TY  - RPRT
AU  - Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
PY  - 2024
SN  - 2341-2356
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/105005
AB  - We examine social choice correspondences (SCCs) -mappings from preference profiles to sets of alternatives- that satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity when individuals are endowed with single-peaked preferences over alternatives, preferences over...
LA  - eng
A3  - Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico
KW  - Strategy-Proofness
KW  - Single-Peaked Preferences
KW  - Social Choice Correspondences
TI  - Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single Peaked Preferences
TY  - technical report
ER  -