RT Journal Article
T1 Marginality and Myerson values
A1 Manuel García, Conrado Miguel
A1 Ortega Castelló, Eduardo
A1 Del Pozo, Miguel
AB The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between marginality and the Myerson value, the within groups Myerson value (WG-Myerson value) and the between groups Myerson value (BG-Myerson value). We enlarge the idea of the classical marginal contribution of a player to a coalition in a cooperative game. Besides this type of contribution, in games with cooperation restricted by a graph, a player can contribute to a coalition in other ways. For example, lending his links to the coalition but without joining it. We will call it the marginal contribution of the player's links (L-marginal contribution). Also he can contribute to a coalition by joining it with his communication possibilities. This is the marginal contribution of the player with his links (PL-marginal contribution). According to this, we define the strong monotonicity of the allocation rules with respect to the L-marginal contributions (and the L-marginality); and similarly, the strong monotonicity with respect to the PL-marginal contributions (and the PL-marginality). We prove that the Myerson value, the WG-Myerson value and the BG-Myerson value can be characterized using as requirement PL-marginality, marginality and L-marginality, respectively (as well as other properties).
PB Elsevier
SN 0377-2217
YR 2020
FD 2020
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/91993
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/91993
LA eng
NO Manuel, Ortega y del Pozo (2020) «Marginality and Myerson values», European Journal of Operational Research, 284(1), pp. 301-312. doi:10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.12.021.
NO Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España)
DS Docta Complutense
RD 5 abr 2025