RT Journal Article
T1 Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
A1 Llamazares, Bonifacio
A1 Pérez-Asurmendi, Patrizia
AB In this paper we study to what extent majorities based on difference in support leads to triple-acyclic collective decisions. These majorities, which take into account voters’ intensities of preference between pairs of alternatives through reciprocal preference relations, require to the winner alternative to exceed the support for the other alternative in a difference fixed before the election. Depending on that difference, i.e., on the threshold of support, and on some requirements on the individual rationality of the voters, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding cycles of three alternatives on the collective decision.
PB Elsevier
SN 0020-0255
YR 2015
FD 2015-04-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/23709
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/23709
LA eng
NO Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO)
NO Junta de Castilla y León
DS Docta Complutense
RD 1 may 2024