RT Journal Article
T1 Splitting graphs when calculating Myerson value for pure overhead games
A1 González-Arangüena, Enrique
A1 Manuel García, Conrado Miguel
A1 Owen, Guillermo
A1 Pozo, M. del
A1 Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio
AB A communication situation consists of a coalitional game and a graph, the nodes of the graph corresponding to the players of the game. To calculate the Myerson value for such situations, we obtain results which extend those well known for trees and cycle-complete graphs. On the other hand, in order to reduce the associated calculus for communication situations with a pure overhead game, the possibility of splitting the graph in several subgraphs is analyzed. For each fixed decomposition of the graph, a subspace of games compatible with this decomposition is given.
PB Springer
SN 1432-2994
YR 2004
FD 2004-07
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/50046
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/50046
LA eng
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DS Docta Complutense
RD 2 may 2024