RT Journal Article
T1 Market power in California's water market
A1 Tomori, Françeska
A1 Ansink, Erik
A1 Houba, Harold
A1 Hagerty, Nick
A1 Bos, Charles
AB We estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.
PB Wiley
SN 0002-9092
YR 2023
FD 2023-10-28
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/134133
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/134133
LA eng
NO Tomori, Françeska, Ansink, Erik, Houba, Harold, Hagerty, Nick, and Bos, Charles. 2024. “Market Power in California's Water Market.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 106(3): 1274–1299. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12434
NO Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)
NO Universitat Rovira i Virgili
NO Generalitat de Catalunya
DS Docta Complutense
RD 9 abr 2026