RT Journal Article
T1 Hardware Trojan detection via rewriting logic
A1 Asavoae, Irina Mariuca
A1 Tofighi Shirazi, Ramtine
A1 Riesco Rodríguez, Adrián
A1 Yasuyoshi, Uemura
AB Hardware security studies, discovers, and classifies hardware attacks as well as defense strategies such as prevention and protection methods along the entire hardware production chain. Hardware Trojans represents a hardware attack model that emerged in the last decades in the hardware security community. In this paper, we present a methodology for achieving a scalable approach to detect hardware Trojans at the design stage using program transformation in a rewrite-based environment. We note that the hardware Trojan attack considered here assumes the vulnerability introduction during the hardware design stage while the payload is obtained as information leakage during the hardware usage. The main contribution in our work is the methodology correctness proof for a high security evaluation assurance level. We also benchmark the effectiveness of our methodology on industrial hardware designs, e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard cores, which is widely used and deployed for numerous devices and applications.
PB Elsevier
SN 2352-2208
YR 2022
FD 2022
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/91467
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/91467
LA eng
NO Asăvoae, Irina Măriuca, et al. «Hardware Trojan Detection via Rewriting Logic». Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming, vol. 127, junio de 2022, p. 100762. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlamp.2022.100762.
NO Comunidad de Madrid
NO European Commission
DS Docta Complutense
RD 6 abr 2025