RT Journal Article
T1 The representational semantic conception
A1 Suárez, Mauricio
A1 Pero, Francesca
AB This article argues for a representational semantic conception (RSC) of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely, that theories can be characterized as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modeling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse representational practices in the sciences. These insights are applied to some mathematical models, thus showing that the mathematical sciences are not in principle counterexamples to RSC.
PB Cambridge University Press
SN 0031-8248
YR 2019
FD 2019
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/98822
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/98822
LA eng
NO Suárez, Mauricio and Pero, Francesca. 2019. "The Representational Semantic Conception", Philosophy of Science, 86 (2), pp. 344-365.
NO Mauricio Suárez would like to acknowledge support from the Spanish government (DGCyT research project FFI2014-57064-P). Francesca Pero acknowledges support from the Department of Philosophy, University of Florence.
NO Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (España) 
DS Docta Complutense
RD 17 abr 2025