RT Journal Article
T1 Agency theory: Forecasting agent remuneration at insurance companies
A1 Turrado García, Fernando
A1 Sandoval Orozco, Ana Lucila
A1 García Pineda, M. Pilar
A1 García Villalba, Luis Javier
AB The principal–agent problem occurs when one entity (the ‘‘agent’’), is able to make decisions and/or take actions on behalf of another person or entity (the ‘‘principal’’). The agent earnings are regulated under a contract designed by the principal. Under the principal’s point of view, the main goal while designing said contract (and the payment rules incorporated on it) is to align the actions made by the agent to the principal’s own goals. So, in this paper we will define a method that will allow the principal to forecast the remuneration obtained by the agent under an established contract in the insurance sector.
PB Elsevier
SN 0957-4174
YR 2022
FD 2022-11-24
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/72823
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/72823
LA eng
NO CRUE-CSIC (Acuerdos Transformativos 2022)
DS Docta Complutense
RD 15 may 2024