RT Report T1 An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups A1 Cabrales, Antonio A1 Lugo Arocha, Haydeé Corina AB We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels. PB Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico. Universidad Complutense de Madrid YR 2011 FD 2011 LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/48979 UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/48979 LA eng NO Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under grants CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 NO Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation DS Docta Complutense RD 6 abr 2025