TESIS DOCTORAL

Second generation muslims in Madrid: hybrid identities, experiences of discrimination and rights expectations

La segunda generación musulmana en Madrid: identidades híbridas, percepciones de discriminación y expectativas de derechos

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SECOND GENERATION MUSLIMS IN MADRID:
HYBRID IDENTITIES, EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION
AND RIGHTS EXPECTATIONS

LA SEGUNDA GENERACIÓN MUSULMANA EN MADRID:
IDENTIDADES HÍBRIDAS, PERCEPCIONES
DE DISCRIMINACIÓN Y EXPECTATIVAS DE DERECHOS

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Abstract

In recent decades, the growth of immigrant communities in Europe has prompted controversial political and discursive contexts. Due to a combination of factors, real or imagined boundaries between the majority group population and minority migrant groups have brought about or affected policy measures aimed at managing immigration and integration, as well as have fueled debate regarding the legitimacy of these migrant groups. In particular, European political, social and even academic rhetoric has often framed Muslims as ‘the other,’ both in terms of migrant background, and in juxtaposition with Europe’s historic Christian tradition and today’s mainstream secularism. Muslim youth face discrimination in their European communities of residence that militates against a sense of belonging, compounding the disadvantages that children of migrant parents otherwise face. Second generation Muslims negotiate pluralist realities and multiple attachments, and express complex identities. As citizens, they are entitled to comprehensive inclusion, and their rights and opportunities should be equal to that of peers with native-born parents. In reality, they can grapple with social or institutional discrimination and xenophobia.

It becomes apparent that in fostering cohesive societies and in attempting to facilitate integration, recognizing agency and a two-way dialogue between the individual and community of residence is key. The impact of globalization and transnationalism challenges modern European actors to better understand and perhaps even reconsider the relationship between the state and the individual, the nature of citizenship, and the power networks and influences behind integration policymaking and agendas. Adhering to a concept of static culture, where the individual bears the burden of adaptation, is no longer appropriate, if it ever was. New formulations of citizenship, synthesized with human rights norms and ideals, now embrace institutional and societal respect for individual rights and agency, and emphasize participation as a means to build solidarity in pluralist realities.
Within Europe, Spain provides a timely case study in exploring societal cohesion within a diverse community. Modern Spain has experienced relatively recent immigration in comparison with other European states, and the second generation is currently forming a significant part of the societal fabric as they finish their education and enter the labor market. Moreover, Spain’s unique historical and structural pluralism, as well as its decentralized governance in matters of integration, provides a novel space within which to observe and reform diversity management.

As such, given the European and Spanish contexts, Spain's second generation Muslims are a exceptionally salient population to study, both as a vulnerable minority group in the present climate, and as an important current and future citizenry. As the discussion regarding integration and diversity increasingly intensifies, a sense of belonging is thought to signify acculturation on the part of the second generation and of the receiving society. Sense of belonging can be measured through expression of self-identity; self-identification, whether with the society of residence or with religion, can facilitate support and engender a sense of belonging. Consequently, this work analyzed identity in pursuit of several objectives, via a qualitative study of second generation Muslim youth in Madrid, with participants drawing from the first and 1.5 generation for comparison. Madrid was chosen specifically in order to establish a reasonable framework for the research, as well as to demonstrate the multilevel governance of Spain and the sociological value of observing local communities. The investigation first sought to measure to what extent these youth expressed attachment to Spain, to Madrid or to their local community of residence, based on their own self-identification. It then asked whether participants self-identified religiously, and measured religiosity based on self-assessment and questions as to religious practice. The study hoped to determine whether societal attachment and religious identity were correlated. Finally, it asked whether this group's perceptions of Spanish societal and institutional reception affected how they self-identified.
The investigation was couched in theoretical grounding regarding migration and citizenship, and was conducted alongside analysis and comparison with past and current European studies. France and the United Kingdom provided earlier migration and integration learning curves and points of comparison. The empirical data then demonstrated positive trends in identification and social participation among the target population, all of which boded well for future individual trajectories, as well as for Spanish social cohesion. Most markedly, the participants manifested a hybrid identity when they engaged in identification. This multiple identity can serve as a way to measure integration, as exclusive attachment to Spain or the community of residence is not the only way to manifest belonging. Multiple attachment can in fact reflect adept adaptation and social navigation skills. It demonstrates how transnationalism and time-space compression allows for more complex identities, in a diverse contemporary reality.

Moreover, religious identification formed a part of these hybrid identities, and did not preclude but was often expressed alongside social attachment. This religious identity was either individualized and less visible and public, or was leveraged as a claims-making tool in civic engagement. In both their expressions of attachment to the community or in their religious identification, the participants related experiences of discrimination and expressed expectations of rights recognitions and societal inclusion. Essentially, this work found that citizen engagement, as well as institutional responsibility to foster participation and prevent marginalization and discrimination, is necessary for societal coexistence and success in a globalized world. It addressed how Spanish society and institutions have approached the youth's expectations for social inclusion so far, and how they could improve in supporting this collective in the future. With the consistent experiences of discrimination in this investigation providing a cautionary note, supporting these youth in their endeavors to participate in and contribute to Spanish society remains a priority: it not only affords this group the rights and protections they are due, but also promises to benefit the community as a whole.
Resumen

En las últimas décadas, el crecimiento de las comunidades de inmigrantes en Europa ha generado contextos políticos y discursivos controvertidos. Debido a una combinación de factores, las fronteras reales o imaginarias entre segmentos mayoritarios de la sociedad y miembros de minorías inmigrantes han afectado las políticas públicas dirigidas a gestionar la inmigración y la integración, y han alimentado debates sobre la legitimidad de estos grupos migrantes. En particular, una retórica política, social y a veces incluso académica en Europa ha señalado a los musulmanes como "el otro", tanto en términos de sus orígenes inmigrantes como en yuxtaposición con la tradición cristiana de Europa y el secularismo actual. Los jóvenes musulmanes son objeto de discriminación en sus comunidades de residencia europeas, lo que milita en contra de los sentimientos de pertenencia, agravando las desventajas a las que los hijos de padres migrantes se enfrentarían en todo caso. Los musulmanes de segunda generación negocian realidades pluralistas y apegos múltiples, y expresan identidades complejas. Como ciudadanos, tienen derecho a la inclusión integral, y sus derechos y oportunidades deben ser iguales a las de los jóvenes de padres nacidos en el país. Sin embargo, se enfrentan a la discriminación social o institucional y a la xenofobia.

Para fomentar la cohesión social y facilitar la integración es crucial reconocer la agencia de los migrantes y promover un diálogo bidireccional entre el individuo y la comunidad. El impacto de la globalización y el transnacionalismo compelen a los actores europeos modernos a comprender mejor, y quizás incluso a reconsiderar, la relación entre el estado y el individuo, la ciudadanía y las redes de poder que subyacen a las políticas y agendas de integración. Adherirse a un concepto de estático de cultura, donde el individuo soporta la carga de la adaptación, ya no es aceptable, si alguna vez lo fue. Las actuales formulaciones de la ciudadanía, amalgamadas con normas e ideales de derechos humanos, reclaman respeto institucional y social de los derechos y de la agencia individual, y hacen
hincapié en la participación como una vía para construir la solidaridad en sociedades diversas y pluralistas.

Dentro de Europa, España puede dar lugar a un estudio de caso particularmente adecuado para explorar la cohesión social en una sociedad diversa. La España moderna ha recibido una inmigración relativamente reciente en comparación con otros estados europeos, y en ella la llamada segunda generación está empezando a suponer una parte significativa del tejido social a medida que los jóvenes que la protagonizan finalizan su educación y entran en el mercado laboral. Además, el pluralismo histórico y estructural de España, así como su gobernanza descentralizada en materia de integración, proporciona un espacio singular dentro del cual observar y quizás reformar la gestión de la diversidad.

A la luz del contexto europeo y español, los musulmanes de segunda generación en España constituyen una población excepcionalmente significativa para su estudio, como un grupo minoritario vulnerable en el clima actual y a la vez como una importante parte de la ciudadanía actual y futura. A medida que se intensifica el debate sobre la integración y la diversidad, el desarrollo de sentimientos de pertenencia puede suponer aculturación por parte de la segunda generación y también de la sociedad receptora. El sentido de pertenencia se puede medir a través de la expresión de la propia identidad; la autoidentificación, ya sea con la sociedad de residencia o con la religión, puede proporcionar redes de apoyo y engendrar un sentimiento de pertenencia. En consecuencia, este trabajo analiza la identidad persiguiendo varios objetivos, a través de un estudio cualitativo de la juventud musulmana de segunda generación en Madrid, añadiendo miembros de la primera generación y la generación 1,5 a efectos de comparación. Madrid fue elegida específicamente para establecer un marco razonable para la investigación, así como para poner de manifiesto la gobernanza multinivel que existe en España y el valor sociológico de la observación de las comunidades locales. En una primera instancia, la investigación ha tratado de medir en qué medida estos jóvenes expresan apego a España, a Madrid o a su comunidad de residencia local, basándose en su propia autoidentificación. Luego indagó acerca de si los participantes se identificaban a
sí mismos en términos religiosos, y midió la religiosidad basándose en la autoevaluación y en preguntas sobre la práctica religiosa. La investigación trataba de determinar si el apego social y la identidad religiosa estaban correlacionados. Finalmente, indagó acerca de si las percepciones de este grupo sobre la recepción social e institucional de la sociedad española afectaban a la forma en que se autoidentificaban.

La investigación se ha basado en diversos fundamentos teóricos sobre la migración y la ciudadanía, y se ha desarrollado en paralelo con el análisis y la comparación con estudios europeos pasados y actuales. Francia y el Reino Unido han proporcionado curvas de aprendizaje y puntos de comparación con experiencias de inmigración e integración más antiguos. Los hallazgos empíricos han puesto de manifiesto tendencias positivas en la identificación y participación social de esta población, lo que supone un buen pronóstico para sus trayectorias individuales futuras, así como para la cohesión social española. De forma acusada, las identificaciones de los participantes han revelado una identidad híbrida. Esta identidad múltiple puede proporcionar una forma de medir la integración, ya que la pertenencia exclusiva a España o a la comunidad de residencia no es la única forma de expresar sentimientos de pertenencia. De hecho, las pertenencias múltiples pueden reflejar destrezas para la adaptación y habilidades para la navegación social. Esta tendencia híbrida demuestra que el transnacionalismo y la compresión del espacio-tiempo permiten la construcción de identidades más complejas, en una realidad contemporánea diversa.

Más aún, la identificación religiosa formaba parte de estas identidades híbridas, y no excluía, sino que a veces se expresaba en paralelo a ella, la pertenencia social. Esta identidad religiosa era de carácter individual y poco visible y pública, o era utilizada como una herramienta para la reivindicación en la participación cívica. Tanto en sus expresiones de apego a la comunidad como en su identificación religiosa, los participantes relataron experiencias de discriminación y expresaron expectativas de reconocimiento de derechos e inclusión social. Esencialmente, esta investigación ha puesto de manifiesto que la participación ciudadana, así como la responsabilidad institucional para fomentar la
participación y prevenir la marginación y la discriminación, son necesarias para la convivencia social y el buen funcionamiento en un mundo globalizado. El estudio ha abordado la cuestión de cómo la sociedad y las instituciones españolas han tratado las expectativas de los jóvenes respecto de su inclusión social hasta el momento, y examinado cómo podrían mejorar su apoyo a este colectivo en el futuro. Mientras las repetidas experiencias de discriminación observadas en esta investigación proporcionan una nota de advertencia, el apoyo a estos jóvenes en sus esfuerzos por participar en, y contribuir a, la sociedad española constituye una prioridad: no solo otorga a este grupo los derechos y la protección a los que son acreedores, sino que también promete beneficiar al conjunto de la sociedad.
Dedication

To all those who feel they belong “neither here nor there”
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Chapter I: Introduction

Over the past few decades, Europe has experienced significant immigration, yet a boundary often remains between minority migrant groups and native European society. Member states consequently address immigration with integration policies in order to ameliorate differences. However, despite these efforts, and given the Christian tradition and secular paradigm of Europe, some are wary of the recent increase in Muslim immigration. It is argued that Islam is illegitimate in European society, and this suspicion is compounded with reservations society may have about immigration in general. Public debates present Islam as “the other,” separate from and incompatible with Western ideals. Yet, from the perspective of Muslim minorities, religious identity can facilitate social support, continuity of heritage and a guys’guiding worldview. There are contentions that secularization has assumed an exclusive and dominant ideology in Europe, and rather than seeking social cohesion and coexistence via diversity management, as international liberal democratic recommendations prescribe, European religious minorities face stigmatization and both institutional and societal obstacles to inclusion.

The debate assumes an even more complex dimension when addressing second generation immigrants, or youth of migrant origin, self-identifying as Muslims. Studies to date suggest that the institutional arrangements of each country, including approaches to religious freedom (i.e. individual and collective rights), church state-relations, and immigrant incorporation, can influence a sense of belonging to respective member states or societies among these second generation Muslims. Indeed, how the second generation identifies with its society is a sensitive issue, because as citizens (in the majority of cases, to be elaborated

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1 It is of note that the term "second generation immigrant" can be qualified as imprecise, as this second generation can refer to native-born individuals who have not migrated, rather than foreign born like their parents. In this sense, they are by definition not immigrants. However, it is a term used in the field to identify this population set. It will be used interchangeably with “youth of migrant origin” to refer to the population studied. Further clarification, including as to the distinction between 1.5 and second generation and the parameters defining second generation, and why they are significant, is provided later in this work.
upon in further depth) they are entitled to comprehensive inclusion in their societies of residence. Their rights and opportunities should be equal to that of peers with native-born parents.

As part of these rights, international norms and liberal democratic values entitle these second generation Muslim youth to maintain and express diverse identities, doing so without being subject to discrimination. Some of these identities have been investigated in recent years and presented as multi-layered and plural. Still other research has signaled reactive identities, a lack of a sense of belonging to the society of residence, and a marginalization of this population. Modern Europe, facing the impact of globalization and transnationalism, faces policymaking challenges in migration and agendas of integration. Integration is defined variously among different authors; generally, however, the notion of integration conceptualizes of everything that happens after an immigrant arrives to their new country (Cachón 2011). Zanfrini further offers that it could be conceived of as a process of socialization engaged in by the individual, where society and culture are united in values and behavior. In addition, she provides a definition of integration that incorporates the element of modernity, explaining that integration is often conceptualized as the problem presented when recently arrived immigrants must assimilate in an industrial and modern culture (2007). As such, integration is a contentious concept, in that it is arguably intended to create homogeneity in a reality that is increasingly diverse. Indeed, authors have questioned whether integration is even an ideological position, especially in the case of Spain, and have explored its degree of uniqueness to the European experience (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011; Brettell 2008). At the same time, it is of standard usage in the literature, and serves as an international reference, to indicate policy attempts at societal cohesion. It will be employed as necessary, for pragmatic purposes, throughout the argument of this work.

A variety of indicators are essential in evaluating societal integration of any given group, and traditional indicators like social capital and education are often emphasized. While sense of belonging, the subject of investigation in this study, is a soft indicator, it still
provides a predictor of social mobility and perceived successful societal inclusion. Belonging, in its most basic sense, can be understood as an individual's orientation towards, and interaction with, the environment of which they form a part. Sense of belonging can be evaluated via an understanding of how the subject self-identifies, both at the individual and collective level. It is sometimes used interchangeably with the concept of identity, and can often be associated with citizenship themes in the literature. For example, within migration specifically, it can signify the relations that people and their descendants experience with varying locations and fluctuating social and political environments. As Western states pursue policies encouraging either inclusion or exclusion, in both immigration and integration legislation, attention is directed toward the individual and the sense of belonging that they construct and experience. Meanwhile, the “politics of belonging” is a phrase used to indicate political attempts to construct belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006).

In the process of constructing belonging, these second generation youth negotiate two or more cultures and identities, as well as any disadvantages inherent to their individual situations. Responsibility is twofold, however; in addition to the efforts of these youth, society as a whole must balance an emphasis on integration and cohesion with respect for an increasingly diverse reality. This can be managed via protection of individual and collective autonomy and rights. In a both globalized and individualized modern European culture, second generation identity can be diversified even within a specific, local community, and accounts of super-diversity are increasingly prevalent (Vertovec 2007). As recognized at the European normative level, integration and identity is based not only on the second generation's individual choice, but is also shaped by their very own societies: society's approach to nationalism and difference can significantly affect identity among second generation Muslims in Europe.

The Spanish case is of particular interest, as a variety of factors make it unique. It has a distinct modern historical, political and societal context in comparison with other countries in Europe, as well as a comparatively more recent immigration wave. Spanish public opinion
and political culture has been described as more welcoming and positively oriented towards immigration in comparison with the rest of Europe, even in the wake of economic crisis (Barrero 2009a; Cea D’Ancona and Valles 2012; Gallup 2007). Some studies have indicated that the second generation seems to be well-adjusted, more so in comparison with other countries in Europe (Aparicio 2006). There may be several reasons as to why Spanish society seems to view immigration more favorably than surrounding Europe, including the demographics, political culture and national identity that stem from Spain’s recent history.

Present-day immigration began as recently as the 1980s and reached substantial flows in the new millennium. The majority of immigrants entered the country contributing to the workforce and GDP, thus representing a societal advantage (Arango 2012). Additionally, Spain’s political culture embraced democratic and universalistic values in its transition from dictatorship to democracy, facilitating positive attitudes toward immigration (Ibid.).

In fact, regarding immigration from a diversity perspective, this singular post-dictatorship era is the space wherein the Spanish example provides the most significant promise, as well as presents the most challenges. With the case of Islam in particular, cultural links can be traced to the historical legacy of Al-Andalus, or to the colonial relationship with Morocco and subsequent continued institutional engagement in immigration policy. Conversely, the Franco regime attempted to maintain a homogeneous, monolingual and monotheistic version (i.e. Christian) version of being Spanish (Zapata 2010). At this point, however, the recently constructed and developing modern democracy has taken a new direction. Despite the homogeneity pursued prior to this young democracy, the pluralistic makeup of Spain has consistently remained a reality, with its national-regional identifications (i.e. Basque, Catalan and Galician, among others) (Arango 2012). Spain has worked towards multi-level governance and providing local autonomy in attempts to respect this pluralism.

Still, it could be argued that there have been failings in regard to diversity management, with issues related to religious, linguistic and regionalism or nationalism remaining unresolved in the democratic transition (Zapata 2010). For example, in a
reevaluation of the relationship between church and state in the post-dictatorship democracy construction, Spain allowed for a concordatarian church-state structure. In this arrangement, the state recognizes and engages with religious bodies, including Islam. However, the country’s extensive Catholic history leaves traces of institutional Catholic privilege. This, in combination with more recent increasing secularist attitudes and views that religion is illegitimate in the public sphere (shared in other parts of Europe), can shape a society that is resistant to manifestations of Islam. Additionally, not unlike analyses regarding the rest of Europe, a rise in experiences of discrimination and Islamophobia has been recorded in some Spanish studies (D’Ancona and Valles 2012; Tellez 2011). Along with this trend in typifying Islam as the other, the slow recovery of the post-recession labor market and the variability of which party gains political power could affect overall positive attitudes to immigration (Arango 2012).

In light of all this, Spain provides a particularly distinct and timely case study. As Zapata offers, “Spain is a laboratory of diversities” (2010). The second generation is gaining more visibility and is rooted more firmly in Spain’s demography. Maturing and developing Spanish society and institutions are positioned to approach diversity management and societal inclusion with the learning curves of other European countries as demonstrative of what to pursue or avoid. The inclusion of Muslim populations, and in particular the Muslim second generation or youth of migrant origin, is an important objective in liberal democratic societies that emphasize respecting individual and collective rights; there is a commitment to provide equality and opportunity within cohesive communities. In attempting to balance an inclusive society with respect for plurality and individual diversity, research in the field must necessarily examine individual contexts or networks at the local level. They provide exemplary microcosms from which to learn specific findings, as opposed to postulating less evidence-based, grand conjectures.

For example, in Spain, native attitudes towards immigration may vary by region. Some argue national or regional identification can predict intercultural dynamics or anti-
immigrant sentiment among Basques, Catalans and Galicians (Escandell and Ceobanu 2010). For example, in regard to attitudes towards Muslim immigration, Astor points out that while there is a virtual lack of opposition to mosque building in Madrid, significant opposition exists in Barcelona (and, at the same time, the latter situation allows for dialogue) (2014). Indeed, integration policies in Spain are often decentralized and adapted to the regional and local level and context. Of course, the pluralism noted throughout Spain, as well as the varying levels of governments, means that the situation for Muslim youth can differ from region to region or city to city.

**Research questions and hypotheses**

For this reason, in addition to noting the importance of examining the case of Muslim youth in Europe, and how the Spanish context is particularly pertinent, this study will focus on second generation Muslim youth in Madrid. This provides a concrete local case, as well as sets a reasonable goal for a population study. In light of the debates discussed, the thesis question will first attempt to address how the second generation self-identifies, with special attention to sense of belonging to their community of residence, as well as their religious identity. Sense of belonging or attachment to the community of residence is understood as an indicator of integration. Demonstrating belonging or attachment on the part of these youth is one way of indicating their participation and inclusion in the societal fabric.

This sense of belonging will also be explored in relation to religious identity to see if the two correlate, if at all. Religiosity is often cited as a barrier to integration, or at the very least as something that sets this group apart from others as they engage with European or Spanish society. This work will seek to illustrate how the population themselves believes their religiosity or “Muslimness” factors into their operation as members of the community, whether that of Madrid, Spain, or Europe. A 2003 study of the Moroccan population in Spain (not specifically youth or second generation) determined that Muslim identity was an active or influencing factor in identity and social relations (Martín, García, López and Crespo). This
work will investigate Muslim youth of migrant origin in particular (beyond solely Moroccan origin), in understanding how and if Muslim identity serves as an active and influential component in identity.

As so, primarily the dissertation is guided by an investigation into how these youth approach multiple identities and how they intermesh this individuality with their community and sense of place. There is a second component of the thesis question, however, that addresses the surrounding community’s responsibility of receptiveness, i.e., the inclusion that these youth are afforded. The dynamic that the participants perceive the community emits (and perhaps indeed objectively is) bears significant ramifications for state and society. As the second generation is perhaps striving to participate as full members of the body politic, they may feel marginalized or sidelined by institutional or societal forces, including via experiences of discrimination. Analyzing this group’s perceptions of how Spanish society or their community receives them is an important factor to take into account. Again, the study will focus on the second generation, given its relevance as previously described, but also engage with participants from generation 1.5 and the first generation to provide points of comparison. The 1.5 generation, not born in the country of residence but raised in their formative years in the very same, reflect societal processes in the receiving community and provide an important comparison in understanding societal attachment and perhaps even religious identity.

As to the hypotheses regarding this two-part inquiry, firstly, it is projected that the majority of the youth will express attachment to the community of residence (either Madrid or Spain), given that the few studies available to date have demonstrated a relatively well-adjusted Spanish second generation. Moreover, it is postulated that this attachment may not necessarily be exclusive, but can still demonstrate adaption and flourishing in the community. As youth of immigrant origin manage multiple bonds and differentiated social practices, partial attachment or “hybrid” identity may characteristic of these Spanish youth of migrant origin. This would not necessarily indicate less involvement or success in Spanish society, but
rather would reflect a promising ability to participate and cross-cut boundaries in an increasingly differentiated social sphere, exercising adept individual agency whether at the local, national or international level.

Furthermore, it is supposed that religiosity can and will serve as a determinant in individual identity, it is not an obstacle in engaging with the receiving society, as polemically expressed in the public sphere, but rather just another variable in this engagement; moreover, it could be that the degree of religiosity may facilitate or support the degree of sense of belonging. Amongst a vulnerable population that can be marginalized for a variety of reasons, religious involvement can provide a shared sense of community, as well as aid in achieving social capital and societal mobilization. For a minority group with less societal leverage, this identity and community can offer support that might otherwise be lacking.

Finally, in examining the second part of the question, it is hypothesized that perceived reception by society, including some experience of discrimination, will have an effect on the targeted variables that formulate self-identification. It seems inevitable that the internal and external, reflexive nature of identity means that institutional and societal welcome will affect participants’ feelings of attachment to their community.

Significance and contribution

In line with the problematization outlined above, this work’s central inquiry is especially meaningful, as it finds its place in a growing body of literature addressing the changing nature of citizenship: the individual navigates belonging, and society attempts to manage a space, that is diverse, global and transnational, yet simultaneously local. This is manifested on several levels. To begin, at the European level, demographic shifts and migration debates regarding citizenship and belonging complicate the practical implementation of European liberal democratic values. This is evident in the case of the discourse surrounding Islam in Europe, as institutions and societies must consider to what extent individual religious liberty remains protected, in the face of other individual or
collective rights. Within this context, Spain is working to address its recent and continued demographic shift, as well as its unique historical, social and cultural situation, in an evolving process of diversity management. It must balance a cohesive society on the one hand, avoiding the pitfalls experienced by fellow European countries at a more advanced stage of immigration. On the other hand, it must observe international recommendations for rights protections and respecting diverse individuals and collectives, on the other.

Underpinning all of this is an observation regarding the process of societal change, and analyzing how it will impact future generations. Gebhardt, Zapata and Bria estimate that the 1.5 and second generation in Spain represent about 15-19% percent of youth under 25 years old (2017). This is a substantial percentage of Spain’s future citizenry. Second generation Muslim youth are a particularly significant case study, as they remain a vulnerable minority group that may face multiple challenges, including those already documented among other Muslim European youth in Europe (briefly referenced above). Essentially, the investigation is relevant in that it hopes to treat of future strategy for reconciling both the individual as a complex and autonomous agent, and society as an inclusive community. As a result, the conclusions of this work propose anti-discrimination measures that seek such a reconciliation. Spanish Muslims are an important target group in this regard. They are citizens positioned to fully participate in Spanish society, and are growing in number, but may be more prone to disadvantages and discouraged from exercising autonomy and expressing differentiated identities.

This last observation speaks to the one of the several contributions this work can offer. The investigation reflects a trend in qualitative migration literature, while simultaneously providing for gaps in the field in terms of youth study. Yalaz and Zapata analyzed articles published between 2000 and 2016 in two leading migration journals, the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (JEMS) and *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (ERS), and found that the quantity of publication increased significantly, indicating that "such expansion is a clear signal of strong scholarly interest in issues of migration, mobility, ethnic, racial, and
cultural diversity” (2017). At the same time, they noted that among the topics of research, the category of youth was initially researched to a greater degree, but articles on the topic have declined. Again, given youth’s societal potential to contribute, and how they comprise a significant demographic, this decline in study should be rectified.

Moreover, this project is significant in that it provides a local and concrete case study as a reference during a crucial time for Spanish diversity management and demographic fluctuation. There is a projection that local level policy may perhaps exercise the most influence, and in turn receives the greatest degree of feedback and reciprocal influence from the subjects it proposes to affect (Zapata 2009b). In Spain, integration is transitioning from the political spotlight to administrative realms, local government, NGOs, and private companies (Zincone, Penninx and Borkert, 2011). Rather than the sweeping national integration models of old, it becomes increasingly important to identify how to support individual groups. Common spaces and the coexistence within them operate in a significant way at a local level (Glick-Schiller, Darieva and Gruner-Domic 2011). For this reason, the focus on Madrid has been chosen; this, of course in addition to the practical need to containing the scope of the study.

Finally, while some studies concentrate on the compatibility between attachment and religiosity, or others on the receptiveness on the receiving society, there is less available that can comprehensively approach these two considerations in tandem. Again, given the two-way nature of integration and citizenship, there is a need to canvass the challenges that this selected target group faces. However, in doing so, it is important to consider those factors that are both within and outside of their control. European youth of migrant origin are moving into the labor market, and more importantly are entering into the overall societal fabric in increasing numbers. Throughout this process, they are not only entitled to the same equality of opportunity as their peers of native origin, but also represent the societal future in the same way. Essentially, this demographic shift should not only be considered from the
perspective of population control, but also in terms of human rights and societal commitment to liberal democratic values (Cachon 2010, 1569).

Methodology

In proceeding to conduct the investigation as proposed, the work evidently necessitates empirical study. Given the specificity of the target population, the soft indicators explored and the limitations of a dissertation study, the methodology selected as most appropriate is a qualitative, inductive approach, and the research technique takes the form of a semi-structured, qualitative interview. Via a series of multiple-choice and open-ended questions, this qualitative method allows for the participant to self-report sense of belonging, religiosity and overall self-identification. As such, the study accounts for the perspective of the participants as best it can, by allowing them to set the definition of what is considered belonging or religious ascription. Of course, for context, the interview will evaluate other indicators of integration and information that could be quantified more objectively by the researcher, as well. The study sought out Muslim youth via the snowball method and through the collaboration of various Muslim youth associations. The interviews were conducted in a range of neighborhoods and cities throughout the community of Madrid, over the course of two years, from 2016 to 2018. The final sample size of 32 participants respondents (disregarding pilot interviews) was selected based on an estimate of saturation. There were a total of 19 second generation, eight 1.5 generation and 5 first generation, almost equally split between genders.

Thesis outline

In structuring this work, both a theoretical grounding and literature review indubitably provide essential framework for the empirical portion of the study. As previously alluded to, the theoretical foundation proceeds from an overview of migration theory based in the modern nation-state, to an exploration of reconfigured notions of citizenship. In light of globalization and transnationalism, new understandings of how individuals engage with the
community and formulate belonging have produced contemporary theories about how to manage diversity. These theories observe societal realities from the transnational to the local level, as well as arrive at a more nuanced understanding of identity in the modern era. Given the theoretical considerations, the study’s chosen methodology is outlined in more detail. There is an explanation of why the indicators in the qualitative research were selected and how they function, as well as a more exacting description of the interview, data collection, participant pool and limitations of the study.

In addition to the theoretical framework and methodological rationale, further complementary analysis precedes the account of empirical results. An examination of second generation Muslims in Madrid and the how they identify both with the European, Spanish or Madrid community alongside their faith demands relevant literature examination in several areas of research. To begin, a broad perspective on historical and sociopolitical realities that shape current European integration and immigration policy is useful, with a comparison between Spanish policy versus that of the United Kingdom and France. These countries provide contrast not only due to the volume of Muslim immigration each has, but in the distinctive ways in which these states approach integration; in some ways they diverge from Spain’s relatively recent immigration experience and integration measures. Moreover, in the vein of this migration focus, literature specifically addressing the second generation follows. The second generation review is not simply approached in relation to Europe, but as a whole, given it is a relatively specific and recent field that merits full contemplation in order to inform the examination of this population in Spain.

Of course, the group selected for this study is singled out in public and academic discourse not solely due to their migrant origins. They are also targeted due to their faith and the accompanying presumptions or foreign connotations associated with it, mistaken or otherwise. For this reason, a transition to the distinguishing factor of religiosity on the part of this population, especially given its distinction as a variable, ensues. There is a long history of church-state relations as well as modern debate regarding individualism and secularism.
informing the European context. All of this is often pitted against the Muslim faith, migrants, or both. Thus, the work proceeds to describe both European religious history and current policy regarding secularism, as well as overviews the trajectory of Islam in Europe. It discusses factors that impact public policy and Islam, and explores literature on Muslim integration, including providing a comparative focus on second and third generations in France and Britain.

The preceding steps are all important background: a general analysis of both migration theory and context, alongside an examination of how religion relates to systems of power, individual or collective rights and understandings of citizenship. It allows for further detail regarding the thesis question to follow. This detail includes a thorough explication of literature on identity, from its essential characteristics to a more specific account of how individual, collective and religious identity impact discussion of Muslim youth identity in Europe, and in what ways it relates to sense of belonging. Finally, the work continues to narrow the focus by providing an overview of Islam in Spain, addressing its history, the current institutional relationship, and research to date on today's community both in Spain and Madrid.

Couched in theory, the methodological strategy, as well as an account of sources and criteria treating of the migration and religious variables targeted in this study of identity, the work is positioned to finally provide the empirical results and analysis. Initial observations and patterns are identified as the data provided by the semi-structured interviews and interaction with key figures in the participants' community is reported. This information is compared to original hypotheses and analysis earlier in the work. The findings include expectations of rights that were not originally addressed as part of the research question, but emerged as an important consideration in the data collection. In the conclusions, inferences are made and relationships drawn using the trends indicated in the empirical section. This leads to theoretical takeaways, implications for policy recommendations and proposals for further academic research.
Aside from the greater aspirations addressed in the conclusions, however, this work in the meantime hopes to provide a degree of clarity, albeit on the local scale, as to the value of understanding this unique cohort’s expressions of identity and their perspectives on societal inclusion. In the context of modernity and the individual’s relationship with surrounding networks, the project seeks to answer the sociological discipline’s call for a continuous reexamination of the individual in order to provide a more exacting science. These individual accounts, provided in a very specific context, facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of agency. They allow for addressing various questions, inspired by the problematization, in an especially concrete manner. The opportunity to hone in as such is complemented and reflected by broader themes regarding participation and coexistence, which will now be detailed in the proceeding theoretical background.
Chapter II

Migration theory: The individual, the state and reconfigured notions of citizenship and belonging

Second generation Muslim youth in Spain, how they identify, and their reciprocal relationship with Spanish society are questions that typify a broader trend in social science investigation: analyzing the changing political and societal landscape in light of perceived global transformations, and how to better accommodate the pluralism that results. Until recently, study of political and societal networks has been understood within the framework of the nation state model, where individual rights are bestowed on nationals belonging to relatively closed societies. However, present transnational flows, including that of people and information, have prompted reconfigured understandings of the rights of the individual and the role of institutions, as new space and networks supersede national boundaries.

These reconsidered ideas are especially present in second generation studies. This group navigates multiple attachments, including the culture of their parents’ origin, Spanish society (in this case), and even new conceptions of global citizen. It could perhaps even be posited that youth in general, regardless of parental origin, are facing new understandings of attachment and belonging as they confront global networks and responsibilities as a local, national, or global member of society. At the same time, political and societal institutions are called upon to assume responsibility for the cohesiveness of their communities. An increasingly prevalent and accepted understanding is that this cohesiveness requires incorporating pluralism and respecting the unalienable rights of the individual, and that cohesiveness involves a two-way process. The child of migrant origin in Spain, and in this case specifically, those with parents that identify as Muslim, reflects the significance of the relationship between the individual, or individual collectives, and state and societal networks. For example, some studies across Europe have reflected that this group faces marginalization and exclusion.
As such, this chapter will proceed to explore how the individual has remained a consistent theme in the literature, and continues to remain relevant given these apparently global transformations. Throughout this exploration of the individual, it will highlight how a cohesive dynamic between individual and state or society can be reflected through sense of belonging, and the obligation to forge this relationship is both on the part of the individual and society. To begin, the trajectory of migration theory will be especially useful in demonstrating this continued investigation of the individual in relation to the state. The concept of citizenship and its reformulation will also be important to address, as it previously marked the formal relationship between the individual and state or society, but is currently being redefined or even superseded with new terms or concepts. In this vein, additionally clarifying the terms globalization and belonging will prove useful. Then, provided this sketch of the relevant theory to date, I will present more recent study of transnationalism, diversity and hybridity and how these concepts reflect reformulations of citizenship and the understanding of an individual’s place in society. Finally, given that the object of study is second generation Muslim youth, it will be useful to hold a brief discussion of how religion factors into these theories of the individual, belonging and societal transformation (to be followed by more in depth explanation in a later chapter).

Migration theory and the modern nation-state

To orient the discussion, theories of migration can be initially understood within the context of the modern nation-state trajectory. Migration theory grew into its own as a discipline in the 1960s, and the field continues to rapidly grow and evolve (Arango 2000; Yalaz and Zapata 2017). For the purposes of this work, especially in targeting the second generation and their unique individual identities, I will examine migration theory through the lens of the individual, or better put, through an evolving understanding of the state and its relationship with the individual. This will include an overview of theory grounded in the nation-state paradigm, before demonstrating an evolution into a migration theory approach
in the context of reformulated concepts of state and citizenship, all with a consequent emphasis on the individual (and their multiple or intersecting identities).

As such, in beginning with the modern nation-state context of migration theory, it is perhaps obvious to note that the history of the modern state involves a shift in sovereignty from that of the ruler to the sovereignty of the people, with territorial state boundaries and national sovereignty (Sassen 1996). However, with the process of globalization, and in the postwar era of a challenged nation-state paradigm, migration and international flows progressively confront traditional state authority. This struggle for authority is both in physical terms, with loss of border control, as well as via electronic, legal and economic space that replaces territorial boundaries with the symbolic (Sassen 1996; Soysal 1997; Brettell 2008). In migration studies, and in Western European dialectic, the state has transitioned from the traditional conception of nation-state, understood as owned by a certain nation or ethnic group to the exclusion of others, to a liberal state based on a commitment to individual rights that self-limit the state's own authority, to be further explored in a discussion of citizenship and accompanying reconfigured notions (Joppke 2005). This new liberal state, while still linked to nation-state moorings as a collective with history, has proceeded to admit individuals into its membership, rather than dealing with admission on a group basis (Ibid.). This can be seen in the example of first generation migrants allowed pathways to citizenship in their receiving country, with full rights and participation. While the second generation are purportedly entitled to these rights de facto, having been born into the host society, they often still have to advocate for full recognition and participation.

And so, when seeking an understanding of migration in the context of globalization, a new understanding of societal processes shifts from an emphasis on the nation-state framework to one on the individual. The relationship between the state and the individual can be conceived of either as a twofold linking of the individual to the state, through both the individual and the individual's community, or simply recognizing that an individual must be implicated in order to receive or demand the citizenship that the state offers (Kymlicka 2003;
Bloemraad 2000). In lieu of the nation-state, some have argued to a conception of the state that is embedded in a series of associations and networks of power (Castells 2000; Gupta 1995; Mitchell 1991). This observation stems from Foucault’s observation that the complexity of power is visible at the individual level (1979). And while traditional institutions remain important, as Sassen puts it, “The space of traditional governance is shrinking, even though it remains the most strategically important and powerful” (2017, 8).

Moreover, a discourse of rights emphasizes individual autonomy at the trans- and international level, beyond the nation-state. This rights discourse includes the right to immigrate and its significance for the community. There are views that democracy is improved via recognition and support of migrants’ transnational ties or multiple identities (Vertovec 2001). From this perspective, immigration as a social right is a reality that affects all of society, most especially public institutions, and not solely the immigrants it receives (Cahon 2011). This principle is reflected in those of several transnational legal frameworks and institutions. While migration policy remains a prerogative of the individual state, many states abide by certain international legal frameworks reflecting these principles of international unalienable rights.

**Citizenship**

While international and transnational realities propound, the state and citizenship and the evolving nature of the relationship between the two remains a key consideration. While migration and the protection of the rights of the individual constitutes a responsibility of public policy at various levels, it still often falls within the jurisdiction of a state to varying degrees. Traditional conceptions of citizenship often fall within the confines of the nation-state, and the state has regulated migration via citizenship. As such, the state has held large responsibility for immigration and integration policies, both of which obviously affect societal incorporation of European Muslim youth, and a further detailing of immigration and integration policies in Europe and Spain will follow in later chapters. Meanwhile, this analysis
will begin with an overall synopsis of traditional citizenship, before continuing on to new theories of citizenship and belonging that emphasize individual rights and autonomy, all of which has implications for the second generation.

Citizenship has been traditionally understood in relation to the state, as citizenship historically signified membership and participation within a nation-state. Simply put, this traditional citizenship is defined as individual membership in a socio-political community (the state), with reference to "legal status rights, identity, and participation" (Bloemraad 2000). Citizenship and nationality become confused at times. This is because at a conceptual level, citizenship is often used to denote a juridical idea including rights and obligations, whereas nationality is often used to refer to mutual recognition as a fellow member of the community; it implies a shared ethnicity or recognized cultural belonging. This confusion comes as no surprise, of course: state and nation, as well as citizenship and nationality, overlap and intertwine as a result of the nation-state membership model.

However, in the international legal regime, nationality is the term used to indicate membership in a state, and this membership is prerequisite to obtaining full rights within that state, as a citizen. This nationality varies from state to state based on differing levels of recognition (Ibid.). Access to this national citizenship often takes the route of either jus sanguinis (citizenship by blood) or jus soli (citizenship by birth in a territory) depending on each state’s institutional framework. Moreover, one can obtain it via other routes, including marriage or naturalization.

In short, citizenship and nationality can manifest distinctions in the legal field. However, the concepts, depending on their usage and by whom, can be merged or confused. For the purposes of this work, although there may be some technical distinction, any reference to an individual as a national or a citizen (including participants in the study) will be indicating national citizenship (unless clarified or specified otherwise). This national citizenship can be defined as "congruence between territorial state and the national community; national belonging as the source of rights and duties of individuals as well as
their collective identity. Hence, what national citizenship denotes is a territorially bounded population with a specific set of rights and duties, excluding others on the ground of nationality” (Soysal 1996, 18).

Anderson’s “imagined communities” of nations, where the citizen feels a sense of community with fellow nationals despite having no demonstrable attachments, comes to mind in these definitions of citizenship (2006, 6). And of course, these discussions of citizenship very clearly stem from the modern nation-state trajectory. However, new understandings of citizenship have developed beyond the bounds of the nation-state. The literature has pursued an exploration of a symbolic sense of belonging, and how it requires the conferral of more or different rights and understanding than it did before (Cachon 2011). In psychological terms, citizenship is understood as the identity and solidarity that a person experiences in the collective or public sphere. Thus, it is perhaps not tied to the traditional definition of the nation, and far less to a legal understanding (Zanfrini 2007). Here we see that the individual is not only important in relation to a nation, but also in terms of their own self-identification and participation in any community.

It should be noted that while this work is moving towards an understanding of citizenship that encompasses solidarity, employing citizenship as a means to engender collective identity is a hotly debated topic in the literature (Bloemraad 2000; Yuval-Davis 2006). For example, Fraser hails from the camp that citizenship no longer remains relevant: “what turns a collection of people into fellow members of a public is not shared citizenship, but their co-imbrication in a common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their lives” (2007). This “common set of structures” that affects the public are a set of transnational powers held accountable by democratic, transnational collectives “of public opinion” (Ibid).

This “co-imbrication” that Fraser refers to does not necessarily imply an inherent sense of belonging, and an individual may not feel compelled to buy into a membership model that prescribes this. A specific example of this qualified form of membership can be found in multicultural and transnational spaces: an immigrant can lack citizenship but still operate
fairly cogently within the socio-political community (Brubaker 1989). Citizenship itself may be of less value to an individual than their position in the labor market or education system (Ibid.).

Still, in keeping with the current drift in migration studies, the shift towards framing citizenship within the context of participatory membership and a communitarian nature is especially conducive to our approach to the individual identity. This approach to citizenship also includes an emphasis on the individual actor, rather than remaining solely within the framework of the state and bestowed rights. For the purposes this work, citizenship and an understanding of the individual’s role in society will encompass, as Rodriguez aptly puts it, “all of the rights and obligations—individual, universal, and at the level of the community and the state—that identify the participation or intervention in public matters of a member of society” (2017, 261). Further development of this definition proceeds in the following discussion of more recent theory that addresses an increasingly fluid and interconnected social reality.

**Belonging**

Discussing the communitarian aspect of citizenship merits an explanation of the term ‘belonging,’ mentioned earlier. Consideration of a shared community carries with it an attempt to identify belonging and social cohesion, especially in relation to public policies of inclusion. ‘Belonging,’ in its most basic sense, can be understood as an individual’s orientation towards, and interaction with, the environment of which they form a part (Albiez 2011). Within migration specifically, it can signify the relations that people and their descendants experience in varying locations and fluctuating social and political environments (Cachon 2011). As Western states pursue policies encouraging either inclusion or exclusion, in both legislating and implementing immigration and integration, attention is directed toward the individual and the sense of belonging that they construct and experience.
One indicator of how the second generation is incorporated into society, to be
examined in more depth in chapters treating of the second generation and integration
indicators, is this very sense of belonging. According to a definition of citizenship that
encompasses communal cohesion, it would be desirable that all individuals experience this
belonging. Yet, the second generation, despite representing the societal future and forming
part of the current citizenry, are more at risk of being marginalized and lacking such a sense
of belonging. ‘Belonging’ can entail various aspects in its definition. For example, Yuval-Davis
defines belonging in terms of social spaces and “constructions of individual and collective
identities and attachments,” as well as the way in which these processes are “valued and
judged” (2006, 203). So, belonging entails some form of identity construction, attachment,
and value judgements or perceptions of these constructions and attachments. The aspect of
agency can be important as well, as this “human togetherness” can only be achieved via the
stranger’s “right to choose” their belonging rather than the surrounding community or state
alone given the power to define the stranger (Bauman 1997, 57). Finally, belonging can
become complicated in the current reality, as the individual is called upon to navigate
multiple groups, systems, and “bonds of belonging,” each with their own set of rules; the
individual is obligated to continually adapt (Melucci 1997, 61). Both individual and collective
identity surface in these examinations of belonging, and it is difficult to clarify whether new
societal transformations impact individual and collective agency, or vice versa.

**Globalization**

Given the systems of power that individuals are forced to contend with in an age of
globalization, individuals may seek collective identities and belonging based in ethnicities,
religion and regionalism, beyond the traditional fault lines of the state (Castles and Davidson
2000). A digression is useful at this point, in order to identify the frequently reoccurring term,
‘globalization,’ before further examining thought development regarding the individual and
citizenship. The term is often cited in the development of new social theory that affects this
study, and indeed has already been referenced here. Globalization is often popularly understood as integration of financial markets. However, it has been debated in the context of international networks, including networks of information, in which it purportedly marks a societal shift not only economically but culturally, socially and politically (Elliott and Lemert 2006).

In relation to social science, there are three founding theories regarding the concept. Firstly, Wallerstein explains globalization as a new term for the processes of capitalism (2004). A second theory identifies globalization as an institutional phenomenon, with world organizations uniformizing their practices (Lechner 2005; Meyer et al. 1997). However, in the context of this work, an understanding of globalization as Robertson first defined it makes sense, given a broader debate on migration and culture. He treated globalization as a concept referring to the “compression of the world,” and an intensified world consciousness as whole (Robertson 1992). Still, a more general definition from our approach could include, “the growing interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all aspects of society” (Jones 2006, 2). Giddens also offers a useful account of how modernity brought about the globalization of social activity, activity which is oriented towards worldwide connections. He also provides a more general, starting point definition: “Globalisation concerns the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations ‘at distance’ with local contextualities” (1991, 21).

While these transnational trends are significant, there is a danger in using a vague terminology of “globalization” to refer to an uncontrolled, impetus of societal change. Friedman and Ekholm distinguish that globalization is not so much an analysis of a phenomenon in process, but rather a discourse. This discourse implies a critique and drive to establish a new intellectual configuration of the world that sheds tradition and imperialism. They argue the discourse is flawed in several aspects, and contend that historical processes are not as novel as depicted, and explains how historical transformation has taken place and continues to occur at the local level (2013). Yet while the implications of globalization may
not be completely novel phenomena, the need to study societal change remains, especially in light of what is considered to be recent change. And again, in conducting this study, it should be noted that the individual has always been present, even in the nation-state model; it continuously promised a protection of the rights of the individual, albeit increasingly simultaneously increasingly consolidating its own power. Now the focus turns to how the unalienable freedoms of individuals can be addressed in a post-nation state model, in light of the networks of power and new flows of both information and people mentioned (Bauman 1997).

**Individuals and new formulations of citizenship and belonging**

Study of the individual, of course, has quite a lengthy history in a number of disciples, and is ever so germane in our area of research. There has been a substantial degree of recent consensus in the sociological field that the study of society calls for a close examination of the individual, and that it is at the level of individual experience that we are called to recreate the sociological imagination (Martuccelli 2013). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim present an account of individualization in a second modernity, citing many studies and trends in Western modern society. They emphasize the new generations’ call to an “ethic of self-fulfillment,” and “life of one’s own,” asserting that new demands are made on individuals to be responsible and held culpable for their own life trajectories, instead of the state or society (Beck 2002).

Individualization represents an ongoing structural process, intrinsically connected to institutions, that engages individuals in both opportunities and risks, and reflects the relationship of the individual to society (Ibid.). Giddens similarly speaks of a reflexive project of self that feeds into a new “life politics” in society (1991).

These claims of individualization in modernity are not only pertinent to reformulated understandings of power structures and the state, citizenship, immigration and integration; what is more, it interacts in an interesting way with the study of religion and religiosity. Several studies on Islam in Europe have indicated that a growing number of younger Muslims
are reapplying Islam in a European context, breaking with some traditional Muslim sources and expressions and emphasizing the ethical and spiritual values, and individual spiritual relationship, instead (Martín 2003; Nielsen). Moreover, if indeed society has become much more individualist, this can even prompt individuals towards a solidarity found in religion (Castien 2012).

And so, in the context of modernity and an emphasis on individual agency, this work explores the individual's interaction with surrounding networks, including state, society and religion. Manifestations of racism, discrimination and xenophobia directed towards Muslims in Europe, as well as the growing Muslim youth demographic targeted in this study, engage the attention of political actors. This raises questions about society's responsibility to accommodate and protect the individual. As alluded to earlier, personhood and individual rights have legitimatized individual claims to the extent that nation-state affiliation no longer automatically takes precedent (Soysal 1997). Given this shift towards an emphasis on the individual within the context of migration theory and societal cohesion, several schools of thought, concepts and new terminology have populated the literature. A particular focus on the visibility of diverse and transnational practices and identities underlie these new areas of research.

**Transnationalism and responses to multiculturalism**

In an effort to briefly outline this progression, it is useful to note that beginning in the 1970s, both theoretical and practical attempts to approach migration and specifically integration were manifested in terms of multiculturalism (concrete examples with country case studies will follow in a later chapter). However, while attempts were made at policy implementation of multiculturalism, these attempts or inclusive vision did not translate smoothly to processes and practices of multiculturalism (Martiniello 2007). Indeed, the limits to and ambiguity of multiculturalism has remained a point of contention in both academic and politic debate. Primarily, there is the contention that "culture" may remain a colonial,
essentialized concept, and serves as a divide between migrants and the rest of society. However, some still advocate for multiculturalism’s viability. They argue for a reconfiguration, or better and more precise understanding, of the idea, admitting the need to recognize that there are indeed specific needs to be addressed, and discrimination to avoid (Modood 2013; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2006; Kymlicka 2003). These proponents argue for an improved and more precise understanding of the concept. For example, Baumann conceives of a multiculturalism that operates via a relationship triangle between the state, ethnicity and religion. Rather than a system of multiplied groups, multiculturalism is a system of pluralistic practices applied to the self and others (1999). Again, how different approaches to integration and accommodation employing the multiculturalism approach were implemented in policy and practice will be explored in further detail in Chapter Four’s overview of integration policies in Europe and Spain.

However, for the purposes of outlining continual progression in the theoretical literature, it must be noted there remained something of a consensus that a single approach to integration or accommodation is no longer a viable solution (Rodríguez 2010). On the heels of multiculturalism, transnationalism (already referenced earlier) became increasingly addressed in migration studies in the 1980s, principally in the field of anthropology (Waldinger 2013). Transnationalism, rather than an approach to immigration or integration, instead represents an area of study, and came to the forefront in the 1990s when Portes called for a new field of research (Waldinger 2013, Portes 1999). Of course, transnationalism would confront traditional notions of citizenship, as more space is created beyond the traditional nation-state (Bloemraad 2000). Until recent decades, at least the political aspect of migration theory has operated within the concept of a closed society (Bauböck 2003). For example, one can turn to the work of Rawls and his proposition that the individual chooses and demonstrates loyal exclusively to one state (Rawls 1971).

When transnationalism first circled through political and economic theory, contestations that the nation-state remained relevant continued. In fact, there is the
argument that transnationalism does not have to be understood as undermining traditional citizenship, but should rather be factored into a new understanding of the concept of citizenship. Transnational migration, in turn, can be defined as a phenomenon involving multiple "memberships, rights and practices that reflect a simultaneous belonging of migrants to two different political communities" (Bauböck 2003). In reminding emphasizing the relevance of the nation-state, Bauböck reminds that simplistically treating transnationalism as a threat to the nation-state, rather than viewing it as mutually influenced by national politics, could lead to mistaken understandings of how it truly works (2003).

Of course, the concept or possibility of transnationalism is not particularly recent. Instead, the advance of technology and increasingly globalized space has catalyzed its continuous evolution. Transnational connections have been highlighted in the form of remittances that migrant communities send back to their countries of origin. However, especially in light of second generation transnationalism, the term has come to signify much more than economic connotations (Vertovec 2001). Now transnationalism occupies political, social and cultural spaces in addition to the economic space that had remained a focus. In discussing transnationalism, Vertovec enjoins to keep several points to mind: that perhaps the phenomenon itself is not as new, albeit the plethora of growing literature is; that technology should not be taken for granted as a cause but examined in a less deterministic manner; and that transnationalism should not be positioned in contra to other processes of integration and assimilation (2001). Again, this argues that transnationalism does not have to be understood as undermining traditional citizenship, but can rather be considered in a reformulation of the citizenship concept.

Some argue that there is not yet enough data to support whether transnationalism is advantageous or disadvantageous for the migrant, the sending or the host society (Bloemraad 2005). At the same time, transnationalism remains a practical reality that the migration literature and social science as a whole must and continues to address (Massey 1998). Moreover, transnationalism can serve not only in examining first generation migrants but
should also be considered in the continuous examination of second generation patterns. As seen in this work, second generation youth can still maintain transnational connections. But perhaps it is not as useful to speak in general about transnational phenomena, but rather to proceed on to the various terms and concepts applied in specific contexts within migration theory; as Waldinger puts it, a “disaggregated view” of transnationalism (2013). This may help to address the shift from the nation-state to transnational space.

Again, and perhaps stemming from lack of success with integration policies, while earlier the discussion was couched in terms of multiculturalism and bounded ethnicities, the academic debate has turned to a conversation about fluidity, including the study of transnationalism. There is also a discourse of diversity, which may even signify for migration scholarship what intersectionality signifies for feminist studies (Berg and Sigona 2013; Yuval-Davis 2006). Indeed, multiple and intersecting identities have come to define migration literature and understanding of migrant groups. Bounded ethnicities no longer serve as a tool to analyze increasingly diverse urban spaces, and as we will see, this especially applies in the case of the second generation and layered identities. Diversity has also served as a useful approach in that it allows for investigation of differences at the local level. Proponents of “diversity management” at the policy level argue that full citizenship rights include the sociocultural in order to guarantee full societal participation, and thus societal cohesion via a comprehensive sense of belonging (Rodriguez 2017). A salient example includes second generation Muslim youth, who may express diverse or hybrid identities while still expecting full societal participation and representation, as they are promised in their liberal democratic rights.

In reckoning with these complexities, and in studying the implications of transnationalism, Vertovec coined an additional term, “super-diversity,” to express a notion encompassing the interplay between a wide variety of variables (beyond ethnicity), and the outcomes that arise, as a result of patterns of migration. These variables include origin country, migration flows, legal status, locality, labor market access, transnationalism, and the
response of local institutions and society (Vertovec 2007). This “super-diversity” also reflects the general principle underlying the diversity approach: that citizenship can operate in multiple spaces apart from the national, including the local and transnational, and that bounded notions of culture are a false starting point in understanding identity. Indeed, in self-identifying, the second generation may sometimes not be restricted to an ethnicity, like “Moroccan,” or “Spanish,” but rather may identify with their religion, their city, and so forth.

Super-diversity has been used in studies emphasizing that in examining the factor of difference, inequalities accompany that difference. However, these studies have been somewhat limited in that they have not addressed “vertical” power influences, like national sentiment or formal institutions, and how the local community interaction is also embedded in these influences (Foner, Duyvendak & Kasinitz, 2017). Despite a changing demographic of super-diverse settings, including cities with mainstream minorities, formerly majority groups can still remain dominant (Ibid.). Still, super-diversity proponents continue to strive to address any shortcomings, and it certainly has arisen as a prominent and widely utilized alternative to the multiculturalism concept (Ibid.). In fact, diversity as a concept attempts to avoid the criticism levied at both multiculturalism and even hybridity (to be discussed further): that implying a mixing of essentialized, defined elements is unrepresentative of reality, and that it is unlikely that individual or collective identities are a combination of initially well-defined categories.

**The cosmopolitan and the local**

This interaction at the individual and local level continues to encourage various research angles and terminology. As such, ‘cosmopolitanism’ is another concept or term that has surfaced. One definition, per Robbins, includes: “instead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing cosmopolitanism is a reality of (re) attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance” (1998, 3). Again, theories or propositions of cosmopolitanism or cosmopolitics trace their roots to an embrace of individual agency. Instead of framing
cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan politics as diametrically opposed to nationalist formulations, some assert that cosmopolitanism remains linked to the nation state. This connection lies in how liberal democracies supposedly provide a space to freely express this individualism and multiple attachments, while simultaneously the nation state attempts to accommodate power (Appiah 1997, Robbins 1998).

And of course, there are those that place emphasis on operating within a local space of individual agency that Glick-Schiller, Darieva, and Gruner-Domic have identified as a ‘cosmopolitan sociability.’ This term encompasses a “set of practices in which people are not passive consumers but active participants in the creation of common place” (2011). These processes are formulated via social and civic encounters as well as coexistence, and they take place at the local level with ‘micro-level practices.’ The authors stress the agency of individuals and small groups that mobilize and interact in their local spaces, and how these local relations may align with larger collectives and transnational social spaces. Many studies touch upon the concept of cosmopolitan when investigating realities within the urban space. In Madrid case, for instance, Muslim youth associations include youth from various backgrounds, with second generation Muslims with parents of migrant origin from several different countries and cultures, alongside Muslim converts with Spanish native parents as well as. These associations seek to unite the community not only religiously, but to engage in cultural and educational activities, and to provide opportunity for the socioeconomic success of community members.

Indeed, the local and the urban space have emerged as important contexts for ethnography, and for this study of the individual and its relation to networks, whether state institutions or other power structures. Massey’s ‘global sense of place’ is particularly useful as it encompasses a local plane that allows for migration diversity, as she explains, “Instead then, of thinking of places as areas with boundaries around, they can be imagined as articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings, but where a larger proportion of those relations, experiences and understandings are constructed on a far larger
scale ... which integrates in a positive way the global and the local” (1994, 156). Of course, minorities and immigrants come to mind in considering the inner neighborhoods of grand metropolises throughout Europe. But the local space and the multicultural reality of quotidian life is being examined in the suburban areas and towns as well (Berg and Sigona 2013). In this study, Madrid will be examined at a somewhat local level, not necessarily to such a finite degree as a specific neighborhood, but at the very least as a community rather than on a national scale.

**Hybridity**

Another alternative to more traditional approaches to citizen engagement, and in response to theories of multiculturalism, includes theories of cultural hybridity. It seeks to “to capture the complexity of lives and subjectivities,” and the creative combinations constructed by individuals, including second generation migrants, as they determine how they self-identify (Modood 1997, 10). An obvious example: identifying with migrant origins alongside the current host society. Furthermore, hybridity “problematizes boundaries”; in short, it addresses the societal boundaries that these individuals confront and must negotiate (Pieterse 2001, 220). Of course, hybridity is represented in other areas of study too, including linguistic hybridity. In fact, linguist Bakhtin’s distinction between language’s unconscious, organic hybridity and conscious, intentional hybridity can apply to cultural hybridity (Bahktin 1981). Hybridity can manifest as either unperceived, inevitable cultural change, like “routine cultural borrowing and appropriations” (unconscious hybridity) or as a “deliberate, provocative aesthetic challenge to an implicit social order and identity” (conscious hybridity) which can be alternatively considered a threat, or as revitalizing and welcome (Werbner 1997, 5).

Hybridity has been subject to debate over the past decades, and one criticism it receives is similar to that levied at multiculturalism: that any mixing implies a foundation in static and bounded categories, with these categories serving as the norm to which hybridity
is the exception. Or, as Palmié argues, “hybrids” and “hybridity” are always and everywhere the products of the operation of classificatory regimes (Palmié 2013, 465). However, proponents of hybridity argue, in a similar way to defenders of multiculturalism, that this criticism does not account for the full depth of the theory, including layered histories of hybridity, the importance of fluidity, and the necessity of confronting boundary-making (even if it may simultaneously imply giving credence to the boundaries themselves). In short, a hybridity apologist would argue that hybridities are not based on the assumption of static, essentialist notions, because the theory itself argues for a continual, historical process of hybridities (Pieterse 2001).

Still, one can argue that this still entails theorizing based on categorical understandings of “collective individuation” and “performances of individuality” (Palmié 2013, 472). Perhaps then, in using hybridity as a theoretical approach, Palmié’s injunction to reframe the question as to not what is hybrid, but when, can facilitate a sounder study. In investigating hybrid identity among the second generation, for example, rather than asking what hybrid identity is, the question should be: in what social conditions does that hybrid identity emerge? It could be envisioned as a zone to examine, “where people can meet – themselves or each other” (Kuortti and Nyman 2007, 16). Individual or collective agency again resurfaces, as Wicker explains that collective or social political action or “the social power to define” should be examined when dealing in “complex wholes” (1997, 42).

Hybridity as defined in this work will attempt to avoid limitations like that of multiculturalism in that it stresses individual choice and autonomy and the inalienable rights of individuals, regardless of nation or community, and avoids creating a definition of the “stranger” (Werbner 1997). While there are various disciplines treating of hybridity, for the purposes of this study and in light of the subject matter, cultural hybridity will serve as the implicit hybridity referenced. Such cultural hybridity can and will encompass the selection of systems of belief, including religion, as well. Of course, there is much more to consider in an
attempt to address unique identity construction, to be further discussed in the chapter on second generation and identity.

In navigating a series of national, transnational, and finally local networks, the literature has recently increasingly attempted to engage varied new approaches and concepts. These include the previously discussed notions of transnationalism, cosmopolitism and hybridity, throughout which individuals of migrant origin remain in particular focus. An individual’s relationship with society (including community and institutional authorities) in a pluralistic reality is all the more emphasized against the backdrop of migration. In the case of youth of migrant origin, and Muslim youth in particular, minority status and vulnerability make membership, and access to the same, all the more essential. Citizenship comes to the fore, less in the traditional definition of the word and more in the communitarian sense previously established, in that it encompasses the rights and responsibilities that a member of society exercises in public life, from the individual to the universal, at all levels of community life.

The individual, secularism and migration

Despite new understandings of citizenship and belonging that are oriented towards protecting the most vulnerable, the collective studied in this work can and has been targeted as “the other,” especially in the greater context of depicting a new Muslim frontier in Western Europe that threatens traditional citizenship. Migrants and their progeny are perceived as unable to properly acculturate as a result of their religious beliefs. Then there are those that assert the phenomenon of Euro-Islam is in development: a process by which Islam’s adherents adapt their religious identity to European society, and a claim to be discussed further in this work (AlSayyad 2003). In either case, what causes these perceived boundaries will be explored later in a more thorough examination of secularism in Europe. However, given the discussions of migration, the individual and citizenship up to this point, the current
literature explaining the relationship between religious identity and the state falls within this theoretical foundation, and merits a brief overview.

In discussing religious identity, the modern nation-state remains pertinent, as it engages in a contentious relationship with religion in laying claim to the individual. As Baumann points out, "If nation-state and ethnicity are two conflicting ideologies because of the romantic heritage of the state, then nation-state and religion conflict because of the rationalist heritage of the state. The more the modernizing state had to justify its unprecedented concentration of power and wealth, the more it had to push religion out of the public sphere" (1999, 52). Essentially, there are tendencies in modern society to relegate religion to the private sphere, and moreover treat it as simply a preference. These trends can be viewed as a reproduction of capitalism or a discourse of homogenization, thus jeopardizing attempts to accommodate individualization and not allowing for cultural evolution (Van der Veer 1997). As such preferences should be differentiated from what Taylor and Maclure categorize as, "Core beliefs and commitments, which we will also call "convictions of conscience," [and] include both deeply held religious and secular beliefs" (Taylor and Maclure 2010, 13).

They argue that current liberal democracies and the democratic state (for example, European states), live under a “regime of secularism, albeit the state is meant to be neutral” (2010, 9, 13). As such, the relationship between religion and the state clearly affects the individual and citizenship, to the extent that religious membership may even weaken citizenship status. For example, if the state or a political system such as democracy is inevitably based in a set of ethics or convictions, the political system may adopt a secular philosophy that can leave the religious in the category of a “second class citizen,” as they do not embrace the values of secularist antireligious moral philosophy, i.e, secularism (Ibid.).

Of course, secularism is a contested and complex concept, and, again, will be addressed in detail later. It is pertinent to this discussion given the European context. Although Europe has a historic Christian tradition and frame of reference, the region has
demonstrated that it perhaps does not share the same proclivity for pluralism or religious belief as other regions, including the United States; this Christian element and institutionalization will certainly be discussed further as well (Papademetriou 2016). As such, the extent to which secularism has become a competing ideology exclusive of personal religious beliefs is to be borne in mind as we approach young individuals in Europe ascribing to Islam. Indeed, increased secularization and lessened religiosity is often a benchmark by which Europe views successful immigrant integration (in contrast with the American approach) and this in itself should elicit pause (Fleischmann and Phalet 2011).

In summary

As migration theory has blossomed, so too has a reconstitution of notions of the state and citizenship. Throughout these reconstituted notions, considerations of how the individual operates in new networks of power and information surface. Consequently, social systems in light of new global, transnational or super-diverse contexts come under scrutiny. Amidst this ever-changing social fabric, a call to protect the rights of the individual throughout these transformations in the public sphere permeates both the public discourse and scientific literature. Considering factors from the cultural and religious, hand in hand with the more obvious socio-economic and political, is important in understanding the individual experience, especially in relation to migration. Belonging and societal cohesion remain a public policy issue: whether within the nation-state jurisdiction, or at local and global levels, networks and institutions are responsible for both the protection and inclusion of the individual. Of course, the individual as an agent of change is also responsible for self-selecting belongings and attachments while navigating these networks.

At the same time, while individual autonomy remains salient, collective autonomy is also significant. Group identity and action can confront the state or social order in order to reformulate discourses and practices, and thus effect societal change. Naturally, in addressing the roles of individual and collective action, the power exerted by public institutions over this
individual or collective experience, and the responsibility that comes with it, is a key consideration.

In light of this theoretical framework, and before proceeding to the literature analysis and empirical observations, it is helpful to explain the methodological process behind this work. Research methods, the logic behind the integration indicators chosen as part of the study, and the study limitations shed light on the overall logic behind this investigation. As the reasoning and criteria behind the empirical process and the study's design is inherently linked to the theoretical foundation of this project, it is important to follow with this explanation in order to orient the discussion.
Chapter III

Research design and methods

An overview of the study's design and methods now prefaces the analysis and empirical portion of this work. Beginning with an outline of the integration indicators and the logic behind their selection, this section will also attempt to address the research methods and the reasoning behind those methods. It will analyze the relationship between researcher and participant, as well as describe the general parameters, nature and format of the interviews that took place. Finally, it will indicate the limitations of the study, in order to provide a context for the subsequent analysis and results. This overview of the strategy informing the format of the study's design and methods, in conjunction with qualifications regarding the study's limitations, will provide context and perspective for the study's results. As such, it will clarify the research landscape and offer a self-critique of the weaknesses and strengths of the investigation.

Interview in relation to integration indicators

The empirical study is based in a qualitative, semi-structured interview administered to individuals falling within the demographic of Muslim youth of migrant origin living in Madrid. In light of the societal impact of the youth experience, the interview can provide measures of integration, from both the standpoint of the individual and the rest of society. These integration measures are used to evaluate the current reality, in order to draw conclusions and propose solutions.

The choice of integration indicators in this study formulates the essence of the study's design and the objective that it is intended to achieve. As such, the philosophy behind integration integrators, and an explanation of those chosen, is merited. Later analysis with concrete examples in France, the United Kingdom and Spain will demonstrate how integration indicators are highly relevant in the second generation discussion, and especially on how identity can serve as an indicator of integration among the second generation.
Moreover, additional integration indicators used by other second generation studies will provide a point of comparison in Chapter Four.

The second generation literature, as a subset of the larger migration field, has its own set of integration indicators (of course, a varied range, depending upon the sociological theory or approach), tailored and sometimes distinct from indicators used to study the first generation. However, in providing a comprehensive perspective of how these indicators function in social science, it must be understood that indicators are chosen by scientists to measure levels of integration among all immigrants. Just as there are diverse approaches to integration in varying levels of government, the integration indicators chosen at the supranational, national and regional level are selected based on policy interests and context. Stemming from the theoretical conceptions of integration, there are several resources at the European level that provide a framework of integration indicators, enabling governments to monitor at the practical and policy level. The Zaragoza Declaration, promulgated in 2010, delineates indicators in the areas of employment, education, social inclusion, and active citizenship (Godenau, Rinken, Martinez and Moreno, 2015). A 2013 report from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Home Affairs expands upon the Zaragoza Declaration and groups these factors impacting integration into three categories: the characteristics of the immigrant population, the general policies and context of the immigrant's receiving country, and finally and more precisely, the immigration and integration policies of the receiving country (Huddleston, Tjaden and Niessen, 2013).

Delving into more detail, within those categories lie more specific factors: the immigrants’ time of residence in the country, gender, origin country, socio-economic background, and qualifications. In turn, factors such as the receiving country’s levels of discrimination, social context, access to education and employment, and social inclusion are considered. Finally, the factor of active citizenship is presented, with the explanation that access to citizenship, as well as civic integration, has a powerful relationship with integration
(Huddleston, Tjaden and Niessen, 2013). This emphasis on civic activity surfaces later in our presentation of this study’s findings.

These factors, of course, must be evaluated in context. The European Commission’s report on indicators of integration points out that factors like socioeconomic contexts and demographics can vary regionally within a nation, as indeed they do in the Spanish case (Huddleston, Tjaden and Niessen, 2013). Indeed, in Spain, these differing factors can range from the political to the cultural, with more accentuated cases including Catalonia and the Basque country. Of course, the European Commission developed these indicators in light of the context of Europe and its member-states. At the same time, it provides a fairly thorough overview of the factors that need to be taken into account when evaluating the process of integration.

**Indicator of self-identity and sense of belonging on the part of the individual**

With the full scope of potential indicators in mind, it is incumbent in this case to turn to the second generation indicators overviewed later in Chapter Three. Portes and Rumbaut found that among second generation youth in the United States, integration indicators could be grouped into three broad categories: individual features, the receiving country’s social environment, and family structure (2001). This investigation homes in on self-identity, which can fit into all three indicator categories, depending on the ways in which it is shaped. Self-identity is a soft indicator, less easily defined, but garnering significant interest throughout the literature as globalization advances (Portes, Aparicio and Haller, 2016). It can be used to measure sense of belonging. In assessing to what extent participants identify with the host country, be it as a Spaniard, as a Madrileño, and so forth, the greater degree of attachment or belonging can determine a greater degree of integration into the receiving society.

Of course, the study adopts a cautious approach in using identification with a nationality to serve as an exclusive indicator of integration. For example, to be demonstrated in later study analysis and comparison, second generation immigrants can identify with more
than one culture or society and still demonstrate a high level of integration or strong sense of belonging to the host society. The reality of hybrid identities that these youth are hypothesized to manifest presents the possibility that they may balance multiple, situational identities that vary over the course of time. In societies that accommodate diversity while simultaneously seeking syncretism, these complex self-identities can still serve as an indicator of how and whether the young citizen feels engaged or connected with society.

**Indicator of self-identity and sense of belonging as responsibility on the part of society**

In tandem with studying self-identity as an individual feature, the indicator of self-identity can fall into the category of the country’s social environment (for example, whether or not the society discriminates against the individual) rather than into the category of individual feature (i.e., the student’s level of education, integration into the workforce, language ability). Self-identity and its manifestation of sense of belonging begs the question of to what extent society is responsible for the level of engagement or attachment on the part of the individual. So, in addition to inquiring about self-identification with Spain or the community, sense of belonging in this case will be evaluated with an inquiry as to discrimination (which would indicate that society is treating the youth as “other”). There will be a more profound explication of self-identity later in the analysis, but at this point it is sufficient to note that self-identity serves as a complex concept, given how it is a reflective exercise and a result of autonomous choice alongside external influences. Perceived discrimination can be understood as an integration indicator and will be measured in this study. It falls into the Portes and Rumbaut indicator category of receiving countries’ social environment (2001). As the interview attempts to collect data about societal and institutional roles in self-identification, the series of questions about discrimination may elucidate how societal and institutional influences have been affecting participants’ sense of belonging and how they self-identify. The questions regarding discrimination also seek to determine
whether national or local institutional arrangements, or instead local community societal interaction, play a greater role in this identity formation.

**Religious identity as a variable**

Moreover, in addition to an examination of perceived discrimination and identification, religious attachment has been selected as a variable. Self-identity can be developed “in relation to one’s nation, religion, gender, class, language and daily life practices” (Toğuşlu et al. 2014, 11). As part of a complex self-identity, the investigation seeks to study self-identified religiosity and whether there is any relationship between this and other factors, including perceived discrimination. In regard to second generation immigration, religion is sometimes viewed as a bright boundary, although recent studies indicate that there is not necessarily a correlation between religious identification and a sense of belonging to the host society (Fleischmann 2012). Alba describes how varying levels of integration can be analyzed in terms of “bright” versus “blurred” boundaries, and contrasts US and European examples in order to explain his premise that some boundaries, including religion, are “brighter.” The bright boundary of religion can explain challenges for second generation Turks in Germany or Maghrebis in France, while a blurred racial boundary could explain why fairer-skinned second generation Mexicans with European features may meet with a less disadvantaged situation in the US than fellow second generation Mexicans that do not share these features and confront a brighter racial boundary (Alba 2005).

While level of religious attachment or practice can be viewed as an indicator of integration in Europe, in this work, self-reported level of religious attachment or practice will not simply be viewed as an indicator that the participant is more or less integrated (Crul, Schneider and Lelie, 2012). For example, if a participant reports more religious practice or belief than another, it will not be assumed this serves as evidence that they have not integrated properly, simply because they are less secular or do not draw from the majority religion, Catholicism. Instead, the study will use self-reported religiosity and practice in
combination with perceived discrimination to analyze the possibility that this has caused resistance on the part of the receiving society. Simply put, the questions on discrimination, in addition to measuring the participants’ perception of societal welcome, will also seek to discover any connection or relationship between religiosity and the response of the receiving society. This may help determine whether perceived discrimination can be better traced to cultural or ethnic factors.

**Expectations as an indicator**

Finally, while this was not specifically sought out in the interview as it was designed, another indicator that emerged over the course of the study includes expectations. Occupational aspirations and expectations have been identified by Portes, Aparicio and Haller as an indicator of integration because they correlate to social mobility and attainment (2016). The indicator that emerged over the course of this study was not so much occupational aspirations and expectations, as much as expectations for representation in society. Participants expressed a desire to exercise full rights, both cultural and civic, in quotidian life in their community or country. This can also serve as a positive indicator for integration, in addition to sense of belonging expressed through self-identity, as it denotes that these youth are expressing desire to access their full citizenship rights and thus full inclusion in society. In other words, they are seeking active participation and inclusion rather than shrinking from it.

As such, the study was initially designed to study self-identity as an indicator of integration, including the variable component of religiosity and any significance this might carry. It also sought to measure perceived discrimination, as this indicates how self-identity and societal response may be interrelated. Expectations for societal participation and inclusion surfaced without intentional design. Moreover, apart from these focal points, the interview includes several other considerations. These headings and questions (addressing education level and labor market insertion, for example) are used to gather data that could perhaps serve as indicators in a larger quantitative survey, but are not the principal focus in
this case. In this smaller qualitative sampling the personal accounts of self-identity, perceived discrimination and sense of belonging are more useful. If it seems that self-identity and sense of belonging are not directly addressed by a majority of questions, this is because some of the inquiries were designed to gain insight into these factors without bringing them to the conscious attention of the participant. Moreover, the further context provided by the questions gathering background information about each of the individuals was also considered imperative, especially to provide profiles and a richer narrative of the participants; more specific details about the questions and structure of the interview follows.

**Interview structure and headings**

In the interview, the parameters for definitions of belonging or ascription are set according to the participant, both in terms of self-identity and self-reported religiosity; i.e, the participant identifies the group(s) or label(s) they ascribe to (Spanish, Muslim, etc.) and reports their own level of religious, social or cultural practice of Islam. In the form of a semi-structured interview, the questions proceed in various groupings, seeking a sense of the participant's background, current trajectory, and future plans, in order to present the most comprehensive picture possible. While there are some multiple choice or structured questions, various open-ended questions pervade the interview in order to allow the participant to best relate their perspective. Moreover, if the participant opted to continue in a certain direction beyond the stricter narrative of the conversation, they were permitted and encouraged to do so.

Initially, the interview collects participant data, including name, age, sex, current place of residence, birthplace, legal status, and length of residence in Spain. Inquiry as to parental origins identifies the participant as either first, 1.5 or second generation. After this primary data, the interview begins by asking the participant if they identify with a religion. If they identify with Islam, it proceeds with a series of questions regarding context to this identification; these questions relate to degrees of both attachment and practice.
For example, questions inquire as to how frequently the participant engages in traditional religious practice or rules, like undertaking daily prayer or following Islamic dietary laws. At the same time, it asks about their views on how religion should or should not be practiced; for instance, a participant may believe in God or identify religiously, but perhaps does not engage very visibly in traditional practice, or observe very many rules. Examples of this questioning include whether or not they agree or disagree with the statement “I do not necessarily believe in all of the principles of Islam, but I would still say I’m Muslim,” or “religion should be a private matter between an individual and God.”

This part of the inquiry also administers questions about gender and politics, primarily in relation to religion, to gather a sense of either more conservative or more liberal views. These questions are present throughout several European questionnaires directed towards Muslims (among others), presumably based on the hypothesis that due to their religious beliefs, the second generation has more conservative views than their peers with native parents. Examples include queries as to whether men and women should obtain equal access and treatment in both education and the workplace. At this point, it should be noted that even if the participants expressed more traditional views, this may not be a fair benchmark, given that several demographic groups in Spanish society may express more conservative views, but would still not be labelled as failing to integrate.

Moreover, the questions on democratic regimes and the separation of church and state clearly strive to identify whether these youth embrace liberal democratic principles and values, given that many of their parents originate from countries with purportedly authoritarian regimes or theocratic structures. Despite the possible bias and presuppositions of the questions, however, the answers were quite instructive in demonstrating that perhaps these types of presuppositions about the second generation, and specifically second generation Muslims, are misplaced.

In continuation, further questions regarding family and friends, socioeconomic status and language use seek an understanding of the participant’s life trajectory. They are asked
about the socioeconomic status and occupations of their parents, in what language they
usually speak with family or friends, and how many of their friends also have parents of
migrant origin. Participants are also invited to explain their own educational or professional
status, and whether or not they are comfortable with what they have attained. They are
questioned as to what extent they faced any discrimination in these areas. For instance, in the
professional section they are asked, "Is this the job you would like to have?" and in education,
"Are you happy with the level of education you have received?"

The portion regarding participant identification not only asks the participant to self-
identify, but also to estimate how they believe their family, friends and society view them.
They are questioned if they are satisfied with life in Spain, and about their plans for the
future. The interview finishes with the bulk of the questions about discriminations and
perceptions of societal welcoming. It asks the participant to relate how often they face
discrimination, if it is more institutional or societal, and for which reasons they believe
institutional or societal discrimination exists or not. These questions include, "What do you
think was the principle reason for the discrimination?" or inquire as to whether the
participants agree or disagree with statements like “Spanish society welcomes different
beliefs.” In sum, a large part of the research focuses on self-identification, and with it religious
identification and experience of discrimination. At the same time, further questions, like
those of a socioeconomic or familial nature, attempt to achieve the most comprehensive
account possible, given the size and resources of the project.

Data collection and participant pool

At the outset of the empirical data gathering, I conducted several “pilot interviews” in
order to familiarize myself with the process of this particular qualitative investigation (Valles
2014). As discussed earlier, the population under study is not uniformly accounted for at the
institutional level, as government demography censuses do not identify children of
immigrants or Muslims specifically. There is a government sponsored survey, described in
further detail later in this work, that was conducted by Metroscopia in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011. It surveyed a sample of 2000 participants each time, drawing from the Muslim community of immigrant origin in Spain. Surveys aimed at a similar population have been conducted on a lesser scale by individuals and research groups, as outlined previously. As this is a smaller study, and analysis of a larger dataset was unavailable, the qualitative route was a natural choice.

The population was accessed through various methods, including through a friend, acquaintances, social networks and associations, using the general concept underlying the “snowball method” (Valles 2014). The “snowball method” proved useful as I was largely an outsider to the targeted population, and it provided a way to canvas a greater range of participants. The size and limited resources of this study did not allow for sampling from each neighborhood of Madrid, although participants hailed from a wide range of towns or municipalities in the Community of Madrid, including Alcalá de Henares, Alcobendas, Collada Vilalba, Fuenlabrada, Getafe, Guadarrama, Humanes and Parla, as well as districts and/or neighborhoods within Madrid city, including Carabanchel, Embajadores, Lavapiés, Puerta de Toledo, San Blas, Tetuán and Villaverde Alto. In order to locate participants, I also worked with the organizations La Asociación de Chicas Musulmanas de España (The Muslim Girls Association of Spain), Centro Cultural Islámico de Madrid (The Islamic Cultural Center of Madrid, a large mosque in Central Madrid), Asociación Tayba (a central Madrid Muslim youth association), Dawah Project (a Madrid Muslim youth association) and CCIF Al Umma De Fuenlabrada (a Muslim community in the Fuelabrada municipality of the Community of Madrid). All communities were very helpful and collaborative as I explained my work and sought assistance.

The sample size of 32 participants was settled upon to an extent organically, and also given the general estimate of saturation. As Mason explains, saturation constitutes “when the collection of new data does not shed any further light on the issue under investigation” and this range can often be accomplished within as few as around 20 interviews, based on most
qualitative interview studies (Mason 2010). Of the 32 participants, 19 were second generation and eight were 1.5 generation respondents, with a comparative sample of five first generation youth. Most participants had parents that originated from Morocco, while a few had Palestinian, Egyptian or Syrian origins. Two had parents from Ceuta with Maghrebi origins. Of the first generation group, one hailed from Tunisia, another from Senegal, and the remaining three from Morocco. Overall, ages grouped into ranges include twelve participants from ages 16-20, nine from ages 21-25 and six from ages 26-30, with additional outliers including two 13-year-olds and a 32, 33 and 35-year-old. The older participants were included because of their continued participation in youth organizations and the added value of their perspectives.

The entire group broke down into 53% female and 47% male. All interviews took place in Castellano Spanish, with the exception of one in English. They were conducted during a time frame spanning from March 2016 to February 2018, over the course of two years. The majority of interviews were conducted in person with the author (22), by a second academically and professionally qualified interviewer (2), and a portion of the interviews were self-administered via email (8). Most interviews had a duration of between 20 and 30 minutes. Out of those self-administered by email, several had in-person contact to the author prior to completing the interview itself. At this point, I would like to briefly address the implications of conducting an interview electronically, as it becomes an increasingly discussed topic in the field.

A note about email interviews

2 Ceuta is a Spanish territory, and as of 1995 an autonomous city, located in a peninsula bordered by the northeast of Morocco on the African continent, across from the Spanish Iberian Peninsula along the Atlantic Mediterranean divide (White 2003). It is a territory that underwent various conquests for centuries, and Morocco has repeatedly contested Spanish sovereignty; a large portion of the population include Muslims of Maghrebi origin. As of 1986, 83.6% of the Muslim population of Ceuta were foreigners without Spanish nationality (Planet 2004). The two participants with parents from Ceuta (parents most likely born around that decade or a bit before), are included in the group of young Muslims to add additional perspective. However, this is done so with the qualification that they descend from arguably native parents, or that they are not second generation, but rather third or fourth and so on, given the contested nature of the sovereignty of this territory.
While electronic communication is a relatively new phenomenon, it is increasingly standardized in the literature as a new form of data collection, and its usage is exponentially growing (Meho 2006). The advantages of internet research include how it allows for access to otherwise inaccessible groups, amplifying the participant pool, as well as can remove cues or field status differences between the researcher and the participant (Ibid.). This was particularly important for this study, as I represented not only a different nationality, but at times came from a different social demographic than some of the population studied. Moreover, while familiar with some neighborhoods, Madrid is a very large metropolis and region, and I certainly could not claim authentic access to some neighborhoods. The fact that I was a foreigner to Spanish society or did not originate from the community might have made it difficult for me to connect with some participants. In addition to these considerations, an added advantage of virtual research includes that the participant has a chance to reflect on questions, make more effort if they wish, and choose the time that they engage in the interview (Gibson 2010). Furthermore, email correspondence was chosen over Skype interviews, in these particular cases, because the interviewees expressed more willingness and confidence in participating if they could do so on their own time in this manner.

However, as Cea D'Ancona points out, this method can have several drawbacks, including that it may jeopardize the validity of the data. For example, it might be impossible to verify whether the participant had help from others, or whether they were interrupted throughout the interview. Moreover, the participant could read through all of the questions beforehand, thus compromising the effectiveness of the control questions (2014). Other disadvantages include that some contextual richness might be lost, i.e. the senses that are employed in face-to-face interviews will be in absence. Yet another potential risk includes that the participant might not express themselves as well in the written form as they could in speech (Meho 2006). Given the discussion of this potential drawback, it seems appropriate to continue to address further limitations of the investigation overall.
Limitations of study

In analyzing and testing the methodology of this study, several other limitations and qualifications surfaced, many of which stem from the nature of its size and limited scope. For example, this study cannot claim uniform representation, as it gathered participants via “snowball method.” Of course, as outlined earlier, even given greater resources and remit, studies in Spain are limited to this methodology when attempting to reach the Muslim population. While attempts were made (and realized) to locate individuals going about their daily lives, some participants were contacted via associations. This could perhaps skew the sample in that it targets a group with a more civically active profile and visible Muslim identity. However, the small size of the study and the ability to encounter people in quotidian routines, in districts like Tetuan, for example, has provided a fresh and alternative perspective.

A second limit is the study’s lack of longitudinal data. It only examines the participants’ views at one point in time, and lacks the insight of an evolution of identity that could presumably take place. For example, the longitudinal study by Portes and Aparicio found that a sense of belonging to Spain increased in second generation immigrants over time (2013). It also found that over the time period, second generation immigrants had not yet created a pan-ethnic identity. By contrast, this study can only evaluate this sense of belonging and identity in the present, without previous reference points, apart from any offered by the participant.

Yet another consideration includes how the data was gathered. The benefits and drawbacks of interview via email have already been outlined earlier, but a brief review of the problematic elements of transcription after an in-person interview is warranted. There are possible threats to data integrity, from technical errors like mishearing a word, or the researcher being linguistically limited, to the fact that the data is not as much produced as is given by the recording device, and thus leaves the researcher without comprehensive control of the data (Hammersley 2010). Valles reminds that when considering the integrity of a
transcription, it is essential to remember that the primary document is the audio, while the written transcription is secondary (2014). In order to achieve the most precision and complete account of the original source during the transcription process, it is recommended to take notes while recording the interview, followed by writing up memos and analysis the first time the audio is played (Ibid.).

A final criterion, the relationship between researcher and participant, and vice versa, is another important consideration when analyzing the study. As Carling, Erdal and Ezzati succinctly define it, “Positionality in qualitative research refers to the fact that a researcher’s characteristics affect both substantive and practical aspects of the research process—from the nature of questions that are asked, through data collection, analysis and writing, to how findings are received” (2014, 37). The ideal qualitative researcher would have education in the area of study both formally and via experience, skill in improvisation, the quality of intuition and story-telling ability; the last quality would enable them to both identify and assist in relating or narrating (Valles 2014.). Moreover, in the semi-structured interview utilized, a passive, receptive approach is favored in lieu of an active, aggressive questioning (Ibid.). I attempted to apply this receptive approach in my interviewing, allowing participants to take their chosen directions when they were so inspired.

More specifically, a migration researcher relates to the population of study in a way that generally falls into “outsider” or “insider” categories. An outsider belongs to the majority population, whereas the insider may belong to the minority immigrant or immigrants’ progeny groups, researching his or her own population (Carling, Erdal and Ezzati 2014). Apart from this boiled down construction, a relationship can be created based on the researcher’s characteristics, including cultural awareness, experiences, and commitment to the research (i.e., returning to the field of research) (Ibid.). Several elements may help to ameliorate the divide somewhat, including shared beliefs or migration experience. As a non-Spanish expatriate, I can identify somewhat with an immigrant background, and the (obvious) fact that my parents are not native Spaniards may have resonated with some of the
participants, creating an “insider by proxy effect” (Ibid., 47, 48, 50). At the same time, my family connections to native Spaniards, that I am not a Muslim, and my relationship even as a researcher creates an outsider effect.

As Rossman and Rallis enjoin, there is a necessity to remain critical of “complex interplay of our own personal biography, power and status, interactions with participants, and the written word” (Rossman and Rallis 2003, 93). It was key to focus on presenting the understanding of the participants’, rather than my own understanding of what they presented. Of course, I am responsible for remaining cognizant of my own personal ethics and politics that in fact led me to this area of study in the first place, as well (Marshall and Rossmann 2016). I had to distinguish between personal vocation to advocacy and my role as an objective investigator. Moreover, my tendency to empathize with and affirm the participants’ experiences remained a constant challenge.

In sum, given the demographic and the thesis question, individual qualitative interviews seem the most appropriate way to proceed for the empirical portion of the investigation. The indicator of self-identity and how it communicates sense of belonging, as well as how perceived discrimination and the receiving society influence this indicator, underlies the principal objectives of the study. Moreover, the variable of religiosity in this self-identity remains key to the investigation. The project includes further inquiries that can also serve as indicators, and they help to provide a more comprehensive narrative of each individual and their perspective. The size, resources, and nature of the investigation presents study limitations, but still provided some valuable data for analysis, as provided in the next chapter.

Given the preliminary theoretical and methodological grounding, this work can continue on to the analytical portion of the investigation, exploring previous studies and providing a literature analysis to preface the empirical data and observations. As outlined earlier, this analysis will include a broader sketch of integration regimes in Europe, followed by a summary and critique of second generation area studies within migration theory.
Finally, the analysis proceeds to a more specific and tailored review of literature that relates to the target cohort, especially as a religious minority (in addition to their status as a minority population of migrant origin). As a result, this narrowed focus will entail: an overview of work to date on Islam in Europe and its relevance in current migration literature; an exploration of second generation Muslims in Europe and identity studies; and finally, a canvassing of relevant studies on Spain’s institutional relationship with Islam, including any investigation to date on the minority Muslim population. All of this information can provide a point of comparison for the ensuring empirical data in the study. And so, the following chapter will more concretely address immigration and integration models and policies in Europe to date, specifically focusing on Spain in comparison with the United Kingdom and France, in the first part of the analytical section.
Chapter IV

Contexts and policies of immigration and integration: Europe and Spain

Second generation immigrants, while perhaps not impacted as directly by immigration policies as their first generation parents, still can be subject to and affected by a country’s integration policies. In this selected case of Muslim youth of migrant origin, their faith may act as an additional variable in discussions of integration. Religion, discussed in further depth at a later stage in this work, can form part of either an insider or outsider identity, depending on the context. Immigration scholars consider religion as part of group and individual identity, and thus key in determining cohesion and integration within a society. Furthermore, religion can harken back to the idea of a two-way process of integration: the relationship between church and state in each country can impact religious identity and processes of identity formation.

In that integration strives towards a cohesive society, it reflects a reality that immigrants, and in this case, those ascribing to the Muslim faith, are viewed as “the other.” Particularly in the European context, Tecim and Yardin succinctly identify the situation: “Today in Europe, being "immigrant" and especially being Muslim still identified as immigrant means being the "other" in Europe” (2016, 14). Glick and Çağlar point out that these groups facing “racialisation, discrimination and differentiation” can still find common ground in society, despite ethno-religious differences. An expedient way to approach the issue is through consideration of the “multiscalar” and structural inequalities that exist in modern communities (Ibid., 18). In order to fully illustrate the circumstances Muslim youth of migrant origin face, this chapter will first endeavor to provide a general context for European, Spanish state, and Spanish regional level policies of immigration and integration. A more comprehensive account of the second generation follows in the next chapter, before further investigation as to the context of Islam and Muslim identity in Europe and Spain.

In beginning with immigration and integration at the European level, the EU has identified migration as a priority both in terms of external security, internal freedom of
movement, and human rights. However, it struggles to provide policy that complies with international rights standards, and EU dictates may contravene individual Member states’ concerns about their own internal security and migration policy as autonomous nations. Additionally, while the EU has becoming increasingly involved in matters of integration by issuing recommendations, integration policies stretching beyond migration control clearly remain the jurisdiction of the different Member states. For this reason, the states’ integration processes can vary substantially. In a very general sense, however, the European concept of integration has evolved from one encompassing immigrant access to social and economic rights and inclusion, to a paradigm that seeks a cohesive society in a more comprehensive way. This includes encouraging immigrant political participation and a sense of belonging to the host country (Zincone, Penninx and Borkert 2011).

Spain serves as a unique study for many reasons, including in that it only recently became a receiving country with substantial immigration. Spain’s number of foreign residents has multiplied by 8 between the years 1990 and 2010 (Cebolla and González 2013). Public opinion in the country is characterized by a majority tolerant or ambivalent approach to immigration, with attitudes that are fairly positive in comparison to fellow European Member states (Ibid.). Spanish societal attitudes will come into play later when investigating the Muslim second generation’s identity and sense of belonging.

**European immigration and integration**

European immigration and integration policy can provide context for, albeit exercises little influence upon, the policies of France, the United Kingdom, and Spain compared in this study. The multilevel governance of the EU and a very broad definition of what constitutes migration, from regular to irregular, to refugee and asylum, leaves ample room for debate as

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3 This project was conducted over the course of three and a half years, and began before the referendum of 23 June 2016, when the people of the United Kingdom voted via a majority to begin the process of exiting the European Union. The United Kingdom is still provided as a point of comparison, given its status up until now as a member state, and given that the exit process will not be complete before the presentation of this project.
to what extent European governance can prevail over national autonomy. Precisely due to free movement principles amongst member states within EU borders, migration can be posited as a security issue and a matter of external, or foreign, policy. Member states can also be tied to international norms as a result of their membership. There has been a supranational legal codification of human rights that has indeed transferred sovereignty to supranational entities like the EU (Koenig 2007). While there is some consensus on preventing irregular migration control, there is less on policies regulating regular migration (Cardwell 2013).

Currently, the European conversation on migrant claims is formally directed by the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the European Commission (Danese 1998). However, as Cardwell points out, while regulating both regular and irregular migration remains on the EU agenda, firm or binding directives and regulations have been challenging to administer (2013). Policy towards third-party nationals materialized as a communitarian issue under the newly christened European Union with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. The Treaty identified asylum and immigration control as a competency under the third of three "pillars," or groups of powers, that defined European governance system at the time. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 advanced the project further, as it set a deadline (within five years) to address issues of asylum, refugee, entry and residence, with the understanding that a communitarian space within the EU required stricter policing of the shared external borders (Cardwell 2013). The Tampere Summit of 1999 marked even more progress: Member states formally expressed the need for policy-making on legal migration, in addition to the clear understanding that illegal migration was a communitarian issue. It also highlighted the need for third-party nationals to maintain basic rights, just as EU natives enjoyed (Roos 2013). In November 2004, the Hague program reiterated the Amsterdam Treaty’s aim to achieve a comprehensive European asylum policy, though there was mixed consensus amongst the member states about what such a policy would resemble (Garlick 2006).
In the wake of postwar migration, European member states’ policies of integration have traditionally been attributed to three models: multicultural or plural, assimilation, and exclusionary. The model of multiculturalism, pursued in the past by countries including the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, is rooted in respecting and protecting the cultural identity of the migrant community. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, multiculturalism faced criticism as integration policies failed; critiques included that it encourages ethnic separation in a cultural and even physical sense (Vertovec 2010). In light of these criticisms of multiculturalism, interculturalism has been presented as a refined version that encourages intercultural dialogue in order to prevent segregation within multiculturalism. Both multiculturalism and interculturalism can be understood under the umbrella of a pluralism approach (Godenau et al. 2015). Of course, the limits of the multiculturalism model were discussed in the theoretical framework and will manifest in the following practical examples.

In continuation, the assimilation or republican model, with France frequently cited as an example, only grants equality under the law to those that correspond to the category of citizen or national, calling for the immigrant to assimilate completely with the national identity. In other words, integration is conceived of as a one directional process, whereby the minority immigrants adopt the customs of the host country. Finally, the model of exclusion treats immigration as a temporary phenomenon, and denies civic and political participation by the immigrant community (Carrera 2006). Significantly, Spanish integration approaches to date have reflected a blended model. Between more restrictive citizenship policies and more liberal economic policy as a welfare state, Spain’s model for managing diversity is neither assimilation nor multiculturalism, but rather incorporates elements from the two in a way that is also comparable to the approaches of Portugal and Greece (Godenau et al. 2015).

However, these paradigms have become increasingly blurry, especially as states change direction in integration policy over time, and as Europe considers a more dynamic approach to immigration and integration; as discussed in earlier, this approach seeks to provide solutions to a plurality of identities and cultures (Carrera 2006). This has translated
to a reorientation of integration policy at the European level. Previously, at least in the case of some European member states, there had been heavier emphasis on recognizing the cultural integrity of migrants (Joppke 2006). Recently, the repeated emphasis in Europe on a two-way process of integration clearly places a burden on the immigrant that had been less marked before. As a result, many authors concur that public discourse and the political climate encourages the responsibility of the immigrant to integrate (Godenau et al. 2015; Vertovec 2010).

In turn, while member states remain autonomous in matters of integration, the EU still addresses integration with a series of nonbinding initiatives and instruments. The EU approach finds its grounding in the Common Basic Principles of 2004, a measure seeking to harmonize European integration by stressing a two-way integration and inclusion process. This nonbinding agreement reflects a commitment to maintaining uniform policies of immigration and integration at the supranational level, and promises that: "Member states reap many benefits. These include stronger economies, greater social cohesion, an increased feeling of security, and cultural diversity. Taken together and across all Member states, these benefits advance the European process and strengthen the Union's position in the world" (European Commission 2004, 15). Joppke surmises that integration attempts are shaped by the socioeconomic conditions, including unemployment and welfare dependency (often characteristic of migrant populations), inspiring European policy attempts to reverse this situation (2006). Subsequent EU initiatives include a European Agenda for Integration (2005-2010) and a Common Agenda for Integration (2011), as well as a reaffirmation of the original Principles in 2014, and an EC 2016 Integration Action Plan of Third-Country Nationals. The Ministerial Conferences on Integration, National Contact Points on Integration (2002), Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (2014-2020), European Migration Forum (2015), and European Integration Network (2016) also serve as instruments (European Website on Integration).
Again, however, Europeanisation has had a very limited influence on public policies at the national level. While the European supranational bureaucracy commends certain strategies, including the multicultural approach to integration schemes, these recommendations remain distanced from practical implementation (Koenig 2007). For this reason, perhaps, European policy acknowledges, apart from obvious national autonomy, that the regional and local level is an essential part of the integration project. This is especially highlighted in the “European agenda for the integration of non-EU migrants” promulgated by the Commission in 2011. It emphasizes in its prescriptions for action that “Local authorities are responsible for a wide range of services and activities and they play an important role in shaping the interaction between migrants and the receiving society” and indicates that the use of EU funding should be directed towards this area (European Commission 2011, 8).

By comparison: the case of France

France and the United Kingdom have been selected to juxtapose with Spain given their respective demographics of Muslim youth of migrant origin, and as such, their further comparative value at a later stage in this study; the basic approaches and policies of these countries are also useful in demonstrating the various contexts of European member state histories and practices. In fact, they provide particularly apt case studies when discussing Islam in Europe, in light of their approaches to ethnicity and diversity. The French state approach emphasizes that all of its citizens are equal and French, and as such there is less emphasis on integration, because there is no diversity or minority against which to discriminate. By contrast, the United Kingdom is very sensitive to race and ethnicity, based on its recent history, and has emphasized it in its public policies. In expounding upon these two separate approaches to diversity, it is useful to bear in mind how their separate structures and policies would affect a Muslim minority drawing largely from immigrants, and their societal integration.
For example, the French political model and understanding of civil society is rooted in its identity as a republican state. The central state administers a public sphere that treats individuals as unified and equal under the law, and any sort of particularistic identities are relegated to the private sphere. As a result, assimilation is de facto produced: as a French citizen, one is a homologized, in the tradition of the nation-building that occurred during the Third Republic (Favell 1998). The laicism principle is also inherent to France's republican model, and has served as a key feature in French historical memory since the Revolution. The anti-aristocratic and anti-clerical nature of the revolutionary movement has prompted, as Noiriel puts it, “violent rejection of all privileges... based on origin” (1995, 371). A particularly stark image, the guillotine of Revolutionary France, can serve as a reminder of why France seeks to avoid discrimination based on origin or religion. As a result, while France is a regionally, linguistically and culturally diverse country, recent court decisions have interpreted the Constitution as recognizing only one French nation, devoid of distinctions in origin, race or religion. A strong emphasis is placed on equality before the law, while stressing diversity is seen as an impediment in the integration process (Joly 2005).

The evolution of France's nationality law is helpful in expounding upon the idea of French citizenship and thus in giving context to French models of integration. Beginning in the seventeenth century, France's access to nationality was a blended jus sanguinis and jus soli model. The civil code of 1805, however, granted a more influential role to jus sanguinis, an exceptional phenomenon in comparison to the rest of Europe, and signifying a rejection of the feudal or monarchical system that had previously held sway (Weil 2001). Nonetheless, over the years, French legislation expanded the preference for jus soli, through legislation in 1889, 1927, 1945 and 1973 (Ibid.). This jus soli approach did not signify a return to feudal or monarchical ideals, but rather stemmed from a republican conception of citizenship based on French socialization. In 1993, legislators passed a reform wherein the second generation born in France no longer acquired automatic French nationality, and instead introduced the process of requesting French citizenship before a judge, based on the will to become French
and period of five years continuous residence (Ibid.). Again, this development in the law reflected the concept of a shared social contract as understood through French republican principles. It also represented public opinion that assimilation was not taking place as it had in the past (a point of contestation in scholarly research). Subject to criticism and logistical difficulties, this policy of requesting citizenship was modified in 1998, with a law that granted the second generation (born in France) automatic citizenship at the legal age of 18 (Ibid.).

In regard to the first generation of immigrants, naturalization can take place after five years of residence. Indeed, French nationality law illustrates how the country has accepted its role as a receiving country, a progression that can be witnessed in other European states as well (Ibid.). Nationality law and its evolution also demonstrates the French emphasis on citizenship by French socialization, a clear dedication to republican and jacobinist ideals, all of which informs France’s integration policy.

Currently, French immigration and integration is managed by several state ministries. There has been continuous heated debate between the French left and right-wing government regarding immigration. Immigration to France began in the latter part of the nineteenth century with labor recruitment. In the 1970s and 1980s, a politicization of immigration along with a recruitment ban ensued, with a ricochet between alternating policies and various attempts at regularization; in 1984, the government finally introduced laws facilitating French residency (Wihtol de Wenden 2011.). As with other European states in the 1990s, EU directives shaped asylum policy. The Sarkozy government later lifted the recruitment ban in 2006, promoting a model of ‘selected immigration’ and integration (Ibid.).

As part of the republican identity of the French state, ethnicity goes unaccounted for in French statistics, with sole recognition of foreigner versus national status (Ibid.). There is little acknowledgement of inequalities drawing from ethnic and religious discrimination, and if so, it is relegated to the private sphere. Instead, public initiatives in this regard are dressed in the guise of socioeconomic aid (Joly 2005). The substantial presence of Islam, the greatest in Europe, has been pivotal in raising the profile of and shaping integration policy. The
Muslim demographic is largely composed of Maghrebis and their descendants (a result of French colonial history); Muslims as a collective began asserting claims in the 1980s, and public opinion has reflected influences of Islamophobia (Wihtol de Wenden 2011).

Public expression of Islam in France has garnered an international profile in the headscarf debate, which dates back to 1989, and ultimately resulted in the banning of girls wearing headscarves in public school in 2004; in 2010 the French Senate also banned face coverings, and therefore the Muslim burqa, in public (Ramírez 2014). Ramírez indicates that the media was fundamental in driving public opinion towards this prohibitionist stance (Ibid.). Even if those with Maghrebin ancestry do not practice Islam, as Beaman points out, “Regardless of the degree to which they personally identify as Muslim, Maghrébin-origin individuals are often categorized as Muslim in media and popular culture at least partially because Islam is the major religion of the Maghreb” (2016, 42). As a result of the complexities that arise from emphasizing French homogeneity and ignoring diversity issues or conflicts, pressure to recognize ethnic groups and implement anti-discrimination programs has emanated from civil society and the EU (Joly 2005).

By comparison: the case of the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, by contrast, has been recognized for a public policy that acknowledges multiculturalism, a phenomenon shaped by the historical contexts and trajectory of their immigration flows and regulation (Joly 2005). This multiculturalist model succeeded assimilationist and race relations paradigms; to an extent, the multiculturalist policies that eventually prevailed were shaped at the local level via initiatives of the immigrants themselves (Joly 2012). During post-World War II immigration, British colonial citizens drawing from the Commonwealth states were granted British citizenship and unrestricted access to the United Kingdom through the 1948 Nationality Act. This act

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4 The French law banning covering the face in public, or the Interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public, bans various facial coverings, though critics claim it especially targeted female Muslim dress. The law in full is found at: Interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public, n° 2010-1192, L'Assemblée nationale and le Sénat (October 11, 2010), Legifrance.gouv.fr.
distinguished between citizenship of the United Kingdom and its colonies, and citizenship of the independent Commonwealth countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.). At the same time, it granted equal legal status to all. The Act also held to the *jus soli* principle in that it granted citizenship to all born in the United Kingdom or the empire (Hansen 2001). This was later restricted through a law promulgated in 1962, which mitigated the relationship between nationality and citizenship rights for members of the Commonwealth (in an attempt to slow immigration to the United Kingdom). Joly remarks that this move was clearly discriminatory towards New Commonwealth subjects; it implemented the principle of ‘patriality,’ where those who did not have a parent or grandparent born in the United Kingdom were subject to immigration regulation (2011). From the years 1962 to 1981, a U.K. passport did not necessarily indicate citizenship (Hansen 2001).

In 1958, race riots initiated by white extremists against black populations in London and Nottingham raised concerns regarding immigration and integration (Favell 1998). There were calls for social action in response to the discrimination and rioting against immigrants. Mobilization of the largely disadvantaged immigrant populations in the 1960s and 1970s brought about policies that aimed to ameliorate social disadvantages (Joly 2011). The Race Relations Act of 1976, the Commission for Racial Equality and its local network of Community Race Council and Race Equality Councils managed racial and ethnic inequality at the local level (Samad 1998). However, the policies of the Thatcher regime constricted this local level governance, and the 1981 Nationality Act under Thatcher abolished *jus soli* nationality. It divided citizenship into categories of British Citizenship, British Dependent Territory Citizenship, and British Overseas Citizenship (Hansen 2001). Nationality law today, Hansen argues, bears little resemblance to the law that previously included all imperial subjects. Instead, it categorizes citizenship into British citizens, European citizens, and aliens, and those from independent Commonwealth countries and British dependent territories now maintain privileges (or lack thereof) similar to the citizenship category of alien (Ibid.).
Immigration still increased, however, throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. Government immigration policies have encouraged managed migration, beginning with legislation in the 1990s that restricted asylum-seeking migrants and illegal immigration. This was followed by openness to high-skilled labor migration and student immigration (Cerna and Wietholtz 2011). U.K. public opinion in the decades leading up to the 2000s had prioritized race and immigration issues very little; however, beginning in 1999, immigration became a politicized and high-profile issue (Ibid.). Critics argue that public concern is directed by politics and government rather than vice versa. The United Kingdom emphasizes border control, and did not participate in some of the provisions for an EU common policy on free movement in the Treaty of Amsterdam, and are not parties to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (though can partially ‘opt in’). The Home Office remained the key institution responsible for formulating immigration policies, and access to citizenship was largely in line with similar Northern European countries; five continuous years of residence, language proficiency and good conduct were requisites in order to begin the application process (Hansen 2001, 86).

Of course, there has been a great deal of rhetoric regarding immigration in the build up to and aftermath of the June 2016 referendum, where a majority of the population voted to exit the European Union. Nine months later, U.K. Prime Minister Teresa May invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, a clause that allows members to voluntarily leave the Union, and the process has a time limit of two years (until March 2019) for the United Kingdom and the EU to come to an agreement (barring an extension as agreed by members of the EU). As such, the 2018 process of Brexit is currently under negotiation. In the meantime, there has been much speculation as to why the referendum was successful in voting to leave the Union, and whether xenophobia and resistance to immigration was a great contributing factor. There is general consensus that parliamentary scandal and austerity politics following the 2008 financial crisis contributed to distrust of the establishment and political institutions. While some of the “Leave campaign” rhetoric leading up to the referendum did imply that
foreigners were taking British jobs, there is still no clear immigration policy plan for when the United Kingdom finally does withdraw from the EU (Menon 2018).

On the other hand, U.K. integration can be analyzed somewhat separately from migration debate, as anti-discrimination policies within the United Kingdom have progressively strengthened, and often are not necessarily associated with migration. The race riots that began in the late 1950s led to a model of integration that defined ethnic groups and institutionalized anti-discrimination laws (Cerna and Wietholtz 2011). Then, the New Labour party's diversity and inclusion agenda in 1997 led to especially pronounced multiculturalism policies (Ibid.). Still, riots in 2001 encouraged a turn toward policies of social cohesion; the 2005 bombings brought about the 2006 Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CiC). While various national institutions had dealt with matters of integration, the Department for Communities and Local Government was charged with implementing cohesion, and integration remains a fraction of this agenda (Ibid.). However, a commitment to ethnic identities, and thus a multiculturalism approach, still remains. As Parekh describes it, the United Kingdom can be conceptualized as a community of individuals and peoples; they are united by their diversity and commitment to their unique cultures, as well as by a common institutional authority (2001). Often times the label of "ethnic minority" is used in place of "immigrant," especially if referring to individuals of migration origin (Joly 2005).

British ethnic and racial studies have been critical of discrimination in the United Kingdom, yet at the same time the British political rhetoric has maintained that Europe fares far worse in this regard. This rhetoric claims a British "exceptionalism," as an island, distinct from the continent; it also argues that the United Kingdom is ahead in terms of multiculturalism policies by comparison with the rest of Europe, as anti-discrimination policies date back to the 1970s (Favell 2001). It is worthwhile to note that within race relations and multicultural education policies, a number of groups have begun to assert their ethnic distinctions. Whereas initially the rhetoric and scholarly literature focused on a black
versus white distinction, Muslim groups, Jewish groups and Irish groups began to lobby for recognition as well (Ibid.).

One marked advance in U.K. rights and anti-discrimination measures includes their equality body. Established in 2007, the Equality and Human Rights Commission of Britain acts as a non-departmental (i.e., autonomous) public body that not only is responsible for providing resources, monitoring and consultancy to both citizens and organizations seeking to promote and ensure equality and human rights, they also have a remit of implementation (Equality and Human Rights Commission of Britain 2017). Given the trajectory of British diversity management, beginning with race relations legislation in 1976, it seems as if they have been especially thorough in exploring all avenues to equality and human rights guarantees. At the same time, the very existence of the body meets what is still a consistent demand for its efforts.

While the United Kingdom and France share similar colonial backgrounds, demographics, and social challenges, the British policies of immigration and integration are clearly distinctive from the French in their emphasis on race relations, ethnicity and multicultural tolerance (Favell 1998). The French approach, Favell argues, would criticize this U.K. policy as one that is promoting inequality between the majority and ethnic minorities; it would be viewed as alienating and marginalizing these minorities based on race, and would violate equality with claims for special treatment. In turn, the British perspective might label French policies as intolerant and prone to cultural exclusion (1998). Indubitably, the policy framework for each nation is constituted differently, as U.K. policy separates matters of migration versus integration policies, whereas France's nationality law is designed to incorporate and provide for integration (Ibid.).

**Spanish immigration and integration**

Just as France and the United Kingdom are distinct examples, Spain's unique context, situation and approach to immigration and integration can be juxtaposed with fellow member states; this contrast provides a more comprehensive understanding of how multi-
level and diverse policies and societal frameworks can be informed by a multitude of variables. Spanish immigration and integration is conducted at both the federal, regional and local levels. While the central government is responsible for controlling migration flows and matters of citizenship (i.e., entry and residence), policies and processes of integration are predominantly carried out by the regions and local governments. An overview of the country’s immigration history and legal and political framework follows, before further exploring the implications of multi-level governance for Spanish integration.

i. Public opinion in Spain regarding immigration and integration

Public opinion is a key in considering integration processes, as the attitudes of the receiving country can influence the immigration and integration policies of the country as well. Government leaders may look to their electorate’s views in order to make policy decisions. Moreover, as discussed earlier, integration itself is a two-way process, requiring effort on the part of both the receiving society and the immigrant. On a national scale, a Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) report from February 2000 found highly positive attitudes towards immigration. Results included that 96% of Spaniards believed that everyone has a right to work in any country, regardless of nationality, and 55% thought that there were few, or several but not too many, immigrants residing in Spain (Pérez-Díaz, Álvarez-Miranda and González-Enríquez 2001, 140). Seventy-one percent of participants were in favor of the immigrants’ right to vote, and 92% believed that unemployment benefits should be offered (Pérez-Díaz, Álvarez-Miranda and González-Enríquez 2001, 140).

Compared to other European countries, Spain has been identified as more tolerant towards and positive about immigration (Ayerdi and Vidal 2008). In more recent years, despite the financial crisis, Arango explains, there has not been any major social outcry

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5 Comunidad autónoma or “autonomous communities,” abbreviated as CCAA, of which there are 17, will be referred to in this work as regions.

6 The Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, or Center for Sociological Investigation, referred to hereinafter as CIS, is a public organization linked to the Spanish state administration. It conducts continual surveys among Spanish society, providing an archive of the data, as well as manages a journal entitled la Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
against immigration, and according to continuous CIS surveys, public concern about immigration has maintained at the same levels (2012). Zapata notes that it is important to distinguish how Spanish citizens often separate issues of border control from those related to immigrant integration (2009). If anything, the crisis has increased concern about border control, but perceptions of immigrants already residing in Spain has remained the same (Cebolla and González 2013). In 2014, when asked to select from a variety of indicators the three principal problems existing in Spain, only 1.9 to 5.9% respondents, varying by month, indicated immigration (CIS 2014). Public opinion regarding Islam, and claims that cultural racism and Islamaphobia has increased, are a separate consideration that will be explored in a later chapter (Cebolla and González 2013).

**ii. Background, legislation and policies**

In the past, Spain was a country of emigration rather than immigration, with millions of migrant workers first leaving for Latin America in the late 19th and early 20th century, and in the post-World War II era, moving to Northern Europe. However, after the transition to democracy and ratification of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, and joining the European Community in 1986, Spain experienced the return of its emigrants, and also transformed into a receiving country. Immigration flows began around the late 1970s and early 1980s, reaching significant numbers at the turn of the century (Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011). Since the mid-1980s, the incoming immigrants supplied labor and services that provided necessary support to the Spanish economy (Arango 2012). These immigrants could either be qualified professionals, or from less developed countries; they assumed non-skilled labor roles that Spanish workers at the time were unwilling to accept (Moreno 2001). The incoming populations have drawn from Morocco, Latin America, Eastern Europe and, to a lesser degree, Asia (Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011). Unsurprisingly, immigration began to surface as a key public policy initiative, and academia also began to take notice of the phenomenon (Arango 2000). In the last census, as of November 2011, the government
counted approximately 5.3 million foreigners, representing 11.2% of the population; foreign populations can be more concentrated in certain areas, composing up to 15% of the population in regions like Baleares, Murcia, Valencia and Cataluna (Godenau et al. 2015).

In regards to the judicial and legislative framework of Spanish immigration policy, recent history begins with the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Article 13.1 established that foreigners are guaranteed liberties as dictated by treaties and the law (Constitución Española 1978 [CE 1978]). A court decision, 107/1984, then instituted certain rights for all persons, regardless of their legal status, including judicial guarantees; at the same time, it excluded foreigners from most political rights. The first law addressing foreign nationals, La Ley de Extranjería (Foreigners Law), came into force in 1985, as Spain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 and Europe sought to monitor immigration policy (Aja 2006). This law could not be conceived of as immigration legislation in terms of providing for incorporation and nationality, as it simply offered the conditions under which foreigners could stay in Spain, as well as indicated some restrictions to entry (Arango 2000). In other words, it treated immigration from outside of the European community as a temporary phenomenon. It was complemented by implementation regulation via a Royal Decree in 1986 (Relaño 2004). A Supreme Court ruling, 115/1987, deemed some parts of the 1985 Foreigners Law unconstitutional, especially those that restricted judicial liberties (Aja 2006).

In the 1990s, Spanish immigration legislation was marked by a move towards integration policies, albeit in tandem with control measures as well. A 1991 resolution in Parliament called for a regularization process and for more integration measures. This resulted in 120,000 irregular immigrants submitting applications for legalization, and most were granted (Relaño 2004). In 1993, a quota system was introduced to promote immigration management. Danese points out that European influences could be attributed to the relatively young Spanish government's attempt to promote civil society movements (1998). The first “Plan para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes” (“Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants”) was drafted in 1994, a result of the influence of a 1991 document
issued by the Council of Europe, “Intercommunity and Interethnic Relations in Europe” (Ibid). The Plan was established alongside two accompanying instruments, el Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes (The Forum for Immigrants’ Social Integration), and the Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración.⁷ It was be followed by three more integration plans issued in 2001, 2007, and 2011.⁸

A further key stage in Spain’s immigration policy came about with a 1999 Foreigners Law, which reformulated quotas in a way that was more oriented towards labor market policies, and less geared towards regularization. This law also conferred several immigrant rights, and granted access to education, public health and other benefits to all immigrants; additional rights were allowed to those with legal status (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). In 2000, the Ley de Extranjería 4/2000 introduced a “Foreigner’s Law” more sensitive to integration processes and oriented towards policies of incorporation; however, Spain’s conservative party, the Partido Popular (PP) took power in 2000 and modified the law with Ley Organica 8/2000 to make it more restrictive. Some of these modifications included limiting rights granted to immigrants without legal status, and facilitating disciplinary measures directed towards this group (Relaño 2004). This ushered in critique from organizations including NGOs, unions and the Catholic Church, as well as faced condemnation from the regional governments, including the Basque Country, Andalucia, Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha (Relaño 2004, 114). Apart from the modification by Ley Organica 8/2000, the Ley de Extranjería 4/2000, still in force today, has undergone several modifications in the past years (LO 4/2000, de 11 de enero). The implementation of these multiple reforms, and the corresponding amplification or restriction of immigrant rights, reflect varying governments in power, social contexts or changes at the time, or European agreements.

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⁷ The Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, or Permanent Observatory for Immigration, is the government office responsible for analyzing and publishing migration data.

⁸ There have not been subsequent plans since 2011; however, the most recent change in government as of June 1, 2018, with the PSOE or Socialist party leading the ruling coalition, may signify new integration and immigration legislation.
While the central government clearly regulates flows of immigration, the regional and local governments often take on other responsibilities, resulting in a mélange of integration policy throughout Spain. Indeed, Spanish immigration and integration policy is marked by its “patchwork integration;” there are different integration plans in each region (Godenau et al. 2015, 36). The Spanish Constitution describes the governance and capacities at the state level, the regional level and at the level of the provinces within a region (CE 1978). It grants exclusive competencies to the central government in several areas; the regions are granted a legal personality and the right to self-govern, based on their historical legal framework. In certain cases, they are also ceded jurisdiction over infrastructure, as well as in matters like social welfare and health. However, the Constitution does not specify the extent of the competencies of the regions, and for this reason the different regions have varying levels of autonomy, with some challenging the state more than others in this regard (Finotelli 2013).

Initially, there was a de facto distribution of integration responsibilities to regional and local governments, which would include provisions for health care, education, benefits, employment and housing (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). This distribution is now codified in national plans for integration. In practice, the central government works to regulate and restrict migrant entry, while the regions and local governments strive to bring visibility to the immigrant situation and improve their quality of life; regions can pursue this to varying degrees, ranging from a proactive to a “laissez-faire” approach (Moreno 2007).

**iii. Municipal Registry**

In an examination of Spanish integration policy and its decentralized nature, the mandated local registry or census record, “empadronamiento,” is a remarkable phenomenon. All residents of a community in Spain must register in the “Padrón Municipal de Habitantes,” or Municipal Resident Registry. It is useful to the Spanish authorities and those studying migration flows because it provides an important source of statistics regarding foreigners in the country. It indicates to social scientists an individual’s first and last name, gender, regular
residence, nationality, place and date of birth, national identification or other identification if foreigner status (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2018). Moreover, it offers more frequent demographic detail than larger national censuses provide, as the information is updated annually when the National Statistics Registry collects information from the various municipalities that gather the data in an ongoing basis (Ibid). This allows for a continuous record on foreign populations in the country. On the other hand, in addition to its use to investigators and local and national administration and institutions, it confers rights and advantages upon the individuals who register as well. The Padrón was made obligatory and accessible to all residents, regardless of citizenship or legal status, via reform law Law 4/1996 of January 10, which modified an earlier 1985 law that provided instruction for local administrative procedures (Ley 4/1996; Ortega et al. 2013). As a result of this, the Padrón legislation provides access to public health care, school for minors and allows for family reunification, to list some of its advantages (Domingo 2010). This type of municipal resident registry, independent of citizenship or a foreigner’s legal status at the national level, is unique to Spain.

As such, there are studies indicating that not only does the Padrón have direct effects at the administrative and legal levels, it also impacts migration and integration. It is considered one of the ways in which an individual first establishes themselves in the community, and for that reason is important in studies of societal cohesion (Pérez and Rinken 2005). Indeed, this work will later analyse whether the Padrón might have any effect on the target population’s sense of belonging, given that it provides access to rights like education to 1.5 generation migrants who may not yet exercise their full citizenship rights, but have already established residence in their communities.

iv. Integration policy

Unsurprisingly, therefore, a 2015 study on Spanish integration conducted by Godenau et al. demonstrated how different regional groupings, or groups of Spanish regions with
similar contexts, resulted in different levels of integration factors and outcomes (2015). Zapata insists that especially in Spain, regional identity remains important (2009). Of course, the central government has a responsibility to administer consistent policy that guarantees efficient public administration and multi-level cooperation; at the same time, decentralization is especially imperative when regional differences go so far as to include linguistic difference as well. Again, the cases of regions where Catalan and Basque are spoken surface as an example (Zapata 2009). At the same time, there is evidence that the various regional policies have become a bit more homogeneous in the wake of the crisis and lack of funding (Godenau et al. 2015).

The 2015 Spanish integration study further notes that there is a regulatory and legislative framework that provides homogeneity at the state level and also uniformly impacts integration indicators. At the same time, it stresses (with reference to the report’s own results, as grouped by regions) that the pace of the integration process and its results can vary substantially by regional grouping. By way of example, several observations on the varied results by regional grouping (as defined in this study) include: the Northwest, Northeast and Madrid performed most poorly in the indicators having to do with Employment and Welfare, but best in Social Relations; the Northwest and Madrid also performed well in Citizenship; and the South, East and Central regional groupings had poorer results in all areas than the average in the rest of Spain, with especially poor outcomes in the South in Social Relations (Godenau et al. 2015). In light of this clear variance throughout the Spanish state, Zapata argues that going forward, Spain is presented with three alternatives in governance and monitoring: a centralist approach, a collaborative approach, and an asymmetric approach to immigration and integration. He holds that the most recent legislation regulating immigration, Ley Orgánica 4/2000, combines all three approaches (Zapata 2011).

In speaking about integration, approaches to diversity necessarily follow. Again, the societal reception of Islam is discussed in the corresponding chapter. However, for a brief
reference, Zapata outlines an intricate diagram of the Spanish framework regarding diversity, and within that explains a trajectory of religious preference: that the Reconquista initiated a history of Islamophobia; that Franco’s reign reinforced a “Hispanidad” preferential to Spanish language speakers; and that the ensuing transition period led to agreements with the Catholic Church that were inherently biased against other religions, including the “concertado” school system (2010). However, he argues that Spanish diversity policy espouses a “practical philosophy,” i.e., it is informed not by old models, like multiculturalism, but rather learns from other European states with earlier immigration flows, and crafts policy accordingly (Ibid.).

v. Institutional anti-discrimination measures

As part of institutional steps towards diversity protection, in the form of rights and anti-discrimination safeguards, there are a few organizations operating under the umbrellas of respective government ministries. The two most notable include the Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination, under the Ministry of Health Social Services and Equality, and The Spanish Observatory for Racism and Xenophobia (el Observatorio Español del Racismo y Xenofobia, or OBERAXE), under the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security. In a 2018 report, the Council of Europe criticized the Council’s lack of activity, among other critiques of rights protection in Spain, to be further addressed in Chapter Seven (2018). However, OBERAXE has demonstrated more promise in recent projects. It was established in 2000 in order to identify racism and xenophobia, promote equality and non-discrimination and to collaborate with other institutions and entities in working towards these goals (D’Ancona and Valles 2012).

An example of an OBERAXE initiative includes the FRIR project, translated as “Training for the Identification and Recording of Racist Incidents” (“Formación para la Identificación y Registro de Incidentes Racistas”). This Spanish multilateral effort engaged the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, the Ministry of the Interior, the Armed and
Security Forces, and various NGOs to train the Spanish armed and security forces in equal and non-discriminatory treatment. It also provided tools by which to detect and record incidents of such behavior, behavior sanctioned in Spain's criminal code. Special prosecutors for hate crimes were subsequently created in 50 provinces, along with a special unit for these crimes in the Ministry of the Interior. Apart from a manual and training for the armed and security forces, the improvement of information systems recording hate crimes resulted in a progressive increase in reported crimes in 2013, 2014, and 2015, with a 4.5% decrease in 2016 (OBERAXE; Ministerio de Interior, OSCE). OBERAXE has also carried out several other projects in recent years, including a project with the media from 2008-2009, and the most recent in conjunction with the Ministry of Health, still in progress in 2018.

In brief, there is room for improvement in Spanish equality and plurality commitments, to be further explained in Chapter Seven in a discussion of Islam in Spain and how this minority is particularly affected. However, the need for rights protections and anti-discrimination measures has been recognized and is understood as part of a wholistic integration agenda.

Integration in Madrid

Given that the participant pool draws from Madrid, as well as the reality of multilevel governance and integration policy in Spain, it is useful to briefly address integration in this region. Madrid was the first region in Spain to create a Council for Immigration and Cooperation, in 2005 (Comunidad de Madrid 2009, 7, 54). Its third and most recent plan for integration, “Plan de Integración 2009-2012,” emphasized the importance of addressing

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9 Nicolás Marugán, 2018. E-mail message to author, April 28. Nicolás Marugán was Director of OBERAXE from May 2009 to November 2014. He helpfully directed me to and explained some of the information provided above, all of which can be corrected via the OBERAXE website and resources from the Ministry of the Interior.

10 For further information, the Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights provides data from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior about reported hate crimes, as well as data from other organizations in Spain (see OSCE in bibliography).
problems of language, education, work and social welfare, encouraging a sense of belonging, developing the community, and familiarizing with immigrant communities and networks (2009, 13). It lists its guiding principles as equality under the law, coexistence without discrimination, equality of opportunity, social cohesion and the need for coordination between the regional government and state and local governments, as well as private entities (2009, 18-19). Madrid integration policy recognizes the diverse cultures of origin of its immigrants, thus creating policy that not only treats of social benefits but also adds a cultural dimension (Morales et al. 2009, 118). The Community of Madrid on a more basic level also offers a “Know your laws” course, to non-Spanish speaking immigrants, generally who have received a basic level of Spanish via free language classes in the community’s immigration centers (La Spina 2015). While there appears to be no Integration plan in place post-2012, currently, the city of Madrid has outlined objectives in their 2015-2019 government plan. It states that there should be improved neighborhood coexistence, especially in neighborhoods with cultural diversity, and that victims of discrimination, hate and xenophobia should receive proper attention from city police (Ayuntamiento de Madrid).

The Community of Madrid is characterized by its dense and large population (6,421,874 inhabitants in 2011) and an economy drawing heavily on the service industries. It has a substantial percentage of immigrant population, with greater numbers of nationals from Latin America, Romania and Bulgaria, and Africa (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2011; Godenau et al. 2015, 44). In a comparison between the communities of Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia, authors Morales, Amparo and Jorba argue that Madrid does the most to recognize the multicultural elements of its immigrant population, as well as to pursue integration measures (2009). It has created a series of Centros de Atencion Social al Inmigrante (Centers of Social Attention for Immigrants), the majority of which are found in the city of Madrid. These centers address issues of first arrival, employment, social welfare, law, housing, and leisure (Comunidad de Madrid 2009). Migrant associations and non-governmental organizations work in collaboration with the region’s public institutions to
promote integration policies; public funds are directed towards this purpose, granted under the same stipulations that public funds would be granted to any other organization (Morales, Amparo and Jorba 2009). Further exploration is to come of how the Community of Madrid accommodates not solely first generation immigration, but also reaches out to culturally diverse communities and youth of migrant origin.

**In summary**

Clearly, there is a wealth of historical, political, economic and sociocultural context that informs immigration and integration policy and in turn affects community members of migrant origin, even at the local level. When beginning to examine these relationships at the European level, one notes that European integration policies have evolved even over a short period of time in the post-war period. While member states originally adopted models of assimilation and multiculturalism, reality on the ground has prompted a reexamination and reformulation of approaches. EU initiatives remain fairly noncommittal, and largely do not bind member states to policy. The cases of France and the United Kingdom are especially useful in demonstrating how policy can develop over time in relation to various political and social contexts. The French example manifests how political history can shape attitudes towards immigration, as France emphasizes the responsibility of the immigrant in its (albeit somewhat mitigated) republican integration model that largely avoids ethnic distinctions. The United Kingdom’s initial multiculturalism approach to social “cohesion” and emphasis on anti-discrimination can be attributed to its colonial past and public demands, though border control and the restriction of immigration flows have become increasingly prioritized, most especially in recent years and in light of the political climate and social events.

Spanish immigration is also shaped by economic and political contexts, as significant flows began after the transition to democracy. Integration policies reflect Spanish public attitudes at the regional level. Indeed, Spain’s integration structures and practices reflect a multi-level approach; gradually, integration policy has been delegated to the regional and
local level by the state, though issues of border control and flows remain regulated at the national level. For this reason, studies that use integration indicators in Spain attempt to take into account and distinguish between regional contexts as well. Madrid provides an example of how policies can embrace integration and provide either more or less social inclusion at the regional level. While there may have been some initial influences on integration policy from EU policy and directives, Spain’s policy reflects its diverse regional makeup and its post-dictatorship democratic commitment, just as France and the United Kingdom’s current immigration and integration policy and attitudes demonstrate the context and evolution of their societies. These considerations will also be useful in exploring the nuances of second generation integration in the next chapter.
Chapter V

The second generation and integration

Integration policies and processes take on more specific implications when considering the integration of second generation immigrants. Again, study of the second generation is a useful approach in examining the impact of immigration on a society’s future. Of course, second generation analysis merits a distinctive integration or assimilation theory, in order to accommodate this generation’s unique situation: indeed, they are not technically immigrants, but they still face distinct challenges and circumstances as compared to children of native born populations. This can be particularly frustrating, as they should technically be entitled to equal rights as their fellow citizens. This frustration will come into play in a later discussion of Islam in Europe, and in the empirical observations. Meanwhile, this chapter seeks to provide an overview of integration theory and indicators that are tailored to the second generation. Literature on the second generation in Spain will provide the necessary context to the question posed in this project. And, again, increasing literature on second generation Muslims in Europe, and the call for a theoretical framework that addresses this phenomenon, point toward the relevance of the thesis questions.

Defining the second generation

At this point, the term “second generation” merits clarification; it is often defined differently, depending on the context of the study. For example, in a 2006 study by Aparicio and Tornos, the second generation was defined as those children born in Spain to foreign parents, between the ages of 14 and 25 years old, or those that had arrived to Spain with their parents before turning 9 years old. The latter group is referred to in the literature as generation 1.5, but is then included under the umbrella of the second generation immigrant label. By contrast, the first part of a long-term study conducted by Portes, Vickstrom, and Aparicio in Madrid and Barcelona in 2008 defines the second generation as a child with at least one foreign-born parent, who is either born in Spain or arrived to Spain before the age
of 12 (2011). In North American literature, a range of definitions for generation 1.5 similarly exists. For example, in one of his studies, Rumbaut defines it as pre-adolescent children from six to twelve; at the same time, he recommends that it may be more precise to define generations in terms of parental birthplace and the age the individual arrives to the receiving country, rather than including generations 1.5 and 2.0 together as “generational segments” (2002, 57, 92).

As can be deduced through these examples, the “second generation” can include a diverse data set of both native-born and foreign-born children. The difference between the native born and the “generation 1.5” is marked by the native-born children's lack of migration experience, and their supposed social inclusion as a member of society from day one (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this work, it should again be noted that the term “second generation immigrant” remains imprecise, as this second generation can refer to those children born natives rather than foreign born like their parents; as such, they are indeed not properly immigrants. Indeed, as Crul, Schneider and Lelie point out, “In theory, the second generation should have the same life chances as children of native-born parents” (2012, 12). Oftentimes, however, this does not translate into reality.

Second generation immigrants in the majority of EU countries, including France, the United Kingdom and Spain, enjoy access to national citizenship (Hansen and Weil 2001). In Spain, nationality will come into play when determining the population set in this study, and whether they qualify as “second generation” or “generation 1.5.” The majority of laws regarding nationality can be found in the Civil Code of Spain. Nationality is often assigned based on a *jus sanguinis* model rather than *jus soli* model, though there are various avenues to nationality through *jus soli* (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). For example, the Civil Code grants Spanish nationality to those born in Spain, regardless of the nationality of their parents, although the nationality must be requested for the child after they have been in the country for one year; this would be considered opting for nationality by residence (González 2014).
The children of foreign parents are also granted Spanish nationality if the parents’ country of origin would not automatically grant the child nationality, or if neither parent has a nationality (OPI 2006).

Carmen González argues that comparatively, Spain allows for the easiest access to citizenship (by non-EU immigrants) of all of the EU countries; at the same time, she admits that the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) gives Spain a low score in this regard because it only takes into account the 10-year residency requirement (González 2014). However, this residency requirement can be reduced in several cases and for many nationalities. Refugees have a reduced residency requirement of five years; Sephardic Jews are similarly offered a reduced requirement. Only two years of residency is required of foreigners from Latin America, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and Portugal (Álvarez 2010).

For the purposes of this project (in that the majority of Moroccan immigrants and their progeny profess the Muslim faith), it is worthwhile to note that the children of Moroccan-born parents are granted Spanish nationality if the parents’ marriage is not recognized under Moroccan law (Castien 2009; OPI 2006). Otherwise, they face the option of nationality by residence (mentioned earlier), after one year. On the other hand, a first or 1.5 generation Moroccan would have to wait 10 years for citizenship, rather than the two years that many Latin American immigrants enjoy. This is notable because, as Gabrielli points out in a comparative study between Ecuadorian and Moroccan immigrants, not only does the latter population have to wait longer for citizenship, this wait can translate into an impediment structurally, as it slows labor market insertion (2015). Obviously, this would be a great obstacle for our population, young Muslims in Madrid.

Given these observations, while the study will target a majority of second generation participants (19 total), born in Spain, a comparative sample of generation 1.5 (8 participants) and first generation youth (5 participants) will be included as well. This will help to emphasize the different complexities that “generation 1.5” versus the second generation
faces. For example, assuming a welcoming society of residence, a longer time and exposure to that society should correlate to greater attachment. In terms of age, given the patterns of immigration to Spain in the past decades, the participant pool in the empirical section falls within the expected range. The majority of the youth participants are either completing university or entering into society as young professionals. This makes sense in that studies from previous years put the participants more in the high school age range, and at this point the Spanish second generation will have matured into those of workforce age. This phrase in life is especially pertinent in the study of second generation integration as it investigates how this particular population integrates as societal contributors. The identity they have shaped to date is key in this stage of their life.

**Second generation theory**

With the term “second generation” more clearly defined, as relates to this study, and as is defined in general (whether in terms of their period of time in the host country, birth in the host country, or access to citizenship), an overview of second generation literature, or theory, follows. Second generation studies are dated somewhat earlier in the United States, and have formed the vast majority of the literature on the subject to date. However, the European context has more recently emerged as a priority in the study of second generation integration. As Crul, Schneider and Lelie note in their study of the second generation in Europe, “Older children born to Europe's first labour migrants are now finishing their educational careers and beginning to enter the labour market in considerable numbers. The time is ripe for a first real assessment of second-generation integration” (2012, 12). Others similarly conclude that study of the second generation is especially timely in Spain (Diez 2006). Up until recently, the second generation in Spain was either a very negligible percentage of the population, or still in school and not yet facing the questions of civic integration, like access to the labor force and social welfare, that they now must address (Ibid.).
The second generation literature that has been conducted in the United States bears significance in that it has influenced and provided a framework for subsequent European studies. There are several theoretical approaches to second generation adaptation\(^\text{11}\), reflecting an evolution of the concept of assimilation that marked the study of earlier waves of American immigration (Alba and Nee 1997). Studies have investigated the second generation populations and communities that have taken root in the United States in recent history, with theoretical perspectives that Portes, Aparicio and Haller claim can be either classified as "culturalist" or "structuralist" (2016). Alba and Nee present a culturalist assimilation theory that advocates for a general mainstream idea of society. The immigrant, or child of the immigrant, both conforms to and influences the mainstream, as a result of economic drivers (1997). Moreover, in light of supranational institutions and globalization, there is an assumed interaction between the different cultures that produces this mutually-influential assimilation, rather than a one-sided melding to a core host society culture (Esser 2004). There are also those infamous commentators that would claim that no assimilation takes place; for example, Huntington claims that assimilation has not taken place, citing the example of Hispanics in the United States, with European adherents to this philosophy claiming a similar failure amongst Muslims in Europe (2006). Critics of this viewpoint cite the lack of empirical evidence to this effect, and the prejudicial nature of these observations.

In terms of structuralist viewpoints, an exclusionary theory is proposed by Telles and Ortiz. They explain, based on their research on Mexican-American communities in Southern California, that descendants of Mexican immigrants largely did not experience socioeconomic gains from one generation to the next. Due to their ethnicity or race and the subsequent

\(^{11}\) Some shy from the term of “assimilation,” as it can carry negative associations with older or “classical” assimilation theories (from early American immigration waves at the beginning of the 20th century). However, for the purposes of this paper, “assimilation” will be referred to in non-restricted sense, without any ties to past definitions. A past definition it would seek to avoid includes that of Warner and Srole, which holds that assimilation can be understood as the inferior immigrant being enjoined to utterly conform to a superior mainstream society (Alba and Nee 1997). “Adaptation,” an expression currently in use by several authors, can serve as a neutral term (Zhou 1994; Portes 2016).
discrimination they faced, they were unable to flourish. This consistent discrimination, Telles and Ortiz posit, can manifest itself many ways that lead to the disadvantaged position of this group. Some include poor access to education, harsh immigration policies, and how components of the American economy become structured around cheap and racially or ethnically categorized labor (2008). Testing this thesis are the other communities in various regions across the US, including Cubans in Miami, who maintain separate identifications or communities but achieve political or economic success (Portes, Aparicio and Haller 2016).

Similarly, another structuralist approach promises a positive outcome, as a 2009 study conducted among youth in New York, describes how there is a “second generation advantage” in drawing on the resources of two cultures, despite any disadvantages (Kasinitz et al. 2009).

A further structuralist perspective includes the “segmented assimilation,” theory, originally posited by Portes and Zhou, which has been used in the description of integration and mobility trends and processes amongst both relevant US populations and the European second generation (Portes and Zhou 1993; Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). Within this theory, two “modes of incorporation” prevail: either “downward assimilation,” or an “upward mobility” that is facilitated by ethnic communities (Portes and Zhou 1993; Crul et al. 2012). Downward assimilation is marked by second generation immigrants’ vulnerabilities to ethnic and racial discrimination and their descent into the urban “underclass”; this class can become entrapped in a cycle of poverty in a society experiencing increasing economic disparity (Portes and Zhou 1993). By contrast, the incorporation via “upward mobility” involves the children of immigrants finding themselves able to draw upon the resources of their ethnic communities. With this capital, they propel themselves upwards in society, as well as preserve some of the values of these communities. Finally, Portes and Zhou acknowledge the traditionally understood method of assimilation, that of parallel assimilation, into the white middle class. Proponents of the “segmented assimilation” theory argue that its strengths lie in providing for a variety of outcomes, both positive and negative, dependent on the conditions present. Levitt and Waters question how transnational practices, engaged in by the second
generation to varying degrees, can affect these trajectories of segmented assimilation. They argue that a “transnational lens” is imperative to understanding the second generation’s experience (2002, 16).

Crul, Schneider and Lelie point out that weaknesses of utilizing the American conceptions of second generation integration processes when analyzing phenomena in Europe. They argue for a number of shortcomings: the difference in the demographics and context of populations studied; the distinctive American ideology, which may differ from European understandings and approaches to integration; and sometimes, certain theory is not applicable to the European situation (2012). For example, the theory of downward assimilation, they argue, does not hold. While ethnic minorities can often reside in poorer neighborhoods in Europe, these neighborhoods are incomparable to the ghettos of the United States (2012).

In this burgeoning field, scholars have begun to try and adapt theory to take into account the varying considerations of both US and European assimilation or integration theory. As referenced earlier, Alba uses his schema regarding “bright” versus “blurred” boundaries to indicate how religion in Europe may be interpreted as a bright boundary, whereas ethnicity in the United States would be less marked and considered a blurred boundary (2005). However, in straddling the perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic, Aparacio and Tornos emphasize a key difference in the approach to second generation integration in American versus European literature, or indeed in approaching integration in general. They hold that the European methodology gives more precedence to the social environment of the receiving country, namely to the policies and attitudes of the society. They highlight the necessity of the receiving country providing equal civic and social rights to the immigrant population, explaining it is taken for granted as a key foundation for successful integration in Europe. In fact, they insist, in the cases where poor integration is identified, the government and society are held more responsible than the individual immigrant (2006).
While more recent literature regarding European integration has observed that the pendulum has swung back towards the responsibility of the migrant, there is clearly a recurring emphasis in the literature that integration is a two-way process, a mutual give-and-take between the immigrant and the receiving society. By contrast, Aparacio and Tornos point out, the American literature focuses less on social services and the responsibility of the state. However, both sides of the Atlantic agree that the educational and labor systems are objective tools that should be configured so as to fairly incorporate immigrants into society (2006). A 2012 comparative European study looks to measure second generation immigration by progress in factors including "education, labour market, social relations, religion and identity formation," emphasizing how the structures and policies of receiving societies interact with and shape these factors (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012, 12).

**Second generation indicators of integration**

While integration indicators for immigrant integration were outlined earlier, the science studying the second generation clearly emphasizes a more specific set of indicators, especially given the unique nature and position of this population set. The second generation contends with two cultures and languages that can result in varying integration outcomes. Furthermore, difficulties in integration and feelings of exclusion in society are especially challenging for the second generation. Again, given their status as members of society, they should feel that they are facing unjust, unequal treatment. Nonetheless, reality demonstrates there are many factors that clearly place the second generation in a different position than their counterparts with native-born parents.

Portes and Zhou provide a framework, indicating that within the theory of segmented assimilation, a typology of acculturation emerges wherein the child can either: adapt with their parents to the new language and culture at the same pace; the child can outperform their parents in ability to adapt to the receiving culture and simultaneously reject the former culture of their parents; or, the child both adapts to the new culture and preserves elements
of that of their parents’ (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011). The pattern of “selective acculturation,” when the student draws from both the culture of the host country and their co-ethnic community (if available) can provide an advantage; for example, bilingual ability (Portes 2009).

In terms of measuring the second generation’s integration, Portes and Rumbaut group indicators of second generation integration the three categories: individual features (including age, education, skills), the social environment of the receiving country (government policy, native population attitudes, and existing ethnic communities and their support) and family structure (2001). Certainly, social capital, an aspect contained within the general category of individual features, is very significant, as family status and language knowledge can clearly influence the level and direction of integration. However, different studies emphasize different indicators as particularly telling, especially in light of the population set and the question at hand. In another study by Rumbaut, he focuses specifically on educational attainment, incarceration, and early childbearing in a study of second generation Americans, with parents from Mexico, the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, among others (2005). Again, with classifications like this, the European environment should be considered. For example, given that the welfare state is stronger in Europe, perhaps educational skills would fall under social environment of receiving country more so than individual features. Education would be less dependent on the individual or individual’s family than of the state.

For our purposes, a key measure of second generation integration, that of self-identity and if it manifests sense of belonging to the parents’ host country, has been presented in the literature as a soft, rather than objective, indicator. This indicator is correlated to future of these youth, their upward mobility in society and thus a perceived successful integration and inclusion (Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011; Portes, Aparicio, Haller and Vickstrom 2010; Portes and Aparicio 2013). As briefly referenced earlier, and as highlighted in the title of this work, hybrid identity can serve as an indicator. Exclusive national belonging to the host
society does not always necessarily determine positive adaptation outcomes, including in relation to aspirations, and selective acculturation has proved to offer positive outcomes (Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011).

For such a hybrid identity to indicate successful outcomes, the identity includes attachment to the community of residence, of course. A certain degree of belonging to the receiving society is an important indicator, as it demonstrates an individual’s “relatedness to a place or community,” and therefore, in considering the transnational politics of immigration, provides a key component in processes of integration (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). While a self-identity indicating a sense of belonging itself may be a determinant of integration, there are several factors influencing self-identity in turn that require examination. Some of these include social class and education, attitudes of the receiving society, and level of contact with the parents’ home country, among others (Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011). As cited in some studies, education can provide a nuanced determinant, because rather than determining whether the second generation rejects or accepts the host society, it may encourage the individual to adopt both the receiving culture and their parents’ culture as their own (Ibid.). In this study in particular, the attitude of the receiving society, measured through questions about the participants’ perceptions of self-discrimination, will be emphasized.

In concentrating on the second generation’s self-identity and sense of belonging to the host country (Spain) or community (city of Madrid), this project will also explore any relationship with religious identity, including how youth perceive societal discrimination in regards to their religious affiliation. The research conducted among second generation Muslim immigrants in Madrid would first seek to measure their religious self-identification, in order to define the population set; i.e., the participants would identify themselves on a set scale of religious attachment. It would then concentrate on the indicator of self-identification with Spain or the city of Madrid, and the relationship between this and religious attachment, if any. Questions about perceived discrimination (i.e., in order to isolate the factor of
receptiveness of the host society) will also be essential in determining the influence that the host society has on self-identity, including national identity, religious identity or perhaps other components including ethnic or cultural. A further overview of considerations of the theory behind identity, self-identity and collective identity, including religious identity versus ethnic identity and so on, will follow in a later chapter.

Second generation integration and Islam in Europe: its current relevance

The integration of the second generation, and the Muslim youth within this population, is a social and policy concern for Europe, and scientists, for several reasons. To begin, inequalities are frequently encountered among this specific population; while some immigrant youth experience success, many hail from socioeconomically oppressed neighborhoods, and do not experience the same societal prosperity as fellow native children. Spain’s relative positive performance in this regard is reflected in a 2013 long-term study by Portes and Aparicio of the second generation in Spain; they indicate that while there are some instances of teen pregnancy or juvenile detention, the second generation in Spain is integrating fairly successfully and the gap is closing between them and their native population counterparts, although a difference still remains (2013).

An additional impetus for examination of the second generation of Muslim Europeans, specifically, includes the current sentiment towards immigrants and their children, in the wake of the economic crisis of the late 2000s. Compounding this sentiment is negative attention directed towards Islam, by both the media and nativist political parties. This attention could even be conceived of as a “political market that marginalizes and scapegoats Muslims” (Soper 2007, 942). An “anti-Muslim discourse” to be further expounded upon in the next chapter, has emerged via a compendium of forces including xenophobic political parties, feminist critiques of a perceived Islamic patriarchy, and secular anti-religious sentiment and terrorism fears (Casanova 2006). Cesari points out how a 2011 survey carried out in the 27 EU member states indicated that immigrant groups are generally more religious than native
populations (2013). Significant numbers of second generation youth in Europe certainly are faced with the “bright” boundary of religion, albeit perhaps not due to any responsibility on their part (Alba 2005). Because of the "high secularization" in Europe, where mainstream society is secular, religious practices can often be perceived as “illegitimate” (Foner 2008, 378).

A third reason why second generation integration is a European-wide policy priority includes that the discrimination that the second generation may face, or the perception of discrimination, can impact their self-identity. Moreover, it may even encourage an “oppositional” identity, and identifying with Islam can create a sense of belonging when these populations are marginalized (Foner 2008, 373). The second generation’s negotiation of an Islam that adapts their parents’ host country culture into new forms of practice has led some authors to refer to a new “European Islam” (Vertovec 1998, 14). In contrast, there are studies indicating that some second generation groups react with a more traditional or conservative approach to Islam than that of their parents,’ due to a combination of factors including but not limited to a sense of exclusion from mainstream society (Güngör, Fleischmann, Phalet, and Maliepaard 2013).

Finally, second generation youth or youth of migrant origin are tasked with balancing at least two cultures as they navigate society, and with the escalation of globalization, fluidity of transnational communication and challenges to the archetype of the nation-state, they face an unprecedented grappling with identity.

The debates surrounding the sociology of religion and what constitutes religious identity, key to fully exploring Muslim youth of migrant origin in Europe, and specifically in Spain, will be explored in a later chapter. Yet, in considering the discussion up until this point, it is clear that the second generation can embark on different trajectories, as well as contend with a different set of factors than the first generation. These considerations are important when contemplating the future of migration in host societies, and indeed when anticipating the future of the society as a whole.
The second generation in Spain

In a 2016 report on youth in Spain, the authors estimated that 18% of youth in Spain were either migrants themselves or had parents of migrant origin (Benedicto et al. 2016). In another projection based on a 2015 Spanish housing census (Encuesta Continua de Hogares), Gebhardt, Zapata and Bria et al. estimated that between 15 and 19% of the youth between ages 0 and 24 in Spain were either second or 1.5 generation, with the breakdown between the two being fairly even (2017).

Several studies have already been undertaken in respect to this population, and in order to provide background and comparison, it is useful to highlight in further detail three recent studies on the second generation in Spain. The first is a 2006 report surveying second generation Moroccans, Dominicans, and Peruvians. The study provided several observations. As to education, they noted that the youth generally obtained a higher level of education than their parents; however, there was a trend of dropping out of school after the obligatory period, more so than their other fellow classmates (Portes and Aparicio 2006). The authors explained this early drop-out rate could be accounted for by socioeconomic status and the family situation, which could encourage them to enter the workforce as soon as possible, as these youth did enter the workforce earlier than their colleagues (Ibid.). At the same time, they clarified that apart from socioeconomic considerations, factors including precarious legal status and discrimination in the education system could also be responsible for terminating studies after obligatory schooling was completed. Furthermore, in addition to the fact that the participants generally entered the workforce earlier, it was also noted that they tended to find lower quality jobs with less education requirements and poorer salaries, and were not for the most part more successful than their parents in the workforce (Ibid.). At the same time, second generation had higher levels of employment than their colleagues, perhaps due to a perspective that obtaining any employment was of more value than good conditions of employment (Ibid.).
In regard to religious attachments, the study found that while the majority of participants shared the same opinions and views as other Spaniards of the same generation, the Moroccan children differed in certain aspects along religious lines; this included their preferences for couples sharing the same religion, and their linking household tasks to a female responsibility (Ibid.). They also noted that while males placed priority on the attendance of religious services, women were more likely to follow guidelines for religious practices, including dietary restrictions, indicating that religious identity could develop a more cultural rather than religious dimension (Ibid.). Another key finding included that Moroccan and Dominican children tended to identify more with the former culture of their parents, while still maintaining normal relationships with Spanish society (Ibid.). The authors argued that integration of the second generation was still in process.

Another study, termed the “Investigacion Longitudinal de la Segunda Generacion (ILSEG)” (a long-term study of the second generation), surveyed over 6,000 children of immigrants from 2007-2008 and over 5,000 of the same participants from the previous survey over the years 2011-2012, in the cities of Madrid and Barcelona (Portes and Aparicio 2013). Clearly, this study had a more extensive pool to draw from, and included a range of nationalities that expanded beyond those targeted in the 2006 study previously cited. For this reason, perhaps, the survey found that fourth fifths of the participants did not drop out of school after completing the obligatory period. The ILSEG did find that integration challenges included experiences and perceptions of discrimination, unemployment, inequality, teen pregnancy, arrests and imprisonment (Ibid.). However, the survey had the benefit of its long-term data capture to observe that while the percentage of the participants born in Spain self-identified as Spanish remained the same for both surveys, the participants identified as “generation 1.5” or those who immigrated with their parents, increased their self-identification as Spanish from 30% to 50% over the course of both surveys. This indicated advances in the process of integration (Ibid.). The authors noted that unlike in America, where national identity can include a range of identifications including pan-ethnic or
hyphenated identity, types of national identity in Spain broke down into simply Spanish identification or identification with the parents’ host country (Ibid.).

Finally, "The Integration of the European Second Generation" or TIES Project, a study of the children of Turkish, Ex-Yugoslavian and Moroccan immigrants in eight European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) is presented in an IMISCOE Research Series report edited by Crul, Schneider and Lelie (2012). They defined the second generation as those children of immigrants born in the receiving country, who completed their entire education in the same country. They interviewed 250 children of Moroccan immigrants from Madrid and Barcelona each, and 250 participants from a comparison group in each city, as well. The “snowball method” was employed to identify participants, as sampling frames like municipal records were not a possibility, because they do not identify the second generation. Instead, they used what data was available from the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE), they identified neighborhoods with high percentages of Moroccan immigration, and looked to Moroccan immigrant organizations (Ibid.). The majority of the participants only had Spanish citizenship. They found that in Spain, the Moroccan generation had the highest percentage of 'strong' feelings of national belonging (in this case, Spanish) compared to the rest of the second-generation groups from other European countries (Ibid). The study also found that the Moroccans in Spain had the least percentage of religious belief of all groups in the survey; at this time, this religious belief was not equated with religious identity, as those who reported no religious belief could also strongly identify as Muslim (Ibid).

In summary

Examining the second generation literature in the context of Spain and Europe highlights the importance of social, political, historical and cultural contexts in considering how children of immigrants negotiate their place and identity in host societies. Given America’s historical trajectory, a great deal of theory to date has focused on North American
second generation integration; these theoretical approaches to the study of the second generation and those subsequent can prove helpful to understanding the distinction between studying first versus second generation integration. Along with processes of migration and assimilation, practices of transnationalism can be inherent in the second generation experience. While a more recent undertaking, European approaches to second integration are contributing to a growing body of literature that presents theoretical frameworks more tailored to the European context. In fact, a great deal of European literature has identified the uniqueness of the European situation, including that second generation integration is still very much in progress and that social structures in the receiving society are an important component in facilitating it, an observation confirmed in Spanish studies. Moreover, in considering second generation literature, the new demographics also entail that generation 1.5 (in Spain), as well as third and fourth generations (in other countries with relevant populations) should be analyzed as well, in order to fully account for the experience of youth of migrant origin.

While Spain shares a few characteristics with other European member states and their second generations, it differs from them in several ways as well, including in that its modern immigration flows are a more recent phenomenon. Spain demonstrates some variance in both the approaches to the inclusion of the second generation, as well as in the results of its integration outcomes studies. Research seems to find high levels of Spanish identification among the second generation; one study even found that among self-identified Muslims within the second generation throughout several countries, the Spanish participants identified more with the host country. Again, further exploration of Europe and Spain’s relationship with Islam, as well as how self-identity, collective identity and Muslim identity figure into this discussion, require further clarification in the chapters to follow.
Chapter VI

Europe, religion and Islam

Charting the scope of identities among second generation European Muslim youth merits a preliminary explanation of the social ambit and historical framework informing their current context. To some extent, the history of church-state relations and secularism in Europe shapes the current debate on Islam in Europe. Simultaneously, a human rights discourse, including the right to religious freedom, impacts the discussion. Finally, the variance within the religion of Islam itself affects the dialogue on Islam in Europe as well. Islam can be defined in terms of “the other,” foreign in its origins and values to that of secular and Christian Europe, as well as can be linked with recent immigration, thus compounding the conception of Islam as foreign. The right to religious freedom that this Christian Europe espouses, and the diversity within Islam that defies a categorical definition in either opposition to or in congruence with a supposed European value set, complicates the discussion of Islam in Europe.

Beyond the rhetoric, these historical factors also influence institutional arrangements that affect the integration, incorporation and belonging among a population that should be entitled to a comprehensive inclusion in society. The contexts of settlement societies, whether at the institutional level in church-state relations, or at the societal level in how the general population receives these Muslim minorities, are instrumental components in the incorporation of this minority population. At the same time, the diversity of Muslim identities, which can be divided among ethnic, religious, kinship, or sociocultural lines, to name a few, simultaneously affects the give-and-take of the two-way integration process.

This study singles out religious identity given the premise that the Muslim children of immigrants in Europe face added complexity: they operate both as a group of migrant origin that must navigate the uncharted territory of balancing the old culture and the new, as well as must negotiate any and all implications that accompany identifying as a Muslim in Europe.
Europe and its religious heritage

Western European values and norms are informed by tradition, including religious tradition. The relationship between religion and the state harkens back to our previous discussion on the relationship between the state and citizenship. Individuals are incorporated into a state both through formal membership and individual rights, as well as symbolically in the way they identify with the nation (Koenig 2005). This model of incorporation, both organizationally through the state and symbolically via the nation, is coupled with the traditional nation-state model. Recent literature on citizenship claims that this traditional model, in light of how transnationalism has expanded the political realm, is being reconstituted and is undergoing change; at the same time, the vestiges of national identity remain embedded in legal, political and societal frameworks (Brubaker 1989; Joppke 2005; Soysal 1997; Koenig 2005).

Church-state relations in Europe can be distinguished by certain features, including an emphasis on religious liberty (to be further elaborated upon), the demarcation of religion as a competence belonging to religious groups rather than the state, and the idea that states and religious groups can cooperate selectively (Ferrari 2002). Ferrari classifies a series of three models for church-state relations in Europe. Concordatarian states have relationships with religious groups either based on “concordats” (with the Catholic Church) or “agreements,” for all other religions. In this case, Spain features an example, with the 1992 Agreement between the Spanish State and Muslim Community meriting further discussion in the next chapter. The second model, that of a state or national Church system, is represented by Northern European countries including England and its Anglican Church.\footnote{It should be noted that while the case of the United Kingdom will be used as a comparative example in this study, the church-state relationship throughout it varies. While there is separation of state in Wales and Northern Ireland, albeit close cooperation between the two in education, England has the national ‘Anglican’ Church (Nielsen 1999).}

Separatist or secular countries, the third paradigm, group the remaining models that do not fit into the first two categories. France with its constitutional declaration of “laïcité”
serves as an example, though Northern Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands are included in this pool. Nielsen's typology of church-state configurations relatively corresponds to Ferrari's; he includes the concordat model, but then proceeds to define the national church system model as an "establishment" model instead; this model represents when the state recognizes or incorporates the church. Finally, Nielsen highlights the “laicist” model as well, noting that it is inexistent in practice, but deals with total separation; again, France serves as a theoretical example (1999). Nielsen’s classification is useful because he indicates that while Spain is currently concordat, it is slowly moving towards an “establishment by recognition” model.

**Europe and secularism**

Both secular and Christian identities can be encountered, through rarely consciously identified, in the cultural or national identities of many European states (Casanova 2006; Nexon 2006). This identity presents a unique and perhaps even adverse environment into which Muslim immigrants must enter (Nexon 2006). While some authors emphasize the Christian tradition of Europe, others insist that Western Europe is a collective of increasingly secular societies. In the most basic sense, secularism can be defined as the separation of politics and religion, relegating religion to the private sphere (Cesari 2005; Cesari 2013). Moreover, in Europe, there is an increasing push for the "privatization" of religion with secularization viewed as essential to a modern society (Casanova 2006). Secularism can be traced to the evolution of Christianity and the birth of Protestant Europe and with its emphasis on God’s relationship with the individual in a cognitive and private way (Asad 1993).

Secularism can also be understood in terms of the decline of religion. In the West, influential 19th century leaders in social thought hinted at a progressive decline in religion with the advent of industrial society (Norris 2004). Weber himself even used the term
"secularization" (Swatos 1999; Weber 1930). Beck and Ulrich-Beck refer to the process of this evolving society that the sociologists identified and predicted as individualization (2002).

Some insist that in their projection of this secularization, implicated in the onset of modernity, these thinkers worked out of the context of a Western, Christian tradition. However, Mahmood argues that secularism should be understood outside of the solely Western context. Rather than defining it as the separation of politics and religion, Mahmood contends that secularism can be conceived of "as a formation that exceeds this rather limited understanding and focuses on transformations wrought in the domain of ethics, aesthetics, and epistemology" (2010). This understanding of secularism can certainly have a relationship with politics, but would not be defined by its relationship with religion, or owe its existence to such religion, like Christianity, for example.

Nonetheless, for the most part, this work will be defining secularism in the sense of the removal or gradual decline of religious influence on society, and the relegating of religion to the private sphere (Cesari 2005). This definition is often utilized in explaining the secularization of Europe. For example, the literature often compares more public religious practices, visible in the United States, with private beliefs and less visible practice in Western Europe (Casanova 2006). Again, there is a general consensus that the US places value on religious observance, while Western Europe can view it as "illegitimate,"—especially any Muslim religious activity (Foner 2008).

The understanding that a European culture increasingly embraces secularism as progress is cited as an underlying cause for the discrimination towards, and isolation of, Muslims in Europe. Pride in this secularist approach is a certain pride in the supposedly enlightened European perspective; as Katzenstein puts it, "What makes the European situation so unique and exceptional when compared with the rest of the world is precisely the triumph of secularism as a teleological theory of religious development" (2006). Statham remarks that the sometimes public nature of Muslim religious practice subjects the religion's adherents to scrutiny, especially in Europe (2016). Given the fact that several many self-
identifying Muslims are not practicing or might not even consider themselves religious, it appears that Muslim religiosity has been overemphasized, and that there is a tendency to group a diverse range of individuals, drawing from different ethnicities, economic and cultural backgrounds, into one "Muslim" category that simplistically emphasizes religious devotion (Banfi, Gianni and Giugni 2016).

At the same time, it is perilous to maintain the view that secularism is a gradual eventuality that results from modernity and globalization. Religion has yet to fade with the advent of modernity. While in the West individualization may be taking place, worldwide religion is increasing (Pew Research Forum). Additionally, religion and religious collectives can serve as a path to civic engagement (Rodriguez 2017). Moreover, Nexon contends, the social and political diversity that can result from the practice of multiple religions in Europe needs to be considered in the efforts towards achieving Europeanisation (2006). A Europe with a commitment to secular values must take this into account. As Zemni puts it, “the best defence of a secular state is the real and honest defence of the idea of freedom of religion. By taking the religious claims from minorities seriously, the secular state not only reinforces itself but it also gives the minorities a voice in shaping the future of their society” (2002, 171).

**Religious freedom in Europe**

As briefly referenced earlier outline of church-state relations in Europe, there is indeed a supranational commitment to religious liberty (Ferrari 2002). A transnational discourse of human rights is embraced at the European level, including this right of religious freedom. This human rights discourse seeks to recognize religious difference, protect against discrimination, ensure equality, and promote multiculturalism; above all, it allows for religion to emerge as a legitimatized type of identity. Various supranational legal mechanisms meant to arbitrate beyond the bounds of state sovereignty have been put in place, including the European Court of Human Rights (Koenig 2014).
Koenig claims that these attempts at transnational homogeneity may have paradoxically encouraged a reframing of church-state relations “as expressions of legitimate national identities” (2007, 916). Religion is indubitably tied to state sovereignty and national identity in Western Europe, as evidenced by each state’s individual legal and institutional frameworks, and their historical contexts. A new diversity, for example, the increased number of immigrants of Muslim faith, has provided heightened exposure of European religious traditions and church-state practices (Soper and Fetzer 2005). Moreover, many conclude that this societal consciousness or unconsciousness, regarding a nation’s traditional religious history and framework, manifests itself in how Muslim populations are treated as “the other” (Ferrari 2002).

And so, a European tradition of Christianity and secularism, the relationship between which is argued to be of varying modalities, provides historical context for the debate on Islam in Europe. Trending secularization throughout Europe (albeit abetted by its immigrant populations), results in the higher visibility of Muslim symbolic practice in the public space. Additionally, both a church-state narrative and, in some countries, a Christian religious tradition, continue to remain. As a result, in addressing Islam in Europe, Statham points out that in almost all cases, states can be identified in two ways: either by the degree to which Christianity is privileged, or the extent to which the church-state structure attempts to accommodate other confessions (2016). After contextualizing the Christian and secular heritage of Europe, and before addressing how these states accommodate the religion of Islam and the ways in which its European believers are characterized and categorized, reference should be made to the historical trajectory of Islam in the region, as well.

Islam and Europe: an overview

Some caution against neglecting the history of Islam in Continental Europe, and its Muslim heritage. The most obvious example for this study is the expansion of the Muslim caliphate into the Iberian Peninsula. This period of itinerant conquering and rule began with
an offensive in 711 CE, reached a peak during the Golden Age under the Umayyad Caliphate around 912, and dwindled to an end when the Kingdom of Granada fell, and those of Muslim and Jewish faith were exiled from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492 (Kennedy 1996; Houghteling 1995). However, a continuous Islamic presence in Europe has extended from the Baltic coast to the Balkans. The successor states that resulted from the advance of the Mongol armies in the 14th century led to Tartar groups with Muslim adherents that populated the area from the Volga River down to the Caucuses and Crimea. Ottoman expansion into the Balkans and central Europe represent a later stage of Muslim presence in Europe. Finally, the current, 21st century phenomenon of Muslim communities in Europe as the most recent influx of Muslim presence (Nielsen 1999).

This past century's wave of Muslim immigration to Europe can be attributed to historic ties, colonial relationships, and economic and political drivers, to name a few. In Spain, the majority of immigrants draw from former colonies in Latin America, and the most Muslim immigrants from Morocco. The latter country of origin, geographically proximate to Spain, was previously a Franco-Spanish protectorate and is where Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla are located (Archick 2011; Arango 2005). Morocco’s inequalities, especially in the North and in rural areas, triggered, among other factors, economic migration to Spain, largely beginning in the late 1980s and increasing throughout the 1990s (López 2009; Cebolla 2010; Gavira 2008). Spain has Muslim immigrants from Senegal, Algeria, Pakistan, and Nigeria, as well (Archick 2011). In France, a majority of Muslim immigrants are of Maghrebi descent, as a result of the history of French colonialism and the relationships and networks that established (France held Tunisia and Morocco as protectorates until 1956 and Algeria until 1962) (Beaman 2016). The United Kingdom, in turn, received many Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants. The 1980s also saw a rise in Muslim asylum-seekers, from Iran, Iraq and Turkey and then later from the Balkans, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. This timeframe experienced the migration of students and investors as well (At Home in Europe Project 2010). Political upheaval and unrest beginning in 2011 has driven some Muslim
refugees to Europe, and polemic has arisen regarding the number of refugees settling in
member states, most recently in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis.

There are over a billion adherents of Islam globally, and while the religion originated
in the Arab world, the majority of Muslims reside in Asia and Africa ("Islamic World," 2015).
In the past fifty or so years, the Muslim population in Europe has risen from just a few tens of
thousands to 16 or 17 million in 2010 (Laurence, 2011). Rather than temporary labor
migrants, these immigrants and their children and grandchildren have become a part of the
European demographic reality. The Pew Research Center projects that (self-identified)
Muslim populations in Europe will increase from 44.1 million (as of 2010) to 58.2 million in
2030, which will include up to 10.3% of the population in France, 8.2% of the population in
the United Kingdom and 3.7% of the population in Spain (Grim 2011). Overall, Muslims are
less integrated into labor markets and face higher rates of unemployment in Europe; this of
course could be due to their migrant or minority status (At Home in Europe Project 2010).

Islam: a brief outline of the faith

Before elaborating further on the concept of Islam in Europe, a brief outline of the
religion itself would be useful. Islam is a monotheistic, world religion that claims to be the
most authentic, original and universal; prophets from earlier monotheistic religions including
Christianity and Judaism complete its message. The word "islam" can be translated as
"submission to God," and it is understood as the eternal religion of God; it originated in
Arabia in the 7th century CE and was founded by the Prophet Muhammad (Gordon 2013;
Rahman 2005). The Qur'an, the word of God, was brought to Muhammad verbatim ("Islam").
The five pillars of Islam, formulated early on in the religion's history, include: publicly
proclaiming the creed "There is no God but God and Muhammad is his prophet"; praying five
times a day; paying zakat, i.e., providing for the poor; fasting during Ramadan, the ninth
month of the Islamic year; and undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime, if
feasible (Rahman 2005). The Sunna are derived from the Prophet Mohammed's behavior and
conduct, and the hadith are reports on these Sunna developed over time ("Islam"). Islamic jurisprudence was also formulated after the religion’s founding, drawing on these Sunna and the Qur’an, and there are four major schools of thought (Calder et al.).

Islam itself takes many different forms, or is composed of several sects. The two largest and most visible branches, Sunni and Shi’a, separated as a result of a dispute about succession when Muhammad passed. Sunni adherents make up the majority of Muslims in the world today (Von Sivers et al. 1995). Ramadan, in his typography of Islam in the Western world, outlines six major tendencies in Islam.13 “Scholastic traditionalism” strictly follows the interpretation of the texts as dictated by one of the Schools of jurisprudence. “Salafi literalism” adheres to the text in its literal form, following the “Salaf,” i.e., the Companions of the Prophet and devout Muslims from the first three generations of Islam; it only allows for a literalist interpretation with reference to the text. “Salafi reformism” also gives priority to the original texts, but practices “ijtihad,” or independent reasoning, in their interpretation. Political literalist salafism is salafi literalism with a political mission, including with the objective of reinstating the caliphate. “Liberal or rationalist reformism” argues for the separation of religious and secular society. Finally, “Sufism” is a form of mysticism (2004).

A brief aside about distinctions between these interpretations of Islam, religious fundamentalism, and violence: The political literalist salafism that Ramadan refers to is an interpretation of Islam often referenced when Islam is politicized or presented as a dichotomy with the West and with Europe. Salafism is also a transnational movement that puts Islam at odds with the West, in that it views Western culture as detracting from the purity of Islam (Cesari 2014). This reading of Islam, a form of Islamic fundamentalism sometimes termed “Islamism,” is often the reference point when political and social actors

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13 Tariq Ramadan qualifies in his outline that Islam fundamentally is one and universal, with identifiable premises in its various sects and diversity. A Swiss academic with a career at the University of Oxford, Ramadan himself is a controversial figure as a figure of moderate Islam in Europe. Some critics claiming that he presents a liberal brand of European Islam as a veritable “Trojan horse” with which to enter European society. However, he is a professed proponent of a progressive Islam and one of the pioneers of the concept of “European Islam” (Klausen 2007).
(or otherwise) claim that Islam is incompatible with Europe and Western civilization. However, it is an interpretation or movement supported by a minority of European Muslims. Fundamentalism, found in many religions, can be defined as an attempt to return to a religion’s origins with a strict, sole interpretation of the past rules, and applying this interpretation for the purpose of a contemporary religious project (Koopmans 2015). Fundamentalism is distinguished from orthodoxy: the latter focuses on content of belief, while the former on the way belief is engaged in. Fundamentalism is also confused in the vernacular with violent extremism (Koopmans 2015). Violence is not a requisite of fundamentalism, though some fundamentalist movements may employ it.

Of course, when a critique of Islam in Europe is present, the fundamentalist interpretations of Islam and any violent extremists who claim the religion as their own are cited as the way Islam in Europe is configured. Beyond popular sentiment regarding Islam in Europe, the current academic discussion ranges a large spectrum and involves many opposing theories. Consequently, an outline proceeds of the diverse nature of Islamic belief and practice, in tandem with Islam’s paradoxically universal nature, in a presentation of the current debate on Islam in Europe.

Theories regarding Islam in Europe

Koenig argues that repetitive claims-making from religious groups, and specifically migrant groups, have led to various modes and avenues of Muslim incorporation and different varieties of Islam in Europe (2007). Indeed, governments in Europe grapple with the transnational nature of the Islamic community and how to position this group in relation to their respective states and societies (Laurence 2011). Especially given the nature of Europeanization, Islam presents a diversifying social element within these nations (Katzenstein 2006). It seems that the literature on Islam in Europe breaks down into three categories: either arguing for varieties of Islam in Europe, postulating that there is a
“European Islam” in development, or claiming that Islam is incompatible with European society.

Ramírez argues that academia is obligated to engage in the “varieties of Islam” approach, claiming that other approaches risk an essentialist nature, and do not maintain intellectual integrity (2014). Indeed, Islam is a comparatively decentralized religion, with various different forms or branches and made up of diverse individuals. It is difficult to construe a unified Western or European Islam from a scientific point of view. Moreover, Ramírez highlights that Islam in Europe is entangled with immigration policies and elements that prevent it from being understood solely as a minority religion by European states. As a majority of the group has undergone relatively recent integration, whether first generation or no, European Muslims often times may not share the same rights as citizens. The state frequently attempts to manage the religion in terms of immigration and integration policy, and adherents can still maintain influences from their origin country (Ramírez 2005). Joly similarly points out that there can be different cultures of Islam in Europe, citing the reaction of British Muslims to the Satanic Verses in comparison with the reaction of communities throughout the rest of Europe (2005). In the British case, she observes, the possibility of identifying as an ethnic minority in combination with religious identification can explain this differentiation; in fact, Islam in Europe can be divided along ethnic lines and social classes, among other forms of diversification (Ibid.).

Moreover, many contend that religious practice becomes increasingly individualized, especially among the younger generations of Muslims in Europe, to be elaborated further upon in this chapter. It would be difficult to typify Islam in the context of Europe as a whole, as Cesari explains, because, “These individuals... demonstrate their autonomy from the group and act as their own mediators between the content and application of Islamic law, in this way, they express their inventiveness and liberty” (Cesari 1998, 31). Cesari also puts forth that this religious adherence is not incompatible with European society. The “varieties of
Islam” or “Islam is a religion” argument is perhaps distinguishable from, but not directly contradicting, some strands of thought within the “European Islam” approach.

Among those supporting the theory of a “European Islam,” there are varied and even oppositional assertions. Still, all positions are unified under the concept that Islam is reformulated or understood in the context of Europe and the European citizens that profess said faith. By contrast, Bassam Tibi, who speaks of “Europeanizing Islam,” is almost leaning towards the incompatibility category, as he insists, “European secularism and Islam are in conflict, because European secularism and traditional Islam are based on different world views and both need to adapt in their mutual encounter: Europe by reacquainting itself with its specifically Christian roots within the context of secularism, Islam by adapting itself to a new European context marked by different values” (2006, 204). In her survey of Muslim leaders in Europe, Klausen claims that a general consensus supports core liberal values, the separation of church and state, that they represent a minority religion, and that their religion must operate within the framework of democracy (2007). She holds that the Muslim leadership in Europe has embraced human rights and democratic institutions, and that there is a new “epistemology of faith” in Europe (Ibid.).

Nielsen contends that, especially in regard to the rising generation, there is a leaning towards spiritual principles and shedding of traditional symbols and values that could lead to a general European Islamic identity:

“Traditional dress codes, method of arranged marriages, and social gender-roles are, in these circumstances, losing their importance as symbols of Islam. The emphasis appears to be moving to the underlying values of ethical and spiritual principles. With time, it may be expected that the basic Islamic principles identified through this process will, in turn, lead to new cultural forms of expressing Islamic identity” (1999).

This is highly evocative of Cesari’s points about individualization of religion; however, it seems that Nielsen is presenting the possibility of this new religious identity forming a type of European Islam. The topic of European Islam is indeed a burgeoning field led by thoughtful
academics; at the same time, Ramirez’s caution that it risks essentialist leanings is helpful to keep in mind.

And finally, as mentioned previously, some argue that Islam and democracy is incompatible, invoking a neo-Orientalist language that posits the Muslim world is opposed to the Western world and human rights. Both political and media actors from several countries also condemn Islam as a threat to Europe, especially, and to a heightened degree, in the wake of terrorist attacks on European soil. When critics of Islam in Europe make their case, they usually reference the practices of theocratic Muslim societies outside of Europe, or a small minority of fundamentalists that exist within Europe itself (Laurence 2011). These critics point to the decentralized element of the religion, as well as to fundamentalist rejections of liberal values, as evidence that Islam could not even function under a separation of church and state model, and that it is in opposition to a thriving European society (Ibid.). In this vein, there are those, including Italian sociologist Giovanni Sartori, that claim Islam is thus inherently incompatible with European society (Sartori 2001). French political scientist Olivier Roy argues that Christian and Muslim groups will increasingly form communities in opposition to secular ideals, and thus European society (2004).

Of course, there are ample and measured arguments to refute this incompatibility between Islam and democracy; Banfi, Gianni and Giugni have pointed to how minority religious experience among Muslim immigrants in their respective home countries have even encouraged these minorities to embrace democratic ideals in their new host countries (2016). For example, Alevis and Ahmadis (sects of Islam) that experienced persecution in their home countries have demonstrated a commitment to secular values in their host countries, and an appreciation for religious neutrality in public institutions. As part of the EurIslam data project, Statham and Tillie found that a sizeable portion of Muslims (including in the United Kingdom and France) believe that Christian religious-claims should be conceded as well; this demonstrates a recognition that religious rights are imperative among all faiths. Moreover, it reflects an embrace of European liberal democracy ideals (2016).
General European state policies towards Islam

As we have noted, as Western states approach immigrant incorporation, religious identity remains a distinctive and contentious factor for a range of reasons. One principle reality includes that religion as a core belief system can influence civic behavior. However, several efforts have been made over the past decades in achieving religious equality for European Muslims. For better or worse, Muslim relationships with the state have even been translated into a policy measure. Sometimes, it can even be viewed as government regulation; this is manifested in the subsequent outline of church and state relations in several European states, and governments’ engagement with Muslim claims. As Laurence puts it, “We can see contemporary centralization and institutionalization of Islam as damage control in defense of national unity” (2011, 132). This has the goal of decreasing the level of foreign ties to Islamic leadership in Europe, and creating a “moderate” Islamic church-state dialogue (Ibid.).

Previous contestation over mosque construction and Muslim cemeteries have been somewhat mediated via state-church relations. While discrimination in host societies still persists, there are new measures in place that attempt to address this at the European and state levels.

Muslim organizations have lobbied for recognition, if not as an official state religion, then on the association level. They can represent ethnic groups vying for political, social, and economic rights in addition to religious, as well as can lobby for immigration issues, and make claims as economic organizations (Soysal 1997). Soysal asserts that these groups by in large support their demands with a discourse of citizenship and human rights, rather than citing religious principles (1997). However, Zemni points out that while this can be understood as a population eager to participate in society, critics call these efforts a threat to European civilization (2002). While there has been some advancement, policy initiatives, institutional arrangements and immigrant incorporation still require further attention. Koenig postulates that this could be achieved by transnational structures and commitments to religious diversity that transcend national identities and politics (2007). More concrete
examples of national politics and European Muslims in the context of individual member states follow.

The case of France

France has the largest Muslim population in Europe, with around 5.72 million adherents, making up about 8.8% of the total population, as of 2016 (Pew Research Center 2017). The majority of France's Muslims are of Maghrebi descent, and hail from the Sunni branch of Islam. A discussion of religious practice in France necessarily entails a discussion of the values of French republicanism, and the French principle of laïcité as a bulwark of the French secular state. Republican ideals shape the French model of citizenship, which avoids origin-based distinctions (for example, identifying ethnicities, etc. via public institutions). The underlying principle is that a French citizen should be objectively appreciated for their social value. Laïcité, in turn, is a historical and political concept that can be defined as “neutrality towards religion on the part of the State,” though it can, has and does garner different interpretations (Salton 2012, 35). Given the prevailing republican ideals of citizenship in the country, and the principle of laïcité driving the policies of the secular state, establishing Islam and Muslim claims in France has proven to be a battleground, with polemical and controversial arguments often surfacing in the political arena, as well as in the media and society at large.

Republican ideals can be traced back to the French Revolution and the ensuing promulgation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789. They find their grounding in the rejection of clerical and aristocratic hegemony that prevailed before the revolutionaries established a new regime. The idea of rejecting an origin-based citizenship in favor of a citizenship based on objective social value was enshrined and continues to maintain precedence in modern France (Noiriel 1995). In a similar way, laïcité’s historical underpinnings are crucial to current understanding. The word itself is used for the first time in the 1958 Constitution, though it extends back to those revolutionary values (Caeiro 2006).
The democratic ideals espoused in the revolution argued for a State that subordinated other powers to its own supremacy in pursuit of the common good. Beginning with the Gallican tradition, which opposed the Roman See even before the Republic, the French state has continuously strived to assert its primacy over religious institutions (Bowen 2007).

Throughout history and up until the present, laïcité has been defined in different ways by various members of academia and government, among others. The country practices a militant approach to laïcité in public life, to the extent that it actively constrains the private life. Now, scholars argue whether laïcité does not, or should not, contradict religious freedom and freedom of conscience (Salton 2012). The concept of laïcité is meant to find its foundation in the principles of neutrality, equality and freedom. Critics of French government and society argue that while laïcité might espouse such principles, the theory may not translate as well into practice (Gunn 2004). France is distinct in the intensity with which it carries out or even “enforces” this principle. For example, it certainly would not embrace a “multiculturalism” approach to integration, as it is obligated to view the French citizen as part of a strictly French culture. The danger of a narrowed version of French citizenship, however pure the intention may be (with a view to encourage equality, etc.), lies in that some may not fit into that model, and may feel excluded.

This possibility manifests itself in the challenges that arise in the practical implementation of laïcité. Controversy and polemic regarding displays of religiosity in public continues to escalate in France, especially as Islam increasing visibility throughout Europe. The headscarf debate, wherein public schools banned head coverings in 2004 (as referred to earlier in this work) is a clear example of prohibition against displays of religious affiliations in public. Similarly, the full niqab was also banned in October 2010 in public spaces (Nielsen et al. 2014). And while there is no official legislation implementing the following prohibitions, women with headscarves are often targeted, and banned (as reported by the Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en France, or CCIF) from “celebrating marriages in the local municipality, attending naturalization ceremonies, entering public buildings, consulting a doctor, going to a
bank agency, [and] participating in outdoor school activities” (Caeiro 2006, 218). A ban on burkinis\textsuperscript{14} issued by several town governments along the French Riviera represents a more recent controversy gaining international media attention. On August 26, 2016, a top French administrative court, Conseil d’État, struck the ban down; however, the issue remains heated, as political candidates have announced their continued support in favor of the ban (McAuley 2016).

It could be argued that in addition to a lack of Muslim religious accommodations, there is preferential treatment for Christianity. As of 2000, there were an estimated 1,558 prayer spaces in France, while there are some 40,000 Catholic buildings (Alba 2008).\textsuperscript{15} This is significant because while the estimated Catholic population is larger than the estimated Muslim population, the percentage of self-proclaimed Catholics and Catholics who practice has rapidly decreased in recent years (IFOP 2010). At the same time, Christian institutions receive significantly less state support in France than in other countries (Statham 2016). Moreover, a poll conducted by international marketing research firm Institut français d’opinion publique noted an increasing distrust of Islam amongst French citizens. Published in 2013, it reported that 74% polled claiming that the religion was intolerant and “incompatible with French values” (Nielsen et al. 2014, 230). As we have seen, that may be a logical conclusion to some if religion is rigidly relegated to the private; at the same time, Muslim communities may hold that it is a key part of their identity to manifest their religion as such (more obviously with the veil, for example). Further exploration of the French populace’s perception of Muslims will be conducted in the discussion of second generation Muslims in France.

\textsuperscript{14} The word “Burkini” is a registered trademark for female beachwear launched in 2003 by Lebanese Australian fashion designer Aheda Zanetti. However, colloquially it can refer to a piece of clothing, or several pieces of clothing, aimed at ensuring modesty in keeping with Islamic belief, but designed to provide freedom of movement for the wearer (Mayer 2014).
Yet, despite the previous observations, admittedly some gradual allowance of Muslim culture into French life has taken place. As a result of a 2008 circular, sections of cemeteries designated for religious groups have led to over 70 Muslim areas, with one entire public Muslim cemetery in Strasbourg (Nielsen et al. 2014). Communities and municipalities work with Muslim organizations to allow mosque-building (Ibid.). Additionally, chaplains are granted to all religious denominations in the army, prisons and hospitals. A Muslim Head Chaplain is appointed by the Minister of Defense for the French military, and a head chaplain for prisons oversaw roughly 147 Muslim chaplains in 2014. Finally, hospitals are granted the option to nominate Muslim chaplains as well (Ibid.). In terms of dietary laws, there are ritual slaughterhouses identified by three mosques that allow the faithful to easily access halal meet in supermarkets and butchers (Ibid.). France subsidizes religious schools as long as they provide the national, secular curriculum (Foner and Alba 2008). However, the majority of subsidized religious schools are Catholic (Ibid.). The first publicly funded Muslim School, Lycée Averroès, was founded in 2003 (Ibid.). As of 2014, the Ibn Khaldun secondary school in Marseille was also pursuing a state contract. There are around 45 other private schools or institutions for youth education (Nielsen et al. 2014).

In 2003, France established the French Council of the Muslim Religion (Conseil français du culte musulman or CFCM) to act as a mediator between the French government and Muslim community. This Council was the product of an extended effort to provide a representative Muslim body; previously, the Grande Mosquée de Paris, largely tied to those of Algerian origin, had served as an interlocutor. While it could be viewed as an overture to Muslims, some also argue that it is an attempt by the French state to contain Islam. The CFCM is legally an association, defined so in a 1901 law regarding associations that is not specific to religious groups in particular, thus allowing the state to continue to remain at a distance from religious involvement. Its ethos is summarized in its internal regulation, with goals to, “i) to

16 Albeit, there is still objection to mosque building in several cases, including the opposition of Jacques Peyrat, Mayor of Nice, as quoted in 2000 and 2005 (Caeiro 2006).
defend the dignity and interests of Islam in France; ii) to favour and organize the sharing of information and services between places of worship; iii) to encourage dialogue between religions; and iv) to provide the state with representatives of Muslim places of worship” (Caeiro 2005, 76-77).

The CFCM has not garnered complete consensus in France’s Muslim communities. To begin, there is the claim that the CFCM has been the result of a great deal of orchestration by the French state (Caeiro 2005). This stems from the perception that the state is attempting to moderate certain bodies through the Council, for example, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF). The UOIF has been described by French media and academia as radical and fundamentalist, with an ideology similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, and as such supposedly in conflict with the ideals of the French Republic (Ibid.). In turn, the UOIF has rendered itself as a collective emphasizing Islamic “citizenship,” (as opposed to other groups’ emphasis on Islamic “moderation”). It is also noteworthy that, to some extent, the organization promotes local religious authorities rather than transnational ones, and engages in religious instruction and text interpretation more so than some other Muslim organizations that are more politically-oriented (Ibid.). As of 2014, about 200 organizations were associated with the UOIF (Nielsen et al. 2014).

Clearly, the negotiation between Islam and the state is an ongoing and evolving process in France (Caeiro 2006). As such, organizations like the CCIF point out that there is not necessarily a particular Islamophobic orientation of the state, but rather a distrust of or opposition to Islam that comes from individuals and institutions. For example, the Institut National d’études Démographiques, INED (the national statistics office) measures the integration of immigrants with Maghrebi descent by the degree to which they practice their faith (Ibid.). In other words, an individual is considered more integrated the less they practice their faith. A construction of “good” versus “bad” Islam has been put forth by some elements in the media and political arena (Klausen 2007). However, there are those that point out that Islamic practice is parallel in fervor to that of Christian; Beaman notes: “When considering
the ratios of regular mosque participation to regular church participation, French Muslims are as “secularized” as other French people” (2016). Indeed, while state power merits consideration in Muslim claims-making, other powers, including those driving the media, need to be entered into the calculation when evaluating the situation. Needless to say, there is a diverse array of Muslim believers in France, from the devout to the secular, drawing from many different traditions and ethnicities.

**The case of the United Kingdom**

Joly argues that in comparing France and Great Britain, Muslims and Islam factor into society in strikingly different ways. As of 2011, studies estimated that 2.9 million Muslims resided in the United Kingdom, reflecting a growing rate, as in 2001 the census counted 1.6 million and the 2005 Labour Force Survey estimated 2 million (Archik 2011). As Joly explains, Muslims were initially categorized into ethnicities or races, including “black” and “Asian”; they could also make claims based on class (2012). For this reason, reports like those issued by the European Monitoring Center for Racism use black and minority ethnic communities with migrant roots in order to facilitate their studies on Muslims in the United Kingdom (EMCR 2006). As mentioned earlier in this work, this pattern reflects how the country’s colonialist history has had a great effect on demographics and the demands Muslim collectives bring forth. Again, claims asserted by those of immigrant origin began in the 60s and 70s, with riots following in the 80s (Joly 2012). The majority of Muslims in this country are made up of those with immigrant backgrounds from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, along with those that come from families of Arab, African, Eastern European and East Asian origin, to total more than 56 nationalities (Allen 2006; Lewis 2002). However, while in the past these groups were first referred to in racial terms, and then ethnic, today they can also

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17 While this work is referring to the United Kingdom, we can make a relative comparison with Joly’s argument.
be differentiated based on religion (Joly 2005). It is noteworthy that approximately half of U.K. Muslims were born in the United Kingdom (Archik 2011).

In recent years, British Muslims have engaged politically with the British “establishment” in a variety of ways: either as political candidates for the preexisting parties, members of lobbying groups, or even in the formation of political parties dedicated to Muslim claims-making. At the same time, there are those that have protested the political status quo by boycotting political participation entirely (Hussain 2004). In the past, Muslims have generally supported the Labour Party, as first generation Muslims had ties to the unions (Ibid.). However, Labour’s stance on the war in Iraq contributed to shifting these votes. In 2004, Hussain counted the following Muslim political officials: “over 200 Councillors, two Members of the House of Commons, four Members of the House of Lords and one Member of the European Parliament, that are of Muslim origin”; at the same time, minorities continue to be underrepresented in comparison to the percentages of the U.K. population that they total (Ibid.). The Muslim Council of Britain, in existence since 1997, works with over 400 U.K. organizations, seeking, among other objectives, to foster unity amongst Muslims themselves as well as between Muslims and the wider community, and to combat forms of discrimination against Islam in society (Muslim Council of Britain). The organization’s predecessors include the Union of Muslim Organisations (1970), the U.K. Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) and the National Interim Committee for Muslim Unity (NICMU) (Ibid.).

Beginning in the 1970s, U.K. education policies espoused a multiculturalism approach, and religious classes were to include an overview of many world religions, and not just exclusively Christianity (Soper and Fetzer 2007). The Standing Advisory Council for Religious Education (SACRE) advises local authorities on curriculum, and especially took action to resolve conflict after the protest of the Rushdie Affair of 1988 (Nielsen 1999). A hijab controversy in 1999 led to local educational leaders permitting head coverings if the colors

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18 The Islamic Party of Britain was established in 1989 as a Muslim political party but has since dissolved in 2006 (Hussain 2004).
were in keeping with school uniforms (Liederman 2000). From the beginning, as Liederman points out, while funding for Islamic schools was controversial, it was at least a consideration. There were 219 newspaper articles published on the subject from the years 1989-1999. In France, where it was a "non-issue," only 3 articles were published in the same time frame (2000). The U.K. government sanctioned public funding for the first two Islamic schools in 1997. Moreover, as of 2002, Islamic Studies were available at the postgraduate level at sixteen universities, with a growing body of academics that profess the Muslim faith (Lewis 2002). At the same time, religious schooling still primarily lies with the state’s Church of England, with government funding supporting 7,000 Church of England and Catholic schools, and only seven Islamic schools as of 2007 (Foner and Alba 2008).

However, in comparison with other European countries like France, the United Kingdom has been fairly permissive of Muslim religious claims-making, incorporating these claims from as early as the 1980s (Ibid.). Again, this can be attributed to the United Kingdom’s historical openness to diversity, united under the umbrella of a common nationality. This permissiveness included allowing for: the construction of mosques, to the point where Fetzer and Soper argue that mosque construction in the United Kingdom is no more difficult than obtaining a permit for any other like building; designating Muslim areas of cemeteries; and finally, permitting the ritual slaughter of halal meat (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Foner and Alba 2008). Studies reflect a significant sense of belonging amongst British Muslims. In a 2010 report by the Open Society Institute, 82 percent of Muslim respondents in Leicester and 72 percent of Muslim participants in London saw themselves as nationals (At Home in Europe Project 2010).

In terms of an interlocutor with the state on behalf of the Muslim community, the U.K. government has, like France, taken steps to regulate and shape Islam within the country (Joly 2012). While the state does not elect an official religious representative body, and does not require registrations of religions, the Muslim Council of Britain has certainly emerged as a preferred mediator (Cesari 2005). Moreover, the state’s approach to Islam became more
involved as a result of the 2005 London bombings. As Joly calls it, “repression” was implemented domestically and abroad, alongside “outreach initiatives” to British Muslims (2012). A marked difference between the United Kingdom and France, however, is that these “outreach initiatives” specifically target Muslim communities and dialogue in the United Kingdom, while the same thing could not be spearheaded by the state in France.

The “Prevent” program, part of the U.K. Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (CONTEST) was launched in 2007 (Archik 2012). As published in 2011 in the U.K. Home Office’s 2010-2015 Policy Paper, the Prevent strategy was espoused as one of the four components of the CONTEST program (Home Office 2011). The program received 45 million GBP between 2008 and 2011 (Joly 2012). The Prevent framework was revised by the Home Office in 2011 to reflect a distinction between security and anti-terrorism efforts versus integration initiatives (Archik 2012). While this move received initial approval from the media and the Institute for Race Relations, some argue that it has proliferated a discourse of ‘radicalization’ that leaves Muslim citizens vulnerable to discrimination, even going so far as to obstruct rather than to create community cohesion (Heath-Kelly 2013; Thomas 2010).

At the same time, policies since 2011 have been increasingly emphasizing social cohesion, rather than multiculturalism (Joly 2012). Moreover, the government’s more active role in “shaping” Islam in Britain has led to decreased funding for bodies like the Muslim Council of Britain, once viewed as moderate but then faulted for not taking a sufficiently strong position on terrorism issues; a key point of contention included the organization’s leader’s views on Hamas (Thomas 2010). Instead, funding has been redirected towards other groups currently viewed as more moderate, like the Sufi Muslim Council, though some of these groups remain MCB affiliates (Thomas 2010). In recent years, including in reaction to the aftermath of the Paris 2015 attacks, some have pointed to possible undercurrents of resentment regarding the expansion of Muslim claims-making in the country (Statham 2016).

In summary, however, while there is not thorough equality amongst religious groups, the
United Kingdom (through state policy) has demonstrated a marked openness to Muslim religious claims in comparison with other European states.

However, it is essential to keep in mind that while only about half of the United Kingdom’s Muslims are immigrants, Muslims can be associated with immigration, and immigration in U.K. public opinion has consistently been less favored than in other countries. Although immigration and asylum-seeking only started to increase in the 1990s, U.K. citizens have been wary of immigration from as early as the 1960s. Studies report that citizens associate immigrants with asylum-seekers, and a German Marshall Fund report as of 2013 indicated that many prefer less immigration and see immigration as a key political issue (Blinder and Allen 6-7). The European refugee crisis of 2015-2016 could have been one of the drivers behind the “Brexit,” the United Kingdom’s ongoing exit process from the European Union. The campaign in favor of leaving the EU relied on anti-immigrant sentiment and populist leanings as they lobbied voters before the referendum.

**Repercussions of extremism**

This leads to a subject that will be less explored throughout this work, but nonetheless requires attention: the political and social reality of Islamophobia and its relationship with extremism and radicalization, and thus the ensuing securitization of Europe. It is especially opportune to bring these issues up in light of the recent 2016 Brussels and 2015 Paris bombings, which have only encouraged further wariness of Islam in European societies. After the terror attacks by Muslim extremists in New York in 2001, as well as those in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, policymakers and others claim there has been a failure of multiculturalist integration. Xenophobic parties have capitalized on these incidents and have begun to flourish in several European states. To add to this uncertainty, lone wolf incidents, including the Nice, France truck attack of July 2016, have compounded the recent violence and provided populist movements with more fodder.
The extremist Islamist attacks have created a political and societal fervor that has contributed to islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment. This has led to what Cesari terms a "process of securitization," where Islam is perceived as an "existential threat" to European society, and thereby there is a justification for "extraordinary measures against it" (2009, 1). Ramirez goes further to say that Muslims are a scapegoat in a system of societal domination that certainly pinpoints them, but does not address them as the sole victims; neoliberal policies and the social uncertainty caused by financial and political crises have created a societal "moral panic" that legitimizes the repression of collectives like Muslims, and facilitates the construction of a Muslim “other” (2004, 12).

Fundamentalist Islam, that is, the literalist readings of Islam, has been associated with violence, extremism and terrorism. Again, when making an academic distinction, one must note that religious fundamentalism, or an individual’s adherence to religious principles (often times subverting political systems in order to prioritize religion), is not equivalent to extremism (Koopmans 2015). For this reason, it can be and is argued that religious extremists are not practicing Islam in its true form. Despite this, extremist groups have prompted a European environment where Muslims bear the burden of proof to demonstrate they are moderate; securitization policies have been put in place in the name of security and counterterrorism that simultaneously threaten individual freedoms (Owers 2015). Similarly, these actions have encouraged the perception of Muslims as the “other,” apart from society both by nature of their immigrant background but especially due to their religious beliefs. While the French state has always taken careful steps to avoid creating distinctions, the aftermath of the Paris bombings has caused an increase in counterterrorism measures, and no doubt has facilitated a toxic social environment as all Muslims are shadowed by the attacks of religious extremists.

The onus of proving “moderation,” and that one is not an extremist, gravely affects youth of migrant origin born and raised in Europe. In fact, all of the church and state relationships, commitments to religious liberty and specifically relationships between
Muslim collectives and the majority society or institutional frameworks impact this cohort. Of course, there are myriad elements that shape this group’s identity, which can vary from individual to individual. In seeking to isolate self-belonging and religious identity within this self-identity, the broader picture must be addressed. Now, the discussion will begin to focus more specifically on Muslim youth of migrant origin in Europe. The next chapter explores work to date on second generation or Muslim youth in Europe and self-identity, with both literature analysis as well as a more general overview of the complexities of self-identity.
Chapter VII

Muslim European youth and self-identity

As previously noted, approaches to Islam in Europe are saturated with the lingering implication of Islam as juxtaposed with Christianity and secularism, as well as framed in terms of immigrant background. Integration comes to the forefront as a policy priority, as European member states seek to accommodate the Muslim diversity in a way that will encourage societal stability, with special attention to the second generation. A sense of belonging is thought to signify acculturation on the part of the second generation, as the discussion of integration and citizenship has become oriented towards emphasizing this belonging. In exploring the relationship between how European youth of migrant origin identify as Muslims and how or if this is related to their sense of belonging to their host society, it is imperative to simultaneously address the way in which the host society shapes both Muslim self-identification and a sense of belonging to Spain.

Identity: an overview

The indicator of self-identity is used in this effort to measure a sense of belonging among a research sample of second generation Muslims in Madrid, alongside comparative 1.5 and first generation cohorts. Sense of belonging will be evaluated via a semi-structured qualitative interview with questions about discrimination (indicating that society is treating the youth as "other") and whether the participant self-identifies with Spanish society, be it as a Spaniard, from Madrid or from their neighborhood.

At this point, a digression to review identity is useful, especially as it is the integration indicator examined in this study. Identity is a cross-disciplinary concept found in sciences including anthropology, psychoanalysis, political science, logic, philosophy, psychology, history, and sociology, to name a few (Stryker and Burke 2000). In philosophy, or in the most basic metaphysical sense, identity means "sameness," whether numerically or quantitatively. In this case it is used quantitatively to have "same" properties (i.e., an individual self-
identifies with certain properties or characteristics which they believe makes them their "same" self over time) (Klein 2014). In the Platonic vein, having being—an identity—implies multiple forms; by having an identity, there are consequently many identities different from one's own (Republic VII, 524e-525a). This sameness over time, that is unique in its sameness and differentiated as such, can lead to a more generic, interdisciplinary definition of identity as the distinct way in which a person or group conceives of itself.

Identity is often characterized by an internal and external component. In social science in particular, identity pertains to how the individual or group relates to or differentiates his or itself from the group or groups (note that the underlying principle of sameness remains in play). Given this relational nature, there is substantial consensus in most fields on the subjectivity of identity. Bourdieu points out that while social scientists proclaim an objective aspect to sociology, still, "social science must take as its object both this reality and the perception of this reality, the perspectives, the points of view which, by virtue of their position in objective social space, agents have on this reality" (1989, 18). In other words, the way the self or the collective perceives its identity is the identity itself. For this reason, the interview in this study asks the participants to distinguish between how they self-identify, and how they perceive they are identified by others.

A contested and continuously developed notion, identity is subject to diverse interpretations even strictly within the sociological field. There is especially renewed debate in light of recent work grappling with the new reality of modernity and its implications for the individual (Giddens 1991, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). Brubaker and Cooper warn that the ambiguity of the term identity can lead to its "use and abuse" in the social sciences to the point that it is detrimental to social analysis itself" (2000, 2). For this reason, this work defines and focuses on two uses of "identity": as collective in a group sense, or as self-identity or self-identification in the sense of a "deep, basic, abiding or foundational" understanding of
the self, which implies a reflexive process, to be elaborated upon further (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 7). 19

**Self-identity**

To begin with the latter, even this qualified use of self-identity within this discussion of identity remains constantly debated. One can look to Bourdieu as describing this type of identity in the form of his “habitus”, i.e., the social and cultural imprint on an individual that derives from their existence and growth in the “field” of society. Rather than conscious decision-making, individuals are encoded and reinforced by social practice (1977, 72, 166). Bourdieu does distinguish that reflexivity can prove an exception to this rule, taking place when there is a “disruption” to the habitus (Bottero 2010, 8, 11). However, there are arguments that this exceptionalism does not fully account for a more pervasive reflexivity in self-identity. Giddens, for example, ascribes more agency to the individual, observing, “The self is seen as a reflexive project, for which the individual is responsible” (75). For the purposes of this work, the reflexive element in self-identity will be emphasized and explored.

This reflexivity implies a fluidity and situational aspect as the individual reevaluates based on the context. Depending on the situation, the extent to which one identifies becomes more or less important (Joly 2005). Because the process of identity construction can be affected by external variables, when the context and circumstances change, identity remains fluid. For example, a child of immigrant parents from Morocco might identify more strongly with Islam while still living at home, and being exposed to both cultural and religious practice. However, once they move out to live with peers or begin university, they might learn other cultural or social viewpoints that cause them to change the intensity or manner of their belief.

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19 Brubaker and Cooper address several frequent uses of identity. For example, it can be used to refer to social or political action based on self-understanding versus universal interests, or in turn, it can be used to refer to a continuously fluctuating self. They advocate for the use of “identification” and “self-understanding” in order to encourage more precise terminology (2000).
Again, self-identity, and in particular whether the individual self-identifies with society and how society identifies the self in return, is an important indicator in this study of the second generation because it can serve as an indicator of this population’s sense of belonging to their society and thus their relative integration in society. Bottero reminds that self-identity remains inherently relational to society as “agents must account for their actions towards others” (20). For this reason, Joly points to the internal and external components of self-identity, elements previously mentioned in our general overview of identity. In particular, she maintains that Muslim European youth have a self-identification, but are then simultaneously identified by other actors; in fact, identification can be imposed by these external influences. In the TIES study referenced in early chapters, the authors argue that the marginalization and discrimination the second generation (primarily Muslim) in Europe faces—“from simple remarks to overtly xenophobic treatment”—affects these youths’ feelings of belonging (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012, 291). Clearly, non-Muslim actors can be responsible for complicating second generation identity; this is a prime example of how identity has an internal and external nature.

**State versus society and identity**

Moreover, as in addressing themes of integration and immigration, the role of the state as a dominant power in categorization and identification remains, albeit challenged by transnationalism and globalism as discussed previously. As Brubaker and Cooper point out, “there is another key type of external identification that has no counterpart in the domain of self-identification: the formalized, codified, objectified systems of categorization developed by powerful, authoritative institutions...the modern state has been one of the most important agents of identification and categorization in this latter sense” (2000, 15). Of course, there is ample debate as to the extent of the state’s role in this regard. Gramsci emphasizes hegemony in civil society, albeit consensual, where the elite exercises control in an analytically distinct way from how the state coercively exercises control (2000). He makes the distinction that
civil society co-opts the individual into its discourse ideologically through subtle and unobtrusive methods, as opposed to the coercive element of the state. As a result, the increasing subtle force of civil society can slowly and increasingly detract from the coercive power of the state.

Foucault insists that it is not “the state” as such (or its fellow civil society) that demands analysis, but that power and its effects on the individual create what is recognized as state and societal entities (1980). Some theorists examine the state as part of a series of systems of power, without denying the fundamental reality of the state. With this approach, power articulates itself in a series of networks, and the state versus society conundrum is also addressed as they are placed in a series of interrelated systems that are indeed intricate, enmeshed and difficult to distinguish (Gupta 1995; Castells 2000; Migdal 2001). Moreover, this goes back to the discussion of how citizenship is now defined on a supranational sphere, in terms of individual rights and often in the ambit of transnational institutions or networks of power.

This work recognizes the practical reality of the state, especially in light of migration studies. At the same time, though they are not as readily identifiable or easily recognized, acknowledging the networks of power that the individual contends with on a daily basis, including local networks or civil society, remains key in discovering the full breadth of how a community affects and shapes the individual (and vice versa). For this reason, this work alternates between referring to the Spanish state and Spanish society when approaching responsibility on the part of state or society in the two-directional relationship between individual immigrants and their receiving society.

And so, in following the discussion on self-identity above, self-identity will be defined as reflexive and thus a fluid and relational concept, with an internal and external nature. One aspect of its external component includes the hegemonies that the individual encounters as they navigate communal space; in the endeavor to illustrate individual identities and the identity of Madrid’s second generation Muslims, these networks of power and institutions
may alternate between resembling an understanding of the state or an interpretation of society, as it attempts to address all power networks and influences that affect how an individual operates within a community. As such, in the exploration of European Muslim youth self-identification, feelings of discrimination from these external factors will form a part of the analysis.

**Collective identity**

Group identity is also sameness, but contextualized, including sameness in the form of religious identity, ethnic identity, gender identity, and so on. Collective identity has already been touched upon to some degree. It involves both the collective identity one ascribes to, and the degree of importance one attaches to this ascription. And so, collective identity is founded in categorization or classification, in that the individual and the group elect a certain categorization. The way in which a collective identity is produced is also important to the identity itself. Given this, the following summarization is possible: collective identity involves a sameness, which is perceived, and ascribed to via classification. Finally, the importance or meaning that the group or individual assigns to that collective identity is key.

Unlike individual identity, collective identity is less susceptible to variation by nature of the unwieldy composite it is, and its persistence despite individual behavior (Smith 1992). Religious identity is one such collective identity that endures; an example being, to state the obvious, Muslim identity. Ethnic identity, ascribing to a collective culture, language, or nationality, cultural identity, or merely ascribing to a group in general, is a collective identity that is important to immigration studies, in examining how the migrant relates to society (whether origin or receiving). Gordon’s theories on assimilation a few decades ago spotlighted the subject of identity in the migration field, and targeted ethnic identity in an inclusive capacity, as he explains: “Identificational assimilation takes place in the form of all

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20 Group and collective identity are used here in an interchangeable and general manner; they are meant to express a collective of individuals classifying themselves into one category, but these phrases are not referring to any particular definition set by one author, of which there are many.
groups merging their previous sense of peoplehood into a new and larger ethnic identity which, in some fashion, honors its multiple origins at the same time that it constitutes an entity” (1964, 125). And so, in considering the population under study, it is essential to recognize that Muslim identity can imply a singular categorization or a compounding of religious identity, ethnic identity, cultural identity, and social identity.

**Religious identity**

In the discussion of how Muslim European youth face unique challenges, and how religious identity fits into this narrative, religion and its sociological meaning orient the conversation. Religion as a phenomenon is discussed in a wide range of the sciences, though sociology serves as most useful in this case, as it treats of the relationship between religion and society. Collins summarizes four classical sociological approaches to religion, as synthesized by the founders of the science, explaining that they generally address religion in three different ways: in the “reductionist or illusionist tradition” where skeptics like Marx identified it as the “opium of the masses”; as “social order in morality,” wherein those including Durkheim explain society is conscious of its group membership via symbolism in religion; or as an “organization and carrier group,” which Weber illustrates in his analysis of world religions, maintaining that the status groups of each religion lead society (Collins 2007, 20; 27;31). Needless to say, there has been a wealth of literature since on the sociology of religion, ushered in by these founding thinkers.

In exploring religious identity, Durkheim’s analysis is particularly helpful, especially in light of Islam in particular, and its both individually diversified and universal natures. Durkheim contends that the societal need to both simultaneously affirm its universal humanity and express its individuality is manifested via religion and its symbolism: “Thus there is something eternal in religion that is destined to outlive the succession of particular symbols in which religious thought has clothed itself. There can be no society that does not experience the need at regular intervals to maintain and strengthen the collective feelings
and ideas that provide its coherence and its distinct individuality” (Durkheim 1915, 429).

And so, religion provides society with a set of tools, including symbolism, to affirm existence. Indeed, as a group identity, religion facilitates achieving goals and social processes; for example, as noted in the description of Muslim political organizations in France and the United Kingdom. Simultaneously, many thinkers have reformulated or expanded upon the concept that, at the individual level, religious identity can serve as a societal advantage. Several researchers have discovered increased health and wellbeing and “positive psychological health” among those with religious commitments (Ysseldyk, Matheson and Anisman 2010, 62-63). The individual can gain from both a sense of group belonging, as well as the embracing of a life purpose and sense of meaning (Ibid.).

Just as in other group identities, religious identity is defined by both the out-group, and in-group. The individual in a religious group defines itself in relation to the religious group, as well as in relation to the out-group. The same process is valid in the case of ethnic identity, and so forth (Van Heelsum and Koomen 2016). The relationship between in-group and out-group can be negatively-oriented in some cases, a situation the literature often explores.

Religious identity is key in the consideration of identity among second generation Muslims in Europe because, as previously discussed, religious identity can be intertwined with the nation-state narrative in European states. Consequently, there might be a special relationship between religious identity, citizenship and a sense of belonging. It is this relationship this project seeks to explore. There are arguments both for and against religious identity as a positive catalyst in a globalized world. At the same time, as Soysal points out, identity has not always been viewed as a public attribute: “Identity is commonly assumed to be something prior to the constitution of citizenry that belongs to the private domain. Identity formation and politics are not considered as part of the processes of the public sphere” (1997, 513). However, as a result of the post-war discourse on human rights, identity has become a rights issue: it serves as a natural, private right that both individuals and
collectives are entitled to in the public sphere. Personhood, rather than citizenship, has become a strategy by which rights are claimed. Thus, claims-making groups have asserted their rights to religious identity, ethnic identity, feminist identity, and so on (1997).

On the one hand, religious identity can serve as a mechanism for forming an insular social group in opposition to other social groups. Moreover, society could stigmatize such a group. A negative public discourse or reception of immigrants or Islam may cause the ostracized group to identify separately from this critical public. On the other hand, religious group identity can also increase social activity to the extent that it is a positive force for social trust and can create “interreligious favorability,” i.e., tolerance among religious groups for any outside group (Ciftci, Asif and Sydiq 2016, 275). Furthermore, group identity in general can provide an advantage to the individual inasmuch as explained earlier: providing a cognitive or psychological stability. Moreover, the shared culture or community enterprise can encourage increased economic activity or support. For example, Eseverri points out that a Muslim neighborhood in Madrid can create new business by opening halal shops or clothing stores to meet the needs of the Muslim community and thus create growth (2015). In a similar manner, Portes and Rumbaut point to the “economic enclaves” of Cubans and Vietnamese that arrived to the United States several decades ago (2001, 83).

As previously mentioned, sometimes European society has attributed a negative connotation to Muslim identity. Given the understanding that religious identity functions, both at the group and individual level, as a source of security, belonging, stability and purpose, it stands to reason that discrimination against one’s religious identity can be a very damaging encounter. The role that experiences of discrimination (perceived or otherwise) play in shaping religious identity, or simultaneously in this case ethnic identity, should be carefully considered.

21 Albeit such identities would most likely be considered group rather than person identity. The point, however, is that there is a move towards individual human rights (acknowledgement of personhood regardless of statelessness, etc.) that can be claimed, regardless of citizenship or legal rights at the national level.
Given the complexities of religious identity, a hybridized approach could offer the best lens with which to understand religious identity. In short, religious identity can serve as one facet of self-identification and the extent to which socialization is affected. Bearing in mind the reflexive self and individual agency, while individuals may choose religious identity as part of their self-identity, this makes up only one part of the actor. European Muslims elect their self-identity, and the extent to which they choose to identify as Muslim or with the Spanish nation or society. Religious identity can provide a sense of belonging in a space lacking such; however, it can also enrich and further social success in that it is a group support system. The extent to which the Spanish state and society tries to engender collective Spanish identity, or takes steps to be more inclusive of Islam, may aid in the process of integration. But it is also up to the individual to choose the degree of importance they on that identity, and their prioritization can be influenced by other factors. This will prove a useful dichotomy to bear in mind when exploring how young Muslims in Madrid self-identify and how the society they contend with may affect this self-identification.

Fluidity of identity

Finally, and most importantly, and as briefly alluded to earlier, while some identities can be described as more cemented than others (for example, collective versus individual), identity itself remains variable. Muslim identity in particular is a salient example of this. When an individual identifies as Muslim, this may not signify the same notion or state of being from one individual to the next. Indeed, the variance can be as significant as a religious verses ethnic identity. This is a very obvious clarification but one that should be highlighted in this work's attempt to gain an understanding of the problem at hand: while the subjects of the investigation will be self-identified Muslims, this is certainly not a uniform concept (Joly 2005). And of course, being “Muslim” can be both a self-identification and the way an individual is defined by others.
The term “Muslim” has grown to encompass several categories in recent European history. As Brubaker notes, “Throughout northern and western Europe, populations that had previously been identified and labelled using national-origin, region-of-origin, socio-economic, demographic, legal or racial categories—such as Algerians, North Africans, guest workers, immigrants, foreigners or (especially in the UK) blacks—have been increasingly identified and labelled in religious terms as Muslims” (2012, 2). More importantly, how Muslim individuals define themselves can encompass an even broader range of meaning. For this reason, Brubaker suggests using Muslim identity as a category of practice (how “Muslim” is identified by the self or identified as the other) rather than as a category of analysis (for example, degree of religiosity) (2012). This critique highlights the reality that self-identification or identity labels does not necessarily correspond to sociocultural practice or greater religiosity (Slootman 2016). The dangers of assuming a strict link between self-identification and practice will be discussed further below.

**Taxonomy of Muslim youth in the literature**

Given this varied element inherent to identity, many have provided their own accounts of European Muslim youth identities, producing a smorgasbord of characterizations. Some researchers present conflicting accounts, some employ a different discourse but provide the same general categorization, and some criticize an attempt to identify Muslim youth identity in Europe at all as essentialist.

Nielsen outlines a series of Muslim youth identifications in Great Britain, asserting that they can be the following: acts of retaliation by gangs operating outside of or on the fringe of the law; silently residing in the traditional community and family structures and norms; limiting public activity to economic or educational but remaining in the community for social interactions; engaging in political and social activity in pursuit of a societal voice for Islam, in what Nielsen terms “high profile integration,” wherein youth seek to develop new
behaviors and adapt Islamic culture in order to engage actively and constructively in society; and finally aggressive behavior attempting to change society into an Islamic model (1999).

Farhad Khosrokhavar offers a similar range of Muslim youth profiles in France, typifying their religious behavior as either a personal Islam (in avoidance of discrimination and oppression), a low-profile practice of Islam limited to the Islamic community, radical Islam in which Western society is utterly rejected, and an Islam wherein young Muslim women embrace modern society both in the wider community and in the home (Joly 2005).

To these classifications of Muslim youth identity, it is important to add that many youth have identified as Muslim without really espousing any belief or engaging in religious practice, and instead are “culturally” Muslim (Vertovec 2010; Vertovec and Rogers 1998). While these are just a few examples from the literature, it demonstrates the range of profiles with which some young Muslims in Europe align.

Clearly there is an expansive amount of material and population to draw from when offering observations regarding European Muslim youth. However, for the purposes of this work, a certain number of reoccurring observations in the literature should be addressed, and some of them will even come into play later as they resurface in the content of the Madrid research. These findings include an increase in the visibility of individualism among youth, the existence of reactive identity among youth, this population’s expression of a sense of belonging in host societies, and the claim that Muslim youth are constructing a “European Islam.”

i. Religious individualism

Firstly, individualization and privatization of religion among European Muslim youth is reflected in the above youth profiles and is also noted in several youth studies throughout Europe. Multiple studies indicate that European Muslim youth feel compelled to restrict their faith to the individual, private level. In her 2008 study of Muslim youth associations in Spain, Téllez found that older Spanish Muslim youth (from 30-35) seemed to identify less with
religion, and younger Muslims identified with religion in an individualistic way. In another study on Moroccans in Spain, Castien noted that some (Muslim participants) felt it was the spirit of the law, rather than the letter of the law, that drove their individual relationship with God (2009).

Moreover, this privatization of faith also implies a decrease in manifestations of traditional or outward religious practices. Nielsen highlights how Muslim European youth often engage in self-guided learning of Islam, studying the Qur’an and Sunna, along with modern texts; they conduct this education alongside their peers, abandoning more traditional education in mosque schools as early as in their pre-teen years (1999). In a 2012 study, Kashya and Lewis found that British Muslim youth are frequenting the mosque less and praying less than their elders, in a parallel way to a decrease in religious practice among Christian peers.

Much of the literature has noted how the second generation has certainly been steering towards more individual religious practice, rather than traditional public forms such as attending mosque. Indeed, the “new generations,” oftentimes second and third generations, emphasize belief in religion rather than the practice of religion. They may have a negative view about certain religious dietary or sexual restrictions, but still identify as Muslims (Vertovec and Rogers 1998). There are attempts to pinpoint why this trend in individualization is so prevalent.

Some argue that this youth's faith life reflects a European culture of individualism and secularism. As such, Vertovec and Rogers attribute secularization to one of the factors affecting Islamic identification among contemporary Muslim Youth, explaining that there is a tendency towards “compartmentalization,” where religious values become a separate component of one's personal life, but not central to it as such (1998). Beaman found in her study of the second and third generation in France that “middle class French Muslims are increasingly choosing more privatized and individualized expressions of their religious identity, which reflects how Islam is being adapted to the French context” (2016, 64). In fact,
Beaman argues that because association with their faith can be problematic for these youth, they either consciously or unconsciously ensure that they associate with Islam in a manner that is compatible with secular European ideals. Thus, faith practices translate into a “cultural” and individual way rather than in an open form (2016). The second generation’s negotiation of an Islam that adapts their parents’ host country culture into new forms of practice has led some authors to refer to a new “European Islam” (Vertovec and Rogers 1998, 14).

In turn, Soysal insists that this individualization is more of a manifestation of agency in a globalized community, rather than a “conformance” to European values. The second generation’s cultural practice draws from global practices in addition to the practices of their parents’ host country. She cites youth subcultures like rap groups in Germany, that assert a language of “resistance” that does not fit into one collective (1997, 521). Similarly, Vertovec and Rogers warn that approaches to the study of this group should steer clear of essentialist notions of identity, especially given today’s globalized reality (1998). Rather than claiming that second generation youth draw from or imitate their parents’ home countries or attempt to bind themselves to their host culture, theorists in contemporary sociology have asserted a discourse that attempts to reflect how these youth select, combine or preserve various aspects of more than one culture or ethnicity (Ibid.). While various terms have been coined (“translation, creolization, crossover, cut ‘n’ mix, hyphenated, bricolage, hybridity, syncretism, third space, multicultural, transcultural, diasporic consciousness”), Calgar and Jenks’ notion of “cultural reproduction” is especially pertinent in that it implies a concept of creativity and innovation on the part of these youth, rather than a passive subsuming of static cultures (Vertovec and Rogers 1998 6,8).

Cesari insists that this individualization and personalization of faith does not necessarily present a lessened version of religiosity, just a different form and manner of belief (2005, 5). In fact, as we have seen in several studies, Muslim youth are not necessarily backing away from a Muslim identification, but in fact are even asserting this identification.
and advocate for their rights as a religious or ethnic group. Further, some studies contend that it is important to qualify these findings of individualization. In a study of large datasets of Muslim youth of different ethnicities from four European countries, Güngör et al. argue that instead of religious decline, there is rather a reaffirmation of religion among simultaneously acculturating youth (2016). However, the authors indicated that religiosity was more privatized among youth in societies that “offered some degree of institutional accommodation and where less unequal intergroup relations allowed for some social mixing and upward mobility across intergroup boundaries” (Ibid.). The study also found that religious affiliation was detached from acculturation or sense of belonging to the host society, except in their findings for the German case (Ibid.).

In considering the discussion up until this point, it is clear that the second generation can embark on different trajectories, as well as contend with a different set of factors than the first generation. These considerations are important when contemplating the future of migration in host societies, and indeed when anticipating the future of the society as a whole.

**ii. Reactive identity**

A contrasting observation includes the claims that there is an increased religiosity rather than a push towards secularization, referred to as reactive identity, a theme emerging in Muslim youth studies. It harkens back to identity as both internal and external. While not significant in this work’s Madrid case study, it is a polarizing topic that bears mentioning. Again, identities can be formed as a result the migration context (Van Heelsum and Koomen 2016). The experience of religious discrimination can further solidify religious identities among the second generation in Europe, for better or for worse (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). Some authors go further to posit that, as a result, Islam can also serve as an “oppositional identity” for the second generation, when they face rejection, discrimination or marginalization in their societies (Foner and Alba 2008, 373). There are several claims of a
positive correlation between experiences of discrimination and greater religious affiliation (Torrekens and Jacobs 2016).

Experiences of discrimination can unfold in a variety of ways, as pointed out in a study of Muslim and non-Muslim youth by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Conducted over the course of 2008 to 2009, a survey of 3,000 participants in France, Spain and the United Kingdom resulted in the finding that among different Member States, Muslim youth experienced discrimination differently (2010). This implies that there are many factors influencing the discrimination faced by youth from immigrant backgrounds, varying depending on the host society. Islamophobia probably represents one of the greater obstacles that second generation Muslims face in their European host countries (Torrekens and Jacobs 2016). As mentioned earlier, political discourse arguing that Muslim values are contradictory to democracy is usually championed by one or several political actors in each country, and societal Islamaphobia, thanks to the extremist attacks in recent years, has risen.

To a greater extreme, some cite a hostile environment for the second generation as a breeding ground for fundamentalism (Koopmans 2015). Current political rhetoric in the wake of the 2015 and 2016 extremist attacks argue that some of the second generation has engaged in this religious reactivity in a dangerous way. Ysseldyk, Matheson and Anisman do point out that negative reactivity like fundamentalism is not exclusive to a religious identity (2010.). It can also be the result of ethnic or nationalist leanings, and can be exercised by long-standing members of the host society just as much as it may attract a minority of second generation immigrants (Ibid.). Torrekens and Jacobs argue, in fact, that religious reactivity is an extension of “reactive ethnicity” (2016, 326).

Moreover, it should be qualified that religious or ethnic reactivity can be confused with simply asserting one’s identity or beliefs. Dargent points out in his study of French Muslims, assertion of religious identity, rather than a signal of marginalization, may instead be an indicator of a more advanced integration: populations with immigrant origin may feel that they can assert their individuality with ease in their liberal democracy societies (2010).
Similarly, as mentioned earlier, experiences of discrimination can lead to positive developments. For example, in the form of political participation and as an impetus to pursue active claims-making.

iii. European Islam

As previously highlighted, in addition to the theory of "European Islam" applied to all Muslims in Europe, second generation Muslims are also said to ascribe to a European Islam, and in some cases are supposedly integral to its existence. Vertovec and Rogers arrive at this conclusion by observing the range of factors within Europe, distinct to the second generation, that may lead second generation Muslims to arrive at their own version of Islam and thus a "European Islam": conditioning to organized action in an ethnic/religious context; “rationalization” of Islam in that the Western system of schooling may encourage more critical debate and argumentation within the religion; Islam being disseminated in European languages; and how youth are immersed in American and European youth culture that includes various media and consumerism, to name a few (1998, 10-14). For the purposes of this work, the empirical observations do not so much encounter a strong argument for such a generalized European Islam, though in the literature analysis, it is worthwhile to reference.

iv. Sense of belonging

A sense of belonging to their respective host societies among second generation European Muslim youth is another recurrent debate, and especially pertinent to this work. Again, the indicator of a sense of belonging should supposedly signal greater levels of integration. The 2010 Open Society Institute report on Muslims in 11 European cities claims that according to their study, Muslims have a sense of belonging to their neighborhood and city that is stronger than their belonging to the nation, whereas non-Muslims maintain more of a sense of belonging to the nation. They extrapolate from this finding that instead of the oft-proclaimed argument that Muslims go about lives segregated from the general population,
absent ties to the community or society, Muslims indeed do feel a sense of belonging despite the fact that they face substantial discrimination (At Home in Europe Project 2010).

Similarly, in their study of first and second generation Moroccans in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Switzerland, using data from the EurIslam project, Van Heesum and Koomen studied sense of belonging in the form of national identification (2016). As Moroccan-origin immigrants and their children frequently identify with Islam, this study provides a vantage point in surveying sense of belonging among European Muslim youth. They found that generally throughout these countries, the second generation had a lower ethnic-group identification and a higher religious and national identification, in comparison to the first generation (Ibid.).

In Slootman’s 2016 study of second generation Turkish and Moroccans in the Netherlands using the TIES survey data, the author made several observations about nominal identities as either “substantive” and “empty” signifiers when it came to self-identification in relation to “sociocultural practices” or “homogeneous culture.” The findings echoed precautions about essentialism as one observation included that neither the Turkish nor Moroccan second generation shared a “homogeneous culture.” She found that in relative terms, identification as Turkish could be a substantive signifier of sociocultural practice, and identification as Muslim by both the Turkish and Moroccan second generations also was a somewhat substantive signifier of Islamic practice. However, the Moroccan second generation did not demonstrate that identifying as Moroccan was a substantive signifier of Moroccan sociocultural practice. One theory explaining a disconnect between nominal identity and practice includes that a label may serve as a substitute for practice, and indicate an advanced acculturation to the host society (Ibid.).

This project seeks to identify a sense of belonging among second generation Muslim youth in Madrid, by inquiring as to how the identify (including whether they identify with Madrid or Spain) and by assessing any discrimination they perceive from Spanish society. It then will attempt to investigate any relationship between this sense of belonging and Muslim
identity or degree of religiosity, assessing this Muslim identity in terms of both self-identification and religious practice.

**Caveat: Risk of essentialism**

There has been an emergence of an “anti-essentialist critique,” wherein scholars argue that seeking to quantify religious identity, or other forms, is in fact an essentialist approach to science (Vertovec and Rogers 1998, 4). There should be a reconceptualized method of identity exploration that avoids the “static” and “bounded” notions were referenced in Chapter Two. This also relates to the earlier point that a nominal self-identification may not translate to sociocultural or religious practice in tandem with that label.

However, for the purposes of measuring levels of integration and societal cohesion, it has proved a practical tool in the sociological field, among others. It is still useful to maintain a critical view when exploring identity. Even when more specifically examining identity and belonging at the national and local level, as the next chapter does in addressing Muslim identity in Spain and Madrid, the diversified nature of identity is an important lens with which to conduct our analysis.

**Caveat: Qualifying determinants of integration**

This chapter has underscored religious identity in its overview of European Muslim youth and the literature examining this population. This identity is also explored in relation to levels of integration among these youth. However, it should be emphasized that, as mentioned earlier, identity and integration among Muslim youth may be more dependent on the many conditions second (or third and fourth) generation immigrants face when negotiating their place in host societies, rather than remaining solely influenced by religion or factors related to religion.

Second generation Muslims are implicated in many factors that affect their inclusion and success in society, as described in earlier chapters regarding second generation
integration. For example, there are those that contend any isolation or lack of integration that may take place is more likely the result of socioeconomic determinants and labor-market drivers. Laurence observes, “many of the basic socioeconomic inequalities endured by Muslim-origin young people reflect the familiar dynamic of relative newcomers in host societies, and do not appear to be religion-specific” (2011, 246). Eseverri indicates that literature on both sides of the Atlantic highlights how the current second generation faces more obstacles than ever before in integrating into mainstream society, as they are often marginalized in impoverished suburbs and lack many opportunities as a result (2015).

Indeed, there is a consensus, backed by quantitative evidence, that regardless of religious affiliation, second and third generation immigrants typically face higher rates of unemployment then those with native-born parents, lower levels of education, discrimination, and weak political representation (Laurence 2011; Joly 2005; At Home in Europe Project 2010,). While this group should enjoy the same conditions and advantages as the children of the native-born, this is clearly not the case; moreover, success in employment, education and social relations serve as indicators as to how these second generation citizens are integrating (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). For example, Archick describes the situation in France: “A significant number of France’s Muslims, and particularly Muslim youth, live in public housing projects located on the outskirts of urban centers. These areas, known as banlieues, are marked by poverty and high unemployment. The percentage of Muslims who fail to finish secondary school appears to be considerably higher than that of non-Muslims” (Archick 2011, 11).

Connor and Koenig argue, based on results from their multivariate analysis of Muslims using the European Social Survey data collection, that perhaps some of these employment challenges faced by both first and second generation Muslims can be attributed to individual-level effects; for example, a religiosity that does not allow them to fully integrate into the workforce (2015). However, they find, the variables that seem to account in large part for any underemployment are others: either the migration background (coming from a
socioeconomic disadvantage) or a discriminatory society is what affects their labor market incorporation most (Ibid.). They point out that the second generation's socioeconomic disadvantage might outweigh the education they are receiving in the host society (Ibid.).

By the same token, while flawed, the institutional conditions in the welfare states of Europe imply that children can become more independent from their parents than they could in host societies, and practice more self-determination (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). Moreover, the demographic makeup of Europe, increasingly diversified, allows for these youth to challenge the status quo and assert their own identities and claims (Ibid.). Indeed, second generation Muslims may engage in a more fluid identity than that of their elders, and have several additional dimensions to draw from when formulating this identity. In sum, while not as emphasized in this work as religious identity, social and economic structures in host societies, among other factors, can significantly influence integration and identity, whether to an advantage or disadvantage.

**Conclusion**

This chapter sought to clarify the use of “identity” and outline self-identity versus collective identity in prefacing the study of second generation Muslims in Madrid. Self-identity can be reflexive, as well as subject to internal and external influences. Participants in this study will be asked to self-identify, with the implicit acknowledgement that it is their personal understanding of the label’s significance. However, this does not mean that the participants’ understanding of their identity is not useful; in fact, it can help demonstrate their sense of belonging to the host society. Moreover, current observations regarding spirituality and identity trends among Muslim European youth are context for the study taking place. Literature to date on the topic has demonstrated the variance that comes with the “Muslim” identification," including that the category is used broadly to mean a variety of affiliations, among those ethnic, religious and cultural. Reoccurring subjects touched upon in the research so far include a trend in religious individualism among these youth,
observations regarding reactive identity, and a struggle to define sense of belonging and how this relates to integration, and for the purposes of this work, religiosity. Once more, the danger of an essentialist discourse, or of limiting integration indicators to solely identity and sense of belonging, remain a challenge in this discussion. The importance of individual agency, as well as the fluidity of identity and the many factors that shape identity, should remain present throughout this investigation. In fact, the empirical potion examines this fluid identity and agency among the target population. Meanwhile, a brief segue to an analysis of the context of Islam in Spain and specifically Madrid, in which the population under study finds themselves, as well as a handful of relevant studies to this effect, prefaces the final empirical observations.
Invariably, in providing context for the experience of Muslim youth of migrant origin in Madrid, it is useful to consider the history of Islam in Spain, current Spanish policy towards Islam and inextricably linked public opinion regarding this policy, and finally, the sentiments of the Muslim community in Spain and Madrid. Moreover, though the history of the Islamic caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula is cited as a factor in Spain’s relationship with Islam, a more immediate and relevant reality is Spain’s recent immigration and fairly new Muslim community, which sets it apart from other European countries with third and fourth generation Muslim populations. While the 1.5 and second generations are made up of individual actors shaping their own identities, those self-identifying as Muslim contend with contemporary public policies and current public opinion regarding Islam, and these societal perceptions may influence identity formation.

Of course, second generation Muslims in Madrid may experience societal inclusion differently than their peers with native-born parents merely as a result of being second generation, rather than specifically due to their Muslim faith or culture. As alluded to in previous chapters, there are indications that discrimination is sometimes not religiously-specific. However, in a report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), religion was cited as one of the most frequent reasons for discrimination among Muslims (2018). Muslim claims can be regarded as illegitimate, because, as discussed earlier, they may be perceived as the “other” and on the fringes of “European society,” whatever that notion entails. This chapter will endeavor to provide a context for Islam in Spain and how it relates to the population in question.

Spain’s religious history

When outlining Islam in Spain, many cite as a frame of reference the historic Muslim occupation of the Iberian Peninsula, which began with an invasion in 711, continued through
a thriving civilization under the Umayyad Caliphate's Golden Age, and ended with the fall of the Kingdom of Granada and the first expulsion of the Moors in 1942. Muslims and Jews were later expelled again in the early 17th century. Historically religions, other than Catholicism were abolished until the Constitution of 1869 (Kennedy 1996; López et al. 2007). However, recent history is the most pertinent context for our study. After the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and under the ensuing dictatorship, the government strongly favored the Catholic majority, making it the only legally-recognized religion; minority religions were forced to practice clandestinely (Ibid.). Later, pressure from the Vatican, and an alliance with the United States in 1953, finally led to a Law of Religious Liberty in 1967 (Ley 44/1967).

During the post-war period, only a diplomatic few were practicing Muslims, as well as a small cohort of Moroccans that served as Franco’s personal guard (López et al. 2007). The Franco regime then took a pro-Arab turn in the mid-50s, encouraging contact with near Eastern countries and student exchanges (Ibid.). An Egyptian Institute of Islamic Studies was established in 1950 in Madrid, as well an Institute for Hispano-Arab culture in 1954 (Ibid). After the fall of the dictatorship and the transition to democracy, religious pluralism further improved with the Constitution of 1978 and the 1980 Law of Religious Liberty (CE 1978; Ley Orgánica 7/1980). Formal agreements between the government and Protestantism, Judaism and Islam finally took place in 1992 (López et al. 2007).

**Current Spanish institutional relationship with Islam**

As discussed earlier, Spain is unique in comparison with France and the United Kingdom due to this Concordatian church-state structure, whereby the state engages with organized religion by way of agreements. Moreover, Spain's recent Catholic history is in contrast with France's secular tradition and England's church state. For example, the Spanish citizenry's attitude towards religion is based on a national identity tied closely to the

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22 Again, given that the United Kingdom is composed of various countries, England is specified here to refer to a church state example, as the system is constituted differently from country to country.
country’s Catholic history (Osorio 2012; Martín et al. 2003). Because of these close Catholic ties, while Islam is a recognized body in Spain, it does not share the Catholic Church’s specific privileges with the state (nor does any other religion). Some argue that due to the history of the Islamic presence in the Iberian Peninsula, an “otherness” has been attributed to Islam in Spain, not only based on current-day differences but also rooted in perceived historic conflict (Corpas 2010; Zapata 2006).

At the same time, religious diversity management has evolved from a diplomatic issue (making concessions in order to maintain foreign ties) to more of a migration issue (addressing pluralism as a domestic reality) as immigration discussed in earlier chapters began to increase in the past decades (Astor and Griera 2016). Spain formalized relationships with Spain’s Protestant and Jewish leaderships, and an official agreement was brokered between the Spanish government and the Islamic Commission of Spain in April 1992 (Communidad Islamica de España - CIE). The CIE is composed of representatives from the group the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI, founded in 1989), and the Spanish Union of Islamic Communities (UCIDE, founded in 1991); these two groups sometimes find themselves in opposition (Medina 2012). The goal of establishing the CIE was to create a single Muslim entity for official government interaction, as part of the 1992 agreement (Arigita 2006).

As of 2015, according to a UCIDE publication, there were up to 1,427 Muslim religious communities, 44 federations and 20 associations registered in the Ministry of Justice (Observatorio Andalusí 2016). Some of them come under the umbrella of FEERI or UCIDE, but others are unaffiliated. Originally, upon the signing of the agreement in 1992, Muslims in Spain reflected a makeup of middle class immigrants or naturalized Spanish citizens from Arabic countries. More recently, throughout the 1990s, immigration from Morocco led to a demographic makeup more in common with rest of Europe; these recently arrived immigrants came to work in the labor force and now have children that are entering the labor market with a European education. About 70% of the Muslim population in Spain has some
degree of Moroccan origin, while other heritages included Algerian, Pakistani, Iranian, Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian and Tunisian (FRA 2010). In comparison with the rest of Europe, an increase in Islamic adherents in Spain is relatively recent, due to this labor immigration in the 1990s (Ramírez 2005).

As described in the previous chapter in the cases of other European Member states, while the establishment of the CIE was undoubtedly a deliberate recognition of religious plurality in Spain, it also served as a mechanism by which the Spanish government could mediate and observe Islamic activity within Spain (Arigita 2006). Corpas explains that the purpose of the CIE itself is twofold: not only to represent Islam to the Spanish state, but also to serve as a source of leadership, and as an avenue for consensus among the Muslim community in Spain (2010).

Riay Tatary, President of both UCIDE and the CIE, is known for his ability to arbitrate as a result of his relatively good institutional relationships, and is fairly uncontroversial among the faithful (Corpas 2010). By contrast, Mansur Escudero of FEERI in the past sparked more controversy with a progressive approach that has alienated some conservative Muslims; FEERI sometimes caters to Muslim converts, as well. Currently, FEERI is led by Mounir Benjelloun Andaloussi Azhari. Arigita maintains that some feel the leaders of the two larger cohorts within the CIE, both Tatari and Escudero, are unrepresentative of the wider Spanish Muslim community. Their leadership has been prolonged and seemingly out of touch with those Muslims from a more recent migrant background or experience, and there have been calls for a more pluralistic and authentic representation (2006). In 2004, the Association of Moroccan Immigrant Workers in Spain (Asociación de Trabajadores Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España or ATIME) jockeyed to act an interlocutor with the state in religious matters, as well. Up until then, it had largely remained an immigrant or labor association (Mijares and Ramírez 2008). The ATIME’s efforts to regulate religious matters,

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23See later information about the 2004 bombings, explaining why the ATIME chose to come forth at this time.
including imams and religious instruction, were not supported by either FEERI or UCIDE (Arigita 2006).

On an institutional level, another prominent entity dedicated to the facilitation of an understanding between Islam and Spain includes Casa Árabe. It works to promote understanding between Arab culture (and the Muslim faith associated with it) and is an official arm of Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Casa Árabe). Casa Árabe could be described as less of a migration-oriented organization, and more of a diplomatic or cultural entity that educates about Islam and Arab culture.

**Estimate of Muslim population**

In terms of the current Muslim population in Spain, it is difficult to provide legitimate statistics on Islam because officially, the government only offers information on the nationality of foreigners, and there is also a portion of illegal immigration that cannot be accounted for (AFR 2010). Census data does not include information about the religious affiliation of households or individuals (Ibid.). As of their 2015 report, UCIDE estimated 1,858,409 Muslims in Spain (40% Spanish, 40% Moroccan, and 20% other nationalities) in 2014 (Observatorio Andalusí 2015, 37). This reflects an increase in comparison with the same organization’s 2014 report, in which they indicated there were 1,732,191 believers in 2013, with only 30% of them Spanish and 50% Moroccan (Observatorio Andalusí 2014, 24). There are lower estimates of total Muslims in the country from other sources. The 2017 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights report estimated the population to be around 1 million (2017). A further census UCIDE published in 2016 used registries from the Spanish government and from the Islamic Communities of Spain (CIE). They estimated that there are about 779,080 Spanish citizens who are Muslim, 433,030 of which are progeny of Muslims, most of them immigrants who did not originally have Spanish nationality but naturalized (Observatorio Andalusí 2016).

**Rights protections**
In 2004, the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence ("La Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia") was created by the Council of Ministries through the recommendation of Spain’s Ministry of Justice. The Foundation describes its objectives as both to promote religious freedom through cooperation with religious minorities, and to create a forum for research, debate and the generation of public policies that promote religious freedom and peaceful coexistence (La Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia). It conducts many activities in support of social cohesion. These include aiding recently arrived immigrants with Spanish instruction or labor market entry, helping young children enter the Spanish school system, celebrating religious events and publishing relevant materials. Álvarez-Miranda also points out that this Foundation reinforces the structure of the CIE (2009). UCIDE has received funds from the Foundation for activities like organizing conferences, as has FEERI. Moreover, the Foundation encourages other Muslim communities to register in the Ministry of Justice’s records (Ibid). Astor and Griera hold that while the practical implementation of state policies supposedly open to managing religious diversity is lacking, the Foundation is a hopeful and perhaps even well-intentioned step towards closing the gap between policy and social reality (2016).

The Foundation, at the federal level, also collaborated with the Spanish Federation of Local Governments (Federación Española de Gobiernos Locales) in 2011 to create an Observatory for Religious Pluralism (El Observatorio del Pluralismo Religioso). This combined state and local initiative is directed towards monitoring religious diversity in Spain, especially policies at the local level, and recommending good practices. This is an important mechanism because of the competing jurisdictions of state, community and local in Spain, and the questions that arise as a result. For example, in Catalonia, as Astor and Griega note, the community government challenged a provision in a 2013 federal law that made stipulations for religious spaces, albeit leaving a great deal of decision-making to the local authorities. For this reason, the Observatory and the good practice manuals it provides local authorities can serve as an example of how the Spanish multilevel government attempts to manage the
varying levels of jurisdictional power (2016). The Observatory also provides information about legislation or judicial decisions relating to religious pluralism in a format that allows you to search by topic.

Of course, there is confusion between what constitutes religious discrimination versus ethnic discrimination, xenophobia, and so on. In addition to the recourse of Spain’s Observatory for Religious Pluralism, institutional bodies in place that may affect the chosen cohort of this study also include the Spanish Observatory for Racism and Xenophobia (OBERAXE), under the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, or the Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination, under the Ministry of Health Social Services and Equality (the latter two referenced in the integration discussion in Chapter Four). OBERAXE and the and Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination both perform some of the functions of an equality body, and indeed the Council is listed as Spain’s Equality of Body by the European Network of Equality Bodies (Equinet). However, neither body is autonomous, i.e., each fall under the jurisdiction of a government ministry. In 2011, there had been an attempt to create such an autonomous body, with powers beyond observation and reporting, however, the change of government during the Spanish election cycle interrupted the process. Moreover, a 2018 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (under the Council of Europe) report criticized a lack of institutional protections in Spain. It lamented the 2011 failure to legislate a stronger body, and argued that Constitutional provisions and definitions of discrimination were not strict enough. In addition, it insisted that anti-discrimination provisions were so obscure that discrimination cases are almost never brought to court (2018).

Still, there are several civil society organizations working towards education and rights protections. For example, Fundación de Cultura Islámica was formed in the 1980s to develop understanding between the West and the Arab Islamic world with a focus on the history of Al-Andalus (La Fundación de Cultura Islámica). Fundación Al Fanar similarly conducts research and journalism to foster collaboration between the Arab world and
Spanish society (La Fundación Al Fanar). Moreover, various graduate programs and centers at Spanish public universities study Arab language and culture, as well as Islam. As Arab cultures are strongly associated with Islam, Islam is consequently often discussed or is even the primary subject of study at some of these institutions and organizations. Of course, among the Muslim community in Spain itself, there are multiple social media groups dedicated to self-instruction in Islam, combating islamophobia, or creating community among young Muslims. Official Muslim associations are established throughout Spain, with those in Madrid to be described shortly. Finally, Informe Raxen, a report periodically published by the group Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia, as well as reports by SOS Racismo, the Fundación de Cultura Islámica, and the Observatorio Andalusí, document and monitor incidences of Islamophobia in Spain (Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia, SOS Racismo, Fundación de Cultura Islámica, Observatorio Andalusí). Most recently, a joint project has produced an observatory for Islamophobia in the media (“Observatorio de la Islamofobia en los Medios”), with partners including Fundación Al Fanar, El Instituto Europeo del Mediterráneo (European Institute of the Mediterranean, IEMed, in Barcelona), La Fundación Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo (The Three Cultures of the Mediterranean Foundation, a collaboration between the governments of Seville and Morocco), Casa Árabe and the University of Murcia (Observatorio de la Islamofobia en los Medios).

**Education**

As for Islamic education, the FRA report mentioned earlier used data gathered from 2007-2008 to find that Spanish Muslim youth indicated their religious education took place at home (2010). There are certainly community organizations and mosques that offer more formal instruction. Since the 1992 Agreement with the Spanish Islamic Commission, Islamic

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24There are several degree programs throughout Spain that study this topic. For example, University of Salamanca, University of Sevilla, University of Alicante, University of Cádiz and University of Granada all had undergraduate degrees in Arab and Islamic studies, and Complutense University of Madrid an undergraduate in Semitic and Islamic studies, as of the 16-17 academic year. The Autonomous University of Madrid and the University of Barcelona similarly offer a Master in Arab and Islamic studies.
education has theoretically been available in Spanish public school. In practice, however, this situation has been slow to materialize; as of 2010, there were 46 public school teachers of Islam, versus 15,000 public school teachers of Catholicism (Archick 2010). Organizations like UCIDE argue that the number of Islamic teachers funded by the government is low in comparison to demand for the courses (Ibid). Technically, children in kindergarten, primary and secondary are entitled to Islamic education in both public school and private “concertados.” This can take place given the following conditions: if the request comes from over 10 students; if a candidate for the instruction is put forward by the CIE; and if the final decision for the candidate’s eligibility is approved by the school administration (Álvarez-Miranda 2009). UCIDE estimates that there are 275,324 Muslim children and youth in school (40% Spanish nationality), a number which would require at least 400 professors (Observatorio Andalusí 2014).

Religious freedom in educational institutions has remained a constant debate, albeit the topic attracts less headlines and controversy in the media than it does in countries like France. The first “headscarf case” that gained media attention in Spain took place in 2002; the student was initially banned but then readmitted, and there have been several incidents since (Mijares and Ramírez 2008). In 2013, The Supreme Court declared any laws that barred wearing a headscarf in public spaces, such as those that had existed in Lleida, Catalonia, unconstitutional (Ibid). In fact, there is no federal law prohibiting the use of religious symbols. However, depending on the case, whether in a public setting, the workplace, or in educational institutions, restrictions on the veil are dealt with on a case by case basis (Pascual 2015).

For example, in a court of first instance ruling in 2012, where parents took legal action after their daughter had been banned from school due to her veil, the defendants

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25Concertados are private schools that receive funding from the state. Obviously, Islamic education would take place if it was not in contra to the school’s mission; i.e., it would not make sense that a concertado Catholic school offer such education.
argued that laicism represented a constitutional value, and for that reason demonstrating religious affiliations can be restricted (Mijares and Ramírez 2008). When taken to the Supreme Tribunal of Madrid, the court ruled in favor of the institution on two grounds: it established the school had the right to enforce its internal regulation against head coverings, and it also argued that based on a technicality, rulings cannot be appealed in a dispute over less than 30,000 euros. A dissenting decision contended that this ruling infringed on religious freedoms (Álvarez 2013). The rulings regarding headscarves thus remain nebulous in the spheres of employment and education. However, Mijares and Ramírez note that very few schools exercise their ability to enforce internal regulations against head coverings, if students do so for religious reasons (2008). When this does occur, the press often pursues the story very quickly and the school finds itself under public scrutiny.

**The workplace**

There is certainly a consensus regarding difficulties in integration due to comparatively less labor market entry and stable employment among Muslims. In 2011, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recommended that Spain make further efforts to tackle workplace discrimination, especially when directed against Muslims from North Africa or of that descent. The ECRI admitted that while the economic recession in Spain could also be to blame for unemployment and work instability, discrimination in the workplace and in employment processes still remained a significant issue (Solanes 2015).

Apart from discrimination in the workplace, devout Muslims face a certain difficulty in that their holy day of obligation rests on a Friday; similarly, the holy month of Ramadan and the traditional fasting it involves can be difficult for practicing Muslims given that the Spanish workday does not provide for the prayer and fasting obligations (Observatorio Andalusí 2014). While Catholics in Spain have several public holidays that fall on their own religious feast days, Muslims have to take personal days in order to observe theirs.

**Media**
The media is accused of inciting Islamophobia and of painting a poor image of Muslims throughout the continent of Europe. In Spain, the media provides very cursory coverage of Muslim activity, apart from reporting on extremist activities at home or abroad. This coverage, of course, can amplify during certain periods, depending on political and social events that the media may determine are compelling content for their audiences. Sensationalism and politicization of the issues prevails in the mainstream outlets, and content is created for pure political consumption rather than for objective analysis.

There are a few informative documentaries of the Muslim religion, and discussion of the religion is usually restricted to negative news (Sánchez 2013). Some grassroots movements attempt to document perceived violent incidents of islamophobia that do not reach mainstream media outlets. Aside from “Islam Hoy” of Televisión Española’s Chanel 2, or the Córdoba TV chain, news reports can encompass documentation of extremist behavior, conflicts in school or in communities, or negative opinion pieces.26 One news story in a local newspaper in Aragon reported Muslim parents demanding halal menus in public high schools in Zaragoza, implying that these were unreasonable demands, and that public high schools had already been sufficiently catering to Muslim students (Figols 2013).

As a result, in a study by Cea D’Ancona, the author finds that Spanish media does indeed drive public perception of Islam; at least, the way in which the media echoes the political debate and rhetoric on the subject has an effect. An obvious example includes when local election campaigns single out immigration or Muslims as an issue, and the candidate attributes economic woes to the immigrant population, and the media disseminates this discourse to the public (2016).

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26 For example, a 2015 article in Cinco Dias explained how the international press had picked up a story about a political party in Tarragona spearheading an initiative to modify commercial licensing laws in order to protect Spanish businesses; they did so namely by barring commercial licenses for any new kebab restaurant, internet café or convenience store within 500 meters of an existing ones. These particular types of stores were targeted because they are typically run by immigrants (Marco 2015).
A 2015 Observatorio Andalusí report (again, headed by UCIDE) provides readers with the organization’s own take on the treatment of Islam in Spain’s media. They believe that the discourse the media uses is prone to diffusing negative views of Islam. It explains that when Islam is covered in the international news, especially in relation to Muslim majority states, the words “Islamist” and “extreme” are used; “social democratic” or “Islamic democracy” are phrases that rarely feature alongside stories treating of Islam (Observatorio Andalusí 2015, 3).

Islamophobia

Several authors note that the historic relationship between Islam and Spain distinguishes the latter from fellow European counterparts (Zapata 2006; Corpas 2010). As Corpas points out, Andalusia, and all the history it connotes, has left a distinctive mark on Spain, and Islam remains both a close and historical adversary in the evolved Spanish identity (2010). There is evidence that points to Spain having a past tradition of Islamophobia, and that negative reactions to immigration in Spain are thus mainly directed at Muslim immigration (Zapata 2006). Indeed, one can observe how such a sentiment is enmeshed in quotidian life, as there is a frequently used term in the Castellano Spanish vernacular, “el moro,” referring to Muslims in general, but particularly aimed at today's Moroccans, specifically. It can be interpreted as derogatory, although some may maintain that it is used as a term of identification and without malicious intent. In the past, Islam was understood as the opposite of Spanish identity, an understanding that can still be cultivated today in some circles. Zapata theorizes that public discourse in Spain, rather than embracing a shared tradition with Islamic culture, historically remembers the oppositional relationship it had with Islam during the period of the Islamic caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula (2006). This past is further complicated by later colonial relationships with Muslim countries and continued complex situations with the protectorates of Ceuta and Melilla. Again, in this
approach to Islam, it is still perceived as the “other” and a migratory phenomenon (albeit cyclical) rather than a modern reality in a diverse Spain and Europe.

Islamophobia can be described as an intolerance of the religion of Islam and its practice, and can even be couched in terms of modernity and progressivity, as voices in politics and the media, and even in academia, characterize it as an anti-Western threat to liberal democratic values. Essentialism and the tendency to generalize regarding Islam predicates Islamophobia. Those who warn of intellectual islamophobia caution specifically that there is a danger in making simplistic distinctions between a “good” (moderate, and majority) Islam, versus a “bad” (minority, more traditional or strict) Islam (Gomez 2014, 53). In her study of Muslim youth associations, Téllez confirms that many, if not the majority, of participants had in some form or another had encountered this message of a “good” versus “bad” Muslim paradigm (Téllez 2011).

The 2004 bombings were a significant event in the trajectory of islamophobia in Spain. On March 11th of that year, ten different bombs, set off within a matter of minutes in the early morning, killed 191 people in Madrid on commuter trains. Spain had been familiar with terrorism in the past beginning as early as the 1960s, due to the ethno-nationalist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) from the Basque country, but this group had never achieved an attack of such scale. The attack was attributed to Islamic extremists linked to the Al Qaeda network (Alonso 2013).

As a result, the word “islamofobia” (Spanish for islamophobia) began to surface in the media in 2004 (Gomez 2014). Still, the La Fundación de Cultura Islámica had published a manifesto against Islamophobia in 2003 (Fundación 2003). The word itself has yet to receive official recognition from the Dictionary of Spanish Language of the Real Academia Espanola, which as of 2014 still did not have the term in its entries. Over the course of its existence, OBERAXE has identified Islamophobia identified as a phenomenon that required attention (D’Ancona and Valles 2012). In addition to the historical implications of Spanish identity and Islam, the recent extremist attacks throughout Europe in the past 15 years have brought a
whole new dimension to islamophobia. Gomez observes that islamophobia begins to spike around election periods, implying that in it can be exploited as a political tool; essentially, there may be a perception islamophobia pervades society more than it actually does (2014). It should be borne in mind yet again that apart from the historic relationship between Spain and Islam, as well as recent extremism, Muslims in Spain also face an academic prejudice against Islam as a threat to secular society and liberal values; this is a belief entertained by various academics throughout Europe.

**Spanish public opinion regarding Islam**

There is some indication as to Spanish public opinion regarding Islam and Muslims in Spain, or what public institutions and the media register as public opinion in Spain. A 2015 “Global Attitudes” survey by Pew Research Center found that the majority of Spanish society, 52%, had a favorable view of Muslims. While favorable percentages were higher in France and the UK, these countries also have much larger Muslim populations (Stokes 2015). In a 2008 survey by CIS, 16.2% of Spaniards said people of all religious faiths should practice freely, 43.6% said free religious practice should be permitted as long as it does not bother others, and 34.2% said religions should be practice freely as long as it is not proselytized (Centro de Investigaciones 2008). 75% of Spaniards said having Muslims as neighbors would not bother them at all (Ibid.).

Again, as explained earlier, Islam is often largely associated with immigration, and Spain has a record of a very open and positive attitude towards immigration in comparison with the rest of Europe. In a 2007 Gallup Eurobarometer, out of 27 member states, Spain had the fifth greatest percentage of participants indicating that they believed diversity enriched cultural life very much (Cea D’Ancona and Valles 2009; Gallup Eurobarometer). Similarly, a 2014 CIS study found that 78% of Spaniards believed legal immigrants should have the right to bring their family to Spain, 87.6% believed they should be able to collect unemployment,
and 68% believed they should be able to obtain Spanish nationality (Centro de Investigaciones 2014).

Still, resistance to immigration remains a reality in Spain, and this as well as xenophobia and racism is measured by several government institutions and organizations. The CIS has monitored it since 1990 in a series of barometers and surveys using those indicators. Xenophobia can stem from the perception of immigration as a social problem (i.e., uncontrolled borders) or as a threat to the societal status quo. Within such threat to the societal status quo falls competition in the labor market, competition access to social services, and finally fear of losing cultural homogeneity or national identity: in short, a socioeconomic or cultural threat is perceived (Cea D’Ancona 2009a). In terms of the former socioeconomic threat, a CIS 2014 report found that Spaniards indicated delinquency and labor market competition as the two greatest negative aspects of immigration (Centro de Investigaciones 2014).

Then there is the latter, cultural threat. As for some, Islam represents a foreign religion or culture and way of life practice, Spain can be slightly less welcoming toward Muslim immigrants as opposed to immigrants overall. The fear of losing national identity can be linked to how individual differences, including “prior attitudes and experiences” as Pettigrew describes in his intergroup contact theory, can shape contact between groups (1998, 77). Perhaps for this reason, in the Spanish MEXEES27 project, the data suggested that immigrants of Latino origin encountered less native resistance than North African immigrants, or those that professed the Muslim faith. To begin, immigrants hailing from Spanish-speaking countries share a common language with the host country of Spain, and thus a certain homogeneity with the society (albeit less so among the ethnically diverse).

27 MEXEES, funded by the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, bears the full name EJ2005-00568 – “La medición de la xenofobia en la España de comienzos del siglo XXI [Measurement of xenophobia in Spain at the beginning of the 21st century]” and was carried out from 2006-2008.
Furthermore, Cea D'Ancona found a significant rate of rejection of Muslims due to their religion distinguishing them from the Catholic tradition and culture of Spain (2009b).

In a 2013 CIS study conducted five years later than the one previously referenced, Spanish participants were again questioned as to how much it would bother them to be neighboring various groups (Centro de Investigaciones). The reluctance to be neighbor to an immigrant was slightly less than being neighbor to a Muslim: 67.4% said they would not mind at all having an immigrant as a neighbor, versus 60.9% who would not mind having a Muslim neighbor (Ibid.). However, there was also recognition of discrimination, as 14.3% percent of Spaniards agreed that a Muslim or another religious minority could face prejudice in accessing public services; 30% and 22% believed it was possible that religious minorities could face prejudice in renting a living space or accessing the job market, respectively. In a 2014 CIS study regarding attitudes towards immigrants, when participants were asked which immigrants they had the least sympathy for or got only the worst with, Moroccans and other North Africans received 9.6%, Arabs 8.4% and Muslims 2.5%, surpassed only by Romanians at 11.8% (with immigrants from South and Central America drawing much lower figures) (Centro de Investigaciones 2014).

Noya uses data from the del Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano to indicate that there is not islamofobia in Spain per se (he maintains that Spaniards can distinguish between extremists and practitioners of Islam), but instead a Catholic empathy for Muslims. He qualifies that the any rejection of Islam is a public rejection by secular citizens that would reject the same display of religion if exercised by Catholics; he argues it does not so much constitute fear as much as an assertion of democratic values of separation of church and state (2007). By contrast, based on analysis of attitudes towards immigrants from CIS data beginning in the 1990s and proceeding up through projects in conjunction with OBERAXE, D’Ancona asserts that there is a tendency among the religious or conservative to be anti-Islam or to reject Muslim immigration; religious or conservative Spanish are more likely to reject what is foreign (2009a).
Again, societal sentiment in Spain, or at least the record of sentiment, can vary within a year or from year to year based on either media or political influence. In 2010, when debates regarding the burqa surfaced, as a consequence of the aforementioned attempt to ban the burqa in Lleida, public opinion also fluctuated. The primary Spanish newspaper El País published 71 articles related to Islam that year, and the main newspaper from the Catalonian province where Lleida is located, La Vanguardia, published 163. Two years later, articles on the topic only totaled 37. This rise in the public consciousness of debates regarding Islam, thanks to media and political actors, had an effect on public opinion, as a rise in Islamophobia and a push to ban veils and ban mosques increased that year (Cea D’Ancona 2016).

Islam in Madrid

Nonetheless, Corpas holds that the Autonomous Communities in Spain have adapted to Muslim immigrant diversity with more success (albeit not total success) than other neighboring European states (2010). Earlier chapters have outlined processes of immigration and integration in Spain, as well as integration policies at the state, regional and local levels, and how a certain amount of autonomy is afforded to the regions in terms of integration policy. Moreover, Madrid itself has a unique history with Islam. The city was founded by Mohamed I in the 9th Century. After the Muslims were expelled from Spain in 1609, believers from Islamic and Jewish faiths were forbidden from practicing in Madrid until the Spanish Constitution of 1869 allowed religions aside from Catholicism to practice again (López et al. 2007). With the arrival of Muslims to Madrid in the past few decades, as indicated earlier in the description of Muslim immigration to Spain beginning in the 80s, prayer rooms and mosques have been established throughout various neighborhoods in the community.

Madrid has the second largest Moroccan population of all Spanish cities and the second largest Moroccan population of all Spanish communities, after Barcelona and Cataluña, respectively (Lora-Tamayo D’Ocó 2004). The first Muslim association in Madrid
was founded in 1971, the Muslim Association of Spain (La Asociación Musulmana en España) (López et al. 2007, 51). As Madrid is the nation’s capital and hosts the Spanish central government, the CIE and the UCIDE and FEERI organizations that serve as CIE’s representatives are also based in Madrid. However, they do not operate as much at the local level. Rather, López et al. claim that several local communities in Madrid are more active in reaching out to civil society; this finding was confirmed in the empirical study of this work, where greater outreach and community was encountered in associations like the CCIF Al Umma De Fuenlabrada or Comunidad Musulmana de Getafe Al Falah.

There are two larger and well-known mosques in Madrid city itself. The oldest, located in the Tetuan neighborhood, “Mezquita Abu Bakr,” was inaugurated in 1988, and according to the President of the Muslim Association of Spain was funded by individuals (rather than foreign governments, a phenomenon that has taken place in Europe) throughout the world. For a while, it served as the nucleus of the Muslim community for Arab language teaching, celebrations, prayer, conferences, observing Ramadan, and many other activities (López et al. 2007, 56). In 2013, this mosque arranged 166 visits from a total of over 14,000 visitors, with visitors hailing from university faculties, neighborhood associations, and so forth (Observatorio Andalusí 2015). The second, known as the “Mezquita de la M30” sits on the periphery of Madrid city and was established in 1992. It is more grandiose and houses a large library and several cultural exhibits, gathering about 3,000 faithful every Friday for prayer (López et al. 2007). Of course, there are many more mosques and prayer spaces throughout the community of Madrid and the city, including those in Fuenlabrada, Parla and Lavapiés, some of those visited during the empirical portion of this study.

Organizations like SOS Racismo Madrid monitor discrimination against Muslims and other minorities in the community, and certainly hold that there are elements of islamophobia in Madrid (SOS Racismo Madrid). However, Astor theorizes that Madrid inhabitants are less wary of immigration or Islam due to a more equal distribution of immigrants across neighborhoods in comparison with regions like Barcelona. While the
overall levels of immigration are the same in these two regions, in Madrid there are not so much ethnic ghettos rather than just diverse, lower class neighborhoods (2009). Astor’s innovative socioeconomic reasoning for discrimination against Muslims, or lack thereof, can be combined with more traditional and general observations about Spanish society in general and its relationship with Islam. Of course, this goes in tandem with acknowledging recent concerns about extremism, in order to provide a comprehensive picture of the nature of discrimination towards Muslims in Madrid.

**Muslim attitudes in Spain**

One observation distinct to Islam in Spain, and more specifically Muslim behavior, is how it seems Spanish Muslims attempt to remain less publicly visible than Muslims in other European countries. For example, in the Martín et al. study, the authors observed that some women had stopped wearing their head covering to work because they felt it would elicit rejection from traditional Spaniards (2003). In fact, there have been several surveys undertaken in the past two decades that enable a rough understanding of Spanish Muslim attitudes, with a few noteworthy findings: that the majority held beliefs aligned with Spanish societal values, that they were open to integration, and that they embraced Spanish society.

For instance, a 2011 report conducted by Metroscopia (briefly referenced earlier in this work) and commissioned by the Spanish government, provides the most recent information in a series of five surveys that began in 2006. It offers several insights into Spanish Muslim attitudes, demonstrating how this population’s views are compatible with liberal democracy societal values, including in terms of the participants’ tolerance. Metroscopia interviewed 2,000 participants. According to the survey, the majority of Spanish Muslims believed that no religion was superior to another, that non-believers maintained the same dignity as believers, that violence was an unacceptable way to defend one’s religious beliefs, and that a laical state should treat all religions equally (2011). The 2006 report by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia indicated that Spanish Muslims were...
more likely to believe that their values were compatible with Spanish society, whereas, in comparison, Spanish non-Muslims felt Islam was less compatible with dominant societal values or norms. Both of these surveys demonstrate the extent to which Spanish Muslims believe that their religion and Spanish societal values are reconcilable.

The Metroscopia report also offered two further conclusions: that Spanish Muslims demonstrated a desire to integrate, and that they expressed a positive view of Spanish societies and institutions. Regarding the participants’ efforts to integrate into their host society, 67% said they were content in Spain, 83% of those who lived in Spain for more than 5 years said they believed they had adapted to Spanish life, and the majority had a good level of Spanish language skills (2011). They felt that Spanish society rejected Islam the least, only 36% rejection versus the 43% rejection and 49% rejection perceived in France and the United States, respectively (Ibid.). Moreover, 75% believed that Muslims and Christians in Spain at least attempted at mutual understanding (Ibid.).

In a study of Moroccan integration tangentially related in its approach to religion and integration, Martin et al. observed that the Moroccan population faced considerable integration difficulties in a socio-economic sense; most of all, they had difficulties with employment instability and workforce entry. The authors explain that when conclusions are made about Moroccan integration, they are usually couched in terms of cultural and social differences (including religion), because this collective is perceived as different. Still, one of the main influencers of integration, socio-economic status and workforce instability, is applicable to the Moroccan populations and perhaps has a greater impact than socio-cultural differences (Martín et al. 2003). At the same time, the authors do indicate that religious belief or Muslim identity was indeed an active, rather than a passive, factor in both identity and social relations among the Moroccan population in their study (Ibid.). Beyond these surveys treating of the larger Muslim population, recent investigations into second generation Spaniards identifying as Muslims, or being identified as such, provide a picture of how Spain’s relationship with Islam can affect the second generation’s experience of inclusion and
identification with Spanish society. In these studies, observations unique to Spain are present alongside observations regarding trends among second generation Muslim youth in Europe.

**Second generation integration and identity in Spain**

For example, one common theme that resurfaces in the study of second generation Muslims in Spain, which is also found in several analyses of the same populations in the United Kingdom and France, is how the second generation relates to Islam on a more individual than institutional level, as cited in the previous chapter. Martín et al. explained that youth participants in their study did not feel religion meant adhering to various obligations or manifesting outward practices. To them, it instead signified conducting an individual and less outwardly visible relationship with God (2003). Female Muslim youth chose to dress more in their own style than in the traditional style that their parents thought was appropriate for their religion (Ibid.).

However, the aforementioned FRA report, comparing Muslim youth with those in France and the United Kingdom, found that Spanish Muslim youth felt they faced more discrimination due to their religious beliefs than in the other two European countries. Overall, second generation, non-Muslim youth rarely faced discrimination due to their religious affiliation in the three states; however, this was often the reason for discrimination against Muslim youth, and especially so in Spain (2010). At the same time, the TIES study described in Chapter Five held that “Only in Berlin, Frankfurt, Antwerp and Stockholm (and not in the other cities) were experiences of discrimination significantly related to religious attachment” (Crul et al. 2012, 362). This paints a picture of the conflicting evidence and overall difficulty of comparing second generation Muslims across Europe. However, it may point to how second generation integration and experience is distinct from first generation experiences. It highlights how the relationship between faith and individuality among youth may complicate any capacity to make larger generalizations about second generation Muslims as a whole.
López et al. found that the second generation certainly underwent a different experience in their study of Moroccan youth in the San Cristóbal neighborhood of Madrid. They found that sometimes those youth of Moroccan origin inspired less trust or confidence on the part of the community; it was theorized that this rather than a result of racist attitudes, this mistrust was more due to being part of an alien group. As such, the youth were more predisposed to lag in education, as a result of this differential treatment, or lower expectation. At the same time, their families and group culture encouraged higher expectations for success, a success that was difficult to achieve given the reality of the neighborhood’s resources and socioeconomic contexts, among other factors. The authors found that this dichotomy was distinct to their second generation experience. From these observations and several other key takeaways, the authors of the study concluded that these youth faced a greater degree of negative circumstances. In terms of religious identity, they were described as influenced by Islam and their family’s faith culture, though not to the point of detracting from their individual agency.

Similarities are found in a 2005 study of children of immigrants alongside children of native peers conducted for the City of Madrid’s Study of the Observatory of Migrations for Intercultural Coexistence (OMCI). The findings serve as a reminder to consider the experience of youth of migrant origin, irrespective of religious affiliation. The investigation was conducted in five neighborhoods in the Madrid municipality, including Justicia, Acacias, Ciudad de los Ángeles and Vista Alegre. It asserted, unsurprisingly, that youth of both migrant and native origin confront many of the same challenges in both institutional settings and via socialization outside of places like school. However, the study noted that, evidently, youth of migrant origin faced added challenges that included but were not limited to: the legal situation of their family, whether they faced a hostile or welcoming receiving society or

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28The Área de Investigación del Observatorio de las Migraciones y de la Convivencia Intercultural de la Ciudad de Madrid (OMCI) was a public service provided by the Madrid Municipality as part of its Family, Social Services and Pariticipation section at the time of the study in 2015. It is no longer in existence.
community, and the human capital their family could offer to their social network (Barbosa 2007).

And so, in addition to the discrimination faced as youth of migrant origin, other studies found that Madrid’s Muslim youth specifically found a greater experience of discrimination. Still, this did not always discourage youth to the point of marginalization. The following qualitative studies provide observations of Muslim youth, mostly second generation Muslims: Adlbi’s 2009 publication on identity among young female Muslims in Madrid; a second 2010 publication where she expanded to include Ceuta and Melilla, as well as Valencia; and Téllez’s 2011 dissertation entitled, “Contra el estigma: jóvenes españoles/as y marroquíes transitando entre la ciudadanía y la “musulmaneidad” (Against stigma: Young Spaniards and Moroccans transitioning between citizenship and “Muslimness”). Moreover, the studies are helpful in that they are not particularly exclusive to one ethnicity (i.e., Moroccans). The authors found that this demographic does face discrimination, presumably due to their Muslim identity, but that they also seek to integrate in Spanish society.

Adlbi’s studies were conducted among young Muslim women with parents originating from Syria, Morocco, Sudan, Palestine, Jordan, Tunisia, and Spain. From this sample, she found that despite the women’s diverse range of backgrounds and experiences, they all seemed to expertly juggle both their ethnic background (or parent’s original culture) with Spanish society; they also strived to preserve their religious identity within the Spanish context. However, they faced a tricky balance in this religious aspect, due to the difficulties of assimilation, rejection and marginalization that they encountered trying to maintain this balance (2009). The majority of the girls Adlbi interviewed reported at least some discrimination during the course of their lives, especially if they wore a headscarf. Those who didn’t wear a headscarf explained that once they were identified as Muslims, they also experienced discrimination (Adlbi 2010). Indeed, it seems that these second generation Muslims were thus discriminated against due to their religious beliefs; however, that is not to
say that the offending party knew whether to distinguish between the girl's religious
affiliation, immigrant heritage or ethnic background.

Téllez’s study of Muslim youth associations in Spain is another example of a study of
Muslims in general, primarily geared toward the second generation, and not exclusive to
Moroccan ethnicity (again, a scarce type of demographic study in Spain, as Moroccans make
up the majority of Spanish Muslims, and are often the targeted population of study). As
briefly referenced earlier, Téllez found that Muslims from around 30-35 seemed to shy away
from religious identification, perhaps because of how it could be associated with being
perceived as immigrants. Younger Spanish Muslims seemed to possess a stronger Muslim
identity, though they practiced on a more individual level, which they combined hand in hand
with pursuing association work as "a good Spanish citizen." She theorized that the desire to
be considered a “good or bad” Muslim or a “good or bad” Spanish citizen is the result of
policies directed towards Muslims, not only in Spain but in other European countries (2011).

However, Téllez noted that in contrast with other countries she compared, Spain has
recognized the necessity of facilitating religion in its state policies and legal code, rather than
viewing it as threat (Ibid.). In another Téllez study, she explained that her target group was
not composed of immigrants or those that suffer from legal exclusion, but youth that seek
social approval and political representation (2008). Again, rather than being uncooperative in
integration processes as some maintain, and perhaps as a result of these accusations, Muslim
youth were attempting to find acceptance as good citizens or societal contributors.

Conclusion

Studies so far indicate that the majority of Spanish Muslim youth can be characterized
by their openness to integration, along with an awareness of being discriminated against due
to their faith. While access to formal rights seem to be robust, an attitude of mistrust in
society and lack of rights implementation can still make integration difficult. A tendency to
have a more individual faith rather than ascribe to traditional practices is also present, a
trend that seems to be common throughout Europe. The Spanish state itself presents several distinguishing characteristics in its relationship with Islam, including its Concorditarian church-state structure, its familiarity with organized religion, its acceptance of immigration, its relatively new experience with Muslim immigration and its openness to formalized integration policies.

Thus far, in order to provide a context for the experience of the second generation in France, Great Britain and Spain, there has been an explanation of European immigration and integration realities and policies, church-state structures and societal attitudes (including the phenomenon of European secularization). While there is relatively substantial comparison with Spanish Muslims and other European counterparts, it is more difficult to find ready comparisons with second generation Spanish Muslims (i.e. specifically Muslim youth of migrant origin). This is perhaps due to the recent arrival of this cohort, or may find its cause in the nature of second generation integration and the very diverse paths to integration this population faces. Moreover, increasingly individualized religious belief among these youth, and the variegated forms of practice that can result, further adds to this diversification. With this in mind, we approach the specific case study of Madrid, in order to examine to what extent religious identity and identification with the host society may influence each other (whether one the other, mutually or not at all). Madrid and the identity of its young second generation is an important case study, as this Spanish city, with a larger Muslim population spread through diverse neighborhoods, has the potential to set a precedent for successful cohesion. This contrasts with countries bearing longer Muslim integration trajectories, where major cities may have developed pan-ethnic and reactive identities, or isolated communities.
Chapter IX

Empirical findings

The empirical analysis recorded self-identification and sense of belonging, including religious identity, as well as explored related experiences of discrimination and their impact. Moreover, throughout the course of the study, the population demonstrated expectations of rights recognition. A pattern of hybrid identities repeatedly included evidence of attachment to Spain or the community of residence, demonstrating high levels of integration and social adaptation on the part of the youth. Meanwhile, societal and institutional discrimination simultaneously threatened cohesion and presented cautionary lessons for future trajectories. Throughout the discussions and analysis, experiences of discrimination frequently linked to self-identity as well as to individual and collective rights claims.

The findings both align with and digress from results in other Spanish and European studies. For example, in the taxonomy outlined earlier in this work, various investigations of European Muslim youth were categorized into research that either explored themes of religious individualism, reactive identity, European Islam or a sense of belonging. The latter trend is most emphasized in this study, and this sense of belonging is the first pattern that will be examined in the empirical analysis. Moreover, religious individualism was also observed, and European Islam surfaced in the sense that participants expressed hybrid identities in how their religious identity, and other identities or beliefs, were blended together (albeit again, the concept “European Islam” risks essentialism and for that reason is not termed as such in the below analysis). Finally, the reactive identity explored in other studies is not particularly apparent in this investigation, although experiences of discrimination did sometimes link to feelings of alienation. Apart from the comparative patterns in relation to previous research, the various trends observed and unique to this study, particularly that of the rights claims, provide a point of departure from which to offer later suggestions for improved policy and practice in this work’s closing thoughts.
**Initial observations**

In order to communicate the participants' views as directly as possible, the languages are reported as the participants termed them, so as not to obscure any intentional or unintentional reasons for their being specific or general about the language or languages they spoke. The reader will notice that there is varying reference to Castilian or Spanish. Castilian and Spanish can be understood as referring to the same language, although of course the Spanish language varies regionally. The participants also sometimes made distinctions between Moroccan and Arabic. Moroccan Arabic is a dialect of Arabic, while Arabic may refer to the general standard Arabic derived from Classical Arabic. Berber is a language originating in North Africa that is spoken by large populations in Morocco, and Riffian is a northern Berber language spoken by ethnic Riffians. Just as the languages have been as literally translated as possible, the term Madrileño will not be translated. This term seemed the most accurate way to communicate the participants' manner of expressing that they were "of Madrid."

Of the five first generation participants, none had Spanish citizenship, and while four of the eight generation 1.5 did not hold Spanish citizenship, two of them were planning on receiving it within a few months. The following chart lists: each participant's first name; whether they were first, 1.5 or second generation; their age; the origin country of their parents; their gender; how they self-identified; and the languages that they spoke.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Parental Origin</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Muslim Spaniard</td>
<td>Castilian, Moroccan; prefers Castilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>&quot;Citizen of the world...all brothers&quot;; more Spanish than Moroccan</td>
<td>Spanish, Arabic, French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ceuta</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Spanish Muslim</td>
<td>Spanish, Arabic; prefers Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Language(s)</td>
<td>Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayah</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Arabic, Spanish, Italian, Romanian</td>
<td>Arabic, Spanish, English; prefers Spanish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayeh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic, Spanish; prefers Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayim</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Morocco, Egypt</td>
<td>Arabic, Spanish, English</td>
<td>Arabic, Spanish, English; prefers Spanish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chaima</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>Arabic, Spanish, English; prefers Spanish</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Arabic, Spanish, English</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibrahin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Spanish, Arabic</td>
<td>Spanish, Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ihsan</td>
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<td>Ceuta, Syria</td>
<td>Spanish, Syrian, Moroccan</td>
<td>Spanish, Syrian, Moroccan</td>
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<td>Iman</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Spanish, Arabic</td>
<td>Spanish, Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Spanish, German, Arabic; prefers German</td>
<td>Spanish, German, Arabic; prefers German</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jauad</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Castilian, Arabic, Berber; prefers Castilian</td>
<td>Castilian, Arabic, Berber; prefers Castilian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihan</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>Spanish, Arabic, English, Catalan; prefers Spanish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laila</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Arabic, Spanish; prefers Spanish</td>
<td>Arabic, Spanish; prefers Spanish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malek</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>French, Arabic, English, Spanish</td>
<td>French, Arabic, English, Spanish</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moha</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Moroccan, Spanish</td>
<td>Moroccan, Spanish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaim</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Castilian, Arabic</td>
<td>Castilian, Arabic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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20 Jauad, Jihan and Nouha chose to select an age bracket rather than state their exact age. Jauad selected bracket 26-30 years and Nouha and Jihan 16-20. The average of the respective brackets was calculated and Jauad, Jihan and Nouha assigned ages 28, 18 and 18, respectively, to enable the flow of the narrative. All other ages are the exact age the participant stated at the time of the interview.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Language(s)</th>
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<td>33</td>
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Again, the participants were identified as Muslim based on their own self-analysis. As displayed above, 31 of the 32 youth identified as Muslim; one second generation participant with Muslim family on his father’s side did not identify as Muslim or religious. Out of the 31 identifying as Muslim, four described themselves as Muslim but non-religious. Of those that defined themselves as religious Muslims, there was a range of difference as to what that might signify in several areas, including but not limited to: whether they considered themselves as practicing; what they defined practicing to be; whether they felt observation of traditional practice necessary to be considered religious; and whether they believed religion was an individual relationship with God or also had a collective and visible component. Several times participants explained how they would adapt their practice to the Spanish workday, or their observance of religious dietary constraints as best they could, given the options they had available. These aspects are addressed both in further exploration of religious identity, and in conclusions regarding efforts on the part of these youth to adapt their beliefs to societal norms and quotidian reality.

**Initial note on participants’ religiosity**

While religious practice or spirituality may be individualized among many of the participants, it is notable how many strongly identify as Muslim. Of course, the sample was selected on the condition that participants self-identify in some way as Muslim, or at least that they have self-identifying Muslim parents. Still, it could be argued that this group’s spirituality, or religious orientation and identity, may contrast somewhat with their counterpart peers with native parents. These peers may have originally grown up Catholic, but perhaps no longer identify as such, or do not express the same degree of religiosity. In a 2008 CIS survey studying religiosity among participants ages 18 and above with only Spanish nationality, 27.7% percent identified as practicing Catholic, 45.8% as non-practicing, 14.5%
as non-believing and 9.6% as atheist, with 46% explaining that they never attend religious events.

Again, this treads contested territory, as some have argued for an interpretation of Islam as wielding more overwhelming power than other religions, citing the strength of youth religiosity and rising numbers of faith adherents in a purportedly secular Western context. As mentioned before, the threat of reactive religiosity due to marginalization is also frequently presented (Torrekens and Jacobs 2016). Indisputably, there has been a trend of de-Christianization in recent history in most Western countries, perhaps with the exception of nations like the United States, Ireland, and Poland (Gorski and Altinordu 2008).

It seems reasonable to keep in mind Durkheim's emphasis on the element of solidarity as characteristic of religion. And, in the migration context, to understand that when examining integration of religious identity, one should consider the totality of the integration process. Perhaps a Muslim identity is especially important to these youth as the second generation in Europe, as essentially they may find themselves to be minorities (in various aspects, apart from religion) in a vulnerable and often disadvantaged position. Muslim identity may allow them additional support, community and sense of belonging in the face of obstacles due to migrant origin and minority status (Slootman 2015). In fact, in a postnational framework of social relations, formal and information Muslim collectives can indeed provide communal support in a variety of ways. As Soysal explains,

"Some of these associations function as ethnic interest groups, claiming for their members not only religious, but also political, social, and economic rights. Like their secular counterparts, they take stands on such migrant issues as racism, discrimination, and integration. Other Islamic associations are involved in economic activity, usually small-scale enterprises, such as local broadcasting stations, travel and insurance agencies, import-export shops, bakeries, and grocery stores" (1997).

In fact, the economic support described by Soysal, provided by ethnic enclaves and in this case, religious communities, can be very important to creating social cohesion and establishment within a community. As described in the second generation literature review, these support networks can contribute to social capital that allow migrant background
"outsiders" to better integrate into the societal fabric and gain equal footing with native counterparts (Waldinger 1995).

Above all, modern society has fundamentally recognized the significance of religious belief by enshrining religious choice and freedom in its international human rights norms. It seems perilous to make value judgments about one belief system wielding more power than the other. Still, it remains important to address determinants of religiosity, especially within the European context. Some factions argue that religion is illegitimate in public life, and where there has been a historically continuous debate about church that continues to permeate the discourse even today. Nonetheless, in such an analysis, it is important to remain cognizant that the liberal systems governing our societies operate on the principle that protection of the rights of individuals is paramount to a functioning coexistence.

**Self-identification and sense of belonging**

These initial observations provide a preliminary starting point from which to embark on a series of analyses that address the root of the theses questions, beginning with findings regarding sense of belonging, or expressions of attachment, as part of identification. Of the 19 second generation participants, 16 made some reference to Spanish or Madrid identity in their thoughts about self-identification. Out of the three that didn't, two were instead emphasizing their identity as a world citizen (not exclusive of Spanish affiliation); one more selectively identified as Muslim because of the discrimination she felt from Spanish society, to be addressed in more detail. Out of eight generation 1.5, five referenced some ties to Spanish or Madrid identity. One of the five first generation participants expressed affiliation with the city of Madrid, and the rest identified with their origin country. While they are relatively small comparative groups, the first generation selection is useful in comparing the second generation's affiliation with their community, whether that of Madrid or Spain. It is of course notable that overall, more of the second generation conveyed sense of attachment to the community of residence than did generation 1.5; moreover, the majority of the first
generation did not express attachment to their place of residence. These brief first impressions begin to provide an overall idea of sense of belonging among the population investigated.

In fact, sense of belonging to Spain or to the immediate community manifested itself in various aspects, and before proceeding to explain how this only formed a part of these participant's identity, it should be noted that Spanish identity was not only communicated by the declaration "I am Spanish." It was especially marked when they recounted experiences of discrimination and found themselves having to defend their Spanish loyalty. Moreover, while they may have not specifically identified as Spanish in the chart above, some second and 1.5 generation youth felt most at home in Spain, and indicated they planned on remaining in Madrid or Spain in the future. For example, Jauad, a 28-year-old financial analyst and generation 1.5, identified as Moroccan and part Madrileño, and said he felt more at home in Spain than in Morocco. He wanted to stay in Madrid in the future. Jihan, an age 18 university student and also generation 1.5, said she felt Muslim and Moroccan, but felt more at home in Spain than in Morocco, preferred to speak in Spanish, and wanted to remain living in Madrid. Safia, a 22-year-old, second generation university student, did not specifically identify as Spanish, but considered herself more at home in Spain than in Morocco, did not feel different than other Spaniards, and wanted to live in Spain in the future. Several more examples like these demonstrate that while participants may not have resonated with a specific national identification, they still manifested attachment to their community.

As attachment can be multiple, it is important to examine, with attention to detail and aided by specific accounts, how a sense of belonging or lack thereof figures into the hybrid or complex identities the participants communicated over the course of their interviews. Throughout the data and discussions, self-reported, multi-faceted self-identities surfaced. In the basic outline one can observe different combinations of nationality, community ascription or identification with Islam (again, with varying interpretations of what being Muslim signifies, to be described further). There are many observations to make in this regard; while
the trend of emphasizing individuality and the rejection of exclusive and bounded identities is addressed first, there are also several other patterns reflecting an underlying hybridity theme. To varying degrees, participants identified: multiple language use in interacting with different groups; national identification that differed from language preference; diverging understandings of religious identity and combinations with other expressions of identity; the desire to live abroad in the future; and a feeling of “neither here nor there,” as produced by experiences of discrimination. These patterns, albeit drawing from diverse backgrounds, reflect relationships with the variables of religiosity and discrimination identified earlier.

A final consideration to take into account when analysing the empirical data relating to sense of belonging includes the Padrón referenced earlier in this work. Again, the Spanish municipal resident registry, independent of citizenship or legal status, is a very particular case, and provides several social rights that migrants and foreigners would not have otherwise. In allowing one to become resident of a municipality and have access to various rights, including public health care there is a possibility that this provides for a sense of belonging in a way that other countries, even those that endorse the welfare state, cannot. In particular, this is especially relevant when considering generation 1.5 participants, as they may have had access to schooling and other services before they were regularized as Spanish citizens. Jauad, generation 1.5, came to Spain around the age of ten, and still does not hold Spanish citizenship. However, he identifies as from Madrid, and underwent Spanish schooling; he continued on to receive a Master level education. Similarly, Jihan, generation 1.5, at the time of interview had lived in Spain for 18 years without citizenship, and was planning on receiving it in a few months; she had also completed her education through secondary and is now in university, and feels most at home in Spain. Perhaps the Padrón is a factor in sense of belonging in that it allows residents of the community, and especially these youth, to become a part of the system and access rights, despite holding a foreigner status or not being considered citizens at the national administrative level.
Hybrid identities and emphasis on the individual and the collective

A few of the participants that typified a pattern of hybridity directly articulated an emphasis on individuality, alongside a rejection of bounded nationality and an embrace of multi-faceted, fluid identity. They described their own understandings of identity in terms that very much resembled what new citizenship theories advocate: accommodating pluralism and encouraging engagement at both the individual and universal level. In fact, some even referenced the universal in their accounts. Ibrahim, a second generation and 22-year-old student, provided an extended reflection on individual and universal identity that also touched upon how identity can change over time, how it is subjective, how it can take the shape of a process of self-reflection, and how it is above all, multiple:

“There are stages in our life where we reject a little bit our identity or our origins, sometimes we are more closed to it, I think that it is according to the stage, but in the end, I believe I am many things. I couldn’t say that I’m only Spanish, I also couldn’t say that I’m not Spanish because it’s a reality. But I also can’t deny that I’m Arabic or I am Moroccan or that I’m Muslim or that I am a lot of other things that later I’ve taken as I go... in all of my personal life experience I have been travelling an I have realized that I’m many things, that I’m also European in my way of seeing many things. I was born in Europe, I’m European. And it could be that I have much more in common with a well-traveled Spaniard than with a Moroccan from a small town, because we find ourselves in the same thing, we grew up in the same way. Basically, I also believe that the Spanish identity is a little complex. What is Spanish, right? .... And I think it’s true that I for example, or the fact of being Spanish or from Madrid makes me share this identity with a lot of people from Madrid, and the fact that I am Arabic means I have something in common with these people although they are from different worlds, but in the end, I feel I share things with them. ... We are composed of many things, we can’t limit ourselves. Identity is multiple.”

At the collective level, Ibrahim noted that one can experience a common identity not only based on ethnicity, race, culture, or creed, but on shared experience of daily life, and that a sense of community can reach a universal level. Obadah, a 26-year-old second generation dentist, also transmitted a global attitude: “I identify as a citizen of the world, because I was born here, but my family, my origins are from there. I was born in Granada, but later I lived in Valdepeñas and then came to Madrid. I have so many places that I don’t feel rooted in one. I am a citizen of the world, you have to change the chip, there aren’t as many borders between countries and now it is very important that we don’t fall into these problems that the world
has...we have to open the mind and think of what we have in common with people, rather than what sets us apart." Both Obadah and Ibrahim evoked Massey's "global sense of place" as they communicated their understandings of and engagement with identity (1994). Ihsan, a 20-year-old student, also argued for a more universal personhood: "I can initially say I am Spanish and Muslim, but what can I say, I’m a person, and that’s it."

Rami, a 30-year-old polling analyst with a Moroccan father and the one participant in the study that did not identify as Muslim or religious, similarly rejected the idea of identifying with a certain nationalism, or the idea of identity as static.

"I don’t think this way, you know? For example, I have travelled to other places, like Morocco, I’ve travelled to Paris, and to Rome, and honestly to me any city abroad, where are you from? ...Washington. If I went there, I’m sure I’d love it and I would feel like I’m from there. Even though I’ve only been once. You know? I don’t think in this way that, if I’m from Spain I am Spanish. In this I feel certain. Although of course I feel Spanish. Because I have friends, I have my family. But I also feel Arab, I feel like I’m from there. No, for example if you ask me here, I would say I am Spanish, but if I go to another place, I don’t say I’m Spanish. I say I’m from Madrid, for example. I don’t have nationalism like that."

The emphasis on an unbounded and continual reconstruction of identity continues via 30-year-old, second generation international development professional Ayim’s description of his identity:

"Honestly, I identify as the sum of my experiences that have composed my identity. Something that makes it unique is that I speak and write Arabic, a characteristic that unites me with a large part of the population. I grew up in Spain, where I have had the most important experiences of my life, and Madrid is my city. I consider myself Muslim, the religion in which I was raised. So, the sum of all these experiences, this is what makes me who I am."

Further expressions of hybrid identities

The youth referenced explicitly argued for a heterogenous, de-territorialized, and fluid identity in no uncertain terms, with reference to the collective and the individual. The majority of the remaining participants (generations 1.5 and second) also expressed hybrid identities (again, as available in the chart), sometimes even directly asserting that identity could or should be multiple. About half of these hybrid identities included a combination of
nationalities or communities. Beyond that, hybrid identity almost always included identification with Islam, with differing interpretations of what being Muslim signified (to be further discussed). Moreover, among those that did not combine nationalities or communities in their self-identification, some would identify with a certain country, but then would prefer to speak the language of another, or saw their future in a different country.

Hybrid national or community identifications included participants like Iman, a generation 1.5, 23-year-old engineer. He explained: “I identify as Muslim, Muslim and Spanish, also. Also Arab. I don’t have any problem with it. You don’t have to feel only Muslim or Spanish or Arab, there’s no reason, so I feel like all of them. If you call me Arab, yes, I speak Arabic perfectly. If you say Spanish yes, perfectly Spanish. If you say Muslim, yes, perfectly Muslim. I can identify with any of them without an issue.” Nur, a second generation, 13-year-old student, identified as Spanish, Muslim and Madrileña with Syrian origins. She felt most at home in Spain, although in the future she wanted to travel and perhaps live in another country, like the US. Yusuf, an 18-year-old second generation student, explained his Rifian origins, and identified as a believing Muslim that feels more Moroccan when with his family, and more Spanish when with his friends. Chaima, 16 and second generation, identified as Spanish, Muslim, and partially Moroccan, feeling most at home in Spain. Zacarias, an 18-year-old second generation student, while identifying as a Spanish Muslim, felt at home both in Spain and Morocco.

Nessrin, a 32-year-old lawyer and generation 1.5, identified as Muslim, Moroccan and Spaniard, and elaborated on why she believes a hybrid identity is an asset:

“I never thought about the question of identity until I was in an interview a couple of years ago. They asked me if I felt Moroccan or Spanish and I didn’t answer because I didn’t know what to answer. I never thought about having to choose between one or the other, and I always thought that both added up to more than the two alone. So, I don’t know how people see me, but I think above all they see me as special because they see me as different. I have the two things, the two worlds, and I like to work with that and I think it’s something beautiful, I can show to the world that you can be Muslim and practicing but always respectful of everyone else.”
She went on to further describe how her facility for Arabic has opened many doors for her in her career in Spain, and how she saw that as an advantage, as well.

**Hybridity in language use**

As demonstrated in the chart, the participants often communicated in multiple languages, depending on the environment or in which they found themselves. This enabled them to connect and navigate among a variety of groups. Obadah, like Nessrin, valued the advantage multiple languages provided: "It is very important and good what my parents did with me, because they have insured that I have another language, and what is more, culture."

Of the first generation participants, there was an unsurprising preference to speak in another language apart from Spanish, although Nouha and Rajae confirmed they spoke in Spanish often. For those that went into their language use in detail, most of the second and 1.5 generation confirmed that they largely spoke Spanish among friends, including Amal, Ayah, Ayeh, Ayim, Chaima, Hanaa, Ismail, Jauad, Jihan, Laila, Monaim, Moseen, Obadah, Nessrin, Nouha, Nur, Obadah, Rami, Safia, Warda, Yusuf, Zacarias and Zayneb. Arabic was sometimes spoken in the home at least partially, and if they had friends with migrant origins, they often used a mix of Arabic to speak with them.

For example, as Iman described it, it would depend which language was more useful given the context: "with my friends it depends, a bit more [in Spanish], there are times when it's not easy in Spanish and other times when it's not easy in Arabic. It depends on what you are talking about, because sometimes you feel like a subject is a lot easier than the other."

Ayeh, a 20-year-old second generation student, similarly commented, "with my friends I speak in mixed [languages], because we are used to speaking Spanish, but if there's an Arabic word, we use it." Even with family and first generation parents, the language depends on the context. As 20-year-old, second generation student Ihsan described, "It depends on who I am talking to. When my mom is happy...we speak in Moroccan. When she's angry we speak in Syrian, and when there's a debate, in Spanish. I speak in Syrian with my father, apart from..."
Moroccan jokes.” Nur, second generation and 13, spoke with her parents in a mix of Spanish Arabic ["Españarabe"], and with her siblings in Spanish or English.

**Remaining in Spain in the future**

As demonstrated so far, most of these youth expressed an affiliation with the community, either via identity, sense of belonging, or language use. They maintained these links simultaneously alongside hybrid identities and practices. As could be expected, of the first generation, only one participant expressed the desire to remain in Spain in the future. However, four 1.5 and five second generation participants agreed they were content to remain in Spain in the future, often in Madrid. At the same time, others, while identifying with Spain in some form, were either reluctant to limit themselves to Spain in the future, looked forward to possibilities abroad, or thought there were improved job opportunities abroad.

Ibrahim, who had also identified with Spain and Madrid in part, believed that he had more to learn from living abroad: "The truth is that I believe I really don’t [want to stay in Spain in the future]. In the short term I don't think I want to stay in Madrid. Because I believe there is a lot of world to discover, a lot of things to see, and to stay, above all when you are young, within four walls, limits you a lot, and I would like to get out, to live abroad for many years." Yusuf also said that he might like to just try living in France or Germany.

Nessrin (who again identified as Muslim, Moroccan and Spaniard) explained she couldn’t predict the future, or rule out the possibility of job opportunities outside of Spain: "I'm more carpe diem; I don't know what's going to happen in life. I don’t know what’s going to happen in 10 years. I feel very comfortable in Spain at the moment, and I can say I am in a very rich and fulfilled part of my life but you never know. Many things can happen, like a job opportunity, the love of your life." Others, like Iman, believed that he might have to go with his current job to another country, like Germany, for work. Presumably, search for economic opportunity could stem from the 2008 crisis in Spain, which especially affected Spanish youth.
However, second generation, 20-year-old student Ayeh specified that she thought her job opportunities were limited in Spain because she wore the veil: “I love Spain, but the only problem I would have in the future would be working with the veil, I would have to work in other country. But apart from this problem with work, this country is very good. The problem is that there is still a lot of discrimination in that regard.” Several participants were concerned about women who wore the veil facing discrimination in the labor market. Experiences of discrimination remained a consistent and reoccurring theme both in discussions of identity and expectations of inclusion or societal participation. Of course, these experiences and how they impacted identity and expectations require much more profound description and analyzation. It is indeed difficult to even separate discussion of discrimination from the overall narratives the participants presented. Still, a bit more exploration of the religious component of these hybridized identities follows, before outlining accounts of discrimination and proceeding to how it relates to identity and expectations of inclusion.

**Religious identity as part of hybrid identity**

Again, apart from one second generation participant with Palestinian origins, interviewees self-identified as Muslim, with varying degrees as to whether this identification presented as religious belief or spirituality versus sociocultural practice. Ayim, for example, identified as Muslim, but not religious. At the same time, he still sometimes went to mosque and observed Ramadan, although didn't generally observe dietary restrictions or pray. Obadah also identified as non-religious, though he did observe dietary restrictions, and made efforts to observe Ramadan; he explained that in Spain in recent years, it has been taking place in the summer, with very long and hot days. Without the possibility of modifying the Spanish workday, it had been difficult. Nouha, 18 and first generation, also responded that she was not religious, and barely went to mosque, but she did observe Ramadan and did not eat pork products or drink.
The rest of the participants identified as religious or at least did not deny religiosity. Of the 1.5 and second generation, 11 could be described as traditionally observant: they attended mosque regularly, prayed regularly, observed Ramadan and followed dietary laws. Many also participated in traditional practice, with the exception of attending mosque. This seemed to occur for several reasons. One reason, expressed by Yusuf and Moseen, included that it was difficult to fit mosque attendance into the Spanish workday, although they attempted to do so. Warda, a second generation, 19-year-old university student, explained that she did not attend mosque because she did not have access to one for women, though her father attended regularly, and she did go to mosque when she visited her extended family in Morocco.

Seven out of the eight that replied yes to frequent observance of all questions about traditional practice, but indicated they did not frequently attend mosque (if ever), were female. It is argued that Islamic precepts only oblige men to attend mosque. Shannahan notes that UK mosque space is preferential to males; Smits and Ultee cite different studies of Muslim immigrants in the US and Belgium, as well as of Muslims in several countries, reporting higher male mosque attendance (2014; 2013). As such, it might be inferred that the participants not attending mosque frequently or at all, may simply indicate a varying understanding of what constitutes traditional practice of Islam.

In fact, about eight in the 1.5 and second generation groups were traditionally observant apart from frequently attending mosque. Rajae, a 30-year-old, first generation Arabic teacher from Morocco, with a second generation husband, observed that attending mosque in Spain, in her experience, seemed to assume another meaning from what it signified in her origin country:

“Here in the mosques in Europe, they can take on a different role than mosques in a Muslim country. For example, I come to the mosque to pray and perform my religious activities, but apart from that, the mosque is a place where we can do interesting things, like teach Arabic, provide activities for young Muslims—for example, young Spanish Muslims that were born here—give talks about a lot of things that aren’t only
about a religious theme. So, the mosque relates to things apart from religion, we do community things.”

**Muslim identity, individualized practice and privatization of faith**

Apart from varied mosque attendance, some also reported that finding a halal option was complicated, and that they sometimes didn’t pray consistently. While identity, citizen claims and discrimination were more prevalent patterns, it is additionally noteworthy and not extraneous that some youth in this study expressed an individualized and private spirituality that mirrored the findings of other studies discussed in Chapter Five. Again, studies in England, France, and Spain found that Muslim youth of migrant origin approached religion in a more individualistic way than their parents, especially in comparison with what might be considered traditional practice (Kashya and Lewis 2012, Beaman 2016, Téllez 2008).

In terms of dietary restrictions, participants discussed how options in Spain could be sometimes limited, though they often observed this is a non-critical manner, and adapted their practice to the reality they faced. For example, Iman admitted that eating halal was a bit complicated, but that in recent years more options were available, including more Pakistani, Turkish and Indian restaurants that provided halal meals. Aya, an age 16 second generation student, also said that it was difficult to determine whether products contained pork, but that one can adjust. Indeed, pork and dishes containing pork are prevalent in traditional Spanish cuisine. Ayah, a generation 1.5, 18-year-old student, maintained that almost everything contained pork, but that simply meant being careful and reading ingredients when buying in the supermarket. Obadah also said options had improved, explaining that there were more halal butchers. Ibrahim, on the other hand, did not eat halal because he found it very difficult to manage in Spain. Moha, Monaim, and Ayim said they infrequently ate halal.

Sometimes a break from tradition could be found in informal education. A few participants reported that they received some formal education in Islam when they were
young, including Arabic classes in order to read religious texts, or religious classes at a mosque or community center. At the same time, others combined or replaced religious education with informal self-study. Amin, a twenty-two-year-old second generation student, who also worked and volunteered part-time, described his religious study:

“We were in an Islamic science course but didn’t finish. But then we liked to read a lot, read texts like the Koran or hadiths, go to talks. And we have a lot of wise friends that can explain correct interpretations. ... for interpretation, because some things in earlier times are not like today, a lot of things have changed. And there are things that maybe were applicable then or things that don’t make any sense to apply today.”

Moseen, 35, second generation, and a graphic designer, also advocated for educating yourself in addition to formal study, taking initiative in sorting out correct information from misinformation, and knowing which sources to seek.

And of course, another way in which this individualized practice manifests itself is in the behavior described above: how prayer may be conducted on the individual rather than communal level (i.e., prayer at home vs. attending mosque), and how sometimes the above mentioned dietary restrictions are not followed. Moseen elaborates further on how prayer is adapted, given the situation:

“It depends on the circumstance of everyone, for studies, for work, depending your schedule, if you are out all day, the prayers may add up, and when you get home, you pray the whole day and that’s it. You should follow to the schedule but logically you can’t. Well, here God, or Allah, however you want to call him, is very flexible, so you can get home and pray the whole day and it’s not a problem.”

In addition to customized and varied practice of the religion, a few participants stressed the personalized and private nature of their faith. Zacarias, a second generation, 18-year-old student, disclosed that there were some principles of Islam he thought were too strict, and agreed that religion should be a private matter between an individual and God, because it was a very personal matter for each individual. Ayim similarly explained, “I think religion should be lived as an individual experience, in a lucid and conscious way. [I am in] partial agreement [with all Islamic principles], there are things in Islam that I find questionable.”
Obadah also added that he did not believe in all of the principles of Islam because he felt religious prescriptions, independent of creed, were written many centuries ago, and that they needed to progress alongside modern society. He felt that religion could be manipulated for human purposes, though Islam was most impervious to this because it preserved the word of God in the most unmitigated form. He also noted that an individual relationship with God and the spirit of the law, rather than the letter, was what he found most important:

“At the end of the day it’s between me and God. Moreover, I think that it doesn’t help to go mosque every day so they see you praying, and then later not to respect the values of the religion or ideology you espouse. It doesn’t do any good if you go to mosque and then you go home and behave badly with your daughter, with your wife—if you aren’t respectful with everyone”

Nessrin, professed the five pillars of Islam and its mysticism, though was skeptical of interpretations, or of what society had transmitted. She also emphasized the private nature of her belief:

“I don’t believe in intermediaries...I think that religion is a question of the private life of each individual and that what people do in their house is private and I don’t care about, nor should I be interested in that. At the same time, this implies that society and governments should guarantee that people can defend their right to religious freedom, the religion each believes.”

Indeed, many of the participants indicated that while they felt religion should be a private matter, or that there should be separation of church and state, they qualified that there should still be a right to religious freedom, and to open practice of one’s religion, via societal protection of religious pluralism. This topic, of course, has been mentioned as a key finding in the study; further discussion will thus ensue, especially in conjunction with the theme of discrimination.

Visibility of Muslim identity

Again, a different form of religiosity does not necessarily signify lessened belief (Cesari 2005). Moreover, while a trend of individualization in faith and religiosity permeated much of the data, this did not consequently translate to participants obscuring their Muslim identity. Several participants, regardless of frequency or consistency of traditional practice,
emphasized that they were open and direct about their faith. For example, Laila, second generation and 24, asserts: "I’m Muslim and I practice my faith openly, and it’s not just a part of my life, but rather a very important facet of it, and I don’t think I should hide it."

Monaim, a generation 1.5, 20-year-old student, talked about how he felt he was not as religious as others, and said he did not believe in everything that Islam represented. Still, he was very open about his faith, to the point where his friends were well aware of it and tried to accommodate any religious practices he followed:

“I identify more or less with Islam, for example my family is very religious and I am not so much but yes, more or less. I consider myself Muslim, and openly, and I go to mosque, for example when it’s Ramadan my friends know and they ask what time to have dinner to make sure that we can all eat ...they are curious about it. If I am thinking about taking a trip there [to Morocco] I tell them and we talk a lot and I try to explain very openly.”

Warda was also very candid about her Muslim identity and how she manifests it: “I’m Muslim and I practice openly and everyone that knows me knows I do, and to them it’s fine. And if it’s not fine for them, I respect all opinions, another thing is if they respect me. I am religious and I support all that Islam is.”

Openness about Muslim identity among the population set was not restricted to verbal assertions, however. The visibility of Muslim identity could also take place via issues surrounding the veil, for example, an issue that is important to touch upon, not only as a matter of identity, but in terms of how it intersected with discussions about discrimination and individual rights.

The veil as part of identity

When asked why women should use headscarves or cover their head outside of the home, only five of the participants (two of them first generation) held that it was purely a religious obligation (one of the multiple choice options). The majority, about 21 males and females, replied instead that it was some version of a “free and personal choice” and many elaborated that it was an important part of identity. Females Hanna, Rajae, and Jihan, for example, all stressed that it was an integral part of their Muslim identity. Nessrin, who does not wear the veil, argued that it was a misconception that it was a religious requirement, and
rather that it was a cultural tradition. At the same time, she felt it was certainly related to personal identity. Males Moseen, Ibrahim, and Yusuf also thought it was very related to identity, and were emphatic that a woman should never be compelled to wear it.

In fact, within those 21 that composed the ‘free and personal choice’ responders, many were very vocal about how it should be solely the decision of the wearer to adopt their head covering. As Iman explains, “I would say that it’s something the woman has to decide. A man can’t impose this on anyone, if a woman wants to put it on she can and if not, then not; it’s her thing and depends on her, her faith and her beliefs, and you can’t go there.” Ayeh, Ibrahim, Moha, Moseen, and Zayneb also underlined that as part of a ‘free and personal choice,’ no girl or woman should be ordered to wear it, including by their family. Several others also pointed out that just as no one should be obligated to cover their head, they should similarly not be compelled to uncover it. Many participants and their family and friends had been asked to remove their veil to access the labor market. Ayeh believed she would have to work in another country because of her experience at an interview. She recounted: “I was interviewed with the veil and they asked, ‘Why can’t you take that cloth off?’ And I replied, ‘It’s called a headscarf, a veil. And I can’t.’ And they asked, ‘not even at work?’ And I answered, ‘No, because for me, it is like telling me to take off my shirt, it’s part of what I wear.’ And [they said] ‘Oh, I’m sorry, it’s an image problem.’”

Hanaa, a second generation 20-year-old, also believed it was difficult to obtain a job where you could cover your head or perform daily prayers. While Chaima, 16 and second generation, said she did not face discrimination frequently, the times she did occurred in school or on public transport, and she attributed this to the fact she wore the veil. Ihsan also reported that in public school they discouraged wearing the hijab. Malek, a first generation, 25-year old-architect, theorized she did not encounter discrimination precisely because she did not wear a veil, and explained how a friend of hers was specifically told she would not be hired because she wore one. Moreover, Malek noted that she was discussing the subject with her employer and was informed that if she had applied wearing the hijab, they would not
have offered her a position. Warda, still in university, had not yet attempted to access the labor market herself, but had three female friends that encountered resistance in either the interview or hiring process due to wearing a veil.

Participants were not only preoccupied with obstacles to wearing the veil or headscarf in the workplace or at school, but also perceived that society identified the veil as foreign and “the other.” Rajae explained that she had many friends, born in Spain, who were treated as foreign because they wore a headscarf. Zayneb, 13 and second generation, offered that while she did not wear a headscarf, her sister did, and was consequently identified as “…moro, Moroccan or foreigner.” Moreover, Ibrahim argued that in addition to attracting unwanted attention, the practice of head covering could even incite aggression: “I know many girls that have a lot of friends that have been attacked or molested physically and have been insulted and couldn’t find work, at the European level, it’s difficult. It’s complicated for girls who were born here. Our mothers came and were used to it. It’s a problem.”

The topic of the veil and its intersection with identity and discrimination preludes a more in-depth and labyrinth exploration of experiences of discrimination. The Muslim youth in this study confronted penalties and bias not only due to displays of religious or cultural symbolism, but also as a result of skin color, their name, their migrant origins, socioeconomic status, an unidentified reason, or some combination of these factors. The youth faced discrimination that not only impeded a sense of belonging and place, but also discrimination that threatened to obstruct socioeconomic mobility allowing for eventual status attainment and increased societal recognition. If they faced resistance in the workplace or different treatment in education, while the majority of this particular group seems to have overcome it, such continued ostracitory treatment could create disparities between this minority and the majority population. In sorting through their experiences of discrimination, responses were varied as to whether they perceived it was societal or institutional, and to what factor(s) the bias was due. Again, terms such as ethnicity, religion, or religiosity can cause confusion and
overlap, and must be approached with a critical view as well as a cognizance of the processes behind the definition of these terms.

**Experiences of discrimination**

Discrimination sometimes directly affected identity and sense of belonging in a very obvious way, with a few participants even verbalizing the connection between the two. On the other hand, at times participants denied they felt any personal discrimination, but after further discussion would note examples of pervasive discrimination in society, or report discrimination felt by friends or family. The various patterns in participants’ experiences of discrimination follow, and are linked to ensuing observations regarding the youth’s claims for individual and collective rights. Twenty one of the 32 confirmed that they had encountered discrimination personally. Ten more initially may have denied personal discrimination, but later in the discussion would remember an event, or agreed that generally there was societal or institutional discrimination, or that a friend or acquaintance had been personally affected. Amal, a second generation, 21-year-old student, was the only one that did not perceive discrimination as directed at her, or as identifiable in Spanish public or private life.

**“Neither here nor there”**

The most striking repercussions of experiences of discrimination or victimization manifested as a sense of displacement, or a lack of belonging, in any society or community. Amin, who had again identified as a citizen of the world, more Spanish than Moroccan, explained how he experienced a sense of double displacement, despite being second generation with a hybrid identity: “Since I was young, and was 12 years old, 13, 14, I felt like here they called me, ‘You, Moroccan!,’ and later [when visiting extended family] in Morocco they said, ‘You, Spaniard!,’ because I came from Spain. It’s true that, our generation, the second generation as you call it, we feel like outsiders here and outsiders there.” Ismail, generation 1.5, reported that he did not feel at home in Spain or in Morocco. This out of place feeling among second generation youth, albeit not the majority in this study, should be noted.
as an important issue to address in the multidisciplinary study of displacement, given the gap in the literature (Pratt 2003).

**Perspectives on discrimination**

Distress at feeling rejected and ostracized could, at the same time, coexist simultaneously with feelings of attachment to Spain and awareness of a right to inclusion. The case of Moseen is a particularly salient example of this: he is very adamant about his Spanish identity, yet relates a particularly painful experience of discrimination. When applying to a summer internship multiple years in a row, with a high probability of acceptance, he decided to investigate why he was unsuccessful:

"It turns out that the executives told human resources not to hire me just because of my name and my origin. So there I felt, in my life, I felt really bad. I felt really bad for at least two or three days... It seemed to me so false, come on, I’m Spanish, I’m Spanish and patriotic, but they make you, they discriminate and they make you feel, it’s painful."

Moseen’s account reflects coincides with descriptions of labor market barriers due to the veil. Participants described a range of scenarios and settings wherein they encountered discrimination, and differed on whether they felt it was societal or institutional, or at the level of ethnic or religious bias. Many understood the discrimination to be a xenophobic or racist reaction, though often combined with other factors.

**Discrimination in an educational setting**

In addition to the workplace, the youth described discrimination in renting apartments, attempting to enter clubs and on public transport. Amin felt that Spanish media was especially biased in comparison to other European countries. And given that many of the participants were students with the educational environ as their daily reality, there were several reports of discrimination from either professors or fellow classmates. Ihsan reported biased treatment in second and third year of ESO from professors, including from the director of the school. When Ayeh first began school, she was the only one wearing a headscarf, and it was days before any fellow students spoke to her, although she related that once they got to
know her, she was less ostracized. Ismail also reported discrimination on the part of professors, and Nessrin was told by a professor at 12 years old that because she was of Moroccan origin and had parents with little education, she only had a future in cleaning service. She replied that it was honest work, and then described how later she met the professor in Constitutional Court in her work as a lawyer, and he was taken aback.

Several participants noted that while initially their peers harassed them, as they grew and progressed to later stages of education, it became less traumatic. It is difficult to determine whether this was because the participant had grown more comfortable with themselves, if the peers had become more accepting, or if the children had simply matured.

For example, Amin reports:

"When I was young, in school and everything, and I didn't have Muslim friends, I didn't live in Parla, I lived in a place that wasn't as multicultural, I was ashamed because they said, 'Man, moros or Muslims you are very closed and everything,' and they attacked me with stuff... Today I am open about it. For example, my friends from university, the second or third day they already knew I was Muslim... And there wasn't a problem. Everyone was very open. I think that age, when you are more of a teenager, when you get older people are more open."

Zayneb also described how she was more comfortable now than earlier in school: "In primary school it's true they discriminated against me but now that I am older I feel more comfortable... For example, when I was in primary the people when they get mad at you or start something with you they say 'Go back to your country mora' and whatever." Yusuf felt that discrimination from his peers took place when they were less mature: "when I was little yes, when I was little they gave me hard time in school, but now no. Everyone respects me because we are older and we behave well." Finally, Aya describes increasingly less discrimination as she progresses in her education: "In school they discriminated against me because I was Muslim, they called me “mora” and all that, there were some professors who discriminated and fellow students at times, but ok, not that many people and very few now."

**Discrimination: according to background?**
Many participants attributed discrimination to racist or xenophobic sentiment, sometimes using the two interchangeably. Others emphasized more that ignorance incited the biased treatment or reaction; of course, one could argue this ignorance may be fueling racism or xenophobia, depending on the case. Religious symbolism such as the veil could often be associated with ethnicity or migrant origins. Some participants, like Ibrahim, noted that discrimination may stem from a complex or combination of factors, including ethnicity, migrant origin, postcolonialism and socioeconomic disparity, among others. This section will attempt to sort through distinctions between ethnic or immigrant background, and communicate as clearly as possible the participants’ thoughts on what motivated the offending party, although there is considerable overlap between these causal factors.

Chaïma believed that societal discrimination in Spain targeted “everyone without Spanish origins, is directed against all those who have a different way of seeing life.” Hanaa specified that “there is discrimination in Spanish society against any social minority and more concretely towards immigrants with Arab or Latin origins.” Tariq, first generation, insisted that he faces constant discrimination and also concurs that society is resistant to foreigners. Sami, also first generation, found that discrimination is directed at foreigners, and more specifically those from Africa. He argued, however, that many are identified as foreigners when really they are second generation and should be recognized as equal members of society: “The majority of people that are ‘moro’ are from here...they are people that were born here and grew up, studied here. There’s a lot of them.”

Safia, Yusuf and Ibrahim (all second generation) talked about how because they were perceived as foreign, and how perhaps due to the race or ethnicity the offender associated with them, they were grouped together with terrorists. Yusuf said that since he was little he had been called a “bomber, terrorist” although he contended that the majority of society was unbiased. Ayim, Safia and Warda agreed that terrorist incidents led to increased problems with islamophobia. Ibrahim noted that even if difference was not visible, like skin color or veil, even a name could beget racism, “my name is Ibrahim but I don’t look Arab, simply being
Arab, begets racism. So, the problem isn’t on my end. It’s not that I look the way I look, the problem is that we live in a racist society, in a racist Europe.”

And so, a few felt discrimination was a result of migrant origin, and some due to ethnicity, though again it is important to note how many stereotypes are conflated together and directed at Muslims in Europe. The term ‘moro’ described in Chapter 6, is frequently levied at the participants, and most often, due to Spain’s demography, at Moroccans or those of Moroccan origin. It is a clear example of how some relegate those not just from the Maghreb, but from Arabic-speaking countries, or those professing Islam or with a different skin color, all into the same category. While people may use it as a term of identification without seeking to offend, it can of course be interpreted as an insult. Ibrahim continued to elaborate upon the term:

“Even though I’m from Madrid, from Madrid all my life, they see me as ‘moro.’ It’s a concept that we make negative and doesn’t exist in Arabic, or in other languages...it’s a name that a lot of people in the world are grouped under, ‘moro,’ it reduces us to just that and it’s a negative thing. So, I believe that there is a very stereotypical vision of ‘moros,’ as they call us.”

While some pointed to migrant or ethnic origin as underlying discriminatory behavior, Monaim distinguished between a type of uneducated ignorance, versus a directed and intentional racism, as he explained how when he went out with his Spanish friends to clubs, he was denied entry:

“Yeah, there are things that are more because of ignorance and everything, but at the level of big clubs in Madrid it is just racism, the security there is very fascist and they are Nazis that don’t accept anyone else. I think it’s about being Arab, from another culture, another race. They associate us with Arabs—we are thieves, we are terrorists, whatever cliché society has. But in other aspects I haven’t had a problem.”

In keeping with Monaim’s distinction about an uneducated, or unaware ignorance, other participants also identified a lack of education as an underlying problem. Iman asserted: “The principal reason for discrimination is ignorance. The majority [of Spain welcomes religions] but there’s always a minority of ignorant people that know nothing of history, they know very little and are ignorant, but the majority is very sociable and amiable.”
In referencing history Monaim was referring to the medieval Al-Andalus period as demonstrative that Muslims are not foreign to the Iberian Peninsula. Nessrin talked about how ignorance related to the Muslim community as associated with terrorism, as she noted,

"I think that society has a problem, a problem with knowledge, and it's that they aren't informed. They see you as a stereotype because of fear and because of the things that have occurred in recent years, things that have caused society to see the Muslim community in a very bad light. But this is lack of information, because any person with basic education perfectly well knows that the most vulnerable in attacks with terrorist connections is the Muslim community... But I think it's a problem of education and it has to do with schooling from the beginning."

Obadah, Laila and Moha also cited ignorance in particular as the principle driver behind discrimination.

**Institutional discrimination**

In addition to offering their viewpoints on what factors motivated persecutors to behave as they did, participants were also asked for their perspective as to whether discrimination seemed institutional in particular. In recalling experiences of discrimination, Rami, Ayim, Monaim, Moha, Nouha and Sami (the latter two are first generation) described incidents or difficulty with the police or with Spanish administrative entities. Sami said that in his neighborhood of Lavapiés, the police stopped him on a daily basis, “They see you and that you are Moroccan, that you are black, from Africa, or from someplace. For example, the police come by here every day, even though they know you, even though they came the day before. They come back for you today.”

Others argued that there was institutional bias against Islam in how the Spanish state was configured. Nessrin, with her background in law, explained how subsidies and favoritism systemically were allotted to the Catholic Church, more so than to other confessions. Rami and Hanna also felt that Catholicism or Christianity had influence in public matters, despite a supposedly secular state. Zayneb and Amin pointed to regulation of mosques as indicative of institutional religious bias. At the time of her interview, in fact, Zayneb was protesting the closing of a mosque in Getafe with her family and community. She felt her community had
been targeted unfairly, as they had only received three complaints over the course of 21 years. She said that the mayor had initially visited with their community, but had changed her position and sought the mosque’s closure, and that the Getafe’s administration reasons to close the mosque were fabricated.\textsuperscript{30}

Amin objected to how mosques were designated in Spain, explaining,

"In the Spanish Constitution, it says that it is a secular country, that all religions are equal, etc., but it always gives more weight to Christianity, to Catholicism. Buddhism or Judaism or any other religion is respected. But to have a mosque they create obstacles. To have a mosque, you have to open it as a ‘cultural center.’ In Tetuán there is one, in Madrid there are two, no, Tetuán is a ‘cultural center.’ It is a mosque but they call it a cultural center. The M30 is the only mosque, mosque."

Furthermore, he noted that because of societal pressures, his community felt the need to remain less visible and did not exercise a collective right to practice openly:

"A while ago, the mosque we have here [in Parla] we went every Friday, because Friday is the day of collective prayer, and many people came, and there was not a lot of room, so we took the mats outside and prayed in the street, without interrupting traffic, and nothing happened. But with things like terrorism and all, we have become more private."

Some of those who reported discrimination simultaneously noted a caveat, both about discrimination institutionally and societally. For example, despite Nessrin’s experience of discrimination in education, she noted that in all of her professional experience with Spanish administrative bodies, she had not been subjected to different treatment:

"The only selection process I went through was when I was working in the public administration, or for example the Bar Association of Madrid where I worked as an intern, or in the Observatory of Justice and later in the Constitutional Court...These were the only places that I had to interview and it was very much a meritocracy. They never judged me for my name, or my last name, for how I look. They never said anything that could have hindered my application."

Rami, who worked in polling and social science research, noted how at the societal level Spain was more open to immigration, and one of the most receptive countries in Europe. He

\textsuperscript{30} After weeks of protest, the Cultural Association of Getafe Al-Falah (Asociación sociocultural de Getafe Al-Falah) were successful in their protests, and the mosque was not closed down. The Getafe city government originally set a date to close the mosque down citing that it did not meet building, security and health restrictions.
asserted that individuals were less likely to blame migrants as problematic, but instead political rhetoric and manipulation by the media caused bias.

**Attitudes towards discrimination**

Throughout these experiences of discrimination, due to migrant or ethnic origin, and either encountered institutionally or societally, a sizeable number of participants were either resigned to or dismissive of discrimination; sometimes, they were perhaps even hardly consciously aware of it. As they provided accounts, a few participants pointed out that any society has such problems, and as such Spain was not an especially problematic case. The problems were described as not terribly grave, and not alarmingly frequent. And again, 10 of 32 initially denied personal examples of discrimination, but would later recall instances, or acknowledge discrimination was prevalent in general. For example, Jauad said he never encountered problems personally, but said discrimination existed in how a CV with a foreign name would not be considered for a position. Still others could come up with multiple experiences of discrimination suffered by those close to them. As Ibrahim put it, it seemed that at times, discrimination was so pervasive, it went unnoticed: “There are lots of levels, but I believe that many of us, well I speak for myself, I believe that to have grown up in a society that is racist, it has made us accept many things as normal, many things that later I realize are racist. It has been naturalized in the end.”

Ihsan was one of those who noted discrimination but disregarded dwelling on it: “I don’t know, I dismiss it, I talk to ignorant people and that’s it and you learn and it’s done. You can’t focus on whether they are discriminating or not. I’m a person like you, you have to accept me the way I accept you, period. And that’s it. Of course, Spain could improve, but the public has to want to.” Similarly, Nessrin said she preferred to focus on the good, rather than the bad, and also tried not to dwell on the topic. Ayah said she did not let it affect her: “I haven’t felt discriminated against because I don’t let it offend me, it’s very difficult to offend
me, because I’m not a person that gets offended and shuts up, I respond, well, I respond in a way, like you insulted me, you said something wrong, well explain yourself.”

Warda noted that discrimination troubles all societies, and thus Spanish society could not be exceptionally faulted: “Spanish society and even Moroccan society have discrimination. In all societies there is discrimination, racism, homophobia, anything, in every society, there is no perfect one, no one respects everything.” Moha argued that discrimination in the labor market could be surmounted, because while there were some companies that did not hire Moroccans or people of color, there had to be companies that did hire them. In short, these youth sometimes accepted negative behavior directed at them, and did not conceive of themselves as victims.

It could be argued that in a similar way, those who denied personal discrimination but later detailed various incidents, also did not conceive of themselves as victims. Jihan said she did not face discrimination, but then later mentioned an experience with a professor. Iman also denied any real problems of discrimination, and yet related a very arresting example in the workplace. When asked about discrimination directed at him, he remarked:

“The typical comment, but really no. it was pretty problematic when a colleague for the yearly Christmas dinner invited all the Spaniards and not the foreigners. The Christmas dinner where everyone gets together. Also, there is a person I work with pretty closely, daily, and he is fascist, and I don’t have any problem with him, because he has to accept me.”

Rami could recall even more incidents of discrimination, but denied feeling rejected or out of place.

“I don’t feel this way. Discriminated against. No, no, no, no, no. It’s not the same as other people that yes, they were born here, and they don’t feel integrated. I am integrated and I haven’t had this type of situation. Sometimes. But it’s individual people. More times with the police, for these types of things. For example, there are some people in the street that give me a look. They grab their purse and everything, once in life that’s happened to me. But not normally. At least in my case. Others yes. But in my case no.”

Monaim also described being repeatedly stopped and search by the police, being called a moro along with expletives during football games, and being denied access to clubs, but said
he feels welcome in Spain. He did not view discrimination as very prevalent: “I think that there isn’t that much discrimination, there are just little things that one notices.” Rajae also did not view the occasional racist comment or dirty look as an issue, because she was treated well by those close to her in both her professional and personal life.

These attempts to move past the challenges they face could be interpreted as a strong signal of the youth’s willingness and efforts to adapt to their community, sometimes in a one-sided attempt at what should be a two-way process of community cohesion. Perhaps, as well, in order to connect with their community, they were forced to look past these experiences of rejection in order to be able to formulate a sense of belonging. Essentially, they had to work harder to cooperate or ‘integrate’ in order to compensate for the lack of cooperation from their receiving society or community. These efforts certainly represent the opposite of a reactivity or self-segregation that is sometimes described of second generation Muslims in Europe, or Muslims in Europe in general. This downplay of discrimination experiences was only one approach to such challenges, however. Others were more aggrieved by such treatment and convinced that they deserved more respect for their rights, an important pattern in this study. Channeling such legitimate shock and indignation into action and deliberate claims for individual and collective rights could prove one way to facilitate improved coexistence and societal pluralism in Spain.

**Rights discourse and expectations of social participation and inclusion**

Discussions about discrimination gave rise to repeated calls for recognition as both individuals with rights and a collective with rights in a purportedly liberal democratic society. In describing experiences of discrimination, participants noted that there were either discrepancies between Spanish institutional and legal commitments and implementation, and/or societal realities. Nur expressed her frustration with the previously described issue of seeking employment with a headscarf: “There are many people who don’t accept the
headscarf in the workplace, and to me that it is absurd and unjust, I would like to work just like anyone, and I have the right to do so.”

Several others highlighted a deprivation of fundamental rights that are supposedly enshrined in the law at the Spanish, European and international level. Ihsan also stressed difficulties with the veil, in her case in school: “Supposedly we can be free, in the Constitution it says we have freedom of religion. So, I don't understand why when I have to study, when I have to work, when I have to live my life, I need to be restricted to what you want. I don’t like it, I don’t understand it... because they have the law and later there is what they say.” Amin believed that this deprivation of the right to wear the veil, while a fundamental right, was not protected in Spanish law, “Of course in Spain you can't work with the veil, there is a law that says companies can hire, have the right to dictate the dress they want. In England or France, it's normal to encounter policies, to see women with the veil and everything. In the US too.”

Jauad also emphasized individual fundamental rights. He pointed out that in a pluralist society with respect for each individual, religious practice should be accommodated: “Religion and politics have their respective places and shouldn't be mixed. This doesn't mean that you can’t create policies for practicing religious, and they should also be able to participate as citizens with full rights. I think people practicing their religion in freedom should be normalized, in the same way it is for people who don't believe.” Laila stressed how a citizen’s individual rights included that of religious belief and practice, as part and parcel of universal human rights norms:

“Religion is an important part of some people’s lives and they practice it, so there should be representation in the public sphere, to ensure that there is respect for religious freedom and to guarantee equal treatment and the same advantages to people who profess different beliefs. I believe that everyone has the freedom to practice their religion in a public way, in their daily life, without having to hide, enjoying the rights and liberties as long as they don't hurt other people and always respecting everyone else’s individual rights.”

Ibrahim additionally underlined the primacy of universal individual human rights, guided by the principle that they do not infringe on the rights of another: “I believe that
anyone has the right to liberty of conscience, the liberty of thought, the freedom of religion, and this means having the right to show it, provided ...that everyone shows what they want but within the limits that we have, our individual rights, without getting in the way of the rights of others.” He goes on to explain that he believes visibility of other religions goes uncontested, whereas visibility of Islam is often targeted. Chaima insisted religious representation should occupy both political and societal space, because “it is our way of thinking and acting in this world.” This reflects Statham’s point that European states are constrained in attempts to shape immigrant integration in the ambit of religious identity, due to Europe’s simultaneous commitment to ensure individual liberties, including freedom of thought (2016).

Hanaa and Monaim both underscored collective rights as well, as they argued for their uninhibited exercise. Hanaa asserted: “Religion should be expressed in community with the objective of sharing knowledge and obtaining a social identity. When different religions are expressed in politics and society it allows for an enrichment of cultural diversity...freedom of religion and religious expression should be a natural right.” Monaim advocated for the rights of a collective within a society: “I don’t think [religion] should be represented [in politics] but it should be taken into account, knowing that there is a group of people that have these customs and culture. I think that practice should be in a free manner, as each one wants.”

Again, while these individual rights are protected by transnational and national commitments in theory, a complex array of factors, including societal distrust of religious attachments and competing confessional, secular or national ideologies, can relegate religious youth to a kind of ‘second class citizenship,’ bereft of full rights, as previously explained in Chapter Two (Taylor and Maclure 2010).

**Legal background to rights discourse**

In order to put the participants’ experiences and understandings of rights into context, it is useful to highlight some of the legislation that may be affecting their experiences...
or understandings. Indeed, the participants’ rights claims and indignation at rights deprivation find justification in both international and national legislation. At the level of international human rights, freedom of religion, as well as to manifest belief in public and private, is enshrined in Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” Similarly, Article 10 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights guarantees religious freedom, and Article 22 protects religious diversity (as well as cultural and linguistic diversity), prohibiting discrimination based on religion. As noted in Chapter Eight, Spain’s 1980 Law of Religious Liberty complements the Spanish Constitution’s Article 16 right to religious liberty, as well as its Article 14 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or any other personal or social attributes. One area where contestations arise includes in how Article 16 also provides for the secularism or neutrality of the state. Another area of dispute includes how the Law of Religious Liberty allows for the right to freely manifest one’s religion and thus presumably religious symbols, while at the same time, Article 16 of the Spanish Constitution allows for limits in religious manifestation if necessary for the public order protected by the law. In short, public powers are called upon to strike a balance between all religions, and maintain a neutrality, that simultaneously allows for religious pluralism (Vidal 2016).

And so, despite these guarantees of freedom of religious manifestation, and as the participants noted, in practice they face many challenges. With regard to the claims of discrimination in the workplace, it could be that the employers were objecting to the veil with the argument that the work contract contains stipulations about a certain type of dress or hygiene and security norms, based on one of two legal grounds: Spanish Constitution’s Article 38, that recognizes the rights of businesses and ensures their protection by public powers, and Article 20.3 of the 1980 Worker’s Law, that allows the company to oblige employees to meet their work requirements as so far as they meet standards of human dignity (CE 1978; BOE-A-2015-11430; Pascual 2015). However, if the worker wearing the veil could prove that
the employer’s request did not comply with standards of human dignity, or that the objection to the veil was merely a matter of discrimination (rather than the employer’s concern for their ability to carry out workplace duties), a defense could be more easily accomplished. Needless to say, and as very clearly demonstrated in Malek’s case, the episodes of workplace rejection cited seemed to be cases of discrimination rather than grounded in the other constitutional provisions mentioned. Moreover, it is striking that the individual right to religious freedom might be less prioritized than these other constitutional guarantees (Pascual 2015).

And in education, again, while there are guarantees to personal religious liberty and the individual right to manifest one’s religion in both the Spanish Constitution and Law of Religious Liberty, court cases involving wearing the veil in school often vary from case to case. One provision cited in defense of requiring female students to remove the veil can be found within the 2002 Law of Quality of Education, which delegates responsibility for school management to the school’s governing body (Bedmar 2010). The 1992 Law for the Protection of Citizen Security is another law invoked in cases against wearing the veil in school. In utilizing this legislation, a court case about a girl’s right to wear the veil in school could revolve around whether the school is public or private, what type of veil it is, and the age and maturity of the student (Pascual 2015). Again, one can see why Ihsan, age 20, was upset that she would be challenged to remove her veil in public school, as part of her internationally recognized right to manifest her religious convictions. The continued battle between the recognized right to religious manifestation is doubtless due a widespread European view that faith expression in the public sphere is illegitimate (Shadid and Koningsveld 2002). Furthermore, a Catholic bias, or foreign connotation attributed to Islam could encourage undue hostility towards visibility of Islam in Spain, specifically. Meanwhile, Muslim youth in
this study legitimately expect freedom of religious expression, and an equal treatment of their confession alongside Catholicism.\textsuperscript{31}

Yet another example of this struggle, as outlined earlier, is how Amin pointed to a deprivation of collective rights in the Spanish institutional management of mosques. Indeed, ambiguity in legislation and lack of implementation of the legislation that does exist has given rise to issues in the management of religious centers (Astor and Griera 2016). Places of religious worship have multiplied in number with immigration. Before, such places of worship might have been afforded public land or recognition by public authorities, as Ayim pointed out about the “M30” (Centro Cultural Islámico) mosque.\textsuperscript{32} However, increasing numbers of places of worship have resulted in a transfer of regulatory responsibility to local and city authorities. While the Observatory for Religious Pluralism provides best practice guides for authorities to follow, the decentralization or religious worship site regulation allows local authorities a great deal of leeway and thus could result in variance or discrepancies in the management of places of worship, and in conflicts like the one described by Zayneb. Regulation could include norms regarding health, security, accessibility, noise and capacity (Astor and Griera 2016).

A study by Astor interviewed the leader of the mosque in Parla that Amin referred to, and the leader confirmed that while they had to sometimes go to the street, they had received minimal complaints (2009). Astor argues in his study as well that mosque opposition in Madrid is relatively low compared to activity in Catalonia for example (Ibid.). Still Amin’s concerns regarding visibility present possibility of at least mosque opposition in Madrid, and Zayneb’s experience in Getafe presents another example. Indeed, as establishing places of

\textsuperscript{31} Contestation within education, the workforce and mosque building are not the sole areas of confrontation. For example, is a supposed conflict between a veiled lawyer in public court and the guarantees within Spanish criminal law; this type of challenge did not arise in the situations presented by the participants and is thus not discussed here (Vidal 2016).

\textsuperscript{32} The land for the M30 mosque was donated by former Mayor of Madrid during a visit from the Saudi Arabian king. Thus, perhaps, Amin’s impression of authoritative recognition (López García et al. 2007).
worship is managed at the local and community level, there could be a risk that local regulation is motivated by reasons other than facility management. Thus, the rights protected in the Law of Religious Liberty or the 1992 agreement with representatives of Islam could be jeopardized in this way (BOE-A-1980-15955; BOE-A-1992-24855).

As such, despite this brief overview of the legislation utilized to defend what is interpreted to be deprivation of rights, the participants’ various instances of perceived discrimination seem to point to a reoccurring possibility: that conflicting legislat ing protecting rights other than that of religious liberty do not necessarily seem to be the true motivation behind why actors objected to the participants’ religious manifestations. In fact, it seemed that the participants encountered rejection or biased treatment based on migrant or ethnic origin or a supposed Muslim threat, rather than due to the offending actors attempting to protect a conflicting constitutional right. Furthermore, some participants seemed to be highly cognizant of this, with an awareness of the inherent priority of fundamental rights to religious liberty and freedom of expression, both at the individual and collective level. For this reason, they repeatedly demanded protection and full realization of their rights. As Moseen put it,

"By right one should be free to practice any religion because you should not be deprived of your rights, because for example in my case I’m Muslim and if they deprive me of my right to, I don’t know, observe Ramadan for example, this is depriving me of a right. So, we can say they are completely different things, and at the same time I am a citizen, a Spanish citizen, I observe the Spanish Constitution and everything."

**Frustration with democratic system and promise**

Unsurprisingly, given experiences of discrimination and perceptions that rights were denied or breached, disillusionment with the democratic system in Spain recurred throughout the interviews. Ayim saw room for improvement: "with its defects and virtues, it’s the best system we have known until now. But you have to keep working to improve those gaps that don’t work well." Safia also said that she believed there were many undemocratic issues that needed to be resolved. Ihsan described democracy in Spain as a joke. Jauad
opined that while democracy was a perfect model, in practice it was riddled with corruption. Moseen was also critical of political corruption in Spain. Both Nouha and Ismail presumably also were critical of Spanish democracy, as they specifically termed the democratic system itself ‘a utopia.’

Furthermore, Obadah felt that the democratic system was immobilized by economic powers. Warda, interviewed in 2016, was frustrated with repeat national elections because the parties could not come to an agreement: "it is a lot of public spending, it’s a lot of money, and they can’t form a government...we could have progressed a little bit or taken a step forward." Of course, given the recent Spanish recession and political climate, Spain has seen a fair share of political disaffection and critical voters, including among the youth of the 15M movement (Muñoz 2015). In fact, a CIS study conducted after the 2016 elections found that on a scale of 1-10, with 0 being completely unsatisfied with how democracy functioned in Spain and 10 being completely satisfied, roughly 61.8% of the Spanish population surveyed rated satisfaction at a five or below (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 2016).

While experiences of discrimination and the obstacles these participants face may produce these disenchanted views of the Spanish political system, the group could also be simply part of a larger cohort of their peers experiencing frustration with the current socioeconomic and political climate in Spain. Still, it is important to note how disappointment with the supposed institutional safeguards protecting their citizen rights could contribute to disaffection and distrust of the systems in place. While only 13 of the 32 total participants expressed this disappointment, further obstacles and institutional failures in protecting rights and ensuring societal inclusion could augment this dissatisfaction and perception of disenfranchisement.

Expectations of equality and pluralism

Despite these instances of disillusionment or mistrust of institutions, there were clear patterns of convictions that aligned with liberal democratic values, including a strong belief in
values of equality, along with the expectations of rights described earlier. Moreover, in order to achieve this protection of rights, many participants upheld the principle of separation of church and state, with the understanding that this separation would ensure protection of religious pluralism. Of course, a disclaimer follows about remarking that these youth of migrant origin demonstrate allegiance to liberal democratic values and thus must be acculturating to society: it presumes inherent judgment that liberal democratic values are the universally accepted correct values. As Baumann puts it, “Why should it be the nation-state as we know it, a supertribal and quasi-religious enterprise, to which we look for ethnic or religious equality, and what exactly is meant by equality?” (1999, 99). As such, an emphasis on the framework established in Chapter Two is key, in that a dialogical process of pluralism should be maintained. At the same time, from the perspective of integration and societal cohesion, these youth do indeed reflect mainstream cultural values in their considerations of equality and the public and private sphere and, consequently, acculturation with their country of residence.

For example, in response to inquiries regarding gender equality, twenty-five participants responded there should be equal sharing of household tasks between genders, with only one first generation participant in disagreement. Out of the twenty-seven who spoke about the issue of gender equality overall, each one was a proponent of equal treatment. Several were very emphatic about equality in education, as well as in personal and professional life. Amal maintained, “Education should be equal for all and just being women shouldn’t make us feel inferior; everything a man can do a woman can do and vice versa.” Aya argued that education was in preparation for a professional career: “You don’t study for nothing. You study for your career and to work.” Warda remained critical that there was still gender wage inequality in Spain, and Chaima also emphasized the importance of equal salaries: “If she has chosen herself [her job] then both genders should receive the same salary and the same treatment.” Laila similarly advocated for a merit-based approach to professional life: “In the professional environment
no one should be judged by their gender, but rather by their ability to perform the requested task, or their knowledge and capabilities. They should receive the same treatment. And we should only make distinctions about whether an individual is more capable than the other.”

Nessrin also specified that there should be no gender-based discrimination in either personal or professional life: “I think that a woman should develop both her personal and professional life to the utmost extent, and under the same conditions as men, and that there should be no type of discrimination.”

Some noted that there has been an evolution in gender roles, progress that they supported. Warda compared her views with that of her parents’, and regarding staying at home with children maintained,

“If you want to bring up kids while they are infants, but no, after a while you have to have a life and you don’t spend your whole life dedicated to the kids. My parents no, the woman has to be at home, helping, doing the chores, taking care of the kids, but we are more modern, the woman can be more independent, for herself, working and pursuing her life.”

Iman commented: “Today, both in the Muslim world as well as the West, the woman has to share household tasks with the husband, because just one person can’t do it. Everyone helps and it seems right to me.” Amin similarly noted how that the female professional career was a modern reality: “In Islam, the woman can work... Now that the word is modernized, globalized, it is viewed as normal for men to be alongside women working, and from my point of view too.” All of these views on female self-determination parallel the European TIES survey findings, claiming that large cities enabled Muslim youth, “to claim a more emancipated and self-determined position for highly educated second-generation women. This comes up against their largely conservative communities whose mores run counter to female self-identities as students and working women” (Crul et al. 2012, 29).

By in large, the conservative mores referenced in the TIES study were few. Regarding whether a woman should stay at home with the children, some participants either expressed a personal preference for the mother to stay at home and educate, or a belief that this was
best for the family. Amal said it was preferable for the woman to stay at home, but depending on economic circumstances, perhaps the woman might need to work. Amin said that he would not object to a woman working outside the home, but would personally prefer his children raised by their mother. Ayeh and Ihsan also said that educating the children, while a responsibility of both parents, fell more to the mother. While this may appear to digress from mainstream cultural values of gender equality, a February 2018 CIS survey found that 60.6% of Spaniards at age 16 remembered their mother as "inactive," including in unremunerated household work. As such, the few participants that expressed a preference for the female household member staying at home with the children does not appear to especially deviate from the Spanish societal norm overall (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2018).

**Separation of church and state and safeguarding pluralism**

Moreover, in keeping with liberal democratic values espoused in the Spanish Constitution, several in the study elaborated upon why they supported the liberal view that a successful public sphere necessitated a clear division between civil society and the state. In communicating this, they included a special emphasis on how religion as part of civil society should be protected. As Jauad succinctly summarized: “Religion and politics have their respective places and shouldn’t be mixed. This doesn’t mean that you can’t create policies for practicing religious, and they should also be able to participate as citizens with full rights.” Zacarias concurred that religion and politics should remain independent of each other, as did Yusuf. Moseen similarly noted, “One thing is civic responsibility and public laws, and another thing is religions.” Ibrahim argued that separating the two was for the sake of protecting religious pluralism: “I believe that in such a diverse world, more and more there are people sharing common spaces of things so different, religions so different and ideologies so different, that it seems important that everyone have their space and that there isn’t an imposition of religion in general.”
Iman and Obadah also argued for separation of religious and civil law, while at the same time maintaining that religion was often integral to and enmeshed in society. Rami, while not religious, stressed that civil law should protect certain rights, like the right to religious freedom. Ayim similarly echoed the importance of a separation between civil society and politics that allowed for protection of individual rights like religious exercise: "Religion should be represented in civil society, with associations, organizations, collectives, but not as political parties and not in political life. It should be practiced in an open way, without stigma, but not in public spaces." The right to free and open exercise of religion was a subject of consensus among the group. Twenty seven agreed that religion should be allowed to be openly practiced. Only one first generation Tunisian, Malek, was in disagreement, and the remainder had not addressed the subject.

Indeed, a key consideration to take into account when evaluating the empirical findings, and referred to earlier in this work, includes how religious associations may influence the youth, especially as several of the young people were contacted through the help of associations where participants were active members. While they may be religious civil society organizations, these associations received funding from local government and municipalities in an effort to create cohesion in the community, a type of cooperation that is not practiced in France, for example (Eseverri 2017). Of course, institutional bias towards Catholicism described earlier also came up several times in the discussion about separating civil society and institutions; this leads to overall conclusions that while cooperation between religious associations and public institutions may be beneficial to providing this group with support, careful and vigilant management of the church and state relationship remains necessary.

Moreover, safeguarding religious liberty and individual and collective rights were of course not only a concern expressed by the youth interviewed. Speaking with a leader from a Muslim faith community in Leganes and a leader from the Association Tayba, they were both concerned that the onus of ‘integration’ was borne by youth they assisted, even though these
youth had been born in or had grown up in Spanish society.\textsuperscript{33} They felt that rather than demanding how these youth identified, societal actors demanding such integration should analyze whether they were truly accepting this demographic. A social worker who similarly worked among second generation Muslim youth noted that she believed they were not in fact withdrawing or segregating themselves from mainstream society, but instead were thriving in remarkably multicultural and diverse communities.\textsuperscript{34} She noted that perhaps Spain had a better facility for encouraging interaction and pluralism given that it was “Mediterranean culture” of socializing outside on the street, an observation not dissimilar from the one that Eseverri makes about public space in her comparison study between Muslim youth in Madrid versus Paris (2015).

\textbf{Concluding thoughts}

As one can garner from the general narrative of the empirical data, the majority of the participants interviewed were very generous and forthcoming in sharing their story, and this open and cooperative interaction is indeed a striking pattern. Of course, it could be that those who were more reticent would not accept an invitation to interview in the first place, as oftentimes invitations to interview were rejected over the course of the field work.

Moreover, as is undoubtedly evident, the participants expressed themselves in an articulate, thoughtful, and often intelligent manner. One can gather from this consistent articulate expression throughout these narratives that there is perhaps a selection bias, most likely due to the utilization of the snowball method (causing a self-selective pool of participants). Despite their young age in the majority of the cases, they are able to communicate in a very studied and thoughtful way. It is important to note that this consistent eloquent expression would be difficult to encounter so regularly among any selected demographic. Of course, this observation also has a twofold significance: it additionally

\textsuperscript{33} Interview with Ahmed June 10, 2017; Interview with Mohamed, September 6, 2017.

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Ines, February 22, 2018
indicates a strong level of integration, in that these participants manifest such a high level of education. Their manner of speech reflects a solid educational foundation and the thoughts and concepts they express similarly communicate that they have received formation in critical thinking. This could reflect high levels of aspiration on the part of their family or community supporting them, an effective and extensive Spanish state education system, or both. It is notable as many of the youth, when asked, indicated that their parents were not educated beyond mandatory secondary school.

Finally, in relation to this very studied and intelligent expression among the target population, and as noted earlier in the empirical findings, the participants are highly cognizant of their individual human rights. Whether referring to rights guarantees at the national or international level, they make clear and coherent arguments for why they feel their rights should be ensured, better protected or not violated. Specifically, they pointed to a right to non-discrimination and freedom of religious expression enshrined in liberal democratic legal regimes. The participants’ own recognition of a discrepancy between guaranteed rights and societal and institutional biases harken back to earlier discussions of multiculturalism and pluralism, and redefined notions of citizenship.

It seems that in order to seek integration from these youth, or better put, to ensure societal cohesion that incorporates more vulnerable populations, it is paramount to both guarantee equality of opportunity, and to recognize that embracing pluralism is important in maintaining societal balance. Again, the interview attempted to record self-identification, a self-identification that measured sense of belonging, but it also observed religious identity, alongside the experiences of discrimination that impacted both variables. The results demonstrated hybrid identities and claims for full citizenship rights, with religious or minority accommodation and recognition. The following chapter explains how these observations provide a basis for policy recommendations and potential future studies that can help to ameliorate concerns both highlighted in the analysis and to be further explained at this juncture.
Chapter X

Conclusion

This work sought to understand second generation identity and belonging, in light of factors including religiosity and societal and institutional inclusion. These objectives were motivated by the heightened rhetoric surrounding Muslims in Europe, which has consistently pervaded academic and sociopolitical dialogues for several decades now. Despite the longevity of this theme’s discussion, contestations continue, and indubitably reflect perceived global transformations that pit an emphasis on pluralism and transnational phenomena against competing nationalist sentiment and integration measures. Whether imagined fault lines or no, Islam has been highlighted in the European context as a manifestation of “the other,” associated with modern immigration processes and depicted as antithetical to Europe’s Christian past or secularist present. Meanwhile, regardless of contentions that this is simply polemicizing a larger debate regarding the individual, the state, and their respective changing roles and relationships in modern conditions, European Muslims must continue to negotiate their place in the community. Second generation Muslims in Europe come to the fore as an especially pertinent focus in this case, as they represent a growing component of future society with a compounded challenge; they are burdened not only by any disadvantages that migrant origin may cause them, but also face further obstacles with any repercussions that their ascription to Islam affords.

Spain, with its unique historical, sociopolitical context, and relatively recent modern migration, presents a unique opportunity for focus, as second generation Muslim youth are currently poised to fully participate in Spanish society, in the wake of almost two decades of literature and debate regarding Muslim youth in fellow European countries. In that previous groundwork, identity has emerged as a principal consideration in determining these youth’s place in society. This is because self-identity, a reflexive and thus fluid and relational conception of the self, with an internal and external nature, by definition manifests an individual’s external relationships; thus, it can demonstrate an external relationship with
society. In this case, the external relationship with society is determined via an assessment of whether self-identification includes a sense of belonging or attachment, i.e., if there is identification with the community of residence. Religious identity is also highlighted as important for examination, as that is often cited as the differentiated aspect of this population, and that it could be incompatible with a sense of belonging to the society of residence.

Still, it cannot be over-emphasized that the second generation is not solely responsible for reaching their place in society. Whether considering past understandings or new formulations of citizenship, there is clearly a mutual responsibility to work towards coexistence both on the part of the individual and of society, and in this case the individual represents the minority confronting the majority. Institutional and societal realities affect an individual’s inclusion, and there may be more obvious structural factors, like economic and educational social protections, that contribute to this. However, institutional accommodation and societal acceptance of pluralism represents another important component in two-way integration (especially in regards to a group often rendered as “the other”). Liberal democratic norms and indeed Spanish constitutional commitments recognize this mutual responsibility of coexistence, and in theory promise protection of individual and collective difference. Yet, these Muslim youth of migrant origin find themselves facing a twofold hurdle: balancing a dynamic, pluricultural and differentiated position in society due to their migrant origin, as well as perhaps encountering resistance due to Spain’s Christian tradition and current secularist trajectory, which may cast ascription to Islam as an incompatible type of differentiation. Essentially, they may be more prone to discrimination and intolerance. In Spain, there are still few investigations to date on these issues, given the nature of the target population as an emerging demographic and the lack of largescale data available. Moreover, given that at the European level the subject remains disputed, a study at the local level provides a valuable additional data point.
And so, all of these considerations led to the guiding, two-fold inquiry of this work: How do second generation Muslims in Madrid identify, in terms of both sense of belonging to their community of residence and in terms of religiosity, and do these two identifications demonstrate the inverse relationship that is often presumed? Furthermore, how does this population’s perception of Spanish societal and institutional reception shape that identity? The former query seeks to respond to the various contentions regarding Muslims of migrant origin and whether in Spain it truly is the case that second generation Muslim youth do not engage with the community sufficiently and thus constitute a risk of societal fragmentation. The latter question is significant in that in the two-way process of integration or inclusion, institutional and societal factors could be in fact hindering sense of belonging among Spain’s emerging adult citizens, thus jeopardizing the societal future.

The discussion found its logical grounding not simply in migration theory, but within a larger framework of how the individual, the state, and notions of citizenship and belonging fit within the multidisciplinary nature of migration theory. Initially, the nation-state narrative drove migration studies, defined by a collective nation or ethnic group, sovereignty of the people, and bounded territories. The nation-state proceeded to a liberal model with a rights discourse, and while state institutions remain relevant, state hegemony faces competition with various power networks and the individual agency and rights enshrined at the international level. While citizenship may have been understood in its most basic sense as individual membership in a socio-political community, the importance of the individual’s self-identification and participation in that community has become key in discussions of societal cohesion amidst pluralist societies.

The inclusion and belonging constructed and experienced in social spaces, and the importance of individual agency in these processes, has undergone increased and intense scrutiny in more recent theory, and particularly in migration theory. At first, multiculturalism was presented as a way to approach or create policy for plural societies. Transnationalism was then considered as an antithesis to the nation state, and then reconsidered as simply a
reality that should be applied to specific or micro-contexts in social science investigation. Diversity management similarly tackles issues surrounding pluralism, with particularly focus on the individual citizen’s sense of belonging, and their sociocultural rights as part of citizenship rights. Theories of super-diversity and hybridity, among others, accompany this progressing concentration on pluralism and cohesion, as well as a recognition of the dichotomies and parallels between the cosmopolitan and the local.

Given this context, the work first addressed integration in Spain and Europe more broadly, emphasizing how multilevel integration policies are increasingly a necessitated reality. It provided the comparative country cases of France and the United Kingdom in order to give a more comprehensive picture of the uniqueness of Spanish immigration and integration policy, as well as historical context. It then offered an overview of the plethora of growing literature regarding the second generation in Europe, why the Muslim second generation has been singled out in many instances, and the recent and few studies that have addressed the second generation in Spain, specifically. From there, a more detailed account of the European church and state relationship and trajectory followed, as well as further explanation of Muslim religious practice in Europe. Why religiosity is addressed in migration studies and the social sciences was covered, as well. An exposition of self-identity, including individual, collective, religious, and how it relates to the second generation and sense of belonging, then prefaced an overview of the literature on Islam in Spain and the Muslim community in Madrid.

Of course, in tandem the theoretical background and literature analysis, the empirical qualitative study provides a new set of data to consider. Qualitative interviews of twenty-seven 1.5 and second generation Muslims in Madrid (with a small sample of five first generation Muslim youth for comparison) examined how the population identified, to what extent their identification incorporated religious attachment and/or sense of belonging to community of residence, and how Spanish society and institutions affected this identity. The interview featured variables including sense of belonging, measured by identification with
the community of residence as well as experiences of discrimination, and religiosity, measured by the individual’s own parameters as well as inquiries into their religious practice. Questions addressing experiences of discrimination and how the participants believed society identified and approached them sought to measure Spanish societal and institutional influence on the second generation youth’s experience and formulation of identity. Using the first generation as a comparative group serves to demonstrate how, theoretically, the second generation as non-migrants and citizens and residents of Spain for the entirety of their lives should express higher level of attachment to this community of residence, given that Spanish society and institutions are providing inclusion as they should; the more prolonged the insertion and interaction with society, the more they would presumably relate and identify with the community.

**Key findings**

Synthesized with this preceding framework, the observations that ensue as a result of the empirical portion of the study offered many promising insights that either affirmed past surveys and literature or provided new and slightly divergent insights. Spanish studies tend to focus on either specifically Moroccan immigration, the entire Muslim population in Spain, or youth of migrant origin overall. European studies have addressed levels of identity or alternative indicators of integration including employment and education, with some focus on Muslim youth, and have provided a comparative reference throughout this investigation. However, there are few Spanish studies that target solely Muslim youth of migrant origin and examine the relationship between self-identity and religiosity, comparing these variables with the participants’ perceived reception by the community. As previously noted in this work, the European-wide TIES study somewhat addressed these variables, though the data dates back to 2007-2008 (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012); it was additionally reported that Téllez and Adlbi provide small qualitative studies regarding religiosity and identity among Muslim youth in Spain, albeit with slightly different foci, as well (Téllez 2011; Adlbi 2009 and 2010).
from a multitude of societal actors. Moreover, as these youth of migrant origin reach an age that presupposes active citizenship and participation in the labor market, and have matured almost another decade in the community, further study of these topics is even timelier. What follows are important themes raised, implications for theory, and suggestions for future policy and studies. In total, it ultimately offers a fresh, albeit complex, perspective: the conflicted yet promising experience of second generation Muslims in Madrid, and how in a post-multicultural discourse, citizen engagement as well as institutional responsibility are necessary for societal cohesion and success in today’s globalized world.

Essentially, the patterns manifested in the empirical data were largely positive for Spanish societal outcomes. Firstly, the majority of 1.5 and second generation identified with the community of residence in some way, and thus express a sense of belonging. At the same time, they often combined this attachment with another or several self-identifications, which marked a notable pattern of hybridity in identification. A trend of hybrid identity in the participants’ identification can serve as a way to measure integration, in that perhaps exclusive attachment to Spain is unnecessary, but rather partial attachment is hopeful and also realistic in the current, diverse social climate. Secondly, as a religious minority with this hybrid identity, they express a spirituality that is largely either individualized and thus less visible, or mobilize more noticeably with religious identity, using it as a claims-making method of civic engagement. As such, religiosity is also a significant variable; while it does not indicate lack of integration, it is a vehicle for communicating participants’ expectations for societal inclusion. Moreover, as the participants individualize and combine their religious identity as necessary to meet the competing demands of multiple attachments, it demonstrates a skillful capacity for adaptation. Again, these combined observations signal promising trajectories for the future of this cohort, and consequently Spanish society.

It seems fitting to expound upon these broad observations and embark on a final exploration of the major insights and theoretical takeaways resulting from this study. This will aid in prefacing a final overview of various caveats and nuances that require attention,
along with several implications that merit caution, in a series of policy recommendations and suggestions for future research.

**Sense of belonging**

As noted in the empirical section, the albeit small sample of first generation participants provided a useful comparison to the 1.5 and second generation’s expressions of belonging. Of the five first generation youth, all preferred to speak in another language apart from Spanish, four did not express an attachment to the community or Spain, and four did not want to remain in Spain in the future. By contrast, while not everyone in the 1.5 or second generation cohorts made reference to Madrid or Spain when self-identifying, 63% and 84% respectively did include this in their identification. This comparative difference in identification between the 1.5 and second generation could be explained by how generation 1.5 faces further disadvantages that immigrants might confront and the second generation hopefully does not, given that they arrived at some point during school age and did not benefit from being raised from birth in the community of residence. These can include legal obstacles, or challenges such as language. The progressive increasing levels of attachment, from the first generation to generation 1.5 to second generation, indicate that presumably, the second generation is not as besought with the same challenges migrants face, as should be the case if society is accommodating them as the full citizens they are.

Moreover, participants demonstrated attachment to their community of residence in other ways, including feeling at home in Spain or hoping to stay in Spain in the future. These levels of attachment reflect a 2017 survey of self-identifying Muslim immigrants and their descendants by the 2017 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), that found average level of attachment to Spain at a 4.1 on a 0 to 5 scale.

Again, sense of belonging is at the crux of this study. In an increasingly pluralist and globalized social fabric, that still operates in a significant way at the local level, the notions of individual autonomy and agency are key in providing a space for individual citizens in the
modern era. In efforts towards societal integration and cohesion, communities must balance the process of incorporation and shared sense of belonging with a realistic approach and respect for multiple attachments and identities. Sense of belonging to the community as part of self-identity on the part of these youth indicates they are oriented towards participating in a welcoming community. As such, they are positioned to contribute to the community in a mutually beneficial relationship for both parties.

Alienation or marginalization by the receiving society can cause the opposite effect: a sense of rejection, disempowerment and disaffection, which may cause withdrawal and all of its accompanying consequences. In self-identifying in this investigation, the participants demonstrated levels of attachment to the community in combination with other facets of identity. Nurturing and maintaining this attachment, for the benefit of collective societal success as much as for the benefit of this minority group, means consideration of the whole confluence of self-identity, accounting for its fluidity, reflexivity, and most importantly, its external as much as its internal influences. In this case, such consideration involves the following observations regarding religiosity, hybridity and expectations of participation, as well as an underlying, influencing factor of discrimination.

Religiosity

The youth self-identified as Muslim and expressed or practiced their faith or religiosity to varying degrees. This religiosity sometimes included an individualized or personalized spirituality that was marked in its difference from traditional religious practice. One might look to how second generation youth are juggling two different cultures, sometimes two languages, and two sets of expectations or ethical underpinnings. These demands may force them to prioritize what merits their time, as they must make certain choices about how to strike this balance. Perhaps while belief may remain a priority, practice may need to be customized so as to coalesce with the many other moving parts that shape their identity.
As previously mentioned, the target population of this study is often the subject of heated debate, in political, academic and societal rhetoric. There are those who frame the discussion in terms of "the other," arguing there is a Muslim frontier in Europe, and those identifying as Muslim are inherently unable to acculturate to Western society. However, sense of belonging did not seem to correlate with a varying degree of religiosity in this study. Those who demonstrated more traditional practice did not express significantly less attachment to Spain, Madrid or their community than those who articulated an individualized faith. Indeed, religious identification did not necessarily entail a conflict between attachments; multiple ethnic identities, alongside or including religious identity, could instead provide more societal linkages and facilitate solidarity among various groups. These findings mirror that of Fleischmann's 2011 study of Turkish and Moroccan second generation immigrants in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, although her study noted that dual identity among minority groups proved less prevalent if perceived levels of discrimination were high. While discrimination was often encountered in this investigation, although sometimes not described as particularly concerning, the population nonetheless balanced hybrid identities, or harmoniously combined multiple attachments.

The empirical data also demonstrated that in the case of young Muslims in Madrid, self-identified religious youth can maintain an egalitarian approach to gender roles and support a secular, democratic state. This observation challenges claims that religiosity would correlate to conservative social views, or that adherents of Islam support gender inequality, theocracies and dictatorships. In regard to gender roles, Röder similarly concludes, using findings from the European Social Survey (of 27 European countries) that a link between practice of Islam or religiosity and gender inequality is neither "intrinsic nor fixed" (2014). Again, religious identity may have influenced this population's worldview, but not to the extent that it significantly alienated them from mainstream societal views or participation. As discussed throughout this work, the fact that religious civil society organizations cooperate with the local and municipal levels of government could help to explain how youth feel
supported and connected to the community, as some of the participants in this study drew from such organizations. The reality of associations and civic participation at the local level may be an important aspect of how these youth gained support from their local networks. Indeed, religiosity provided another form of attachment or belonging upon which to draw from, as well as motivated claims for societal participation.

**Hybridity**

And so, in examination of religious identity as a variable in this study, it ultimately served to illustrate how hybrid identities could operate alongside societal cohesion, and how a sole identification to the nationality of the country of residence was not the only form of demonstrating attachment and acculturation. Youth could religiously identify, demonstrate a sense of belonging to the local community, and even simultaneously identify as citizens of the world. Recognizing the value in multiple identifications and the perils of an exclusive mindset, some participants emphasized the importance of an inclusive and broad-minded approach to societal participation and interaction. The potential of syncretism to beget change and progress was not lost on them. Of course, a tension remains between differentiation and integration; between a modernized approach to a politics of difference, versus current calls for a homogenized cultural project. More specifically, the latter finds its most extreme form in the rise of xenophobic, right-wing populist parties in Europe and throughout the world that prey upon a threefold fear of the dilution of national identity, socioeconomic decline and security concerns (Arango et al. 2017). Thus, the second generation, as they balance multiple identities, not only have to determine where they themselves stand in the dichotomy between a politics of difference versus a national project. They also might have to contend with the current wave of extremist nationalist sentiment that unequivocally rejects pluralist approaches.

And in the case of the study’s generation 1.5 and second generation participants, the majority expressed a liberal democratic perspective, sometimes described as a ‘global citizen’
worldview, which enabled them to engage with a universal conception of human rights and citizenship. This was significant, as the conception of active citizenship that they espoused aligns with theories advocating for a participatory citizenship in order to pursue societal cohesion. Legitimacy in the public sphere is based upon communication between the various parties that compose it (individuals, state, society), and as such, the agency of individuals remains important to ensuring functioning rights systems and citizenship at all levels, from the local to the transnational (Fraser 2007).

Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio similarly stressed in their Spanish study of immigrant children that selective acculturation, rather than homogeneous identity, led to more positive outcomes in terms of aspirations (2011). In short, this study makes a comparable observation, in discovering expectations of societal participation and rights alongside hybrid identities. It harkens back to the notion that in terms of integration, agency may indeed prove more vital than notions of static culture.

Rights claims and expectations of recognition

It bears repeating, of course, that in any discussion of integration, the responsibility of the receiving society or community is an important aspect of a two-way process (Joppke 2007). Moreover, at some point, in the of developing legislating and implementing integration, society may simultaneously arrive at new meanings of citizenship and state. This could be applicable to Spain’s case, as it continues to go about providing for a pluralist society. Immigration beginning in the 1980s has presented new challenges and questions, alongside the pluralist realities and issues that Spain has encountered among its autonomous communities in recent history (Arango 2012). As a result and as discussed, many institutional safeguards are in place to protect rights, and diversity management is underway.

Within this context, the majority of the participants addressed rights claims in some manner. They may have asserted these claims due to experiences of discrimination, or thanks to Spanish civic education reinforcing a rights discourse. Perhaps they were simply exercising
their individual agency, as children of immigrants negotiating their place in society. Any of these motivations, however, link back in some form to a broader human rights agenda, one that was presumably learned of in Spanish society. Some addressed rights claims directly; they argued that there was a need for more activism, especially on the part of Muslims or Muslim youth. These claims were directed in response to Spanish societal and institutional obstacles or shortcomings in managing religious pluralism or ensuring religious equality and freedom. Others noted a deprivation of rights, whether or not they sought to rectify it. Finally, still others expressed a frustration with Spanish democracy. This may have been caused by frustration on the part of their entire generation in Spain (including children of natives), given the recent recession and its perceived causes, or also due to disappointment in Spanish institutional protection of minority rights.

**Findings in the context of other European studies**

As discrimination was a pervasive factor linked to rights claims and identity, it merits some final attention in this work. The recent 2017 EU FRA survey of self-identifying Muslim immigrants and their descendants noted that likelihood of discrimination was low in Spain in comparison with other countries. Indeed, some participants in this study did report no personal discrimination, and still others explained that the discrimination they did face was surmountable and unremarkable. Exposure to discrimination was often trivialized in their accounts. However, the vast majority of the youth had at least some experience of discrimination to report, both among the first, 1.5 and second generations. The youth in this study hypothesized various reasons for the discrimination they faced, including ignorance, racism or xenophobia.

In the empirical portion, accounts that dealt with labor market discrimination and discrimination in education held a certain significance when contemplating future trajectories. Of course, these signify barriers to social mobility, and could cause increased problems for Muslim youth in the future if they are unable to remain mobile in Spanish
society. The workplace is especially problematic, because it introduces a new set of factors and dynamics that could be viewed as less easily regulated by the state than say, education. Indeed, these youth are at risk as they face disadvantages due to discrimination either based on origin, race, skin color or religion, or some combination of these. Moreover, a recent, small-scale study by Gebhardt, Zapata and Bria confirmed that in Barcelona as well, second generation youth (not solely Muslim) were highly exposed to discrimination, especially in school and public spaces (2017).

Moseen remained hopeful that time would translate into increased opportunity, rather than a stagnated future trajectory:

"I think it’s a question of time. We could also say that Spain is most behind in terms of countries with foreigners in relation to generations...The first generation when they came, well, the poor people, my father, they only wanted to survive, to work and whatever, and their kids you could say, we are going further in our studies, so I think it’s a question of time and we will rise to the top until we are integrated into the most important positions and can open the mind of people, open their eyes, so they see us as equal. I think it’s a question of time and this will get better, we hope."

Again, in order for the Spanish second generation to remain upwardly mobile, and to achieve empowered positions and equality of opportunity in Spanish society, the rights challenges previously addressed remain a key concern.

This is especially evident in the cases mentioned earlier in this work, in studies of other children of migrant origin in Europe. Research in countries like France and the United Kingdom, with third and fourth generations, has demonstrated that entrenched societal disparity and obstacles can isolate children of migrants and stunt social mobility. This can incite reactive identity that causes societal cleavages, as well as can aggravate socioeconomic disparities. Essentially, acculturation does not necessarily entail a linear process. Still, Spain is relatively new to immigration in its modern history, and has consequently only very recently been addressing the needs of both the second generation and the response of society and institutions. There is an opportunity to learn from any negative trajectories in other countries and apply the appropriate measures or prevention. The same applies in taking into
account examples of positive trajectories. In fact, the study participants’ expectations of inclusion and societal participation were very hopeful for future Spanish societal cohesion. As noted in other European studies, societal mobility may also be enabled by welfare state support and increasingly diverse metropolises where minorities can increasingly stake their presence (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). However, one again, these youth cannot be the only ones that bear the responsibility of seeking such cohesion.

**Theoretical takeaways: checks and balances and agency versus static values and culture**

In this discussion of cohesion, diversity management and welcoming pluralism remains key on the part of the receiving society’s responsibility. Again, identities can be formulated according to nation, religion, gender class, culture, language, or simple daily life practices (Toğuşlu and Sezgin 2014). In addressing identity, recognizing individual and group agency, as well as the fluidity of identity, is crucial when studying the relations between groups and people in an increasingly mobile and diverse social reality. Identities can be plural and de-territorialized, as was demonstrated in the case of young 1.5 and second generation Muslim youth in Madrid. Their hybrid identity has been an important finding in this study: it indicated the degree of their sense of belonging in Spanish society, and disproved misconceptions that a high level of religiosity (essentially affiliation with Islam) precludes identification with European society, Spain or local communities within Spain.

These observations and surrounding misconceptions point to the recognition of a tension in modern society: there are efforts to balance cohesive integration on the one hand, while simultaneously protecting individualization and diversity on the other. The empirical portion addressed how some laws or rights are prioritized more than others. As such, what may be problematic is a prioritization of values, or a focus on a system of values. Of course, theory and political systems are inevitably based in values, and in this case liberal democratic values. Moreover, a systematic protection of rights does indeed necessitate some selection and prioritization of values. Still, the theoretical overview as well as the empirical sample in
this study demonstrate that culture is not static, and while societal roles and rules have always experienced continual transformation, their reformulation and interchange in modern society is a prevalent and timely topic in the literature. As such, in order to maintain societal cohesion while concurrently respecting individual rights, both academic theory and the practical policy it informs should perhaps turn its concentration to improving a system of checks and balances that protects autonomy and governs difference to the fairest extent possible.

Given the patterns and data in this study, in addition to directing efforts towards a reexamined and renewed system of checks and balances, the importance of emphasizing agency over static culture arises. In keeping with this principle, the conclusions reached affirm what some theoretical literature has previously and increasingly advocated for: engaging active citizenship as a manner of facilitating societal cohesion. Of course, this active citizenship incorporates previous ideas regarding belonging, and a sense of attachment is necessary in order to encourage levels of participation. Indeed, perhaps the two concepts work in tandem. For this reason, no doubt, the 2010 EU Zaragoza meeting recommended addressing hard integration indicators like access to education and the labor market, but nodded to soft indicators as well (Huddleston et al. 2013). These less obvious indicators addressed the importance of societal welcome, active citizenship participation and discrimination monitoring; these factors are integral in ensuring social mobility and accommodating the next generation of citizens, albeit perhaps are less perceptible and take effect over a longer period of time.

Policy recommendations alongside civil advocacy and activism

Various recommendations for future policy and action surface, to be undertaken by policymakers, civil society, or both, follow from the previous analysis. Spain has several equality initiatives under the jurisdiction of other ministries that conduct work protecting the target population. These include OBERAXE (Spanish Observatory for Racism and Xenophobia,
under the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security), the Council for the
Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination (under the Ministry of Health Social Services
and Equality), both referenced previously in Chapter Four, as well as Spain's Observatory for
Religious Pluralism, an initiative of the Ministry of Justice, treated of in Chapter Eight. They
have made some promising strides in terms of institutional steps towards identifying and
combatting discrimination.

i. Improved awareness and reporting

However, there is undoubtedly room for improvement in awareness and reporting. For example, in the last Ministry of the Interior report on recorded racist incidents, that of
2016, only 47 such incidents were counted in the category of reports of discrimination
against religions and other beliefs that do not fall into antisemitism (OSCE, Ministerio del
Interior). This indeed seems low, given that of the qualitative sample in this study, almost all
of the 32 participants had experienced some form of discrimination, several of which could
clearly merit an official police report. Of course, in our population's case, incidents may also
be falling into the category of racism and xenophobia, which totaled 416 cases throughout
Spain in 2016 (OSCE, Ministerio del Interior). Still, these numbers also seem remarkably few,
especially in comparison with other European countries, and when considering recent
qualitative and quantitative studies of discrimination experiences in Spain. It is of course a
baseline imperative to ensure that the listed institutions’ efforts remain prioritized and
funded. However, in order to encourage increased rights claims and ensure protective
measures as needed, it would be useful to create awareness of mechanisms among the
affected population.

ii. Creating accessible tool for Spanish Muslim youth

As previously discussed, data on reported discrimination (of all kinds) is available via
OBERAXE. Moreover, the Spanish Observatory for Religious Pluralism publishes information
on institutional legislation and regulation from the national to local level that is especially
useful for religious minorities as they navigate their rights to belief and practice in Spain. The
information provided by both bodies is extensive, but sometimes not specific to Spanish
Muslim youth, and may be difficult to digest. It would thus be useful to compile information in
a targeted way. Institutional policies and mechanisms, data about those civil society
organizations that help advise in instances of discrimination, and the information available
on religious pluralism, could all be incorporated into a tool. This tool should be designed so as
to be easily distributed among Muslim youth, in order to inform them of their rights and
options. The proposed targeted tool would of course draw on the wealth of information
already available, but particularly aggregate the information that is applicable to youth of
migrant origin who ascribe to the Muslim faith, as their case is a specific and complex one
involving multiple challenges, not limited to considerations of religious freedom.

The most obvious format might be twofold: a pamphlet for easy distribution that
provides preliminary information, and then a more in-depth, user-friendly internet
application that would allow the individual to indicate the query or problem. Based on the
nature of the query and the level at which it needs to be addressed (local, national,
international) the appropriate information and resources, and most importantly the most
relevant advocacy organization, could be provided in palatable form. Again, this tool would
go hand in hand with continued and increased efforts on the part of the state and civil society
to improve mechanisms and protections for non-discrimination and equality (in areas
including, but not limited to, racism, xenophobia and religious discrimination, depending on
how it pertains to the Muslim youth in question).

iii. Enforcing equality and non-discrimination safeguards

Developing a concrete and comprehensive tool that will better reach out to and advise
this particular target population may aid in increasing awareness. But simultaneously,
awareness of rights mechanisms must be complemented by a strengthening in the
mechanisms themselves. As previously described, the work of OBERAXE, the Council for the
Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination, and Spain’s Observatory for Religious Pluralism is indeed useful for local authorities, institutions and civil society organizations, and affected citizens, as they provide good practice guides, reporting mechanisms and resources. However, as alluded to in Chapter Eight, and as a previously referenced 2018 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance report notes, an equality body as such remains lacking. While these various initiatives monitor and report in order to combat discrimination, none are a completely autonomous public body. What is more, they lack the power of implementation that, for example, the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission exercises.

Spain would benefit from a similar, autonomous body that provides publicly funded legal support to those victims of discrimination. While civil society organizations do provide some support to victims of discrimination, a state-funded body that enforced the laws already in place in Spain would go a long way towards safeguarding citizen rights. It might perhaps encourage more incident records, if there was a promise of action and resolution when such incidents were reported. It would remain key in assisting victims of rights violations; e.g. those who do want to contest their right to wear the veil in the workplace. This institutional social commitment would allow for the most vulnerable to have access to legal aid, and would serve as a truly concrete implementation of institutionally espoused ideals.

iv. Correcting institutional biases

On a separate note, but in a similar vein (in that it treats of pursuing institutional equality), specifically addressing preferential treatment for religious collectives could be useful, although a bit more grandiose of a legislative project and thus only briefly discussed here. Despite the 1992 agreements with religious minorities, institutional bias in favor of Catholicism in Spain noted earlier in this work continues, and can perhaps create cleavages. Rather than seeking to eliminate preferential treatment, which might be a laborious and difficult process given resistant interest groups, one option may be to legislate similar
advantages for minority religious groups. Thus, instead of alienating or aggravating a
dominant group, leveling the playing field with similar advantages for minority populations
can ameliorate concerns and provide a sense of fairness.

v. Institutional protections during formative years

Finally, a more obvious recommendation includes measures to fight stereotypes and
bullying at a young age, perhaps via the educational system. Of course, this proves difficult to
identify, monitor, and implement. Hopefully, the changing societal fabric will help increase
exposure to pluralism and correct for ignorance and stereotypes in a kind of automatic, self-
correcting way. In addition, as noted earlier in this work, Islamophobia is increasingly
identified by society as an issue to rectify. In the discrimination outlined earlier, Ibrahim
draws attention to the frustrating misconceptions his cohort constantly faces when making a
new acquaintance:

"...at some point they ask about terrorism. And the fact that they are asking about
terrorism means they are linking me to terrorism...we have been in this situation
having to justify ourselves, that we have nothing to do with it... with a white person,
you don’t ask them about Hitler, making a connection with Hitler because Hitler was a
white person...they also ask a lot about dictatorships, which I have nothing to do with,
they ask me about Saudi Arabia and all, and they relate it with me, with us, which is
racist."

Leveraging the information and advocacy organizations already focusing on
Islamophobia in Spain, in order to conduct preventative or educational measures within the
school system, could be one way to go about addressing discrimination and bullying in
impressionable and formative years. Special programs directed at youth of migrant origin,
aimed at retention in the educational system, could also double as a feedback system for any
discrimination these youth face.

Essentially, in brief, there have been promising steps forward in raising awareness
and documenting problems with discrimination and equality in Spain. However, there is still
ample room for enhancement. Continued unawareness of rights puts this population at a
disadvantage. A synthesized account of projects underway, alongside an in-depth study of
rights mechanisms, organizations and bodies already in place, should be compiled. Once assembled into an easily accessible and specific form, it should be distributed as necessary among this particular group of affected youth. This can help to increase reporting and improve awareness. Finally, there is a necessity to create, fund and strengthen mechanisms that enforce and implement the institutional safeguards already in existence. This includes the strengthening of ongoing projects, and a need to renovate those projects that have reached the end of their funding. Such mechanisms should be available at both the level of civil society and institutionally, with specific examples including: a true equality body, correction of institutional biases, and providing assistance and recourse via the educational system.

**Future academic research**

Moreover, it would perhaps be useful to conduct future studies inquiring whether Muslim youth in Spain have reported the discrimination they face. Several studies suggest that experiences of discrimination vary widely in Spain. The proposed investigation might also assess Muslim youth’s rights awareness, and their knowledge of rights organizations and mechanisms to ensure these rights. The FRA’s survey reported that only 5% of the Muslims they surveyed knew of an equality organization in Spain (2017). In our analysis of the cohort in Madrid, while our participants faced actionable incidents, they seemed to shy from rectification. Only a few addressed whether they were aware of the recourses they had.

However, the topic of whether the youth reported experiences of discrimination was not addressed directly in this study, and as such would be a useful inquiry to include in future study, perhaps investigated via a broader comparative survey, throughout Spain. Such research would help provide insight as to whether there are deficiencies in reporting and to what extent this is problematic. This could encourage a conscious reflection that over-turns automatic reproduction of marginalization. It could be important to analyze whether
reporting levels or lack thereof contribute to a reproductive effect in cycles of discrimination, with embedded inequalities becoming entrenched rather than brought to light.

In addition to this specific line of questioning, of course, studies of a larger scale throughout Spain, examining the same variables identified in this study, would be useful to provide more comparative perspective. There is still ample room for data collection and analysis, especially given the relevance of this population set, and ongoing societal change.

In conclusion

While seeking to understand identity and religious attachment among second generation Muslim youth in Madrid, as well as Spanish societal and institutional influence on these processes, patterns of hybrid identity, experiences of discrimination and expectations of rights recognition emerged. These hybrid identities could include ethnic and religious identification that did not necessarily clash with a sense of belonging to the community of residence; rather, one aspect of their identity could even buttress and nourish another facet. While the cohort did not communicate grave distress about their experiences of discrimination, such incidences were prevalent, and inspired articulation of rights claims. Indeed, both individual and collective religious identification seemed to drive these youth towards Spanish civic participation. Many called for rights protections as a minority group, whether religious or of migrant origin.

While advocacy for cultural pluralism and the incorporation of various groups facilitates social interaction and dialogue, obstacles and institutional failures in protecting rights and ensuring societal inclusion remain a threat. These youth’s justified reaction and rights claims can serve as a promising indication of integration, as they clearly command enough confidence in their position in society to engage in claims-making in the first instance. However, going forward, anti-discrimination measures must remain a high priority if Spain is to avoid examples of negative trajectories witnessed in other European countries. A cautionary note ensues, as insufficient support or even impediments could augment
dissatisfaction and perceptions of disenfranchisement; the sense of belonging articulated as part of these hybrid identities could be jeopardized by the receiving environment.

The issues emphasized in relation to this particular group underlined broader themes, ones that have incurred renewed debate in the current discourse, although are certainly not unprecedented in the study of social interaction. In this case, religious practice does not seem to be as visible or detached as purported to be by its critics. Moreover, as secularist ideology asserts its own set of values and principles, for secular systems to truly provide the fairness the ideology promises, they should ensure that religious minorities have a voice. Religious identity, both at the individual and collective level, calls attention to repeated efforts throughout social science to pinpoint how people define the collective good. This search for the collective good is not limited to religious or spiritual individuals or groups, but underlies the very theory and policy behind integration efforts.

At this point, given the pluralism and overlap between groups and societies, scholars must focus their efforts on the agency and elasticity behind individual identity and the processes behind social relations at the most basic level, in order to better understand and account for larger collectives and greater transnational social phenomena. At this point, social life can be understood as an intermeshing of dynamic identities, rather than a series of separate groups pieced together alongside one another. Change and adaptation has always promised progress and improvement in all life processes, including the social, and they provide an inspiring pathway toward an enhanced coexistence. Madrid communities, Spain, and Europe should capitalize on and protect the diversity, dynamism and civic energy that Muslim youth of migrant origin in Madrid have to offer, recognizing and indeed benefiting from their potential and significance as society's future.
Appendix A: Outline/text of interview

No tiene que poner sus datos personales si no quiere. Estoy cursando un doctorado en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid y mi tesis trata sobre los retos que afrontan los jóvenes musulmanes en Madrid. Quiero explorar si España es un país abierto o si los jóvenes aquí se sienten discriminados de algún modo. También estudio la relación entre cómo los hijos de inmigrantes musulmanes se identifican y cómo expresan las diferentes formas de identidad.

Se puede contactarme a cboland@ucm.es o 629817790.

Muchas gracias por su tiempo.

Colleen Boland

Datos de la entrevista
1. Fecha y hora de la entrevista
2. Lugar de la entrevista

Datos del participante
1. ¿Cómo te llamas? (puede ser solo nombre, o anónimo)
2. ¿Dónde vives en Madrid?
3. ¿Cuál es tu correo o número de teléfono?
4. ¿Hombre o Mujer? ____________
5. Edad:

Identidad como segunda generación
1. ¿Dónde vive tu padre biológico?
2. ¿En qué país nació tu padre biológico?
3. ¿Tu padre es ciudadano español? Sí/No
   a. ¿Si no, que ciudadanía tiene?
4. ¿Dónde vive tu madre biológica?
5. ¿En qué país nació tu madre biológica?
6. ¿Tu madre es ciudadana española? Sí/No
   a. ¿Si no, que ciudadanía tiene?
7. ¿En qué ciudad y país naciste?
8. ¿Cuánto tiempo has vivido en España?
9. ¿Eres ciudadano/a español/a?
   a. Si no, ¿vas a intentar a obtener la ciudadanía español/a?
      i. Si no lo quieres intentar, ¿a que se debe?
   b. En el caso afirmativo, ¿eres ciudadano/a español/a de nacimiento?
      i. Si no, ¿cuándo obtuviste la nacionalidad española?
Identidad religiosa

1. ¿Te identificas con una religión? ¿Cuál?
   Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:
   1. La religión debería ser un asunto privado entre un individual y Dios.
   2. La religión debería estar representada en la política y la sociedad, junto con otros puntos de vista religiosos o políticos.
   3. La religión debe ser practicada de manera abierta y pública.

Los roles y el género

4. ¿Crees que las mujeres deben permanecer en casa si la familia tiene niños?
5. ¿Crees que las mujeres y los hombres deben compartir las tareas domésticas por igual?
6. ¿Crees que la educación superior es menos importante para las mujeres que para los hombres?
7. ¿Piensas que es importante que se trate a los hombres y a las mujeres por igual en la vida profesional?

Religión y política

8. ¿Crees que los líderes religiosos deberían influir en la política civil?
9. ¿Crees en los partidos políticos religiosos?
10. ¿Crees que la ley religiosa debe ser una parte de la ley civil?
11. ¿Crees que un país debería consagrar la libertad religiosa en sus leyes?
12. ¿Qué piensas sobre la democracia como sistema político?

Identidad musulmana (si el participante está auto-identificándose como así)

1. ¿Con qué frecuencia asistes a la mezquita (no incluyendo bodas, funerales y eventos sociales)?
   a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia
2. ¿Durante el Ramadán pasado, con qué frecuencia ayunabas?
   a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia
3. ¿Comes halal?
   a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia
4. ¿Con qué frecuencia rezas las oraciones diarias?
   a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia
5. ¿Tratas de seguir las leyes de dieta islámicas?
   a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia
   b. Si a veces/con frecuencia, ¿cuáles?
6. ¿Has recibido algún tipo de educación formal en Islam?
7. Las mujeres musulmanas deben usar pañuelos en la cabeza o deben cubrirse la cabeza fuera de la casa:
   a. Porque es una elección libre y personal
   b. Porque es una obligación religiosa
   c. Porque es parte de su/mi identidad
   d. Porque quiero/quieren evitar falta de respeto o persecución
   e. No debo/deben llevar un pañuelo
   f. Neutral sobre los pañuelos
g. Otra razón: Explica, por favor.

Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:

8. Soy musulmán/a, pero no practico mi fe abiertamente.
9. No creo necesariamente en todos los principios del Islam, pero aun así, diría que soy musulmán/a.
10. No soy religioso/a, pero aun así, diría que soy musulmán/a.

Familiares y amigos

1. (Si tu padre nació en un país extranjero) ¿Cuándo vino tu padre a España?
2. (Si tu madre nació en un país extranjero) ¿Cuándo vino tu madre a España?
3. ¿Cuál es la ocupación de tu padre?
4. ¿Cuál es la ocupación de tu madre?
5. ¿Cuál es la titulación más alta de tu padre?
6. ¿Cuál es la titulación más alta de tu madre?
7. ¿Cómo clasificarías la situación económica de tu familia?
   a. (muy pobre/clase obrera/media baja/media alta/rico)
8. ¿Vives con tu familia? Si/no
   a. ¿Si es así, con que familiares vives?
   b. ¿Si no, con quién vives?
9. ¿Qué idioma hablas con tus padres?
10. ¿En qué idioma prefieres hablar normalmente?
11. ¿Cuántos de tus amigos cercanos tienen padres que no fueron nacidos en España?
   a. Ninguno/algunos/muchos
   b. Si algunos/muchos, ¿de dónde son los padres de estos amigos?
12. ¿Hablas español con tus amigos cercanos?
   a. ¿Con ninguno de ellos/con algunos de ellos/con la mayoría de ellos?
13. ¿Hablas otro idioma, aparte del español, con tus amigos cercanos?
   a. ¿Con ninguno de ellos/con algunos de ellos/con la mayoría de ellos?
14. ¿Si hablas otro idioma con algunos/la mayoría de ellos, cuál idioma?
15. ¿Tienes pareja?
   a. ¿Cómo has conocido a tu pareja?
   b. ¿En qué país nació tu pareja?
   c. ¿En qué país nacieron los padres de tu pareja?
   d. ¿Qué idioma hablas con tu pareja?

Mano de obra/empleo

1. ¿Tienes trabajo en este momento? Si no, por favor, continúa a “Educación”
2. ¿Es a tiempo completo o a tiempo parcial?
3. ¿Cuál es tu trabajo?
4. ¿Qué trabajo te gustaría tener?
5. ¿Cómo has encontrado tu trabajo?

Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:

6. Tu trabajo se corresponde con tu nivel de educación y habilidades.
7. Has percibido discriminación en tu búsqueda de empleo.
8. Personas con padres nativos españoles tienen más oportunidades de empleo.

**Educación**

1. ¿Cuál es la titulación más alta que tienes?
2. ¿Te has sentido alguna vez discriminado por parte de tus profesores o compañeros?
3. ¿Estás satisfecho con el nivel de educación que has recibido?

*Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:*

4. El sistema de educación español ofrece oportunidades de igual a todos.

**Identidad/Sentido de pertenencia**

1. ¿Cómo te identificas?
   - Español/a
   - Musulmán/a
   - Musulmán/a Madrileño/a
   - Musulmán/a Español/a
   - Madrileño/a
   - Con el país de origen de mis padres
   - Otra respuesta: ______________

2. ¿Cómo te identifica tu familia?
   - Español/a
   - Musulmán/a
   - Musulmán/a Madrileño/a
   - Musulmán/a Español/a
   - Madrileño/a
   - Con el país de origen de mis padres
   - Otra respuesta: ______________

3. ¿Cómo te identifican tus amigos?
   - Español/a
   - Musulmán/a
   - Musulmán/a Madrileño/a
   - Musulmán/a Español/a
   - Madrileño/a
   - Con el país de origen de mis padres
   - Otra respuesta: ______________

4. ¿Cómo te identifica la sociedad en general?
   - Español/a
   - Musulmán/a
   - Musulmán/a Madrileño/a
   - Musulmán/a Español/a
   - Madrileño/a
   - Con el país de origen de mis padres
   - Otra respuesta: ______________

5. ¿Qué país sientes más como tú “casa”: España, o el país de origen de tus padres?

6. ¿Tienes derecho a votar?
   - a. ¿En caso afirmativo, has votado alguna vez?
      - i. ¿En caso afirmativo, cuál es tu preferencia de partido político? Partido
Popular/Partido Socialista Obrero
Español/Podemos/Ciudadanos/Izquierda Unida/Otra

7. ¿Quieres permanecer en España en el futuro?
8. ¿Quieres permanecer en Madrid en el futuro?
9. ¿Quieres permanecer en tu barrio en el futuro?
10. ¿Cómo describirías el barrio?
   a. muy pobre/clase obrera/media baja/media alta/rico
11. ¿Participas en actividades y organizaciones?
    a. ¿En caso afirmativo, cuáles?
12. En los últimos cinco años, ¿has solicitado ayuda en cualquiera de las siguientes áreas?
    Educación/Empleo/Vivienda/Salud
    a. ¿En caso afirmativo, dónde has buscado ayuda?
       ● La familia
       ● Tus amigos
       ● Recursos/sitio web de Ayuntamiento de Madrid
       ● Recursos/sitio del barrio/distrito
       ● Comunidad religiosa
       ● Comunidad del barrio
       ● Otra respuesta: __________

Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:

13. Me siento diferente de otros españoles.
14. No hay mejor país para vivir que España.
15. No hay mejor ciudad para vivir que Madrid.

La experiencia de la discriminación

1. ¿Te has sentido discriminado? Sí/No
   En el caso afirmativo:
   2. ¿Con que frecuencia te sientes discriminado/a?
   3. ¿Dónde y con quien te sientes discriminado/a? Por favor, explica.
      a. Por ejemplo, en la escuela/en el trabajo/buscando trabajo/ocio/en el barrio/con la policía/otra respuesta ______
   4. ¿Cuál piensas que fue la razón principal por la discriminación?
      Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:

   5. Hay discriminación en la sociedad española.
      a. ¿Si “de acuerdo” o “parcialmente de acuerdo,” contra quién?
   7. Me siento rechazado/a por mis creencias religiosas.
   8. En general, la sociedad española discrimina a los musulmanes.
   9. No importa el nivel de mi educación o mi empleo, la gente todavía me discrimina.
   10. La sociedad española da la bienvenida a las diferentes creencias.
   11. La sociedad española da la bienvenida a las religiones.
   12. No me siento discriminado en la sociedad española.
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