RT Journal Article
T1 Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?
A1 André García, Francisco Javier
A1 Mazón Calpena, Cristina
A1 Álvarez González, Francisco
AB We study the efficiency of the uniform auction as an allocation mechanism for emission permits among polluting firms. In our model, firms have private information about their abatement costs, which differ across firms and across units, and bidders’ demands are linear. We show that there is a continuum of interior Bayesian Nash equilibria, and only one is efficient, minimizing abatement costs. We find that the existence of many bidders is not a sufficient condition to guarantee an efficient equilibrium in the uniform auction. Additionally, bidders’ types have to be uncorrelated.
PB Springer
SN 0938-2259
YR 2019
FD 2019
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/92704
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/92704
LA eng
NO Alvarez, Francisco, Cristina Mazón, y Francisco Javier André. «Assigning Pollution Permits: Are Uniform Auctions Efficient?» Economic Theory 67, n.o 1 (febrero de 2019): 211-48. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1.
NO Comunidad de Madrid
NO European Commission
NO Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España)
DS Docta Complutense
RD 11 abr 2025