RT Journal Article
T1 Auctions: A New Method for Selling Objects with Bimodal Density Functions
A1 Castro Cantalejo, Javier
A1 Espínola Vílchez, María Rosario
A1 Gutiérrez García-Pardo, Inmaculada
A1 Gómez González, Daniel
AB In this paper we define a new auction, called the Draw auction. It is based on the implementation of a draw when a minimum price of sale is not reached. We find that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is reached in the Draw auction when each player bids his true personal valuation of the object. Furthermore, we show that the expected profit for the seller in the Draw auction is greater than in second-price auctions, with or without minimum price of sale. We make this affirmation for objects whose valuation can be modeled as a bimodal density function in which the first mode is much greater than the second one. Regarding the Myerson auction, we show that the expected profit for the seller in the Draw auction is nearly as good as the expected profit in the optimal auction, with the difference that our method is much more simple to implement than Myerson’s one. All these results are shown by computational tests, for whose development we have defined an algorithm to calculate Myerson auction.
PB Springer Nature
SN 0927-7099
YR 2022
FD 2022-04-03
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/71561
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/71561
LA eng
NO CRUE-CSIC (Acuerdos Transformativos 2022)
NO Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (MICINN)
NO Universidad Complutense de Madrid
DS Docta Complutense
RD 7 abr 2025