RT Journal Article
T1 A Monotonic Weighted Shapley Value
A1 Manuel García, Conrado Miguel
A1 Martín García, Daniel
AB In this paper we deal with TU-games in which players possibly have different cooperation levels or different willingness to cooperate. The dividend (and thus the value) of each coalition is modified to take into account the cooperation abilities of players in that coalition. Then, we propose as point solution for these situations the Shapley value of the modified game. This allocation rule, -a new kind of weighted Shapley value- is inefficient, which is justified by the imperfect cooperation and it satisfies several interesting properties. In particular, for superadditive games, increasing the weight of a player does not decrease his value. Moreover, different characterizations for this rule can be obtained. They are parallel to those more prominent existing in the literature for the Shapley value.
PB Springer
SN 0926-2644
YR 2020
FD 2020
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/92274
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/92274
LA eng
NO Manuel, C.M. y Martín, D. (2020) «A Monotonic Weighted Shapley Value», Group Decision and Negotiation, 29(4), pp. 627-654. doi:10.1007/S10726-020-09671-5.
NO Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (España)
DS Docta Complutense
RD 25 mar 2026