RT Journal Article
T1 Reciprocal cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma repeated with random horizon
A1 Manuel García, Conrado Miguel
A1 Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio
AB A standard assumption on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is that the probability of further interaction is constant. Then, cooperation via reciprocity can be guaranteed if and only if this probability is sufficiently high. In this paper, we analyze a more realistic model: a discrete random variable, not necessarily geometric, governs the number of interactions. We obtain necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for reciprocal cooperation based on the use of TFT strategy by both players. The obtained conditions are particularized to classes of distributions with monotonous failure rate and to some relevant probability models.
PB Springer
SN 1134-5764
YR 1995
FD 1995
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/57465
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/57465
DS Docta Complutense
RD 30 abr 2024