RT Journal Article
T1 Strategic signaling and new technologically superior product introduction: A game-theoretic model with simulation
A1 Madjid Tavana, 
A1 Debora Di Caprio, 
A1 Santos Arteaga, Francisco Javier
AB User acceptance of technology is essential to determine its success. The current paperincorporates the main properties of the technology acceptance models (TAMs) developed by management scholars into a pre-commitment signaling duopolistic framework, where two competingfirms must decide the level of technological improvement of the products being introduced. As aresult, the corresponding equilibria of the duopolistic technological games will be determined bydemand-based factors, providing a novel approach and complementing the current supply-basedeconomic and operational research models developed in the literature. The proposed model will besimulated numerically to illustrate the strategic optimality of the update process of smartphone andtablet characteristics defined by Apple and Samsung as the market developed.
PB Vilnius Tech
SN 2029-4913
SN 2029-4921
YR 2018
FD 2018-08-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/113945
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/113945
LA eng
NO Tavana, M., Di Caprio, D., & Santos-Arteaga, F. J. (2018). Strategic signaling and new technologically superior product introduction: A game-theoretic model with simulation. Technological and Economic Development of Economy, 24(4), 1466-1498. https://doi.org/10.3846/TEDE.2018.4531
DS Docta Complutense
RD 20 abr 2025