RT Report
T1 Lies and layoffs. Asymmetric information and unemployment equilibrium
A1 Malowny, John
AB Implicit contracts were initially seen as a form of insurance. Workers bought a less variable wage at the expense of a slightly lower average wage. But as long as this idea of implicit contracts persisted, they could do little to explain unemployment. A risk-averse worker is unlikely to buy a steadier wage if it is at the increased risk of losing his job. He might do so if the disutility of labour or the level of unemployment benefit were high enough, but in such cases we are effectively back with the classical version of unemployment.
PB Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Decanato
SN 2255-5471
YR 1987
FD 1987
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/65984
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/65984
LA eng
DS Docta Complutense
RD 11 abr 2025