RT Report
T1 Rent seeking for export licenses: Application to the Vietnam rice market
A1 Vu, Tan Ngoc
A1 Vo, Duc Hong
A1 McAleer, Michael
AB The paper develops a model to examine rent seeking in innovation and export licenses, with an application to Vietnam rice exports. Firms can lobby for export restrictions or for free trade. Innovation is introduced as a cost-reducing technology. The analysis focuses on the innovation incentives of the firm lobbying for export restrictions, and the determinants of lobbying incentives. The analysis shows that firms lobbying for export restrictions may have lower incentives to adopt technological innovations under export restrictions than under free trade. The findings can help to identify economic inefficiency when the political elites use export restrictions to seek rents.
PB Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
SN 2341-2356
YR 2019
FD 2019
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/17468
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/17468
LA eng
DS Docta Complutense
RD 3 sept 2025