RT Journal Article
T1 On single-peakedness and strategy-proofness: ties between adjacent alternatives
A1 Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
AB We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in the single-peaked domain of preferences by Moulin (Public Choice, 1980) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (Journal of Economic Theory, 1993) to multivalued social choice rules that admit either the selection of single alternatives or the selection of pairs of adjacent alternatives.
PB Economics Bulletin
SN 1545-2921
YR 2017
FD 2017
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/18852
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/18852
LA eng
NO Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO)
DS Docta Complutense
RD 8 abr 2025