RT Journal Article
T1 Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer
A1 Davia, Cory
A1 Palmira, Michele
AB Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
PB Oxford University Press
SN 0031-8094
YR 2015
FD 2015
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/132007
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/132007
LA eng
NO Davia, C., & Palmira, M. (2015). Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer. The Philosophical Quarterly, 65(261), 605-625. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv014
NO The second author’s research was supported by the project PRIN (Progetti di Ricerca di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale) "Realismo e Oggettivita" (20107738C5_007) and by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Centre de Recherche en Ethique and the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativite (GRIN).
NO Centre de Recherche en Ethique (Montreal)
NO Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca (Italia)
NO Fonds de recherche du Québec
DS Docta Complutense
RD 18 mar 2026