TY  - JOUR
AU  - André García, Francisco Javier
AU  - Mazón Calpena, Cristina
AU  - Álvarez González, Francisco
PY  - 2019
DO  - 10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1
SN  - 0938-2259
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/92704
T2  - Economic Theory
AB  - We study the efficiency of the uniform auction as an allocation mechanism for emission permits among polluting firms. In our model, firms have private information about their abatement costs, which differ across firms and across units, and bidders’...
LA  - eng
M2  - 211
PB  - Springer
KW  - Emission permits
KW  - Uniform auction
KW  - Efficiency
KW  - Incomplete information simultaneous games
TI  - Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?
TY  - journal article
VL  - 67
ER  -