RT Report
T1 An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups
A1 Cabrales, Antonio
A1 Lugo Arocha, Haydeé Corina
AB We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.
PB Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico. Universidad Complutense de Madrid
YR 2011
FD 2011
LK https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/48979
UL https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/48979
LA eng
NO Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under grants CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010
NO Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation
DS Docta Complutense
RD 29 abr 2025