RT Journal Article
T1 Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology
A1 Loss, Roberto
AB According to the thesis known as ‘Composition as Identity’ (‘CAI’), every entity is identical to the parts it fuses. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that, in spite of its controversial character, one attractive virtue of CAI is its apparent ability to give a straightforward account of the innocence of mereology. In this paper I will present a simple argument according to which CAI entails that no composite entity can be said to be ontologically innocent in the relevant sense. After having shown that said argument is independent from the problems surrounding the infamous ‘Collapse Principle’, I will conclude that CAI-theorists should endorse a suitably ‘restricted’ version of CAI. In the final part of the paper I will then argue that the best restricted version of CAI is the theory according to which every composite entity is identical to the plurality of its atomic parts.
PB Wiley
SN 0031-8205
YR 2021
FD 2021-07-07
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/4638
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/4638
LA eng
NO CRUE-CSIC (Acuerdos Transformativos 2021)
NO Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (MICINN)
NO Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
DS Docta Complutense
RD 28 abr 2024