RT Book, Section
T1 Coalition Governments and Electoral Behavior: Who Is Accountable?
A1 Urquizu Sancho, Ignacio
A2 Schofield, Norman
A2 Caballero, Gonzalo
AB [Resumen del libro] Elections have been studied in political sciences from two different points of view: either by looking at the selection of ‘good types’ – prospective mechanism – or by studying the sanctions – retrospective mechanism. If we assume that elections are a question about sanctioning, it is widespread that citizens may not assign responsibilities to multiparty cabinets. Thus, scholars have concluded that economic voting does not work properly in the case of coalition governments. This argument has been coined as the hypothesis of ‘clarity of responsibility’. However, if so, how do they explain the electoral results of coalition governments? What do voters consider when they evaluate a multiparty cabinet? In this chapter, Urquizu Sancho discusses some theoretical arguments that question that hypothesis. In fact, this research develops the causal mechanisms that explain how economic voting work for multiparty cabinets.
PB Springer Berlin
SN 9783642195198
YR 2011
FD 2011
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/129171
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/129171
LA eng
NO Urquizu-Sancho, Ignacio. «Coalition Governments and Electoral Behavior: Who Is Accountable?» Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting, editado por Norman Schofield y Gonzalo Caballero, Springer, 2011, pp. 185-213. Springer Link, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19519-8_9.
DS Docta Complutense
RD 25 ene 2026