TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
PY  - 2023
DO  - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.004
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/103811
T2  - Mathematical Social Sciences
AB  - We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the...
LA  - eng
M2  - 107
PB  - Elsevier
KW  - Pairwise exchange
KW  - Individual rationality
KW  - Constrained efficiency
KW  - Strategy-proofness
KW  - Maximal domain
TI  - Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
TY  - journal article
VL  - 126
ER  -