RT Report
T1 A note on Lindahl equilibria and incentive comparatibility
A1 Corchón, Luis C.
AB We show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lindahl equilibrium (L.E) is a Nash equilibrium (N.E.) in a price-setting game, b) not all N.E. are L.E., but just those for which the production of the public good is positive and c) the set of L.E. and Strong Equilibria coincide. However if the supply function is continuously differentiable, L.E. is never a N.E. We end the paper with some general comments about the nature of the incentive problem.
PB Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Decanato
SN 2255-5471
YR 1988
FD 1988
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/63872
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/63872
LA eng
DS Docta Complutense
RD 29 abr 2025