RT Journal Article
T1 The Stackelberg–Armstrong model
A1 Sánchez Cartas, Juan Manuel
AB We show that sequential (Stackelberg) competition between two-sided platforms can overturn the price-skewness ranking of the Armstrong (2006) competition benchmark: the side subsidized under simultaneous pricing may become the taxed side under sequential play. The mechanism is that the Stackelberg leader internalizes cross-side feedback through the follower’s best response, which introduces both externalities into each side’s markup and can reverse which side is subsidized. The equilibrium is unique, admits closed-form solutions under standard interiority/concavity conditions, and is directly comparable to Armstrong’s benchmark. Both platforms earn strictly more than under simultaneous play, and we characterize a sharp threshold separating second-mover from first-mover advantage.
PB Elsevier
SN 0165-1765
YR 2026
FD 2026
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/136561
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/136561
LA eng
NO Sanchez-Cartas, J. M. (2026). The stackelberg–armstrong model. Economics Letters, 265, 113019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113019
NO Fundación Ramón Areces
DS Docta Complutense
RD 7 jun 2026