%0 Book Section
%T Coalition Governments and Electoral Behavior: Who Is Accountable?
publisher Springer Berlin
%D 2011
%U 9783642195198
%@ https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/129171
%X [Resumen del libro] Elections have been studied in political sciences from two different points of view: either by looking at the selection of ‘good types’ – prospective mechanism – or by studying the sanctions – retrospective mechanism. If we assume that elections are a question about sanctioning, it is widespread that citizens may not assign responsibilities to multiparty cabinets. Thus, scholars have concluded that economic voting does not work properly in the case of coalition governments. This argument has been coined as the hypothesis of ‘clarity of responsibility’. However, if so, how do they explain the electoral results of coalition governments? What do voters consider when they evaluate a multiparty cabinet? In this chapter, Urquizu Sancho discusses some theoretical arguments that question that hypothesis. In fact, this research develops the causal mechanisms that explain how economic voting work for multiparty cabinets.
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