RT Journal Article
T1 Spillovers and strategic interaction in immigration policies
A1 Görlach, Joseph-Simon
A1 Motz, Nicolás Peer
AB Asylum policies are interdependent across countries: policy choices in one country can affect refugee flows into neighbouring countries and may provoke policy changes there, in an a priori unknown direction. We formulate a dynamic model of refugees’ location choices and of the strategic interaction among destinations that we fit to Syrian refugee migration to Europe. We find that south and southeastern European countries view recognition rates as strategic substitutes, whereas the same policies can be strategic complements in northern Europe. Our findings imply that regression frameworks which use cross-country variation to estimate the effects of recognition rates on immigration underestimate (overestimate) the effect if this policy is a strategic substitute (complement).
PB Oxford University Press
SN 1468-2702
SN 1468-2710
YR 2020
FD 2020-12-22
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/129767
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/129767
LA eng
DS Docta Complutense
RD 11 ene 2026