RT Book, Section
T1 Second order beliefs and second order controversies: justification and normativity
A1 González Castán, Óscar Lucas
A2 Jiménez Perona, Ángeles
AB There is a quite relevant aspect for philosophical discussion that, nevertheless, recent literature on controversies does not deal with properly, i.e., the problem of second order controversies. These are controversies that the contending parties establish about the meaning of a set of first order beliefs and theories once they are generally accepted by the participants. A historical example of this kind of second order controversies is the classical discussion between “instrumentalists” and “realistic” interpretations of Copernicus’ theories. What is at stake in second order controversies is the general structure and dynamics of our belief system and not so much its particular semantic contents. These second order controversies have two different normative implications. On the one hand, they provide ideas about how our belief system should be compartmentalized, for example, whether or not religious and scientific beliefs should have some interesting inferential relationships. On the other hand, they give further motives to cognitively evaluate first order beliefs.
PB Mimesis Edizioni
SN 978-88-69770-01-2
YR 2015
FD 2015
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/123830
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/123830
LA eng
NO González-Castán, Óscar L. (2015). “Second Order Beliefs and Controversies: Justification and Normativity”, en Normativity and Praxis: Remarks on Controversies, Ángeles J. Perona (ed.), Milán, Mimesis Edizioni, pp. 39-61.
NO Texto escrito en el marco del Grupo de investigación "Materialismo crítico" (9330664) de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.
NO Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (España)
DS Docta Complutense
RD 30 dic 2025