RT Conference Proceedings
T1 A common mistake on weakness of will
A1 González Castán, Óscar Lucas
A2 Philosophy Documentation Center, 
AB In this paper I propose the sketch of an explanatory model to deal with cases of weakness of will that has some advantages in comparison with other well-known and influential theories. The main thesis of this model, of classical inspiration, is that the weak-willed agent should be portrayed as someone who has a sort of divided self. The development of this idea will allow us to place back desire to the central stage in the explanation of this phenomenon. According to this model we do not need to give up the idea that the agent forms and maintains an unconditional intention of doing the action that he finally fails to do, as Davidson’s epistemic version of the phenomenon proposes, but we do no need to rely on the idea that there is a causal gap between intentions and actions, as Searle’s ontological version of it makes us think.
YR 2013
FD 2013
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/122305
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/122305
LA eng
NO González-Castán, Óscar L. (2013). “A Common Mistake on Weakness of Will”, in Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, vol. 44, pp. 27-31.
NO Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (España)
DS Docta Complutense
RD 12 jul 2025