%0 Report
%A Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
%T Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof Pairwise Exchange
%J Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
%D 2021
%@ 2341-2356
%U https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/11918
%X We analyze centralized non-monetary markets for indivisible objects through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We characterize a family of do- mains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) such that there exist pairwise exchange rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Minimal reversal domains are maximal rich domains for individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy- proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common rank- ing but for a specific pair of objects.
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