RT Conference Proceedings
T1 Measuring the benefits of lying in MARA under egalitarian social welfare
A1 Carrero, Jonathan
A1 Rodríguez Laguna, Ismael
A1 Rubio Díez, Fernando
AB When some resources are to be distributed among a set of agents following egalitarian social welfare, the goal is to maximize the utility of the agent whose utility turns out to be minimal. In this context, agents can have an incentive to lie about their actual preferences, so that more valuable resources are assigned to them. In this paper we analyze this situation, and we present a practical study where genetic algorithms are used to assess the benefits of lying under different situations.
SN 978-1-7281-8527-9
SN 1062-922X
YR 2020
FD 2020-10-14
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/126134
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/126134
LA eng
DS Docta Complutense
RD 24 mar 2026