RT Journal Article
T1 Linear production games with committee control: Limiting behaviour of the core
A1 Molina Ferragut, Elisenda
A1 Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio
AB We study the relation between the core of a given controlled committee LP-game and the set of payoff vectors generated by shadow prices and core allocations of those simple games describing the control over the different resources. The central problem we tackle is the convergence of the core of LP-games with committee control to the set of competitive equilibria, which we define as the set previously described, as the number of players increases uniformly.
PB Elsevier Science
SN 0377-2217
YR 2004
FD 2004-05-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/50047
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/50047
LA eng
NO Generalitat Valenciana (Pla Valencià d'Investigació Científica i Desenvolupament Tecnòlogic
NO Gobierno de España
DS Docta Complutense
RD 9 abr 2025