) (1962, 3) argues that economic theory presents sociability in the capitalist system in terms of "harmony of interests" or as "an automatic reconciliation of conflicting interests". The owner of the means of production and the worker meet in the marketplace to pursue the same goal: utility maximization. The relationship between them is accepted as "eternal and natural" without delving into its historical background ([1947] 1982, 1). In other words, the *statu quo* is taken for granted, and the development of the economic theory tends to reproduce and preserve it.

Robinson ([1947] 1982, 1) points out that the notion of increasing social surplus could be linked to both orthodox theory and the Marxist political economy. It is possible to sustain this argument in the Marxist-inspired approaches elaborated by Michal Kalecki<sup>8</sup>. However, Robinson observes that conventional economics maintains a different perspective from the Marxist regarding changing the system. If we consider that neoclassical economists' proposals respond to eternal laws and a set of harmonious interests that regulate society through the market, the social transformation is inviable. Robinson ([1947] 1982, 1) specifies that the orthodox economists' interests can be described as "fear to lose by the change". In this way, Robinson links orthodox economists' approach to the concrete bourgeoisie's class interests.

Robinson disagrees with the passivity of orthodox economics concerning social transformation. Her ideas about economics as a mechanism of social change align with the Marxian political economy, which urges the subjects to end the conditions of capitalist subjugation, taking advantage of the degree of development achieved by the productive forces in capitalism (Robinson, 1967, 64). For Robinson (1967, 64), economists should fight to overcome poverty and fulfill human and social development. Therefore, Robinson's speech opposes preserving the *statu quo* and ethically grounds that economics aims to achieve social welfare.

Thirdly, Robinson ([1947] 1982, 1) shows that orthodox economic theory must be associated with advocacy of capitalism; orthodox economists identify with the "reproduction" of the system and become their adherents. This eulogy for capitalism is covered with an apparent "scientific impartiality," expressed in the formal mathematics language in orthodox economics (Robinson, 1967, 122). Robinson ([1947] 1982, 1-2) shows that orthodox economists are "unconscious" because "their preconceptions emerge rather in the problems which they chose to study and the assumptions on which they worked than in overt political doctrine".

Robinson's research reveals that orthodox economists maintain interests that coincide with preserving the bourgeois *statu quo*. However, mainstream economic theory does not identify the bourgeoisie's agenda in its discourse; on the contrary, its arguments are present-

<sup>7</sup> To contrast history's approach and orthodox economic theoretical procedure, Robinson (1962, 75) affirms that "in history, we learned of the growth and decay of economic systems", but "in theory" only, there was one set of principles that governed life on Robinson Crusoe's island".

<sup>8</sup> It has been possible to identify this tendency since 1933 in *An Essay on the Theory of the Business Cycle*. Later, Kalecki's (1935) work was known in international academic journals like *Econometrica*. This idea also could be found in other Kalecki's works, such as *The Determinants of Distribution of the National Income* (1938) and *A Theory of Profits* (1942).



ed in terms of market “efficiency”. The mathematical formulation of its principles conceals its class character in a language of apparent “scientific impartiality”<sup>9</sup>. Following Robinson’s analysis, this omission can be interpreted as a lack of academic integrity.

However, Joan Robinson finds a theoretical coherence benchmark in Marx because he openly exposes his political and economic interests using his methodological procedure. In this sense, Robinson’s argument proves that it is vital to manifest class interests in economists’ production because they directly regard society. Also, Robinson’s research demonstrates that the correspondence between Marx’s economic interests and objectives makes his approach a “consistent standard” for academic integrity in economic thought. In contrast, neoclassical economics’ theoretical foundation defies academic integrity by pretending to be associated with an apparently “unbiased” resource allocation mechanism based on efficiency parameters.

The economists who formed the *Circus* were challenged to develop studies that integrated the Keynesian contributions with neoclassical equilibrium principles. It was visible in the works of Champernowne (1936), Harrod (1937), Meade (1937), Reddaway (1936), and Hicks (1937) (King, 2009, 23). In the face of these facts, Joan Robinson ([1947] 1982) demonstrated theoretical alternatives to mainstream ideas that reflected a coherent approach between interests and objectives – based on the Marxian reference. In this manner, Robinson’s work shows that hiding class interests behind formal mathematical argumentation is an “unethical behavior” in economic thought.

Additionally, Robinson’s critique reveals that orthodox economists’ bourgeois interests have driven them to endorse a theory that lacks real support. The pursuit of “eternal principles” in neoclassical economics diverted attention “to the special historical features of actual situations” (Robinson, [1947] 1982, 2). A mismatch between theory and reality was created because orthodox economists insisted on theorizing about “the economics of a community of small equal proprietors into the analysis of advanced capitalism” (Robinson, [1947] 1982, 2).

Fourthly, Joan Robinson finds an inconsistency in the “perfect competition” idea. Production theory holds that many producers provide the market guided by the “economic rationality” assumption (Robinson, [1947] 1982, 2). In this way, “each market is supplied by a large number of producers, acting individually, bound together neither by open collusion nor by unconscious class loyalty” (Robinson, [1947] 1982, 2). Consequently, the individual producer can compete in any market. For Robinson, this idea is unconnected with advanced capitalism, characterized by the development of monopolies and class alliances. In 1933, with the publication of *The Economics of Imperfect Competition*, Joan Robinson confirmed that the economic theory approach to perfect competition was inconsistent. She demonstrated that “it

is more proper to set out the analysis of monopoly, treating perfect competition as a special case” (Robinson [1933] 1969, 307).

For Joan Robinson, Marxian economics has the advantage of not theorizing about a community of small proprietors. Marx ([1867] 1992a) identifies the emergence of monopoly through the thesis of concentration and centralization of capital. He also expressed in his theory the tendency towards capitalist alliances and the importance of trade unions in the struggle for labor time and wages (Marx, [1867] 1992a). Thus, Marxian theory reflects more clearly the capitalist reality and provides the basis for its contemporary theorization.

Robinson demonstrated that economists had not considered that their production has a moral obligation to express social reality. They had been forced to make reality resemble theory through their theoretical work, legitimizing the capitalist system. Consequently, orthodox economics does not show an ethical procedure in its theoretical models.

In the fifth place, Robinson ([1947] 1982, 2, 67) finds a theoretical anachronism in the fact that “wages” tend to “equal the marginal disutility of labor”. This conception comes from the context in which the economic system is conceived as a community of small proprietors. In this society, a “farmer” can decide “whether the extra product of another hour’s work will repay the extra backache” (Robinson, [1947] 1982, 2). However, the worker in developed capitalism does not enjoy the same conditions as a landowner. The working class, deprived of the means of production, can only ask themselves “whether it is better to work or to starve” (Robinson, [1947] 1982, 2, 67)

For Robinson, Marx’s approach best reveals the proletarians’ condition in capitalism, who owns only their labor power and must sell it on the labor market to survive. To assume that the worker is in the same conditions as a small proprietor hides the deprived workers’ reality. For orthodox economists, workers are small proprietors who would have the possibility of working without being hired. It is important to emphasize that the labor force’s notion, as a means of production, leads to the perception of unemployment as an external phenomenon, equivalent to denying involuntary unemployment<sup>10</sup> (Robinson, [1947] 1982, 6-7).

This conception is ethically questionable, especially given the historical experience of the capitalist crisis of 1929. Robinson (1972, 3) maintains that before 1929 there was a wide acceptance among economists of free-market policies, reduced state involvement in the economy, and confidence in economic equilibrium as an optimal position in society. However, the unemployment caused by the crisis of 1929 resulted in state intervention as an inherent necessity of contemporary capitalism to maintain desirable employment rates. This historical fact was refuted with mathematical and formal arguments by economic theory to completely absorb the Keynesian ideas into its equilibrium approach

<sup>9</sup> This trend is reflected in an “anodyne” appearance of the economic models that try to prevent “moral doubts” from being raised (Robinson, 1967, 58).

<sup>10</sup> Robinson (1947, 7) defines “the amount of involuntary unemployment” as “the amount of work which, in existing conditions, the population is willing but unable to perform”.

(Champernowne, 1936; Harrod, 1937; Reddaway, 1936; Meade, 1937; Hicks, 1937).

Through Keynesian thought's subsumption, orthodox economic theory tried to eliminate a different theoretical perspective and blur the importance of social phenomena such as unemployment and the capitalist crisis. In this respect, Robinson's approach encourages a profound reflection on the relationship between theory and social reality. She highlighted that it is epistemically questionable for economists to exclude social phenomena that directly concern their theorizing issues.

In the sixth place, Robinson opposes the economics teaching method, particularly the elaborate formalization of economic theory in a complex mathematical language. Robinson ([1947] 1982, 2) states that "the orthodox economists have been much preoccupied with elegant elaboration... which distract the attention of their pupils from the uncongenial realities of the modern world".

For Robinson, research in economics and teaching were directly connected. She believed that economics should have a dynamic character instead of seeking eternal truths. She transferred this effort to her role as an economics professor, being concerned about her students' contributions and interests, as reflected in her research papers (Emami, 1992).

Robinson (1962, 66) detected a tendency to distance economics' students from problems related to capitalist social reality. This trend has been shown in the university's study plans specializing in applying mathematical tools. The tendency has been identified as "the overuse of mathematics in economics" (Quddus & Rashid, 1994). Economics students do not develop a critical profile because they focus on understanding microeconomics and macroeconomics formulations.

An outstanding example of educational reductionism in economics was the 2011 protest of Professor Gregory Mankiw's students at Harvard. The undergraduates complained about the biased view provided by the neoclassical methodology. In *An Open Letter to Professor Mankiw*<sup>11</sup>, they argued that his approach "perpetuates problematic and inefficient systems of economic inequality in our society today". They also stressed the role of Harvard graduates globally and the awful effects on public policies established through the exclusive orthodox economic theory study.

Robinson's criticism is even more substantial today because neoclassical economists have managed to consolidate a theoretical approach that has prevented many generations of economists from drawing closer to social reality. Orthodox theorists can be held responsible for economic policies based on perfect competition, the free market, and economic rationality by consolidating an "unethical behavior" in the teaching of economics.

In contrast to the elaborate mathematical theorizing of orthodox economics, Robinson ([1947] 1982, 2) finds that "Marx's intellectual tools are [...] cruder, but his sense of reality is far stronger". Robinson's analysis shows that it is preferable to develop a theoretical approach with a foundation rather than ignoring history and social context in economic thought.

Finally, Robinson's study establishes a relationship between the *circus* economists who theorize about economic reality and Marxian economics. Marx's historical content leads to a proposition consistent with the history of capitalism, its worldwide expansion, and the set of laws and contradictions that manifest in social reality. Robinson maintains that in the academic context, Marx had been silenced. Consequently, the economists (of the *circus*) who had needed to study the capitalist reality had to do this based on the experience of a world economic crisis without a contemporary intellectual reference. Robinson's argument denounces the overpowering feature of economic theory in the academic sphere, which results in the inability to take accurate measures in the face of the capitalist crisis and its ability to silence other ideas.

Keynesian theory's rapid absorption into neoclassical theory and the silence promoted towards Marxist theory show the predominance of neoclassical economics in academia. However, Joan Robinson's analysis brings an alternative reflection source in economic thought. Bourgeois class interests hidden in mathematical formalizations are exposed, and Marxist analysis tools, which had been silenced, appear as mechanisms to better understand capitalist social reality.

Robinson's approach raises a milestone on academic integrity in economic thought, revealing which characteristics should be good or desirable for research in economics and which vices or defects could be avoided. The following section presents an interpretation based on Macfarlane's (2009) academic integrity studies and Joan Robinson's conclusions presented in this article.

### 3. Joan Robinson and virtues

During the first half of the twentieth century, experimentation on vulnerable population groups led to the development of a series of ontological codes and ethical rules to guarantee human dignity in science, such as *The Nuremberg Code* ([1947] 1991) and *The Declaration of Helsinki* ([1969] 1982) (Macfarlane, 2009, 12). Ethical standards were still lacking, which prompted the *Belmont Report* (1978) publication by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Beauchamp and Childress' ([1979] 2013) work, *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*, was released in the same year, establishing "principlism" in medical ethics as a robust approach through four principles: "respect for autonomy," "non-maleficence," "beneficence," and "justice".<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The letter was written as part of the "global Occupy movement". Also, the students joined "a Boston-wide march protesting the corporatization of higher education". The letter specified that they were "walking out of" Mankiw's class "to protest" for his "inadequate discussion of basic economic theory and to lend [their] support to a movement that is changing American discourse on economic injustice".

<sup>12</sup> The first principle is "the respect for autonomy". It means to "acknowledge" the "patients and potential research subjects" "right to hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on their

Principlism is based on Kantian, Utilitarianism, and Rawlsian grounds. Its practice has spread to the academic community and public policy formulation. The use of Principlism has been controversial and insufficient. Clouser (1990, 219) considers that the principles “lack any systematic relationship to each other, and they often conflict with each other”<sup>13</sup>. Callahan’s (2003, 291) research shows that Principlism is “too narrow to do all the necessary work of ethics, too individualistic to help us answer questions about the appropriate needs of communities, and too mechanical to encourage some necessary analytical and personal skills”.

Macfarlane associates Principlism’s problems with the moral foundations on which it has been built. The issue with Kantian principles is that any action can be morally justified if it is rational (Macfarlane, 2009, 16). Rawlsian grounds retain a Kantian basis, which can be problematic because they maintain a reversible logic (Macfarlane, 2009, 16). The utilitarian view has been developed by orthodox economists, founded on methodological individualism. It can justify any action if it causes utility maximization (Macfarlane, 2009, 17).

Robinson’s critique, which preceded the growth of Principlism in academic life, suggested delving into the repercussions of economic ideas on society. She showed that behind the assumption of utility maximization, mainstream economics has bourgeoisie class interests, expressed in the reproduction and maintenance of the *statu quo* through economics teaching and free-market public policies.

There is a binding connection between Joan Robinson’s critique of neoclassical economics and the Principlism criticism for constraining academic integrity. Firstly, the justification of utility maximization is a sufficient criterion to establish that the neoclassical system presumes that its principles are efficient and beneficial to society. Secondly, economic thought was a pioneer in assuming an adaptive capacity to justify any social situation morally. Joan Robinson (1962, 57) explains that the perception of utility in neoclassical economics sought to “raise profits to the same level of moral respectability as wages”. Through this formulation, the capital property is considered productive. Therefore, “the capitalist has a right to his portion” (Robinson, 1962, 58), and social inequality is justified.

values and beliefs” (Beauchamp and Childress, [1979] 2013, 106, 140). The second principle is “nonmaleficence”, which “obligates” researchers “to abstain from causing harm to others” (Beauchamp and Childress, [1979] 2013, 150). This notion does not imply that exists “a positive obligation [...] to provide benefits such as health care and various forms of assistance” (Beauchamp and Childress, [1979] 2013, 192-193). The third principle is “beneficence”, which involves patients’ and research subjects’ welfare. Beauchamp and Childress ([1979] 2013, 202) distinguish “positive beneficence” and “utility”; the first one requires “agents to provide benefits to others”, and “utility” involves “that agents balance benefits, risks, and costs to produce the best overall results”. The fourth principle is “justice”, which indicates that subjects in research should have fair and equal treatment (Beauchamp and Childress, [1979] 2013, 250).

<sup>13</sup> For example, “showing respect for patient autonomy may not always lead to treatment in a patient’s best interests, and so could conflict with the principle of beneficence” (Ozoliņš, 2015, 33).

Macfarlane’s main criticism shows that the current theoretical problems are insufficient for academic integrity development. He suggests that researchers delve into alternative ways of achieving academic integrity, reaching into the concrete issues the different research fields face, instead of legitimizing a (moral) procedure under intellectual assumptions that justify and conceal it (Macfarlane, 2009, 32). Therefore, Macfarlane warns that the academic community members should behave beyond any code of conduct, delving into their consequences to develop academic integrity. This objective takes on greater importance in economic thought because, as was shown in the previous section, neoclassical economics consolidated an “unethical behavior,” which must be overcome.

According to Macfarlane (2009, 32), academic integrity responds to a practice that depends on the researcher so that “no code of ethics can operate without being interpreted” by the researcher “through their [...] value system”. This perspective emphasizes that academic integrity “depends on the integrity of the individual”. Developing academic integrity has generally delved “on bad behavior rather than what we mean by being a good researcher” (Macfarlane, 2009, 32). Macfarlane (2009, 33) focuses on the characteristics that are considered acceptable or desirable to be a “good researcher” by exposing a *virtue theory*<sup>14</sup>.

Macfarlane’s work is characterized by associating the research process with a “journey”. He identifies six stages and relates them to six virtues, understood as a midpoint between the vices caused by deficit or excess of virtue<sup>15</sup>. The virtues and vices of each step are not exclusive to it; they can appear at any time during the re-

<sup>14</sup> Macfarlane (2009, 34) explains that the *virtue theory* was widely developed by philosophers such as Aristotle and Confucius. Although it had been out of fashion for a long time, it has been recaptured by Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1981). Macfarlane (2009, 34), following Rachels (1999), explains that a virtue is a “trait of character, manifested in habitual action, that is good for a person to have”. Thus, “virtues represent median positions between extremes of behavior, otherwise known as vices” (Macfarlane, 2009, 34).

<sup>15</sup> Macfarlane (2009, 42) refers to the first stage as “framing” (questions, problems, hypotheses, issues, projects, proposals). He recognizes “courage” as a virtue, “cowardice” as a vice caused by the deficit of this virtue, and “recklessness” as a vice produced by the excess of it. The second phase is called “negotiating” (access, consent, permission, time, support). At this stage, “respectfulness” is identified as a virtue, “manipulability” as a vice for lack of “respectfulness”, and “partiality” as a vice for excess of “respectfulness” (Macfarlane, 2009, 42). He defines the third stage as “generating” (data, materials, ideas, inspiration) (Macfarlane, 2009, 42). His approach associates “resoluteness” as a virtue, the vice for deficiency of it is “laziness”, and for excess of it “inflexibility”. The fourth stage is known as “creating” (results, interpretations, models, concepts, theories, critiques, designs, artifacts). Macfarlane (2009, 42) recognizes “sincerity” as a virtue, “concealment” as a vice rising from a deficiency of sincerity, and “exaggeration” as a vice for an excess of it. The fifth phase is “disseminating” (through publication, exhibition, and performance). At this phase, the virtue that researchers should develop is “humility”, like a vice of lack of humility is “boastfulness”, and the vice for its excess is “timidity” (Macfarlane, 2009, 42). Finally, Macfarlane (2009, 42) describes the sixth stage as “reflecting” (on epistemological and personal learning). The virtue that researchers must develop is “reflexivity”, the vice to be avoided due to lack of it is “dogmatism”, and due to the excess of it is “indecisiveness”.



search cycle. Defining the development of virtue means to act “with integrity” (Macfarlane, 2009, 5).

The theoretical process through Joan Robinson expanded the ethical and epistemic grounds of economic thought can be considered as a “journey” in which she developed “virtues” and tried to overcome the theoretical “vices” of neoclassical economists. This reflection on Robinson’s journey proposes a way to enhance academic integrity in economic thought.

Firstly, when Joan Robinson evaluated the research effects of the *Circus* members, the neoclassical economists, and Marx, she raised problems concerning the first stage or “framing”, in which questions, challenges, hypotheses, issues, projects, and proposals are presented. In this stage, Robinson’s attitude reveals the virtue of “courage” because her arguments criticize a dominant theory. Her approach is pioneering in warning that the economists’ interests are hidden behind an elaborate mathematical formalization. Robinson’s critique demonstrates that for academic integrity in economic thought, it is necessary to go beyond utility and analyze the epistemic foundations of theories, their results, and their effects on society. Also, Robinson’s virtue of “courage” is manifested in her denunciation of economic thought for silencing the Marxian proposal. Robinson (1973, 43) finds in Marx, a rigorous thinker who reflects a high degree of social reality and an ethical and epistemic coherence between interests and objectives in his theory.

“Courage” is a constant virtue throughout Robinson’s academic career because she maintained a critical attitude towards economic thought. This virtue was externalized in her debates with orthodox economists and Marxists. Robinson (1973, 45) criticized the dogmatic approach to Marxian categories. She also condemned Keynes’s belated response to the crisis<sup>16</sup> and his theory’s subsequent absorption into neoclassical equilibrium principles<sup>17</sup>.

Secondly, in the orthodox economics approach, the vice of “cowardice” can be identified. Macfarlane (2009, 58) characterizes “cowardice” as “being unwilling to tackle big or important questions”. Robinson (1942, 2) stated that orthodox economists’ “preconceptions emerge... in the problems... they chose to study and the assumptions on which they worked”. Additionally, their theorizing does not respond to social reality matters, but logical-mathematical formalization, so problem-solving has a limited field of action. Their contributions to social issues are limited to promoting the “free market” to get “equilibrium”. In this sense, “cowardice” is a vice that should be overwhelmed by orthodox economists.

Thirdly, for Macfarlane (2009), “respect” is one of the virtues researchers must develop. He links “respect” with experimentation on human beings and people’s treatment in investigation projects. However, we can transfer “re-

spect for others” to the theoretical field. It is then possible to wonder whether orthodox economics has developed a respectful treatment of the subjects. The economic theory had ignored the “others”, assuming that if individual interest is sought, the collective welfare is achieved. Nevertheless, within the economics definition as a science that aims to reach social welfare, we find in Robinson the negation of it as a discipline that “selfishly” seeks individual utility maximization. Robinson (1962, 77) proposes that the revolution initiated by Keynes and later promoted by the *Circus* “returned the moral problem into economics by destroying the neo-classical reconciliation of private egoism and public service<sup>18</sup>”.

Amartya Sen’s (1977) research has shown that orthodox economists developed a reductionist ontological approach to human beings. In Sen’s article “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory”, it is possible to presume that economic theory models aspire to human beings behaving under simplistic patterns of economic rationality. The economic theory’s human being conceived as “a social moron” is not respectful of actual human capabilities, which are restricted to the pursuit of individual interest through their “one all-purpose preference ordering” (Sen, 1977, 336).

Macfarlane (2009, 66) explains that “respect” is related to researchers’ “sensitivity”. In Robinson’s analysis, it can be noted that Marxian thought contrasts with economic theory in its “sensitivity” to issues that neoclassical economists have ignored or have not chosen to explore in-depth. One example –provided in the previous section– is related to Marx’s perception of the workers’ reality and the character of exploitation that they suffer in the capitalist system. This situation is opposed to the assumptions of neoclassical models, which accept that real wage is equivalent to marginal productivity; consequently, social inequality is justified. Robinson’s reflection reveals that neoclassical theorizing lacks “sensitivity” concerning the worker’s actual situation in the capitalist system.

Fourthly, it should be noted that economic theory has attempted to manipulate reality to suit its epistemic aspirations. “Manipulation” is a vice opposed to “respecting” (Macfarlane, 2009, 69, 71), which in the case of economic theory, hinders the development of academic integrity in economic thought.

In the fifth place, Macfarlane (2009, 74) explains that the vice of “partiality” can occur in the research field. Researchers are not expected to be completely impartial. Still, when there is an academic formalization that validates the interests of a powerful group in society, the vice of “partiality” is experienced. Through the previous section’s evidence, it is possible to assert that orthodox economists incur the vice of “partiality” because their epistemic background is associated with the bourgeois class’s interests.

<sup>16</sup> Robinson (1972, 8) did not “regard the Keynesian revolution as a great intellectual triumph. On the contrary, it was a tragedy because it came so late”.

<sup>17</sup> Robinson (1972, 3) argued that “after the war, Keynes became orthodox in his turn. Unfortunately, the Keynesian orthodoxy, as it became established, left out the point”.

<sup>18</sup> Robinson’s (1978, 62) perception of economics as a “moral” science led to a necessary reevaluation of economic thought. Robinson (1978, 62) points out that one of the central distortions of neoclassical economics was Adam Smith’s figure, associating him with a selfish discourse on the free market.



The vice of “partiality” is opposed to researchers’ capacities such as creativity and the freedom to implement theoretical alternatives in an investigation field. In economic thought, proposals that do not contain a mathematical formalization have been relegated, such as those based on historical, philosophical, and sociological approaches. It is worth emphasizing that, due to the prevalence of orthodox economics, theoretical lines such as cliometrics adhered to the principles of economic theory to analyze society historically. Cliometrics maintains the essential epistemic principles of economic rationality and satisfies the orthodox economic approach. It contrasts with Robinson’s idea of history instead of the equilibrium criteria, revealing the reductionist aim of conventional economic theory.

In the sixth place, Macfarlane (2009, 79) describes that “resoluteness” is a researcher’s virtue that must cultivate to carry out the objectives that motivate their studies. The virtue of “resoluteness” is characterized by the “activity” of researchers, i.e., the set of actions they carry out to achieve their objectives. Epistemically, it is possible to ask whether economic thought has developed the virtue of “resoluteness”. It “implies a determination to unveil the truth, however confirming or disconfirming to one’s view of the world this may be” (Macfarlane, 2009, 90). “Resoluteness” requires actions, while economic theory invites the researcher to maintain a passive attitude; as such, economic policy objectives are limited to promoting the free play of market forces. The mainstream theory does not develop a transformative aspect of society but contemplates and legitimizes powerful social groups’ interests.

In the seventh place, Macfarlane (2009, 92) considers that members of the academy are obliged to develop “sincerity” in the history of research. Researchers must ensure that their results “are authentic representations of what” they have “found out” (Macfarlane, 2009, 91). Macfarlane (2009, 92) stresses that academics have a particular obligation to build this virtue because he considers that historically they have been “public servants” and therefore have been able to develop “academic freedom”.

Macfarlane (2009, 92) maintains that “despite the growing privatization and commercialization of the modern university, many academics continue to work for publicly funded institutions of higher education”. For that reason, part of this “responsibility is to fulfill the expectation that they will act in the public interest by pursuing and reporting the truth as far as they are able” (Macfarlane, 2009, 92). Therefore, academia is committed to society because universities have historically followed Wilhelm von Humboldt’s idea of the need to maintain “academic freedom” (Macfarlane, 2009, 92). This commitment is linked to the search for truth and the development of academic integrity.

In this evaluation of academic integrity in economics, it is necessary to ask: What has been the role of economic thought in its commitment to society and the search for truth? It is reprehensible that orthodox economic theory has established itself as the dominant current in economics, despite not promoting the search for truth.

Economic theory’s lack of academic integrity prevents the development of a commitment to society because it restricts its field of action to free-market forces.

Finally, Robinson’s analysis also demonstrated that the search for truth does not characterize economic theory, but it expects reality to adhere to its principles to confirm its validity. It is contradictory that economists, as public servants in the academic sphere, have promoted a line of thought that supports the privatization of the public university and the commercialization of its interests, putting at risk academic freedom.

#### 4. Conclusions

Joan Robinson’s research has shown that economists have an ethical obligation to improve their academic integrity due to the mainstream economic theory having consolidated an “unethical behavior” as an intrinsic part of the study and analysis of economics. This behavior has manifested in orthodox economists’ tendency to hide their bourgeois class interests under an elaborated mathematical formalization. It is also possible to recognize it in the justification of the *statu quo*, which in neo-classical economics appears as the effect of the free play of market forces and its capacity to optimize resources.

Robinson’s results suggest that one way to improve academic integrity in economics is to critique epistemic and ethical foundations. For Robinson, economics cannot be based on eternal principles that do not match social reality. The importance of history in Joan Robinson’s critique and Marx’s discourse reveals that economists should focus on capturing reality. Therefore, their models have a moral obligation to coincide with reality and not the other way around. In this respect, the article has argued that Joan Robinson developed the virtue of “courage” by proposing a substantial transformation in the dominant epistemic foundations of economic thought. At the same time, Robinson showed that economists must develop this virtue to confront the predominance of one theory over the others.

Robinson’s analysis of Marx’s economics brought about a comprehensive evaluation of economic thought, leading to the reconsideration of economics as a discipline that studies the origin and distribution of wealth rather than a selfish science of individual utility maximization. This classical perception of economics underlines the responsibility of economists to the ideas that their theories propose. Thus, in Robinson’s conception, neoclassical economists’ statements cannot be concealed under mathematics’ “value neutrality”. They must recognize that their arguments belong to a dominant social class whose objective is to reproduce the economic system. These statements point out that Robinson developed the virtue of “respect for others” because she reoriented economics to pursue social welfare.

Robinson’s approach to Marxian economics led to a critique of capitalism eulogy, reflected in the establishment of economics as a discipline that pursues changes and is not content with guaranteeing the *statu quo*. Therefore, it is corroborated that Robinson developed

the virtue of “resoluteness” in the epistemic field because her statements are oriented toward a transformative role in economics.

Macfarlane (2009) stresses the importance of “sincerity virtue” in academic integrity. Historically, researchers have been public servants, so they have a duty toward society. At the same time, their position gives them “ac-

ademic freedom”. However, the neoclassical economists’ promotion of free-market policies and privatization of education is detrimental to “academic freedom” and restricts the development of research activity to commercial interests. It reveals that the mainstream economics’ negative results compromise the improvement of “academic integrity” as it has historically manifested.

## References

- An open letter to Greg Mankiw. (2012). *The Critical Quarterly*, 54(2), 10-11. <https://login.bucm.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/open-letter-greg-mankiw/docview/1024162694/se-2?accountid=14514>
- Anscombe, G.E.M. (1958). Modern Moral Philosophy. *Philosophy*, 33(124), 1-19. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749051>
- Beauchamp, T., & Childress, J. [1979] (2013). *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*. Oxford University Press.
- Blosser, J. (2016). More Than Free Markets: Adam Smith and the Virtue of Responsibility. *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics*, 36(1), 163-179. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44504814>
- Bretag, T. (2018). Academic Integrity. *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Business and Management*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190224851.013.147>
- Callahan, D. (2003). Principlism and Communitarianism. *Journal of Medical Ethics*, 29(5), 287-291.
- Clouser, K.D. (1990). A critique of Principlism. *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (United Kingdom)*, 15(2), 219-236. 10.1093/jmp/15.2.219
- Champernowne, D.G. (1936). Unemployment, Basic and Monetary: the Classical Analysis and the Keynesian. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 3(3), 201-216. 10.2307/2967628
- Dobb, M. (1929). A Sceptical View of the Theory of Wages. *The Economic Journal*, 39(156), 506-519. 10.2307/2223662
- Douglass, R. (2020). Bernard Mandeville on the Use and Abuse of Hypocrisy. *Political Studies*, 0032321720972617. 10.1177/0032321720972617
- Emami, Z. (1992). History versus Equilibrium: Joan Robinson on Teaching Economics. *International Journal of Social Economics*, 19(10), 83-94. 10.1108/EUM00000000000505
- Gaido, D., & Quiroga, M. (2021). Marxism in the Age of Imperialism – The Second International. In A. Callinicos, S. Kouvelakis & L. Pradella (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Marxism and Post-Marxism* (pp. 51-65). Routledge.
- Haakonssen, K. (1981). *The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith*. Cambridge University Press.
- Harrod, R.F. (1937). Mr. Keynes and Traditional Theory. *Econometrica*, 5(1), 74-86. 10.2307/1905402
- Hicks, J.R. (1937). Mr. Keynes and the “Classics”; A Suggested Interpretation. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 147-159.
- Hirschman, A.O. (1977). *The Passion and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph*. Princeton Univ. Press.
- Kalecki, M. [1933] (1990). Essay on the Business Cycle Theory. In J. Osiatynski (Ed.), *Collected Works of Michal Kalecki. Volume I. Capitalism Business Cycle and Full Employment* (pp. 65-108). Oxford University Press.
- Kalecki, M. (1935). A Macrodynamics Theory of Business Cycles. *Econometrica*, 3(3), 327-344. 10.2307/1905325
- Kalecki, M. (1938). The Determinants of Distribution of the National Income. *Econometrica*, 6(2), 97-112. 10.2307/1907142
- Kaye, F.B. 1922. “The Influence of Bernard Mandeville.” *Studies in Philology* 19: 83-108.
- Keynes, J.M. [1936] (2018). *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and money*. Springer International Publishing; Palgrave Macmillan.
- King, J.E. (2017). Post Keynesian Economics in Cambridge. In R. A. Cord (Ed.), *The Palgrave Companion to Cambridge Economics* (pp. 135-155). Palgrave Macmillan UK. 10.1057/978-1-137-41233-1\_7
- Macfarlane, B. (2009). *Researching with Integrity: The Ethics of Academic Enquiry*. Routledge.
- Mandeville, B. [1714] (1998). *The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Public Benefits*. Liberty Fund.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. [1867] (1992a). *Capital: Critique of Political Economy Volume 1*. Penguin Classics.
- Marx, K., & Frederick, E. [1894] (1992b). *Capital: Critique of Political Economy Volume 3*. Penguin Classics.
- MacIntyre, A. (1981). *After virtue*. Duckworth.
- McCabe, D.L., Trevino, L.K., & Butterfield, K.D. (1999). Academic Integrity in Honor Code and Non-Honor Code Environments: A Qualitative Investigation. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 70(2), 211-234. 10.2307/2649128
- Meade, J. E. (1937). A Simplified Model of Mr Keynes’ System. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 4(2), 98-107. 10.2307/2967607
- Nuremberg Trials. [1947] (1991). The Nuremberg Code. *Law, Medicine & Health Care: A Publication of the American Society of Law & Medicine*, 19(3-4), 266-266.
- Nussbaum, M.C. (2001). *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ozoliņš, J.T. (2015). Ethical Principlism. In J. T. Ozoliņš, & J. Grainger (Eds.), *Foundations of healthcare ethics: Theory to practice* (pp. 33-50, Chapter xviii, 283 Pages). Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
- Quddus, M., & Rashid, S. (1994). The Overuse of Mathematics in Economics: Nobel Resistance. *Eastern Economic Journal*, 20(3), 251-265. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40325574>
- Rachels, J. (1999). *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. McGraw-Hill.
- Reddaway, W. B. (1937). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. *Economic Record*, 12(1-2), 28-36.
- Robinson, J. [1933] (1969). *The Economics of Imperfect Competition*. St. Martin’s Press.

- Robinson, J. (1947). *Essays in The Theory of Employment*. Basil Blackwell.
- Robinson, J. [1947] (1982). *An essay on Marxian economics*. Macmillan Press.
- Robinson, J. (1951). Introduction. In R. Luxemburg (Ed.), *The Accumulation of Capital* (pp. 13-28). Routledge and Kegan Paul LTD.
- Robinson, J. (1962). *Economic Philosophy*. Penguin Books.
- Robinson, J. (1967). *Economics: An Awkward Corner*. Pantheon Books.
- Robinson, J. [1970] (2018). *Freedom and Necessity: An Introduction to the Study of Society*. Routledge.
- Robinson, J. (1972). The Second Crisis of Economic Theory. *The American Economic Review*, 62(1), 1-10. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1821517>
- Robinson, J. (1974). History versus Equilibrium. *Indian Economic Journal*, 21(3), 202.
- Robinson, J. (1978). The Growler: Morality and Economics *Challenge*, 21(1), 62-64. 10.1080/05775132.1978.11470407
- Sen, A.K. (1977). Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 6(4), 317-344. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264946>
- Sen, A. (1987). *On Ethics and Economics*. Basil Blackwell.
- Trincado Aznar, E. (2003). Adam Smith, crítico del utilitarismo. *Telos: Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas*, 12(1), 43-59. <http://hdl.handle.net/10347/5450>
- Trincado Aznar, E. (2004). *Crítica a la doctrina de la utilidad y revisión de las teorías de Hume, Smith y Bentham*, UCM, Madrid.
- Trincado, E. (2019). *The Birth of Economic Rhetoric: Communication, Arts and Economic Stimulus in David Hume and Adam Smith*. Springer International Publishing AG.
- United States. National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (1978). *The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research* (Ser. Dhew publication, nos. 78-0012-78-0014).
- Vivenza, G. (2001). *Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought*. Oxford University Press.
- World Medical Association. [1969] (1982). The Declaration of Helsinki. *World Medical Journal*, 29(6), 86-8.