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   <dc:title>Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof Pairwise Exchange</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>C71</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>C78</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>D71</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>D78</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Pairwise Exchange</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Individual Rationality</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Constrained Efficiency</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Strategy-Proofness</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Maximal Domain.</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Teoría de la decisión</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Teoría de Juegos</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>1209.04 Teoría y Proceso de decisión</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>1207.06 Teoría de Juegos</dc:subject>
   <dc:description>We analyze centralized non-monetary markets for indivisible objects through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We characterize a family of do- mains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) such that there exist pairwise exchange rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Minimal reversal domains are maximal rich domains for individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy- proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common rank- ing but for a specific pair of objects.</dc:description>
   <dc:description>Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO)</dc:description>
   <dc:description>Fundación Ramón Areces</dc:description>
   <dc:description>Fac. de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales</dc:description>
   <dc:description>Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)</dc:description>
   <dc:description>TRUE</dc:description>
   <dc:description>pub</dc:description>
   <dc:date>2023-06-17T12:24:39Z</dc:date>
   <dc:date>2023-06-17T12:24:39Z</dc:date>
   <dc:date>2021</dc:date>
   <dc:type>technical report</dc:type>
   <dc:identifier>https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/11918</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>2341-2356</dc:identifier>
   <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
   <dc:relation>Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>PID2019-107161GB-C32</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>ECO2016-76818</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>open access</dc:rights>
   <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
   <dc:publisher>Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)</dc:publisher>
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