TY  - CPAPER
AU  - Carrero, Jonathan
AU  - Rodríguez Laguna, Ismael
AU  - Rubio Díez, Fernando
PY  - 2020
DO  - 10.1109/SMC42975.2020.9282975
SN  - 978-1-7281-8527-9
SN  - 1062-922X
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/126134
AB  - When some resources are to be distributed among a set of agents following egalitarian social welfare, the goal is to maximize the utility of the agent whose utility turns out to be minimal. In this context, agents can have an incentive to lie about...
LA  - eng
TI  - Measuring the benefits of lying in MARA under egalitarian social welfare
TY  - conference paper
ER  -