RT Report
T1 Some results on stability concepts for matching models
A1 Camiña Centeno, Ester
AB We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the non-existence of unsatis…ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game.
PB Facultad de CC Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico
YR 2010
FD 2010-12
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/48956
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/48956
LA eng
NO JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78.
NO España. Ministerio de Educación
NO Universidad Complutense de Madrid
DS Docta Complutense
RD 12 may 2025