RT Journal Article
T1 Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check
A1 Palmira, Michele
AB The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher-order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double-checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one's belief in the face of higher-order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which appeals to the notion of defeat.
PB Wiley
SN 0029-4624
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/131988
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/131988
LA eng
NO Palmira, M. (2024). Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check. Noûs, 58(3), 799-824. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12479
NO Issue Online: 15 August 2024 ; Version of Record online: 25 September 2023.El trabajo en este artículo ha recibido financiación de la Ayuda para contratos Ramón y Cajal (RYC2018-024624-I).
NO European Commission
NO Universidad Complutense de Madrid
NO Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)
DS Docta Complutense
RD 19 mar 2026