RT Report
T1 Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game
A1 Álvarez González, Francisco
A1 Deissenberg, Christophe
AB Se presenta un juego repetido que modeliza la interacción entre un gobierno optimizador y el sector privado, representado por un continuo de agentes heterogéneos y atomísticos.Abstract: This paper presents a simple repeated-game model of interactionbetween an optimizing government and the private sector. Two polar cases areconsidered: (a) the private sector is represented by a single agent; and (b) thereis a continuum of heterogenous atomistic private agents. In both cases, the governmentstarts each repetition by making a non-binding announcement about its future actions. The players have complete and perfect information, with one exception: the private agents do not know whether or not the government will act as announced. Thus, each private agent i either behaves with probability πi as if it trusted the announcement, or plays with probability 1 − πi as a Stackelberg leader. After observing the reaction of the private sector, the government
PB Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico. Universidad Complutense de Madrid
YR 2001
FD 2001
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/64463
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/64463
LA eng
NO JEL classification: C69, C79, E5
DS Docta Complutense
RD 8 abr 2025