%0 Book Section
%T The case for conventionalism about personhood
publisher Routledge
%D 2025
%U 9781041083856
%U 9781003645122
%@ https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/135001
%X The problem of personhood, as I will understand it in this paper, is the problem of which properties define the class of persons. The standard response to this problem is that to be a person means having certain higher-order psychological capacities. Call this “cognitivism” about personhood. By contrast, conventionalism about personhood claims that to be a person is to occupy a role within certain normative conventions. In this paper, I argue against cognitivism and in favour of conventionalism. To do so, first I present both cognitivism and conventionalism. Second, I introduce two of the strongest arguments for cognitivism. Third, I show that we should reject both arguments. Finally, I conclude that the insights we can get from the discussion support a certain type of conventionalism.
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