RT Report
T1 Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof Pairwise Exchange
A1 Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
AB We analyze centralized non-monetary markets for indivisible objects through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We characterize a family of do- mains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) such that there exist pairwise exchange rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Minimal reversal domains are maximal rich domains for individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy- proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common rank- ing but for a specific pair of objects.
PB Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
SN 2341-2356
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/11918
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/11918
LA eng
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NO Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO)
NO Fundación Ramón Areces
DS Docta Complutense
RD 1 sept 2024